json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nezikin/English Explanation of Mishnah Bava Kamma/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json

{
    "language": "en",
    "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bava Kamma",
    "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/",
    "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp",
    "status": "locked",
    "license": "CC-BY",
    "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp",
    "actualLanguage": "en",
    "languageFamilyName": "english",
    "isBaseText": true,
    "isSource": true,
    "isPrimary": true,
    "direction": "ltr",
    "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה בבא קמא",
    "categories": [
        "Mishnah",
        "Modern Commentary on Mishnah",
        "English Explanation of Mishnah",
        "Seder Nezikin"
    ],
    "text": {
        "Introduction": [
            "Bava Kamma literally means “first gate”, and it refers to the fact that this tractate is the first third of what was originally a larger tractate called “Nezikin” or damages.  The next two tractates which we will learn are called Bava Metziah or “middle gate” and Bava Batra, or “final gate”.  Together these three tractates contain the bulk of Jewish civil law, dealing with such issues as damages, penal laws, employment and contracts, bailiff laws, property rights, and many others.",
            "The first six chapters of Bava Kamma deal mostly with damage laws, generally answering two questions:  when is a person obligated to pay damages that he or his property caused another person or his property; for how much is he obligated.  The final four chapters of the tractate deal mostly with thievery and robbery.",
            "An important note to remember with regards to most of the Mishnah, but especially in regards to Bava Kamma, is that the Mishnah does not give all possible circumstances.  Rather the Mishnah will teach archetypal situations, from which a person or a judge could reasonably adjudicate most matters.  ",
            "Another important note, again especially in regards to Bava Kamma is that the Mishnah is both independent from and yet explaining the Torah.  There are several key passages in the Torah that deal with damage laws, and they are listed at the bottom of this page.  However these passages are usually not thorough enough for one to adjudicate all situations.  They are in essences chapter headings that the Oral Torah, of which the Mishnah is part, fills in.  We will refer back to these verses from time to time as we learn the Mishnah.  ",
            "List of relevant verses for Bava Kamma:  They are listed in the order of their relevance throughout the tractate. Exodus 21:33-34 Exodus 21:35-36 Exodus 22:4-5 Exodus 21:28-32 Exodus 21:37 Exodus 22:3 Exodus 22:6-8 Exodus 21:18-19 Exodus 21:22-25 Leviticus 24:18-20 Deuteronomy 19:21 Leviticus 5:20-25 Numbers 5:5-8"
        ],
        "": [
            [
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b> The first mishnah in Bava Kamma serves as an introduction to the first six chapters of the tractate.  As such, if all of the details are unclear now, they will hopefully become clearer as we continue to learn.  The mishnah discusses four primary causes of injury, literary “fathers of injuries”.  These are archetypal causes of injury mentioned in the Torah, from which we will learn many other types of injury and subsets of laws in the following chapters.",
                    "<b>1. There are four primary causes of injury:  the ox and the pit and the crop-destroying beast and fire. 2. [The distinctive feature of] the ox is not like [that of] the crop-destroying beast, nor is [the distinctive feature of] either of these, which are alive, like [that of] fire, which is not alive; nor is [the distinctive feature of] any of these, whose way it is to go forth and do injury, like [that of] the pit, whose way it is not to go forth and do injury. 3. What they have in common is that it is their way to do injury and that you are responsible for caring over them; and if one of them did injury whoever [is responsible] for the injury must make restitution [to the damaged party] with the best of his land.</b> The four causes of injury mentioned in the first clause mishnah are all derived from the Torah:  the ox (Exodus 21:35-36), the pit (Exodus 21:33-34), the crop-destroying beast (Exodus 22:4) and fire (Exodus 22:5).  The mishnah then raises a question generally asked in midrashic texts (texts that explain the Torah): why does the Torah need to mention all four types of injury?  In other words, why couldn’t the Torah have mentioned one, two or three primary causes of injury, from which we would have learned the rest?  The Rabbis believed that no law in the Torah was superfluous and therefore each must come to teach us something that we could not have learned from the other laws.  The mishnah therefore explains that each “cause of injury” has its unique characteristic and therefore we would not have been able to derive the laws of the other causes of damages without all four examples in the Torah.  Note how the mishnah is both dependent on, yet independent from the Torah.  This is typical of Jewish oral Torah; it explains the Torah yet it can usually be understood on its own. Questions for further thought:  What type of injury does an ox cause?  What therefore is the difference between an ox and a crop-destroying beast?  The Mishnah tells you things that you are obligated to watch and that if they are yours and they injure you will have to pay the damaged party.  Is there anything you can already imagine for which a person will not be obligated if it causes damage? (We will learn the answers to these questions as we go on, but it is worthwhile to start thinking of them now)."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe second mishnah in Bava Kamma continues in the vein of the previous mishnah, providing us with general information about damage law that we will continue to learn about in subsequent chapters of the mishnah.  Again, some of the details may not be clear, but they will become clearer as we continue to learn.  If you have trouble understanding the mishnah, do not despair:  this mishnah baffled even the great sages of the Talmud!",
                    "<b>1. Anything that I am responsible to guard, I have rendered it possible to do injury [for which I will become obligated]. 2. If I have partially rendered it possible to do injury, I must make restitution for that injury as if I totally rendered it possible to do injury. 3. When one damages [property that fits all of the following categories]: property that does not have “sacrilege” [i.e. sacrificial animals or property that belongs to the Temple in Jerusalem], property that belongs to other members of the covenant [Jews], property that is owned, and the injury is done in any place other than the private domain of the injurer and the common domain of the injured and injurer, in these cases the injurer must make restitution for the injury with the best of his land.</b> This mishnah teaches several laws, albeit in language that is difficult to render into coherent English: 1) In order to be obligated to pay damages, the damage must be caused by an object over which I have an obligation to watch.  For instance, I am not responsible for full damages the first time my ox gores another ox, since I had no way of knowing that my ox gores.  However, the third time my ox gores, I am obligated because my ox is now known as a “goring ox” which I am obligated to guard carefully. 2) If I partially enable damage to happen I am obligated for full damages.  For instance if there was a pit that was already 4 feet deep, and a six foot deep pit will kill an animal which falls into it, and I came along and deepened the pit by two feet, thereby making a four foot pit into a six foot pit, I am obligated as if I dug the whole pit. 3) A person is obligated for damages caused only to certain types of property, namely property that belongs to Jewish individuals when the damages are done either on the injured person’s property or in the public domain.  In all other cases the owner of the damaging object is exempt. Questions for further thought:  If a person only created part of the object that caused the damage, why is he obligated?  Should the person who dug the first four feet of the pit also be obligated to join in paying the damages?  If a person enters my property and my animal injures his belongings, for instance my animal eats his expensive leather shoes, why am I not obligated?  Could there be a way that I might become obligated for this type of damage?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe third mishnah of Bava Kamma continues to give us introductory information to the general laws of damages which will be learned throughout the tractate.  The previous mishnahs dealt with the causes of injury (mishnah one) and the type of property for which one would be liable if damaged (mishnah two).  Mishnah three basically deals with the judiciary procedure through with the damages will be assessed.",
                    "<b>1. Assessment [of injury] in money or things worth money must be made before a court of law and by witnesses that are free and Children of the Covenant (Jews). 2. Women may be parties in [suits concerning] injury. 3. The injured and the injurer [in certain cases may share] in the compensation.</b> 1. The first clause of the mishnah deals with assessing both the monetary amount of the damages  and the monetary evaluation of the payment that the injurer will give to the injured party.  For instance, if my ox gores your ox and your ox dies, we need to go to the court to assess two things:  1)  how much your ox was worth, 2)  how big of a piece of land must I give you in order to compensate you for your loss.  These assessments must be done in front of a court, which according to Jewish law must have three judges.  The witnesses who testify in cases involving the laws of damages must be free and  Jewish. 2. The second clause of the mishnah states that with regards to damage law, men and women are equal.  This means that if a man or his property damages a woman or her property, or a woman or her property damages a man or his property, in all cases we judge according to the same law.  Perhaps the reason why the mishnah feels the necessity to state this law is that the Torah uses the word “ish”, man, in many of the verses concerning damage law (Exodus 21:33, 35, 37, Exodus 22:4, 6, 9, 13).  One may have explained that according to the Torah only men’s damages are considered to be important.  The mishnah states the opposite, that women are also a part of damage law (see also Exodus 21:28). 3. The final clause of the mishnah refers to the case of “half damages”.  When an ox that is not known to gore gores another ox, the owner of the goring ox is only obligated for half damages, since his ox was not known to be a “goring ox”.  In this case it is as if the injurer pays half for the dead ox and the injured also pays half.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Why must property evaluation be done in front of the court?  Why can’t people just come to an agreement?<br>• We have seen now in several mishnahs that damage laws as described in the Torah and in the mishnah apply only to free Jews?  Why do you think this is so?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Five [agents of damage] rank as harmless and five as an attested danger. Cattle are not an attested danger to butt, push, bite, lie down, or kick. The tooth [of an animal] is an attested danger to eat that which is for it; The leg [of  an animal] is an attested danger to break [things] as it walks along; So also is a warned ox [an ox that has gored before]; And an ox that damages in the domain of the damaged party, and human beings.<br>The wolf, the lion, the bear, the leopard, the panther and the snake all rank as attested danger.  Rabbi Eliezer says:  When they are tame they are not attested danger, but the snake is always an attested danger.<br>What is the difference between that which is  harmless and that which is an attested danger?  The harmless pays half-damages from its own body and the attested danger pays full damages from the best property (of its owner and.</b><br>This mishnah introduces us to an extremely important concept in Mishnaic damage law, that is the difference between agents of damage which are likely to damage and those that are not likely to damage.  The first are called “muad”, warned or attested danger and the second are called “tam”, innocent, or usually harmless.  We will continue to talk about these concepts as we proceed to learn Bava Kamma.  The major difference between these two types of agents of damage is that a person is obligated for full restitution on the first type and only half restitution for damages done by the second type.  The idea lying behind this concept is that a person who owns, for instance, an animal that is likely to cause a certain type of damage should be aware of this and therefore guard the animal more carefully.  The Torah already speaks of this concept in Exodus 21:29 with regards to the ox that is known to gore.<br>The mishnah lists various types of damaging agents and categorizes them all into things which are likely to cause damage and things that are unlikely to do so.  Furthermore, the beginning mishnah distinguishes between different activities of a domesticated animal, some of which the animal is likely to do and some that it is unlikely to do.  For instance, a normal cow is unlikely to kick and therefore if it causes damage by doing so, the owner is only obligated half damages (section 1a).  However, the cow is likely to trample on things over which it walks(section 1c), and therefore if it damages in this manner, the owner is obligated for full restitution.  Wild animals are always likely to damage (section 2) and therefore if one owns a wild animal he will be obligated for full restitution for any damage the animal might cause.  Human beings (section 1f) who cause damage are always obligated full restitution.<br>Section 3 explains the two differences between harmless and attested agents of damage.  The first I already explained in the introduction.  The second difference is that if the owner of a harmless agent of damage becomes obligated to pay damages, he must only make restitution up to the value of the animal that caused the injury.  For instance if my cow that is worth 1000 dollars should kick you, thereby breaking your 5000 dollar Rolex diamond and gold watch, I am only obligated to pay 1000 dollars.  Even though half damages are 2500 dollars I cannot be obligated more than the total value of the cow that caused the injury. Kicking is not an attested form of damage, at least for a cow.  However, if my cow were to do the same action, however this time on your property, I would have to pay the full 5000 dollars (see section 1e).<br>For further explanation of the concepts of “tam” and “muad” see the Steinsaltz Reference Guide, pages 212 and 272.  One can also find entries there for “shen” (tooth), page 268, “shor” (ox), page 264), regel (leg), page 257, and “adam muad laolam” a person is always an attested danger), page 158.  The concepts of “hezi nezek” (half damages), page 193 and “nezek shalem” (full damages), page 228, are explained there as well,.   Again, we will continue to learn these concepts as we proceed."
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>How is the leg [of a beast] an attested danger to break [what it tramples upon] as it walks along? A beast is an attested danger [only] in so far as it goes along in its usual way and breaks [an object]. If it kicked, or if small stones were tossed out from beneath its feet and it thus broke other vessels, one pays half damages. If it trampled upon a vessel and broke it, and this [broken vessel] fell upon another vessel and broke it, for the first one pays full damages and for the other half damages.<br>Fowls (chickens and are an attested danger in so far as they go along in their usual way and break [objects]. But if the fowl had its feet entangled, or if it was jumping and it thereby broke any vessel one pays half damages.</b><br>This mishnah deals with damages done by an animal through trampling.  We learned in the mishnah at the end of chapter one that when an animal causes damages in a usual manner, meaning it is an attested danger (muad) for that damage, the owner is obligated to make full restitution.  However, if the damages are done in an unusual manner, for which the animal is an unattested danger (tam), the owner is only obligated to make half restitution.  This mishnah continues to deal with these concepts with regards to damages done by trampling.<br>The first section of the mishnah deals with damages done by a beast, meaning a domesticated animal, cow, sheep or goat, by trampling on another object.  If the damage is done in an anticipated, usual manner, the owner is obligated for full damages.  She should have watched over her animal, and since she did not, she is obligated to make full restitution.  Section 1c brings up a strange circumstance whereby with one action the animal damages two vessels.  For the first vessel the owner is obligated for full restitution and for the second vessel only half restitution.<br>The second section of the mishnah basically states that the same is generally true for damages done by fowl.  They too are attested dangers to damage while walking in their usual manner.  Section 2a brings up special circumstances in which the fowl damaged in an unusual way, and therefore the owner is only obligated for half restitution."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>How is the tooth [of a beast] an attested danger to eat that which it is fit to consume? A beast is an attested danger to eat fruit and vegetables. [If however] it ate clothing or utensils [the owner] pays only half damages.<br>When does this apply? [This applies] in the domain of the damaged party But if it was within the public domain, the owner is not liable.<br>If [the beast] benefited, [the owner] pays what it benefited.<br>How does [the owner] pay what [the animal] benefited? [If it ate] from the middle of the marketplace, [the owner] pays what [the animal] benefited. [If it ate] from the sides of the marketplace, [the owner] pays for the damage [the animal] did. [If it ate] from in front of the store [the owner] pays for what [the animal] benefited. [If it ate] from inside the store [the owner] pays for the damage [the animal] did.</b><br>The previous mishnah taught us the laws dealing with damages done by an animal’s “regel” leg through walking (trampling).  This mishnah teaches damages done by an animal’s “shen” or tooth.  Note that the mishnah does not deal with vicious biting by an animal but with an animal that damages by eating.  The laws in this mishnah are related to Exodus 22:4 which speaks of a crop-destroying beast.  Our mishnah will deal with several issues:  1)  what does an animal eat, thereby causing its owner to become liable; 2)  differences in liability based on where the animal eats; 3)  two different levels of liability, a greater level in which the owner is obligated to pay the actual cost of damages, and a lesser level in which the owner pays that which the animal actually benefited.<br>There are really three parts to the mishnah.  The first section tells us that an owner is only liable when an animal eats things that an animal normally eats.  For instance, if my dog goes into your house and eats your cupcakes, I am liable.  However, if he eats your mail, I am liable only for half damages.<br>The second section deals with where the damages are done.  I am liable when my animal goes onto your property to damage.  I am not liable if you carelessly leave your things in the public domain and my animal eats them.  However, the end of the mishnah returns and refines this clause.  If you leave things on the side of the public domain, that is not considered careless and the owner of the damaging animal would be liable.<br>Finally, in sections three and four we introduce a new type of payment, compensation for that which the animal benefited and not for the damage done.  For instance if you leave an expensive cut of steak in the public domain and my animal eats it the damages may be 100 dollars.  However, since I would not feed my animal steak, rather I would usually feed her cheap dog food, I am only obligated for the amount of dog food that I will now not have to feed her, since she already ate.  Paying for the benefit is usually much less that the actual damages.<br>You should note the highly formulaic nature of this mishnah.  It teaches many laws but uses few words.  (This is especially true in the Hebrew.  In the English I have added words to make the mishnah read better).  The mishnah repeats the same structures and phrases over and over again, as does the previous mishnah.  Remember, this is oral law, recited and memorized orally.  Having repeated structures and few words makes the mishnah much easier to remember and repeat.<br>Questions for further thought:<br> What is the difference between in front of the store and in the store?  From this mishnah, can you imagine how their stores were set up?<br> What might the law be if I did regularly feed my dog expensive steak?<br> What might the law be if my dog is accustomed to eating shoes, and he goes onto your property and eats your shoes?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a dog or a goat jumped from a roof and broke vessels, [the owner] must pay full damages, since they are attested dangers.<br>A dog that took a cake [while there was a cinder attached] and went to a stack of grain and ate the cake and burned the stack of grain, For the cake [the owner] pays full damages And for the stack of grain [the owner] pays half damages.</b><br>This mishnah deals with damages done by either dogs or goats.  The important principle to remember when reading this mishnah is that a person is obligated full damages when the damager is an attested danger (muad) and only half damages when the damager is an unattested danger (tam).  One is obligated to guard animals in one’s possession which attested dangers and therefore if one fails to do so, the restitution which must be made is higher.  Furthermore, we have learned several times already, that animals can be muad for those actions which they are likely to do and tam for those that they are unlikely to do.  For instance in the previous mishnah we learned that an ox is muad to eat grain but tam to eat clothing.  Over the first the ox’s owner will pay full damages and over the second half damages.<br>Evidently dogs and goats were likely to damage by jumping off roofs.  Therefore, there owner must prevent them from doing so and if she fails, she is obligated to pay full damages.<br>In the second section of the mishnah we learn that dogs are likely to eat cake (I know my dog is!), but unlikely to burn down stacks of standing grain.  Therefore for the cake one is obligated for full damages and for the stack only half damages.<br>Questions For Further Thought<br> Is there a new principle which we are learning from the second clause of the mishnah?  In other words, what might you have thought had not this clause been taught?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Which kind of animal is accounted harmless ( and which is an attested danger (? An attested danger is one that people have given testimony about [that it damaged] for three days. A harmless one is one that has refrained from damage for three days. This is according to Rabbi Judah.<br>Rabbi Meir says, An attested danger is one that people have given testimony about three times. A harmless one is one that children can touch and it will not gore.</b><br>We have several times already discussed the two types of danger:  a muad which is an attested danger and a tam, which is harmless, meaning something that is not expected to cause damages.  However, we have mostly discussed the different consequences of being a muad or being a tam.  The owner of a muad that causes damage will pay full damages from the best of his land while the owner of a tam that damages will only pay half damages which cannot exceed the value of the damaging animal (see Mishnah 1:4).  This mishnah discusses how an animal can move from the status of a tam to the status of a muad and vice versa, how an animal that is muad can revert to the status of tam.<br>In this mishnah we see a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah, two of the most prevalent Rabbis in the Mishnah. According to Rabbi Judah in order for a tam animal to become muad people must testify against the animal on three different days.  However, according to Rabbi Meir it is enough that people testify against the animal three times on one day for it to become a muad.<br>Similarly the Rabbis dispute how a muad would revert to being a tam.  According to Rabbi Judah all it would need is three days, in which it had the opportunity to gore and yet it didn’t do so.  However, according to Rabbi Meir it needs to be harmless enough for children to touch.  Otherwise it remains a muad."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages.<br>But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.”<br>Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the said to him:  “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred:  if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].<br>He said to them:  “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn.  Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot.  Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the said to him:  “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred:  if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].</b><br>This mishnah deals with one of the clauses from mishnah four of chapter one, which stated that the owner of an ox that damages on the property of the damaged party is obligated for full damages.  If the same ox had committed this type of damage in the public domain the owner would only be obligated half damages.  However, since a person should be extra careful when they bring their animal onto another person’s property the owner is more liable.  Being a father of two little children, the following, albeit imperfect analogy, comes to mind.  If I bring an expensive toy over to my son’s friend’s house, and one of the children breaks it, I believe I am at fault.  However, if someone brings their child over to my house, and breaks something I believe that they should be at fault.  There are many more analogies that one could make; this was just an example.<br>One important note with regards to learning the mishnah.  We will see a dispute between the sages and Rabbi Tarfon, and as part of this dispute the sages will state that, “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred.”  This principle means that when you learn a law regarding one situation from a law regarding a similar situation, the inferred law does not need to be stricter than the original law from which it was inferred.  This principle is learned from Numbers 12:14 where God punishes Miriam for speaking against Moses.  God says, “If her father spat in her face, would she not bear her shame for seven days?  Let her be shut out of camp for seven days.”  God says that had her father rebuked her, Miriam would have been punished for seven days.  One might have thought that God’s rebuke would carry an even more serious consequence.  The Torah teaches us the aforementioned principle that the inferred law, the length of Miriam’s punishment when God rebukes her, is not stricter than the law from which it was inferred, the length of Miriam’s punishment had her father rebuked her.<br>This is a long mishnah and is not a simple one, but we will try in any case to explain briefly.  The sages and Rabbi Tarfon argue at length whether an ox that gores or does some other unusual form of damage in the private domain of the one who is injured would be obligated full or half damages.  Rabbi Tarfon’s initial argument in section 3 is based on the following chart.<br>Public Domain<br>Private domain of him that is injured<br>Horn<br>Half damages<br>Acc. to Rabbi Tarfon full damages.<br>Foot and tooth<br>Exempt<br>Full damages<br>Rabbi Tarfon claims that since we are lenient on damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain and yet strict in the private domain, we should also be strict in the private domain on damages caused by the horn, since after all we were relatively strict in the public domain.  The other sages reply that by the means of this type of logical argument one cannot extend the liability for damages caused by the horn, beyond what we already know, that one is liable for half damages.<br>Rabbi Tarfon’s second argument in section 4 is a different variation on his first argument.  He claims that he is not learning liability for damages done by the horn in the private domain from damages done by the horn in the public domain.  Rather he emphasizes that he is learning from damages done by the foot and tooth in the private domain, in which case one should not say that one cannot extend the liability, as the sages argued with him.  Again the sages reply with the same reply they gave in section 3a.  In their opinion, no matter how you phrase it, Rabbi Tarfon’s argument is based on the relative strictness of damages done by the horn in the public domain.  Since this is so, the law cannot be extended further by an argument based on logic."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThis mishnah deals with damages caused by a human being, a topic that was mentioned briefly in chapter one mishnah four.  There we learned that a person was always considered to be muad, or an attested danger.  This mishnah explains deals with that concept, that a human being is a muad.",
                    "<b>Human beings are always an attested danger, whether the damage is caused inadvertently or deliberately, whether the person who caused the damage is awake or asleep. If a man blinded his fellow’s eye or broke his utensils he must pay full damages.</b> A person who damages is always considered to be a muad, attested danger, and as such he will always pay full damages. The idea is that a person cannot claim that something was accidental and thereby exempt herself from culpability.  For instance if I throw something heavy out my window and it hits someone’s car, I cannot claim that it was an accident and that I didn’t mean to do it.  Even if I go to sleep next to something that belongs to someone else, and in my sleep I roll over and break the item, I will always be obligated. Questions for further thought: Why should a human being always be a muad?  Why not exempt her when she causes damages inadvertently?"
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe following two mishnayot (plural of mishnah) deal with damages that a person’s possessions might cause in the public domain.  In general if a person leaves something in the public domain and someone else comes along and breaks it the person who broke it is not obligated to pay for the broken item.  Furthermore, if the person who breaks the object is also injured while doing so, the owner of the object will be liable for his injuries.",
                    "In the first section of mishnah one we learn that a person does not have the right to leave his objects in the public domain.  Therefore if he should do so and another should come along and break the object, the person who broke it is exempt and if he should be injured the owner is liable.",
                    "<b>If a man’s jug broke in the public domain, and another slipped on the water, or was hurt by the potsherds, he is liable. Rabbi Judah says:  “If he [broke the jug] with intention, he is liable, But if he broke it without intention he is not liable.”</b>  In section 2 Rabbi Judah teaches us a new principle, that of intention.  If a person accidentally put a damaging object into the public domain he is not liable for subsequent damages.  One is only liable if he put the damaging object into the public domain on purpose."
                ],
                [
                    "The second mishnah lists some common ways in which a person might put a damaging object into the public domain.",
                    "In section 2 we learn that even though he may have tried to keep them out of people’s way, if they are harmful materials he is responsible for subsequent damages. One might want to consider the implications these mishnayot have on modern ecological problems.  The sages considered the public domain to belong to everyone and as such no one was allowed to place there potentially dangerous material.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What is the difference between the cases in clause 2 of the first mishnah and clause 1 of the second mishnah?<br>• Rabbi Judah distinguishes between deliberate and inadvertent breaking of the jug.  Evidently the sage(s) who taught the clause preceding Rabbi Judah did not make such a distinction.  According to them one would be obligated even if the jug broke accidentally.  What is the logic behind this opinion?<br>• The first clause of mishnah one says that when one stumbles on a jug left in the public domain he is not obligated.  What might the law be if he broke it with intent?  Would he still be exempt or would he be obligated?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe first mishnah we deal with today continues to discuss the topic of damages caused by a person’s property in the public domain.  We learned in the previous two mishnayoth that if a person brings his belongings out to the public domain and someone damages them, the damager is not liable.  Furthermore if someone is injured by these belongings, their owner is liable.  This mishnah will add in a third principle:  if a person brings an item out to the public domain, an item which is potentially damaging to others, any person who finds that item can take it.  In other words, the owner of the item is punished for endangering other people’s safety.\nToday’s second mishnah deals with the liability of a person who trips in the public domain and thereby causes damage to another.",
                    "In mishnah three a person put out straw and stubble in order to make fertilizer for his field.  The mishnah states that this is an illegal action, the consequences of which are liability for damages done to others and loss of property.  Note the double punishment:  1)  anyone can claim the straw and stubble, meaning they are not really his anymore;  2)  nevertheless if someone is injured by them, we make the owner, who is not really the owner anymore, pay for the injuries.  Evidently the mishnah sees bringing the straw and stubble out to the public domain as a grave offense.",
                    "<b>If a man turned over a piece of cattle dung in the public domain and another was injured thereby, he is liable for injury.</b>  Section two deals with a situation where a person saw an ownerless piece of dung in the public domain.  (Believe it or not, people wanted to own this dung for fertilizing.)  By turning it over, he has taken possession of the dung.  Therefore if someone else is injured by it, he is obligated.  The mishnah teaches that once you technically own something, you now have to make sure it doesn’t injure someone else. Mishnah four teaches us the principle that accidentally stumbling is not an excuse for causing damages.  Although the person who tripped certainly did not intend to do so, and probably caused damage to the things he himself was carrying (pots), he is still liable. He should have walked more carefully.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What is the difference between Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s opinion and the statement that immediately preceded him?   Is there even a disagreement in this mishnah?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Two pot-sellers were walking one behind the other and the first stumbled and fell, and the second fell on the first, the first one is liable for the injury caused to the second.</b> Mishnah four teaches us the principle that accidentally stumbling is not an excuse for causing damages.  Although the person who tripped certainly did not intend to do so, and probably caused damage to the things he himself was carrying (pots), he is still liable. He should have walked more carefully.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Mishnah four uses the example of pot-sellers.  Why use this example?  What piece of information might the mishnah be teaching by using this example and not, for instance regular pedestrians?<br>• What are some modern day situations that are similar to these mentioned in the mishnah?  How does modern law differ?  How is it the same?To sign up for the Mishnah Yomit project visit www.mishnahyomit.org or www.uscj.org.To receive hard copies of Mishnah Yomit please write to Dr. Morton Siegel, United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, 155 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY  10010"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>This one comes carrying his jar and another one comes carrying his beam: this one’s jar is broken by that one’s beam, [The owner of the beam] is exempt, since this one has the right to walk along and this one has the right to walk along.<br>If the owner of the beam came first and the owner of the jar came after, and the jar was broken by the beam,  the owner of the beam is exempt. If the owner of the beam stopped [walking suddenly], he is liable. If [the owner of the beam had said] “Stop” to the owner of the jar, he is exempt.<br>If the owner of the jar came first and owner of the beam came after, and the jar was broken by the beam, [the owner of the beam] is liable. If the owner of the jar stopped [walking suddenly],he is exempt. If [the owner of the jar had said} “Stop” to the owner of the beam, he is liable.</b><br>This mishnah continues to deal with the subject of damages done by a human being in the public domain.  The basic topic is damages done by people carrying different objects and bumping into each other.  One should note that although this mishnah (and most mishnayoth) deal with specific topics, their relevance is far greater than the immediate material learned.  We are learning here about such important issues as individual rights which conflict with the individual rights of others.  From the specific examples of the mishnah we can learn many principles about the public rights that people have, rights that may occasionally come into conflict with others’ rights.  As one learns these mishnayoth please try to extract from them general principles and think about how they apply in other circumstances, perhaps circumstances relevant to modern societal problems.<br>This mishnah lists three scenarios regarding people walking in the public domain, one carrying a beam and one carrying a jar.  In all of the scenarios the jar is broken by the beam and the mishnah needs to decide if the owner of the beam is liable. In section one the beam-owner and jar-owner are evidently walking together, meaning neither one is walking in front of the other.  The owner of the jar has the right to walk in the public domain without being damaged.  Therefore if the owner of the beam walks into him he is liable.  He should have watched where he was going.<br>In the second clause the owner of the beam was walking in front of the owner of the jar.  If the jar-owner walks into him, it is his own fault and the beam-owner is exempt.  If, however, the beam-owner stops suddenly he is obligated.  He should have realized that stopping suddenly might cause the other person to walk into him.  Therefore if he didn’t stay “stop” he is liable, but if he did say “stop”, thereby warning off the jar-owner he is exempt.<br>The third section reverses the scenario that we saw in the second section:  this time the jar-owner is walking first.  Therefore if the beam-owner walks into him he is obligated. If, however, he stopped suddenly without warning the beam-owner the beam-owner will be exempt."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe first mishnah we will learn today continues to deal with damages caused by people bumping into each other in the public domain.\nThe second mishnah, the seventh of the chapter, deals with a person who is chopping wood and a chip flies off and injures someone else.  The new topic here is damages caused by a person’s livelihood to other people.  The mishnah teaches us that although a person has a right to work in a profession that he/she may choose, that profession cannot cause damage to other people.",
                    "<b>[If] two were walking along in the public domain, the one running and the other walking, or both running and they injured one another, neither is liable.</b> Mishnah six teaches again that people have the right to walk in the public domain and if someone bumps into them, they will not be liable for damages, unless they should have seen the person, as we learned yesterday.  The new element in this mishnah is running.  One might have thought that running in the public domain is by its nature dangerous, and therefore anyone who does so will be liable for any damages he/she causes.  The mishnah says no, a person has the right to run in the public domain.  Running in and of itself is not a criminally negligent activity and therefore does not carry with it an added degree of liability.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Yesterday I suggested to analogize the mishnah’s descriptions of accidents in the public domain to traffic accidents in our society.  What might be a modern equivalent to running?  Try to think of something that is inherently more dangerous but still legal and does not carry with it any extra liability.  Is there such a thing?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>[If] a man was splitting wood in the private domain and injured anyone in the public domain, or if he was in the public domain and injured anyone in the private domain, or if he was in a private domain and injured anyone in another private domain, he is liable.</b> Mishnah seven teaches that if a person while chopping wood damages another person, no matter where the chopping is done and no matter where the damages are done, the wood-chopper is liable.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Based on mishnah seven, would you think a person would be liable if while chopping wood on his own property he damages someone who has entered his property?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If two oxen which were accounted harmless hurt one another, the owner pays half-damages for that one which suffered the greater hurt.<br>If both were attested dangers full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt.<br>If one was accounted harmless and the other was an attested danger, that which was an attested danger as against that which was accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while that which was accounted harmless, as against that which was an attested danger, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered.<br>So, too, if two men hurt one another, full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt.<br>If a man and an ox which was accounted harmless hurt one another, the man as against the ox accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while the ox accounted harmless, as against the man, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other suffered. Rabbi Akiva says:  “Even if an ox accounted harmless hurt a man, full damages must be paid for that one which suffered the greater hurt.</b><br>This mishnah returns to deal with a subject that we dealt with in the last mishnah of chapter one and in the fourth and fifth mishnayoth of chapter 2 and that is the goring ox.  Remember, there are two types of goring oxen, one that is a previously attested danger (muad), who has been testified against.  The second type is innocent (tam) meaning he is not a previously attested danger.  When a muad damages the owner will pay full damages from the best of his land.  When a tam damages the owner will pay half damages from the value of the tam itself.  This means that the upper limit of liability will be the value of the damaging animal.<br>We will continue to deal with the goring ox for the next two and a half chapters.  I will not be explaining the concepts of tam and muad every time we encounter them.  I will try to reference places where I did explain them.  If you are wondering why the mishnah is so fascinated by the goring ox, it is due to the fact that the Torah mentions the ox quite frequently (Exodus 21:28-32, 35-36).  It is indeed the paradigm for the damaging animal.<br>The rendering of this mishnah into sensible English is very difficult since the mishnah speaks in shorthand.  However, the explanation should make more sense to you.<br>The first section deals with two harmless oxen that gore each other.  In general the owner of each is obligated to pay half damages to the other.  Here we figure out what was the greater damage and the owner of the less injured ox will pay half of that amount.  A table will help.<br>Value of ox before injury<br>Value after injury<br>Damages<br>Amount owed<br>100 (tam)<br>30<br>70<br>35<br>50  (tam)<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>In this case the owner of the ox worth fifty will pay twenty-five to the owner of the ox worth 100.<br>In the second case both of the animals were muad and will therefore pay full damages.   Our table now looks like this:<br>Value of ox before injury<br>Value after injury<br>Damages<br>Amount owed<br>100 (muad)<br>30<br>70<br>70<br>50 (muad)<br>30<br>20<br>20<br>In this case the owner of the ox worth fifty will pay fifty to the owner of the ox worth 100.<br>In the third case one ox was muad and one was tam.  The muad will owe half damages and the tam full damages.  According to our example in this case the animal worth 100 was a muad and therefore will owe full damages for the animal worth 50.  The animal worth 50 is a tam and will therefore pay half damages for the animal worth 100.   Our table now looks like this:<br>Value of ox before injury<br>Value after injury<br>Damages<br>Amount owed<br>100 (muad)<br>30<br>70<br>35<br>50 (tam)<br>30<br>20<br>30<br>In this case the owner of the ox worth fifty will pay 5 to the owner of the ox worth 100.<br>The fourth case of the mishnah deals with human beings who injure one another.  Since a human being is always a muad (see chapter one mishnah four), this is similar to case number two.<br>The fifth and final case deals with a human being (who is always muad) and a harmless ox (tam) who injure one another.  This case is similar to case number three.  We will nevertheless bring a new table.<br>Value before injury<br>Value after injury<br>Damages<br>Amount owed<br>1000-- human (muad)<br>500<br>500<br>250<br>50--ox (tam)<br>20<br>30<br>30<br>In this case the owner of the ox will pay the human 220.  Rabbi Akiva disagrees.  According to him an ox that injures a human being always pays full damages as if it was a muad.  Therefore in the previous scenario the owner of the ox will pay 470 to the human."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nOur mishnah is concerned with the scenario mentioned in Exodus 21:35 (translation from JPS Tanakh):  “When a man’s ox gores his neighbor’s ox and it dies, they shall sell the live ox and divide its price, they shall also divide the dead animal.”  This system of payment of damages (applicable only to a “tam” or harmless ox) works well when both animals are worth the same amount.  For instance if both the goring ox and the gored ox were worth 200 before the goring, and the carcass of the gored ox is 50, the two owners will sell both animals and split 200 and 50, leaving each with 125, or 75 less than the worth of their original ox.  75 is half of the 150 in damages caused to the gored ox, which matches our principle that when a tam injures, it’s owner pays half damages.  However this system does not work well if the two oxen are of differing values.  For instance, if the goring ox is worth 500 and the gored ox was worth 50 before the goring and its carcass is worth 30, the two owners will split 500 and 30, leaving each with 265. In this case the owner of the gored ox has benefited 215 since his original ox was worth 50.  Likewise the system in the Torah does not work if the gored ox was worth more than the goring ox.  If the goring ox was worth 50 and the gored ox 200 before the goring, and its carcass is worth 50, the two owners will split 50 and 50 leaving each with 50.  The owner of the gored ox did not receive half damages, which would have been 100.  The sages in our mishnah are dealing with the case in which we are able to fulfill the literal meaning of the verse in Exodus and still maintain our principle of half damages.",
                    "<b>If an ox worth 100 gored an ox worth 200, and the carcass is not worth anything, [the owner of the gored ox] takes the [live] ox.</b>  Section 1 describes a case where an ox worth 100 gored an ox worth 200.  The owner of the goring ox owes 100, which are half damages.  Since the carcass is not worth anything, the owner of the dead ox can just take the live ox as payment.  This case is significantly different than the case described in Exodus. There the two owners sold both the live ox and the carcass and split the proceeds evenly.  In this case there is no need for any selling or splitting of proceeds.",
                    "<b>If an ox worth 200 gored an ox worth 200 and the carcass is not worth anything, Rabbi Meir said, “If thus it was written, ‘they shall sell the live ox and divide its price, they shall also divide the dead animal’.</b>  Section 2, which contains Rabbi Meir’s opinion brings up a case closer to the one described in Exodus.  Here the goring ox and the gored ox are both worth 200, but the carcass is not worth anything.  The owner of the goring ox owes 100 and therefore the two owners sell the goring ox and split the proceeds.",
                    "<b>Rabbi Judah said to him:  “Such indeed is the halachah (, but you have fulfilled the verse ‘they shall sell the live ox and divide its price’, and you have not fulfilled the verse ‘they shall also divide the dead animal’. What case is this?  If an ox worth 200 gored an ox worth 200 and the corpse is worth 50, this one takes half of the live ox and half of the dead ox, and this one takes half of the live ox and half of the dead ox.</b>  In section 3 Rabbi Judah points out that Rabbi Meir’s scenario only fulfills half of the description of the case in Exodus, that is selling the live animal.  Rabbi Meir’s scenario does not include the need to sell the carcass, which is mentioned in Exodus. Therefore Rabbi Judah explains that Exodus describes the scenario as we explained in the introduction, where both oxen are worth 200 before the goring and the carcass is worth 50.  They sell both the live and dead oxen and split the proceeds, leaving both parties with 125, 75 less than the amount with which they started.  Since full damages were 150, 75 is equal to half damages.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• As I pointed out in the introduction, the Torah is only dealing with a circumstance in which both oxen were of equal value.  Why do you think the Torah only describes this circumstance?<br>• Following up the first question, the Torah teaches the principle of half damages.  Why do you think that it doesn’t just say that the injuring party pays half damages and instead it describes the process of selling both the live and dead animals?  To whose advantage is this system?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>There is one who is obligated for the act of his ox and exempt from his own act, and one who is exempt from his own act and obligated on the act of his ox.<br>[If] his ox caused embarrassment [to another person], he is exempt; [If, however] he caused embarrassment [to another person] he is obligated.<br>[If] his ox put out the eye of his slave or knocked out his [slave’s] tooth, he is exempt [from freeing the slave]; [If, however] he put out the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is obligated to free the slave.<br>[If] his ox injured his father or mother he is obligated; [If, however] he injured his father or mother he is exempt.<br>[If] his ox lit a heap of produce on fire on Shabbat, he is obligated; [If, however] he lit a heap of produce on Shabbat he is exempt, because he is liable for his life.</b><br>Our mishnah is concerned with the differences in obligation when a human being and an ox cause the same damage.  We will discuss these differences in the explanation.<br>One interesting note is that our mishnah is composed in highly formulaic language, which makes it easier to memorize.  We should always remember that the mishnah is oral Torah, recited and taught orally by the Sages.  As such it is important for it to be composed in the type of repetitive and formulaic language that could be memorized.  This mishnah is a prime example of this type of composition.<br> Section one is an introductory clause explaining the topic of the mishnah.  We will be dealing with cases in which the same injury which creates obligation when a human being was the cause, does not create obligation if an ox was the cause and vice versa.<br> Section two deals with the case of embarrassment payments.  In chapter eight of Bava Kamma we will learn that when a person injures another person one of the payments he makes is for the embarrassment caused to the other person.  We learn in our mishnah that since an ox does not know that he might cause embarrassment to another person, if the ox should injure another person, it’s owner is exempt from that payment.<br> Section three deals with damages done to a slave.  According to Exodus 21:26-27 if a man should put out the eye of his slave or knock out the slave’s tooth he must set the slave free.  Our mishnah tells us that this is only so if the owner himself does the act.  If the ox were to do the act, the owner is not obligated to free the slave.  Nor is he obligated for any financial payment since the slave is his property.  As such, anything owned by the slave belongs to the master, and therefore there would be no sense in the owner paying the slave.<br> Section four deals with striking one’s parents.  According to Exodus 21:15 if a person strikes his/her mother or father s/he is obligated for the death penalty.  In our mishnah we learn that if an ox that belonged to a person were to damage the person’s parents, the person is obligated for monetary payment, the same way he would be if the ox injured any person.  However, if the person himself struck the parent, he is exempt from monetary payment.  At the end of this mishnah we learn a new principle: when a person commits a crime that would potentially carry with it the death penalty and a monetary fine, he receives only the death penalty.  In Jewish law one generally can receive only one punishment per crime, namely the greater punishment.  If he is liable for death and money, he gets the death penalty only, that being the greater punishment.<br> Section five deals with a burning a heap of produce on Shabbat.  Lighting a fire on Shabbat is a capital crime (see for instance Exodus 35:2-3), as are all forbidden acts on Shabbat (if the person was warned beforehand, and understood properly the severity of his/her crime).  Destroying crops through fire is a crime that will carry with it a monetary penalty.  Therefore if an ox should cause the fire, it’s owner is obligated.  If however, a person should destroy the crops through fire on Shabbat, he will incur the death penalty.  In this case, as in the previous case, when a person is liable for the death penalty he is exempt from monetary payment."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If an ox was pursuing another ox and [the latter ox] was injured: this one claims “Your ox caused the injury, and this one claims “No, it was injured by a rock.” on the one who wishes to exact compensation lies the burden of proof.<br>If two oxen were pursuing a third ox: this one claims “Your ox caused the injury”, and this one claims “Your ox caused the injury”, they are both exempt. However, if they were both owned by one man, they are both obligated.<br>If one was big and was small: the [owner] of injured [ox] says that “The large one caused the injury”, and the [owner] of the injuring [ox] says, “The small one caused the injury”, [or] if one was a harmless ox ( and one was an attested danger ( the [owner] of the injured ox says, “The [ox which is an] attested danger caused the injury, and the owner of the injuring ox says, “The [ox which is] harmless caused the injury”, on the one who wishes to exact compensation lies the burden of proof.<br>If two oxen were injured, one big and one small, and two oxen caused the injury, one big and one small: [the owner] of the injured oxen says, “The big ox injured the big ox and small ox injured the small ox,” and the [owner] of the injuring oxen says, “The small ox injured the big ox and the big ox injured the small ox”; [or] if one was harmless and one was an attested danger: the [owner] of the injured oxen says, “The [ox which is an] attested danger injured the big ox, and the harmless [ox] injured the small ox”, the owner of injuring oxen says, “No rather the harmless [ox] injured the large ox and the [ox which is an] attested danger injured the small ox”, on the one who wishes to exact compensation lies the burden of proof.</b><br>The final mishnah of the third chapter is concerned with an extremely important principle in Jewish law, that the burden of proof is on the one who wishes to exact compensation.  In terms of modern law this means that the plaintiff must bring positive proof that the defendant owes him money in order for the court to find in his favor.  In absence of positive proof, the defendant will be found exempt.<br>We will explain each clause independently.  As you read the mishnah notice how the mishnah begins with simple cases and proceeds to the complicated cases. The mishnah is a didactic text:  once you learn the principles you can move onto more complicated problems.<br>This entire lengthy mishnah is based on one principle, that the burden of proof lies on the pursuant.<br> Section one deals with the simple case of one ox causing injury to another ox.  The owner of the injured ox must bring proof that his ox was injured by the other ox and not by a rock.  Since the burden of proof lies on him, without proof he will not be able to collect damages.<br> Section two deals with the case of two oxen chasing after one ox.  It is clear that one of the two oxen caused the injury but it is unclear which one.  Each of the independent owners of the two pursuing oxen claims that the other ox caused the injury.  Since the owner of the injured ox cannot prove which ox caused the injury, he can’t collect damages from either.  However, if both of the pursuing oxen were owned by the same person, he is liable.<br> Section three continues to deal with the situation of two potentially injuring oxen.  This time we learn that one of the two was a large, probably expensive ox, and the other was small.  They were both harmless oxen, and therefore we are dealing with payment of half damages.  It is in the owner of the injured ox’s best interest that the larger ox caused the damage, since when a harmless ox injures the damages paid can be no greater than the worth of the injuring ox.  Take for example the case where a large ox was worth 500 and the small ox 100 and the damages were 250.  The owner of the damaged ox would like to collect 125, half damages. If the small ox caused the injury the most he could recover is 100, the value of the small ox.  However, if the owner of the large ox caused the injury, he can recover the full 125.  In our mishnah there is a dispute over which animal caused the injury, and as usual the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff.<br> In the second half of section three instead of one of the potentially injuring oxen being large and the other being small, one is a harmless ox, which only pays half damages, and one is an attested danger which pays full damages.  Obviously it is in the best interests of the owner of the injured ox that the attested danger caused the damage, thereby allowing him to recover full damages.  Again the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff.<br> Section four further complicates our scenario.  This time two oxen caused injury to two oxen. However, the principles are all similar to the cases in section three.  The owner of the injured oxen would like to claim that the large ox injured the large ox or that the attested danger ox injured his large ox, and the owner of the injuring oxen claims the opposite.  As expected, the mishnah again declares that the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff."
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>[If] an ox has gored four or five other oxen, this one after this one: the owner shall pay to [the owner of] the last ox injured. If money remains, it will go to the [the owner of] the previously [injured ox]. If money still remains, it will go to the [the owner of the ox injured] previous to the previously [injured ox]. [The owner of] the last [injured ox] benefits, according to Rabbi Meir.<br>Rabbi Shimon says, “[If] an ox worth 200 gores an ox worth 200 and the carcass is not worth anything, this one gets 100 and this one gets 100. [If] it injures another ox worth 200, the [owner of the] ox last injured receives 100 and the owner of the previously injured ox receives 50. [If] it injures another ox worth 200, the [owner of the] ox last injured receives 100, the [owner of the] previously injured ox receives 50, and the first two receive 25.</b><br>This mishnah deals with the nature of the financial obligation of the owner of a harmless ox that has injured several oxen, without it ever becoming an attested danger.  According to one opinion, the owner of the injured ox becomes new owner of the harmless ox, when the latter causes injury.  The result of this ownership is that if the harmless ox causes further injury, the owner of the previously injured ox will have financial liability.  The second opinion is that the owner the injured ox becomes a partner in the ownership of the injuring ox.  In our mishnah we will see the manifestation of these two differing opinions.<br>First of all let us chart out two tables explaining the differences between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon.  In this chart all oxen were worth 200 before the injuries.  The numbers are how much each owner of the injured oxen will collect.<br>Amount left to owner of injuring ox<br>First ox injured<br>Second ox<br>Third ox<br>Rabbi Meir<br>0<br>0<br>100<br>100<br>Rabbi Shimon<br>25<br>25<br>50<br>100<br>According to Rabbi Meir, the owners of the previously injured oxen are considered the new owners of the injuring ox and therefore are fully responsible for subsequent damages.  Only if money remains from the value of the injuring ox can these owners recover money for their own injured oxen.<br>According to Rabbi Shimon the owners of the previously injured oxen are considered partners in the ownership of the injuring ox.  When an ox damages one other ox, they are now partners and they each get 100.  When it injures again, the owner of the currently injured ox is a partner who gets half, meaning 100 and the previous two owners become partners in an ox worth 100, and each gets 50.  If the ox should injure a third time, the owner of the currently injured ox is a partner and receives half, meaning 100.  The owner of the second injured ox is now a half partner in an ox worth 100 and he gets 50.  The fifty that is left in the worth of the original ox is split evenly between the original owner and the owner of the first injured ox, who are partners in that 50."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>An ox which is an attested danger for [injuring] its own kind, and is not an attested danger for [injuring] that which is not its own kind; or an attested danger for [injuring] human beings and not an attested danger for [injuring] beasts; or an attested danger for [injuring] children and not an attested danger for [injuring] adults that for which it is an attested danger [its owner] pays full damages, and that for which it is not an attested danger [its owner] pays half damages.<br>They said in front of Rabbi Judah: “What if it is an attested danger on the Sabbath, and it is not an attested danger during the week?” He said to them:  “For [injuries done on] Sabbaths [its owner] pays full damages and for [injuries done] during the week [its owner] pays half damages.” When will this ox be considered harmless? After it refrains from doing injury for three Sabbath days.</b><br>Our mishnah continues to discuss the meaning of the concepts of muad, an ox which is an attested danger, and tam, an ox which is considered harmless.  We have already mentioned many times that a muad is an ox that has already injured three times (see chapter 2 mishnah 4).  If it should damage again it’s owner will be obligated for full damages, and not half damages as is obligated the owner of a tam.  Our current mishnah will clarify that an ox (or any animal) can be considered a muad for some types of injury and a tam for others.<br>The first section of the mishnah deals with an ox that is known to damage certain types of animals or people but not others.  For instance it is known to damage other oxen, but not sheep, or people but not animals, or children but not adults.  In each of these cases the ox can be treated as a muad for specific things but a tam for others.  The reasoning is that since it is known to injure, for example children, its owner must be extra careful around children.  However, around adults, the owner can be less concerned and therefore he will only be liable for half damages.<br>The second section of the mishnah discusses the idea that an ox might be known to damage on certain days.  This is a somewhat more perplexing idea.  After all, it seems logical that an ox might become more testy around other oxen and be less bothered by sheep.  Section one’s distinctions are therefore logical.  However, one might not imagine that an ox is smart enough to know the difference between days of the week.  Nevertheless, Rabbi Judah concludes that if we have evidence that an ox is more likely to attack on the Sabbath it could become a muad just for that day.  At the end of the mishnah we learn that in order for this ox to revert to tam status, it would have to refrain specifically from its muad behavior.  Therefore a muad for the Sabbath would have to refrain from injuring on the Sabbath itself, and not just during the week."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>An ox of an Israelite that gored an ox belonging to the Temple, or an ox belonging to the Temple that gored an ox of an Israelite, the owner is exempt, as it says, “The ox belonging to his neighbor” (Exodus 21:35), and not an ox belonging to the Temple.<br>An ox of an Israelite that gores an ox of a gentile, the owner is exempt.<br>And an ox of a gentile that gores the ox of an Israelite, whether the ox is harmless or an attested danger, its owner pays full damages.</b><br>Our mishnah deals with an ox owned by a Jew that gores either an ox that has been consecrated to the Temple in Jerusalem or an which belongs to a gentile.<br>The first clause of our mishnah is really a midrash halakhah on a verse from Exodus.  Midrash can loosely be defined as exegesis, in this case deriving something from a verse in the Torah.  Halakhah, is Jewish law, and therefore midrash halakhah is exegetically deriving a law from a verse, even when that law is not apparent from the simple sense of the verse.  Many of the laws in the mishnah are actually derived through midrash from the Torah.  However, the midrash, or scriptural derivation of the law, is not usually mentioned explicitly in the Mishnah.  The Mishnah is a code organized topically and not organized according to the organization of the Torah, and therefore its connection with the Torah is usually less apparent.  However, there are exceptions as we shall see in our mishnah.<br>Section one is a midrash on the word “his neighbor” in the verse “When a man’s ox injures his neighbor’s ox and it dies” (Exodus 21:35).  The Rabbis learned that “his neighbor” comes to exclude an ox that doesn’t belong to his neighbor but belongs to the Temple in Jerusalem.  A person can dedicate any of his property to the Temple.  If the dedicated property was able to be offered as a sacrifice, i.e. a cow, a sheep, a goat, a dove, the priests in the Temple would do so.  If not they would sell the property and use the proceeds for upkeep of the Temple.  In our mishnah a person’s privately owned ox injured an ox that had already been dedicated to the Temple or vice versa.  Since the Torah states “his neighbor” in these cases no damages are incurred.<br>Sections two and three deal with oxen of Israelites that injure oxen of gentiles and vice versa.  According to the mishnah if an Israelite ox injured the ox of a gentile the Israelite is exempt.  However, according to section three if a gentile ox injured an Israelite ox the gentile is obligated full damages, even if the ox was harmless, which usually means only half damages.  Section two is probably also based on a midrash, exegetical derivation, of the word “his neighbor” in the aforementioned verse in Exodus.  “His neighbor” only includes Jews and not gentiles.  As far as section three is concerned according to Maimonides it is meant to encourage the gentiles to protect their oxen from causing damages.<br>When learning mishnayot that deal with Jewish-gentile relations, one should try not to compare the situation to most of today’s world, where Jews and gentiles get along quite well.  In ancient times (and not so ancient times) Jews were persecuted by the non-Jews, their lands were often confiscated, and when they rebelled their Temple was destroyed.  In such an atmosphere it is easy to understand why Jews did not consider the gentiles to be their neighbors."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>[If] an ox of a person of sound senses gored the ox of a deaf-mute, an insane person, or a minor, [its owner] is obligated.<br>[If] an ox of a deaf-mute, an insane person or a minor, gored the ox of a person of sound senses, [its owner] is exempt.<br>[If] an ox a deaf-mute, an insane person or a minor gored, the court appoints a guardian over them, and [their oxen] are testified against in the presence of the guardian. [If] the deaf-mute became of sound senses, or the insane person recovered his reason, or the minor came of age, [the ox] is thereupon deemed harmless once more, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says, “It remains as it was before.”<br>An ox from the stadium is not liable to be put to death, as it says, “When it will gore” (Exodus 21:28), and not “When others cause it to gore.”</b><br>Our mishnah deals with oxen owned by deaf-mutes, insane people or minors that damage oxen owned by adults of sound-mind or are damaged by them.  We should note that in the ancient world deaf-mutes were considered to be unintelligent, probably because they had no way of communicating with the outside world.  We should remember that in those times the written word was much more scarce and almost all communication and learning was done orally.  It is therefore, little surprise, that deaf-mutes were considered to lack intelligence.  The three categories of people mentioned are therefore, according to the mishnah, all people who are not capable of fully knowing the consequences of their actions, and therefore cannot be held responsible for them.  Thankfully, in the modern world we have developed sign language and other forms of communication (including e-mail and the internet) that have allowed us to learn that people who cannot speak verbally or hear are no less intelligent than those who can.<br> Section one deals the ox of a person of sound senses that injures the ox of a deaf-mute, insane person or minor.  In this case the owner is obligated the same way that s/he would be obligated if the ox injured any person’s ox.<br> Section two deals with the ox of a deaf-mute, insane person or minor that gores another person’s ox.  In this case the owner of the injuring ox is not liable.  The mishnah considers these people not to be capable of protecting their oxen from injuring others, and therefore they are not liable.<br> Section three continues to deal with the problem of oxen that belong to deaf-mutes, insane people or minors from injuring.  Although these people are not responsible for their actions, this does not mean that the halakhah does not have the duty to protect the interests of others who are damaged by them.  Therefore, the mishnah institutes a process by which the court appoints a guardian over the oxen of the aforementioned people.  If the ox should henceforth damage three times, it will become an attested danger (muad) and the guardian will pay full damages from the estate of the deaf-mute, insane person or minor.<br> In section three clauses c through e, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose disagree concerning the case where the ox of a deaf-mute, an insane person or a minor was declared by the court to be an attested danger (muad) and then the status of the owner changed to that of an adult person of sound senses.  According to Rabbi Meir, the ox’s slate is cleaned and it returns to being a harmless ox (tam).  If it should injure again its owner will only be obligated half damages.  According to Rabbi Yose, the ox remains an attested danger and if it should injure again its owner will be obligated full damages.<br> Section four deals with a stadium ox, what we might call a fighting bull.  As is well known, the Romans entertained themselves by throwing slaves and other human beings into pits to fight animals to the death.  (Indeed some still find this entertaining).  In Exodus 21:28 we learn that oxen are obligated for death if they kill a person.  Our mishnah is a midrash on the words, “When it will gore” that begins this verse.  According to the midrash, or legal exposition, the verse deals with an ox that gores of its own will and not an ox that is put into the position where human beings are urging it to kill.  In this case, the ox is innocent and I might add one should wonder whether those in the stadium aren’t the ones with innocent blood on their hands."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If an ox gored a person and he died, if it was an attested danger [its owner] must pay the ransom, if it was accounted harmless he is exempt from paying the ransom. In both cases the ox is obligated for the death penalty.<br>So too [if it killed] a son or a daughter.<br>If it gored a male slave or a female slave its owner pays 30 sela, Whether [the slave] was worth a maneh or not even worth a dinar.</b><br>Until now tractate Bava Kamma has mostly been concerned with an ox that kills or injures another ox.  We learned that in such a case if the injuring ox was accounted harmless (tam) its owner will pay half damages and if it was an attested danger (muad) its owner will pay full damages.  The Biblical verses which are concerned with this subject are Exodus 21:35-36.<br>The mishnah now moves to a related subject, that of an ox that kills a human being.  The Biblical verses which are concerned with this subject are Exodus 21:28-32.  According to these verses from Exodus if an ox kills a human being several things must happen.  If it was a harmless ox, the ox is to be stoned and it is forbidden to derive any benefit from its meat.  If the ox was a “goring ox” meaning it was an attested danger and its owners did not prevent it from killing again, on principal its owners deserve the death penalty, in addition to the death penalty to be meted out on the ox.  However, the Torah allows for the owners to “ransom” their lives by paying a fine to the family of the person killed by the ox. The Torah emphasizes that the same is true if the ox killed a child.  Finally, the Torah sets an established ransom-amount for an ox that kills a slave.  Unlike a free person, for whom the Torah does not state the amount of the ransom, the owner of an ox that kills a slave will always pay 30 shekels.  Finally the Torah emphasizes that even in this case the ox is still killed. We should note an ox killing a human being is the only instance in which the Torah allows for the paying of a ransom.  If a person kills another person, the Torah demands the death penalty and does not allow the person to pay for his life.  Money can never equal life and therefore no payment can compensate for its loss.<br>Mishnah five codifies some of these laws and mishnah six begins to deal with exceptional circumstances in which an ox kills a human being.<br>Mishnah five basically explains the verses from Exodus 21:28-32 which we discussed in the introduction.  It may be somewhat puzzling to note how an ox that has killed can ever become an attested danger.  After all, after it has killed once it is obligated for the death penalty and it should not have the opportunity to kill a second and third time, in order to become an attested danger.  There should therefore never exist an ox that is an attested danger for killing.  There are at least two possible answers to this question.  Potentially the ox is an attested danger for goring, but has never killed a human being.  It could become an attested danger by goring other animals and then later get the death penalty for killing a human.  Second, it is possible that the ox killed other people without its being warned in the court.  It cannot officially become an attested danger until witnesses testify against it in court.  Therefore, although it may have killed several times, it is still a legally accounted harmless.<br>The rest of the mishnah is fairly straightforward.  With regards to the monetary amounts in section three, it would help to translate them all into one unit of money, namely a dinar.  A sela is four dinars, so 30 sela is 120 dinars.  A maneh is worth 100 dinars.  (In some versions of the mishnah it says 100 maneh, which would be 10,000 dinar.)  The mishnah states that no matter how much the slave is worth the owner pays thirty sela.  Whenever the Torah states a fixed amount as a fine, one must pay that amount whether or not the damage equaled the amount of the fine."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If an ox was rubbing itself against a wall and it fell on a person;<br>or if it intended to kill an animal and it killed a man;<br>or if it intended to kill a gentile and it killed an Israelite;<br>or if it intended to kill an untimely birth and it killed a viable infant,<br>it is exempt [from death by stoning].</b><br>Mishnah six deals with several instances in which an ox that kills another Jewish human being but unintentionally.  In section one the ox was only scratching its back and certainly had no intention to kill.  In section two the ox did have intention to kill but its intention was to kill an animal. In section three the ox did have the intention to kill a human being, but its intention was directed at killing a gentile.  According to the mishnah an ox that kills a gentile will not be judged in the same way as an ox that kills a Jew.  (With regards to Jewish-gentile relations see the discussion on chapter four mishnah three.)  In section four the ox did have intention to kill a Jewish human being, but that Jewish human being would not have been able to live.  (According to the Rabbis understanding of medicine a child born after eight months could not survive).  In all of these cases since the intention was to kill something for which the ox would not be liable for the death penalty the ox is exempt from the death penalty.  In other words we judge the ox by its intention and not by its actions."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nOur two mishnayot continue to deal with the ox that killed a human being.  As we learned previously, according to Exodus 21:28 an ox that has killed a human being is to be put to death and it is forbidden to derive any benefit from its meat.  Mishnah seven deals with an ox that is owned by someone other than an adult male, and the consequences its ownership might have on its sentence.  Mishnah eight deals with the case where someone tried to either dedicate the ox to the Temple or to ritually slaughter the animal before it was killed for being a goring ox.  As we shall see the effect of these actions are dependent on the time at which they were done.",
                    "<b>The ox of a woman, or the ox of orphans, or the ox of a guardian, or a wild ox, or an ox belonging to the Temple, or an ox belonging to a proselyte who died and has no inheritors, these are all liable for the death penalty. Rabbi Judah says, “A wild ox, or an ox belonging to the Temple, or an ox belonging to a proselyte who died are exempt from death, since they have no owners.”</b> Mishnah seven begins with a list of oxen owned by those other than adult Jewish males.  Although for various reasons one might have thought that these oxen are not liable for the death penalty, the mishnah decrees otherwise.  In all cases the ox is liable for the death penalty.  In section two Rabbi Judah disagrees with the opinion expressed in section one.  According to R. Judah if the ox does not have owners, the Torah does not demand that it be put to death.  Rabbi Judah’s opinion is probably based on a midrash on Exodus 21:29, which describes the process of warning the goring ox’s owners, a process which lead to the ox being declared an attested danger.  According to Rabbi Judah in order to fulfill the law mentioned in Ex. 21:28, namely killing the goring ox, one must be able to fulfill the law in verse 29, which would require the ox to have owners.  In other words since one cannot warn the owners, as verse 29 states, one need not execute the ox, as verse 28 states. A note is required about the laws of inheritance for a proselyte.  According to the Rabbis’ a proselyte does not “Biblically” inherit from anyone in his family that did not convert, but his inheritance is only ordained by the Rabbis themselves.  Therefore, when a proselyte dies without children or a spouse, his property would have no “Biblical” inheritors.  Since the requirement to stone the ox is a Biblical command, with regards to this law the ox is considered ownerless.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Why do you think the Rabbis allowed a person to derive benefit from a goring ox if they slaughtered it before the court pronounced the sentence?  Why shouldn’t the Rabbis be concerned that people will take advantage of this law and slaughter their goring oxen before the sentence is complete?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If an ox goes out to be stoned, and its owners dedicated it to the Temple, it is not considered dedicated. If he slaughtered it, its flesh is forbidden.<br>But if before its sentence was complete its owner dedicated it, it is dedicated. If he slaughtered it, its flesh is permitted.</b><br>Mishnah Eight deals with an owner of a goring ox who tried to “cheat the system” by either dedicating the ox to the Temple, and thereby getting credit for a sacrifice, or by ritually slaughtering the ox, and thereby getting food to eat and the leather from the hide.  We learned in the aforementioned verses in Exodus that the ox must be executed and its meat is forbidden for use.  Our mishnah tells us that this is so only if its sentence has already been pronounced by the court.  If it has not, and a person should either dedicate it or slaughter it, the person’s actions are valid and either the Temple or the person himself may derive benefit from the ox."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nAlthough we will learn only one mishnah today it really contains two distinct subjects.  The first section deals with an ox owner who gives his ox to a guardian.  Jewish law recognizes four different types of guardians (we will discuss their laws in detail when we learn tractate Bava Metzia):  a borrower, an unpaid guardian, a paid guardian and a hirer.  All four of these people receive an object from another person and they have varying degrees of responsibility to guard the object and varying rights to use the object.  Our mishnah will teach us that when an owner turns over his ox to any of the four guardians, they now become responsible for any damage the ox will cause while under their protection.\nThe second part of the mishnah deals with the duty an owner himself has to protect his ox from causing damage.  Exodus 21:29 states:  “If, however, that ox has been in the habit of goring, and its owner, though warned, has failed to guard it...” (JPS translation).  The sages in our mishnah will discuss the duty to guard a goring ox and the financial consequences of proper and improper guarding.",
                    "<b>If one handed it to an unpaid guardian, or to a borrower, or to a paid guardian, or to a hirer, they take the place of the owners; if the beast was an attested danger he pays full damages, and if it was accounted harmless he pays half damages.</b>  Section one states quite clearly that any time an owner turns his ox over to another person who has agreed to watch the ox, that person will be responsible for any damages that the ox causes under his guardianship.  The real point of this mishnah is that even an unpaid guardian, who neither gets use of the ox nor financial compensation for his guarding, still has liability for damages the ox will cause.  In other words, clearly a borrower should be liable in such a case, since he gets the use of the ox and doesn’t even have to pay for it.  A hirer also gets the use of the ox, even though he pays for it, so he too should be liable.  A paid guardian, while not getting use of the ox, is receiving financial compensation for his guardianship and therefore it is reasonable for him to be liable for damages.  However, an unpaid guardian does not receive anything in return and is in essence doing a favor for the owners.  The mishnah therefore emphasizes that even so he is liable if the ox should cause damage.",
                    "<b>If its owner had tied it with a halter, or locked it up properly, but it came out and caused damage, the owner is liable, whether it was an attested danger or accounted harmless, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says:  “If it was accounted harmless he is liable, but if it was an attested danger he is exempt, as it says, “and its owner did not guard it”, but this one has been guarded. Rabbi Eliezer says:  “Its only guarding is the knife.”</b>  Section two deals with the obligation an owner has to guard his ox.  According to Rabbi Meir, tying up an ox or locking it in a pen is evidently not enough protection to exempt one from damages the ox will cause.  Therefore, even if the owner performed these acts, he will still be obligated for damages the ox will cause. According to Rabbi Judah, with protection such as tying it up or locking it in, the owner exempts himself from liability for damages caused by an ox that is an attested danger.  There is something slightly perplexing with regards to Rabbi Judah’s statement.  In the case that he describes an owner may be more obligated for an ox that is a tam, accounted harmless, than for an ox that is a muad, an attested danger.  There are two possible answers to this point.  First of all, the Torah mentions “guarding” only with regards to the muad, attested danger.  Rabbi Judah may be reading the Torah literally.  He therefore states that only with regards to the muad is guarding relevant.  Guarding a tam will not exempt one from paying for its damages.  Secondly, according to the Talmud’s reading of Rabbi Judah’s opinion, if he ties up the ox which is a muad or he locks it in although he will not be obligated for full damages, he will be obligated for half damages.  In other words, according to the Talmud, Rabbi Judah does not hold the opinion that one could be more liable for a muad than for a tam.  ] Rabbi Eliezer believes that the only way to guarantee that an ox which is an attested danger will not cause damage again is to slaughter the ox.  In other words, even though he tied it up or locked it in, he is still obligated for full damages for the muad and half damages for the tam.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Why should the unpaid guardian be liable if the ox causes damages?<br>• According to Rabbi Meir, locking the ox in or tying it up is not sufficient to exempt one from damages the ox might cause.  What then must the owner do, according to Rabbi Meir, in order to properly guard the ox?<br>• What might be some modern equivalents to these laws?"
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nIn chapter three mishnah eight we learned an important principle with regards to monetary claims in Jewish law:  the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.  In order to recover money from the defendant the plaintiff must prove that he owes him money. In absence of such proof the defendant owes nothing. This is generally the position of the sages with regards to monetary claims.  However, there is another position that occasionally appears in the Mishnah.  According to this position in cases where there is doubt to whom the money belongs, the plaintiff and the defendant split the money.  Our mishnah goes according to this general rule and not the rule we learned previously that the burden of proof is on the defendant.\nThis mishnah and the mishnah previously learned (3:8) are a good example how the Mishnah is not exactly a law book.  A law book should not have contradictions between different laws.  The Mishnah occasionally does contain such contradictions.  The Mishnah is therefore more properly described as a collection of laws and traditions from which a capable judge could make a decision.",
                    "<b>If an ox gored a cow [and it died] and its newly born young was found [dead] at its side, and it is not known if the cow gave birth before the ox gored, or if after the ox gored the cow gave birth, the owner of the ox pays half damages for the cow and one quarter damages for the newborn.</b>  Section one deals with an ox that is accounted harmless that gores and kills a cow.  When the cow is discovered it also has dead newborn by its side.  The owner of the ox certainly owes half damages for the cow, as is the law for damages done by animals that are tam, accounted harmless.  However, it is unclear whether he owes half damages for the newborn as well.  If the ox gored the cow before it gave birth, than the goring must have caused the cow to miscarry.  In this case the owner of the ox will owe half damages for the newborn as well.  However, there is a possibility that the cow miscarried before the goring. In this case the owner of the ox will not owe any damages for the newborn.  In other words, the owner of the cow claims that the ox caused the miscarriage and that the owner of the ox owes half damages. The owner of the ox claims that the cow miscarried before the goring and that he does not owe for the newborn.  In such a case the owner of the ox pays one quarter damages, half of the amount in dispute.",
                    "<b>And also if a cow gored an ox and its newly born young was found at its side, and it is not known if the cow gave birth before she gored, or if after she gored before she gave birth, the owner pays half damages from the value of the cow and one quarter damages from value the newborn.</b>  Section two deals with a similar case, except the roles are reversed.  This time the cow gores and kills the ox.  When the goring is discovered, the cow has a newborn next to it (this time the newborn is alive).  Since the cow was accounted harmless (tam) it will pay half damages that cannot exceed the worth of the cow.  Let us say that the gored ox was worth 500, half damages being 250.  The cow was worth 200 after it gave birth and 250 while it was pregnant.  If it gored while pregnant, the owner of the cow owes 250.  In this case he will give over both the cow and her newborn.  However, if it gored after giving birth the owner owes 200.  After giving birth the newborn is already a separate entity not responsible to pay for the goring.  The two owners are disputing whether or not the value of the newborn should be considered in paying the damages for the gored ox.  According to our mishnah the owner of the gored ox can collect up to half payment from the cow.  If he is still owed money, he can collect one quarter payment, or half of the half damages that he is owed, from the newborn.  In our example he would collect the full 200 from the cow and 25 from the newborn.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What would be the law if this mishnah were to go according to the principle that the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a potter brought his pots into the courtyard of a householder without permission, and the householder’s cattle broke them, the householder is not liable. And if the cattle were injured by them (by the the owner of the pots is liable. But if he brought them in by permission the owner of the courtyard is liable.<br>If a man brought his produce into the courtyard of a householder without permission, and the householder’s cattle ate it, the householder is not liable. And if the cattle were injured by it (by the the owner of the produce is liable. But if he brought it in by permission the owner of the courtyard is liable.</b><br>The two mishnayoth which we will learn today are concerned with damages that occur on the property of the damaged party.  In mishnah two we will learn about a pottery maker or a produce seller who brings his ware onto another person’s property and it either causes damage or is damaged.  In mishnah three we will learn about a person who brings his ox onto another person’s property and again it either causes injury or is injured.  In both of these cases we will learn the following general rules:<br>1. If a person’s belongings are damaged after he brought them onto another person’s property without permission the owner of the property is not liable.<br>2. In such a case if a person’s belongings cause damage on another person’s property he is liable.<br>Sections one and two of mishnah two are very similar and can be explained simultaneously.   If a person brings his belongings onto another’s household without permission he is obligated for any damage his belongings will cause.  In addition he will not receive compensation if his belongings are damaged by the belongings of the owner of the household.  After all, the householder can say I never gave you permission to come onto my property.  In modern terms this would be called trespassing.  However, if he received permission to come onto the property the laws are reversed.  The mishnah explicitly states that if the person’s belongings were damaged the owner of the household, whose belongings caused the damage, is liable.  It can be assumed, although it is not stated explicitly, that in such a case if the person’s belongings caused damage to the belongings of the household owner he would not be liable."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man brought his ox into the courtyard of a householder without permission and the householder’s ox gored it or the householder’s dog bit it, the householder is not liable. If [the first man’s ox] fell into [the householder’s] cistern and polluted its water, he is liable. If [the householder’s] father or son was in [the cistern and it killed them] the ox’s owner must pay the ransom price. But if he had brought his ox in by permission the owner of the courtyard is liable.<br>Rabbi says:  “In no case is [the householder] liable unless he had agreed to watch over it.</b><br>The first two clauses of mishnah three are similar to what we learned in the previous mishnah.  We again learn that if a person brings his belongings onto another person’s property without permission and they are damaged he will not receive compensation and if they cause damages he is liable. In clause b we learn an additional law.  If when falling into the cistern the ox kills a person, the owner of the ox is obligated to pay the ransom price mentioned in Exodus 21:30.  As we learned in chapter four mishnah 5 when an ox kills a person, the owner of the ox is obligated to pay a ransom price to the family of the deceased.  In our mishnah we learn that falling into a cistern is similar enough to goring that the ox’s owner is obligated.<br>At the end of this mishnah we learn that Rabbi (Rabbi Judah Hanasi) holds an opinion different from that held in the anonymous previous portions of the mishnah.  According to Rabbi, allowing a person to enter one’s property is not tantamount to accepting upon oneself the obligation to watch over that person’s belongings.  When I allow you to bring your belongings onto my property, I may still assume that you will watch over your things.  Therefore, if they cause damage you are still obligated and if they are damaged I am exempt.  According to Rabbi, a person does not accept the responsibility for watching the belongings until he states so explicitly.  The other opinion in the mishnah held that by allowing a person to enter one’s property on is implicitly accepting upon himself the responsibility for that person’s belongings."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If an ox intended [to gore] another ox and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], its owner is not liable for the value of the offspring. But if a man intended to strike his fellow and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], he must pay the value of the offspring.<br>How does he pay the value of the offspring? They assess the value of the woman before she gave birth and the value after she gave birth.<br>Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said:  “If so, once a woman gives birth she is more valuable. Rather, they assess how much the offspring would be worth, and he pays it to the husband, or if she has no husband to his heirs.”<br>If she was a freed bondwoman or a proselyte no penalty is incurred.</b><br>Exodus 21:22 states:  “When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment is to be based on reckoning” (JPS translation).  According to the Torah, usually a person who accidentally kills another person cannot pay in order to atone for his crime.  However, in the case described in this verse the person did not kill an independent human being but rather he caused a miscarriage.  Therefore the Torah allows him to make financial compensation for the loss of the fetus/baby.  (I am attempting to be very careful about the sensitive issue of Judaism’s stance on the status of a fetus and on abortion.  One could potentially argue from this verse that according to the Torah a fetus is not equal to a born human being.  However, an exemption from murder charges for one who accidentally causes a miscarriage is not necessarily a blanket approval for abortion.)<br>Our mishnah deals with two subjects.  The first is a definition of the scenario in which this law will apply.  The second is an account of the payments required for causing the miscarriage.<br>Section one limits the application of the verse from Exodus to a case where a person caused a miscarriage.  After all the verse states, “When men fight…” and therefore it can be assumed that the law does not apply when an ox causes the miscarriage.  In this case the owner of the ox will pay for the damage done to the woman and not for the damage done to the offspring.<br>Section two begins a discussion of the payments made for the miscarriage.  According to the first opinion one evaluates the worth of the woman before the pregnancy and after the pregnancy and the difference is the payment for the offspring.  This payment is made to the husband, as we shall learn in section 3a.  The payment for the damages to the woman herself is a payment to the woman and the payment for the loss of the offspring is a payment to her husband.  According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel (section three), a pregnant woman is actually worth less than a non-pregnant woman.  In order to understand his words we must remember that in those times death during childbirth was all too common. A pregnant woman was in a dangerous situation and therefore her value is lower.  Once she gives birth her value will rise because she is out of the dangerous situation.  Therefore, we cannot use this system to evaluate the payments.  Rather, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, we estimate how much the offspring themselves would have been worth.<br>In section 3a we learn that if the woman’s husband died between the time of conception and the time of the miscarriage, the payments are an inheritance to his inheritors.  Section 4 is concerned with two women whose husbands are likely not to have inheritors.  There are two possibilities to understand this section.  First of all, if a woman is a bondwoman and is freed while pregnant, or a woman converts while pregnant, her husband or impregnator is no longer legally responsible or legally considered the father of the children.  Therefore, if someone should accidentally cause her to miscarry, there is no father that can collect the payment.  Alternatively this last section may deal with a freed bondwoman who marries a freed slave or convert or a convert who marries another convert.  The miscarriage occurs after this husband has died and before they have other children.  In this case the husband has no inheritors since converts and freed slaves do not have inheritors in their families from before they changed their status."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man dug a pit in a private domain and opened it into the public domain, or if he dug it in the public domain and opened it into a private domain, or if he dug it in a private domain and opened it into another private domain, he is liable [if any is injured by the pit].<br>If he dug a pit in the public domain and an ox or ass fell into and died, he is liable.<br>No matter whether he digs a pit, trench, or cavern, or ditches or channels he is liable. If so, why does it say “a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? Just as a pit which is deep enough to cause death is ten handbreadths deep, so anything is deep enough to cause death if it is ten handbreadths deep.<br>If they were less than ten handbreadths deep and an ox or an ass fell in and died, the owner is not liable; but if it was damaged he is liable.</b><br>In the first mishnah of the tractate we learned that there are four archetypal causes of damage.  Our mishnah and the two mishnayoth that we will learn tomorrow are concerned with the second cause of damage, namely the pit.  Exodus 21:33-34 state:  “When a man opens a pit, or digs a pit and does not cover it, and an ox or an ass falls into it, the one responsible for the pit must make restitution; he shall pay the price to the owner, but shall keep the dead animal.”  Our mishnah deals with several details concerning damages done by a pit.<br>Sections one and two emphasize that the pit which is described in the Torah is a pit dug almost anywhere. The only exception would be a person who dug a pit on his own property and another person came onto his property without his permission and fell in the pit.  In this case the owner would not be liable since the ox entered without his permission.<br>Section three states that one is obligated not only for damages caused by a pit but damages caused by any hole dug into the ground.  There are many types of holes a person might dig for various reasons and they all have different names.  The mishnah emphasizes that one is obligated not just for pits but for other holes as well.  Section 3a asks a follow-up question.  If the Torah meant to say that a person is obligated for any hole he dug in the ground or uncovered why did it specifically mention pit?  The answer is that a pit is an example of how deep something has to be for it to be normal for it to cause the death of an animal that fell in.  Ten handbreadths (=about one yard) is such a normal depth.  Therefore we can conclude that any hole which is ten handbreadths deep is considered to be similar a pit and if an animal falls in and dies, the person who dug or uncovered the hole will be liable.<br>Section four is a follow-up to section three.  If a person dug a hole or uncovered a hole less than ten handbreadths he does not, according to the mishnah, fit into the category mentioned in the Torah.  Therefore if an animal does fall in and die he is not liable.  However if the animal is injured he is liable since a hole less than ten handbreadths is likely to cause injury."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nMishnah six continues to deal with damages done by a pit, a subject that we began to learn in mishnah five.  The Torah states that a person is obligated for damages caused by a pit which he dug or by a covered pit which he uncovered.  The first two sections of mishnah six deals with the duty to properly cover pits.  The third section of the mishnah deals with the cause of an animal’s falling into a pit.  The fourth section deals with damages done to the load carried by the animal when it falls into the pit.  The fifth section deals with irresponsible oxen, children and slaves who fall into the pit.\nAccording to mishnah seven when the Torah states “ox” with regards to a number of laws, the intention is not that the law is limited to an ox.  Rather the laws of the Torah mentioned in this mishnah apply to any animal or bird.  This mishnah is an appendix to the laws that we have learned in the first five chapters, must of which were dealt with goring oxen and damages by a pit.  In both of these laws the Torah uses the example of an ox, and therefore it is essential that our mishnah emphasize that an ox is just an example.  These laws are equally applicable to other animals.",
                    "<b>If a pit belonged to two partners and one went over it and did not cover it, and the other also went over it and did not cover it, the second one is liable. If the first covered it and the second came and found it uncovered and did not cover it, the second one is liable.</b>  Section one of mishnah six deals with the duty to cover a pit.  We learn here that if the pit was owned by two people, the last one to be at the pit is the one responsible for damages done if he left the pit uncovered. Even though the first person also left the pit uncovered, since the second person was the last to be at the pit, he is the one held accountable.",
                    "<b>If he covered it properly and an ox or an ass fell into it and died, he is not liable. If he did not cover it properly and an ox or an ass fell into it and died, he is liable.</b>  Section two states quite simply that if a person covers a pit properly and nevertheless an animal falls in and dies, he is not liable.",
                    "<b>If it fell forward [not into the pit, frightened] because of the sound of the digging, the owner of the pit is liable. But if backward [not into the pit, frightened] because of the sound of the digging, he is not liable.</b>  Section three deals with animals that are frightened by the sound of the digging and fall.  In other words the damage was caused not by the pit itself but by the digging of the pit.  According to our mishnah if they fall forward the owner is obligated but if they fall backward the owner is exempt.  This distinction is based on a midrash that demands that the ox is killed while walking forward and not while walking backward.  [I have explained this mishnah according to Albeck, but there are other explanations].",
                    "<b>If an ox and all of its trappings fell into it and they broke, or if an ass fell into it with its trappings and they were torn, he is liable for the beast but exempt for the trappings.</b>  Section four deals with damages done to the load that the animal was carrying when it fell into the pit.  This law is also based on a midrash.  Exodus 21:33 states: “and an ox or an ass falls into it”.  The Rabbis learned in a midrash “an ox, and not a person; an ass and not trappings.”  Compensation for damages done by a pit are therefore limited to damages done to the animal itself.",
                    "<b>If an ox that was deaf, insane or young fell in, the owner is liable. If a boy or a girl or a slave or a bondwoman fell in, he is not liable.</b>  Section five sets an important limit to the liability for the pit-owner.  The mishnah states that if a deaf ox, or an insane ox or a minor ox that had not yet learned to walk carefully fell into the pit the owner of the pit is liable.  By inference we can learn that if an adult capable ox fell into the pit the owner of the pit is exempt.  The second clause of this section states that this rule is not true with human beings.  As we learned in the aforementioned midrash, the Torah states that one is obligated when an animal falls into the pit and not when a human does.  Our mishnah emphasizes that even if the human was a child who is by nature not careful, the pit-owner is exempt. Furthermore, even if the human was a slave who, like an ox, belongs to someone else, the slave is still not an ox or an ass, and therefore the owner of the pit is exempt."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>An ox and all other beasts are alike under the laws concerning falling into a pit, keeping apart from Mount Sinai, two-fold restitution, the restoring of lost property, unloading, muzzling, diverse kinds, and the Sabbath. So to wild animals and birds. If so, why is it written “an ox or an ass”? But Scripture spoke of prevailing conditions.</b> Mishnah seven lists several laws in which the Torah states “ox” or “beast” but the Rabbis hold that the law is true for all animals, including even wild animals and birds.  I will briefly explain these laws with their Biblical references: Falling into the pit this is our topic in Bava Kamma. Keeping apart from Mount Sinai see Exodus 19:13. There God tells Moses to keep everyone, including the animals away from the mountain before the Revelation. Two-fold restitution see Exodus 22:3, 8.  If a person steals something and is caught he must pay back double. Restoring lost property see Exodus 23:4, and Deuteronomy 22:1. Unloading see Exodus 23:5.  If one sees his enemy’s ox buckling under its load, he must help him unload the animal. Muzzling see Deuteronomy 25:4.  One is not allowed to muzzle an ox while it is threshing. Diverse kinds see Leviticus 19:19 and Deuteronomy 22:10.  According to Leviticus one is not allowed to mate two different kinds of animals.  According to Deuteronomy one is not allowed to yoke an ox and an ass together. The Sabbath see Exodus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 5:14.  One must allow his animals to rest on the Sabbath. According to our mishnah the reason why the Torah uses the word ox is that oxen were the most frequently used animals in those times."
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>If a man brought his flock into a pen and shut it in properly and it went out and caused damage, he is exempt. If he had not shut it in properly and it went out and caused damage, he is liable.<br>If the pen was broken through at night, or bandits broke through it, and the flock came out and caused damage, he is not liable. If the bandits brought out the flock, the bandits are liable.  Section one teaches that if a person were to properly enclose his flock and nevertheless the flock were to escape, the person is exempt.  Since he fulfilled his responsibility he is not liable for damages.  However, if he didn’t enclose the flock properly he will be liable.  Section two can be explained as an exception to the rule in section one that if he didn’t enclose the flock properly he is liable.  Section two teaches that if the flock broke out at night (i.e. they broke the enclosed part of the or bandits broke the fence, the owner is exempt, even though he did not properly lock the fence.  The owner is not liable since the animals broke out against his control, even though they could have gone out through the main gate, thereby making him liable.  If, on the other hand, they were to have broken the fence during the day, and he didn’t lock it properly, he is liable.  (There are other explanations to this.  The final clause of the mishnah says that if the bandits physically let out the flock, they are liable if it causes damage.</b><br>At the end of chapter five we learned the laws of damages done by a pit, the second archetypal cause of damage listed in the first mishnah of the tractate.  The first three mishnayoth of chapter six will deal with the third archetypal cause of damage, the crop-destroying beast."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Two<br>If he left the flock in the sun, or he delivered it to the care of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor, and it came out and caused damage, he is liable. If he delivered it to a shepherd, the shepherd takes the place of the owner.<br>If the flock fell into a garden and derived any benefit, he pays for the benefit. If the flock went down [into the garden] in its usual way and caused damage, he must pay for the damage it caused.<br>How does he pay for the damage it caused? They assess what a seah’s space of ground in that field was worth before and what it is worth now. Rabbi Shimon says:  “If they consumed fully grown produce he must repay with fully grown produce; if they destroyed on seah he must repay one seah, if two seah, two seahs.</b><br> Section one deals mostly with the owner of the flock turning his flock over to another person.  If he should turn it over to someone who cannot take proper responsibility for the flock, he will still be liable for damages.  However, if he turns it over to a shepherd, the shepherd now becomes liable for any subsequent damages.  In the beginning of the mishnah we additionally learn that if he leaves the flock in the hot sun and they break out, he is liable, even if he properly enclosed them.  Leaving animals in the sun, where they will overheat, will drive them to go crazy and break out.  Since he should have anticipated the consequences, he is liable.<br> Section two deals with a flock that entered a garden and ate the produce.  If the flock fell into the garden, the owner is not liable for damages because it was an unavoidable accident.  (Note, that in Israel crops are often grown on the sides of hills.  Falling into a garden is not, therefore, an unlikely circumstance.)  In this case he will be liable to pay only for what the animal benefited.  (See Bava Kamma 2:2 for a definition of this assessment).  If, however, the flock entered the garden in a normal fashion, he is obligated to pay for actual damages, which will be a higher payment.  Section three contains a dispute on how to assess payment for crop damages.  According to the first opinion one estimates how much an area of the field that could grow a seah was worth before the flock ate the row of crops and how much it was worth after.  The difference is the damage payment.  Rabbi Shimon holds that we assess damages based on the crops actually eaten.  His assessment will certainly be higher than the assessment based on the previous opinion."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Three<br>If a man stacked his sheaves in his fellow’s field without his permission, and the owner of the field’s beast ate the sheaves, he is exempt. If [the beast] was injured by them, the owner of the stack is liable. If he made the stack with his permission, the owner of the field is liable.</b> This mishnah contains laws that were all learned previously in chapter five mishnah three.  We will just summarize.  If someone brings his belongings onto another’s property without permission and his belongings are damaged there, the property owner is not liable.  If the belongings damage the other person’s property he will be liable.   However, the reverse will be true if he brings the belongings with the other person’s permission."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a person sends forth fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven. If he sent it forth in the hands of a person of sound senses, the one of sound senses is liable.<br>If one brought the fire, and then another brought the wood, he that brought the wood is liable. If one brought the wood and then another brought fire, he that brought the fire is liable. If another came and fanned the flames, the one who fanned the flame is liable. If the wind fanned the flame, they are all exempt.<br>If a man sent forth fire, and it consumed wood or stones or dust, he is liable, for it says:  “When a fire breaks out and spreads to thorns so that the stacked corn is consumed, or the standing corn, or the field, he that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution.”<br>If it passed over a fence four cubits high, or over a public way, or over a river, he is exempt.<br>If a man kindled fire within his own domain, how far may it spread [and he will still be liable]? Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says:  “It is looked at as if it was in the middle of a kor’s space.” [ Rabbi Eliezer says:  “Sixteen cubits [in every direction] like a public highway.” Rabbi Akiva says:  “Fifty cubits.” Rabbi Shimon says:  “[It is said] ‘He that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution’, all is in accordance with the nature of the fire.”</b><br>The final three mishnayoth of chapter six deal with the fourth archetypal cause of damage, fire.  The mishnah that we will learn today contains several details concerning a person who directly or indirectly causes damage by fire.<br> Section one deals with the liability of a person who sent forth fire in another’s hand and that fire caused damage.  According to the first clause if he sends it forth in the hands of a person who cannot properly take responsibility over the fire he is exempt in a human court but liable in heavenly court.  This is the way the Mishnah will often state that an action is a wrong action but nevertheless not prosecutable.  It is wrong because the person should know that it is likely that the fire will cause damage.  It is not prosecutable because it was not he who directly allowed the fire to cause damage.<br> Section two deals with a case where two or more factors contributed to the fire.  According to the first two clauses whoever is the last person to contribute is liable for all of the damage, whether or not this person brought the fire or the wood.  According to the third clause, if a third person came and fanned the flames, he is the one liable.  However, according to the fourth clause if the wind fanned the flames, they are all exempt.<br> Section three emphasizes that one is obligated not just for the damages done to the crops but for the damages done to the field as well.  This is learned from the word “or the field” in the Biblical verse.<br> Sections four and five set limits on the distance and obstacles a fire will overcome and the owner will still be liable for damages.  According to section four if the fire goes over a fence or jumps over a river or a public thoroughfare, the owner is not liable for damages done on the other side of the fence or river or thoroughfare.  Since this is an unexpected action for the fire, the kindler is exempt.<br> In section five four sages argue about how far a fire may travel and the person who set the fire will still be obligated.  The first three set absolute amounts while the fourth sage, Rabbi Shimon says that the distance depends on the nature of the fire.  According to Rabbi Shimon if a person sets a large fire he will be responsible for damages caused at further distances."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man set fire to a stack and in it there were utensils and these caught fire: Rabbi Judah says:  “He must make restitution for what was therein.” But the Sages say:  “He need only pay for a stack of wheat or barley.”<br>If a kid was fastened to it [to the stack] and a slave stood near by, and they were burnt with it, he is liable. If there was a slave fastened to it [to the stack] and a kid stood near by and they were burnt with it, he is not liable.<br>The Sages agree with Rabbi Judah that if a man set fire to a large building, he must make restitution for everything therein; for such is the custom among men to leave [their goods] in their houses.</b><br>The final two mishnayoth of chapter six continue to deal with damages caused by fire. We learned in the previous mishnah that a person who sets a fire is liable not just for the destruction of crops but also for the damage done to the field itself.  Mishnah five deals with damages done to various things that may be on a field.  Mishnah six deals with fires that may have been set accidentally.<br>Section one of mishnah five contains a dispute between Rabbi Judah and the sages with regards to fire damage done to utensils that were placed inside a stack of wheat.  According to Rabbi Judah one is liable for the damage done to the utensils as well as the wheat (or barley) itself.  According to the Sages the kindler’s liability is limited to the wheat.  For the damage done to the utensils he is exempt.  Section three can help us understand the basis for this dispute.  There we learn that the Sages agree with Rabbi Judah that if one burns a building he is obligated also for the things left inside, because it is customary for people to leave things in buildings.  In comparison, we can see that the Sages think it is not customary for people to leave things in stacks of hay.  Therefore a person who burns a stack of hay is exempt if someone left in there an item that is not usually left in a stack of hay.  Rabbi Judah probably assumes that it does not make a difference if people normally leave things in the place that was burnt.  Since the person caused the damage he is liable in any case.<br>Section two deals with a case where a kid (small goat) and/or slave were found near or tied to the stack of hay and were burnt and killed in the fire.  We will discuss the second clause first.  Here the slave is tied to the stack of hay when he was burnt and killed.  When the mishnah says that the person is not liable, the meaning is that he is not liable for monetary remuneration.  The reason is that he will receive a more severe penalty for killing the slave.  In Jewish law there is a principle that one cannot receive two punishments for one crime.  In this case the person killed another person and caused damage to property at the same time.  For killing, the person is obligated for the death penalty and therefore he cannot also receive a monetary fine.  (For a different example see Bava Kamma 3:10).  In the first clause the slave was only near the stack but not tied to it.  Since the slave could have run away the kindler is not liable for the death penalty and therefore he will be liable for damages."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a spark flew out from under the hammer and caused damage, he is liable.<br>If a camel laden with flax passed by in the public domain and its load of flax entered into a shop and caught fire, the owner of the camel is liable. But if the shopkeeper left his light outside, the shopkeeper is liable. Rabbi Judah says:  “If it was a Hannukah light, he is he is not liable.”</b><br>The first section of mishnah six states that if a person, for instance a blacksmith, were to strike metal with a hammer and a spark were to fly out and burn another person’s property he would be liable.<br>The second section deals with a scenario that is more likely than it may at first sound.  In the ancient world roads inside cities served as shopping areas, just as does the modern day “shuk” in middle eastern countries, including Israel.  The roads were generally quite narrow and the fronts of the stores were open to the roads.  A heavily laden camel walking down the road could easily fill the entire road.  According to our mishnah if the camel’s load of flax were to enter into a shop, catch fire and spread the fire to another person’s property the camel owner would be liable.  He should not have allowed his property to trespass into the other person’s shop.  If, however, the camel owner placed the fire on the outside, he would be liable.  The outside of the store is already semi-public property and he should not have put his candle out there.  The one exception to this rule is the Hannukah candle, which is supposed to be placed outside of the home.  According to Rabbi Judah, if the candle that caused the fire was in celebration of Hannukah, the storekeeper is exempt."
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe first six chapters of Bava Kamma dealt with damage laws, specifically damage a person’s property causes to another person or to another person’s property.  The remaining four chapters of Bava Kamma deal with various types of damages done directly by a person:  thievery, injury and robbery.  Our mishnah and the rest of the chapter will deal with the laws of thievery.  According to Jewish law a thief is one who steals at night or at least without the person from whom he is stealing knowing his identity.   A robber on the other hand, steals in broad daylight without concealing his identity.\nThe laws of thievery are learned from Exodus 21:37-22:3.  According to these verses if a man steals an ox and slaughters it or sells it, he must pay back five times the original value to the owner.  If he steals a sheep and slaughters it or sells it he must pay back four times the original value to the owner.  This is called fourfold or fivefold restitution.  If, however, the sheep or ox is still found in the thief’s possession, he must only pay back double.  This is called twofold restitution.\nOur mishnah deals with these two different types of restitution.",
                    "<b>More encompassing in use is the rule of twofold restitution than the rule of fourfold or fivefold restitution; For the rule of twofold restitution applies both to what has life and what does not have life, while the rule of fourfold and fivefold restitution applies only to an ox or a sheep, for it is written,  “If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill it, or sell it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep” (Ex. 21:37).</b>  Section one of our mishnah raises a key distinction between the laws of twofold and fourfold and fivefold restitution.  Twofold restitution is applicable to anything that may have been stolen (See Exodus 22:8).  No matter what a person steals, he may be obligated for twofold restitution.  However, fourfold and fivefold restitution is applicable only to stolen sheep and cattle (oxen).  For example, if a person stole and sold an ox, he will be obligated to pay back five times the ox’s value.  However, if he stole and sold a television set, he will only be obligated to pay back double the value.",
                    "<b>One who steals from a thief does not pay twofold restitution; And the one who slaughters or sells what is [already] stolen does not make fourfold or fivefold restitution.</b>  Section two deals with a thief who steals an already stolen object from another thief.  Someone who steals from an original owner will pay back double the value.  However, someone who steals a stolen object from a thief, will only pay back the value of the stolen object.  The second clause of this section deals with the same case where someone stole a stolen object from a thief.  If the original thief himself had sold the object or slaughtered it, he would have been obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution.  However, the one who stole the object from the thief is, again, not judged in the same manner as the original thief and he will not be obligated for such payments.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Why do you think one must make greater restitution for oxen and sheep than for inanimate objects?<br>• Why is a thief who steals from another thief not obligated for twofold, fourfold and fivefold restitution?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe two mishnayoth that we will learn today continue to deal with the subject of thievery.  Mishnah two is mostly concerned with unusual circumstances in which a thief has stolen an animal and slaughtered it.\nMishnah three deals with false witnesses who have testified against a person that he stole and slaughtered an animal.  According to Deuteronomy 19:19 a person who falsely testifies against another person receives the punishment that would have been meted out on the accused had the witness been telling the truth.  Our mishnah will deal with the application of that law to the laws of thievery.",
                    "According to Jewish law testimony must consist of two witnesses who saw the entire crime.  Our mishnah teaches us that it is acceptable to have two different sets of witnesses testify to the two different components of the crime.  If one set saw him steal and one set saw him sell or slaughter, we assume that it is the same animal in both cases and he is obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution.",
                    "<b>If a man stole [an ox or a sheep] and sold it on the Sabbath, or stole it and sold it for idolatrous use or stole it and slaughtered it on the Day of Atonement; if he stole what was his father’s and slaughtered it or sold it, and afterward his father died; if he stole it and slaughtered it and then he dedicated it to the Temple he must make fourfold or fivefold restitution.</b>  Section two deals with cases where a person stole and sold or slaughtered and yet for various reasons we might have thought that he would not be obligated. The first three cases in this section are based on the principle that one cannot receive two punishments meted out by a court for the same crime (See Bava Kamma 3:10 and 6:5).  In the first scenario, the person sold the animal on Shabbat.  Selling on Shabbat is not forbidden according to Torah law; it is only forbidden by the Rabbis lest one come to write, which is forbidden according to Torah law.  If, however, he had slaughtered the ox he would be obligated for the death penalty since slaughtering is forbidden on the Sabbath and carries with it (at least in principle) the death penalty (see mishnah four of this chapter).  In the second scenario he sold the animal for idol worship.  Again selling something for idol worship is not a crime which carries with it the death penalty and therefore he will be obligated for remuneration.   In the third scenario the person slaughtered on Yom Kippur.  Slaughtering on Yom Kippur is a crime for which one receives “careth”, cutting off, which is, according to Jewish tradition, a punishment meted out by God and not by a human court.  Our principle that one can receive only one punishment per crime is limited to punishments meted out by human courts. Since, he will not receive any other punishment by a human court, he is liable for restitution. Clause 2a deals with a son who stole from his father and then, when his father died, inherited from him.  He is now in essence a thief from his own inheritance.  The rule is that he must pay back the restitution to the other inheritors.  Clause 2b deals with a case where a person dedicated the stolen, slaughtered animal to the Temple.  Such an action does not exempt him from making full payment of fourfold or fivefold restitution.",
                    "<b>If he stole it and then killed it for use in healing, or for food for dogs; or if he slaughtered it and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered it in the Temple Court [intending to eat it] as common food, he must make fourfold or fivefold restitution. In these last two cases Rabbi Shimon exempts.</b>  Section three of this mishnah deals with several additional scenarios.  The first is when a person slaughtered for medicinal purposes or for dog food.  Although the slaughtering was not for his own food, it still makes him liable for fourfold and fivefold restitution.  In section 3a the person slaughtered but the animal was discovered to be a terefah, an animal that was going to do in any case, and thererefore is not “kosher”.  In this case the person will not be able to eat the animal.  In clause 3b the thief slaughtered the animal inside the Temple as regular food.  This is prohibited and will render the animal forbidden for any benefit.  In both cases, according to the first opinion, even though the animal cannot be eaten, the slaughtering still causes the thief to be obligated for fourfold and fivefold restitution.  Rabbi Shimon disagrees."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man stole [an ox or a sheep] according to the evidence of two witnesses, and killed or sold it according to their evidence, and they are found to be false witnesses, they must pay the whole penalty. If he stole it according to the evidence of two witnesses, and killed it or sold it according to the evidence of two others, and both pairs are found to be false witnesses, the first pay twofold restitution and the last pay threefold restitution. If the second [only] were found to be false witnesses, the thief must make twofold restitution and they threefold restitution. If one of the second set of witnesses was found to be a false witness, the evidence of the other is void. If one of the first set of witnesses was found to be a false witness, the entire evidence is void, since if there is no evidence for stealing there is no evidence for slaughtering or selling.</b> This entire mishnah deals with the result of false witnesses who have testified against a thief.  As stated in the introduction above, false witnesses are punished by whatever punishment the thief would have received.  In the first clause, one set of witnesses stated the whole testimony:  that the alleged thief stole and slaughtered or sold.  Since if they were telling the truth, by their testimony alone he would have been obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution, that is their punishment.  In clause 1a two sets of witnesses testify to the two separate actions:  stealing and selling/slaughtering.  The first set is punished by the punishment that the alleged thief would have received from their testimony alone, twofold restitution.  The second set is punished by the additional punishment the thief would have received from their testimony, a further twofold or threefold restitution.  In clause 1b again two sets of witnesses testify to the two separate actions:  stealing and selling/slaughtering.  This time only the second set is found to be false.  The thief therefore pays twofold, since valid witnesses testified to his thievery.  The second set of witnesses still pay the threefold restitution. In the final two clauses again two sets of witnesses testify to the two separate actions:  stealing and selling/slaughtering. If one of the two (or more) witnesses in the second set was found to be a false witness, the testimony of the first set, that the thief stole, is still valid and he will be obligated for twofold restitution.  If, however, one of the two (or more) witnesses of the first set is found to be false the thief is not liable at all.  Without testimony that he stole, there is no validity to the subsequent testimony of the second set that he sold or slaughtered."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If he stole [an ox or a sheep] according to the evidence of two witnesses, and slaughtered it or sold it according to the evidence of one witness or according to his own evidence, he makes twofold restitution, but not fourfold or fivefold restitution.<br>If he stole [an ox or a sheep] and slaughtered it on the Sabbath, or stole it and slaughtered it for idolatrous use, or stole what was his father’s and his father died, and he afterward slaughtered or sold it, or if he stole it and then dedicated it, and afterward slaughtered it or sold it, he makes twofold restitution but not fourfold or fivefold restitution. Rabbi Shimon says:  “If they were Holy Things which must be replaced [if damaged or lost] he must make fourfold or fivefold restitution; but if they were Holy Things which need not be replaced, he is exempt.” 1. If a man stole [an ox or a sheep] and sold it on the Sabbath, 2. or stole it and sold it for idolatrous use 3. or stole it and slaughtered it on the Day of Atonement; 4. if he stole what was his father’s and slaughtered it or sold it, and afterward his father died; 5. if he stole it and slaughtered it and then he dedicated it to the Temple 6. he must make fourfold or fivefold restitution. 1. If he stole [an ox or a sheep] and slaughtered it on the Sabbath, 2. or stole it and slaughtered it for idolatrous use, 3. 4. or stole what was his father’s and his father died, and he afterward slaughtered or sold it, 5. or if he stole it and then dedicated it, and afterward slaughtered it or sold it, 6. he makes twofold restitution but not fourfold or fivefold restitution. In the cases mentioned in mishnah two the person is liable for fourfold and fivefold restitution and in mishnah four he is not.  Using the line by line comparison we should be able to see why the law is different in each individual case. In case 1, if the person slaughtered the ox or sheep on the Sabbath he is obligated for the death penalty.  Since one can only receive one punishment per crime, he is not fined additionally for having slaughtered the animal.  If, however, he had only sold the animal, he would not be obligated for the death penalty and therefore he would owe the fine.  The same is true for case 3. Selling an animal for idolatrous use is not a crime for which one would receive the death penalty, and therefore he is obligated for the fine.  On the other hand, slaughtering for idolatrous use is a capital crime and therefore he receives a death penaly and not a fine.  We learn in case 4 that if he stole his father’s animal and did not slaughter or sell it until after he dies he is not obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution.  Since at the time of the slaughtering or selling part of the animal was his as an inheritance he is not obligated.  (We will see a similar law in the next.  If, however, he had sold or slaughtered the animal before the death of his father, he would be obligated.  Similarly in case 5 if he sold and slaughtered the animal after having dedicated it, he is selling or slaughtering an animal that is no longer really belongs to him. He is therefore not obligated for the fine. If, however, he slaughtered or sold the animal and then dedicated it, he will be obligated for the fine. Rabbi Shimon makes a clarification on this last law.  The “Holy Things” to which he refers are animals dedicated to the Temple.  There are two types of such dedications.  If the owner says that “this animal is dedicated”, then he must bring this animal. If the animal gets lost or dies the owner is not obligated to bring another animal in its place.  In such a case, if a thief should steal and slaughter or sell the animal he is not obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution.  If, however, the owner dedicated the animal by saying “I dedicate an animal”, then he if the original animal is lost he must bring another.  In such a case if the thief should slaughter or sell the animal he will be obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution.  (This last law is difficult and is explained in other ways as.</b><br>The two mishnayoth which we will learn today continue to teach various details in the laws of thievery and twofold, fourfold and fivefold restitution.<br>Section one of the mishnah deals with a case where two witnesses testify that he stole but his slaughtering or selling is verified only by one witness or by a self-confession.  As we have learned, one witness is not sufficient testimony according to Jewish law.  Furthermore, a person who admits to a crime which carries with it a fine, is not obligated to pay the fine.  Therefore this thief will pay only twofold restitution.<br>Section two contains several laws that are opposite to the laws we learned in mishnah two.  To compare them we will place them in parallel columns:"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If he sold it all but a hundredth part, or if he had [already] a share in it, or if slaughtered it and it became unfit [to eat] by his own hand, or if he pierced the windpipe or rooted out its gullet, he makes twofold restitution but not fourfold or fivefold restitution.</b>  Section one deals with several different scenarios in which a thief will not be obligated for fourfold or fivefold restitution.  First of all, if he sells only part of the animal, and even if he sells is 99% of the animal, he is still exempt.  Second, if he steals something that he already owns part of, for instance he steals from his partner, he is exempt.  Third, if the slaughtering causes the animal to become unfit to eat, because it was not done properly, he is exempt.  Piercing the animals windpipe or tearing out its gullet makes the animal not kosher and therefore the thief is only obligated for twofold restitution.",
                    "<b>If he stole it in the owner’s domain, but slaughtered it or sold it outside the owner’s domain, or if he stole it outside the owner’s domain and slaughtered or sold it within the owner’s domain; or if he stole it and slaughtered or sold it outside the owner’s domain, he must make fourfold or fivefold restitution. But if he stole it and slaughtered or sold it within the owner’s domain, he is exempt.</b>  Section two teaches that if both the stealing and the slaughtering or selling were done on the property of the owner, the thief has never acquired the animal in order to make him obligated.  In order to become a thief a person must take possession of the object.  If he did not do so, he is not considered a thief and he will not be obligated as such.  We will learn more details about this law in tomorrow’s mishnah."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nMishnah six continues to define the moment from which a thief is considered to be a thief and will therefore become obligated for twofold restitution.  Jewish law has an intricate system of acquisition or kinyan (see Steinsaltz reference guide for a brief discussion).  In order for the thief to become obligated he must have acquired the object.\nMishnah seven does not deal with a subject integral to our chapter.  It is somewhat puzzling why it is placed here. In any case it deals mostly with animals which are forbidden to raise in certain places and under certain conditions.",
                    "This mishnah notes two ways of acquiring an animal: by lifting or by dragging it (i.e. pulling it).  The first type of acquisition is effective even if the animal is still on the property of its owner.  Therefore according to 1a and 2a if a person should lift the animal he is considered a thief, and if the animal dies he will be obligated to make restitution.  However, dragging the animal effects acquisition only once the animal is off the property of its original owner.  Therefore, if the thief were to do so on the property of the owner and the animal were to die he would not be obligated to make restitution.",
                    "<b>If he brought it as the firstborn offering for his son, or gave it to his creditor, or to an unpaid guardian, or to a borrower, or to a paid guardian, or to a hirer, and one of them was dragging it away and it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt. If [one of them] had lifted it up or taken it outside the owner’s domain, he is liable.</b>  Section two emphasizes that even if the thief had given the animal to someone else as payment, either to a priest in order to redeem his first born (see Numbers 18:15-16), or to a creditor or he had given the animal to anyone else who takes possession of the animal, he is still not legally liable as a thief until someone either lifts the animal or takes it off the owner’s property.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• If a thief comes onto someone’s property and is caught while still on the property would the thief be liable for double restitution?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>It is forbidden to rear small herd animals in the Land of Israel, but it is permitted to rear them in Syria or in the wildernesses of the Land of Israel.</b>  Section 1 raising small herd animals in the Land of Israel is forbidden because of the damage that they will do to the crops. Sheep and goats can eat a tremendous amount of crops and they are hard to control.  Therefore, if a Jew should wish to raise them he must allow them to graze only in the wilderness or in Syria, which is not in the Land of Israel.",
                    "<b>It is forbidden to rear fowls in Jerusalem because of the “Holy Things”, nor may priests rear them [anywhere] in the Land of Israel because of [the laws concerning] clean foods.</b>  Section 2 Wild fowl have a tendency to pick in the garbage.  The mishnah is concerned that they will find dead animals in the garbage which are ritually impure and they will carry them to places which need to be kept in a state of ritual purity.  Therefore one should not allow them in Jerusalem, which needs to stay in a higher state of ritual purity due to the Temple.  Neither should priests, who need to eat much of their food while they are in a state of ritual purity, raise fowl due to the same concern.",
                    "<b>It is forbidden to rear pigs anywhere.</b>  Section 3 It is forbidden for a Jew to raise pigs.  Evidently this is due to the fact that pigs are not kosher and there is no other reason to raise them.  In contrast, horses and camels are also not kosher to eat, but one usually raises them not for their meat but for riding purposes.  Therefore Jews are allowed to raise them.",
                    "<b>One should not rear a dog unless it is tied with a chain.</b>  Section 4 Dogs can be a menace to society and therefore if one wishes to raise one, he must keep it properly leashed.",
                    "<b>It is forbidden to set snares for pigeons unless it be thirty ris from an inhabited place.</b>  Section 5 Pigeons were a commonly raised in Israel both for food and to offer as sacrifices in the Temple.  Setting traps for pigeons could allow a person to steal those belonging to his neighbor.  Therefore the mishnah states that one must set the trap thirty ris (about four miles) from the nearest settlement.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What are some rules in our society that may be similar to those in mishnah seven?"
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nChapter eight of Bava Kamma deals with personal injury law.  According to Jewish law when a person injures another person he is obligated for five different payments:  1)  compensation for the injury itself; 2)  compensation for the pain; 3)  payment of medical costs; 4)  loss of wages; 5)  compensation for indignity caused by the injury.  Our mishnah teaches how each of these types of compensation are calculated.",
                    "<b>He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts:  for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity.</b>  Section one lists the five payments for personal injury, as we explained in the introduction.  The remainder of the mishnah explains these payments.",
                    "<b>‘For injury’:  How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth.</b>  Section two Injury is assessed by evaluating the previous and current worth of the person as a slave.  The payment is the difference between the two.",
                    "<b>‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so.</b>  Section three Compensation for pain is assessed by evaluating how much a person would accept in exchange for having such an injury.",
                    "<b>‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing].  If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing.</b>  Section four The person who inflicted the injury is obligated to pay for whatever the costs of healing may be.  If sores or other later complications occur, he will be liable as long as the later complications are a result of the original blow.  Finally, the person who inflicted the injury will be liable until the wound completely heals.",
                    "<b>‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot.</b>  Section five loss of income is assessed by evaluating the wage of a person doing the lowest paying job possible, a cucumber patch guard.  There is some overlap between this payment and the payment for injury.  For instance if the person injured was a blacksmith who earned 100 dollars a month and the injury blinded him, thereby preventing him from continuing in his profession.  The payment for the injury will compensate him for this loss.  Therefore the payment for the loss of income is compensation only for the loss of ability to do any job, no matter how low paying.",
                    "<b>‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity].</b>  Section six payment for indignity is relative to the person who inflicts the indignity and to the person who incurs it.  A person of lower social status will inflict greater indignity and will suffer less indignity. (In Mishnah six of this chapter we will see that Rabbi Akiva disagrees with this idea).  For instance, if a poor peasant were to strike the queen, the indignity would be greater, according to the mishnah, than the queen striking a poor peasant.  However, the mishnah teaches that indignity payments are applicable even if the person embarrassed is naked (meaning he has brought upon himself indignity) or sleeping (unaware of his indignity) or blind (unable to see his indignity).  Finally we learn that a person is obligated to pay for the indignity only if the blow was purposeful.  All of the other payments mentioned in the mishnah are obligatory even if the blow was accidental.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Section three states that “even if the injury is on the fingernail”.  What is the meaning of this clause?  Furthermore, this section states, “such a man”; what is the meaning and import of these words?<br>• What is the relationship of clause 6a to clause 6c?<br>• In our society is indignity suffered still relative to the social status of the two parties?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nMishnah two compares payments for injuries caused by an ox with payments for injuries caused by a human.  Mishnah three deals with several laws related to personal injury.",
                    "<b>The law is more strict in the case of a man than in the case of an ox:  for a man must pay for injury, pain, medical costs, loss of income and indignity, and make restitution for the value of the young; whereas the ox pays only for injury and is not liable for the value of the young.</b> This mishnah lists the differences in liability for an ox that injures versus a human who injures. As we learned in the previous mishnah a human who injures another person must make five different payments.  An ox, however, who injures a human being pays only for the injury itself.  Furthermore, if a human should injure a woman and cause her to miscarry, he is obligated to pay for the value of the miscarried child/ren.  An ox that injures is not liable for this payment.  (For the assessment of such a payment see above 5:4)."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man struck his father or his mother and inflicted no wound, or if he wounded his fellow on Yom Kippur, he is liable for all five counts.</b>  Section one teaches a few laws, for which we will find the opposite scenario in mishnah five.  There we will learn, as we have learned in other places, that a person cannot receive two punishments for the same crime.  Inflicting a wound on one’s father or mother is a capital crime (Exodus 21:15) as is inflicting a wound on the Sabbath.  Therefore if he were to perform one of these acts he would be obligated for the death penalty and therefore exempt from a monetary fine.  However, in our mishnah he did not commit a crime for which he could receive the death penalty, and therefore he is liable for the monetary fine.  Striking one’s parents without causing a wound is not a crime for which one would receive the death penalty.  Likewise, inflicting a wound on Yom Kippur, as all forbidden acts on Yom Kippur is punishable by “kareth” (cutting off) and not the death penalty.",
                    "<b>If he wounded a Hebrew slave, he is liable on all five counts, except loss of income if it was his slave. If he wounded a Canaanite slave (non-Jewish he is liable on all five counts. Rabbi Judah says:  “Slaves do not receive compensation for indignity.”</b>  Section two deals with injuring slaves.  There are two kinds of slaves in Jewish law, a Jewish slave and a non-Jewish slave. If one injures a Jewish slave he is obligated for all of the payments unless he injured his own slave.  His own slave performs work for him and therefore there would be no sense in paying the slave for loss of work.  If one injures a non-Jewish slave he is obligated for all of the payments.  Rabbi Judah disagrees. In his opinion slaves do not receive payment for indignity since they are already in a position of constant indignity.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Why do you think that when an ox injures a human its owner is only obligated to pay for the injury, whereas when a human injures another human, he must make five different types of payment?<br>• What do you think Rabbi Judah would say about indignity payments for Jewish slaves?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>It is losing proposition to meet up with a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor: he that injures them is obligated; and they that injure others are exempt.<br>It is a losing proposition to meet up with a slave or [married] woman; he that injures them is obligated; and they that injure others are exempt. However, they pay after some time; if the woman was divorced or the slave freed they are liable for restitution.</b><br>Mishnah four deals with two sets of exceptional categories to personal injury law:  the first set includes deaf-mutes, idiots and minors; the second set includes married women and slaves.  People who fit into these categories receive payment if someone else injures them and yet do not pay if they injure someone else.<br>Mishnah five teaches opposite scenarios from those we learned in mishnah three.  The law mentioned here reiterates the principle that a person cannot be obligated for the death penalty and a financial penalty for the same crime.<br>According to our mishnah there are several categories of people who receive payment for injuries done to them but do not pay if they injure others.  Section one lists people who according to Jewish law are not capable of taking responsibility for their actions.  Therefore if they injure others they are not legally obligated.  However, the mishnah points out that this is not a reciprocal law.  If one injures them he is still obligated for remuneration.  These people, while not halachically capable of being responsible for their own actions, are still human beings and deserve both the protection that the law affords through the right to compensation if injured.  One who injures them is obligated, therefore, on all five counts mentioned in mishnah one.<br>The second category of people who receive payment for injuries done to them but do not pay if they injure others are slaves and women.  Slaves and women cannot pay others because their money is linked to their master or to their husband.  There is, however, significant difference in this matter between slaves and women.  Non-Jewish slaves own no property; everything they acquire belongs to their master.  They therefore have no money with which to make financial compensation.  In contrast, married women can own property.  However, a woman’s husband has a lien on her property and he also has the right to the benefits of the property.  For instance if she owns a piece of land, she cannot sell it without her husband’s consent and he gets the benefit of what is grown on the land, as long as they are married.  Therefore she doesn’t own any property that is totally available for which to make compensation if she should injure someone else.  However, the mishnah teaches that once the slave is freed or the woman divorced or widowed, they now have the obligation to compensate the person they injured."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man struck his father or mother and left a wound, or if he wounded his fellow on the Sabbath, he is not liable for any of the [five] counts because he is liable for his life.<br>If a man wounded his Canaanite (non- slave he is not liable on any of the five counts.</b><br>Striking one’s father or mother and causing a wound or wounding another person on the Sabbath are all capital crimes.  Since the person is sentenced to death, he is not obligated for the death penalty.  (For more on this clause see the explanation to Mishnah three).<br>A non-Jewish slave is considered the property of his owner and cannot own any money.  Therefore one who injures his own non-Jewish slave does not make any payment, since he would pay the money to himself in any case.<br>Note that this is not a license to injure non-Jewish slaves.  According to Exodus 21:26-27 if a man should strike his slave and cause him to lose his eye or tooth the slave must be set free. The Rabbis expanded this law to include losses of other body parts.<br>"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man boxed the ear of his fellow, he must pay him a sela (four. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean:  “A maneh (one hundred.”<br>If he slapped him he must pay 200 zuz.<br>If with the back of his hand, he must pay him 400 zuz.<br>If he tore at his ear, plucked out his hair, spat at him and his spit touched him, or pulled his cloak from off him, or loosed a woman’s hair in the street, he must pay 400 zuz.<br>This is the general rule:  all is in accordance with the person’s honor.<br>Rabbi Akiva said:  “Even the poor in Israel are regarded as free people who have lost their possessions, for they are the children of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It once happened that a man unloosed a woman’s hair in the street and she came before Rabbi Akiva and he condemned him to pay her 400 zuz. He said, “Rabbi, give me time”.  And he gave him time. He caught her standing at the entrance to her courtyard, and he broke a jug of one issar’s worth of oil in front of her. She unloosed her hair and scooped up the oil in her hand and laid her hand on her head. He had set up witnesses up against her and he came before Rabbi Akiva and said to him, “Rabbi, should I give one such as this 400 zuz?” He answered, “You have said nothing.”<br>If a man injures himself, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But others who injure him are liable.<br>If a man cuts down his own saplings, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But, if others cut them down, they are liable.</b><br>Most of mishnah six deals with injuries inflicted on another person that do not cause lasting damage but cause great embarrassment.  The end of the mishnah deals with people who injure themselves or their own property.<br>Sections one through four contain a list of fines a person must pay for striking another person.  These types of blows will probably not cause any damage and therefore the fines are for embarrassment only.  Note that these are extremely large fines. They demonstrate that Jewish law takes publicly embarrassing another person very seriously and penalizes such a person with a stiff financial penalty.  Indeed according to Jewish tradition one who publicly embarrasses another is akin to a murderer.<br>Section five tempers the fines imposed in sections one through four.  According to section five, these fines are imposed only one those people who are of the highest honor and are therefore greatly embarrassed by being slapped etc. Rabbi Akiva disagrees with this statement.  According to Rabbi Akiva, one of the greatest, if not the greatest Rabbi in the Mishnah, all of Israel is of equal honor, since all of Israel comes from the same roots.  A person’s honor is not based on his current financial status, as the opinion in section five intimates.  Rather it is based on his noble roots as a descendant of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.<br>The story in sections 6a through 6f illustrates this point.  In this story a man disgraces a woman who, as we learn later in the story, is willing to disgrace herself over a tiny portion of oil.  (An issar is probably less than an ounce of oil).  Nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva makes the man pay 400 zuz, as he would have to pay to a woman of the most honorable status.  According to Rabbi Akiva, all Israelites are of equal honor, even those who are poor.<br>Section seven relates to the story told in section six.  Here, and in the next section, we learn that a person is not allowed to injure himself, but there is nevertheless no penalty for doing so.  However, if another person should inflict such an injury on him, he is liable, even if the injured person regularly should injure himself.  In the example in the story, although the woman undid her own hair, and thus disgraced herself, no other person has the right to do this to her.<br>Section eight relates a similar law with regards to cutting down saplings.  A person should not cut down his own saplings but if he should do so, he is not liable.  However, if another should cut down his saplings, he is liable, even though this is something that the person himself has done before.<br>A final note on unloosing a woman’s hair.  This phrase can alternatively be translated “to uncover a woman’s hair.”  In Mishnaic times it was customary for men and women to cover their hair in public.  It was considered a disgrace for anyone to go out with their hair uncovered."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe first half of our mishnah teaches that a person is not forgiven for embarrassing another person merely by paying whatever fine was imposed upon him.  He must ask for forgiveness.  When he does the injured person should be gracious and forgive him fully and speedily.\nThe second half of the mishnah teaches several laws concerning a person who asks someone to injure him or injure his property.",
                    "As we explained in the introduction, section one states that a person is not forgiven for embarrassing another until he asks the injured party for forgiveness.  The mishnah learns this from the story of Avimelech and Abraham in Genesis 20.  According to the story, when Abraham came to Gerar he told the people there that Sarah was his sister.  Avimelech, thinking that Sarah was available, took her, with the intent of having relations with her.  In a dream God warned him not to touch Sarah.  God told Avimelech to return Sarah to Abraham and to ask him to pray on Avimelech’s behalf so that he would not be punished for taking Sarah.  From this story our Mishnah learns that merely rectifying the crime is not enough.  Avimelech was not forgiven for his (almost crime) just by returning Sarah.  He had to ask Abraham for forgiveness as well.  We also learn from this story that the wronged person should forgive easily.  Abraham did not delay in praying for Avimelech but immediately answered his request.",
                    "<b>If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.</b>  Section two deals with a person who asks someone else to injure him or his property.  We learn several general principles from the mishnah.  First of all, if a person asks another person to injure him or his property, without saying that the injurer will be exempt, the injurer is liable.  Second, if he asks the other person to injure his body, even if he says that the injurer will be exempt, the injurer is liable.  Third, if he asks the other person to injure a third party, again even if he says that the injurer will be exempt, the injurer is liable. Note the beautiful, carefully crafted structure of the last section of this mishnah.  It is a classic example of mishnaic style.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What is the connection between the first and second halves of the mishnah?<br>• According to section two, if a person asks another person to injure his body and tells him that he will be exempt if he should do so, he is nonetheless liable.  Why?  What is the difference between bodily injuries and damages to property?"
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>If a man stole wood and made it into utensils, or wood and made it into garments, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft.<br>If he stole a pregnant cow and it gave birth, or a sheep ready to be sheared, and he then sheared it, he repays the value of a cow about to bear young, or a sheep ready to be sheared.<br>If he stole a cow, and while it was with him it was impregnated and bore young, or [if he stole a sheep] and while it was with him it grew wool and he sheared it, he makes restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft.<br>This is the general rule: all robbers make restitution according to [the value of the stolen object] at the moment of theft.</b><br>Chapters nine and ten of Bava Kamma deal with a person who steals openly, usually by force.  In Hebrew this person is called a “gazlan”.  In chapter seven we dealt with a “ganav” or thief who steals surreptitiously.  The major halachic difference between the two is that the gazlan pays back only that which he took.  Unlike the ganav, he is not liable for twofold, fourfold or fivefold restitution.<br>Our mishnah deals with a person who stole something and then the stolen object changed while in his possession.  Since he cannot return the exact object he stole, as is the usual requirement, the mishnah must deal with his obligation.<br>In all of the cases in sections one through three the robber stole an item and changed it or it changed on its own while in his possession.  The robber would prefer to return the item at its lesser value and the original owner would like the object at its higher value.  For instance in the case mentioned in section one, if Reuven stole wood from Shimon and made the wood into a beautiful table, Shimon would clearly claim that the table is his property, made from his wood.  Nevertheless, Reuven must only return the value of the raw wood, for that is what he stole.<br>Sections two and three state the same principle with regards to animals.  In section two the thief would like to return just the cow or the sheep and keep the young or wool for himself. The original owner claims the cow and the young or the sheep and the wool.  The rule is that the robber pays exactly what he stole, in this case a pregnant cow or a sheep laden with wool.  In section three the stolen object actually improved while it was in the robber’s possession.  The original owner would like to have both the cow and the young or the sheep and the wool returned to him.  He might claim that it was his cow that gave birth or his sheep that gave wool.  However, since at the time of the robbery the cow was not pregnant and the sheep was not ready to be sheared, the robber need only return the value of a non-pregnant cow and a sheared sheep."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nIn mishnah one we learned that a “gazlan”, robber, must return the stolen object at the value that it was worth at the time of the robbery.  Whether the object increased or decreased in value since the robbery, the robber is obligated to make restitution according to the value at the time of the theft.  Our mishnah introduces a few exceptions to this principle.  There are some stolen items which can be returned as they currently are at the time of their being returned and not at their value at the time of theft.",
                    "<b>If he stole a beast and it grew old, or slaves and they grew old, he makes restitution according to [their value at] the moment of the theft. Rabbi Meir says:  “As for slaves the thief may say to the owner, ‘Here is what is yours before you.’”</b>  In section one the thief stole either animals or slaves and kept them for a while, thereby decreasing their value due to age.  According to the first opinion he is obligated to return to the original owner the value of the slaves or animals at the time of the theft.  Rabbi Meir disagrees with regards to slaves.  According to Rabbi Meir the robber can return the slaves to the owner, disregarding their decrease in value.  Stealing thieves is different from stealing animals or other objects.  When a person steals most objects he actually takes possession of the object and he is now the “owner” of the object and obligated to return the value of the object to the original owner.  However, with regards to slaves and land, taking them does not cause the robber to have legal “possession” over them.  Therefore, in essence the slaves and land never left the possession of the original owner and the robber must return the actual slaves or land.",
                    "<b>If he stole a coin and it cracked, fruit and it rotted, wine and it turned into vinegar, he must make restitution according to [the value] at the moment of the theft. But if he stole a coin and it went out of use, or “Heave offering” ( and it became ritually unclean, or leaven and the time of Passover arrived, or a beast and it was used for a transgression, or became unfit to be offered or it was condemned to be stoned, he may say to the other, “Here is what is yours before you.”</b>  In section two the mishnah teaches an important distinction in damage law between recognizable and unrecognizable damage.  If a person should steal a coin and it cracks and is therefore no longer usable or food and it should go bad, he cannot just return the object itself.  Even though the object still exists he must return the value at the time of the theft. In these cases the damage was recognizable.  However, in section 2a, the stolen object was damaged and is no longer worth what it was previously, but the damage is not visible to the eye.  Since the object still exists and there are no recognizable differences, the robber may return the object itself. We will explain each example.  A coin that went out of use is no longer worth anything but it is still the same coin that existed previously and will not look different.  Heave offering “terumah” is a part of one’s produce that must be given to the priest who must eat it while both he and the “terumah” are in a state of ritual purity. “Terumah” that has become impure must be burnt and it is forbidden to derive any benefit from it.  If someone should steal “terumah” and impurify it the “terumah” becomes worthless, even though it will still physically remain the same.  Leaven or “hametz” that was owned by a Jew during Passover cannot be eaten after Passover and must be burned.  If the thief kept the stolen “hametz” during Passover it will still physically look the same, but now, since it must be destroyed, is not worth anything.  An animal that has had a transgression done with it, such as using it for idol worship, must be killed.  Again, it will look the same but is now worthless.  If the thief stole an animal that was intended to be a sacrifice and by injuring it he made it unfit to be a sacrifice it will still be in essence the same animal, but it can now no longer fulfill its original function.  Finally, an animal that gored and killed a human being must be stoned to death.  If this animal killed a human being while it was in the thief’s possession it is no longer worth anything, and yet it has not changed its appearance.   In all of these cases the damage done to the stolen object was invisible.  Therefore according to the mishnah the person can return the original object, even though it is actually currently worth nothing.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What would happen if the animals increased in value while in the possession of the robber?  What would happen if the slaves increased in value while in his possession?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If he gave [something] to craftsmen to repair, and they ruined it, they must make restitution.<br>If he gave a carpenter a box, chest or cupboard to repair, and he ruined it, he must make restitution.<br>If a builder undertook to pull down a wall, and he broke the stones or caused damage, he must make restitution. If he was pulling down at the one end and it fell down on the other, he is exempt; However, if it fell due to the blow, he is liable.</b><br>The two mishnayoth which we will learn today deal with craftsmen who receive objects on which to work and somehow ruin the object during the course of their work.  In the previous mishnah we discussed the obligation of a robber to return the object to the original owner at its value at the time of theft.  The editor of the Mishnah found these laws to be loosely associated with the obligation that a craftsmen has to return an object on which he was working to the original owner.  The similarity between the two situations is that both a robber and a craftsmen who was contracted to work on an object belonging to another person must return objects to their original owner.  The major difference is of course that the craftsmen received the object at the behest of the owner, unlike the robber who stole the object.  In any case, this is a good example of how the Mishnah will associate different subjects and occasionally teach their laws in juxtaposition.<br>Sections one and two teach that workmen/craftsmen whom receive an object on which to work, are obligated to make restitution for the object, should they ruin it.  This may sound a bit obvious, but it is not necessarily so.  Indeed many of us have probably had arguments over just this topic with modern day repairmen.  The mishnah squarely places responsibility for the object in the hands of the craftsmen.<br>Section three is slightly more complex.  In this scenario a builder was hired to take down a wall.  In the times of the mishnah building material was scarce, especially in the Land of Israel (it is still scarce here).  When the owner hired the builder to take down the wall the intention was not to ruin the stones but rather to use them to build something else.  If the builder took them down and ruined the stones, he has not fulfilled his job as is expected of him, and therefore will be liable for the damage.  Similarly if he should cause damage during the process, he is personally liable.  If, however, the wall should fall at the opposite end of his work, the assumption is that it fell due to other circumstances, and he will not be held liable.  Finally, the mishnah lets us know, that if it fell at the opposite end, but it nevertheless fell due to his breaking down the wall, he is liable."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man gave wool to a dyer and the cauldron burned it, he must repay him the value of the wool.<br>If he dyed it badly: if the improvement was worth more than the cost of the dying, he must pay him the cost of the dying; if the cost of the dying was worth more than the improvement, he must pay only [the value of the] improvement.<br>If he told him to dye it red and he dyed it black; black and he dyed it red: Rabbi Meir says:  “[The dyer] must pay the cost of the wool.” Rabbi Judah says:  “If the improvement was worth more than the cost of the dying, he must pay him the cost of the dying; if the cost of the dying was worth more than the improvement, he must pay only [the value of the] improvement.</b><br>In section one, a person gave wool to a dyer to dye.  If, while in the process of dying the wool, he should burn the wool, he is certainly obligated to return the value of the wool.  This halacha is completely consistent with those mentioned in the previous mishnah.<br>Sections two and three are more complicated.  In these two sections the dyer did not render the wool unusable but rather either dyed it badly (section two) or dyed it the wrong color (section three).  If he dyed it badly the original owner will still have to pay for the dying, but only the lesser of two amounts:  the cost of the dying or the rise in the value of the wool.  Let us say that the wool was originally worth 10 dollars.  If it cost 2 dollars to dye the wool badly, and after the dying it was worth 13 dollars, the owner owes the dyer 2 dollars, the lesser of the two amounts.  If it cost 2 dollars to dye and now it is worth 11 dollars, the owner owes the dyer 1 dollar, again, the lesser of the two amounts.  Note, in a normal circumstance they would have agreed on an amount prior to the dying, an amount certainly higher than the cost of the dying.  Since the dyer did not properly perform his duty he does not receive the full expected payment.<br>If the owner dyed the wool in a proper fashion, but dyed it the wrong color, Rabbi Judah says that the law is the same as in section two.  The owner must pay the dyer the lower of the two amounts:  the cost of the dying or the increased value of the wool.  However, according to Rabbi Meir he must pay back the original value of the wool, 10 dollars in our example above."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man robbed his fellow of the value of a perutah and swore [falsely] to him, he must take it to him even as far as Medea.<br>He may not give it to his son or to his agent, but he may give it to the agent of the court.<br>If his fellow had died he must return it to his heirs.</b><br>Leviticus 5:20-26 discusses a person who steals from another person (or unlawfully takes his property in another fashion) and afterward swears that he did not do so. In order to atone for his sin he must do three things:  1)  Restore that which he stole; 2)  He must pay back an additional fifth of the value of the stolen object; 3)  He must bring a sacrifice (asham) to the Tabernacle/Temple.  The first two obligations are in order to restore the property and pay a fine.  The third obligation is in essence to atone for his false oath.<br>The remaining mishnayoth of our chapter will deal with these obligations, specifically the obligation to return the lost object and to add on a fifth.  Note that what the mishnah calls a fifth is what we would call a quarter of the value.  For instance if the stolen object was worth 100, the robber must add on another 25, thereby paying back 125.  Since 25 is one fifth of 125 the Rabbis called it a fifth.  It is also important to note that our mishnayoth will discuss a perutah.  This is the smallest coin known to the Rabbis and was certainly not worth anything substantial in their time.<br>Our mishnah teaches the stringency of the law of swearing falsely on a stolen object.  In order for the robber to make atonement for his crime of stealing and swearing falsely, he must bring the object to the original owner even as far as Medea (modern Iran).  He cannot give it to a representative of the original owner.  Rather he must confront him face to face.  Alternatively he may use a representative of the court to return the object to the original owner.  Finally, the mishnah tells us that it is obligatory to return it even to the heirs.<br>The single leniency of the mishnah is that this law does not hold true if he stole less than a perutah.  Less than a perutah is not considered to have any value and therefore we cannot legally say that this person has stolen."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>1. If he had repaid the value but had not paid the [added] fifth, or if he had forgiven him the value but not the [added] fifth, or if had forgiven him both except for less than a perutah’s worth of the value, he need not go after him. 2. If he had repaid him the [added] fifth but not the value, or if he had forgiven him the [added] fifth but not the value, or if he had forgiven both except for a perutah’s worth of the value, he must go after him.</b> Our mishnah is taught in a classic style where all of the examples in section one are opposite of those in section two.  This can easily be demonstrated by a chart: Section One Section Two a) If he had repaid the value but had not paid the [added] fifth, b) or if he had forgiven him the value but not the [added] fifth, c) or if had forgiven him both except for less than a perutah’s worth of the value, d) he need not go after him. a) If he had repaid him the [added] fifth but not the value, b) or if he had forgiven him the [added] fifth but not the value, c) or if he had forgiven both except for a perutah’s worth of the value, d) he must go after him. Seen in this manner we can easily learn the abstract principle taught by the mishnah’s mentioning of concrete cases.  If a person has returned to another person the value of the stolen object but not the added fifth, he need not chase after the person in order to restore the object, as we learned in mishnah four.  However, if he paid the fifth and not the value of the object itself, he must still chase after him.  The same is true if the person who had the object stolen from him forgave him the value but not the fifth, or vice versa.  Finally, in section c we learn that if he (the person from whom the object was stolen) forgave most of the value but didn’t forgive a perutah’s or more worth, than he (the robber) still must chase after him.  However, if he remains obligated less than a perutah, he need not chase after him."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nOur mishnah continues to deal with a subject that we began discussing in mishnah five:  the obligation placed upon the robber to return the value plus one/fifth to the original owner if he swore falsely to him.",
                    "<b>If he had paid him the value and had sworn [falsely] to him concerning the [added] fifth, he must pay a fifth on the fifth [and so on] until the value [of the added fifth] becomes less than a perutah’s worth.</b>  Section one deals with a case where a robber returned the value of the original object to the owner but swore to him that he had already returned the added fifth.  If the robber had sworn falsely, the previous fifth now turns into the new contested amount (the value) and in order to atone he must bring another fifth of that value.  This process could continue, if he were to continue swearing falsely on having returned the fifth, until the “value” is worth less than a perutah.  As we learned in mishnah five, less than a perutah is not considered to be worth anything, and therefore one does not swear on it.",
                    "<b>So too with a deposit, as it says:  “In a matter of deposit or a pledge or through robbery, or by defrauding his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it” (Leviticus 5:21-2, such a one must pay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.</b>  Section two brings the related Biblical verse to our halacha in order to emphasize that this process of returning the value, plus the added fifth and bringing a sacrifice is true not just of robbers but of other categories as well.  The category immediately dealt with by our mishnah is a person who received an object from another person to hold and watch, for instance a jug of olive oil.  When the original owner claimed back his jug of olive oil, the guardian denied receiving it.  If the guardian swore falsely and then wished to atone for his transgression, he must return the jug of olive oil, plus an added fifth and bring a sacrifice.",
                    "<b>[If a man said], “Where is my deposit?” and the other said, “It is lost,” [if the one says,] “I adjure thee”, and the other says, “Amen!”, and witnesses testify against him that he consumed it, he need pay [only] the value. But if he confessed it of himself, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.</b>  Section three begins discussing the details of this law.  In the situation described the guardian claimed that the deposit was lost.  The original owner had asked the guardian to take an oath that this was true, to which he had.  At this point the guardian is evidently not obligated for anything.  If witnesses were to later come and testify that the guardian had indeed consumed the deposit, he is only obligated to return the original value.  If, however, the guardian were to admit to the crime on his own, he must return the original value, the added fifth and bring the sacrifice.  This distinction emphasized by our mishnah is based on an understanding of Numbers 5:6-7.  There we learn that if a person commits a wrong against another person and then realizes his guilt, then he shall confess the wrong, pay back the value plus an added fifth and bring a sacrifice.  The Rabbis understood that he was obligated for this only if he confessed on his own.  If witnesses testified against him, he is not obligated for the fifth or the sacrifice.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What is the necessity in teaching the halacha in section one?<br>• Does it make sense that a person who admits to his own crime will be more obligated than a person against whom witnesses testify?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nMishnah eight is a continuation of the second part of mishnah seven.  There we learned that if a guardian swore that the deposit which his friend had given him was lost and then witnesses testified that the guardian actually consumed the deposit, he must restore only the value of the deposit to the original owner.  If, however, he admitted to his crime on his own, without witnesses testifying against him, he is obligated to restore the original value of the deposit plus an added fifth and to bring a sacrifice.  Our mishnah deals with a similar circumstance involving a guardian who steals the deposit (as opposed to consuming it).\nMishnah nine deals with a person who stole from his father, whose money would have eventually become at least partly his through inheritance.",
                    "<b>[If a man said], “Where is my deposit?” and the other said, “It is stolen,” [if the one says,] “I adjure thee”, and the other says, “Amen!”, and witnesses testify against him that he stole it, he must make twofold restitution. But if he confessed it of himself, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.</b> In the scenario presented in this mishnah a person received a deposit from another person.  When the owner came back to claim his deposit, the guardian claimed that it was stolen, and when asked, he swore to his words.  If witnesses were to come and testify that the guardian had actually stolen the object, he will be obligated for twofold restitution, as are all thieves.  However, if he confessed of the crime himself, he is not judged as a thief but as a robber who swore falsely and therefore must pay back the principle plus a fifth and bring a sacrifice.  This distinction is again based on the Biblical passage of which we learned in mishnah seven.  For further clarification see our explanation there.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What is the difference between the law in mishnah eight and the law in mishnah seven?  Why?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man stole from his father and swore [falsely] to him, and the father died, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth to the father’s sons or brothers.<br>If he will not repay or if has does not have [with which to repay] he must borrow and the creditors come and are repaid.</b><br>When a man steals from his own father he is actually stealing from his brothers or from his father’s brothers who are the chief inheritors.  (The primary inheritors according to halacha are sons, and next in line are the father’s brothers.  If the man were to die with no sons, the brothers inherit.)  In this case the robber clearly owes part or even most of the theft to the other inheritors.  For instance if he stole 100 and there is one other son, he clearly owes 50 to the other son (his brother).  If there were three other sons he would clearly owe each 25.  However, our mishnah states more.  He must pay not only the other son’s share of the inheritance, but he must pay his share, as well as an added fifth.  If there was only one other son he would pay all 100 to him.  The key to understanding this is that in order for him to atone for his robbery he must physically remove the stolen property from his possession.  If he were to keep his portion, he would be left with some stolen property.  He therefore must physically give over the entire theft to the other inheritors.<br>The mishnah however allows, under certain circumstances, for the robbing son to retain his portion of the inheritance.  The robbing son may borrow from another person the value of the object he stole from his father.  He then takes the stolen object and returns it to the other inheritors, thereby removing the stolen object from his property.  When the creditors come to collect they collect an equal portion from each inheritor.  In this way the robber can retain his share of the inheritance and still return the object."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man said to his son, “Qonam, you will not derive any benefit from that which is mine”, and he died, the son may inherit him.<br>[But if he moreover said], “Both during my life and at my death”, when he dies the son may not inherit from him and he must restore [what he received from his father’s inheritance] to the [father’s] sons or brothers.<br>If he has nothing, he takes out a loan, and the creditors come and exact payment.</b><br>Mishnah ten deals with a scenario similar to the one dealt with in mishnah nine.  Mishnah nine was concerned with the laws of inheritance in a case where a son stole from his father and the father subsequently died.  The mishnah created a way in which the robbing son could still retain his inheritance.  Our mishnah deals with the inheritance of a son whose father took an oath that the son could not benefit from his property.<br>Mishnah eleven deals with a robber who steals from a convert who subsequently dies.  A convert’s non-Jewish relatives do not inherit his money (at least according to Torah law) and therefore a convert who dies before he has children has no legal inheritors.  Our mishnah deals with this case, and in extension any case in which the original owner of the property died before the property was returned to him, and did not leave inheritors.<br>The word “Qonam” is a nickname that people used in Mishnaic times for the word “Qorban” which means “sacrifice”. If a person wanted to make an oath forbidding his things on someone else or someone else’s things on himself, he would say that the things he wishes to forbid should be like a sacrifice.  Sacrifices were generally forbidden for public consumption.  The person taking the oath is in essence saying that the item mentioned should be forbidden like a sacrifice.  In the case mentioned in our mishnah the father says that his property should be “qonam” or forbidden to one of his sons.  Section one of the mishnah tells us that this will be true only during the father’s life.  In this case the oath does not have effect after death and the son may receive his proper share of the inheritance.<br>In the scenario in section two the father swears that his property should be forbidden to his son both during his life and after his death.  In this case the son cannot take part in the inheritance and he must return anything which he has taken from the inheritance to the other inheritors (generally the father’s sons or brothers).<br>According to section three there is a way for the son to get around this problem.  If the son is poor and dependent on his share of the inheritance he may borrow the sum of his inheritance and then the creditors can collect from the other inheritors.  In this way he receives the amount due to him as part of his inheritance without benefiting directly from his father’s estate."
                ],
                [
                    "As stated in the introduction, a convert does not have inheritors from his previous family.  Therefore, if he should die without having children, he will have no inheritors.  If a person should steal from a convert and then falsely swear that he did not steal, the robber will be obligated to restore the value to the convert, plus an added fifth and to bring a Guilt-offering, just as a robber is obligated to do if he were to steal from a non-convert.  If, however, the convert should die before the money is returned the sacrifice is brought, there is a problem.  To whom should he return the money?  Since there are no inheritors, the robber cannot simply return the money to them.  The answer to this question is found by our mishnah in Numbers 5:8, which states the money should go the priests.  The Guilt-offering, as usual, must still be brought as an offering at the Temple.",
                    "<b>If he brought the money and the Guilt-offering and then died, the money shall be given to his sons, and the Guilt-offering shall be left to pasture until it suffers a blemish, when it shall be sold, and its value falls to the Temple treasury.</b>  Section two brings up an added wrinkle to our case.  In the new scenario, after the convert died, the robber died as well, before he had been able to deliver the money to the priests nor the sacrifice to the Temple.  In this case the money that would have gone to the priests goes to the children of the robber.  Since there are no inheritors of the convert, there is no one who “loses out” by not receiving the restored money and therefore the children of the robber can keep the money as part of their general inheritance.  The sacrifice cannot be offered on the altar since sacrificial animals whose owners have died may never be offered on the altar.  The animal will go out to pasture until it receives a blemish, thereby disqualifying it from being fit to sacrifice.  The animal can then be sold (and subsequently used) and the money will go to the Temple.   This is a common procedure that was done to animals that could not be offered as sacrifices on the altar.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• According to mishnah eleven, section two, if the robber and the convert should die before the money was restored, the money can go to the robber’s inheritors?  Why shouldn’t the priests receive the money, as they would in the previously mentioned case?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If he [who had stolen from the convert] gave the money to the men of the priestly watch and then died, his inheritors cannot recover it from their [the priests] hands, as it says, “Whatsoever a man gives to a priest shall be his” (Numbers 5:10).<br>If he gave the money to Yehoyariv, and the Guilt-offering to Yedayah, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the Guilt-offering to Yehoyariv and the money to Yedayah:  if the Guilt-offering still remains, the sons of Yedayah shall offer it; otherwise, he must bring another Guilt-offering. For if a man brought what he had stolen before he offered his Guilt-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he brought his Guilt-offering before he brought what he had stolen, he has not yet fulfilled his obligation.<br>If he gave the value but not the [added] fifth, the [added] fifth does not prevent [him from offering the Guilt-offering].</b><br>Mishnah eleven dealt with a person who steals from a convert who has no inheritors, swears falsely to the convert, saying that he did not steal, and then decides to repent.  He is obligated, as is always the case, to restore plus a fifth to the convert and bring a Guilt-offering to the Temple.  If the convert should die (without inheritors), the robber must restore the money to the priests in the Temple.  Our mishnah continues to deal with this situation and various possibilities that may arise.<br>In the scenario established in section one the robber had brought the money to the priests, as was his obligation in a case where he robbed a convert who died with no inheritors.  After giving the money to the priests the robber died.  In mishnah eleven we learned that if the robber had died before giving the money to the priests, the inheritors could take the stolen money.  Our mishnah states that once the priests have taken the money into their possession the inheritors have lost their claim.<br>Section two deals with the process of giving the money to the priests and sacrificing the Guilt-offering, the two steps required for atonement.  This section requires some background information. The priests were divided into 24 watches, each watch responsible for a week’s duty in the Temple.  During that week anything brought to the Temple that would be given to the priests would be claimed by the men on that watch.  Each watch had a name.  Yehoyariv was the first watch and Yedayah was the second watch (see I Chronicles 24:7).  The general rule, established in our mishnah, section 2b-c, is that the stolen property must be restored before the Guilt-offering is sacrificed.  If the stolen property were to be restored after the Guilt-offering is sacrificed the robber must bring another sacrifice, for the Guilt-offering will not effect atonement.  If, therefore, he were to give the money to Yehoyariv, the first watch, and the sacrifice to Yedayah, the second watch, he would fulfill his obligation.  If, on the other hand, he had given the sacrifice to Yehoyariv and they had sacrificed the animal, and then he had brought the money to Yedayah, in order to atone for his transgression he would have to bring another offering.  If Yehoyariv had not sacrificed the animal, they could give it to Yedayah, who would subsequently sacrifice it, and the robber’s transgression would be atoned.<br>The final section of the mishnah teaches that restoring the actual value is the only necessary condition to bringing the sacrifice and causing atonement.  If one had restored the value but not the added fifth, his sacrifice would nevertheless effect atonement.  He is still obligated to bring the fifth, but its delay does not prevent atonement.  If, however, he brought the fifth but not the value, the sacrifice will be ineffective."
                ]
            ],
            [
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nOur mishnah begins by further discussing the laws of robbery, a topic which was covered throughout the previous chapter.  Section two of the mishnah begins to discuss tax-collectors.  Since tax-collectors were suspected of stealing money, one had to be careful about accepting money from one, lest the money be stolen.",
                    "If a man were to steal an object and then leave it for his children as an inheritance or feed it to them, the children do not have an obligation to make restitution, since they were not the robbers.  Rather they are only inheritors whose father died with a debt.  According to the halacha whenever a father dies with outstanding debts, the children do not have to pay the debts with “movable property” (anything besides land) from their father’s estate.  If, however, he were to have stolen real estate, the children must make restitution, since inheritors must pay their father’s debts with any real estate left in the inheritance.  Furthermore, according to the Talmud, if the father had stolen something and the thing still existed the children do have an obligation to return the actual item. We should note that in Talmudic times only real estate was considered to be property upon which one could rely on its sustaining value.  Also, when a person loaned another person money, he would only rely on real estate as collateral for the loan.  Their economy was based on property;  “things”, as well as money, were seen to be risky possessions, whose values could radically fluctuate and they were not worthy as collateral.  However, in later times, when Jews ceased to be landowners, and worked usually as merchants and bankers, the halacha changed to adopt to the new reality.  By the Middle Ages (the time of the Gaonim, 8th-11th centuries) it was decided that the same laws that applied to real estate should apply to “movable property”.",
                    "<b>One may not make change from the chest of an excise collector or from the wallet of tax collectors, or take any charity from them. But it may be taken from them at their own house or in the market.</b>  Section two deals with accepting money from different types of tax collectors.  One was not allowed to change money from the various types of boxes used to collect the taxes, and one was even not allowed to accept charity from these boxes.  The fear is that the tax collector has taken more than mandated by the authorities and therefore accepting money from him would be considered accepting stolen property.  Section 2a limits this prohibition to taking money from the boxes of the tax collectors.  One need not fear that the money in the house of the tax collector or money that the tax collector uses at the market is stolen.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What is our mishnah’s attitude towards taxes and tax collectors?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them.<br>If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits:  if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him.<br>So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him.<br>Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said:  “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’”<br>A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says:  “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”</b><br>Mishnah one discussed the prohibition of taking money from a tax-collector, lest the money was stolen money.  Our mishnah deals with cases in which a person is allowed to retain ownership over items that come into his hand even though they may be stolen property or property which may belongs to others.<br>Sections one through three all give different examples that illustrate the same general principle.  If a person receives property that belongs to someone else in a legal fashion and the original owner gave up hope of ever recovering the property, he may retain ownership.  The idea is that by giving up hope of ever recovering the object the original owner actually renounces his ownership, thereby allowing the new owner to claim title.  In the first example the person was given a donkey by a tax collector or a coat by bandits.  Although the item surely belonged to someone else, we can safely assume that the person gave up hope of ever recovering the donkey or coat.  Therefore the new owner can claim title to the item.<br>Section two teaches a more general example of a person who rescues an item from a river, from marauding troops or from bandits. Again, we can safely assume that the original owner gave up hope of ever recovering the object and therefore the finder can claim title.  The same is true for the runaway swarm of bees mentioned in section three.  One can assume that when a person’s swarm of bees runs away, he will give up hope of recovering it.  It will therefore belong to anyone who finds it.  We will deal more extensively with establishing ownership over lost items in the beginning of the next tractate, Bava Metzia.<br>Sections four and five are connected to section three by the issue of finding a swarm of bees.  Generally speaking women and children are not qualified to testify.  According to Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka they are however qualified to say that a swarm of bees originated from so-and-so’s property.  In this case if a person found the swarm he would have to return it to the owner specified by the woman or child.<br>Section five grants permission to a person to trespass another’s property in order to chase after his swarm.  According to the anonymous opinion in section 5 one may enter another’s property but he may not break off a branch in order to lead back the swarm.  Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, whose opinion is found in section 5a, allows a person to even break off a branch to save his bees.  Later he will make restitution for the broken branch."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man recognized his utensils or books in another’s hands and a report of theft had gone out in the town, the purchaser swears how much he paid and takes this price [from the owner and restores the goods].<br>But if [such a report had] not [gone out], he [the original owner] does not have the power, for I might say that he had first sold them to another and this one bought it from him.</b><br>Mishnah three deals with the problem of stolen property being sold and acquired in the marketplace and the rights of the original owner to have his property returned to him.<br>Mishnah four deals with the case where a person saves his fellow’s property, even though by doing so he causes a loss to his own property.  The mishnah is concerned with the obligation to compensate the rescuer for his loss of property.<br>In the case mentioned in this mishnah, Reuven sees that Shimon has something that belonged to him (Reuven) originally.  Shimon claims that he bought the item in the marketplace from another person.  If it was known in the city that these objects had been stolen from Reuven, for instance if he had complained about them before he saw them in Shimon’s possession, then Shimon must swear how much he had paid for the items and Reuven will pay Shimon and take back his possessions.  In other words, even if Shimon does not wish to sell the items, since it is known that they were originally Reuven’s, Shimon must sell them.  However, Reuven will in any case be obligated to pay Shimon whatever Shimon had paid for the object.<br>If, however, there is no report of that the item was stolen from Reuven, we do not allow him to force Shimon to sell him the items.  This is true even if it is known that the items once belonged to Reuven, for instance it was a piece of clothing that everyone had seen him wear.  Since Reuven cannot prove that he did not sell the items to someone else, and that Shimon then bought them from this person, he cannot force Shimon to sell them back."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If one came with his jar of wine and the other came with his jug of honey and the jug of honey cracked, and the other poured out his wine and saved the honey [by receiving it] into his jar, he can claim no more than his wages. But if he had said, “I will save what is yours and you will pay me the value of mine,” [the owner of the honey] is liable to pay him back.<br>If a flood swept away a man’s donkey and his fellow’s donkey, and his own was worth 100 [zuz] and his fellow’s was worth 200 [zuz], and he left his own and saved that of his fellow, he can claim no more than his wages. But if he had said, “I will save what is yours and you will pay me the value of mine,” he is liable to pay him back.</b><br>Both sections of our mishnah deal with what is essentially the same scenario.  A person who has something of lesser value helps rescue the greater-valued property of another person, thereby losing his own property.  The person who helped wants to receive full payment for what he had lost.  For instance in section two, the owner of the donkey worth 100, who lost his donkey, wants the owner of the donkey worth 200, whom he had saved, to pay him 100.  He might say to him that if he had not helped, he would have lost his donkey, and therefore he saved him 200 and all he wants back is the 100 which he lost.  The same is true in the case of the wine and honey:  the owner of the wine who rescued the honey wishes to recover the value of his lost wine .  Honey is a more expensive item than wine (think about how much harder it is to produce).  The wine owner, realizing that his wine was of lesser value, dumped out his wine in order to rescue the other person’s honey.  All he asks in return is that the person repay him for the loss of the wine.  In both cases the mishnah says that if the rescuer saved the other person’s property without being asked he only receives a minimum wage for his work.  If, however, he told the other person before he rescued his property, that he was doing so on the condition that he be fully compensated for his own loss of property, then he does receive full compensation for his loss."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b>\nThe two mishnayoth which we will learn today continue to deal with a person’s obligations to return his fellow’s property.  Mishnah five deals with a robber who stole a piece of land and then someone else came and took the land from the robber.  Mishnah six states that when a person returns something to his friend he must not return it to him in the wilderness, but rather should return it to him in an inhabited area.",
                    "<b>If a man stole a field from his fellow and tyrants came and took it from him, if the whole district suffered, he may say to him, “Here, what is yours is in front of you.” But if it was on account of the robber [that the tyrants took the field], he must provide him with another field. If a flood swept away [the field], he may say to him, “Here, what is yours is in front of you.”</b> In the scenario of our mishnah Reuven stole a field from Shimon and after he sold the field tyrants, probably Romans, came and took the field from him.  The mishnah provides two possibilities for adjudicating the case.  If the field was taken as part of a general conscription of land in the entire district, then Reuven can say to Shimon that he is giving him back his field, and Shimon can go and claim it from the Romans.  Even though Shimon will probably not be able to reclaim his field from the Romans, Reuven is not to blame nor is he obligated to give Shimon a different field.  The field would have been taken by the Romans even if Shimon had had possession of it.  On the other hand, if the Roman’s had taken the field on account of its being in Reuven’s possession, for instance if Reuven owed them a debt or they had some other problem with Reuven, Reuven must return a different field to Shimon.  In this case it is Reuven’s fault that the field was taken.  If it had been in Shimon’s possession the Romans would not have taken it.  Finally our mishnah teaches that if a river came and washed over the field while it was in Reuven’s possession, thereby making it part of the river and not fit for growing crops, Reuven does not need to give Shimon another field.  Since the river would have washed out the field no matter whose possession it was in, Reuven can say to Shimon, “Come take your field.”",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• What would be the law, according to mishnah five, if the Romans came and took the field from Reuven the robber, but we didn’t know why they took the field?  In other words, they did not take from other people in the district, nor did Reuven owe them money?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man stole something from his friend in an inhabited region or borrowed it or received it as a deposit, he may not return it to him in the wilderness. But if he [had borrowed it or received it] with the understanding that he was going out to the wilderness, he may return it to him in the wilderness.</b> Our mishnah teaches that if a person receives something from another person in an inhabited region, whether he stole it, borrowed it or received it as a deposit, he may not return it to him in the wilderness, by definition an uninhabited region.  Receiving something in the wilderness is probably undesirable for the owner, since he will have to shlepp the object all the way home.  Furthermore, there is a greater danger of bandits and wild animals in the wilderness, and therefore a person would prefer to have his object returned in an inhabited, protected area.  However, if it was known that the person receiving the loan or borrowing the object was going out to the wilderness, than he has a right to return it to the owner in the wilderness."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man said to his fellow, “I robbed you”, [or], “You lent me [something]”, [or] “You deposited [something] with me, but I do not know whether I returned it or not” he is obligated to repay.<br>But if he said, “I do not know whether I robbed you, [or], “whether you lent me [something]”, or “whether you deposited [something] with me”, he is exempt from repaying.</b><br>Mishnah Seven deals with a person who either stole, borrowed or received a deposit from another person and does not know whether he has paid him back.<br>Mishnah Eight deals with a person who stole from another and returned the object without telling the original owner that it was returned.<br>In section one of our mishnah the speaker is certain that he at one point had something that belonged to his fellow, either by stealing, borrowing or receiving the object as a deposit, but he is uncertain whether he returned the object.  Since the last verifiable status of the object is with the robber, borrower or one who received a deposit, and it is doubtful whether he returned it, he is obligated to repay the value of the object to the original owner.  In section two, the speaker is uncertain whether he ever had possession of the object.  In this case the last verifiable status of the object is with the original owner.  Therefore, the speaker does not have to repay.  In other words, in both cases we assume that the object is still where it was last verifiably ascertained to be and we adjudicate accordingly."
                ],
                [
                    "<b>If a man stole a lamb from the flock and restored it, but it died or was stolen again, he is responsible for it.</b>  In section one of our mishnah a person stole a lamb from a flock and the owner noticed that it was missing.  If he were to return the lamb without telling the owner that he had done so, the thief is still responsible for the lamb.  Since he has not told the owner that the lamb has been returned the owner does not know that he has to keep an eye out for the lamb.",
                    "<b>If the owner knew neither of its theft nor of its return and counted the flock and found it complete, the thief is exempt.</b>  In section two, the owner did not even know that the lamb was stolen.  When he counted the flock all of the animals were there, and therefore we can assume that he knew that he was responsible for them all.  If the previously stolen lamb should subsequently die or be stolen, it will be the owner’s responsibility and not the thief’s.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Mishnah Eight:  What would be the law if in the scenario mentioned in section two the owner had not counted the flock?  Would the thief still be exempt?"
                ],
                [
                    "<b>Introduction</b> Mishnah nine deals with items one may purchase from certain people without concern that they may have been stolen.",
                    "Mishnah ten deals with a craftsman's rights to keep the by-products of their work.  In the days of the mishnah a craftsman often did the work but did not provide the raw materials.  For instance, a person would bring some cloth to a tailor and the tailor would sew it into a dress.  Or a person would bring wood to a carpenter, who would use the wood to make a table.  Inevitably there will be material that was given to the craftsman that is not part of the finished product.  Our mishnah asks the question to whom do these materials belong.",
                    "<b>One is not to buy wool or milk or kids from herdsmen, not fruit from those that watch over fruit-trees. However, one may buy garments of wool from women in Judea and garments of flax from women in the Galilee or calves in the Sharon.</b> Our mishnah is concerned with the possibility that one may unknowingly purchase stolen goods from another person.  Therefore, the mishnah lists those from whom one should not purchase certain items less they be stolen and those from whom one can purchase.  Section one states that one should not purchase things from herdsmen that may have been illegally obtained from the herd which belongs to someone else.  Likewise one may not buy things from an orchard watcher that he may have illegally obtained from the orchard.  Although we cannot be sure that the product was stolen, the mishnah states that society should avoid giving the herdsmen or orchard watcher the temptation to steal and sell.  If no one buys from him than he will not be able to peddle his stolen goods.  Section 1a is a contrast to section 1.  The women mentioned in this mishnah are probably doing work with things that belong to their husbands.  For instance women in Judea spin and make cloth from the wool that their husbands gather from sheep.  The same is true with regards to flax in the Galilee and calves in the Sharon.  In these cases one may purchase the items without fear that the wife is stealing from the husband.  Since the husband in general expects that his wife will sell the product which she makes, one need not fear of her doing so without her husband's permission.",
                    "<b>And in all cases in which [the seller] says to hide them away, it is forbidden [to purchase the item]. One may buy eggs and fowls in any case.</b> Section 1c and 2 state general reservations on the previous two sections.  If one states that the purchaser should not let anyone know about the purchase, obviously something is wrong and the purchaser should not buy the item.  Section 2 states that one need never fear when purchasing eggs or chickens.  Evidently these items are so common that even those who have access to other people’s chickens and eggs will also have their own to sell, and therefore we can assume that when they sell, they are not selling stolen property."
                ],
                [
                    "The central idea in this mishnah is that a craftsman may keep any material which the householder would not expect to get in return or would not care if he did not get.  With this principle we can explain all of the sections of the mishnah.",
                    "<b>Shreds of wool which the laundryman pulls out belong to him, but those which the woolcomber pull out belong to the householder.</b>  Section one a laundryman will not generally find a lot of shreds and therefore the owner does not expect to recover what little thread the laundryman does find.  Therefore the laundryman may keep them.  In contrast a woolcomber finds many shreds and therefore the owner will wish to recover them.  In that case the woolcomber is obligated to return them.",
                    "<b>If the laundryman pulled out three threads, they belong to him, but if more than this they belong to the householder. If there were black threads among the white, he may take them all and they are his.</b>  Section two a householder does not generally care if he loses one, two or three threads while the laundryman cleans his clothes. If, however, the laundryman should find more, he must return them to the owner because the owner would expect to get them back.  Black threads found on a white garment are undesirable to the owner of the garment and therefore the laundryman may keep them.",
                    "<b>If the tailor left over thread sufficient to sew with or a piece of cloth three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, these belong to the householder.</b>  Section three a tailor who receives cloth and thread from his customer in order to sew a garment will inevitably not use all of the materials.  If more than a minimal amount of thread or garment is left he must return it to the owner.",
                    "<b>What a carpenter takes off with a plane belongs to him; but what [he takes off] with a hatchet belongs to the householder. And if he was working in the householder’s domain, even the sawdust belongs to the householder.</b>  Section four a carpenter’s work by nature creates sawdust and splinters and other left over material from the wood.  The owner may want this material back in order to light his oven or to do with it some other type of work.  Again, if the material is minimal, such as is left by a plane, the carpenter need not return it. Since an owner does not expect to receive this minimal material, the carpenter need not give it back.  If, however, the material is more substantial, than he must return it.  Finally, all of this was only with regards to someone working at his own home.  If he was working at the householder’s home, he must give over everything to him.",
                    "<b>Questions for Further Thought:</b><br>• Mishnah ten, section two:  What would the law be if the laundryman found more than three black threads on a white garment?Congratulations!  We have finished Bava Kamma.It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives.For those of you who have learned with us the entire tractate, a hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations).  You have accomplished a great deal in a short time and you should be proud of yourselves.  Of course, this is just the beginning.  We will begin Bava Metzia tomorrow!"
                ]
            ]
        ]
    },
    "schema": {
        "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה בבא קמא",
        "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bava Kamma",
        "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bava Kamma",
        "nodes": [
            {
                "heTitle": "הקדמה",
                "enTitle": "Introduction"
            },
            {
                "heTitle": "",
                "enTitle": ""
            }
        ]
    }
}