json/Halakhah/Acharonim/Shev Shmat'ta/English/Sefaria Community Translation.json

{
    "language": "en",
    "title": "Shev Shmat'ta",
    "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org",
    "versionTitle": "Sefaria Community Translation",
    "actualLanguage": "en",
    "languageFamilyName": "english",
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    "direction": "ltr",
    "heTitle": "שב שמעתתא",
    "categories": [
        "Halakhah",
        "Acharonim"
    ],
    "text": {
        "Introduction": [],
        "Shmatta 1": {
            "Subject": [
                "In which will be explained: 1) Doubts on matters of Torah law; 2) Doubt concerning impurity in private versus public domains; 3) Cases of doubt within a doubt."
            ],
            "": [
                [
                    "We hold that a safek isur Torah is asur, and the opinion of the Rambam in his great work [Mishneh Torah] in several places, is that this rule is only mid'rabanan, and that mid'oraisa all case of doubt are mutar. This is also the opinion of the Raavad. But the Ramban and the Rashba argue and they prove that when Chazal say \"you must be stringent on a doubt of Torah prohibiton\", that is mid'oraisa. And the Pri Chadash in Yoreh Deah elaborates on this. See there, section 110.",
                    "But that which the Pri Chadash said, and I quote: \""
                ]
            ]
        },
        "Shmatta 2": {
            "Subject": [],
            "": []
        },
        "Shmatta 3": {
            "Subject": [],
            "": []
        },
        "Shmatta 4": {
            "Subject": [
                "In which will be explained the rules of majority and proximity, majority in monetary cases, and the rule of possession"
            ],
            "": [
                [
                    "We have a tradition [or, it is accepted halacha <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">1</sup><i class=\"footnote\">see https://daf-yomi.com/DYItemDetails.aspx?itemId=13710</i>], that in cases where a majority (rov) conflicts with proximity (karov), we follow the majority. In chapter 2 of Bava Batra.23b it states: R. Chanina said, \"majority and proximity, we follow the majority,\" and even though following the majority is a rule of biblical origin, and following proximity is a rule of biblical origin, the majority takes precedence.  Abaye said, \"We have learned similarly in a mishna (Niddah.17b), blood found in the 'passageway' <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">2</sup><i class=\"footnote\">generally translated as cervical canal of the uterus, but on anatomic grounds it may be preferable to translate as vagina or introitus</i> if of doubtful origin, it is considered to be levitically impure, for there is a strong assumption that it comes from the uterus, even though the 'attic' (generally translated as ovary, but some identify this with the urinary bladder) is closer\". Investigate there.    Rashi on \"the doubtful blood is impure\" explains, \"this doubt is treated as definitely impure, for the  text states, 'there is a strong assumption it comes from the uterus'. <br>This doubt is discussed in the Mishna in Tractate Nidda (Niddah.17b), \"They (the Rabbis) described a woman euphemistically as having a room, passageway, and attic. Blood from the room is impure, and this is the source (i.e. uterus). The Gemara explains that the room is internal, in the thickness of the body posteriorly. The passageway is external towards the 'face' (i.e. surface sexual structures), and the 'attic' is above the two.  Blood from the attic is levitically pure, and there is a small portal open from the attic to the passageway <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">3</sup><i class=\"footnote\">Anatomically it makes more sense to say that the mishna is referring to the urethra, which opens from the urinary bladder into the introitus. However, if we interpret \"attic (aliya)\" as the ovary, then it is difficult to understand the meaning of portal, because there is no portal from the ovary into the cervix. The fallopian tubes do open into the upper uterus, but not into the cervix.</i>. We learned (if blood) is found in the passageway, there is a strong assumption that it came from the source (i.e. uterus) and exited, because most blood is found in the the source. We do not say that it came from the attic and flowed into the passageway via the portal, even though the attic is situated atop the passageway and is closer. Rava said to him (Abaye) you referred to (the combination of) majority and prevalent? No one disagrees (that the combination of majority and prevalent is more powerful than proximity alone). Rashi explained, majority and prevalent, in that uterine blood is more plentiful than blood from the attic, and also that it (uterine blood) exits more frequently. In this case, no one argues with R. Chanina, see there. For R. Hiyya taught (Bava Batra.24a), (for) blood found in the passageway, one is liable upon entry into the temple and eating sacrificial foods [<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">4</sup><i class=\"footnote\"> see https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%98%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%AA_%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%A9_%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%95 </i>] and teruma is burned. Tosafot ad loc (lead words d'tani) writes, if the correct text is AS R. Hiyya taught (i.e. as a proof for the preceding statement of Rava), then it is problematic, how did (Rava) adduce proof from here that it is a case of majority with prevalent, perhaps R. Hiyya stated that we burn teruma not because it is a case of majority and prevalent, but because when majority is contradicted by proximity, we follow the majority, as stated by R. Chanina, see there. ",
                    "It seems reasonable to resolve (Tosafot's question), that Abaye wanted to prove the rule that in cases of majority (rov) vs. proximity (karov) we follow the majority, because we rely on a supposition that blood (in the corridor) derives from the uterus even though the \"attic\" (ovary, or possibly bladder) is closer because perforce the majority of blood deriving from the uterus is greater than the (amount of) blood deriving from the attack. Rava rebutted there because the case (adduced by Abaye) was actually a case of majority (rov) together with prevalent (matzui). That is to say, there is more blood in the source (uterus) than in the attic (ovary, or bladder, see footnote 3 above), and in addition, blood commonly flows from the source than it does from the attic, as explained by the Rashi quoted above (Bava Batra 24a). <br> We establish halacha according to the dictum of Shmuel, who stated in the chapter \"A woman who sees a stain\" (Niddah.57b, chapter 8), a woman is not Biblically impure until she senses the blood flow in her flesh <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">5</sup><i class=\"footnote\">i.e. if she merely sees blood without internal sensation of menstruation, then she is merely Rabbinically impure</i>, and see there that the gemara asks from multiple other mishnayot, and concludes that it (the impurity arising from a stain) is of Rabbinic origin. This is likewise explained in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah chapter 183 (Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De'ah 183). \"A woman who has a discharge of blood from her uterus, whether due to outside factors or purposefully, is impure, on the condition that she felt it escaping.\" Nevertheless, as soon as she feels (the blood) separating from its place and (starting to) leave, she is impure, even if it did not yet emerge, see there. It is only of scribal (Rabbinic) origin that she is impure without sensation. <br> (There is a general rule that) \"whenever (a doubt arises in a) fixed location, it is considered (legally) as half vs. half.\"  If the doubt arises in the fixed location (or possibly, in its usual location), for example we saw a non-Jew purchase from one of the stores <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">6</sup><i class=\"footnote\">The standard case for the law of \"Kol kavua k'mechtza al mechtza dami\" is a plaza with 9 butchershops selling kosher meat, and one butchershop selling non-kosher meat. If we see the non-Jew purchasing meat from one of the shops, but do not see which butchershop he entered, the we disregard the majority, interpret the case as being half and half, and the meat is not permissible. However, if we a find a piece of meat in the plaza, then the meat is permitted, because most of the shops sell kosher meat.</i>, the (rule of) \"fixed location\" also applies, as written by Tosafot in chapter \"Sciatic nerve\" ( lead words \"hacha nami\" Tosafot on Chullin 95a:7), and Rashba and Ran wrote similarly ad loc, as did the Tur ( Tur, Yoreh Deah 110:1 ), and the Rama (Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De'ah.110) also rules this way. The rule of \"a fixed location is as half against half\" is applied whether (it results in) a leniency or stringency, and therefore, from that which R. Hiyya taught that for (impurity caused by) blood found in the corridor there is liability (for bringing an \"oleh v'yored\" sacrifice) upon entering the temple, and since R. Hiyya holds that the impurity is of Biblical origin (otherwise there would be no liability to bring a sacrifice), we are unable to say the ruling is attributable to a preference for majority over proximity, that blood from the source is more plentiful than blood from the attic. Since Torah law impurity is impossible without (internal) sensation, and since she felt blood starting to escape from her flesh, but did not know whether it was coming from the source or the attic, it is (considered  ) a case of the the doubt arising in the fixed location, and the rule of \"fixed location is as half vs. half\" applies <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">7</sup><i class=\"footnote\">Thus we cannot legally ascribe the blood to uterine blood, and must apply other criteria (in this case \"prevalent\" (matzui) in order to declare the woman impure.</i>. Perforce, the reason (that she is impure) is because blood more commonly flows from the source, and likewise in the Mishna (Niddah.17b) which taught that there is a strong presumption that the blood is from the source, the reason is because of the (combination of) majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui). This indeed is proven from the baraita of R. Hiyya (but not from the mishna), for the mishna which taught that there is a strong presumption that the blood is from the source could be interpreted as referring to a Rabbinic impurity without sensation (of internal flow), due to the majority of blood being in the source (uterus), as was established for several Mishnayot in chapter \"Haroah\" (Mishnah Niddah.8, relevant gemara Niddah.57b) that they refer to Rabbinic impurity. But from (the statement of) R. Hiyya, which perforce refers to Biblical impurity as implied by the liability for entering the temple (in a state of impurity), and therefore (the blood flow was accompanied by) sensation (of internal flow), and the doubt (as to the source of the blood flow) originates in the fixed location, (the reason for impurity) must be established as arising from the fact that blood flows more commonly (from the uterus), and the rule of \"fixed location\" does not apply (to prevalent / matzui).  The reason for impurity is therefor the combination of majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui) and there is no one who disagrees (with the statement that the combination of majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui) is more powerful that proximity (karov). ",
                    "Even though the majority (of blood) is not relevant (by itself) because sensation (of flow) transforms the analysis into \"fixed location is as half vs. half\", in any event together with prevalent (matzui) we append also the majority. The Shach wrote similarly in Yoreh Deah (Siftei Kohen #23 on Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De'ah 110.4 ), see there in the Shach OBM <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">8</sup><i class=\"footnote\">In the case of meat purchased (as opposed to being found in the street) from one of ten stores, where 9 sell kosher meat, and 1 sells non-kosher meat, and then this piece of doubtful meat was inadvertently mixed with other definitely kosher meat, the Shulchan Aruch writes that the mixture is permissible by reason of double doubt: There is one doubt that any piece of meat in the mixture is from the definitely kosher meat or the doubtful purchased meat, and a second doubt that even if it was from the purchased meat, perhaps the purchased meat itself was actually purchased from a kosher shop and is kosher.  The Acharonim comment that it should be considered as a single doubt because the purchased meat is forbidden by the \"fixed location\" (kavua) rule, and the Rama says that after applying the law of \"fixed location\", the purchased meat becomes Biblically forbidden, since \"fixed location\" is a Torah derived rule. Shach explains that the \"fixed location\" rule is a novelty, and therefore only applies when it is the sole consideration. However, it cannot be used when there are other doubts to be considered, and therefore once we cancel out the \"fixed location\" rule, we view the purchased meat as coming from one of the 10 stores, 90% of which sell kosher meat, and the rule of double doubt can apply.</i>. And even though the rule of a double doubt does not apply where one doubt is in the body of the item itself (e.g. whether the purchased meat is kosher or not) and one (the second) doubt is with respect to the admixture, because the first  doubt is forbidden by Torah law (by application of the \"fixed location\" / kavua rule), (the Shach responds) that the law of \"fixed location\" is a novel rule, for in all cases we (would otherwise) follow the majority, as the Ran wrote. (Therefore) you cannot apply \"fixed location\" except in its specific case, which is when it is applied by itself, and not when it has been mixed (with other permitted items), see there. Similarly here, even though the majority (of blood being in the uterus) by itself is not helpful because we apply the rule of \"fixed location is as half vs. half\", (but) since (\"fixed location\") is a novel law, it (the majority of blood) combines with the prevalent principle (matzui) to overrule proximity (karov). The gist of Rava's proof is that (the impurity) is not because of the majority of blood (being in the uterus) as per Abaye's reasoning, but rather because of prevalent (matzui), and prevalent is joined by the majority of blood (to overrule proximity) even though there is a potential (conflicting) application of the \"fixed location\" rule, as I have written above.  ",
                    "With this the discussion there (Bava Batra.24b) is explained. Rava stated, we can make three conclusions from R. Hiyya's teaching: 1) in cases of majority (rov) conflicting with proximity (karov), we rule according to the majority.  2) Majority (rov) is a Biblical rule. 3) We follow the ruling of R. Zera <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">9</sup><i class=\"footnote\">R. Zera's ruling is discussed in the gemara on BB 24a.</i>. The talmud asks, but wasn't Rava the one who said that (the case of blood found in the corridor) was a case of majority and prevalent, with which no one argues (that the combination is more potent than proximity)? The talmud answers, Rava retracted from that statement (and concludes that even majority alone, without prevalent, is more potent than proximity). Tosafot there (Tosafot on Bava Batra 24a:5, lead words Ruba d'oraita) regarding \"majority\" is a Biblical rule, this refers to a majority which is not in front of us  <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">10</sup><i class=\"footnote\">\"Ruba d'leta kaman\" is most easily explained as a majority which is not actually counted, but is assumed as common knowledge. In this case, as explained by the author in paragraph 5 below, the fact that bleeding occurs more commonly from the uterus than the \"attic\" is an assumed majority rather than a counted majority. In some places, this seems to be described as a form of chazaka, a strong assumption.</i> For with respect to a majority which is in front of us <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">11</sup><i class=\"footnote\">\"Ruba d'ita kaman\", a majority which is actually counted, e.g. 36 out of 71 judges in the Great Sanhedrin, or 9 out of 10 butcher shops selling kosher meat.</i> we have no need (of proof from R. Hiyya), for it is an explicit verse, \"you shall favor the majority\" (Exodus.23.2) <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">12</sup><i class=\"footnote\">This is a more literal translation. The Koren and JPS translations are modified to follow one of the rabbinic interpretations, but our author is using the literal translation to support his argument.</i>. It is possible to ask how is it proven from R. Hiyya regarding a majority that is not in front of us, since the blood of the uterus is (obviously) more copious than the blood of the attic, and this would definitely be considered a majority that is in front of us?",
                    "According to what I have written above, it seems that after Rava retracted from this interpretation (of the mishna in Niddah, discussed in the gemara on Bava Batra 23b) that \"no one disagrees that the combination of majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui) is more powerful than proximity (karov)\", he (instead) thought that even in a case with combined majority and prevalent, if we were to hold that proximity is more powerful than majority alone, then (proximity would also) be more powerful than the combination of majority and prevalent. If so, then it is possible to prove from R. Hiyya's statement that in cases of majority vs. proximity, we follow the majority, except that the majority here is not the majority of blood in the uterus (as understood by Abaye), for since R. Hiyya's statement perforce deals with a case where the woman felt her blood flood start, it is as if it separated in front of us, which converts to a case of (any \"fixed location\" is) as half and half, rather<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">13</sup><i class=\"footnote\">there is a typo here in the Sefaria hebrew text, it should say אלא הרוב, as seen in Shmat'ta Mevueret edition. The text as written does not make sense.) </i> is because bleeding more commonly occurs from the uterus (than from the attic), and this is a majority which is not in front of us, similar to other majorities of this kind, such as \"most animals are not treifot\" and other similar cases of a majority which is not in front of us. "
                ],
                [
                    "In chapter 2, Niddah.18a, R. Yohanan says, \"In three places, the sages followed the majority and made them as definite: uterus<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">1</sup><i class=\"footnote\">i.e. blood found in the \"corridor\" (cervix, or introitus) causes the woman to be considered as definitely impure even though the blood might possibly not have come from the uterus</i>, afterbirth<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">2</sup><i class=\"footnote\">if a woman discharges an empty sac, she is considered definitely impure from birthing, because we assume that there was a fetus, but it decomposed</i>, and (body) part<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">3</sup><i class=\"footnote\">similarly if a woman discharges a body part such as a hand, she is considered definitely impure from birthing, because we assume that there was a fetus, but it decomposed</i>. The Gemara asks, \"And are there no more? Is there not also the case of nine stores selling (properly) slaughtered meat and one store selling non-slaughtered meat, and (he) bought from one (of the stores), but does not know from which store he bought, the doubtful meat is forbidden, but if the meat was found (in the street), then we follow the majority (and the meat is permitted for eating).\" Tosafot ad loc (leading words \"achar harov\") says, here there is a strong assumption (chazakah) opposing the majority, because an animal is presumed forbidden (until we know it has been properly slaughtered). For if there were no strong assumption opposing the majority, the question would not be valid, for we could say that R. Yohanan was only enumerating cases in which there is a strong assumption (chazakah) opposing the majority. ",
                    "It is apparent from their words that in similar situations there is a strong assumption (chazaka) of (the meat being) non-slaughtered. We have a doubt whether this piece (of meat) is non-slaughtered (nevelah), and (because) it previously (i.e. while still alive) was in a non-slaughtered state, except that since majority (9 out of 10 stores) takes precedence over strong assumption (chazaka). Accordingly in a mixture of two pieces of meat, one (kosher) slaughtered and one non-slaughtered, it would be <i>definitely</i> forbidden because each piece has a strong assumption of being non-slaughtered <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">2</sup><i class=\"footnote\">because the chazaka of being non-slaughtered existed before slaughtering, and because there is no majority (rov) to counteract the chazaka</i>.   In Menachot.23a R. Hisda said, \"non-slaughtered meat (nevelah) becomes nullified (if mixed in a larger amount of) properly slaughtered meat, for slaughtered meat cannot become nevelah (in terms of transmitting levitical impurity by being carried), but slaughtered meat is NOT nullified in (a larger amount of) non-slaughtered meat because nevelah CAN become as slaughtered meat (in terms of impurity) for when the non-slaughtered meat becomes rotten to the point of not being edible, the impurity flies away. Rashi explains regarding slaughtered meat not being nullified in non-slaughtered meat, that if there were two pieces of nevelah, and one piece of slaughtered meat mixed in, (the slaughtered meat) is not nullified, and if one of the pieces of meat touches Teruma (heave offering), it is (considered impure, but) not to be burnt <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">3</sup><i class=\"footnote\">Teruma which becomes impure on a biblical level must be burnt. In this case, however, since the teruma may have touched only the kosher meat, which does not impart impurity, it cannot be burnt, because it is not definitely impure. On the other hand, if we had said that the kosher meat IS nullified by the nevelah meat, then we would have viewed all the meat as nevelah, and teruma would need to be burned.</i>. Tosafot (on the other hand), explained that when the meat mixture has a fixed location in a public location, and it is not known which piece of meat touched the teruma, the doubtful teruma is considered levitically pure <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">4</sup><i class=\"footnote\">For doubt in a fixed location (i.e. Kavua) is considered as half vs. half. We then apply the standard rule of doubtful impurity in a public place, and it is considered pure.  This rule is derived from Sotah.  Public location for this rule only requires 3 people, and not the public area as defined for the Sabbath. This explanation is as per Shmait'ta Mevueret, by R. Moshe Leib Look</i>.",
                    "There is difficulty in this (statement of Tosafot) that when a piece of nevelah is mixed with a single piece of kosher meat, both are considered definitely forbidden because of the strong assumption (i.e. chazaka of maintaining the pre-existing forbidden status) that it was not slaughtered in a kosher manner. Similarly, it is established law (Shevuot.47b) that two sets of witnesses who contradict one another with respect to one testimony, each set remains established in its pre-existing chazaka of being kosher witnesses (despite the obvious conclusion that one of the sets has just testified falsely).  If so (that we accept Tosafot's contention that the chazaka of being non-slaughtered is maintained), what then are the practical ramifications of the statement (by R. Hisda) that kosher slaughtered meat is not nullified in (a larger quantity of) non-slaughtered meat? Even if the kosher meat was mixed with just a single piece of non-kosher meat we would consider both pieces of meat as definitely non-slaughtered because of the pre-existing chazaka of being non-slaughtered!<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">5</sup><i class=\"footnote\">If the kosher meat mixed one on one with nevelah meat transmits impurity because of the chazaka of being unslaughtered, then certainly if one piece of kosher meat mixed in two pieces of nevelah meat will transmit impurity. This would apply even in public locations, because according to the understanding of Tosafot, the chazaka of being non-slaughtered causes us to treat all the pieces of meat as <b>definite</b> nevela and not as doubtful, and therefore the rule of treating doubtful impurity in public places as pure does not apply.</i>",
                    "We cannot resolve the difficulty by saying that the chazaka (strong assumption) of being non-slaughtered is applied only with respect to the issue of kashruth for eating, but with respect to the laws of impurity, there is no strong assumption (of being non-slaughtered). For in Chullin.9a <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">6</sup><i class=\"footnote\">Text says Chullin 10, but pagination of the Talmud has changed with editions. The author, R. Heller ZT\"L passed away in 1812, but the Vilna Shas did not start appearing until the 1870's.</i> in a case of a butcher who did not check the signs (trachea and esophagus, for evidence of possible incorrect slaughtering), there is a dispute between two Amoraim, one opinion saying that the chazaka (of not having been slaughtered) applies only to being forbidden for eating, but not with respect to impurity (of nevelah), but we establish the law according to the opinion that the animal imparts impurity by carrying (as with any nevelah <sup class=\"footnote-marker\">7</sup><i class=\"footnote\">This applies to domesticated animals and wild animals, whether kosher or non-kosher, but not to birds or \"sherazim\" - smaller creeping animals</i>). So also writes the Rif (Rabbenu Yitzhak Alfasi, topics/rif) there (in Chullin). Even according to the (other) opinion that (meat from an unchecked shechita slaughtering) does not impart ritual impurity, Tosafot explained that most times the ritual slaughter was done properly and the meat is permitted by Biblical law, and therefore (the Rabbis) were not stringent to apply the status of nevelah (and make it impart impurity. It is understood that if there was a (true) Biblical doubt (regarding validity of slaughtering) it WOULD impart impurity accoring to all opinions, because of the (prior) chazaka (strong assumption) of being non-slaughtered, and any (dead animal) that has not been properly slaughtered  imparts impurity by carrying. That being the case, (the author reiterates,) what are the practical ramifications of the statement (by R. Hisda) that kosher slaughtered meat is not nullified in (a larger quantity of) non-slaughtered meat? Even in the public domain, any meat which is assumed by chazaka to be non-slaughtered will impart impurity!",
                    "Therefore it appears that Tosafot (Niddah.18a) applies the chazaka (strong assumption) of meat being non-slaughtered only when one piece of meat separated (from the butcher shops). Since it was never clarified for this piece of meat whether it had escaped from its chazaka of being non-slaughtered, we apply (i.e. it keeps) the chazaka of its original (non-slaughtered) state. However, with respect to a piece of nevelah (non-slaughtered animal) that became mixed one-to-one with a piece of (kosher) slaughtered meat, since it has been clarified already that one of the (two) pieces was properly slaughtered, and it had left the prior status of being non-slaughtered, except that we don't know which piece (was properly slaughtered), in this case we do NOT apply the chazaka of being non-slaughtered, since one of the pieces definitely left that status. \n"
                ]
            ]
        },
        "Shmatta 5": {
            "Subject": [],
            "": []
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        "Shmatta 6": {
            "Subject": [],
            "": []
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        "Shmatta 7": {
            "Subject": [],
            "": []
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