json/Responsa/Rishonim/Maharach Or Zarua Responsa/English/Maharach Or Zarua Responsa digest, trans. by Noah Goldstein, Yeshiva University, 1959.json

{
    "language": "en",
    "title": "Maharach Or Zarua Responsa",
    "versionSource": "https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001991640",
    "versionTitle": "Maharach Or Zarua Responsa digest, trans. by Noah Goldstein, Yeshiva University, 1959",
    "versionNotes": "",
    "actualLanguage": "en",
    "languageFamilyName": "english",
    "isBaseText": false,
    "isSource": false,
    "direction": "ltr",
    "heTitle": "תשובות מהר\"ח אור זרוע",
    "categories": [
        "Responsa",
        "Rishonim"
    ],
    "text": [
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Why is it customary for some people to recite a benediction when putting on their small prayer shawl (Talith) at home, and repeat the benediction at synagogue, when putting on the larger prayer shawl even though they are still wearing the smaller prayer shawl?<br>I personally observed the custom of Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg wherein he wore the smaller prayer shawl and recited the benediction, only upon returning home from synagogue.<br>signed: Mosheh b. Jacob HaLevi.",
            "<b>A</b> - The reason for the double recitation of the benediction is that the person may have spoken in the interum. One benediction can suffice for both prayer shawls only if there was no interruption between the time the small prayer shawl was first worn at home until the larger prayer shawl was put on in synagogue; and there must be intent when reciting the benediction over the small prayer shawl, that the benediction shall include the large prayer shawl as well."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A negotiated a marriage between his daughter L, and B. B was to give as a dowry 3 Pounds and a prayer book, which he had in Regensburg. L's relatives refused to allow the wedding to take place unless B's brother-in-law C, would agree to bind himself by a Herem, that he would bring these articles. The Herem was administered to C in the absence of a quorum of 10 people. The wedding took place but C failed to bring these articles, because the trustees in Regensburg refused to give him these articles. Must C be penalized for breaking the oath?<br>signed: R. Jonathan.<br><b>A</b> - C is not to be penalized because: 1) The Herem was not administered before 10 or more people, and therefore was not binding. 2) One does not become a surety for the benefit of the bride by a mere verbal agreement. 3) The trustees refused to give the articles to C. He was thus prevented by force major from fulfilling his pledge, and is not to be held legally responsible for it."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A claims that he approached B and informed him about a parcel of land that was for sale. A requested B to pledge that the transaction would be completed only through A and that A would still receive a commission of 6 pounds (Layish) even if the deal would be consummated through the efforts of another person. B agreed and A sent a messenger 14 miles, in order to contact the seller. A succeeded in bringing both the seller and B together. B's relatives demanded from A a share of his commission. They threatened to stop the sale unless A would comply with their demand. When A refused to be intimidated, they declared that this parcel was mortgaged to gentiles. While A was investigating this claim, the transaction was completed without him. A brought suit against the seller and the decision was in his favor. A now wants his commission from B.",
            "B claims that he should not be required to pay A any commission because of the following reasons: He did not purchase the land. Furthermore, even if he did make a promise to B (as B claims), this promise was not accompanied by an act of Kinyan (an act that creates obligations and rights), nor were there any witnesses present. B disputes A's claim that A sent for the seller, and as a proof he cites the fact, that although the sale was completed, the seller did not pay A for the messenger. B maintains that this land was sold to someone else and A had nothing to do with the sale because the seller refused to have A act as his agent upon learning that A lied when he said that the buyer had deposited with him valuables as a pledge, which of course was not true. As for A's claim that he won the verdict in a suit against the seller, B says that the judge merely awarded A money for the effort he expended. This decision was based on misinformation, because A is a rich man, and is not an agent by profession. A incurred no expenses in this transaction, because he did not even leave the city. Finally, when both B and the seller discovered that A lied to them, they refused to have A represent them as their agent.",
            "<b>A</b> - Any person who makes an agreement with an agent (or in case of marriage with a matchmaker) and binds himself by mere verbal promise, must pay in full for the services rendered, even if it was not accompanied by an act of Kinyan. An agent is entitled to the full amount agreed upon, and not merely for his expenses, or for the actual work that he has performed."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - 1 - What type of fringes are to be used for a garment whose woof contains silk threads and whose warp contains threads of a questionable substance (either linen or hemp)?",
            "2 - A woman has an abscess in her urinal canal which cannot be discerned. As a result, she experiences during urination, extreme pain in her thighs, which is followed by a discharge of blood. Even after urination, drops of blood are found in the vagina. She claims that she can discern the fact that the blood was discharged from the urinal canal by examining herself with cotton and testing for blood, and not from the Fallopian tubes. Does this blood render her ritually unclean?",
            "3 - A chicken whose leg was broken above the knee, but well below the place where the sinews of the thigh converge, was examined by the expert who noted that the skin was not ruptured. During the examination a small sharp piece of bone pierced the skin causing a small rupture. Is the chicken fit to eat?<br>signed: R. Eliezer",
            "<b>A</b> - 1- In the case of a garment whose woof contains silk threads and whose warp contains linen threads, fringes of flax may be used.",
            "2 - Under these circumstances she becomes ritually unclean, since the pressure of the flow may have forced urine to enter the Fallopian tubes, from whence it carried blood.",
            "3 - The chicken is fit to eat, and at most, only this limb may not be eaten."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Is grape honey that was produced by a Gentile, permissible, if there was no intent on the part of the Gentile, during the process of manufacture, to squeeze the juice from the grapes; rather were the grapes crushed in a manner that would enable the mash to absorb the chemical used for congealing the grape honey?<br><b>A</b> - The grape honey is permissible. However, if the Gentile squeezed the juice from the grapes, strained it and then added the chemical, it is forbidden. If, as R. Shemarya related to me, it later becomes congealed, it is then permissible."
        ],
        [
            "Milk of a Gentile, that was obtained without supervision by a Jew, is forbidden. This applies even in a place where milk from an unclean animal (for example mare's milk that is used for medicinal purposes) is more expensive than milk from clean animals, because milk from unclean animals, such as pigs and she-asses is always available and can be obtained for less money. We also fear that the Gentile may have mixed the more expensive mare's milk with less expensive cow's milk by mistake.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezar adds: R. Meir and R. Eliezar would not allow their clothes to be mended in the home of a Gentile tailor, for fear the tailor may forget and use linen thread instead of thread made from hemp."
        ],
        [
            "It is not necessary for a father himself to circumcise his son; his only obligation is to see that his son be circumcised."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - If one takes an oath to divorce his wife, or bethrothed, against her will, is the oath valid?<br><b>A</b> - No, the oath is not valid, since it violates Rabbenu Gershon's Takkanah which forbids one to divorce his wife against her will. However, since R. Meir b. Baruch maintains that theoath is valid and must be observed, we yield to his opinion.<br>In a case where a man discovered that the woman he married, had been widowed twice, it may possibly not be necessary for the husband to give her a Bill of Divorce because the marriage was consummated under error and was therefore void."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) Can a judge base his decision only on the evidence before him? (2) Is it necessary for a judge, when requested by a litigant, to record the reasons upon which he based his decision?<br><b>A</b> - (1) A judge can render a decision only on the evidence brought before him, otherwise it will become most difficult, in these times to procure men to act as judges.<br>(2) It would be of little use for a judge to record the reasons upon which he based his opinion for the following reasons: Should the litigants appeal the decision to a higher court, then if the court of appeal should decide that the judge erred regarding a law cited in a Mishna (or a basic legal principle) they will inform him in writing, and the latter will have to reverse his decision. If the court of appeal should decide that the judge did not err in a law cited in a Mishna (or a basic legal principle) but rather in the weighing of conflicting opinions, then since the litigants had originally agreed to abide by the decision of the judge, and asked him to arbitrate rather than render his decision according to strict law <img> the decision is binding, regardless of the manner of its rendition and the judge need not compensate the injured party out of his own pocket, even if he had personally enforced his decision.<br>If, however, it were a case where the court consisted of three lay judges, or a single authorized judge, and the case was tried without the consent of the litigants, the decision remains valid, even if the court of appeal decided that the verdict was based on an error in the weighing of conflicting opinions. The judges must compensate the injured party from their own pockets only if they had personally enforced their decision or as a result of their decree, the decision was enforced. However, if the litigants voluntarily carried out the decision, the judges are not required to compensate the injured party.<br>A G-d fearing judge should, nevertheless, record the reasons for his opinions and decisions."
        ],
        [
            "<i>This is a Responsum of R. Isaac b. R. Hayyim Eliezer</i><br>My relative Nachman B. Shemarya brought to my attention the writings of R. Moses b. Meir, wherein he quotes R. Shemarya b. Hayyim to the effect, that one should not mourn over martyrs.<br>I disagree, and firmly maintain that martyrs are to be mourned. Both my late grandfather and late father were of the opinion that a man who committed a sin, that is punishable by death, and died, is not to be mourned. However, if he was killed by Gentiles, he is to be mourned.<br>It therefore follows a fortiori, that saintly martyrs who were slain by Gentiles, are most certainly to be mourned. One who states the contrary is guilty of a grave sin, as he equates martyrs with one who dies because of wickedness.",
            "Although I am merely the disciple and R. Shemarya b. Hayyim is the master, since however, he always addresses me warmly in his letter and dubs me: \"my relative\", I do dare to state my opinion: If he would heed my advice he would begin to fast on Mondays and Thursdays until Rosh Hashonah, to expiate his sin.<br>This responsum is addressed to his relative Machman b. Shemarya, his school and the community of Regensburg, and is signed: Isaac b. Hayyim."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A woman presented her husband a dowry of interest bearing notes (the notes were drawn up by a non-Jewish notary). The husband died, and his heirs claim that these notes became his property, and even though the woman is entitled to receive them back as part of her Ketubah, nevertheless the interest accrued in his lifetime belongs entirely to them. The woman disputes their claim.<br><b>A</b> - The notes and accrued interest belong to the woman, since the mere handing over of notes to the husband did not transfer to him the indebtedness contained therein; for she did not recite the formula, \"acquire this and all obligations therein\"."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Moses and his father-in-law, C, attended a banquet. A fight ensued, and S together with his brothers and brothers-in-law, drew knives and swords, and drove prominent people out of the banquet, among whom were M and C. The latter went to a Jewish court, in order to lodge a complaint. While there, they were seen whispering to X, and individual of bad repute.<br>Subsequently, X brought a mob of Gentiles, bent on murder and mayhem, to S's house, and X even abetted in their forced entry. As a result, S was killed.<br>Sometime later, S's relatives complained to the Gentile authorities whereupon they caused serious loss to M and C.<br>The relatives of S, claiming that M and C ordered X to bring these Gentiles to S's house, demanded that M and C be branded as murderers.<br>M and C, on the other hand, insist that the vilification of their name should cease, and a ban should be pronounced against anyone defaming and calumniating their name. Furthermore, they demand that the relatives of S should pay for the loss they inflicted upon M and C, expecially when the former complained to the authorities quite some time after the incident, thus voiding any claim that the relatives of S acted in the heat of anger.<br><b>A</b> - Although M and C were seen whispering to X, when they came to a Jewish court after their eviction from the banquet, in order to lodge a complaint, there was no proof presented by valid witnesses to the effect that they induced X to have the Gentiles come and murder S. Even if they had done so, they would not be held responsible, since X should not have heeded this advice. Therefore anyone who calls M and C murderers should be rebuked.<br>A ban, however, should not be pronounced against any person who slanders M and C, because this ban will certainly be violated and we do not wish to \"place a stumbling block before the blind\".<br>X, who was actually responsible for inducing the Gentiles to riot and kill, should be considered a murderer, and his name should be blackened and maligned in every community that he is known.<br>M and C are therefore not to be accused of murder, and you may quote this decision in my name, in any community you so desire.<br>The Jewish courts can not hold the relatives of S liable for the losses they caused M and C by their accusations, since reparations by an informer are considered fines that can not be enforced outside of the land of Israel. Although, if such actions were to become prevalent, they would then come to be considered a form of tort called Garmi (damage which is certain to occur although done indirectly) for which the damager is held responsible, even in our day. However, thank G-d we have not heard about complaints being lodged with the authorities in cases of murder, until now, and there is therefore no fear that such complaints may become prevalent.<br>The claim of M and C, that the relatives of S had not acted in the rage of anger, since they had complained to the authorities quite some time after the unfortunate incident, can not be upheld - since there is no time limit in the case of murder, as to what constitutes acting in the heat of anger.<br>Both the relatives of S, and M and C, should leave the entire dispute in the hands of R. Shabsai b. Samuel and his court, and heed his decision in this matter."
        ],
        [
            "",
            "<b>Q</b> - Negotiations preliminary to betrothal were made between A and L. A then sent B with a ring, to betroth L as his (A's) wife. B told L in the presence of witnesses that A sent this ring to betroth her. The witnesses however, did not see L accept the ring. Later, they saw L wearing the ring, which she claimed belonged to her. Is L betrothed to A, even though the witnesses did not actually see her accept the ring?<br><b>A</b> - L is betrothed; for it was known to the witnesses that A intended to betroth L with this ring. We do not presume now that she is in possession of the ring, that she stole the ring, but maintain that she accepted it as the token of betrothal. L's status of honesty is derived from the common fact that most women are honest. Since this status does not cease, it takes the place of legal assumption. Hence L is betrothed even though witnesses were not present when she took the ring."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A does not wish to summon B to court at the present time. He merely requests that the ban which would force the witnesses to appear, should be pronounced; and that the testimony of the witnesses to the effect that he had lent B one minah, should be recorded; or he produces witnesses and demands that their testimony be recorded. Until the time when the case be tried in court, A wants to have in his possession the recorded and signed testimony of the witnesses.<br>B objects to having the ban pronounced, which would force the witnesses to appear; and that the testimony of the witnesses be recorded, until both he and A appear together in court. B maintains that despite the testimony of A's witnesses, he (B) has a claim that will free him from the obligation. He objects to putting in A's possession the signed testimony of witnesses to the effect that he, B, owes money to A, when in reality he does not owe him any.<br><b>A</b> - The objection of B is sustained, since the deposition of the witnesses will lend credulity that B borrowed money, without any indication that it might have been repaid, or that B might have a valid counterclaim. B's property as a result would decline in value.<br>Until the proceedings have actually begun, B has the right to insist that the case should be brought before a higher court. The proceedings are considered to have begun only when both the claimant and defendant have made their pleas. After B has presented his plea however, and the judges were convinced that he has no plea with which to invalidate A's claim as supported by A's witnesses, B can no longer demand that his case be brought before a higher court.<br>This responsum was addressed to R. Hayyim b. Jacob from the city of Vesoul in Burgundy."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Four partners, A, B, C, and D, imported citrons, packed in a single case. 20 of the citrons in the case belonged to A; 8 citrons were B's; C had 3 citrons, and D's share was 2 citrons. Each partner marked his parcel of citrons with a special recognizable knot.<br>A Gentile robber attacked the merchants, emptied the citrons from the case, removed the knots from the parcels, appropriated 10 citrons and returned the rest. Since the markings were removed thus preventing identification of the citrons, how shall the partners determine their less?<br><b>A</b> - Perhaps we apply in this case, the legal assumption that \"an individual separated from a group, comes from the species that forms the majority within the group\".<br>Therefore A must sustain the entire loss."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - C claims that A and B made an agreement, wherein A would be required to obey the orders of B. A then deposited books with C on condition that should A refuse to obey these orders of B, A would have to pay 10 marks to B. The books deposited with C, were to serve as a pledge for the 10 marks. Moreover, the books were lifted by B, with the intention of performing a binding act of Kinyan.<br>A subsequently refused to obey the command of B, and C now wants to give the books to B.<br>A however, claims that the books were given to C on entirely different conditions, in consequence of which he should not be fined, and C should return the books to A.<br><b>A</b> - Since C was the third party, we must accept his version as to the nature of the stipulation made between A and B.<br>However, even according to C's version, A does not owe B anything for 2 reasons: 1) This conditional agreement is invalid since it did not contain the phrase \"A shall become obligated, from now, to pay the 10 marks\". Without this phrase the conditional agreement is considered an Asmakta (a conditional stipulation, in a verbal or written contract, providing for a payment of a fine, in case of nonfulfillment of a promise) and therefore void. 2) There was no time limit wherein A was to carry out the orders of B. Therefore the fine is not yet due, for A may still carry out the command of B, at some future date.<br>This responsum was addressed to: R. Samuel b. R. Jacob."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Is it forbidden to hand a cup of liquid to a person who is fasting, since one is not permitted to give a Nazarite a cup of wine, lest he forget his vow and drink the wine. While discussing this question with R. Abraham b. Simcha, I mentioned that in similiar vein, a person observing a fast should be forbidden to enter a vineyard.<br><b>A</b> - My nephew replied, that a cup of liquid may be given to one that is fasting, because he will not forget himself as readily as a Nazarite. The former can not partake of any food, while the latter is merely forbidden to eat grapes and its derivatives, and is therefore more susceptible to make a mistake.<br>As proof, my nephew cited the prevalent custom, whereby the reader would recite a benediction over wine, on a fast day, at a circumcision ceremony. He also mentioned how R. Meir would recite Kiddush for his family, on the 2nd day of Rosh Hashonah, despite the fact that R. Meir was fasting.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer refutes the former proof cited by his nephew."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A's wife bore him a son, B. Later, A. left town with L, an unmarried Jewess, and lived with her for many years without marrying her. L bore A sons. B married, but died childless. Is B's widow required to undergo the rite of Halitzah (a symbolic act which has the effect of allowing the childless widow to remarry) with one of L's sons? Some authorities wish to release B's widow from any ties with L's sons, for the reason that L was promiscuous and was suspected of having relations with licentious men during the period of time she lived with A, and there is doubt as to the paternity of her sons.<br><b>A</b> - Although L may have been promiscuous, we assume that A was the father of her children, since most of her intimacies were with him. Furthermore, there even exists the possibility that A may have married L, as one would hardly indulge in an act that is forbidden, when all along it could easily be remedied.<br>However, this case may be similiar to that of a childless widow whose levir was an apostate prior to her marriage. The widow is not bound to the Leviratical marriage since she had no intentions of entering a marriage that would later bind her to a levir who is an apostate. In like manner, B's widow never intended to be bound by levirs, who were her late husbands brothers, of blemished birth.<br>However, the comparison should not be made without further consideration."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A purchased a text of the Bible from C, a transient, and agreed to pay for them by a certain date. C gave A the books, but as they were about to complete the transaction, C refused to extend credit to A. B sent surety for A, to C, on condition that the set of books would remain in his (B's) possession, until the date of payment. B agreed that he would return the books, if A failed to make payment by that time, and B bound himself to pay C for damages incurred by the delay, in case of a breach of contract. After B had gone surety, A was unwilling to give B the books. When A did not pay for the books, B thereupon reconciled C, by paying him a certain sum of money. B now demands reimbursement from A.<br><b>A</b> - B was not obligated to reconcile C, if there was a breach of contract, because this stipulation was an Asmakta (a conditional stipulation, in a verbal or written contract, providing for the payment of a fine, in case of nonfulfillment of a promise) and therefore void. Furthermore there was no mention that A had vowed that he would reconcile C, nor did he tell B to make a similiar vow."
        ],
        [
            "R. Asher disagrees with R. Hayyim Eliezer, and maintains that the rule of Asmakta is not applicable in this case. B is considered the agent of A, since the latter voiced no protest when B bound himself, in the presence of A to reconcile C for damages, in the event of a breach of promise. Under these arrangements, the sale was then completed, and the fulfillment of the terms rested with A."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer refutes R. Asher's argument that B is considered the deputy of A, when the latter tacitly observed how the former bound himself to reconcile C for damages that might result from a breach of contract.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Asher concerning this case and Responsa No. 52 and 53 are addressed to R. Asher."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) The community representatives have acted on behalf of the community. Is their act valid, or can the community later refuse to conform or comply with the action taken by the community representatives?<br>(2) Should the elected officials of the charity fund continue in their offices, even though they were elected only for a period of one year?<br>(3) What method should be employed in controlling and supervising the collector of taxes?<br><b>A</b> - (1) Since early times, it has been customary to select community representatives, who would serve as leaders of the community. Once these representatives are chosen, all their decrees and action on behalf of the community become valid and binding, and are not to be changed or rescinded.<br>(2) As long as the elected officials of the charity fund discharged their responsibilities with efficiency, and were not guilty of negligence, or remiss in their duties, they should not be removed from office, even though they were elected for one year. However, two or three prominent citizens should be appointed to check the accounts, records and transactions of the officials of the charity fund.<br>(3) Since a tax collector is considered by some authorities to be unfit to testify as a witness, a G-d fearing man should avoid assuming the responsibility of this office. Heaven forbid that I am referring to the collector of taxes in your community, for some of the most noteworthy personages have occupied themselves with this task. It is my opinion that the community should appoint two or three of its citizens, who will work together with the tax collectors as a unit, and all action regarding the collection of taxes should be taken by this united group. If the members of the community can not arrive at a unanimous decision, in selecting these men (at an assembly), the majority vote (of those present at the assembly) shall be binding upon the whole community, as set forth by Rabbenu Gershom and R. Meir b. Baruch. If some members of the community, because of immaturity, wish to cause a disturbance and disorder, (regarding the selection of these two or three citizens who will serve with the collector of taxes), their opinions should be overlooked and disregarded. This matter should be weighed by the rabbis and prominent men of the community and surrounding area.<br>This responsum is addressed to the rabbis and leaders of Regensburg."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A engaged B as a tutor, for a season. B refused to accept the position unless the entire salary would be paid in advance. A thereupon complied with B's request. At the beginning of the season, A died. Is B entitled to the complete salary?<br><b>A</b> - B must return the money he received. He is not entitled to receive for the remaining time, even the wages paid an idle worker, since he encountered no loss."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A woman examined herself and found on the examining rag, a white fluid. She thereupon placed it in a drawer. An hour later, she discovered that the fluid turned red and had the appearance of blood. Is she ritually clean or unclean?<br><b>A</b> - She is ritually unclean, since originally it was blood and not white. However, because of it being turbid, it appeared white."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) Is it necessary to recite a benediction on fish that is partaken during the meal?<br>(2) Since we drink wine during the meal, more than is necessary to facilitate in the digestion of the meal, is a benediction required to be recited on this wine?<br><b>A</b> - (1) Fish that is eaten during the meal is not considered food that is primarily partaken, to aid in the digestion of the meal. Therefore a benediction must be recited.<br>A person who wishes to observe all the different opinions of the Rabbis, should first recite a benediction on turnips (and trimmings), or cooked foods, and then the benediction over bread.<br>(2) A blessing is to be recited on drinking excess wine or liquor during the meal, since the recitation of the blessing over bread merely obviates the benediction for liquor that is taken solely to facilitate the digestion of the meal."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - L rebelled against her husband, A, and asserting that she detests him, she claims that he is impotent, and demands that he divorce her.<br>At one time, A vowed to divorce L, and obligated himself to pay a fine, should he fail to divorce L by a certain date. The date passed and A failed to give her a divorce. Must he pay the fine?<br>The possessions of the couple consisted of: property which L brought in to her husband as dowry; property to which her husband had merely the right of usufruct; property which L just inherited; and property which A brought in, at the time of the marriage.<br>Part of their property was in the possession of L, and part in the hands of trustees. A was accused of vilification and defamation, and indemnity is being sought for the mortification and abuse which resulted. Furthermore, A had the room sealed by an order of a Gentile court and thus caused her damage. L now demands recompense for the loss incurred.<br><b>A</b> - According to Talmudic law, when a woman claims that her husband is impotent, although she may have been married to him for ten years, and is willing to forfeit all claims to the Ketubah, the husband is not coerced to grant her a divorce, since we suspect that the only reason she is demanding a divorce is that she found an attachment with another man and wishes to marry him.<br>However, a Takanah of the Saboraim decrees that a husband is immediately coerced to divorce a rebellious wife, lest she turn to evil ways.<br>Since L rebelled against her husband and avers that she dispises him, A is coerced to divorce her, as stated in the Takanah of the Saboraim. All the possesions of the couple shall become the sole property of A, including that which L brought in to her husband as dowry. However, L's own property, to which her husband has had merely the right of usufruct, and property which she just inherited, is not awarded to A.<br>According to the Takanah, A must divorce L. Therefore, when A vowed to divorce L by a certain date, and failed to do so, he need not pay a fine, when he eventually gives her the divorce. This time limit was merely intended as a means of encouragement.<br>The Rabbis of the city, and not I, can best ascertain the indemnity that should be paid by A for the abuse and mortification. The circumstances which precipitated the insults, as well as the position and prestige of those insulted, warrant the careful study and consideration by the judges.<br>Since all the property (with those exceptions mentioned above and which presumably were not involved) is awarded to A, after he divorces L, the latter's request for recompence is denied, inasmuch as the losses caused by A's action affected only A's property.<br>Your messenger asked me to inform you, whether or not, I have received any correspondence concerning this case. I give you my word of honor, that I had no prior information whatsoever (neither written, oral, nor even by intimation) about this matter. I have read the pleas, which were quite verbose, and I have culled the unessentials from the essentials.<br>This responsum is addressed to: R. Asher b. Elikim, R. Jacob b. Moses, R. Menachem b. Tamar, and is signed: Isaac b. R. Hayyim. (The Rosenberg edition of the <i>Response</i> of R. Hayyim Eliezer bears the signature: Isaac b. R. Isaac, but this is an error, inasmuch as this responsum is found in Israel Bruna, <i>Responsa</i> 208, and is signed: Isaac b. R. Hayyim.)"
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A was incarcerated by a feudal lord. Efforts were expended by the Jews to liberate A, from the lord, but were of no avail. They again appeared before the lord, in order to obtain A's release, and inquired as to the whereabouts of A. The lord informed them that A died, and at the instruction of the lord, A's body was thrown to the dogs. Is A's wife permitted to remarry?<br><b>A</b> - We accept the lord's statement as reliable evidence, and permit A's wife to remarry. It is most unlikely that A may have been released by the Gentiles, without first having been ransomed, since it is much more probable, under these circumstances, that he was killed. There need be no concern that A apostatized and therefore fled to escape mortification, for if this were true, the Gentiles would have boasted of it. It is likewise quite remote that A attained freedom, following the amputation of his arm or leg by his Gentile captors, since they would have most certainly killed him, instead of merely maiming him and setting him free."
        ],
        [
            "I have seen people borrow money from a Jew on interest, through a Gentile intermediary, in the following manner; The creditor would be instructed by the debtor to collect the principal from the latter, and to take the debtor's pledge for the interest from the Gentile. However, these people who contract a loan by this method, are guilty of a gross error, inasmuch as the debtor never gave the Gentile the pledge, for the latter's personal use. Rather, did the debtor merely design to have the Gentile hand the pledge directly to the creditor. Therefore, this entire procedure constitutes illegal usury, and is forbidden."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - If Rosh-hodesh (day of the new moon) falls on the Sabbath, and one forgot, while saying grace after his evening or morning meal, to mention the holiday, what must he do?<br><b>A</b> - If he had commenced the recitation of the fourth benediction, then he must again say grace from the beginning. This applies only to Rosh-hodesh that falls on the Sabbath, and not in the case where Rosh-hodesh falls on a week-day, for only in the former instance is one actually required to partake of a meal."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - The overlord made a separate agreement with A, regarding the amount of taxes he has to pay. The community, however, demands that A pay his share of the tax on the community.<br><b>A</b> - If the overlord's deputy, and not the overlord, made the announcement concerning the separate agreement, it has no efficacy whatsoever. If the announcement was made by the overlord himself, after the tax was levied, then A must nevertheless participate with the community in the payment of the tax. It is the custom in all the communities, that one who moved out of town subsequent to the demand of the tax by the authorities, must none the less, pay his share of the tax with the community.<br>If one successfully implores the king for a release from payment of taxes, without having the community assume his share of the tax burden whatsoever, as was the custom of the uncle of R. Kalonymos, then he need not cooperate with the community in the payment of its taxes.<br>If prior to the levy of the tax, the king on his own initiative, made a separate agreement with an individual, wherein the latter would pay a lesser amount than if he were to pay his tax together with the community, he must still participate with the community in the payment of the tax. The custom of the community provides that all Jews be partners in the payment of the taxes. The king had no right to make a separate agreement with a person in violation of the custom he himself had established among the Jews of his town. Such an act on the part of the king is not considered \"law of the land\"."
        ],
        [
            "(1) <b>Q</b> - What is the law concerning a market place wherein Jewish dwellings are on one side and Gentile dwellings are on the other side. Are the Jews permitted to erect a semblance of a gate to comply with the laws of Erub (the incorporation of several private domains, within a certain area, into a single domain, belonging to several partners within the limits of which objects may be carried on the Sabbath; the gate-like structure symbolizing such an incorporation) and thus be permitted to carry objects on the Sabbath from one domain to the next?<br><b>A</b> - According to the view of R. Meir, since the Jews dwell on one side, they may erect the semblance of a gate to comply with the laws of Erub, for that side. I, however, could raise several objections to this view.",
            "(2) <b>Q</b> - Is it permissible to handle, on the Sabbath birds in cages, that sing beautifully, and are a delight to their listeners?<br><b>A</b> - Although animals are not permitted to be handled on the Sabbath, birds, however, that sing beautifully, and whose voices are a source of pleasure to humans, may be moved in their cages."
        ],
        [
            "R. Asher b. Yechiel exchanged correspondence with R. Hayyim Eliezer concerning responsum 81, removed his objections to the above mentioned decision; but maintained that it is forbidden to handle singing birds on the Sabbath.<br>"
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A married a widow L, who brought to A a dowry of valuables worth 500 (?). L had not taken the customary widows oath regarding her ketubah due from her former husband. L died, and the heirs from her former husband demand that A return the valuables to them.<br><b>A</b> - Since L did not take an oath regarding her ketubah, A must return all the valuables which he received from L, to the heirs of her former husband."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Y (echebed) took an oath to the effect that at the time her husband died, his estate was not sufficient for the purpose of paying her ketubah. However, she did not take an oath that the estate in its present condition, is still insufficient to cover her ketubah.<br><b>A</b> - Both Rashbam (R. Samuel b. Meir) and Ri maintain that as long as Y did not take an oath regarding the value of the estate in its present condition, she can not collect her ketubah. However, if Y takes this oath, then according to Rashbam she can collect her ketubah from the increase in value that resulted from her efforts, while the residue belongs to the heirs. On the other hand, Ri contends that she can collect her ketubah only in accordance to the amount of her husband's estate, at the time of his demise, but not from the increase which belongs to the heirs.<br>This responsum is addressed to R. Yonasan and his school."
        ],
        [
            "",
            "<b>Q</b> - Forced converts, after having reverted back to Judaism, reported that while they were still among the Gentiles, they saw the body of A who was killed, lying in front of his house. It was discovered that these converts, prior to their return, partook of non-kosher food, purely out of lust. On the basis of their testimony, is A's wife permitted to remarry?<br><b>A</b> - Although these forced converts formerly partook of non-kosher food, they are believed to be telling the truth, since they have now returned to Judaism. Therefore, A's wife is permitted to remarry."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "(95-97) These responsa deal with the following apparent facts: A husband and wife, prior to marriage made a pact, wherein the survivor would inherit all the posessions. The husband's brother owed him money, and their father was alive. The wife forwent all litigation and claims concerning her ketubah. The contract which contained the release did not state that she agreed to give up her ketubah, but rather did it read: \"I forgo all litigation and claims in reference to my ketubah.\" The husband died childless. The wife how wants to collect the debt, which was owed by the husband's brother, for her ketubah.<br>The questions in this case are: 1 - whether the agreement is binding. 2 - Whether she can collect the debt for her ketubah.<br>There is a discussion about the legality of the various facets of the questions."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - L went to court and demanded the payment of her ketubah from the orphans, who were minors. What is the law?<br><b>A</b> - Since upon demanding her ketubah she lost her right to sustenance, she can therefore collect neither her ketubah, nor her sustenance from the orphans who are minors. If, however, we follow the opinion mentioned in the Talmud, that we do enforce collection of a ketubah from minors, in order that the widow find it easier to remarry - then L is entitled to collect her ketubah."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - What is the law concerning a person who arose before dawn, recited all the morning benedictions and then returned to sleep until morning. Must he again repeat these benedictions upon arising?<br><b>A</b> - Although I have not heard a decision on this matter from my teachers, it seems to me that these benedictions should be recited only during the day. However, if one arose before dawn, in order to embark upon a journey or commence to study, these benedictions may be recited, even though it is still night.<br>In the case where the penitential prayers were said before dawn, I could never comprehend the reason for the repetition, by the congregation, of the benedictions \"over the washing of the hands\" and \"who has formed\", since these benedictions were probably recited by each individual, upon arising, after performing his bodily functions. One can draw a conclusion from this custom that these benedictions were ordained to be recited regardless, every morning.<br>I have asked R. Meir b. Baruch if a time limit exists for the benediction \"who has formed\" which is recited upon leaving the privy. However, I have received no reply from him on this inquiry. It was the custom of R. Meir not to recite this benediction after urination.<br>My mother-in-law informed me of my father's custom to make the benedictions \"over the washing the hands\" and \"who has formed\" upon awakening at night to go to the privy."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Obadiah concerning the problem of whether or not a scholar can absolve the vow of a woman, that was confirmed by her husband."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - L, a maiden became a forced convert, at the age of 2 years, and resided among her captors for 9 years. She escaped from them and married A, who is of priestly lineage. Is A permitted to live with L?<br><b>A</b> - When L was abducted, she was too young for relations. Furthermore, we do not have apprehension that she was violated, since she was a forced convert, and was not taken for the purpose of extortion. The christians are very proud of these converts, and zealously watch their maiden purity, in order that they be fit for marriage. A is therefore permitted to live with L, even though he is of priestly lineage."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - The burghers of Regensburg had to pay a toll to the Emperor of Austria, for the transportation of merchandise and wine. They thereupon levied a tax on the Jews, asserting its purpose was to assist in strengthening the walls of the city. The burghers indicated that this tax be considered an assessment on the houses of the Jews. Until now, real estate was exempt from any assessment. Should the houses be assessed for the purpose of taxation?<br><b>A</b> - It has always been the custom (in Germany) not to assess houses for the purpose of taxation. The burghers have no right to demand that the Jews assess houses for taxation, nor have they the right, according to Jewish law, to tax the Jews in order to defray the cost of the tax on merchandise and wine, or to strengthen walls of the city [Regensburg] that do not require further fortification.<br>However, if it is feared that refusal by the Jews to accede to the demands of the burghers, will result in the confiscation of the houses of the Jews, then even those Jews who own houses in the city, but who dwell outside the city limits, must likewise share in the tax.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer notes that before the community reached an agreement with its city officials [to pay a special tax in place of the personal service] in guarding the section, it was the universal custom among the Jews to assess capital and not real property for taxation [in lieu of personal service]. However, if the burghers refuse to accept the oath of the Jews, regarding the assessment of the latter's capital, and insist that the Jews assess real property, (thus supporting the claim of the burghers that all houses, including those belonging to the Jews, are under their jurisdiction) then such a demand is illegal.<br>The text regarding the following that is recorded in this responsum, is corrupt.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer further notes that while he was in Rhine, subsequent to (the Jews ?) leaving France, (thus indicating a partial expulsion ?) a synod was held in Mayence, attended by R. Menachem of Wurzburg, R. Heilman, R. Asher, and all the notables and leaders of the Rhine. The purpose of the synod was to pay an enormous tax of 30,000 (?) to the king. It was customary in Rhine, that houses are not assessed for purposes of taxation, even in cases where one had a number of houses valued in the thousands. A demand was made by owners of movable property, that real estate belonging to orphans should be assessed. R. Hayyim Eliezer remarked that R. Meir [b. Baruch] had issued the following statement: Even if real property were to be assessed, the assessment should not exceed one-quarter of the value of the real property. R. Hayyim Eliezer comments, that he did not hear this directly from R. Meir, inasmuch as the latter was incarcerated at that time. Rather, did R. Hayyim Eliezer hear about R. Meir's statement, from R. Solomon, while in Prague."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Before his death, A, although seriously ill, refused to dispose of his property by will, as he thought his condition was really not critical. Finally, after much coaxing, he acquiesed. When asked what should be done with money that he had entrusted to B, A declared that it should be given to his mother. However, the money was already confiscated by the king, who upon learning that A was ill and without heirs, had ordered seizure of the money. It is certain however, that the king will return the money upon the appearance of A's heirs.<br><b>A</b> - Should the king decide to return the money, the mother will be entitled to it. However, the letter depicting the case indicates that A had merely instructed to give his mother this particular money though he had other possessions. Therefore, under the circumstances, the money, and latter possessions are awarded to the heirs, and not to the mother or her heirs."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A woman, as a result of cohabitation, detected a discharge of blood. However, the color was different from that of her normal flow of blood. What is the law?<br><b>A</b> - If she did not detect the discharge of blood, until after the period of time it takes to leave the bed and wash her loins, there need be no apprehension concerning this discharge. It is my opinion that, even if she detested the discharge, within this period of time, she is not considered ritually unclean.<br>When I was in Neustadt, I discussed this matter with R. Obadiah.<br>However, I do not want you to rely upon my decision until you show my reply to your rabbis, so they can carefully read my opinion, and then write me their views on this matter."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A returned from overseas for a reconciliation with his wife L. However, L told her neighbors that she did not want to immerse herself in the ritual bath, and moreover, that she was ritually unclean, and even displayed a blood stained shirt. On Friday, however, L immersed herself in the ritual bath. When the neighbors voiced their consternation and disapproval, L replied that she was guilty of no wrong doing, for she was ritually clean, and the reason she said that she did not want to go to the ritual bath was because she was angry. L says that her wrath was prompted by a misunderstanding of A's intentions. As for the blood stained shirt, L explained that the blood came from a wound, and not from menstruation. L maintains that she merely exhibited the shirt in order to avoid being postered about going to the ritual bath. Do we accept L's excuses?<br>Signed: Moses b. Joseph"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) At the time that A married L, his brother B, was an apostate. A died childless. Is L bound to receive Halitzah (a symbolic act which has the effect of allowing the childless widow to remarry) from B? Or is she not bound to B? Would you please explain your father's opinion concerning a case of this type as it seems to be unclear. The reasoning of those who espouse the more lenient view, is not quite clear; while the reasoning for the stringent view is very clear."
        ],
        [
            "(2) Does the recitation of the benediction over the kindling of the Sabbath candles constitute inauguration of the Sabbath?",
            "(3) If a dairy spoon (that was not used for 24 hours) was dipped into a pot of meat, the meat is not forbidden. However, since the spoon itself does become forbidden, what is the law if the same spoon was again dipped into the meat. Is it necessary to have sixty times the volume of the spoon?<br>Signed: Moses b. Baruch"
        ],
        [
            "<b>A</b> - (1) My late father maintained that were one apostatized prior to the marriage of his brother, the brother's childless widow is bound neither to the Leviratical marriage with the apostate, nor to receive Halitzah from him, since a marriage is contracted only with the consent of the Rabbis. The Rabbis would never agree to a marriage that binds a woman to a levir who is an apostate. However, if an apostate married a woman, the marriage is valid.",
            "(2) The actual kindling of the Sabbath candles and not the recitation of the benediction constitutes the inauguration of the Sabbath.",
            "(3) Although the dairy spoon was redipped into the pot of meat, it is not necessary to have sixty times the volume of the spoon.<br>This responsum was addressed to:<br>Moses b. Baruch"
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Obadiah concerning the case of a woman who failed to urinate before immersing herself in a ritual bath."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Solomon b. Machir.",
            "R. Solomon b. Machir discusses the case of a husband who sold, without his wife's consent, property which he had originally contributed to the household, upon marriage. R. Solomon maintains that this property had become mortgaged to the wife's ketubah, and therefore the husband cannot sell it without his wife's consent; neither is it subject to collection by a creditor. The same applies to clothing for daily wear that was given to the wife following the wedding.<br>However, jewelry and Sabbath clothes which were given to the wife following the wedding, is subject to collection by a creditor, and the husband has the right to sell same, unless it was certain, that the husband intended that it be mortgaged for the ketubah.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer is in doubt about R. Solomon's conclusions."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A bill of divorcement contained sufficient space at the top, wherein it was possible for an entire line to be filled in. Is the document valid, since it is subject to forgery?<br>Signed: Abraham b. Simcha<br><b>A</b> - The bill of divorcement is valid."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A built a drainpipe for his roof, and as a result, whenever it would rain, the water from the drainpipe would pour on the roof of his neighbor's house. Must A move the drainpipe?<br><b>A</b> - R. Hayyim b. Moses maintains that it is not necessary to move the drainpipe because it was not raining when the pipe was erected. Therefore, any damage that might result from the rain is considered to be indirect. R. Avigdor Cohen Zedek replied to my inquiry with a similiar reason.<br>However, I feel that such action constitutes direct damage, and A therefore must move the drainpipe. R. Pesach informed me that he heard a decision similiar to mine, quoted in the name of Yonah of Spain."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Wine that became wormy was emptied from one vessel to another. Does this wine become forbidden?<br><b>A</b> - If the wine was emptied from one vessel to another it does not become forbidden.<br>This responsum was addressed to R. Obadiah."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A stated while making a vow with regard to B, C, and D, \"Neither you (B), nor you (C), nor you (D), \". Later, A was released from the vow only with reference to B. Does the law prevail according to R. Judah, wherein the terminology, \"Neither you, nor you, nor you,\" implies an independent vow with regard to each one, and thus, any absolution concerning B, has no bearing whatsoever on the others? Or, does the opinion of R. Simon, who considers this type of vow to be collective, prevail?<br>This question was submitted by R. Abraham.",
            "<b>A</b> - The view of R. Simon is upheld. However, even according to R. Simon, there are exceptions to the ruling."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - The names of the congregants are inscribed on the walls [of the synagogue]. These lists are consulted on the Sabbath, when calling a person to the reading of the Torah portion. Likewise, it is customary for the Hazzan (cantor) to prepare a written list of the bridegroom's family and to refer to it when calling the latter to the reading of the Torah, on the Sabbath. Should this practice not be forbidden, lest it may lead to an erasure, or to reading secular documents on the Sabbath?<br>This question was submitted by R. Abraham<br><b>A</b> - Perhaps it is forbidden to read a list or other writing on the Sabbath only in a case that can result in a loss of money for otherwise, the same apprehension should exist with regard to reading a book on the Sabbath."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A deserted his wife, L, and went to Rome. After a while, he returned to L. In Rome, A studied the art of tanning, and announced his intention of pursuing this vocation in that city. R. Naftali, A's father-in-law, then seized A with the help of Gentiles, and by threat of violence forced him to appear before the court of R. Eliezer, in Nuremburg. A settlement was reached between A and his father-in-law, wherein A acquiesed to divorce L, while Naftali agreed to give him 44 pounds. This money was to be given to A's friend B, who would hold it in trust for A. Naftali gave B the money, and a bill of divorcement was written and given to L, but A had previously lodged a protest against it, before witnesses. Because of this protest, A now seeks to invalidate the divorce, since it was granted under duress.<br>(2) The letter \"vov\" was missing from A's name in the bill of divorcement. Does this necessarily invalidate the divorce?<br><b>A</b> - (1) The previous protest of A may not be valid for the following reasons: 1 - Since A agreed to accept money, we may assume that he fully agreed to grant the divorce out of his own free will. 2 - The witnesses before whom the the protest was lodged, could not state with certainty, that A did not grant the divorce out of his own free will, since the fact that A agreed to take money disproves their contention.<br>Furthermore, inasmuch as A consented to accept money, it is possible that he no longer wanted L as his wife, but was actually desirous of granting her a divorce. After B received the money from Naftali, A issued the divorce without making any stipulation whatsoever. Although A revealed the intention of not wanting to divorce L, without receiving money, nevertheless, the law prevails according to Abaye, who holds that revealing of intention in respect of a divorce, makes no difference. (Gitin 34a). Therefore, Naftali could even have demanded that B return the money without invalidating the bill of divorcement.<br>Some authorities have found fault with this divorce. R. Hayyim Eliezer therefore, insisted that since there was a strong possibility that the divorce was valid, A is to be coerced to give L a second divorce for the following reasons: there is no doubt that the first divorce which A issued, may have validity. Therefore, it is forbidden for L to dwell together with A (since one is not permitted to live together with an unmarried woman). A must then be forced to give her another divorce, inasmuch as L can not live with A, nor may she marry another man. For A's own good, we would advise him to grant this divorce willingly, and without having the court resort to coercion.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer adds: I personally observed how R. Meir b. Baruch had ordered a husband to divorce his rebellious wife, without paying her the Ketubah, while the husband was awarded only the property which he had brought into marriage. When incidents of rebellious wives increased, R. Meir sent word to R. Yedidiah, who was then in Spiers, to have the three communities convene for a synod. The purpose was to pass an ordinance to the effect that a rebellious wife should lose even the possessions which she had brought into marriage. However, I do not know if this ordinance was universally accepted.<br>"
        ],
        [
            "Regarding this case, R. Menachem b. Abraham writes, ",
            "that notwithstanding the testimony of the witnesses, 1 - A was not forced to grant the divorce against his will, inasmuch as A agreed to accept a monetary settlement. 2 - A stated, at the time the divorce was written, that he consented to its issuance. 3 - Any previous protest lodged by A against the divorce is invalid, since the bill of divorcement, which A instructed the scribe to write in accordance to the institution of the rabbis, contained the clause, \"I consented, of my own free will, and without any coercion [to this divorce]\". 4 - A's actions clearly depict that he intended to desert L a second time, and under conditions of this sort, the former is liable to coercion unless he agrees to issue a divorce. R. Menachem maintains that according to law, A was obligated to grant L a divorce, and the latter was entitled to collect her ketubah. However, R. Menachem feels that force was not exercised in this instance.<br>(2) Although the letter \"vov\" was missing from A's name in the bill of divorcement, it does not invalidate the divorce."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A and B were seated at a meal, and one type of wine was served to A, and another type to B. Can A's recitation of the blessing \"Hatov Ve - Hamaytiv\" release B from the obligation of reciting this benediction, and be considered as if B recited it himself?<br><b>A</b> - A's recitation of the blessing \"Hatov VeHayaytiv\" does not release B from the obligation of reciting the benediction.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer notes that he heard R. Meir b. Baruch state how perchance when the latter would mention G-d's name in vain, he would immediately recite: \"Blessed be His name, whose glorious kingdom is forever and ever\"."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "This responsum contains an incomplete question concerning the disposition of inherited real estate."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with his nephew R. Shalom b. Baruch.",
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer asked his nephew the following questions:<br>(1) Why is it permissible to instruct a Gentile to bring willows for the festival of Tabernacles, since a Gentile is forbidden to rob, and these willows are usually robbed by him? We induce the Gentile to sin when we purchase the willows from him, and if we would refrain from buying the willows from him, he would then have no reason to rob them.<br>(2) Why is it necessary for one who purchased a house that was confiscated by the authorities, from a Jew, to return it to the original owner. Should this not be similiar to a case of an article that was washed away by a river, and is considered abandoned property, although the owner refuses to concede its loss?<br>R. Shalom answers:<br>(1) When a Jew purchases willows from a Gentile, the former is not guilty of abetting the Gentile to sin, as the latter would have taken these willows anyway, since he can sell them to another Gentile for other purposes such as barrel covers, etc.<br>(2) Unlike an article that was washed away by a river, a house that was confiscated by the authorities is irretrievable only to the original owner. Furthermore, one does not easily abandon real estate, as there is always hope for its ultimate return, through justice or other means."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A and B were brothers. B had a son Y(echzael) and a daughter D(ina). After B's death, Y and his wife R, who were childless, were killed in a riot and massacre. D and her husband C were also killed, and their daughter L apostatized. Heirs of R and C were also killed in the massacre.<br>(1) A claims that R's heirs died first, and R, in turn, died before her husband Y. A maintains that he is therefore entitled to Y's entire estate, which would also include, according to A's supposition, R's estate. R's surviving heirs dispute A's contention.<br>(2) A asserts that the heirs of C died before C, and the latter died before D. A states that he is entitled to D's estate, as well as her ketubah from the estate of C's heirs. This assertion is contested by C's surviving heirs. The property and estates in question are in the possession of A, and C's surviving heirs, respectively.<br>(3) What is the law concerning L, who apostatized, and her heir?<br><b>A</b> - (1) Insofar as a doubt exists as to whether or not R or her heirs died first, A is entitled to neither the estate of R, nor the estate of her heirs.<br>(2) A is not awarded the amount of D's ketubah from the estate of C's heirs, since D herself would not have been able to collect her ketubah without first taking an oath. Furthermore, a doubt exists as to whether C died before D, and the burden of proof therefore rests upon A."
        ],
        [
            "(3) As an apostate, L forfeits her rights as an heir, even though she has the power to transmit her property to her Jewish heirs. Although it is not known whether L apostatized after her parents were killed, it is legally assumed that she has apostatized after their death. Nonetheless, L's heirs cannot acquire L's property and rights of an heir, during the latter's lifetime, since the above mentioned assumption does not devolve for the benefit of her heirs. The disputed property should be retained by A, and C's heirs, inasmuch as they are in possession of this property."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Isaac b. Eliah, concerning a case where the person who kneaded unleavened bread for Passover, failed to have the intention to guard it from reaching the stage of becoming leavened, while one who stood by, had this intention.<br>"
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Isaac b. Eliah. R. Hayyim Eliezer asks the following: Should those of us who have Gentile domestics not be exempt from making the search for leaven, before Passover, since the latter might accuse us of practicing witchcraft? It was for this reason that the sages abrogated the practice of overturning the couch of mourners.<br>R. Isaac b. Eliah replied that the search for leaven prior to the Passover, would not incite accusations of witchcraft from the Gentile domestics for the following reasons: (1) The search for leaven takes place in our own homes. (2) They know that leaven is strictly forbidden to us during Passover. (3) We burn all the Leaven in their presence.<br>We would most certainly abolish the requirement to search for leaven if a fear existed that the search might foment accusations of sorcery and witchcraft. It was for that reason that purging of the stove (before Passover) was discontinued in Province, as it arroused the Gentile populance to suspect us of sorcery."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer further exchanged correspondence with R. Isaac b. Eliah concerning the question of baking challah (dough offering) with dough from different types of grain."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer further exchanged correspondence with R. Isaac b. Eliah concerning the following problems: An animal whose gall was removed; Blood that was seen by a woman following childbirth; A chicken that was cooked with milk; and a levir's rights of inheritance.<br>R. Isaac b. Eliah mentions that during his time, the Levirate marriage was not practiced in France."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer quotes a responsum of R. Meir b. Baruch No. 402 Cremona edition.",
            "",
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer notes that he himself had a case wherein A, (R. Jacob) who was living in one country, betrothed L, who was living in another country. R. Havyim Eliezer ruled that L can be forced to come and live with A in his country.<br>"
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer asked his nephew the following question: A woman, after cleansing herself, put on clothes and went to take a ritual bath. Should there be apprehension that some substance from the clothes became attached to her person, thus rendering her unfit for the ritual bath?<br>We have such an apprehension in a case where a woman carried her child on her back prior to, or during the ritual bath.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer's nephew replied that the two cases are dissimiliar. In the latter case we have an apprehension that some substance from the child might have become attached to her person, since children often play with dough, clay and other sticky material. In the former case however, garments rarely contain any sticky material. Hence, there need be no apprehension."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A and B are partners in a courtyard. A wants to build a privy in the courtyard, but B objects to this proposal. A claims that he should be allowed to build a privy on the property, for the same reason that it is permissible for B's womenfolk to wash clothes in the yard, since it is objectionable and inconvenient for the latter to use the public laundry. A asserts it is likewise unpleasant and offensive for him to use the public privy.<br>(2) A built a structure on top of the stairway. B objects to its presence and demands its removal.<br>(3) A and B built additions to their buildings. Each demand that the other remove the addition. A claims that he should not be ordered to tear down his addition, as his father's writ of partition, which was duly signed and executed, gave him the right to renovate or add to his house, according to his discretion , provided that the length or width of the original building was not, in any way enlarged.<br><b>A</b> - (1) Although it is as offensive and inconvenient for A to utilize a public privy, as it is for B's womenfolk to patronize a public laundry, the two cases are dissimiliar. In the latter instance, the land need not be dug up, and if a particular space was needed, the washing could be done in another part of the courtyard. The former instance, however, requires that the land be dug up, and furthermore, the privy can not be readily moved. B's objection is therefore sustained.<br>(2) Unless B raised an objection at the commencement of the construction, it is not necessary for A to remove the structure. However, the structure must not block the right of passage to the street.<br>(3) We accept the veracity of A's claim, concerning the conditions, which he avers, were stated in his father's writ of partition. By the same token, we assume that A tacitly concedes that what applies to himself is applicable to B. Therefore, neither A, nor B, need remove the additions which they built."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer asks his nephew, Shalom b. Baruch the following: (1) Cases that deal with fines, are not judged outside of Palestine, unless they occur frequently, or a loss of money is involved. Therefore, why are we permitted to levy fines for the shame and disgrace caused by a breach of marriage agreement, as these cases are rare, and do not involve a loss of money?<br>(2) Should the fine, in cases where the prospective father-in-law broke the agreement, be awarded to the father or the son, since both suffer shame, and the son is dependent upon the father for sustenance?<br>Shalom b. Baruch replies:<br>(1) Cases of this type are not an Asmakta (a conditional stipulation in a verbal or written contract, providing for the payment of a fine in case of nonfulfillment of a promise) but are as stipulations that are accompanied by a kinyan (a symbolic act which makes an agreement binding). It is similiar to cases that deal with loans, since one binds himself from the outset to be responsible, should he violate the terms of the marriage agreement. Therefore, these cases can be judged outside of Palestine.<br>(2) The fine is awarded to the son, as he keenly feels the embarrassment caused by his prospective father-in-law, when the latter broke the agreement.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer does not accept his nephew's views, and feels that further thought and reflection on the subject is required."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Can some members of the community force the other members to build a Mikvah (ritual bath house)?<br><b>A</b> - Insofar as the mikvah is required by the entire community, some members can force the others to build a mikvah and thus eliminate the need for utilizing the rivers for that purpose. This is similiar to the case where members can force other members of the community to build a synagogue or purchase the scriptures for the synagogue and library."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A divorced his wife L and thereupon married R. L did not waive the payment of her ketubah. In order to prevent L from collecting her ketubah, A gave his second wife R, all his chattel. Later, a settlement was reached between A and L, and A engaged in business transactions with the property which he had given R. However, there were no witnesses who could testify that R actually returned the chattel to A. Before A died, he again gave R all his property as a gift causa mortis. A died childless.<br>A's brothers claim that A never gave the chattel to R as a gift, neither the first time nor on his deathbed, but merely appointed her as a trustee over the property. The brothers maintain that insofar as they are A's closest heirs, they are entitled to the property. R disputes the contention of the brothers and claims: that the chattel was given to her, as an outright gift, and the property which A subsequently acquired was given to her as a gift causa mortis. R denies that she was merely appointed in either case, a trustee over the property. R's latter claim is corroborated by the testimony of a single witness.<br><b>A</b> - We must assume that A did not make R a trustee over the chattel but gave it to her as an outright gift, for if this were not so, L would have been able to collect her ketubah from this chattel. Even though A had exercised control over the chattel, by using it for business transactions subsequent to his giving it to R, there is no indication that it belonged to A, since the principle of usucaption does not apply to a husband, in regard to his wife's property. We accept R's claim that the property which A acquired subsequently, was given to R as a gift causa mortis. R need not take an oath, since her claim is corroborated by the testimony of a single"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A man was afflicted with boils. His wife claimed that she detested him and could not live with him. Do we coerce the husband to grant his wife a divorce? Furthermore, if the husband must divorce his wife, does she receive her ketubah?<br><b>A</b> - One whose body is covered with boils, is coerced to divorce his wife. I maintain that one is coerced to divorce his wife if only his head was afflicted with boils, provided we can ascertain that those boils were of the category which make coitus harmful. However, if only an arm or a leg was afflicted with boils, and could be bandaged before coitus, the husband is not forced to divorce his wife.<br>According to the testimony presented, and by the husband's own admission, the latter was exceedingly loathsome to his wife. The ordinance of the Geonim which decrees that a husband is coerced to divorce a wife who claims that he is loathsome to her, is applicable in this case. However, the husband is not required to pay the ketubah, since we are not expert enough in determining which boils belong to the category of the types that make coitus harmful.<br>R. Meir b. Baruch often ruled that a woman who loathes her husband forfeits her ketubah and additional jointure beyond the legally prescribed sum but receives whatever she has brought to her husband as dowry while the latter must divorce her. However, while R. Meir was in Nuremburg, he wrote the Rhine communities to adopt an ordinance to the effect that a rebellious wife should not even be entitled to collect whatever she has brought in to her husband as dowry. R. Hayyim Eliezer is in doubt whether this ordinance was generally accepted."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A wanted to borrow money from B but the latter refused to lend A any money whatsoever, unless A would deposit a pledge with a third party chosen by B. C was designated by B, to act as the third party. B, thereupon, lent A the money, only after having learned that the pledge was already in C's possession. The pledge was destroyed in a conflagration. A claims that B should bear the responsibility for the loss of the pledge, since B had insisted that the pledge be placed in C's possession.<br><b>A</b> - B is not held responsible for the loss of the pledge, even if C was found to be guilty of negligence, since A had personally given the pledge to C."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer received different versions of a case that involved a divorce, from R. Isaac and R. Manoah.<br>R. Isaac's account:<br>A young man, A, ordered a bill of divorcement to be written for his wife, L, but changed his mind after it was written. His relatives and R. Manoah verbally pressured A to go through with the divorce. A appointed B as an agent to present L with the bill of divorcement. A cancelled the bill of divorcement before R. Isaac alone. Later, R. Manoah took the bill of divorcement from A and gave it to B. When A and B arrived at the city where L was, A again cancelled the divorce. B did not give the bill of divorcement to L. Instead, R. Manoah ordered that A, and not B, should give the bill of divorcement to L. A refused to comply and R. Manoah issued a ban against A, effective in that city. A nevertheless continued to shout defiance and protests against the divorce. He told people that his wife had informed him that she does not want to be divorced. A maintained that he wants L as his wife, and would not divorce her, even if he would have to lose all of his money. Two weeks later, R. Manoah issued a ban against B, and ordered him to return to that city. L's father took her to that city, and A also came there. A, in the presence of B, revoked the latter's power as an agent for the former. Nevertheless, R. Manoah ordered B to give L the bill of divorcement.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer makes the following comments on R. Isaac's account of the case:<br>Even though A was compelled by his relatives and R. Manoah to grant a divorce to his wife, if L had refused to live with A, the bill of divorcement does not become void. The ordinance of the Saboraim, which dates back more than 300 years, dictates that when a woman refuses to live with her husband, the latter is coerced to immediately grant her a divorce. Only physical or economic methods that are employed to force a man to issue a divorce, constitute coercion. Therefore, even if L was not averse to living with A, the divorce, in this case, is not void on the grounds of cocercion, inasmuch as A's relatives and R. Manoah had merely exerted verbal pressure on A.<br>The cancellation which A invoked against the bill of divorcement, after having given it to B, has no effect, as it was pronounced only in the presence of R. Isaac. In addition, the formula of cancellation was most ambiguous.<br>Since it was not necessary for A to personally give the bill of divorcement directly to B, R. Manoah did not err, when he took the bill of divorcement from A. and presented it to B.<br>You did not inform me regarding the wording of the formula of cancellation pronounced by A, when both he and B arrived in the city where L was staying, nor did you say before whom this cancellation was pronounced.<br>However, from the latter part of your letter, it would seem that this bill of divorcement should be absolutely void.<br>Nevertheless, R. Monaoh, in his letter to me, described a different account of what had transpired. R. Manoah's account:<br>R. Isaac came to R. Manoah, after the bill of divorcement was written, and asked the latter to instruct A to appoint an agent, for the purpose of delivering the divorce to L. Both R. Isaac and R. Manoah went to A, who thereupon appointed Samuel b. Jacob HaCohen to act as A's agent. A renounced all future cancellations that he might invoke against the divorce, and announced before more than two score people present, that he had willfully ordered this bill of divorcement to be written. A then gave the divorce to the agent, with specific orders to give it to L. Later, we sent for L and the agent informing them that the divorce should take place here in Vladmir. We ordered A to personally give L the bill of divorcement, but he refused to comply. Likewise in Cologne, we ordered him to do so, and again he refused. We then instructed the agent to give L the bill of divorcement. The agent carried out all of our instructions, and gave L the bill of divorcement in the presence of the leaders of the city.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer feels that R. Manoah's account of the episode, nonetheless, requires further study and examination. However, R. Hayyim Eliezer maintains that L should not be permitted to remarry, until all the ambiguities in the case are cleared up."
        ],
        [
            "R. Moshe HaCohen sent the following to R. Hayyim Eliezer:",
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A and B were partners in a house and courtyard. A claimed that B had stored a chest in an area that was restricted, according to the terms of partition, solely for a passageway. A therefore demands its removal. B maintains that according to the terms of partition, he had the right to store articles in that area provided that: (1) The passageway was not blocked; (2) B would remove the articles, whenever A decided to place barrels in the cellar.<br><b>A</b> - If B could prove by means of witnesses, that the chest had been stored in that ares, for a period of three years, during which time A had failed to lodge a protest, then B need not be required to remove the chest, since the latter could claim that such usage constitutes usucaption. However, if B is unable to support his claim, then he is required to move it away. If B had contended that A knew the former's claim to be true and in accordance with the terms of partition, then A could coerce B to remove the chest, only by taking an oath to the contrary.<br>signed R. Moshe HaCohen<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer disagrees with R. Moshe HaCohen's decision and maintains that the principle of usucaption is not applicable in this case.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (2) B demanded that A should be required to close up the doorway that connects the latter's courtyard, and the courtyard of the partners. A avers that prior to their partnership, the property belonged to A's mother-in-law, L, and that she had instructed A to build this doorway. Furthermore, A produced witnesses to confirm his claim, that L had told him to erect the doorway between the two courtyards. A asserts that L, and the latter's heirs waived their rights regarding the passageway and permitted A to utilize this doorway. B contends however, that the property (which he acquired from L's heirs) did not actually belong to L, as she had not taken an oath on her ketubah (and the property was in payment of her ketubah).<br><b>A</b> - A need not be forced to close up the doorway, so long as he can produce witnesses who can testify that A had exercised use of the doorway during the heir's ownership, and for a period of three years subsequent to B's acquisition of the property. The property in question had actually belonged to L, and I personally examined a document which was in the possession of the heirs. This document stated that the heirs had inherited the house from L, and the latter had the right to grant A permission to build this doorway. Furthermore, one of the heirs had a document which stated that part of the house had been given to him, by L, as a present. A produced witnesses who testified that L had instructed him to erect the doorway. Thus B's contention that L did not actually own the property because she did not take an oath on her ketubah, is overruled.<br>signed: R. Moshe HaCohen<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer again disagrees with R. Moshe HaCohen's decision. R. Hayyim Eliezer maintains that even if L had instructed A to build the doorway, she did not waive her rights to the passageway and allow A unlimited use thereof, for if L so desired, she could have later ordered him to close it up. Furthermore, even if the heirs would have permitted A use of the passageway, it is of no avail to A, in this case.<br>The witnesses who affixed their signatures to the documents of the heirs, merely attested to the action which had transpired in their presence. They did not certify the authenticity of the contents of the documents. Thus B could still claim that when L had asked A to build the doorway, she had not as yet taken an oath on her ketubah. Hence the property was not actually in her possession at that time."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - L demands that her father-in-law A, return jewelry, a diadem, 3 golden pieces, and 4 salvers attached to an ornament, that were given to her by her late husband B. L further asserts that B had inherited books and money from his grandfather. This inheritance was administered by A, who served as a trustee for B. L claims that the books are in A's possession, as well as land which A had purchased with the money that B had inherited. L therefore demands payment for her ketubah, from the books and land which are in A's possession.<br>A avers that the three golden pieces and four salvers belonged to him, and that he merely lent them to B and L. A contends that B, who was then a Major, had given the estate, which the latter had inherited from his grandfather to the former. While A was making arrangements for his daughter's marriage, B offered to give his father money for the wedding. A complied with B's offer and used some of B's money. B took back the residue. A concedes that the books and land are in his possession, but maintains that he bought the books from B and purchased the land with the former's money.",
            "<b>A</b> - It appears from both claims, that the gold pieces and salvers were not actually items of jewelry. There is little reason for one to lend articles of gold, unless perhaps to be used as a pledge. Nevertheless, it is most unusual for one to give gold pieces as a pledge. Therefore, if the gold pieces and salvers were not seen in L's possession, either prior to, or following the demise of B, then we do not accept A's assertion that he lent these articles to B and L. However, had A maintained that he lent B and L the gold pieces, in order to have the articles converted into jewelry, we would have to give credence to A's assertion, since he could have denied that these articles were ever in the possession of B and L. (principle of miggo - an alternative claim that the litigant could have put forth [if he wanted to lie] one that would have given him greater advantage than his present claim).<br>If however, these articles were seen in L's possession, we consider that these articles belonged to L. The case is somewhat ambiguous, since L failed to explain whether A actually seized these articles or whether these articles were deposited with the latter, and A likewise, did not relate the manner in which these articles came into his possession.<br>If the gold pieces were known to have been at one time in A's possession, we do not accept the credence of A's assertion that he lent these items to B and L, since he could no longer claim (the principle of miggo) that these articles were not in his possession. If the articles were not seen in A's possession, and L took an oath on her ketubah, we accept A's contention, since A could have claimed that he purchased these items from L, after she took her oath on her ketubah. However, if witnesses are able to testify that these articles were obtained by A by seizure, or were deposited with the latter, A could no longer claim that he had purchased these items.<br>L can not demand payment for her ketubah from the estate inherited by B. However, the heirs of B, if they so desire, can make a claim on the estate."
        ],
        [
            "R. Isaac b. Mordecai corresponded with R. Hayyim Eliezer, and discussed whether heirs are entitled to acquire gifts that were given to a deceased person."
        ],
        [
            "",
            "R. Matatia b. Isaac corresponded with R. Hayyim Eliezer regarding the problem of whether a person engaged in a religious act is exempt from other religious duties.<br>"
        ],
        [
            "R. Matatia b. Isaac corresponded with R. Hayyim b. Eliezer concerning the following question: A woman was appointed by her husband as his trustee and had transactions with his property during his lifetime. Can the husband's heirs compel her to take an oath regarding this property, even though she had not demanded payment for her ketubah.<br>R. Matatia sends his regards to R. Hayyim Eliezer's son, R. Isaac, and to R. Amos b. Isaac HaCohen."
        ],
        [
            "R. Isaac b. Eliah corresponded with R. Hayyim Eliezer, ",
            "concerning the custom of forming a Zurat Hapesach (The semblance of a gate to comply with the laws of Erub, [the incorporation of several private domains, within a certain area, into a single domain belonging to several partners within the limits of which objects may be carried on the Sabbath]), without relying upon a Lehi (a stake fastened to the ground by the side of a wall, serving as a mark or as a fictitous partition [enclosure] for the purpose of enabling the inmates of an alley to move objects on the Sabbath, within the space thus enclosed).",
            "",
            "R. Isaac b. Eliah also discusses the question of whether a person engaged in a religious act is exempt from other religious duties."
        ],
        [
            "R. Isaac b. Eliah corresponded with R. Hayyim Eliezer concerning different versions of the text found in Yebamoth 36A. R. Isaac b. Eliah mentioned that one time, while he was studying these texts, R. Meir b. Baruch, who had already passed away, appeared to R. Isaac b. Eliah in a dream, and tried to smooth out the difficulties. R. Isaac b. Eliah was deeply perplexed by this occurrence, insofar as he had never seen R. Meir, while the latter was alive.<br>R. Isaac b. Eliah further writes, \"When he founded his school in Mayence, he cordially invited me over. On two occasions, I went to visit him in order to ascertain whether or not he agreed with my viewpoint. However, I failed to find him available. On the first occasion he was preoccupied with the imprisonment of his son. On the second occasion, he had already departed\"."
        ],
        [
            "R. Isaac b. Eliah further corresponded with R. Hayyim Eliezer and discussed decisions rendered by R. Meir b. Baruch, and Rabbenu Tam.<br>R. Isaac b. Eliah records the custom in this land (Germany) wherein a woman would hold a sacred object in court, while taking an oath on her ketubah [that she did not steal, retain or use any of her husband's property in a manner not specifically permitted by her husband]. R. Isaac b. Eliah questioned this practice since it is contradictory to the dictum of the Talmud. R. Isaac b. Eliah notes that it is customary in France to have the woman bind herself by a Herem (ban) rather than have her take an oath on her ketubah."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - Why is is permissible for the community to borrow money on interest from Jewish money lenders, so long as a Gentile would consent to go surety for the community?<br><b>A</b> - This practice is permissible, since according to civil law the person who agreed to go surety, is entirely responsible for the loan. Therefore, the burden of payment rests upon the Gentile and not the community. If the Gentile had died, the Jewish money lenders would then be unable to collect the loan from the community, even if witnesses had testified that the money was given directly to the community. It was not necessary for the community to actually stipulate that the money was borrowed in accordance with civil law, since it was tacitly understood that the community was acting in a manner in which it would be permissible for the Jewish money lenders to collect interest on the loan."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A built an extension to his house. During a conflagration, caused by a midwife, the extension fell on the synagogue. A made no endeavor to remove the fallen extension, in order to prevent the fire from spreading to the synagogue. The synagogue, as a result, burned down. Must A pay for the damage caused to the synagogue?<br><b>A</b> - Although A could have saved the synagogue from burning, by removing the fallen extension, A is not held responsible, since the damage caused by A was indirect, and the conflagration did not actually commence through A's negligence."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - L suffered an epileptic seizure, more than one year prior to her betrothal to A. Many people knew about her seizure. L did not have another attack until subsequent to her betrothal. A claims: a) he was unaware of the fact that L was an epileptic; b) even if he was aware of her condition, he was under the impression that L was completely cured, inasmuch as the seizure occurred a long time ago. Was this betrothal contracted under error, and therefore invalid, or can L collect payment for her ketubah from A?<br><b>A</b> - We accept A's assertion, and he is not required to take an oath in support of his contention. L is not entitled to collect her ketubah, since the betrothal was contracted under error. Nevertheless, since a shadow of doubt exists regarding the betrothal, A is required to give L a divorce, which could be issued to her even against her will."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A died, and was survived by his wife and children, who were minors. L, the grandmother A died, and her heirs now demand their share of her estate. The relatives of A's orphans charge that B (R. Nehorai), the uncle of A, is in possession of a house and books, that belong to the estate of L. The relatives request that A's orphans should be awarded the house and books, as their father's rightful share of the estate left by L.<br>B refuses to reply to the allegations of the relatives, until a trustee, who would be empowered to act in matters that might even be disadvantageous to A's orphans, is assigned to represent the latter. B denies that he has property which belong to either L, or A's orphans, and contends that the relatives [who are acting on behalf of A's orphans] have real property and movables in their possession, which are part of L's estate.<br>Should a trustee be assigned to represent A's orphans, even where it might eventually be to the disadvantage of the latter? Furthermore, should this trustee be an individual who is in no way related to A's orphans?<br><b>A</b> - If B had occupied the house during the lifetime of L, he must relinquish it to A's orphans, since the latter retain constructive possession to the house (by virtue of L's ownership). A trustee should not be assigned to represent A's orphans. Instead, when A's orphans reach majority, the matter should be brought to court for adjudication.<br>With regard to the books, if they were never actually seen in the possession of B, we place credence in his assertion that he purchased the books, since he could have denied that the books were in his possession (principle of miggo - an alternative claim that the litigant could have put forth [if he wanted to lie], one that would have given him greater advantage than his present claim). However, if the books were seen [at one time or another] in B's possession, he must then relinquish the books, since the principle of miggo is no longer applicable.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer states: were it not for the fact that R. Hakkim and R. Jonathan were interested parties, and permission was granted to me to judge this case, I would not have had the temerity to render a verdict, in their city."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A and B were partners in a house, which they had leased. They rented quarters, on the main floor near the entrance, to C. A and B charged that C would accost every Gentile who came to the building to borrow money on interest from the partners. C would then arrange a loan between the Gentile and himself. The partners assert that they had suffered severe financial losses because of C's action. A and B demand the issuance of an injunction that would restrain C from luring away their clients, and would require the latter to transact his business, upstains, near the partners quarters.<br>C claims that A was fully aware of the former's business methods since the former had previously rented quarters from the latter in this house. C maintains that he had rented these quarters with the purpose of transacting his business therein, as he had done previously. C avers that B had voiced no objection to the former's occupancy, and had the latter objected, C would have sought other premises wherein to pursue his business.",
            "<b>A</b> - A and B can not restrain C from transacting his business in his quarters, since C acquired these rights upon renting the quarters. However, C must confine his business dealings to his quarters and can not transact business in quarters that were reserved for the partners."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A married L, who became pregnant. The latter was formerly married to A's father-in-law. However, it was known that L was not the mother of A's former wife (inasmuch as the former was younger than the latter). Must A divorce L, since she was, at one time, married to A's father-in-law?<br><b>A</b> - A must divorce L, even if it were known that she was not the mother of A's former wife, since a Talmudic ordinance forbids such a marriage. Since a person, who violated R. Gershon's ordinance and married two wives is coerced to divorce one of them, one who married a woman that was forbidden to him by a Talmudic ordinance, must certainly divorce her. L can not collect payment for her ketubah, even if A desires to write her a ketubah. Likewise, L can not collect sustenance nor usufruct, nor receive compensation for the wear and ruin of the things which she brought along as her property."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A apostatized and left his wife L. Prior to this, he had lent money to Gentiles, and left some immovable property in the possession of L. Later, the Gentiles paid back the loan to L. After many years, A returned to the fold and wanted to exact from L, all profit that she realized from A's property. Furthermore, A insists that all money which L had earned since the former's departure, should now be given to him.<br><b>A</b> - A forfeited his rights to the property that was in the possession of L when he apostatized. A is entitled to neither any profit that was realized by L from the loans, nor to any money that might have since been earned, by the latter. L's situation is similiar to that of a person who utilized an apostate's money for business purposes. The profit belongs to that person and not to the apostate."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A married L, a widow. The trustees of the heirs of L's former husband claim that the dowry which L brought to A, was worth more than the value of her ketubah, and in addition, L had not taken the customary widow's oath regarding her ketubah due her from her former husband. The trustees, therefore, demand that A return the entire dowry to them.<br>L refuses to take an oath, because of an altercation she had with A. L asserts that she does not remember which valuables were needlessly taken by her. Since it is necessary to clarify the proper ownership of thevaluables in the dowry, A refuses to accept the veracity of L's oath. A claims that L is a thief, inasmuch as she had admitted that the dowry which she brought to the former, was in excess of the value of her ketubah.<br>Furthermore, L rebelled against A and avers that she can not live with him for numerous reasons, which she could not explain. A is in possession of the entire dowry.<br>It was customary for R. Eliezer, who was the leader of this province, to follow the ruling of R. Alfasi and R. Meir [b. Baruch], and to return, in such cases, the entire dowry, even if it was seized by the woman's husband. Should the ruling of this sage be followed in this case?<br>(2) A certain contract seemed, to a majority of the people in the province, to be a forgery for several reasons. However, definite proof was lacking. Should this contract be considered valid? signed: R. Yechiel HaCohen<br><b>A</b> - Insofar as L rebelled against A, and it was customary, in your province for R. Eliah to follow the dictums of R. Alfasi and R. Meir, then A must return the entire dowry to L. If L can not, for one reason or another, take an oath that she legally acquired the valuables in excess of her ketubah, all valuables that were recognized as having belonged to L's former husband must be returned to the heirs. Valuables which are undistinquishable and can not be recognized as having belonged to her former husband should be placed in the possession of a 3rd party, to forestall any possibility of L's acquiring them without taking an oath. However, if L conceded that some of the valuables belonged to her former husband, they are awarded to the heirs."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer corresponded with his son and discussed whether a Jew is permitted to benefit from work that was performed by a Gentile on the Sabbath, or holidays, as well as work done by a Jew on these days under certain extenuating circurastances.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer recalls that one time, the winterhouse was once heated by a Gentile on the Sabbath, and his father refused to eat therein. R. Samuel of Falaise in the name of R. Yom Tov permitted one to dwell in a winterhouse that was warmed by a Gentile on the Sabbath. In our city, most of the people rely upon this decision and dwell in winterhouses that are warmed by Gentiles on the Sabbath."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer and R. Saadiah b. Shniar exchanged correspondence regarding the following matter:<br><b>Q</b> - A lent money to B through a Gentile intermediary. A stipulated that the rate of interest would be one quarter per annum, and that B would have to pay the tax on the money he borrowed, in addition to the interest. B stipulated that the pledge, which he gave as security for the loan, should not be entrusted to A, but should be deposited with C, who would return the pledge to B, upon redemption. Is this considered to be direct usury and therefore illegal?<br><b>A</b> - This procedure is illegal, because the Gentile did not acquire the pledge from B, and A was bound, in accordance with B's stipulation, to see that the pledge was given to C. Therefore, this procedure is considered to be direct usury, and is forbidden. signed: Saadiah b. Shniar"
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer disagrees with his relative R. Saadiah, and maintains that this procedure is in no way illegal. Rather, it is as if B lent a pledge to the Gentile in order to enable the latter to borrow money for himself, from A. B was not actually involved in this loan because (1) if C had lost the pledge, A could not demand payment from B; (2) If the Gentile had died, C would be required to return the pledge to B, and not to A. Therefore this does not constitute direct usury."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A and B were partners in a two story house. The former owned the lower level, while the latter owned the upper level. B desired to build an addition on the floor of his apartment. A objected and maintained that this addition will weaken the supports of the house.<br><b>A</b> - It seems to me that A's objection is overruled, and that B should be permitted to build the addition on his floor.<br>Nevertheless, I feel that this matter requires further thought, and I must consult with others, concerning this problem."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A owed B 40 pounds (layish). When B demanded payment of the money, A requested an extension of one year, and took an oath to: 1) assume B's expenses for the year, and 2) give B one pound, in cash. A deposited a pledge with B as security for the 40 pounds (layish), which would be repaid at the end of the year. Does this constitute illegal interest?<br><b>A</b> - Since this agreement was not made at the time the loan was originally contracted, but rather when it fell due, it is considered to be Abak Ribbit (shade of usury). Therefore if B had already collected the interest on the 40 pounds (layish), it can no longer be exacted by judicial process."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A wanted to borrow money from B on interest, through a Gentile intermediary. A gave the Gentile documents (which were written by Gentiles) and instructed the latter to use these documents as collateral. Is this considered to be a usurious transaction, and thus forbidden?<br><b>A</b> - B consented to accept the documents from the Gentile as collateral, only because the former knew that A would have to redeem these documents. Since the documents possess no intrinsic value, whatsoever, but merely afford B the opportunity of pressuring A to pay the interest, it is considered as if B exacted the interest directly from A. Therefore, this transaction constitutes usury and is forbidden."
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A made an agreement to sell a parcel of land to B, before Hanukkah, and gave the latter a book as security, that the former would fulfill the agreement. A said to B, before an authoritative court, \"If I do not carry out the terms of the agreement. This book shall be yours as of now.\" A failed to sell B the land before Hanukkah. Can A still sell the land to B, without incurring the penalty, although the designated time had elapsed?<br><b>A</b> - In reality, both A and B were not sincerely interested about consummating the agreement before Hannukah. This deadline was intended to merely serve as a stimulus to complete the deal. The transaction can therefore be completed after the designated time had elapsed, and A need incur no penalty, whatsoever."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A deposited money with B for safekeeping. A died and was survived by a son C, who later apostatized. Must B return the money to C?<br><b>A</b> - There is a difference of opinion regarding property of an apostate. I maintain, however, that A should continue to safeguard it, awaiting the time that C might repent and return to the fold. It is not directly permissible for B to spend the money or seize it for his personal use. However, if B had already done so, it can no longer be exacted by judicial process.<br>If C had never returned to Judaism, but died, the money should be returned to his Jewish heirs, since it is the unanimous opinion of the Rabbis, that an apostate retains the power to transmit his property to his Jewish heirs. If B wants to act with equity, he should return the money to C's Jewish heirs, after C's death, even if B had spent the money or seized it for his personal use."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A commissioned a scribe to copy the 24 books of the Bible, and agreed to pay the latter in three installments, which were payable when the scribe commenced work on the Pentateuch, Prophets and Hagiographa, respectively.<br>After the scribe had completed copying part of the Pentateuch, A, together with the Jews of his province, were incarcerated, [for purposes of extortion] and were forced to pay a tremendous ransom. They were thereupon left with but a third of their former cash, property and books.<br>A claims that the scribe upon witnessing the plight of the former, released A from the agreement. The scribe denies this, and avers that the agreement was made in the presence of witnesses, and was accompanied by a kinyan (a symbolic act which makes an agreement binding). The scribe insists that he is ready to complete the work which he was commissioned to do, and contends that A is not destitute, but still is a man of means.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (2) A claims that C (the former husband of A's wife, L) and B, jointly lent 40 pounds, and that after the death of C, L became B's partner, in this loan. A avers that L brought him as her dowry her share of the loan. A contends that subsequent to the marriage, B came to the former and discussed the loan. A maintains that B had agreed to make the former an equal partner with the latter, regarding the loan. A asserts that B thereupon gave the former 10 pounds.<br>B denies A's contention, but concedes that the former and C, had jointly lent 40 pounds, which were since repaid. However, B claims that the relatives of L had alleged that one half of C's share of the loan belonged to L, and the other half to the heirs of C. L had not taken an oath on her ketubah.",
            "<b>A</b> - (1) Insofar as A is required to pay the scribe only for work that had been completed by the latter, the former may abrogate the agreement, even if the scribe is unable to procure other employment. However if people, who possess similar means as A, commission scribes to undertake such projects, then A can no longer assert, that due to financial circumstances, he must now cancel the agreement.",
            "<b>A</b> - (2) Since L did not take an oath on her ketubah, the money remains in the possession of the heirs of C, and any agreement that B might have made with regard to this money, is invalid.<br>If the heirs of C demand that B return the 10 pounds which he had given to A, and L agreed to take an oath on her ketubah, then B must reinburse the heirs.<br>I have in my possession a responsum which quotes the decree of R. Zemach and other Gaonim, that a widow who failed to take an oath on her ketubah, but remarried and brought in a dowry to her husband, thereupon forfeits all rights to her ketubah. I maintain however, that in our time, this does not apply to a case wherein the woman had not brought in a dowry worth more than the value of her ketubah."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer corresponded with R. Mordecai b. Abraham.<br><b>Q</b> - The inhabitants of town, T, claim that A settled in a village within Sabbath limits (2000 cubits) of T, and daily conducted his business in T. The community had passed an ordinance that whoever moved into T, during the year, must pay the tax retroactive from the beginning of the year. The community conceded that it had granted a release from taxes to Jews in the past, who had lived in the surrounding territory under another juridiction, and transacted business in T. However, the community refuses to grant A a release from taxes, as the latter and his family daily attended synagogue [in T]. Furthermore, during the year that the aforesaid ordinance was in effect, A leased a house in T, and wanted to settle in the city as soon as the ordinance had expired. In addition, the community had appointed A as a Parnas (an officer of the community). The inhabitants of T contend that A's business dealings, (regardless of whether they are on a small or large scale) increase the volume of Jewish business [and the overlord might thereupon demand more taxes because of this increase in trade]. The community therefore demands that A pay the tax retroactive from the beginning of the year. The overlord imposed another tax on T, and the community insists that A should also pay his share of this tax.<br>A contends that he is under the jurisdiction of another overlord, and that he was obligated to pay the latter an enormous tax. He asserts that he received no assistance from the community regard to this tax, and consequently he refuses to participate with the inhabitants of T, in reference to paying taxes. A professes that his business transactions in T do not exceed 10 pounds and asserts that his debtors who previously owed him money contacted him, after they moved to T, and made arrangements with A concerning payments. A maintains that the community never admonished him about conducting business in T, and avers that in the past, Jews who lived under the jurisdiction of another overlord in the surrounding territory, would transact business in T, without being forced to pay taxes. A insists that there are fewer Jews living in the surrounding territory, than in former times, and demands the same privilege of transacting business in T, without being subject to its taxes. A claims that he regretted having leased a house in T, and instead, remained under the jurisdiction of his original overlord. Concerning his appointment to the position of Parnas, A avers that the community stipulated that the appointment as Parnas would be confirmed, only when he moved into T, by the first day of the month following the expiration of the aforesaid ordinance. A states that he never moved into T, and therefore never assumed the position of Parnas. A contends that his business dealings do not effect the inhabitants of T, and will not result in [the overlord's demand for] higher taxes because the Gentiles know that A does not live in T, but under the jurisdiction of another overlord.<br>signed: Mordecai b. Abraham.",
            "<b>A</b> - Insofar as A lived outside the city limits, under another overlord's jurisdiction, he is under no obligation to pay the taxes. We observe how Gentiles who live in the surrounding territory, do not pay their share of the king's taxes, together with the Gentile subjects of T, although the former apparently come daily to T, to purchase supplies and conduct business. Therefore, Jews who live outside of T, and conduct business in the city, should most certainly be exempt from participating with the inhabitants of T, in payment of taxes. It is the intention of the king to tax his own subjects, and not those of another jurisdiction.<br>In order that A's transactions should not reflect on the volume of Jewish business in T, the inhabitants of T can inform the king that A, who lives outside T, does not pay a share of the tax. The community, however, should not simply mention to the king that A conducts business in T, but should explain that A's volume of business is but 10 pounds.<br>The community can not force A to pay tax on the transactions with his debtors, nor can they restrain A from doing business in T, even on public market days. We accept A's explanation concerning the house he leased in T, and his appointment as Parnas. ",
            "A, however, must pay his \"tithe\" to the community charity fund, from the profits he earned in T."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A number of Jews were incarcerated [for purposes of extortion] but their wives and children were not harmed. A escaped, and as a result, the overlord became enraged and exacted a very heavy ransom from the others. B claims that had A not fled, they could have negotiated a more favorable settlement with the overlord. B therefore, demands that A should pay the former his share of the ransom. B contends they were incarcerated because of the desire [by the overlord] to extort money from their sons. Therefore, B insists that even money belonging to B's son X, that was in A's possession, and which could be used for investment purposes, should also be considered part of A'S assets.<br>B further claims that A, under oath, had included money belonging to the youth, which was in A's possession, as part of his taxable assets, and that A had paid tax on these assets for six years. B demands that A should now pay tax on these assets.<br>B asserts that he had interceded on behalf of C and D, who were also incarcerated with the former, and had implored the Gentile authorities to release the latter from paying ransom, alleging that C and D were destitute. B now demands that C and D reimburse him with their share of the ransom.<br>A contends that he has escaped by the grace of G-d, and did not cause the others any loss. He therefore refuses to make any reimbursements whatsoever. A refuses to pay tax on the youth's money, which was in his possession, and avers that he had made a separate agreement with the overlord, and was not asked by the latter to pay the tax.<br>C and D deny that B was responsible for their being released from the ransom. C and D assert that the Gentiles had previously known that the former were impoverished, and therefore refuse to pay B their share of the ransom.<br>signed: Menachem b. Eliezer, David b. Meir",
            "<b>A</b> - A is obligated to pay his share of the ransom even though he had escaped. C and D [and all others who were incarcerated] are partners, insofar as paying ransom, and must therefore pay their share of the ransom. Such action on the part of the overlord to ruin the Jews and confiscate all their possessions, is not considered governmental law, but is to be put in the category of outright robbery."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A married L, and shortly thereafter L began to wail and complain of birth pangs. A thought this was due to sorcery and sought a remedy. L's pains soon subsided. Two weeks later, on a Thursday night, L again commenced to wail and moan. In the morning, A departed for Rhine and returned to his house, with his uncle's wife, R. L continued to shriek in pain. A then left his house, and shouted to everyone, that his wife was about to give birth.<br>A's relatives learned of L's condition and R thereupon advised him to go to Mayence and inform L's parents and family about her condition. The wife of L's brother, who was an expert in determining pregnancy, examined L, and assured A that his wife was not pregnant. She told A not to go to Mayence and inform L's parents.<br>Witnesses related to A that his wife, while staying with a Gentile woman, was asked by the latter why L had gone to the Ritual Bath. L replied that she went to the Ritual Bath to remove hair from her body, and because she was abused by some young men, which precipitated menstruation. L did not reply that she went to the ritual bath to purify herself from her blood of virginity.<br>A went to Mayence. He publicly vilified his wife's virtue and accused her of becoming pregnant prior to their wedding through immorality. A was prompted to this course of action as a result of his uncle's prodding, and L's belief that she was pregnant. A was therefore placed under ban in two communities.<br>L demands that A be coerced by flagellation, to give her a divorce and pay her ketubah.<br><b>A</b> - Even if A did malign L's character, he can not be coerced to divorce his wife. L was partly responsible for A's actions, since she did not tell the Gentile that she went to the ritual bath to purify herself from her blood of virginity but rather to remove hair from her body and because of her encounter with young men which precipitated menstruation.<br>Furthermore, any woman who wants to receive a divorce and her ketubah, could feign pregnancy shortly after marriage, or upon her husband's return from a distant journey, and thus cause him to publicly accuse her of immorality. Therefore, A is not coerced to divorce L."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A dwelt in town T for many years. Emperor Rudolph levied a tax on T, but the burghers, who were not accustomed to being taxed [by the Emperor] rebelled. The Emperor thereupon beseiged T, and the burghers were forced to yield to the Emperor's demands.<br>The Emperor owed B [who lived in another town] 400 marks, and coerced the burghers of T, to assume that debt. The burghers did not have money to pay the debt. Thereupon, an agreement was reached between the burghers and B, wherein the former were to repay the latter, 900 marks over a period of four years, at the rate of 225 marks per annum. The burghers signed and secured the loan.<br>Upon seeing that the loan was secure, A went to B, and proposed to become an equal partner with the latter, in this loan. A offered to immediately pay for his share. B accepted A's offer and admitted the latter into the partnership.<br>B instructed the burghers to write the promissory note in the name of A and B, and explained to the burghers that this would expedite matters, inasmuch as B did not dwell in T. B informed the burghers that he wanted either A, or the former's son-in-law, to summon the sureties, and collect payment for the loan. B, however, did not reveal to the burghers that A was a partner in the loan.<br>An agreement of partnership between A and B was drawn up, and stated that: A and B jointly lent 400 marks, each supplying an equal share, to the burghers of T, who were obligated to repay the partners 900 marks in silver. The burghers gave a promissary note [written and attested by Gentiles] for the loan. A and B appointed C as trustee for this promissory note, and the latter was instructed not to give the document to anyone, without the knowledge of both the partners. The burghers were required to repay the loan over a period of four years, at the rate of 225 marks per annum. The first payment was to fall due on Marcheshvan (October) in the year (1339) at which time the burghers would pay 225 marks. Each partner would receive 112 1/2 marks. This procedure was to be followed annually for the next three years. When A would receive the annual payment he was required to send 112 1/2 marks to B, or the latter's agent, heir, heir's agent, or to C. C was instructed to deposit the promissory note with B's agent, heir, or heir's agent, should A fail to comply in forwarding the share in the prescribed manner. The document was then to be held by A's agent, heir, or heir's agent until such time as A would send the share, plus payment for all damages thereby incurred. Thereupon the document was to be returned to C. All the aforesaid which applied to A, [concerning his failure to transmit his partner's share] was applicable to B as well. Whichever partner collected the payment from the burghers, was required to transmit the other's share through the medium of C. A and B agreed to accept C's affirmation that one partner paid the other, his share. A, B and C promised by solemn hand-clasp to abide by the stipulations as set forth in the agreement of partnership.<br>Subsequent to the first payment made by the burghers, the king died. B was pressed for money. Prior to the second payment, B dispatched his agent to A, and requested the latter to contact the burghers, and negotiate a settlement wherein the burghers would repay the debt in one installment, at a reduced rate. A brought B's agent before the burghers, and the latter offered to settle the loan for a specified amount. B's agent, aware of B's financial plight, showed a willingness to accept the settlement, but A objected and demanded a higher sum from the burghers. B's agent returned to B.<br>The burghers decided to pressure A into accepting the settlement that was proposed to B's agent, and more than 200 burghers descended upon A's house. The burghers threatened violence, unless A would agree to the terms of their settlement. A fled the city and sought refuge in a fortress from whence he felt he could better negotiate with them. The burghers tried to abduct A's children and family, but the latter hid in the City Hall. The burghers found the keys to A's house and threatened to forcefully take A's family from the City Hall. Thereupon A reluctantly acquiesced to the burgher's terms. In addition, A was forced to cancel all debts which the burghers had owed A, his sons, and his sons-in-law. A would not have been forced to cancel these debts, had B's agent not demonstrated a willingness to accept the burgher's terms for settlement.<br>After A concluded the negotiations with the burghers, he sent B a report of all that had transpired. A instructed B to come and collect his share of the money. B, however, refused to accept any adjustment whatsoever, and demanded his annual share.<br>The burghers were under the impression that the promissory note was in B's possession, and did not demand its return from A, since they had not as yet, paid the entire settlement.<br>B again related to A about the former's dire need for money. A thereupon, sent B his annual share, plus a substantial amount. A stipulated that should the court decide in his favor, then the money he sent B should go toward the full payment. However, should the verdict be in B's favor, then A requested that he be given an extention of time to make further payments to the former.<br>B then informed C about the proposal of A. C, [who was entrusted with the promissory note, and collected B's share of the loan, from A,] replied that B had received sufficient money [from A] to cover the third annual payment, [which was not due,] and furthermore, it was not time to summon the sureties. C requested the opportunity to seek advice regarding the abrogation of his trust, and assured B that he would faithfully carry out his responsibility. C agreed to go to court and abide by its decision, should B refuse to accept the former's proposition.<br>B nevertheless, summoned the sureties. The burghers suddenly remembered that they were not in possession of the promissory note, when they learned that the sureties were commencing to eat [and were charging the food they consumed to the account of the burghers]. Thereupon, they rang the [church] bells and a large crowd responded to the call. Armed with swords and lances, the burghers again descended on A's house. The burghers forced A to promise either to free them from any damage [caused when the sureties charged food to the burgher's account] or to deliver the promissory note to the former. The sureties had already consumed food worth more than 100 pounds.<br>A thereupon deposited with C, a pledge valued in excess of B's share, of the fourth payment, and C then gave the promissory note to the former. A was obliged to pay for whatever the sureties had already consumed (while some of the sureties were still continuing to eat).<br>A suffered all this damage when B summoned the sureties, despite the former's assurance that he would heed the decision of the court [in regard to the adjustment A had made with the burghers].<br>A demands the right to withhold the pledge until B agrees to go to court for adjudication. C requests assistance in having his trust abrogated, and inquires whether he should deposit the pledge (which is now a substitutue for the promissory note) with A, until B pays for the damage he caused A, inasmuch as B had violated the conditions, as set forth in the agreement of partnership. C maintains that A's action [in negotiating the settlement with the burghers] was the result of unavoidable circumstances, while B [upon summoning the sureties] had acted with malice and intent to cause damage to A.<br>signed: Ephraim b. Abraham",
            "<b>A</b> - A had never actually acquired any share in the loan, since a proper kinyan (a symbolic act which makes an agreement binding) between A and B was never made. Furthermore, the agreement between A and B was contracted under error, inasmuch as the latter was under the false impression that the former had legally acquired a share of the loan. A is merely entitled to the 200 marks which he had originally given B, while all the interest collected from this loan belongs to the latter.<br>B had acted most improperly [when he summoned the sureties]. Nevertheless the damage caused by B, fall under the heading of Garama (damages caused indirectly) for which one is not directly responsible, [but is liable to be fined]. However, property of B that was seized by A as compensation for the loss he sustained as a result of the former's action, can not be exacted from the latter."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Mordecai regarding a case wherein A [who was critically ill] gave a bill of divorcement to his wife on condition that should he recover, she would have to remarry him. This bill of divorcement was written at twilight. R. Hayyim Eliezer remarks that he would neither validate nor invalidate this divorce until he hears further from R. Mordecai on this matter.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer then writes that when he was visited by R. Levi, the latter filled in the following details, concerning the case:<br>A, who was critically ill, was instructed [by R. Levi] that he must issue a divorce to his wife effective as of now, without any stipulations whatsoever. A agreed to abide by all the instructions [of R. Levi]. However, A petitioned that his wife should not wed anyone else but should remarry him, upon his recovery.<br>R. Levi thereupon asked A's wife whether she would agree to A's request, and she replied in the affirmative. R. Levi thereupon asked A whether the latter wanted to issue the divorce, effective as of now, and A agreed. The divorce was issued, and subsequent to the interval needed for an utterance to take effect, A cried out, \"If I die, the divorce shall take effect as of now, on condition that my wife would have to remarry me, upon my recovery\". Were it not for the fact that R. Levi instructed A to announce \"If I die, the divorce should take effect as of now\", A would have remained silent, and would not have added the stipulation which required his wife to remarry him upon his recovery."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A gave all his possessions to his sons, B and C, on condition that should one of them die childless, the latter's share would then be transmitted to the surviving son. Subsequently B, [who apparently was childless] gave his brother-in-law D, the principal, effective as of today, and the right of usufruct, upon the former's death. Is B's gift to D nullified?<br><b>A</b> - The terminology of the conditions contained in A's writ was not lucidly stated, and the decision in this case, depends upon the phraseology of this writ.<br>Nonetheless, D certainly does not acquire the right of usufruct.<br>We shall accept R. Asher's opinion in this matter and we await his decision."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - When A wrote the additional jointure [beyond the legally prescribed sum of the ketubah] it was in excess of his resources. His widow now demands payment for the additional jointure.<br><b>A</b> - Since A lacked the resources to pay for the additional jointure, at the time it was written, his widow is not entitled to collect it. This is similiar to a case wherein one wrote over all his possessions to his wife [during his children's lifetime]. The husband did not actually intend to give them to her, but rather to make her a trustee over the possessions."
        ],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A claims that B, who was critically ill, told L, the latter's wife, that he owed the former 18 pounds. A demands the 18 pounds from B's estate.<br><b>A</b> - You failed to elucidate whether A demanded 18 pounds from B, whereupon the latter conceded the former's claim, or whether B, without being pressed by any claim of A whatsoever, voluntarily conceded that he owed A 18 pounds. In the latter instance, B's ante-mortem confession of indebtedness does not establish a claim against heirs, as a man is wont to disclaim wealth for his heirs. In the former instance, however, A's claim is upheld."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> (1) A claims that his grandfather, G, was most affluent, and was worth in excess of 600 marks. A asserts that X (the uncle of A's father) seized G's possessions,' without the permission or knowledge of the court, or the testator, and allotted from the estate of G, 40 marks more to B (the uncle of A), than to A. A demands that B should give these 40 marks to the former. A's late father, was the first born of G. Therefore, A claims that as his father's heir, he should be entitled to a double share of G's estate.<br>A alleges he has witnesses that X apportioned 140 marks to one of G's heirs, who will concede this under ban, while X had allotted A only 80 marks as his share of the legacy.<br>A refuses to accept B's contention that X had made an accurate accounting of G's estate, and that X had assigned to A his complete and rightful share of the estate. A accuses X of having taken a false oath, inasmuch as X had sworn: 1) He had allotted A his full share of G's estate, and 2) X had never promised to give A any profits from business transactions. A avers that he has in his possession a document which states that X owes A 20 marks, as the latter's share of one-half the profits from business transactions. This document was certified subsequent to X's oath, and the witnesses who attested to it are alive and known in all of Westphalia. A contends that insofar as he has proof that X lied in respect to one part of the lather's oath, X should be considered untrustworthy in respect to the other part of his oath.<br>Furthermore, A avers that B and the latter's brother, C, are in possession of 140 marks, which their brother D, who was insane, had inherited from G. As proof that B and C are in possession of this money and the income thereof, A alleges that the former had given someone 10 marks, to feed and care for D, with the income realized from this money.<br>A asserts that B and C are using the residue of D's share, for their own personal gain. A charges that B and C are untrustworthy, and refuses to permit the latter to administer D's money. A insists that inasmuch as both he, and B and C, are heirs of D, a third party should be appointed to act as a trustee for D.<br>A avers that he has witnesses who can testify that B and C bought a house with D's money, and A therefore demands his share of the house. In addition, A declares that relatives are not to be appointed as administrators of property belonging to an insane person.",
            "Furthermore, A demands a double portion [as the heir of his father who was the first born of G] from 80 books valued at 15 marks, which formerly belonged to G. A refutes the contention of B and G, that G had given the books to them as a present. A asserts that G was in a confused state of mind prior to his death. A charges that B and C had exerted undue influence and pressure in urging G to give them the books. A insists that unless B and C could prove that G had been mentally alert, at the time of the gift, these books should be included in G's estate.<br>A avers that he has witnesses that R. Hayyim b. Yechiel had been appointed as a trustee for the former. However, R. Hayyim b. Yechiel died before the case had come to court. A asserts that had R. Hayyim b. Yechiel been aware of any irregularities concerning the claims of the former, R. Hayyim b. Yechiel would have immediately disassociated himself from the case.",
            "B and C claim that they had returned D's money to the person who had given it to them. They profess that they had purchased the house for themselves, with their own money, and had never intended to buy the house for D.<br>B and C deny that G was in a confused state of mind, at the time he had given them the books. They avouch that A has no right whatsoever, to any share of these books. Furthermore, they contend that they are in possession of the books [and the burden of proof regarding the mental condition of G, at that time, rests upon A].<br>B asserts he had not received more than his rightful share of G's estate, and alleges that X had made a complete accounting for A in court, and had taken an oath regarding the share which he had allotted B. B maintains that he had received no account from X, regarding the rest of the legacy, and had accepted the veracity of X's accounting without requiring any oath from the latter. B avers that A had received his complete share from the estate.<br>B refuses to accent A's contention that an heir received 140 marks from X. B refutes A's charge that X's account was incorrect, and B contends that it is no concern of his, that A's documents dispute X's oath, inasmuch as B had received no accounting whatsoever from X. Furthermore, B claims that X had not taken a false oath.",
            "<b>A</b> - (1a) B's contention that he had returned D's money to the one who had originally given it to him, is sustained, and the responsibility for this money no longer rests with B.",
            "Despite the testimony of a single witness that B and C had stated that they purchased the house with D's money, B and C are not to be accused of larceny since they claim that they purchased the house for themselves with their own money.",
            "A's own assertion seems to indicate that G was not in a confused state of mind when he gave B and C the books, but rather was mentally alert atthe time. Therefore A's claim to a share of the books is disallowed."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b>- (2) A's father was the child of G and L, while B was the child of G and R. A claims that his father was entitled to L's ketubah and therefore claims his father's right of Ketubat Benin Dikrin (the ketubah of a woman, who died before her husband, collected from his estate by her sons [who are also his sons] before the rest of the estate is divided among the heirs), in addition to a double share of G's estate.<br><b>A</b> - (2) A inherits his father's right of Ketubat Benin Dikrin.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (3) If D (who was insane) dies without issue, who inherits his estate?<br><b>A</b> - (3) If D dies without issue, then all his brothers who were sons of G, inherit an equal share of D's entire estate."
        ],
        [
            "<b>A</b> - (1b) Even if there are witnesses who could testify that X gave B more than 100 marks, and informed B that this represented the latter's share of G's estate (which was in the possession of the former) A is not sustained in his claim against B, that X had stolen part of A's share and had given it to B. However, if X is summoned to court by A, and denies the charges of the latter, then the money which B received is considered as if it is still in the possession of X, provided, the heirs themselves, did not personally partition the estate, by casting lots.<br>The residue of the estate must be divided among the heirs. X, however, is no longer responsible for the share which he swore that he gave B. X must allot A and the other heirs, their rightful share of the estate. In any event, A has no grounds for complaint against B, concerning the latter's share.<br>However, further study and thought on the subject, would be required if X were to demand that B return all money that was in excess of the latter's rightful share of the estate."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer exchanged correspondence with R. Mordecai concerning the latter's opinion to equate in certain respects, a ketubah with a note of indebtedness."
        ],
        [
            "R. Hayyim Eliezer apparently further exchanged extensive correspondence with R. Mordecai concerning R. Shemarya's decision in the case where a man placed a covering on the head of his daughter worth more than her dowry, as he brought her to the Huppah (the marriage canopy)."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A formally released his mother L, from the obligation of taking the required oath regarding her ketubah, and gave her permission to keep movables, which she had taken from his father's estate.<br>A's wife R, insists that A had no right to give these movables to L, as these movables along with immovables, which A inherited, are to be secured for R's ketubah.<br>This question was apparently asked by R. Mordecai.<br><b>A</b> - A is permitted to give away the movables as a present, since it is no different from a case wherein a mother conceded to her son that she had taken certain movables, belonging to her husband (the father of her son) to which the son remitted, despite his wife's objections.<br>Hence R's claim is overruled, and she can collect her ketubah only from the immovables."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A died and was survived by his wife L, and his son B. B formally released his mother L, from the obligation of taking the required oath regarding her ketubah, and as a result, L was able to take possession of immovables [that belonged to A].<br>B's wife R, refuses to grant L a release from her oath, as R claims that B, upon A's death immediately acquired possession of these immovables, which were thereupon secured for R's ketubah.<br>This question was apparently also asked by R. Mordecai.<br><b>A</b> - When A granted L a release from her oath, he had acted to the disadvantage of R, since the latter would be prevented from collecting, her ketubah from these immovables. Therefore, R's claim is sustained."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A negotiated a marriage between his son C, and B's daughter L. A deposited a pledge with D on condition that should C fail to marry L, by a certain date, D should give the pledge to B, This conditional transaction was accompanied by a kinyan (a symbolic act which makes an agreement binding) made before an authoritative court, effective as of now. A died prior to that specified date and C failed to marry L. Is the pledge awarded to B?<br>This question was apparently also asked by R. Mordecai.<br><b>A</b> - The pledge is not awarded to B and the agreement is voided because: (1) conditional transactions classified as asmakhta, (a conditional stipulation in a verbal or written contract, providing for the payment of a fine in case of nonfulfillment of a promise)that were made before an authoritative court are invalid, in cases where one is prevented by unavoidable accident, from carrying out his part of the agreement. Death most certainly constitutes an unavoidable accident. (2) The kinyan did not terminate during A's lifetime, for it commenced when A deposited the pledge with D, and was to conclude at the expiration of the specified date. (3) Terms of a stipulation that were not completed by A during his lifetime, have no effect, in regard to his son C. A son is obligated to carry out his late father's directives in matters of giving presents etc. to others, but not in cases of asmakhta that were accompanied by an unavoidable accident. Although the Geonim dealt harshly with the party who retracted the arrangements preliminary to betrothal, and held him monetarily responsible. for the embarrassment which resulted, this is not applicable, in the case of an orphan."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A built a privy for himself on land which belonged to B. A maintains, that insofar as he had borne the entire expense of erecting the wall [which separates the property of A and B] he had the authority to build the privy on that place. B contends that the odor [from the privy] renders the wall valueless.<br>Furthermore, B asserts that the sewage flows on his land and the odor is most offensive. B avers that rainwater from A's roof causes damage to the former's roof.<br><b>Q</b> - (2) B alleges that A built a structure on the wall which was built by both of them. B asserts that he protested this action, and demands that A should remove this structure.<br><b>Q</b> - (3) A built an entrance to a oath and thereupon insists that the path belongs entirely to him. B disputes this claim and demands that A close up this entrance.<br><b>Q</b> - (4) A built windows which open into his own property, but overlook B's property. The latter demands that the former close up these windows.<br><b>Q</b> - (5) Both A and B claim that each caused the other to undergo an expenditure on their houses. A well [in the road] prevents the pigs from getting to the privy and one of them demands that this obstacle be removed.<br><b>A</b> - (1) R. Hayyim Eliezer prefaces his answer by stating that the questions are vaguely phrased, and many details are lacking.<br>If both A and B were obligated to build the wall [e.g. a courtyard that required partition], and A claims that he acquired the land [on which the privy stands] with the money he spent in erecting B's share of the wall, or else, it was not necessary for A to erect the wall, but B promised to give this land to A for putting up the wall, then A's claim is sustained. However, if B was not obligated to build the wall, together with A, then A's claim is disallowed.<br>We do not accept B's contention that the odor rendered the wall valueless and unless the damage caused by the sewage and rainwater was direct, B will have to afford his own protection.<br><b>A</b> - (2) If the case is as B explained, then A must remove the structure which he erected on the wall that was built by both of them.<br><b>A</b> - (3) If the path was in the possession of both A and B, the former has no right to claim the sole ownership of this path, and must therefore close up the entrance.<br><b>A</b> - (4) Even though the windows open into A's house, he must close them up, since they overlook B's property.<br><b>A</b> - (5) The claims of A and B, concerning the expenditures caused by each other are inadmissible. If the well which prevents the pigs from reaching the privy, results in an extra expense, then it must be removed."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A vowed to give one pound to charity, upon the occasion of his son's circumcision. Although the occasion had not, as yet, taken place he now seeks absolution by a scholar from the vow.<br><b>A</b> - He can not be absolved from the vow until the occasion of his son's circumcision actually takes place. Then, if he so desires, he can seek absolution by a scholar from the vow.<br>This responsum was addressed to R. Samuel"
        ],
        [],
        [],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A and B were partners in an alley. C had one entrance to the alley and wishes to erect another entrance. However, A and B object to having C build another entrance to the alley.<br><b>A</b> - (1) C is permitted to build this entrance, since this new entrance will not result in an increase in the number of tenants, and he already had one entrance to the alley.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (2) C wants to erect a building on land which he bought. A and B object to this and claim that it would obstruct a window of theirs, and would render the eaves and the entrance useless.<br><b>A</b> - (2) C is permitted to build this structure on the land which he purchased.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (3) C claims that the courtyard between the house of A and B, and the house of D. (R. Joel) and E (R Jacob), which extends to C's house, belongs to the latter. A and B assert thatthis courtyard, except for a passageway, belongs entirely to them.<br><b>A</b> - (3) If the deed of A and B merely states that the house was sold to them [without any mention, whatsoever, of the courtyard], then they have no right to the courtyard. However, if the deed mentioned that a portion of the courtyard was sold to them, then only the part of the courtyard which is described in the deed, belongs to A and B.<br>Nonetheless, the deeds do not clearly define the exact boundaries, inasmuch as the deeds of both A and B, and C, include the property of D and E as their eastern boundary respectively, while the western boundary is similarly ill-defined.<br>I feel certain that you canclear up this matter with the assistance of the documents and deeds, and the testimony of witnesses and the seller himself. If however, you encounter any difficulty in reaching a decision, I will personally look into the matter and render my opinion and advice.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (4) A and B constructed windows in their house, which overlook the courtyards of C. C demands that these windows should be boarded up, while A and B claim that the windows open into their own house, and overlook their own. courtyard.<br><b>A</b> - (4) Although the windows of A and B overlook their own courtyard, they must be boarded up, since they overlook the courtyards of C, as well.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (5) C desires to make excavations adjacent to the wall [which separates the property of A and B, and C]. A and B object to this action.<br><b>A</b> - (5) C is permitted to dig adjacent to the wall, only if he maintains a sufficient distance between his excavations and the wall.<br>These responsum was addressed to R. Menachem, and R. Samuel."
        ],
        [
            "Concerning the case where A claimed that B had agreed to become a Kablan (One who assumes another man's obligations unconditionally) for the former, to C, (A's son-in-law) for 7 mina, I suggest that you make inquiries from A regarding the exact phraseology that was used. Only the phrases such as: \"Give him, and I will pay you\", or \"Give him, and I am a surety\", constitute assumption of the obligation and even then it is possible to be free from his obligation. However, the statement: \"Lend him, and I am a surety\", does not constitute unconditional assumption of another man's obligations.<br><b>Q</b> - (1) A claimed that B informed against him and caused the former a loss. B denies this.<br><b>Q</b> - (2) A asserts that B called the former's wife \" a prostitute\", while the latter avers that A called B \"a bastard\". Furthermore, one accuses the other of violating a Herem (ban).<br><b>A</b> - (1) If A avers that the damage caused by B, was a specific amount, then B must take an oath in support of his denial. However, if witnesses testify that B had informed against A, and had caused the latter to sustain an undetermined loss, then B is not obligated to compensate A. However, A can not take an oath, and collect for his losses.<br><b>A</b> - (2) Unless they can produce witnesses who could testify that the other used slanderous and vituperative language, they need not be required to take an oath regarding this matter. The accusations that one violated a Herem are to be disregarded, unless witnesses are produced, who can substantiate these charges."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A and B lent money on a partnership basis [to the overlord]. After A died, half the loan was repaid [by the overlord] and was given to A's heirs as their share [of the loan]. On the other half which was due, B, along with the rest of the community [who lent money to the overlord], refinanced the balance, with the overlord. Subsequently, B was able to deceive the overlord by appearing before the latter and insisting that the overlord still owed the former 50 pounds. The overlord, not realizing that this had been paid, promised to give B the 50 pounds.<br>The heirs of A claim that B was able to practice this deception on the overlord, only by means of the loan which was originally made by A and B, on a partnership basis. The heirs of A therefore demand their share of the 50 pounds.<br><b>A</b> - B need not share the 50 pounds which he acquired by deceiving the overlord with the heirs of A, because:<br>(1) Had B not deceived the overlord, the relatives of A's heirs would not have been able to perpetrate a similar deception, since they had no relationship whatsoever, with the overlord, with regard to this loan. (2) They would not have placed themselves in such a precarious position, in which the overlord might realize the deception and quarrel with them. (3) Furthermore, B would have to return all the money should the overlord suddenly comprehend the deception. (4) The heirs had already received their share of the loan."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A asserts that B owes him one pound. B thereupon insisted that A should fully explain his claim against the former, but the latter refused. A avers that he has witnesses who could corroborate his claim, and asked the court to pronounce the ban against the witnesses in order to compel them to reveal their testimony. B denies owing A one pound.<br>B contends that A is in possession of a pledge which the former deposited with the latter, as security for 10 shillings rent. B avers that A owes him 12 shillings, and the former demands that A return the 12 shillings as well as the pledge. Thereupon, A declared to the court that it was a witness to the fact B conceded that the pledge in the former's possession, was for 10 shillings, which B owed him. A denied owing B, 12 shillings. A insists that his claim can be substantiated by witnesses.<br><b>Q</b> - (2) A encountered monetary difficulties, and was forced to sell his library. He related his plight to B, and the latter replied that he had a customer for A's library, and suggested that A give him the library for 44. pounds. A replied that X could verify that the former could have sold the library himself, for 44 pounds, whereupon, B went to X for verification. B returned to A, and informed the latter that he would try to sell A's library at the highest possible price, insofar as they were both relatives. B guaranteed A a minimum of 44 pounds, and assured the latter that B would give him everything in excess of the 44 pounds, that B might receive by arranging the sale. A acquiesced to B's terms, and the latter sold the library_for 46 pounds. A avers that B gave him only 44 pounds and now demands the two additional pounds from the latter. B claims that he fulfilled his part ofthe agreement and demands two pounds from A, maintaining that the latter promised to give the former a commission for making the sale. A, however, denies having made a promise to pay B a commission.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (3) C, the brother of B, arranged a betrothal for his daughter, but needed a pledge for her dowry. C, who lived a great distance from A, asked the latter to lend him a pledge, but A refused. B thereupon pleaded with A to lend him a pledge, and promised to return it to A by a specified date. A agreed to lend B [a book as] a pledge. A contends that the date for its return elapsed, and now demands the pledge from B.<br>B insists that he never had borrowed the pledge, but merely went surety for C. B asserts that D and E, who also lent pledges to C, will substantiate B's claim.<br><b>Q</b> - (4) A contends that a Gentile came to his house, in order to borrow money from A's wife, and the latter thereupon made arrangements with the Gentile regarding the amount that was to be repaid for the loan. In the meantime, B lured the Gentile from A's use by deceit, and took the Gentile to F, who made the loan. A now demands 6 shillings from B for the loss caused by the latter. A asserts that he would never have pressed charges against B, had the latter, and not F made the loan to the Gentile.<br>B denies having caused A any loss whatsoever, and professes that the Gentile had come to the former for a loan. B avers that atthe time, he did not have the money and therefore brought the Gentile to one of B's (female) relatives, who then made the loan.<br>A desires to retain the pledge, which B had given him for the 10 shillings rent, as security for the former's claim against the latter, in regard to: 1) the sale of A's library; 2) The pledge borrowed by B for C; 3) And the 6 shillings damage caused when B lured away the Gentile from A's house.",
            "<b>A</b> - (1) The ban should be pronounced by the court, against witnesses who are unwilling to testify. It is lmperativethat the court carefully weigh the testimony of the witnesses concerning the circumstances of the case. If the court finds, according to the testimony of the witnesses that B had owed A one pound, then B can no longer profess that he had repaid the money.<br>However, if A is unable to produce witnesses, then B is free from any obligation whatsoever and is not required to take an oath. Since B conceded in court, that he had deposited a pledge with A, as security for 10 shillings rent, he must pay this sum to A, and the latter must then return the pledge to B. Inasmuch as the pledge was deposited with A only as security for rent, A is not permitted to retain it as security for other claims against B.<br>Unless A can produce witnesses to corroborate his assertion that he did not owe B 12 shillings, the former must then take an oath regarding B's charges.<br><b>A</b> - (2) B is required to return the 2 pounds to A. However, even if A did not promise to give B a commission, the former must pay the latter for his efforts in making the sale, as estimated by the court.<br><b>A</b> - (3) If D and E testify that A gave the book [to be used by C as a pledge] directly to B, then B is responsible for it, and must return the book to A. However, if D and E testify that A leased the book to C, and B went surety for C to A, then A must first go to C, and demand the return of the book from the latter. If C lives a great distance from A, the latter must nevertheless go to C, for his book.<br>However, if C refuses to heed the decision of the court and A is unable to force the former to return the pledge, then B becomes responsible, even though B did not make a kinyan (a symbolic act which makes an agreement binding) at the time he went surety.<br><b>A</b> - (4) If A's claim is proven to be true, then B may be called \"wicked\" for having damaged the interests of A. B however, is not required to pay for the damage he caused."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - (1) A, B and C were brothers, as were D and E. A and D owner land in Tiberias. D went away, and E and the latter's son F, wanted to erect a building on D's half of the property. A protested, and claimed that D had sold this land to him. This dispute waged between the two parties, for a long time. Finally a settlement, accompanied by a kinyan (a symbolic act which makes an agreement binding) was reached between A, and E and F, wherein the latter would have possession of the land during a period of 3 years. They further agreed that if D returned during this time, and conceded that he either had sold the property to A, or mortgaged it to the latter as security; or else D refused to take an oath regarding this matter], 30 days after A insisted that he so do; then E and F would return the property to either A, or to B and C.<br>E sold the land during the first year. B and C thereupon charged E with violating the agreement, wherein the latter had promised by solemn hand-clasp and a kinyan, not to sell the land during the 3 year period.<br>E contends that he had merely sold the improvements, which he made, by erecting buildings on the land, and thus increasing its value. E insists that the remaining land which was not sold, is equal in value to the original parcel, prior to the improvements.",
            "<b>A</b> - (1) If E had actually promised by solemn hand-clasp, not to sell the land during the three year period, and then broke his promise, he should be severly punished.<br>However, R. Hayyim Eliezer notes that the writ of settlement merely stated that a kinyan was made wherein E would not sell the land. Such a kinyan constitutes only an agreement on words (no transfer of a tangible object being agreed upon) and thus has no legal consequences. Therefore, the sale of the land by E is not invalidated. If a double stipulation (an agreement stating both alternatives and their eventual consequences) had been made by A and E, then the settlement is nullified.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (2) B and C claim that the house in Tiberias [in which they were partners with E] was in a very poor condition. B and C, who were in another place, sent money to E, who lived near the house, to repair and renovate it. E, thereupon sent B and C an account of the latter's money he expended in fixing the house, which totaled 40 pounds.<br>B and C demand that E should pay his share of the expense [in repairing the house] less all rent owed by the former, for the time that they lived in the house. Furthermore, B and C assert that if E states on his word of honor, that he had subsequently given money to the former, then they will waive all their claims to this money, for such was their promise, in the writ of settlement.<br>E declared on his word of honor, that he owed nothing to B and C, and refused to render any explanation, concerning the matter.<br><b>A</b> - (2) The letter which E wrote to B and C, even though it might not have been signed, is an admission to the latter's claim. Therefore, E can no longer aver that he had erred and must give a full explanation regarding the matter.",
            "<b>Q</b> - (3) B claims that E exacted 3 marks, 6 pounds (layish), interest from the former. B demands that E pay him back the interest.<br>E refuses to return the interest to B, and asserts that both parties had agreed to cancel all claims against one another, at the time they had reached the settlement.<br>B contends that they had agreed, at the time of the settlement, to cancel their claims against one another, only with regard to the house.<br><b>A</b> - (3) It is apparent that even E concedes he had exacted interest. E's only claim is that B had remitted the interest. Therefore, both parties should be punished, and placed under ban and Herem. Their testimony as witnesses, or their oaths, should be disqualified. However, since there are no witnesses, E should take an oath in support of his claim, that it was not so.<br>Nevertheless, E's contention that he should not be required to return the interest, since B had remitted all claims to the money, is overruled, inasmuch as the latter's renunciation is invalid."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A and B reached a settlement. One of the conditions of the settlement was that B was to give A money by a specified date. B failed to do so. Can A declare \"I regard myself as having received the money on that date.\"<br><b>A</b> - A declaration, \"I regard myself as having received the money on that date,\" is of no avail in this case, and therefore the settlement is nullified.<br>There is a difference of opinion, between Tosefos and my father, R. Isaac, whether a double stipulation (an agreement stating both alternatives and their eventual consequences) is required in monetary matters. Therefore, the one in possession of the property in question, need not relinquish it, unless the terms of the settlement contained a double stipulation."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - The community of T lent 200 pounds to the feudal lord. A who was living in T, at the time, contributed his share toward the loan. Afterwards, A moved out of T. Subsequently, the feudal lord imposed a tax on the community and credited the community with the 200 pounds, which it lent him, toward the payment of this tax. A demands the return of his share of the money, which he gave toward the loan to the feudal lord [inasmuch as the loan was repaid, when the latter permitted the community to deduct it from the tax]. A asserts that since he is no longer a resident of T, and was not required to pay the tax, he is entitled to receive his share of the loan.<br>The community contends that when A had given his share of the loan, he had despaired of ever receiving it back, since everyone felt that the feudal lord would never repay the loan.<br><b>A</b> - The community must return to A, his share of the loan because: 1) A had not fully abandoned hope of receiving his money back from the feudal lord, inasmuch as the feudal lord occasionally repays the money he borrows. 2) The feudal lord desired to repay his creditors and had no resignation whatsoever, with regard to any money that was intended for his creditors, but for some reason, was not given to them. Therefore, unless the community returns the money to A, who is one of the creditors of the feudal lord, it would be guilty of stealing from the feudal lord, and Jewish law forbids stealing from a non-Jew, even where it was unbeknown to the latter.<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer notes that it is a common practice when the king incarcerates someone and confiscates his property, the community does not share with him, his loss."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> A avers that B deposited a golden tray, with the former, as a pledge for chairty. B's wife L then sent a messenger to A and requested the latter to deliver the tray to L, as she wanted to sell it. A refused to give it to L's deputy, but personally brought it to L. A asserts that he encountered B in the latter's doorway, and that B instructed A to give L the tray, which A did.<br>A alleges that B took the tray from L, and demands that B return it to A. B contends that A should go to L for the tray, and denies ever having told A to give it to L.<br><b>A</b> - B must return the tray to A, even if the former did not instruct the latter to give it to L. Women are considered to be agents for their husbands, and especially in this instance, where the pledge is in B's possession. Furthermore, it is no different than a case wherein A had deposited the pledge with C, and B thentook the pledge from the latter. B would then be required to return it to A."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A Informed against B, who thereupon could have fled, but failed to do so. As a result, B suffered a loss. Is A responsible for the loss sustained by B?<br><b>A</b> - A must pay for all the damage he caused B, notwithstanding whether the latter sustained a monetary loss, or bodily injury. A is placed under a ban until he agrees to pay for the entire damage sustained by B.<br>It is actually imposslble for B to flee without incurring any loss whatsoever, since the very fact that he is forced to flee his home and seek shelter and protection elsewhere, contitutes damage in itself. Furthermore, even if B were to run away, the possibility always exists that he might be discovered by the Gentiles, from whom he was forced to flee. In addition, B feels more certain that by remaining at home, he could avoid bodily injury, through the payment of money, and thus obviate the necessity of having to run away."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A claims that the community had acted illegally when it assessed his dowry, and took a pledge from him as security for his share of the tax. A alleges that although he was married, before the tax was levied, the community knew that he had received his dowry subsequent to the tax. A asserts that the dowry is in the hands of B, who lives in another town, and a tax is paid on this dowry [in that town].<br>The community treasurer contends that it is the local custom that a person must pay tax to the community wherein he resides, even on assets which one has outside the community, as well as on loans that have not fallen due. Therefore, the community maintains that A's dowry is taxable.<br><b>A</b> - If, during the wedding (which took place before the tax was leyied) A's father-in-law had instructed B to give the dowry to A at a specified date, in the presence of all three, then A acquired the dowry [and it is taxable].<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer prefaces his answer by stating that he is reluctant to profess his opinion before the court of R. Yonasan and his academy."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A and B jointly own a house, and one-seventh thereof belongs to the latter. A improved and renovated the house, and as a result, it was worth more than double its original value. A claims that B approved the actions of the former since the latter saw that the building was being renovated and remained silent. A therefore demands that B should pay his share of the expenses.<br>B contends that he did not order A to make any improvements whatsoever on the house. B maintains that the reason he remained silent was because he thought A would not demand money from the former, but would dwell in the house [rent free].",
            "<b>A</b> - B conceded that he was satisfied with the improvements that were made and asserted that he did not want to pay his share of the expense, but would permit A to dwell in the house. Therefore, B is required to pay his share of the expense. However, B need not pay actual cash to A, but could tell the latter to dwell in the house rent-free, for a period of time that would be equivalent to his expenditure in making the improvements."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A asserts that he had deposited a book and clothing with B, as security for money he owed, when he purchased wine from the latter. A alleges that the pledges were worth more than double the amount of the debt. A now wants to redeem the pledges and demands their return from B.<br>B concedes that A had pawned these articles with him as security for the debt. However, B avers that A refused to allow the former to personally hold the clothing for safekeeping, but insisted that B's daughter L, should guard the clothing, along with her own clothes. B maintains that A had consented to deposit the book with the former, and it is still in his possession. B declares that he will return the book only when A pays his debt.<br>L alleges that A's clothing was stolen. B contends that he was not responsible for the clothing and insists that A take L, and not the former, to court regarding the return of the clothing.<br>B disputes A's contention that the pledges were worth more than twice the amount of the debt. B claims he had the pledges appraised beforehand, and had found that they were not even equal to the amount of the debt.<br>A, however, professes that he had deposited the pledges with B, and avouches that they were valued at twice the amount of the debt. A demands that these pledges be returned by B."
        ],
        [
            "<b>A</b> - B should take an oath that A did not deposit the pledges with the former, and that B was not made a bailee for the pledges. B will then be free from obligation. However, he can no longer demand payment for the debt from A and refer the latter to L, for the return of the pledges.<br>However, if B did not take an oath, then if the pledges were worth in excess of the debt, B is obligated to pay A for the pledges, since A is considered to be a paid trustee regarding these pledges. If L had asserted that the pledges were lost as a result of an accident, B is nevertheless responsible, unless witnesses testify that the accident was of a nature that even B could not have prevented from occurring.<br>Both A and B should take an oath regarding the value of the pledges. A must swear that the pledges were not worth less than that of the debt, while B is required to take an oath that the pledges are neither in his possession nor were they valued in excess of the debt. Thereupon, both A and B will be free from obligation toward one another.<br>signed: Meir b. Yekusial HaCohen<br>R. Hayyim Eliezer disagreed with the decision of R. Meir b. Yekusial HaCohen. R. Hayyim Eliezer maintains that if B had taken an oath that A had explicitly stated he wanted L, and not B, to hold the pledges for safekeeping, then B is not even considered to be a gratuitous bailee. B is entirely free from the obligation, and A is required to pay the former the debt.<br>Even if A's claim (that he had deposited the pledge with B) were true, then if L had taken an oath that the pledges were stolen from her possession, B would not be obligated to pay A for the pledges, nor would he be required to take an oath regarding this matter, inasmuch as he who deposits with his neighbor, does so with the presumptive condition that the latter's wife and children be also trusted (and it is no breach of trust to leave the deposit in their charge). However, if B concedes that A had deposited the pledges with the former, he could no longer collect payment for the debt from A."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Q</b> - A lent a horse which was given to him by Gentiles as security [for a loan] to B. Subsequently, X (a Gentile) alleged that the horse was stolen from him by the Gentiles, and took it away from B, by means of the Gentile authorities.<br>A claims that he had informed B, at the time the latter borrowed the horse, that it was apparently stolen by the Gentiles, and avers that he warned B to be careful and to exercise caution in guarding the horse.<br>B contends that A did not apprise him of the fact that the horse was stolen.<br><b>A</b> - If A had asserted thatthe horse was his, and had not actually known that it was stolen property, then B is responsible, since a borrower is responsible even for a loss caused by unavoidable accident.<br>However, since A had conceded that he knew the horse was stolen property, then B must take an oath that he was not apprised of this fact by the former. B will then be free from obligation, inasmuch as he did not assume upon himself the responsibility of guarding a stolen article."
        ],
        [
            "An incomplete responsum concerning the custom of sending fish that are ritually unclean, and rabbits, to Gentiles.<br>However, this responsum seems to be completed in R. Meir b. Baruch's <i>Responsa.</i> Judah b. Sabbatai asked R. Hayyim Eliezer the following question:<br><b>Q</b> Why are we permitted to honor the overlord, by sending him rabbits and fish that are ritually unclean, inasmuch as it is forbidden at the very outset, to derive benefit from these items.<br><b>A</b> The law prevails according to R. Joshua b. Levi who maintains that is is not forbidden to derive benefit, at the very outset, from these items."
        ]
    ],
    "sectionNames": [
        "Siman",
        "Paragraph"
    ]
}