json/Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/Mishnah Keritot/English/William Davidson Edition - English.json

{
    "language": "en",
    "title": "Mishnah Keritot",
    "versionSource": "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1",
    "versionTitle": "William Davidson Edition - English",
    "status": "locked",
    "priority": 2.0,
    "license": "CC-BY-NC",
    "versionNotes": "English from The William Davidson digital edition of the <a href='https://www.korenpub.com/koren_en_usd/koren/talmud/koren-talmud-bavli-no.html'>Koren Noé Talmud</a>, with commentary by <a href='/adin-even-israel-steinsaltz'>Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz</a>",
    "shortVersionTitle": "Koren - Steinsaltz",
    "actualLanguage": "en",
    "languageFamilyName": "english",
    "isBaseText": false,
    "isSource": false,
    "direction": "ltr",
    "heTitle": "משנה כריתות",
    "categories": [
        "Mishnah",
        "Seder Kodashim"
    ],
    "text": [
        [
            "There are <b>thirty-six</b> cases <b>in the Torah</b> with regard to which one who performs a prohibited action intentionally is liable to receive <b>excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>].</b> They are: <b>One who engages in sexual intercourse with</b> his <b>mother; or with the wife of</b> his <b>father,</b> even if she is not his mother; <b>or with</b> his <b>daughter-in-law.</b> The same punishment is imposed on a man <b>who engages in intercourse with</b> another <b>male [<i>hazekhur</i>], or</b> who copulates <b>with an animal; and a woman who brings an animal upon her</b> to engage in bestiality. The same punishment is imposed on <b>one who engages in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, or</b> with <b>a married woman.</b> The same punishment is imposed on <b>one who engages in intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with the wife of his father’s brother, or with the wife of his mother’s brother, or with a menstruating woman.</b> <b>And</b> these too are liable to receive <i>karet</i>: <b>One who blasphemes</b> the name of Heaven, <b>and</b> one who <b>worships an idol, and one who gives of his children to <i>Molekh</i></b> (see Leviticus 20:1–5), <b>and a necromancer, and</b> one who <b>desecrates Shabbat. And</b> the same is the punishment of <b>one who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial</b> food; <b>and one who enters the Temple</b> while <b>ritually impure; and one who eats</b> forbidden <b>fat, or</b> consumes <b>blood, or</b> eats meat <b>left over from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption [<i>notar</i>], or</b> eats meat of <b>an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>]; and one who slaughters</b> offerings <b>and offers</b> them <b>up outside</b> the Temple. <b>And</b> these too are liable to receive <i>karet</i>: <b>One who eats leavened bread on Passover, and one who eats or performs</b> prohibited <b>labor on Yom Kippur. And</b> the same is the punishment of <b>one who blends the</b> anointing <b>oil</b> according to the specifications of the oil prepared by Moses in the wilderness (see Exodus 30:22–33); <b>and one who blends the incense</b> according to the specifications of the incense used in the Temple service for purposes other than use in the Temple; <b>and one who applies the anointing oil</b> to his skin. <b>And</b> one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for failure to fulfill the mitzva of bringing <b>the Paschal offering and the</b> mitzva of <b>circumcision,</b> which unlike the cases of prohibitions enumerated in the mishna, are <b>positive mitzvot.</b>",
            "<b>For</b> any of <b>these</b> prohibitions, one is <b>liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> for its intentional</b> violation <b>and</b> to bring <b>a sin offering for its unwitting</b> violation. <b>And for their</b> violation in a case where it is <b>unknown</b> to him whether or not he transgressed, he is liable to bring <b>a provisional guilt offering,</b> which provides provisional atonement until he discovers whether or not he transgressed. This is the <i>halakha</i> for all of the transgressions listed above <b>except for one who defiles the Temple,</b> i.e., he enters the Temple while ritually impure, <b>or</b> partakes of <b>its consecrated items</b> while ritually impure. In these cases he does not bring a provisional guilt offering <b>because he is</b> obligated <b>to</b> bring <b>a sliding-scale</b> offering for a definite transgression. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> The <i>halakha</i> is the same <b>even</b> with regard to <b>the one who blasphemes, as it is stated</b> with regard to the sin offering: <b>“You shall have one law for him who performs the action unwittingly”</b> (Numbers 15:29), <b>excluding</b> one who <b>blasphemes, as he does not perform an action</b> but sins with speech.",
            "<b>There are</b> some women who <b>bring</b> a sin <b>offering</b> of a woman after childbirth <b>and</b> the offering <b>is eaten</b> by the priests. <b>And there are</b> some women who <b>bring</b> a sin <b>offering but it is not eaten. And</b> there are <b>some</b> women who <b>do not bring</b> a sin offering at all. The mishna elaborates: The following women <b>bring</b> a sin <b>offering and it is eaten</b> by the priests: <b>One who miscarries</b> a fetus with a form <b>similar to a domesticated animal,</b> one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to <b>an undomesticated animal, or</b> one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to <b>a bird;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say:</b> She does not bring a sin offering <b>unless</b> the fetus <b>has the form of a person.</b> With regard to a woman <b>who miscarries a sandal</b> fetus, i.e., one that has the form of a flat fish; <b>or</b> if she miscarries the <b>placenta; or an amniotic sac</b> in which <b>tissue developed; or</b> a fetus <b>that emerged cut,</b> i.e., in pieces; <b>and likewise</b> a Canaanite <b>maidservant,</b> owned by a Jew, <b>who miscarried;</b> in all these cases <b>she brings</b> a sin <b>offering and it is eaten</b> by the priests.",
            "<b>And these</b> women <b>bring</b> sin offerings <b>but</b> their sin offerings <b>are not eaten: One who miscarries and does not know</b> the nature of <b>what she miscarried; and two women who miscarried,</b> in a case where <b>one</b> miscarried a fetus <b>of a type</b> for which a woman is <b>exempt</b> from bringing an offering <b>and</b> the other <b>one</b> miscarried a fetus <b>of a type</b> for which a woman is <b>liable</b> to bring an offering, and they do not know which miscarried which type. <b>Rabbi Yosei said: When</b> is their sin offering not eaten? It is <b>when</b> both women <b>went</b> to different places within the Temple to bring their offerings, e.g., <b>this</b> woman went <b>to the east and that</b> woman went <b>to the west. But if both of them were standing</b> together, <b>both of them</b> together <b>bring</b> one sin <b>offering, and it is eaten.</b>",
            "<b>These</b> women <b>do not bring</b> a sin offering: A woman <b>who miscarries an amniotic sac full of water,</b> or one <b>full of blood,</b> or one <b>full of</b> different <b>colors;</b> and likewise a woman <b>who miscarries</b> a fetus with a form <b>similar to fish, or grasshoppers, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals;</b> and a woman <b>who miscarries</b> on the <b>fortieth day</b> of her pregnancy; <b>and</b> a woman who gives birth by <b>caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon deems</b> a woman <b>liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>in</b> the case where she gives birth by <b>caesarean section.</b>",
            "A woman who gives birth to a daughter counts fourteen days during which she is ritually impure. That is followed by sixty-six days during which she remains ritually pure even if she experiences a flow of blood. The Torah obligates a woman to bring her offering on the eighty-first day (see Leviticus 12:1–6). If the woman miscarries another fetus before that day, she is not required to bring an additional offering. In the case of a woman <b>who miscarries</b> a fetus <b>on the night of,</b> i.e., preceding, <b>the eighty-first</b> day, <b>Beit Shammai deem</b> her <b>exempt from</b> bringing a second <b>offering and Beit Hillel deem</b> her <b>liable</b> to bring a second offering. <b>Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: What is different</b> between the <b>night of the eighty-first and</b> the <b>day of the eighty-first? If they are equal with regard to</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>ritual impurity,</b> i.e., the blood flow of this woman on the eighty-first night renders her ritually impure and all the standard strictures of ritual impurity apply to her, <b>will</b> the two time periods <b>not be equal with regard to</b> liability to bring an additional <b>offering</b> as well? <b>Beit Shammai said to</b> Beit Hillel: <b>No,</b> there is a difference between that night and the following day. <b>If you said with regard to</b> a woman <b>who miscarries</b> on the <b>eighty-first day</b> that she is obligated to bring an additional offering, this is logical, <b>as she emerged into a period that is fit</b> for <b>her to bring</b> her <b>offering.</b> Would you <b>say</b> the same <b>with regard to</b> a woman <b>who miscarries on the night of</b> the <b>eighty-first</b> day, <b>where she did not emerge into a period that is fit</b> for <b>her to bring</b> her <b>offering,</b> as offerings are not sacrificed at night? <b>Beit Hillel said to</b> Beit Shammai: <b>But let</b> the case of a woman <b>who miscarries on</b> the <b>eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat prove</b> that this distinction is incorrect, <b>as she did not emerge into a period that is fit</b> for <b>her to bring</b> her <b>offering</b> because individual offerings are not sacrificed on Shabbat, <b>and</b> nevertheless <b>she is obligated to bring</b> an additional <b>offering.</b> <b>Beit Shammai said to</b> Beit Hillel: <b>No,</b> there is a difference between these cases. <b>If you said</b> this ruling with regard to a woman <b>who miscarries on</b> the <b>eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat,</b> the reason is <b>that although</b> Shabbat <b>is unfit for</b> the sacrifice of <b>an individual offering,</b> it is <b>fit for</b> the sacrifice of <b>a communal offering</b> whose time is fixed, e.g., the daily offering. Would you <b>say</b> the same <b>with regard to</b> a woman <b>who miscarries on the night of</b> the <b>eighty-first</b> day, <b>as the night is completely unfit,</b> since <b>neither an individual offering nor a communal offering</b> is sacrificed at night? Beit Shammai add: <b>And</b> as for the ritual impurity status of <b>the blood,</b> i.e., Beit Hillel’s opinion that the two time periods are equal with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity, this <b>does not prove</b> what the <i>halakha</i> should be with regard to offerings, <b>as</b> with regard to a woman <b>who miscarries</b> before the <b>completion</b> of the term of eighty days, <b>her blood is impure</b> like the blood of a woman after childbirth, and nevertheless <b>she is exempt from</b> bringing <b>the offering.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>a woman who has in her</b> case <b>uncertainty</b> concerning <b>five births, and</b> likewise a woman with regard to whom there is <b>uncertainty</b> concerning <b>five</b> irregular <b>discharges</b> of blood from the uterus [<i>ziva</i>], <b>she brings one offering, and</b> then <b>she may partake of</b> the meat of <b>offerings. And the remaining</b> offerings <b>are not an obligation for her.</b> If she experienced <b>five definite discharges of a <i>zava</i> or five definite births, she brings one offering, and</b> then <b>she may partake of</b> the meat of <b>offerings. And the remaining</b> offerings <b>are an obligation for her.</b> There was <b>an incident where</b> the price of <b>nests,</b> i.e., pairs of birds, <b>stood in Jerusalem at one gold dinar,</b> as the great demand for birds for the offerings of a woman after childbirth and a <i>zava</i> led to an increase in the price. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said:</b> I swear by <b>this abode</b> of the Divine Presence that <b>I will not lie</b> down <b>tonight until</b> the price of nests <b>will be in</b> silver <b>dinars. Ultimately, he entered the court and taught: A woman who has in her</b> case <b>five definite discharges of a <i>zava</i> or five definite births brings one offering, and</b> then <b>she may partake of</b> the meat of <b>offerings. And the remaining</b> offerings <b>are not an obligation for her. And</b> as a result, the price of the <b>nests stood that day at one-quarter</b> of a silver dinar, as the demand for nests decreased."
        ],
        [
            "There are <b>four</b> individuals whose halakhic status is defined as: <b>Lacking atonement [<i>khappara</i>],</b> which means they had been in a state of ritual impurity and underwent rituals to purify themselves, but since they have not yet brought the requisite atonement offering to complete the purification process, they may not partake of sacrificial meat. <b>And</b> there are also <b>four</b> individuals who <b>bring</b> an offering <b>for an intentional</b> transgression in the same manner <b>as</b> they do for <b>an unwitting</b> transgression. <b>And these are</b> the four individuals <b>who lack atonement: The man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>], the woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>], the woman after childbirth, and the leper.</b> In all four of these cases, although the individual has completed all of the other steps of the purification process, the process is not complete until the atonement offering has been brought. <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: A convert</b> also <b>lacks atonement,</b> even after he has been circumcised and has immersed in a ritual bath, <b>until</b> the priest <b>sprinkles the blood</b> of his offering on the altar <b>on his</b> behalf. <b>A nazirite</b> also lacks atonement <b>with regard to his</b> permission for drinking <b>wine, and cutting his hair, and his</b> exposure to <b>ritual impurity</b> imparted by a corpse, until his offerings are sacrificed.",
            "<b>These</b> individuals <b>bring</b> an offering <b>for an intentional</b> transgression in the same manner <b>as</b> they do for <b>an unwitting</b> transgression: <b>One who engages in intercourse with</b> an espoused <b>maidservant,</b> who is liable to bring a guilt offering (see Leviticus 19:20–22); <b>and a nazirite who became ritually impure,</b> who is required to bring a sheep as a guilt offering and two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering (see Numbers 6:9–12); <b>and</b> one who falsely takes <b>the oath of testimony,</b> asserting that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue (see Leviticus 5:1); <b>and</b> one who falsely takes <b>the oath on a deposit,</b> asserting that an item belonging to another is not in his possession (see Leviticus 5:21–26).",
            "There are <b>five</b> individuals who <b>bring one offering for several transgressions,</b> i.e., for violating the same transgression several times; <b>and</b> there are <b>five</b> individuals who <b>bring a sliding-scale offering,</b> which is determined based on the financial status of the sinner. <b>These</b> are the five individuals who <b>bring one offering for several transgressions:</b> First, <b>one who engages in several</b> acts of <b>intercourse with</b> an espoused <b>maidservant, and</b> second, <b>a nazirite who became ritually impure</b> due to <b>several</b> instances <b>of</b> contact with <b>ritual impurity.</b> The mishna continues to list the five situations in which one offering is brought to atone for several transgressions: Third, <b>one who issues a warning to his wife</b> declaring himself jealous <b>with regard to several</b> different <b>men</b> with whom he suspects her of committing adultery, and forbidding her to be alone with them. If the wife was then found separately in seclusion with each of the men, he brings her to the Temple with one single meal offering of jealousy. <b>And</b> fourth, <b>a leper who was afflicted</b> with <b>several</b> instances of <b>leprosy,</b> meaning that he was purified from his leprosy, and before he brought his offerings, he suffered a relapse of the leprosy. When he is finally purified, he brings only one set of offerings. If a leper <b>brought</b> the two requisite <b>birds</b> on the first day of his purification (see Leviticus 14:4–7), <b>and</b> prior to bringing his offerings on the eighth day of his purification he <b>was afflicted</b> with a relapse of leprosy, those birds <b>do not satisfy his obligation until he brings his sin offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he brings his guilt offering.</b>",
            "The mishna continues with the last of the five situations in which one offering is brought to atone for several transgressions: <b>A woman who gave birth to several offspring.</b> This is a case where a woman gave birth to a daughter, after which she is ritually impure for fourteen days and then enters a period of sixty-six days of ritual purity, even if she experiences uterine bleeding. Nevertheless, during this interim period, she is still somewhat impure, and it is therefore prohibited for her to enter the Temple or to partake of consecrated food, and at the end of the period she must bring an offering. <b>And</b> during those days of ritual purity, <b>she</b> became pregnant again and then <b>miscarried a female</b> fetus <b>within</b> the <b>eighty</b> days, <b>and then</b> became pregnant <b>again and miscarried</b> another <b>female</b> fetus <b>within eighty</b> days of the first miscarriage. In this situation, when she ultimately completes her process of purification, she brings one single offering for all the births and miscarriages. <b>And</b> a similar <i>halakha</i> applies to a woman <b>who miscarries multiple</b> fetuses from a single pregnancy at different points in time, miscarrying each fetus before completing the purification period of forty days for a male or eighty days for a female for the previous fetus. When she finally completes her process of purification, she brings one single offering for all of the miscarriages. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> In these cases, a single offering does not suffice for all the births or miscarriages. Rather, <b>she brings</b> an offering <b>for the first</b> birth or miscarriage and <b>does not bring</b> an offering <b>for the second</b> miscarriage, as it took place before the completion of the purification period for the first. <b>She</b> then <b>brings</b> an offering <b>for the third</b> miscarriage <b>and does not bring</b> an offering <b>for the fourth</b> fetus, as it was miscarried before the completion of the purification period for the third fetus.<br><b>These</b> are the five situations mentioned in the mishna (9a) in which one <b>brings a sliding-scale offering: For hearing the voice</b> of an oath, i.e., where one took a false oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; <b>and for</b> the <b>utterance of the lips,</b> which is a case where one took a false oath about a different matter; <b>and for</b> the <b>defiling of</b> the <b>Temple,</b> by entering it while ritually impure, <b>or</b> defiling <b>its sacrificial</b> foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure; <b>and a woman after childbirth; and a leper</b> at the end of his purification process.<br><b>What are</b> the differences <b>between</b> an espoused <b>maidservant and all those</b> others <b>with whom relations are forbidden?</b> The difference is <b>that</b> the status of the maidservant <b>is not equal to their</b> status, <b>neither with regard to punishment nor with regard to an offering, as</b> one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with <b>any of those with whom relations are forbidden</b> is liable <b>to</b> bring <b>a sin offering, and</b> by contrast, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused <b>maidservant</b> is liable <b>to</b> bring <b>a guilt offering.</b> One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with <b>any of those with whom relations are forbidden</b> brings <b>a female</b> animal, <b>and</b> one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused <b>maidservant</b> brings <b>a male</b> animal, as a sin offering is a female and a guilt offering is a male. <br>Furthermore, with regard to engaging in intercourse with <b>any of those with whom relations are forbidden, both the man and the woman are equal with regard to</b> liability to receive <b>lashes</b> if they were forewarned, <b>and with regard to</b> liability to bring <b>an offering</b> if they did so unwittingly. <b>And in</b> the case of one who engages in intercourse with <b>a maidservant,</b> the Torah <b>did not equate the man with the woman with regard to lashes,</b> as she alone is flogged, as will be explained, <b>and</b> the Torah <b>did not equate the woman with the man with regard to</b> bringing <b>an offering,</b> as she does not bring an offering. <br><b>With regard to</b> intercourse with <b>any of those with whom relations are forbidden,</b> the Torah <b>rendered</b> the halakhic status of <b>one who engages in the initial stage</b> of intercourse [<i>hame’areh</i>] to be <b>like</b> that of one who <b>completes</b> the act, <b>and one is liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>for each and every</b> act of <b>intercourse</b> that he performs unwittingly. By contrast, in the case of relations with an espoused maidservant, one is liable only for completing the act of intercourse, and the man brings a single offering for several transgressions. <br><b>This is a stringency</b> that the Torah <b>imposed with regard to the maidservant</b> relative to other individuals with whom relations are forbidden: <br><b>That</b> the Torah <b>established her</b> status so that <b>the</b> one who engages in intercourse with her <b>intentionally is like the</b> one who does so <b>unwittingly,</b> as both are liable to bring a guilt offering, whereas one who engages in intercourse with those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering only when he does so unwittingly.",
            "<b>Who is</b> the espoused <b>maidservant</b> in question? It is <b>any</b> woman <b>who is half-maidservant half-free woman,</b> i.e., a maidservant who belonged to two masters, one of whom liberated her, <b>as it is stated: “And she was redeemed and not redeemed”</b> (Leviticus 19:20), which means that she was partially but not completely redeemed. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yishmael says:</b> An espoused maidservant is a full-fledged <b>maidservant</b> whose status is <b>certain,</b> as the language of the verse does not mean redeemed and not redeemed; it is simply a way of stating that she was not redeemed. <b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: All those with whom relations are forbidden</b> are <b>enumerated</b> in the Torah, <b>and we have no exception other than one who is half-maidservant half-free woman.</b>",
            "This mishna cites an additional difference between the status of an espoused maidservant and the status of forbidden relatives. In <b>all</b> cases of intercourse with <b>those with whom relations are forbidden,</b> if <b>one is an adult and one is a minor,</b> the <b>minor is exempt;</b> if <b>one is awake and one is sleeping,</b> the <b>sleeping</b> one is <b>exempt;</b> if <b>one</b> commits the act <b>unwittingly and one</b> does so <b>intentionally,</b> the one who did so <b>unwittingly</b> is liable <b>to</b> bring <b>a sin offering and</b> the one who did so <b>intentionally</b> is liable to be punished <b>with <i>karet</i>.</b> By contrast, in a case of intercourse with an espoused maidservant, the man is liable to bring a guilt offering only if the woman is flogged, and that is the case only if she was an adult, awake, and committed the sin intentionally."
        ],
        [
            "If witnesses <b>said to</b> a person: We saw that <b>you ate</b> forbidden <b>fat,</b> he is liable to <b>bring a sin offering</b> if he did so unwittingly. If <b>a witness says: He ate</b> forbidden fat, <b>and a witness says: He did not eat</b> forbidden fat, or if <b>a woman says: He ate</b> forbidden fat, <b>and a woman says: He did not eat</b> forbidden fat, he is liable to <b>bring a provisional guilt offering,</b> brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. If <b>a witness says: He ate</b> forbidden fat, <b>and</b> the person himself <b>says: I did not eat</b> forbidden fat, he is <b>exempt.</b> If <b>two</b> witnesses <b>say: He ate</b> forbidden fat, <b>and</b> the person himself <b>says: I did not eat</b> forbidden fat, <b>Rabbi Meir deems</b> him <b>liable</b> to bring a sin offering. <b>Rabbi Meir said:</b> This conclusion can be derived <i>a fortiori</i>: <b>If two</b> witnesses could have <b>brought him</b> liability <b>to</b> receive the <b>severe</b> punishment of <b>death,</b> can <b>they not bring him</b> liability <b>to</b> sacrifice <b>an offering, which is</b> relatively <b>lenient?</b> The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> Witnesses are unable to render another person liable to bring an offering contrary to his statement, as <b>what if he wishes to say: I did</b> so <b>intentionally,</b> in which case he would be <b>exempt</b> from bringing an offering?",
            "If one unwittingly <b>ate</b> an olive-bulk of forbidden <b>fat and</b> then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden <b>fat during one lapse of awareness,</b> i.e., in a case where he did not discover in the interim that fat is forbidden, or that the food he is eating is forbidden fat, <b>he is liable</b> to bring <b>only one</b> sin offering. If one <b>ate</b> forbidden <b>fat, and blood, and <i>piggul</i>, and <i>notar</i> in one lapse of awareness,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>for each and every one</b> of them. <b>This is a stringency</b> that applies <b>to</b> one who eats <b>several types</b> of forbidden food and does not apply to one who eats <b>one type</b> of forbidden food. <b>And a stringency</b> that applies <b>to</b> one who eats <b>one type</b> of forbidden food and not to one who eats <b>several types</b> of forbidden food is <b>that if one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half an olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness,</b> in a case where they were both <b>from one type</b> of forbidden food, he is <b>liable</b> to bring a sin offering. If they were <b>from two types,</b> he is <b>exempt,</b> because he did not eat an olive-bulk of any specific forbidden food.",
            "<b>How much</b> time <b>can one expend</b> while eating an olive-bulk <b>of</b> forbidden <b>food</b> and still be liable for violating the prohibition? The duration is calculated <b>as though he were eating toasted grain,</b> which one eats one kernel at a time. If he eats the olive-bulk of forbidden food within the amount of time it would take to eat an olive-bulk of toasted grain, he is liable. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Unless</b> the amount of time <b>he expends from beginning to end</b> is more than the time it takes <b>to eat a half-loaf [<i>peras</i>]</b> of bread, he is <b>liable.</b> Likewise, one who <b>ate</b> a quarter-loaf of <b>ritually impure foods or drank</b> a quarter-<i>log</i> of <b>ritually impure liquids</b> within the amount of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is rendered unfit to partake of <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for priests, until he becomes pure. Similarly, if one <b>drank a quarter</b>-<b><i>log</i> of wine and entered the Temple, and he remained</b> there for the time it takes <b>to eat a half-loaf</b> of bread, he is <b>liable. Rabbi Elazar says: If he interrupted</b> his drinking of the quarter-<i>log</i> of wine <b>or if he placed any amount of water into</b> the wine, he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "<b>There is</b> a case where one can perform <b>a single</b> act of <b>eating</b> an olive-bulk of food <b>and</b> be <b>liable</b> to bring <b>four sin offerings and one guilt offering for it.</b> How so? This <i>halakha</i> applies to one who is <b>ritually impure who ate</b> forbidden <b>fat, and it was left over from a consecrated</b> offering after the time allotted for its consumption <b>[<i>notar</i>], on Yom Kippur.</b> He is liable to bring sin offerings for eating forbidden fat and <i>notar</i>, for eating the meat of an offering while impure, and for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. <b>Rabbi Meir says: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out</b> from a private domain to a public domain while eating it, he would be <b>liable</b> to bring an additional sin offering for performing prohibited labor on Shabbat. The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> That liability <b>is not from the</b> same <b>type</b> of prohibition, as it is not due to the act of eating, and therefore, it should not be counted.",
            "<b>There is</b> a case where <b>one</b> can <b>engage in a single</b> act of <b>intercourse and</b> be <b>liable</b> to bring <b>six sin offerings for it. How so?</b> It is possible for <b>one who engages in intercourse with his daughter</b> to be <b>liable due to</b> having violated the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with <b>his daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.</b> It is possible for <b>one who engages in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter</b> to be <b>liable</b> to bring sin offerings <b>due to</b> the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with <b>his daughter’s daughter, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. Rabbi Yosei says: If</b> the <b>elder,</b> i.e., the man’s father, who is the woman’s great-grandfather, <b>transgressed and married her,</b> the man would also be <b>liable for</b> engaging in intercourse with <b>her due to</b> the prohibition of intercourse with <b>the wife of his father.</b> <b>And likewise,</b> it is possible for <b>one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his wife</b> to be liable to bring six sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter, for violating the prohibitions against engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. <b>And</b> it is possible for one who engages in intercourse <b>with</b> his wife’s <b>daughter’s daughter</b> to be liable to bring seven sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter’s daughter, for violating the following prohibitions: Engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter, his daughter-in-law, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, his wife’s sister, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.",
            "It is possible for <b>one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law</b> to be <b>liable</b> to bring seven sin offerings <b>for</b> doing so, <b>due to</b> the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with <b>his mother-in-law, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And likewise,</b> the same applies with regard to <b>one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or with the mother of his mother-in-law.</b> <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says:</b> It is possible for <b>one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law</b> to be <b>liable due to</b> the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with <b>his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law.</b> The Rabbis <b>said to him: Those three</b> prohibitions <b>are</b> all <b>one category</b> of prohibition, derived from the same verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter” (Leviticus 18:17). Consequently, one is not liable to bring separate sin offerings for violating these prohibitions. ",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market [<i>itlis</i>] in Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the</b> wedding <b>feast of the son of Rabban Gamliel:</b> In the case of <b>one who</b> unwittingly <b>engages in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother,</b> during one lapse of awareness, <b>what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is he <b>liable</b> to bring <b>one</b> sin offering <b>for all</b> three prohibitions, <b>or</b> is he <b>liable</b> to bring a separate sin offering <b>for each and every one</b> of the prohibitions? <b>They said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>We did not hear</b> a ruling from our teachers about that case, <b>but we heard</b> the following ruling: <b>One who engages in intercourse with</b> each of <b>his five wives</b> while they are <b>menstruating, during one lapse of awareness,</b> we heard <b>that he is liable</b> to bring a separate sin offering <b>for</b> having engaged in intercourse with <b>each and every one</b> of them. <b>And it appears to me that these matters</b> can be derived from <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: If he is liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women, who are forbidden by one prohibition, he should certainly be liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with his sister, the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, who are forbidden by three separate prohibitions. ",
            "<b>And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked</b> Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus: <b>What is</b> the status of <b>a dangling limb of an animal?</b> Does it impart ritual impurity like a severed limb? <b>They said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>We have not heard</b> a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, <b>but we have heard</b> with regard to <b>a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. And</b> in <b>this</b> manner <b>would</b> the people <b>afflicted with boils,</b> whose limbs were dangling due to their affliction, <b>act in Jerusalem:</b> Each of them <b>would go on Passover eve to the doctor,</b> who <b>would cut</b> the affected limb almost completely <b>until he would leave</b> it connected <b>by a hairbreadth</b> of flesh, so that neither the doctor nor the afflicted would be rendered ritually impure by a severed limb. Then, the doctor would <b>impale</b> the limb <b>on a thorn</b> attached to the floor or the wall, <b>and</b> the afflicted <b>would pull away from</b> the thorn, thereby completely severing the limb. <b>And that</b> person afflicted with boils <b>would perform</b> the rite of <b>his Paschal offering, and the doctor would perform</b> the rite of <b>his Paschal offering,</b> as neither had come into contact with the limb once it was severed. In any case, as long as it was dangling, the limb did not impart impurity. <b>And I consider that these matters</b> can be derived from <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference. If a person’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is severe, does not impart impurity when it is dangling, it is all the more so logical that an animal’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is lenient, does not impart impurity when it is dangling. ",
            "<b>And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked</b> Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to <b>one who</b> unwittingly <b>slaughters five offerings outside</b> the Temple <b>during one lapse of awareness, what is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is he <b>liable</b> to bring five sin offerings, one <b>for each and every</b> act of slaughter, <b>or</b> is he liable to bring <b>one</b> sin offering <b>for all</b> the acts of slaughter? <b>They said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>We have not heard</b> a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats</b> meat <b>from one offering from five</b> different <b>pots</b> in which they were prepared, <b>during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable</b> to bring five guilt offerings, which are <b>for</b> the meat prepared in <b>each and every</b> pot, <b>due to misuse</b> of consecrated property. <b>And I consider that these matters</b> can be derived from <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for slaughtering five offerings outside the Temple. <b>Rabbi Shimon said:</b> It was <b>not that</b> question that <b>Rabbi Akiva asked</b> them. <b>Rather,</b> it was <b>with regard to one who eats <i>notar</i> from five offerings during one lapse of awareness. What is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is he <b>liable</b> to bring <b>one</b> sin offering <b>for all</b> the offerings from which he ate <i>notar</i>, <b>or</b> is he <b>liable</b> to bring five sin offerings, one <b>for each and every one</b> of the offerings from which he ate <i>notar</i>? <b>They said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>We have not heard</b> a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats</b> meat <b>from one offering</b> that was prepared <b>in five</b> different <b>pots, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable</b> to bring separate guilt offerings <b>for</b> the meat prepared in <b>each and every</b> pot, <b>due to misuse</b> of consecrated property. <b>And I consider that these matters</b> can be derived from <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for eating the <i>notar</i> of five separate offerings. <b>Rabbi Akiva said to</b> Rabbi Yehoshua: <b>If</b> you are reporting <b>a <i>halakha</i></b> that you received from your teachers with regard to one who eats <i>notar</i> from five offerings, <b>we will accept</b> it, but <b>if</b> it is based merely <b>on</b> the <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference</b> from misuse of consecrated property, <b>there is a response</b> that refutes the inference. Rabbi Yehoshua <b>said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>Respond.</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>said: And no;</b> one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from misuse of consecrated property: <b>If you said with regard to misuse</b> of consecrated property that one is liable to bring five guilt offerings, perhaps that is because there are additional stringent elements unique to misuse. <b>As, with regard to</b> misuse, the Torah <b>established</b> that the status of <b>one who feeds</b> another person sacrificial meat is <b>like</b> that of <b>one who eats</b> sacrificial meat, <b>and</b> the status of <b>one who gives benefit</b> to another from consecrated property that is not food is <b>like</b> that of <b>one who derives benefit</b> himself, in that each is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. In addition, the Torah <b>joined the misuse</b> of consecrated property that was performed <b>over an extended period,</b> i.e., if one derived benefit worth half a <i>peruta</i> one day and half a <i>peruta</i> the next, he is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. <b>Would you say</b> the same <b>with regard to <i>notar</i>, which has none of these</b> <i>halakhot</i>?",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to</b> one who <b>performs multiple</b> prohibited <b>labors on several <i>Shabbatot</i>,</b> and all those labors were <b>subsumed</b> as subcategories of <b>one</b> primary category of prohibited <b>labor,</b> and he performed them <b>during one lapse of awareness. What is</b> the <i>halakha</i>? Is he <b>liable</b> to bring <b>one</b> sin offering <b>for</b> unwitting performance of <b>all</b> these labors <b>or</b> is he <b>liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>for</b> violation of <b>each and every one</b> of the labors? Rabbi Eliezer <b>said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: He is <b>liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>for</b> violation of <b>each and every one</b> of the labors, and this is derived <b>from an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>Just as</b> in the case of <b>a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple</b> actions that <b>result</b> in transgression <b>and</b> that result in <b>multiple sin offerings,</b> but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless <b>one</b> is <b>liable</b> to bring a separate sin offering <b>for each and every one</b> of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of <b>Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple</b> primary categories and subcategories of labor that <b>result</b> in transgression <b>and</b> that result in <b>multiple death</b> penalties or sin offerings, <b>is it not right that he will be liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>for</b> performance of <b>each and every one</b> of the prohibited labors? Rabbi Akiva continues: <b>I said to</b> Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: <b>If you said</b> one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings <b>in the</b> case of <b>a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as</b> the man <b>is prohibited</b> from engaging in intercourse <b>with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited</b> from engaging in intercourse <b>with him, would you say</b> the same <b>in the</b> case of <b>Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition?</b> Rabbi Eliezer <b>said to me:</b> The <i>halakha</i> of <b>one who engages in intercourse with minor</b> menstruating <b>girls will prove</b> this refutation is not valid, <b>as in</b> that case <b>there is only one prohibition,</b> because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, <b>and</b> nevertheless the man is <b>liable</b> to bring a separate sin offering <b>for</b> intercourse for <b>each and every one</b> of the acts of intercourse. Rabbi Akiva said: <b>I said to</b> Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. <b>If you said in the</b> case of <b>minor girls that although it is not</b> prohibited <b>for them at present it is</b> prohibited <b>for them after</b> the passage of <b>time,</b> when they reach majority, <b>would you say</b> the same <b>in the</b> case of <b>Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither</b> two prohibitions <b>at present, nor</b> will there be <b>after</b> the passage of <b>time?</b> Rabbi Eliezer <b>said to me:</b> The <i>halakha</i> of <b>one who copulates with an animal will prove</b> this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: <b>I said to</b> Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of <b>the animal is like</b> that of <b>Shabbat;</b> there is uncertainty with regard to both cases."
        ],
        [
            "If there is <b>uncertainty</b> whether <b>one ate</b> forbidden <b>fat</b> and <b>uncertainty</b> whether <b>one did not eat</b> forbidden <b>fat, or even</b> if <b>one ate</b> forbidden fat and there is <b>uncertainty</b> whether <b>there is the measure</b> that determines liability <b>in</b> the piece he ate <b>and uncertainty</b> whether <b>there is not</b> the measure that determines liability <b>in</b> the piece he ate, he must bring a provisional guilt offering. If one has a piece of permitted <b>fat and</b> a piece of forbidden <b>fat before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate;</b> or if <b>his wife and his sister</b> were <b>with him in the house</b> and <b>he unwittingly</b> engaged in intercourse <b>with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly</b> engaged in intercourse; or if he confused <b>Shabbat and a weekday and he performed labor</b> prohibited on Shabbat <b>on one of</b> the days <b>and he does not know on which of them he performed</b> the labor, in all of those cases he is liable to <b>bring a provisional guilt offering.</b>",
            "<b>Just as</b> in a case <b>where one</b> unknowingly <b>ate</b> a piece of forbidden <b>fat and</b> then another piece of forbidden <b>fat in a single lapse of awareness</b> he is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>only one sin offering, so too, in</b> a case where their status is <b>unknown</b> to him and he ate them both unwittingly during a single lapse in awareness, he is <b>liable</b> to bring <b>only one provisional guilt offering.</b> But <b>if</b> he <b>had</b> gained <b>knowledge between</b> the first and second instance of eating that there is a possibility the fat might be prohibited, then the <i>halakha</i> is different: <b>Just as he</b> would be liable to <b>bring a sin offering for each and every</b> piece when he gained knowledge of their prohibited status in between each act of consumption, <b>so too,</b> he must <b>bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every</b> instance in which he consumed food that might be forbidden after learning of their uncertain status in between each unwitting act of consumption. <b>Just as</b> in a case <b>where one ate</b> forbidden <b>fat, and blood, and <i>piggul</i>, and <i>notar</i> in one lapse of awareness he is liable</b> to bring a sin offering <b>for each and every one, so too, with regard</b> to a case where <b>their</b> status is <b>unknown</b> to him and he ate them unwittingly during one lapse of awareness, he must <b>bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every</b> item. If one has pieces of forbidden <b>fat and <i>notar</i> before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate;</b> or if <b>his menstruating wife and his sister</b> were <b>with him in the house</b> and <b>he unwittingly</b> engaged in intercourse <b>with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly</b> engaged in intercourse; or if <b>Shabbat and Yom Kippur</b> occurred adjacent to one another <b>and he performed</b> prohibited <b>labor</b> during the intervening <b>twilight</b> period <b>and he does not know on which of</b> the days <b>he performed</b> the labor, in all of these cases, <b>Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> the transgressor <b>liable</b> to bring <b>a sin offering,</b> as he certainly sinned, <b>and Rabbi Yehoshua deems</b> the transgressor <b>exempt,</b> as he does not know the nature of his sin. <b>Rabbi Yosei said:</b> Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua <b>did not disagree with regard to one who performs</b> prohibited <b>labor</b> during the intervening <b>twilight</b> period because they concur <b>that</b> he is <b>exempt, as I say: He performed part</b> of the labor <b>today, and he performed part</b> of the labor <b>the following day.</b> <b>With regard to what</b> case <b>did they disagree? With regard to</b> the case of <b>one who performs</b> prohibited <b>labor in the midst of the day, and he does not know whether</b> it was <b>on Shabbat</b> that <b>he performed</b> the labor or <b>whether</b> it was <b>on Yom Kippur</b> that <b>he performed</b> the labor; <b>or with regard to one who performs</b> a prohibited labor <b>and he does not know which labor he performed. As,</b> in those cases <b>Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> him <b>liable</b> to bring <b>a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems</b> him <b>exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would deem him exempt even from</b> bringing <b>a provisional guilt offering.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say:</b> Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua <b>did not disagree with regard to</b> a case involving <b>a matter</b> where his lack of knowledge involves items <b>from one category,</b> e.g., he picked a grape from a vine on Shabbat and does not know which vine it was, as in that case they both agree <b>that he is liable,</b> since he knows the nature of his sin. <b>With regard to what</b> case <b>did they disagree? With regard to</b> a case involving <b>a matter</b> where his lack of knowledge involves items <b>from two categories,</b> e.g., he picked fruit from a tree on Shabbat and does not know whether it was from a vine or from a fig tree. <b>As,</b> in that case <b>Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> him <b>liable</b> to bring <b>a sin offering,</b> since he certainly sinned, <b>and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt,</b> as he does not know the nature of his sin. <b>Rabbi Yehuda said: Even</b> if one <b>intended to pick figs and he picked grapes,</b> or to pick <b>grapes and he picked figs,</b> or to pick <b>black</b> figs <b>and he picked white</b> figs, or to pick <b>white</b> figs <b>and he picked black</b> figs, <b>Rabbi Eliezer deems</b> him <b>liable</b> to bring <b>a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems</b> him <b>exempt.</b> Rabbi Yehuda added: <b>I wonder if Rabbi Yehoshua deemed</b> him <b>exempt in</b> that case, as even in his opinion the person intended to perform a prohibited labor. The mishna asks: <b>If</b> it is <b>so,</b> that he is not exempt according to Rabbi Yehuda, <b>why is it stated:</b> “If his sin, <b>wherein he has sinned”</b> (Leviticus 4:23), from which it is derived that one is liable only if the object of the sin was the one that he intended? The mishna answers: This serves to <b>exclude one who acts unawares</b> and does not intend to perform a prohibited action at all."
        ],
        [
            "If <b>one consumed</b> an olive-bulk of <b>blood</b> that spurted during the <b>slaughter of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, whether</b> it is <b>a kosher or non-kosher</b> species; or if one consumed <b>blood</b> that flowed after <b>stabbing</b> an animal or killing it in a manner other than by ritual slaughter, or <b>blood</b> that spurted after <b>ripping</b> the animal’s windpipe or gullet, or <b>blood</b> that spurted during <b>bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable</b> to receive <i>karet</i> <b>for</b> consuming <b>it</b> intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly. But with regard to <b>blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of eggs, blood of grasshoppers,</b> or <b>blood of exudate [<i>tamtzit</i>],</b> i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes,<b>one is not liable for</b> consuming <b>it. Rabbi Yehuda deems</b> one <b>liable in</b> the case of <b>blood of exudate.</b>",
            "This mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering addressed in the previous chapter. <b>Rabbi Akiva deems</b> one <b>liable</b> to bring <b>a provisional guilt offering for</b> a case where he is <b>uncertain</b> whether he is guilty of <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property, a transgression that renders one liable to bring a definite guilt offering (see Leviticus 5:15). <b>And the Rabbis deem him exempt,</b> as one brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case of uncertainty as to whether he is liable to bring a sin offering, not a guilt offering. <b>And Rabbi Akiva concedes that one does not bring</b> payment for <b>his misuse until it becomes</b> definitely <b>known to him</b> that he is guilty of misuse, <b>as</b> then <b>he will bring a definite guilt offering with</b> his payment. <b>Rabbi Tarfon said: For what</b> purpose <b>does that</b> person <b>bring two guilt offerings,</b> one provisional and one definite? <b>Rather,</b> at the outset <b>one brings</b> the payment for <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property <b>and its</b> additional payment of <b>one-fifth,</b> as mandated by Torah law, <b>and he will</b> then <b>bring a guilt offering</b> worth <b>two <i>sela</i> and say: If</b> it is <b>certain</b> that <b>I misused</b> consecrated property, <b>this is</b> payment for <b>my misuse and this is my</b> definite <b>guilt offering. And if</b> it is <b>uncertain</b> whether <b>I misused</b> consecrated property, <b>the money is a contribution</b> to the Temple fund for the purchase of communal offerings <b>and the guilt offering</b> is <b>provisional, as from the</b> same <b>type</b> of animal <b>that one brings</b> a guilt offering <b>for</b> a case where it is <b>known</b> to him that he is guilty of misuse, he likewise <b>brings</b> a guilt offering <b>for</b> a case where it is <b>unknown</b> to him.",
            "<b>Rabbi Akiva says: The statement of</b> Rabbi Tarfon <b>appears</b> correct <b>in</b> the case of <b>minimal misuse,</b> but in a case <b>where he is confronted with</b> a case of <b>uncertainty</b> with regard to <b>misuse</b> valued at <b>ten thousand dinars, would it not be preferable for him that he will</b> now <b>bring</b> a provisional <b>guilt offering</b> valued <b>at two <i>sela</i> and he will not bring</b> payment now for <b>uncertain misuse</b> valued <b>at ten thousand dinars?</b> The mishna concludes: Apparently, <b>Rabbi Akiva concedes to Rabbi Tarfon in</b> the case of <b>minimal misuse.</b> He agrees that at the outset one brings payment for misuse and its additional payment of one-fifth, and conditionally brings a guilt offering. Apropos the previous case in which one brings the same type of animal when liability is certain as when liability is uncertain, this mishna teaches: With regard to <b>a woman who brought a bird sin offering</b> in a case of uncertainty whether she miscarried a fetus that would have rendered her liable to bring a sin offering or whether what she expelled would not render her liable to bring an offering, in which case this sin offering may not be eaten by priests, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If <b>before</b> the nape of the neck of the bird <b>was pinched it became known to her that she certainly gave birth,</b> i.e., miscarried, in a manner that obligates her to bring a sin offering, <b>she should render</b> the offering <b>a definite</b> sin offering, <b>as from the</b> same <b>type</b> of animal <b>that she brings</b> a sin offering <b>for</b> a case where it is <b>known</b> to her that she miscarried, <b>she brings</b> a sin offering <b>for</b> a case where it is <b>unknown</b> to her.",
            "The mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering. If one had <b>a piece of non-sacred</b> meat <b>and a piece of sacrificial</b> meat, and <b>he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. <b>Rabbi Akiva deems</b> him <b>liable</b> to bring <b>a provisional guilt offering,</b> in accordance with his opinion in the previous mishna that one brings a provisional guilt offering even in a case of uncertainty with regard to misuse. If he then <b>ate the second</b> piece, <b>he brings a definite guilt offering,</b> as it is certain that he ate the sacrificial meat. If <b>one</b> person <b>ate the first</b> piece <b>and another</b> person <b>came and ate the second</b> piece, <b>this</b> first person <b>brings a provisional guilt offering and that</b> second person <b>brings a provisional guilt offering;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one</b> definite <b>guilt offering</b> as partners, and they stipulate that the one who ate the non-sacred meat grants his share of the animal to the one who ate the sacrificial meat, and the guilt offering is sacrificed on his behalf. <b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> <b>Two</b> people <b>do not bring one guilt offering,</b> as one may not sacrifice atonement offerings conditionally.",
            "If one had <b>a piece of</b> forbidden <b>fat and a piece of non-sacred</b> meat, and <b>he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a provisional guilt offering,</b> as perhaps he ate the forbidden fat. If he then <b>ate the second</b> piece, <b>he brings a sin offering,</b> as it is certain that he ate the fat. If <b>one</b> person <b>ate the first</b> piece <b>and another</b> person <b>came and ate the second</b> piece, <b>this</b> person <b>brings a provisional guilt offering and that</b> person <b>brings a provisional guilt offering;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one sin offering</b> as partners, and they stipulate that the sin offering should be credited to the one who ate the fat. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: Two</b> people <b>do not bring one sin offering.</b>",
            "If one had <b>a piece of</b> forbidden <b>fat and a piece of sacrificial</b> permitted fat and <b>he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a provisional guilt offering,</b> as perhaps he ate the forbidden fat. If he then <b>ate the second</b> piece, <b>he brings a sin offering,</b> as he certainly ate the fat, <b>and a definite guilt offering</b> for misuse of consecrated property. If <b>one</b> person <b>ate the first</b> piece <b>and another</b> person <b>came and ate the second</b> piece, <b>this</b> person <b>brings a provisional guilt offering and that</b> person <b>brings a provisional guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring a sin offering and a guilt offering</b> as partners, and they stipulate that each offering should be credited to the one who is liable to bring it. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: Two</b> people <b>do not bring one sin offering and</b> one <b>guilt offering.</b>",
            "If one had <b>a piece of</b> forbidden <b>fat and a piece of sacrificial</b> forbidden <b>fat</b> and <b>he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a sin offering</b> as he certainly ate forbidden fat. <b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> He <b>also</b> brings <b>a provisional guilt offering,</b> as perhaps he ate the sacrificial fat, in accordance with his opinion that one brings a provisional guilt offering even in the case of uncertainty with regard to misuse of consecrated property. If he then <b>ate the second</b> piece, <b>he brings two sin offerings,</b> as he ate two pieces of forbidden fat, <b>and a definite guilt offering</b> for misuse of consecrated property. If <b>one</b> person <b>ate the first</b> piece <b>and another</b> person <b>came and ate the second</b> piece, <b>this</b> person <b>brings a sin offering and that</b> person <b>brings a sin offering. Rabbi Akiva says: This</b> person <b>and that</b> person each <b>bring a provisional guilt offering</b> as well, due to the uncertainty as to which of them ate the sacrificial fat. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: This</b> person <b>brings a sin offering and that</b> person <b>brings a sin offering and both of them bring one guilt offering</b> as partners, and they stipulate that the offering should be credited to the one who ate the sacrificial fat. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: The two of them do not bring one guilt offering.</b>",
            "If one had <b>a piece of</b> forbidden <b>fat and a piece of</b> forbidden <b>fat</b> that is <b><i>notar</i>,</b> an offering whose designated time has passed for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> if he ate it intentionally and liable to bring a sin offering if he ate it unwittingly, and <b>he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a sin offering,</b> as he certainly ate forbidden fat, <b>and a provisional guilt offering,</b> due to the possibility that he ate the <i>notar</i>. If he then <b>ate the second</b> piece, <b>he brings three sin offerings,</b> two for the forbidden fat and one for the prohibition against eating <i>notar</i>. If <b>one</b> person <b>ate the first</b> piece <b>and another</b> person <b>came and ate the second</b> piece, <b>this</b> person <b>brings a sin offering and a provisional guilt offering,</b> as he certainly ate forbidden fat and it is uncertain whether he ate the <i>notar</i>, <b>and that</b> person <b>brings a sin offering and a provisional guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon says: This</b> person <b>brings a sin offering and that</b> person <b>brings a sin offering and both of them bring one</b> additional <b>sin offering</b> as partners, and they stipulate that the offering should be credited to the one who ate the <i>notar</i>. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: Two</b> people <b>do not bring any sin offering that comes</b> as atonement <b>for a sin.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "In the case of <b>one who brings a provisional guilt offering</b> due to uncertainty as to whether he sinned, <b>and it became known to him that he did not sin, if</b> he made that discovery <b>before</b> the ram <b>was slaughtered, it shall emerge and graze with the flock</b> as a non-sacred animal, since its consecration was in error. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> Its status is not that of a non-sacred animal; rather it is that of a guilt offering that was disqualified for sacrifice. Therefore, <b>it shall graze until it becomes blemished; and</b> then <b>it shall be sold, and</b> the <b>money</b> received <b>for it shall be allocated for</b> the purchase of communal <b>gift</b> offerings by the Temple treasury. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: It shall be sacrificed</b> as a provisional guilt offering, <b>as if it does not come</b> to atone <b>for this sin</b> that he initially thought, <b>it comes</b> to atone <b>for another sin</b> of which he is unaware. <b>If it became known to him</b> that he did not sin <b>after</b> the ram <b>was slaughtered</b> and its blood collected in a container, <b>the blood shall be poured</b> into the canal that flows through the Temple courtyard, <b>and the flesh shall go out to the place of burning,</b> like any disqualified offering. If <b>the blood was sprinkled</b> before he discovered that he did not sin, <b>and the meat is intact,</b> the meat <b>may be eaten</b> by the priests like any other sin offering, as from the moment that its blood was sprinkled the meat is permitted to the priests. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the blood</b> was still <b>in the cup</b> when he discovered that he did not sin, the blood <b>shall be sprinkled and the meat may be eaten.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>a definite guilt offering,</b> it is <b>not so,</b> i.e., the <i>halakha</i> is different than with regard to a provisional guilt offering. If he made the discovery that he did not sin <b>before</b> the ram <b>was slaughtered, it shall go out and graze among the flock,</b> as it is not consecrated. If it became known to him that he did not sin <b>after</b> the ram <b>was slaughtered, it shall be buried</b> like a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, and its blood is poured. If he discovered that he did not sin <b>after the blood was sprinkled, the flesh shall go out to the place of burning,</b> like any disqualified offering. In the case of <b>an ox that is</b> sentenced to be <b>stoned</b> (see Exodus 21:28–32), e.g., for killing a person, it is <b>not so,</b> i.e., it also does not have the same halakhic status as a provisional guilt offering. If it is discovered that the testimony with regard to the ox was false <b>before it was stoned, it shall go out and graze among the flock</b> as it never had the status of an ox sentenced to be stoned. If this was discovered <b>after</b> the ox <b>was stoned,</b> its halakhic status is as though it had not been sentenced, and therefore <b>deriving benefit</b> from its carcass <b>is permitted.</b> In the case of <b>a heifer whose neck is broken,</b> when a corpse is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9), it is <b>not so</b> i.e., the <i>halakha</i> is different than with regard to a provisional guilt offering. If the identity of the murderer is discovered <b>before</b> the heifer’s <b>neck was broken, it shall go out and graze among the flock,</b> as it is not consecrated. But if the identity of the murderer was discovered <b>after</b> the heifer’s <b>neck was broken, it shall be buried in its place,</b> like any other heifer whose neck is broken. The reason is <b>that from the outset</b> the heifer whose neck is broken <b>comes</b> to atone for a situation of <b>uncertainty.</b> Once its neck was broken before the identity of the murderer was revealed, its mitzva was fulfilled, as <b>it atoned for its uncertainty and</b> that uncertainty <b>is gone.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer</b> to bring <b>a provisional guilt offering every day and at any time that he chooses,</b> even if there is no uncertainty as to whether he sinned, and <b>this</b> type of offering <b>was called the guilt offering of the pious,</b> as they brought it due to their constant concern that they might have sinned. <b>They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer</b> to bring <b>a provisional guilt offering every day except for one day after Yom Kippur,</b> when he would not bring the offering. Bava ben Buta <b>said:</b> I take an oath by <b>this abode</b> of the Divine Presence that <b>if they would have allowed me, I would have brought</b> a guilt offering even on that day. <b>But they</b> would <b>say to me: Wait until you enter into</b> a situation of potential <b>uncertainty. And the Rabbis say: One brings a provisional guilt offering only</b> in a case where there is uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin for <b>whose intentional</b> performance one is liable to receive <b><i>karet</i> and</b> for <b>whose unwitting</b> performance one is liable to bring <b>a sin offering.</b>",
            "Those <b>liable</b> to bring <b>sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring</b> them <b>after Yom Kippur.</b>By contrast, those <b>liable</b> to bring <b>provisional guilt offerings are exempt</b> from bringing them after Yom Kippur. With regard to <b>one who encountered uncertainty</b> as to <b>whether</b> he performed <b>a sin on Yom Kippur, even if</b> it was <b>at nightfall</b> at the end of the day, he is <b>exempt, as the entire day atones</b> for uncertain sins.",
            "<b>A woman upon whom</b> it is incumbent to bring <b>a bird sin offering</b> due to <b>uncertainty,</b> e.g., uncertainty with regard to whether or not her miscarriage obligated her to bring the sin offering of a woman who gave birth, <b>for whom Yom Kippur has passed, is liable to bring</b> it <b>after Yom Kippur.</b> This is <b>because</b> the offering does not come as atonement for a sin; rather, <b>it renders</b> her <b>eligible to partake</b> of the meat <b>of offerings.</b> With regard to this <b>bird sin offering that is brought due to uncertainty, if it became known</b> to her that she was exempt from bringing the offering <b>after</b> the nape of the neck of the bird <b>was pinched,</b> the bird <b>must be buried.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who designates two <i>sela</i>,</b> which is the minimal value of a guilt offering,<b>to</b> purchase a ram for <b>a guilt offering,and he purchased two rams for a guilt offering with</b> the two <i>sela</i>, <b>if one of them is</b> now <b>worth two <i>sela</i>, he shall sacrifice</b> it <b>for his guilt offering. And the second</b> ram that he purchased with the money he designated does not become non-sacred. Rather, it <b>shall graze until it becomes blemished; and</b> then <b>it shall be sold, and</b> the <b>money</b> received <b>for it shall be allocated for</b> communal <b>gift</b> offerings. If <b>he purchased two rams for non-sacred</b> use <b>with</b> those two <i>sela</i> designated for a guilt offering, he has misused consecrated property. He is therefore liable to bring a guilt offering and to compensate the Temple treasury for those two <i>sela</i> and add one-fifth to the sum for a total of ten dinars, as there are four dinars in a <i>sela</i>. If <b>one</b> of the rams <b>is</b> now <b>worth two <i>sela</i>, and</b> the other <b>one is</b> now <b>worth ten dinars,</b> i.e., two and a half <i>sela</i>, <b>the</b> one <b>that is worth two <i>sela</i> shall be sacrificed as his guilt offering</b> for misuse of the two <i>sela</i>, <b>and the second one</b> shall be sacrificed <b>for his</b> initial <b>misuse,</b> as it is worth two <i>sela</i> plus one-fifth. In a case where he purchased two rams with those two <i>sela</i> designated for a guilt offering, <b>one for a guilt offering and one for non-sacred</b> use, <b>if</b> the ram <b>for</b> the <b>guilt offering is</b> now <b>worth two <i>sela</i>, it shall be sacrificed for his</b> initial <b>guilt offering. And</b> with regard to <b>the second</b> ram that he purchased for non-sacred use, if it is now worth two <i>sela</i>, it shall be sacrificed as a guilt offering for <b>his</b> present <b>misuse, and he brings with it</b> the sum of <b>one <i>sela</i> and one-fifth</b> to the Temple treasury as payment for his misuse.",
            "In the case of <b>one who designates a sin offering</b> for <b>his</b> performance of an unwitting sin <b>and dies, his son shall not bring it in his stead,</b> neither on behalf of his father nor for his own unwitting sin, even if it was the same transgression. Likewise, <b>one may not bring</b> a sin offering by reassigning it <b>from</b> the <b>sin</b> for which it is designated to atone and sacrificing it <b>for</b> atonement of another <b>sin. Even if he designated</b> a sin offering as atonement <b>for</b> forbidden <b>fat that he</b> unwittingly <b>ate yesterday, he may not bring it</b> as atonement <b>for</b> forbidden <b>fat that he</b> unwittingly <b>ate today, as it is stated:</b> “And he shall bring <b>his</b> sin <b>offering,</b> an unblemished female goat, <b>for his sin</b> that he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:28), indicating that he does not satisfy his obligation <b>until his offering is</b> brought <b>for the sake of</b> the <b>sin</b> for which he designated it.",
            "<b>One may bring a female goat from</b> money <b>consecrated</b> for a sin offering of <b>a female lamb,</b> and <b>a female lamb from</b> money <b>consecrated</b> for a sin offering of <b>a female goat. And</b> likewise, one may bring <b>doves and pigeons from</b> money <b>consecrated</b> for a sin offering of <b>a female lamb and a female goat; and one-tenth of an ephah</b> of fine flour <b>from</b> money <b>consecrated</b> for a sin offering of <b>doves and pigeons.</b> <b>How so? If</b> one unwittingly performed a sin for which he is liable to bring a sliding-scale sin offering, which varies based on economic status (see Leviticus 5:1–13; see also 9a), and he <b>designated</b> money <b>to</b> purchase <b>a female lamb or for a female goat</b> and then <b>became poorer, he may bring a bird,</b> and the remaining money is non-sacred. If <b>he became</b> yet <b>poorer, he may bring one-tenth of an ephah</b> of fine flour. Likewise, if <b>he designated</b> money <b>to</b> purchase <b>one-tenth of an ephah</b> of fine flour and <b>became wealthier, he shall bring a bird.</b> If <b>he became</b> yet <b>wealthier, he shall bring a female lamb or a female goat.</b> If <b>one designated a female lamb or goat</b> as an offering <b>and it developed a blemish,</b> he must redeem the animal and bring another offering with the money. If he became poorer, <b>he may bring a bird with its money.</b> But if <b>one designated a bird</b> as an offering <b>and it developed a blemish, he may not bring one-tenth of an ephah</b> of fine flour <b>with its money, as there is no</b> possibility of <b>redemption for birds.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon says: Lambs precede goats</b> almost <b>everywhere</b> in the Torah that they are both mentioned, as in the verse: “You shall take it from the lambs or from the goats” (Exodus 12:5). One <b>might</b> have thought that it is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> sheep <b>are more select than</b> goats. Therefore, <b>the verse states:</b> “And he shall bring for his offering a goat” (Leviticus 4:28), after which it is written: <b>“And if he bring a lamb as his offering for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 4:32), which <b>teaches that both of them are equal.</b> Similarly, <b>doves precede pigeons</b> almost <b>everywhere</b> in the Torah, as in the verse: “And he shall bring his guilt offering…two doves, or two pigeons” (Leviticus 5:7). One <b>might</b> have thought that it is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> doves <b>are more select than</b> pigeons. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “And a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering”</b> (Leviticus 12:6), with the usual order reversed, which <b>teaches that both of them are equal.</b> Likewise, mention of <b>the father precedes</b> that of <b>the mother</b> almost <b>everywhere</b> in the Torah, as in the verse: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12). One <b>might</b> have thought that it is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that the honor of the father takes precedence over the honor of the mother.</b> Therefore, <b>the verse states: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father”</b> (Leviticus 19:3), with the order reversed, which <b>teaches that both of them are equal. But the Sages said:</b> Honor of <b>the father takes precedence over</b> honor of <b>the mother everywhere, due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> both the son <b>and his mother are obligated in the honor of his father.</b> <b>And likewise with regard to Torah study, if the son was privileged</b> to acquire most of his Torah knowledge from studying <b>before the teacher,</b> honor of <b>the teacher takes precedence over</b> honor of <b>the father, due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> both the son <b>and his father are obligated in the honor of his teacher,</b> as everyone is obligated in the honor of Torah scholars."
        ]
    ],
    "sectionNames": [
        "Chapter",
        "Mishnah"
    ]
}