diff --git "a/json/Halakhah/Mishneh Torah/Sefer Zemanim/Mishneh Torah, Sabbath/English/merged.json" "b/json/Halakhah/Mishneh Torah/Sefer Zemanim/Mishneh Torah, Sabbath/English/merged.json" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/json/Halakhah/Mishneh Torah/Sefer Zemanim/Mishneh Torah, Sabbath/English/merged.json" @@ -0,0 +1,743 @@ +{ + "title": "Mishneh Torah, Sabbath", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah,_Sabbath", + "text": [ + [ + "Resting from labor1Within the context of the Sabbath laws, labor does not refer to strenuous work, but rather to the performance of one of the thirty nine labors that were necessary for the construction of the Temple or a labor which is analogous to them. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.)
The Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah is significant. Our Rabbis have offered two definitions of the mitzvah of resting on the Sabbath: In his commentary on Yevamot 6a, the Rashba states that the mitzvah is negative in nature: one refrains from performing prohibited labors. In contrast, in his commentary on Leviticus 23:24, the Ramban explains that the mitzvah possesses a positive dimension: to spend the day in a restful frame of mind, abstaining from all activities - even those that are not forbidden labors - which would disrupt this tranquility.
From the Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah, it would appear that he follows the first view. From his statements in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, however, it would appear that he accepts the second perspective. (See also Tzafenat Paneach.)
on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment,2Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 154) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 85) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. as [Exodus 23:12] states, \"And you shall rest on the seventh day.\"3In Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam mentions that the commandment to rest on the Sabbath is mentioned 12 times in the Torah. Sefer HaKovetz and others question why the Rambam cites this proof-text in particular. Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment,4Many of the mitzvot involve a positive and a negative commandment which share a single objective. for [ibid. 20:10] states, \"Do not perform any labor [on5 Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 320) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 32) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. it].\"
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly,6i.e., without being forced by others as a conscious act of defiance,7and not inadvertently.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression \"willingly, as a conscious act of defiance\" with regard to the transgressions of idolatry (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1), the Sabbath laws, and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת, the Rambam merely states \"as a conscious act of defiance.\"
The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of \"willingly\" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, he does not think further repetition is necessary.
he is liable for karet;8כרת means \"cut off.\" Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת would die prematurely, before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being \"cut off in this world\" is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. In addition, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come. if witnesses who administer a warning are present,9As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2, punishment is not administered for the violation of a transgression unless the transgressor is made aware of the punishment he could receive for his deed. he should be stoned [to death].10See Numbers 15:35. This is the most severe form of execution. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression,11accidentally, performing a forbidden labor or doing so without awareness of the transgression involved he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.12The Rambam uses this term to differentiate the sin offering required from a קרבן עולה ויורד - a guilt offering - which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.", + "Whenever the expression, \"one who performs this is liable\" is used within the context of the Sabbath laws, the intent is that he is liable for karet, and if witnesses are present and administer a warning, he is liable to be stoned to death. If he performs such an activity without being aware of the transgression, he is liable for a sin offering.1The Rambam is explaining that by performing a forbidden act on the Sabbath, a person incurs liability. The nature of this liability depends on his intent and on whether witnesses are present. These factors are common, however, to all the laws of the Sabbath. Therefore, in the future, all that is necessary to say is that \"the person is liable,\" and based on the principles stated here, we can determine what his liability is.", + "Whenever the expression, \"one who performs this is not liable\" is used, the intent is that he is not liable for karet, for [execution by] stoning, or for bringing a [sin] offering. It is, however, forbidden to perform this act on the Sabbath.2Shabbat 3a makes a similar statement of principle, but states that there are three exceptions to this rule. When discussing these exceptions, the Rambam deviates from the terminology used in the Talmud and states that these three acts are \"permitted.\"
In such an instance, the prohibition is Rabbinic3Our translation reflects the usual interpretation of the Hebrew expression מדברי סופרים. There are commentaries (e.g., the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Ishut 2:1) who cite the Rambam's statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2) and explain that this expression can refer to a prohibition of the Torah which is derived through the accepted traditions of Biblical exegesis. In this instance, however, the Rambam's intent is clear; the term refers to prohibitions that the Rabbis instituted on their own initiative as safeguards. in origin and was instituted as a safeguard against [the performance of] labor. A person who performs such an act is given \"stripes for defiance.\"4The Rambam discusses this punishment in Hilchot Edut 18:6, explaining that the person is flogged to the extent of the court's discretion (in contrast to the number of lashes received for the violation of a Torah command, which is fixed at 39). Other authorities offer different interpretations.Similarly, whenever the expressions \"this should not be performed...\" or \"it is forbidden to do this on the Sabbath\" are used, a person who performs such an act as a conscious act of rebellion5Shoshanat Ha'amakim states that this expression implies that a person must be given a warning before such a punishment is administered. is given \"stripes for defiance.\"", + "Whenever the expression, \"it is permissible to do this\" is used, the intent is that, at the outset, one may perform this act.6I.e., there is no prohibition whatsoever for performing the act in question. Similarly, whenever the expressions, \"one is under no obligation\" or \"one is not liable at all\" are used, one does not receive any punishment at all [for performing such an act.]7This expression implies that, at the outset, it is improper to perform such an act. Nevertheless, doing so does not warrant punishment (Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh).", + "It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty8If, however, it is certain that the forbidden labor will be performed, it is prohibited to perform the permitted act, as explained in the following halachah. - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor9Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 9), explains that by using the term \"forbidden labor\" in this and the following halachah, the Rambam implies that there is a difficulty only if a prohibition from the Torah is involved. If merely a Rabbinic prohibition is concerned, it is permitted without question. This question is also discussed by the Mishneh L'Melech. will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor.10The Rambam's decision is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (See Beitzah 23b and other sources.) Rabbi Shimon maintains that although a forbidden labor results from a person's activity, since he did not desire that this labor be performed, he is not held liable. Rabbi Yehudah, in contrast, holds the person liable, for his actions brought about the performance of a forbidden labor.
The commentaries explain Rabbi Shimon's opinion based on the principle (Chaggigah 10b) that \"The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath].\" A deed is forbidden only when it is associated with a purposeful intent. (See also the notes on Halachah 7.)
The concept discussed in this halachah, אינו מתכוין, differs from an ordinary example of a labor performed unintentionally. When we speak of a labor performed unintentionally (בשוגג), the person had no thought whatsoever of performing a forbidden activity. In the case of אינו מתכוין, by contrast, the person performs an act consciously with the knowledge that there is a possibility that it may lead to a forbidden act. Nevertheless, since there is no certainty that the transgression will be committed, he is not held liable.
Although this principle is applicable to the Sabbath laws in particular, the difference of opinion between these two sages on this issue is relevant, not only to the Sabbath laws, but to all other prohibitions in the Torah as well.
Based on Pesachim 25b-26b, it appears that one is allowed to perform an activity that may result in the incidental performance of a forbidden labor even when one has an alternative manner of accomplishing one's objective, which does not involve any risk of a forbidden labor being performed. See Hilchot Kilayim 10:16.

What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench11Our text follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, which quotes the text of Shabbat 22b. The original manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah substitute מגדל, \"cabinet,\" instead of ספסל, \"bench.\" and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind.12Digging a groove is forbidden because it is included in the category of forbidden labor, plowing. Nevertheless, since one did not intend to perform this labor, the fact that it was performed is of no consequence. Similarly, all the subsequent activities mentioned by the Rambam involve the performance of a forbidden labor without the intent to do so.
Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair.13See Chapter 22, Halachah 13. Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so.", + "[In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable14As mentioned in Halachah 2, the use of this term implies that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself (the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham). Although some authorities have explained that since the person had no intent for the labor itself, the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature, from the Rambam's perspective it appears that since he knows that the labor will be performed, it is considered as if he performed it intentionally. even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor].
What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken,15The addition of the word \"merely\" implies that the person has a desire to slaughter the fowl. Albeit, his desire may not be to kill the fowl for food, but even for use as a toy it is preferable that the fowl be dead than alive.
This leads to another concept. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). In his notes on Chapter 10, Halachah 17, Rabbenu Chayim Soloveitchik states that the Rambam also subscribes to this opinion.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:18) gives an example of this situation: The plug of a barrel of wine was closed with flax. Although some wine will inevitably be squeezed out when the barrel is unplugged - and squeezing is a forbidden labor - since the wine that is squeezed out will be lost, there is no prohibition.
This opinion is not, however, accepted by all authorities. Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher in their glosses on Shabbat 103a differ and maintain that, since it is inevitable that a forbidden labor will be performed, such an act is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch's statements, it would appear that it is preferable to follow the more stringent view, but that the more lenient perspective has become popularly accepted.
he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.", + "Anyone who performs a [forbidden] labor - even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed - is liable for his deed.16This also represents a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, as evident from Shabbat 29b-30a, 73b, and other sources.
As in the laws mentioned in Halachah 7, the source of their difference of opinion is Rabbi Shimon's principle, \"the Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath].\" To explain: The prohibition against labor on the Sabbath is derived from the labors performed to construct the Sanctuary (see the commentary on Chapter 7, Law 1), and with regard to the construction of the Sanctuary, the Torah uses the expression, מלאכת מחשבת, \"contemplative work.\" Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the Torah's prohibition against labor is related to thought. Only when one's actions are purposeful can they be forbidden.
For this reason, Rabbi Shimon maintains - as explained in Halachah 5 - that when a person performs a forbidden labor without the intention to do so (אינו מתכוין), he is not liable. Although a forbidden activity results from his conduct, since his thought was not involved in the matter, his work does not resemble the labor that was necessary to construct the Sanctuary. Hence, one is not held liable for such labor on the Sabbath.
In the situation at hand, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, the person performing the forbidden labor is doing so intentionally. Nevertheless, since his intent is not the same as that ordinarily associated - or according to some authorities, associated at the time of the construction of the Sanctuary - with this labor, he is not held liable. (See the comments of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, quoted by the Kessef Mishneh.)
Rabbi Yehudah differs on both issues, maintaining that since the performance of a forbidden labor results from this person's conscious activity, he is held liable. The Rambam (following the opinion of Shemuel, Zevachim 92a) accepts Rabbi Shimon's view with regard to אינו מתכוין, but follows Rabbi Yehudah's view with regard to a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
The difference between these opinions can be explained based on the interpretation of the command תשבות, \"rest,\" on which basis we observe the Sabbath laws. We find another difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehudah and the other Sages (Pesachim 27a) concerning a word with a similar root. With regard to the command (Exodus 12:15 , תשביתו שאור, \"destroy leaven,\" Rabbi Yehudah maintains that leaven must be burned. The other Sages (including Rabbi Shimon) maintain that leaven may be destroyed be other means.
What is the difference between them? Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the destruction of leaven must be utter and complete as possible, while the Sages maintain that all that is necessary is to negate its usefulness (potential for purposeful use). Similarly, in the present instance, Rabbi Yehudah explains that all semblances of labor are forbidden on the Sabbath. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon maintains that only purposeful labor is forbidden; only when both the activity and the intent for which it is performed are analogous to the activities performed to construct the Sanctuary is a transgression committed. (See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 7, p. 190-191.)
Shemuel and the Rambam take an intermediate position. They agree with Rabbi Shimon that an activity must be coupled with a purposeful intent, but maintain that since a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is an intentional act, it is forbidden as such a combination.
It must be noted that the Rambam's view is not accepted by all authorities. The Ra'avad, Tosafot (Zevachim, ibid.) and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities state that Rabbi Shimon's opinion is accepted in both these instances. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1, 334:12) accepts Tosafot's decision. Nevertheless, even the authorities who accept Rabbi Shimon's view maintain that, if there is no danger to the community involved, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree.

What is implied? A person extinguished a lamp because he needed [to save] the oil or the wick from being destroyed or from burning or so that the earthenware reservoir of the lamp [that holds the oil] would not break. Since he had the intent of extinguishing the lamp, even though he did not do so for the [usual] purpose of extinguishing,17I.e., his intent in extinguishing the lamp was not to produce coals to use for kindling an even flame, the purpose for which extinguishing was performed in constructing the Sanctuary. but merely for the sake of the oil, the wick or the earthenware, he is liable.
Similarly, a person who moves a thorn four cubits in the public domain or extinguishes a coal so that many people will not be injured by it, is liable. Although the [usual] purpose [served] by extinguishing [the coal] or moving [the thorn] is not important to him,18I.e., when constructing the Sanctuary, articles were transported because they were desired, and coals were extinguished to use for kindling an even flame. and his intent was merely to prevent injury, he is liable. The same applies in other similar situations.", + "Whenever a person intends to perform a forbidden labor, but instead [through his actions] causes the performance of another forbidden labor for which he had no intent, he is not liable, because his intent was not carried out.19Although the instance stated by the Rambam is not found in the Talmud, it is a logical extension of the principle stated in Keritot 19b and Shabbat 97b (and expressed in the following halachah), \"The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath].\" Since the labor ultimately performed was not the one originally intended, this is not considered to be \"purposeful work.\"
What is implied? A person threw a stone or shot an arrow at a colleague or at an animal with the intent of slaying them. Should [the object that he propelled] uproot a tree in its progress and not kill [the intended victim], he is free of liability.
How much more so does this principle apply if one had the intent of performing a lesser transgression and one performed a more serious one. For example, a person intended to throw [a stone] into a carmelit,20As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 4, a carmelit is a domain in which the Sages applied the prohibitions against transporting and throwing articles which apply in the public domain by virtue of Torah law. Thus, the person had the intent of violating merely a Rabbinic law. and instead, the stone passed into the public domain.21The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Chapter 13, Halachah 21, which states that even when a person intended to throw an object four cubits in the public domain and instead the object traveled eight cubits, he is not held liable, because he did not accomplish his intent. Hence, he explains that the intent is not that the public domain is beyond the carmelit and the object did not rest in the carmelit as intended, but rather continued to the public domain.
Instead, the Rambam is referring to an instance where a person is standing in a private domain with both a public domain and a carmelit before him. Although he intended to throw the object into the carmelit, it traveled into the public domain.
He is not held liable. The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Should a person have the intent of performing a permitted act and instead perform another act [which is forbidden], he is not held liable.22See Hilchot Shegagot 7:11. This halachah represents a progressive sequence. In the first instance mentioned, the forbidden activity the person intended to perform was not performed at all. In the second instance, he intended to perform the forbidden activity - removing an object from his property - but his intent was not to transgress a Torah prohibition. In this third instance, the person had the intent of performing the activity that he performed for the sake of the result that activity produced. Nevertheless, since he desired to perform this activity with a permitted entity and that aspect of the desire was not fulfilled, he is not held liable (Rav Kapach). For example, should he intend to cut produce that was not attached to the ground, and instead cut produce attached to the ground,23The Maggid Mishneh offers two different interpretations of the Rambam's words: one that the person cut a different plant from the one he intended to cut, and one that he thought the plant he intended to cut had been detached from the earth, and discovered that it was attached. Although, both interpretations are halachically acceptable, the Maggid Mishneh favors the second one. The Kovetz and other authorities, however, favor the first. he is not held liable. The same applies in other similar situations.", + "Should a person intend24This halachah develops the theme stated in the previous halachah, giving a further example of a case where a person is not held liable for a forbidden activity he performed, because of the principle, \"The Torah prohibited purposeful labor [on the Sabbath].\" to pick black figs and pick white figs instead25The difference in the color of the figs causes them to be regarded as two different types of fruit. This is significant, as is obvious from the contrast to the following halachah. - or should he intend first to pick figs and then to pick grapes, but instead picked grapes and then figs - he is not liable.26The Ra'avad takes issue with this point, arguing that since the person picking the fruit accomplished his objective, he should be held liable. It is insignificant that the order in which he picked them differed from that which he originally intended.
It can be explained, based on Keritot 19b, that the Rambam's understanding is that for a person to be held liable, not only must he accomplish his ultimate intent, but also, while he is performing the labor, his actions must be controlled by his thoughts.
Commenting on the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh notes that there is no difference regarding practical halachah at present. The only difference will be in the Era of the Redemption, at which time there will be a question whether it is necessary for such a person to bring a sin offering or not, and in that era, \"the righteous instructor (Mashiach) will come\" and render a decision.
He in fact picked everything that he desired, but because he did not pick them in the order that he intended, he is not held liable, since he did not act according to his intent. It is \"purposeful labor\" that the Torah forbade.", + "When a person had two candles before him and both of them were either burning or extinguished, and he desired to kindle or extinguish one, but instead he kindled or extinguished the other, he is liable,27This is the text of Keritot 20a according to the Rambam and others. Our text of Keritot differs and frees a person of liability in such an instance. On this basis, the Ra'avad and others challenge the Rambam's position. for he performed the [forbidden] labor that he intended to perform.28In contrast to the previous halachah, this is speaking about an instance where the person does not derive any advantage from kindling or extinguishing either candle; he merely wants to kindle or extinguish a candle. The same effect results from kindling or extinguishing one as the other. Hence he is liable, for he performed a forbidden labor, and he is considered to have performed it willfully. Were there to be an advantage to kindling or extinguishing one of the two candles, the situation would resemble that described in Halachah 11.
To what can the matter be compared? To a person who intended to pick one fig and picked another instead, or to a person who desired to kill one [living being]29The intent does not appear to be that he desired to kill a person, for it is highly unlikely that there would be no difference killing one person or the other. Rather, the Rambam appears to be referring to the killing of an insect or an animal, an act that is also forbidden on the Sabbath. and killed another instead. [He is liable,] because the [forbidden] labor which he intended to do was performed.", + "One is, however, freed of liability [in the following instance: There were two candles before a person, one lit and one extinguished.30The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Keritot 20a.] The person intended to kindle the [one that was extinguished] first and to extinguish the second candle afterwards. Nevertheless, the order [of his actions] became reversed, and instead, he extinguished the candle first and kindled the second candle afterwards.31As in Halachah 9, the fact that the person did not perform the tasks in the order in which he originally intended indicates that, at the time he performed them, he was not in control of his deeds. Hence, this is not considered to be \"purposeful work.\" In this instance as well, the Ra'avad differs and holds the person liable.
The new concept this halachah teaches is that even when the tasks which the person intended to perform involve two separate labors (as opposed to Halachah 9 when only a single forbidden labor is involved), he is held liable only when he performs the tasks in the order he originally intended.

If he extinguished one and kindled the other in a single breath, he is liable. Although he did not kindle the first candle before [extinguishing the other], he did not delay [its lighting], and performed both activities simultaneously. Therefore, he is liable.32Since the order in which the person desired to perform the activity was not reversed, his actions are \"purposeful work.\" The same applies in other similar circumstances.
Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor casually, without specific intention, he is not liable.33Rashi, Keritot 19b, differentiates between this type of behavior, referred to as מתעסק, and an inadvertent transgression of a commandment (שוגג) as follows: When a person transgresses בשוגג, he willfully performs the forbidden activity, but is unaware of the prohibition involved. In all the situations described as מתעסק, the person may be aware of the prohibition, but is not consciously controlling his behavior.", + "Whenever a person intended to perform a forbidden labor and performed it more effectively than he had originally intended, he is liable.34Although he accepts the Rambam's premise, the Ra'avad objects to the wording the Rambam chose, explaining that there is an instance - a person who desired to write the name שמעון and instead, wrote the name שם - where a person does not fulfill his intention and is still liable.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, the person also had the intent to write the letters of the name שם and is therefore held liable, as implied by Halachah 14. By putting the focus on intent, the Rambam emphasizes that the leniency stated in this halachah is also an outgrowth of the principle that \"The Torah prohibited purposeful work.\"
If [he performs it] less effectively than he had originally intended, he is not liable.35As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the expression \"he is not liable,\" means that a person should not be punished - nor is he liable to bring a sin offering - for his deed. Nevertheless, performing such a deed constitutes the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. As mentioned, this concept is applicable throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the Mishneh Torah as a whole.
What is implied? A person intended to carry a burden suspended behind him and instead, it swung in front of him. He is liable, for he intended to protect it in a less effective manner, and it was ultimately protected in a more effective manner. If, however, he intended to carry a burden suspended before him, and instead it swung behind him, he is not liable, for he intended to protect it in a more effective manner and, it was ultimately protected in a less effective manner.", + "[A person who transfers an article from one domain to another is held liable in the following situation]: He was wearing a belt36Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:4. Rashi and others offer alternate definitions of the term. and he placed a burden that is commonly transferred in this manner between his body and his garment. Whether the burden hung in front of him or it had shifted behind him [at the time he transferred it], he is held liable, since it is likely to shift position.37The intent here is that since it is usual for the article to shift position in such an instance, this is considered to be part of the person's original intent.
Although this law is more specific than most mentioned in this chapter, it is still worthy of mention, because it illustrates how a person's intention can be general in nature and include several different possible ways in which a forbidden labor could be performed.
", + "Whenever a person desired to perform a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, began the performance of that labor, and performed an amount of work sufficient to incur liability,38Here the Rambam introduces a new concept, שיעור, the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. When the Torah forbade the performance of labor on the Sabbath, it also specified that a person is not held liable unless his activities are sufficient to bring about a significant result. Thus, a particular שיעור was established for every specific labor.
A similar concept applies with regard to other prohibitions. For example, with regard to most forbidden foods one is not held liable unless one eats an amount equivalent to the size of an olive.
[Yoma 74 discusses whether a person who performs a forbidden activity, but does so involving less than a שיעור, is considered to have violated a prohibition from the Torah (although he is not liable for punishment or a sin offering) or whether he is considered to have violated merely a Rabbinic commandment.]
he is held liable, even if he did not complete the task he desired to perform.39One might think that since the person did not complete his intended objective, his activity is not considered \"purposeful labor.\" The Rambam explains, however, that since the work the person did complete was performed \"purposefully,\" and since he completed a significant amount of work (a שיעור), he is held liable.
For example, a person desired to write a note or a contract on the Sabbath. We do not say that he is not liable until he completes his desire and writes the entire note or contract. Instead, as soon as he writes two letters, he is liable.40See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.
Similarly, a person who desires to weave an entire garment is held liable after weaving two strands.41See Chapter 9, Halachah 18. Although he intended to complete [the entire garment], he is held liable because he intentionally performed the amount of work sufficient to incur liability. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself,42A situation in which a forbidden labor requires the efforts of more than one individual is discussed in the following halachah. they are [both] free of liability.43Shabbat 3a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, explaining that that verse teaches that one is liable only \"when one performs the entire labor and not a portion of it; when one person performs the labor and not two.\"
See also Rashi, Shabbat 93a and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 316:7 explain that a person is not liable for performing a labor in this manner, because this is not the ordinary manner in which the labor is performed.

This applies whether one performed part of the [forbidden] labor and the other performed the remainder - e.g., one removed an article from one domain and the other placed it down in the other domain - or they both performed the [forbidden] labor together from the beginning to the end. For example, they both held a pen and wrote, or they both held a loaf of bread and transferred it from one domain to another.", + "When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable].44Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that the same applies when a forbidden labor is performed by three or more individuals and the performance of the forbidden labor requires the efforts of all the individuals involved. Nevertheless, if three individuals perform a forbidden labor and it requires only the efforts of two, none of the individuals is held liable, for no one is capable of performing the task alone. For example, two people held a beam and transferred it to the public domain. Since neither one of them had the strength to perform this task alone,45Tosafot, Shabbat 93a emphasizes that the matter is not dependent on strength alone. Even when a person has sufficient strength to carry an object alone, but requires a second person's assistance because of the object's bulk, neither is liable. In practice, the transfer of the object requires both their efforts. and they performed it together from the beginning to the end, they are both held liable. The minimum amount of work for which they are held liable is the same as for a single individual who performs such a task.
[The following decision applies when] one of them has sufficient strength to transfer the beam alone, but the other is unable to transfer it alone. If they join together and transfer the beam, the one who is capable [of moving it himself] is held liable. The second one is considered [merely] as offering assistance, and a person who offers assistance [in this fashion] is not liable at all.46This principle is also applied in other contexts aside from the laws of the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Tum'at Mishkav UMoshav 7:6 and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 5:18. See also the commentary to the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Tefillin 1:11.) The same applies in other similar situations.", + "Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable.47As mentioned previously, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath was derived from a comparison to the labors performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In that instance, all the labors had a positive intent.
(The Rambam's statements imply that performing a forbidden labor with a destructive intent is not forbidden by the Torah at all, but is merely a Rabbinic prohibition. There are opinions which differ, and maintain that although the Torah did not hold one liable in such an instance, the act is forbidden by the Torah itself.)
What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent,48However, see Chapter 8, Halachah 8, which states that if a person injures another person as an expression of anger, he is liable, for in his own mind his activity is constructive; he is releasing pent up emotion. one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.
A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability.49The Maggid Mishneh and others note that this activity is only destructive when the pit is dug within a home. Digging a pit for the sake of its earth in a field, by contrast, is not considered a destructive act. It is, however, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (see Halachah 7), for the digger has no desire for the pit, the object of the work. As mentioned, other authorities free a person in such an instance; the Rambam, however, would normally hold one liable. Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.", + "Whenever a person carries out a destructive activity for the sake of ultimately performing a constructive activity, he is liable.50Indeed, several of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath - e.g., tearing, erasing, and demolishing - involve activities that are essentially destructive in nature. Nevertheless, when one performs these activities for an ultimate constructive intent, one is held liable. For example, a person who demolishes [a structure] in order to build [another] in its place,51The commentaries note the contrast between the Rambam's wording in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 15, where he omits the expression, \"in its place.\" Accordingly, the commentaries question whether one is liable for demolishing a building for the sake of building another, when the other building will not be built in the place of the first. (See the gloss of the Or Sameach on Chapter 10, Halachah 12.) one who erased for the sake of writing [something else] in the place of the erasure, or one who dug a pit in order to place the foundations of a structure within. The same applies in other similar situations.
The minimum measure of the destructive activity for which he is held liable is equal to that of the correspondent positive activity.52For example, the minimum measure (שיעור) for which one is liable for the constructive act of writing is two letters. Therefore, one is liable for erasing two letters. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 9, a person is liable when he erases one letter which is large enough for two to be written in its place.", + "Whenever a person performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, partially with intent and partially unintentionally,53The definition of \"unintentionally\" (בשוגג) is that one is unaware that the activity is forbidden, or one is unaware that the day is the Sabbath. Thus, the situation described by the Rambam would involve, for example, writing one letter knowing that it is the Sabbath and that it is forbidden to do so, and writing a second letter having forgotten either of these factors. he is not liable. [This law applies] regardless of whether one began the performance of the [forbidden] labor intentionally and completed it unintentionally, or one began the [forbidden] labor unintentionally and completed it intentionally.
One is liable for karet only when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor intentionally from the beginning to the end. [In such a circumstance,] were witnesses who administered a warning to be present, one would be liable for execution by stoning.54See Halachah 1. Conversely, one is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature55See Halachah 1. when one performs the entire minimum measure of a [forbidden] labor unintentionally from the beginning to the end." + ], + [ + "The [laws of] the Sabbath are suspended1The Rambam uses the expression דחויה, which, as evident from Pesachim 77a and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:15, implies that although a prohibition is not enforced, it has not been lifted entirely. In contrast, the term הותרה would imply that no trace of the prohibition remains.
The Kessef Mishneh and other authorities question the implications and the appropriateness of the Rambam's choice of terms. [In a responsum (Vol. 1, 689), the Rashba illustrates the difference between these terms. A person was in need of meat on the Sabbath and there was non-kosher meat available. If the Sabbath laws are דחויה, it would be proper to eat the non-kosher meat. If the Sabbath laws are הותרה, it would be preferable to slaughter a kosher animal on the sick person's behalf. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:14) states that, in such a situation, one should slaughter a kosher animal, implying that the laws are הותרה. (Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:16 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:39.)]
See the Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim, Responsa 455, which explains the concept of הותרה as meaning that, with regard to this person, it is as if the laws of the Sabbath were never commanded. (See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which explains that although the Rambam stated that a threat to Jewish life overrides the observance of all the mitzvot of the Torah in Hilchot Yesodei Torah, Chapter 5, he emphasizes this concept with regard to the Sabbath laws for the following reason. The other prohibitions are דחויה in the face of a threat to life, while the Sabbath laws are הותרה.
in the face of a danger to life,2Yoma 85b uses the expression, \"Violate one Sabbath on his behalf, so that he will be able to observe many Sabbaths [in the future].\" This expression, however, is not halachically exact. Even when one knows that the person will not live to observe many other Sabbaths, as long as he is alive we are obligated to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. See Halachah 18. as are [the obligations of] the other mitzvot. Therefore, we may perform - according to the directives of a professional physician3Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:10), which cites an opinion that states that we may rely on the evaluation of experienced God-fearing individuals, even if they are not physicians. of that locale4Rav Kapach explains that, with this expression, the Rambam implies that we may rely on a local physician and need not seek the advice of a greater expert who lives further away. - everything that is necessary for the benefit of a sick person whose life is in danger.
When there is a doubt whether or not the Sabbath laws must be violated on a person's behalf, one should violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf, for the Sabbath laws are suspended even when there is merely a question of danger to a person's life. [The same principles apply] when one physician says the Sabbath laws should be violated on a person's behalf and another physician states that this is not necessary.5See Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:8, which gives further details regarding a difference of opinion between physicians.", + "[The following laws apply when physicians] determine on the Sabbath that a person needs [a treatment to be administered] for eight days. We do not say that we should wait until the evening so that it will not be necessary to violate two Sabbaths on his behalf.6Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:13 states that this applies even if there is no danger that the person will die immediately. Since there is a danger that he may die later if the treatment is not administered at this time, the Sabbath laws may be violated. Instead, the treatment is begun immediately, on the Sabbath, and even one hundred Sabbaths may be violated on his behalf.
As long as a person is dangerously [ill] - or even if there is a question whether or not he is dangerously [ill] - and requires treatment, [the Sabbath] should be violated [on his behalf]. A lamp may be lit on his behalf and extinguished on his behalf.7Note that the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 2:5, specifies that the leniency to extinguish a lamp is granted only when it is impossible to move it - or, alternatively, the sick person - to another place or veil the lamp's light. [Animals] may be slaughtered on his behalf, [food] baked and cooked on his behalf, and water heated for him, whether to drink or to use for bathing.
The general principle for a person who is dangerously ill is that the Sabbath should be considered as a weekday regarding all his needs.8There is a question among the Rabbis if this statement is to be interpreted literally or not. As mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, there is a difference of opinion if the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life. According to the opinion that they are merely דחויה, an attempt should be made to minimize the violation of the Sabbath laws if doing so does not constitute a threat to the person's life. (See Tzafenat Paneach, Shulchan Aruch HaRav, ibid. and the Mishnah Berurah 328:14.)", + "When such treatment is administered, it should not be administered by gentiles,9Gentiles are not obligated to observe the Sabbath, and thus having them administer the treatment would not involve the violation of a Torah commandment. Nevertheless, they should not be entrusted with the care of the sick for the reason stated by the Rambam. by children,10Since they are below the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah, according to the Torah itself the observance of the mitzvot is not incumbent upon them, and only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved. by servants, or by women,11Although women and servants are obligated to observe the Sabbath laws, since in many areas of Torah and mitzvot, their obligations are less than men, having them violate the Sabbath laws in this instance could cause the Sabbath to be regarded flippantly, as explained in the next note. so that they will not view the Sabbath flippantly.12The Rambam's choice of wording, based on Yoma 84b, has raised several questions among the commentaries. The most literal interpretation is given by the Merkevat HaMishneh, who explains that when people see that the Sabbath laws are violated by the gentiles for Jews or by women or children, they may get the impression that the observance of these laws is not very crucial, and leniencies may be taken on other occasions - even when there is no valid reason. If, however, it is Torah Sages who violate the laws, the common people will realize that it is only the seriousness of the situation that allowed for this leniency.
Among the other interpretations given why the laws should not be violated by women and children, is that this might cause them to violate the Sabbath laws in the future (Kessef Mishneh).
Significantly, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 328:12) explains that the reason the treatment should not be administered by gentiles is the possibility for delay. Accordingly, if there is no delay involved and one can be sure that the same quality of treatment will be given, it is preferable that the treatment be administered by gentiles.
The commentaries explain that the difference between his opinion and that of the Rambam (quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.) depends on the question discussed above: Are the Sabbath laws הותרה or merely דחויה in the face of a danger to life.
[See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which states that the Rambam's wording here indicates that he sees the violation of the Sabbath laws in such situations as an expression of reverence and regard for the Sabbath.]
Instead, the treatment should be administered by the leaders of Israel13This also is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Yoma, ibid. Others (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:12) understand the phrase גדולי ישראל in that passage as meaning simply \"adult males.\" and the wise.
It is forbidden to hesitate before transgressing the Sabbath [laws] on behalf of a person who is dangerously ill,14The Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 8:5) states, \"A person who [administers treatment] quickly is praiseworthy, and one who raises questions is considered as if he shed blood. as [reflected in the interpretation in the phrase of Leviticus 18:5,] \"which a person shall perform to live through them,\" as \"['to live through them'] and not to die through them.\"
This teaches that the judgments of the Torah do not [bring] vengeance to the world, but rather bring mercy, kindness, and peace to the world. Concerning those non-believers who say that [administering such treatment] constitutes a violation of the Sabbath and is forbidden,15The Rambam is referring to the Sadducees, the Karaites, and others who do not accept the oral tradition. one may apply the verse [Ezekiel 20:25]: \"[As punishment,] I gave them harmful laws and judgments through which they cannot live.\"16The Rambam seems to be interpreting the verse as meaning that since these individuals purposefully misinterpret the Torah, God causes their misinterpretations to be cruel and harsh so that they will not live and spread such an approach.", + "When a person's eyes are ailing - i.e., when he has a secretion from either one or both of them, when tears flow from them due to great pain, when blood flows from them, or when they are affected by fever,17Significantly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state קדח, \"piercing pain\" (the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el on Avodah Zarah 28b), rather than קדחת, \"fever.\" or by other afflictions of this like - he is considered among those individuals who are dangerously ill.18Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., explains that there is a connection between the eyes and the heart, and such a person is therefore considered to be dangerously ill. The Sabbath may be violated on his behalf, and anything necessary for his treatment may be performed for him.19From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:9), it appears that once an eye ailment is nearly healed, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. See also Hilchot Milah 16.", + "Similarly, a person who has a wound20The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:3) states that this can also apply to an infection. Disquiet and pain are not, however, considered sufficient cause to violate the Sabbath laws. in his body cavity - from his lips inward,21When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) substitutes \"teeth\" for \"lips,\" and explains that a toothache can also be considered cause to violate the Sabbath laws. The Ramah and subsequent commentaries, however, qualify this statement, explaining which types of toothaches can be treated by Jews and which can be treated only by gentiles. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:3 and Mishneh Berurah 328:8.) whether in his mouth, his digestive organs, his liver or spleen, or any of the other organs in his body cavity - is considered to be dangerously ill and does not require [a physician's] assessment [of his condition]. His ailment is serious, and we should violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf immediately without [waiting for] an assessment.22The Maggid Mishneh cites the Ramban as explaining that this applies only when we are unsure if the wound is dangerous or not. In such a situation, we are not required to wait for a physician's assessment and may treat the wound immediately. If, however, we know - or a physician says - that a wound is not dangerous, a Jew may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. It may, however, be treated by a gentile. This ruling is also quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:4).
A wound on the back of the hand or on the back of the foot is considered equivalent to a wound in the body cavity. It does not require [a physician's] assessment [of his condition] for us to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. A fever that causes the flesh to wince23This phrase is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Avodah Zarah 28a and refers to an extremely high fever. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:7) appears to interpret it as referring to a type of malaria that causes fever and chills simultaneously. is considered equivalent to a wound in the body cavity, and we should violate the Sabbath laws on this person's behalf.
Similarly, we should violate the Sabbath laws whenever a physician24From the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:5), it would appear that if the sick person himself says that the Sabbath laws should be violated on his behalf, his word should be heeded. assesses an ailment as dangerous, even when it affects only the exterior of a person's skin.", + "When a person swallows a leech, water may be heated for him on the Sabbath, and any medical treatment that is necessary may be administered, since his life is in danger. Similarly, when a person is bitten by a rabid dog25See Yoma 10:4 and the Rambam's commentary on that mishnah. or a poisonous snake or other reptile, any medical treatment that is necessary to save him may be administered. [The same laws apply] even when there is merely a question of whether or not [the bite] can cause death.", + "When physicians assessed that a sick person required a fig, and ten people ran and brought26Either they brought the figs from the public domain or picked them from the tree. Both of these activities involve the performance of labors forbidden on the Sabbath. him ten figs at once,27This situation refers to an instance where none of the ten know of the others' activities. Alternatively, each one thought that he would be able to bring the fig before the other person (Mishnah Berurah 328:42). they are all absolved of liability entirely.28I.e., they need not bring a sin offering, nor do their actions cause them any spiritual blemishes. Indeed, to quote the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:15), \"all of them receive a bountiful reward from God\" for their actions. 29. If, however, there are two figs on a single stem, it would be preferable to pick them so as not to bring any additional figs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:16). (See also Halachah 9.)
[The same decision applies] if the ten people brought the figs one after another, even when he recuperated after the first fig, for all of them had license to bring them.", + "If a sick person required two figs, and two figs could be found only on two separate stems - while three figs were found on another stem - we should remove the stem that has three figs, even though only two are required.29 [It is preferable] to cut only one stem and not two stems, so as not to increase [the performance of the forbidden labor of] gleaning.30The Ramah (Orach Chayim, loc. cit.) emphasizes that if there is any danger of delay or difficulty, the threat to a Jew's life overrides all these considerations. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "When food is cooked for a sick person on the Sabbath and the sick person leaves some over after eating, a healthy person is forbidden to eat from the remainder, lest [this cause] more food to be added for him.31On Saturday night, however, a healthy person may eat from the remainder. Moreover, there is no need for him to wait the amount of time necessary to cook the food [(כדי שיעשו) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 318:2, and commentaries].
When, however, an animal is slaughtered for a sick person on the Sabbath, it is permissible for a healthy person to partake of uncooked meat32The meat need not be salted to remove the blood. Although this is generally done as a preparation for the cooking process, it is necessary only because blood will move from place to place within the meat during cooking. There is no prohibition against eating raw meat even though it has not been salted (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 67:1-2).
The Kiryat Melech Rav notes that this explanation is appropriate according to the interpretation of the Tosafot (Chulin 14a). The Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:12), however, requires even uncooked meat to be salted before one partakes of it. Several different explanations are offered for this difficulty. See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.
[from that animal].33For this leniency to be granted, the Ra'avad requires that the sick person have been ill before the commencement of the Sabbath, and his attendants to have thought of slaughtering the animal for him at that time. Otherwise, the animal is considered muktzeh. Although the latter prohibition is waived on behalf of the sick person, it is still enforced as regards the healthy individual.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:2 and Shulchan Aruch Harav ibid 318:5) explain that in this instance, the prohibition of muktzeh does not apply at all.
A decree was not enacted, because there is no possibility of an additional [activity] being performed [for a healthy person].34Slaughtering an animal is a single activity which will provide enough meat for both the sick person and the healthy individual. Allowing the healthy person to eat from the meat will not cause any increase in the violation of the Sabbath laws. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "When a sick person is not dangerously ill,35This refers to ailments which, although not threatening to a person's life, are after all serious, and cause him to be confined to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17) or which cause him to feel weakness throughout his entire body (Ramah, loc. cit.). In contrast, if the person merely feels ill or has a minor ailment in a particular limb, there is a Rabbinic prohibition against taking medication even when the performance of forbidden labors is not involved. (See Chapter 21, Halachah 31.) all his needs should be cared for by a gentile. What is implied? We may tell a gentile to perform [forbidden labors]36As is explained in Chapter 6, the Rabbis forbade a Jew to tell a gentile to perform work on his behalf on the Sabbath. This prohibition is, however, relaxed because of the sick person's condition. on his behalf and he performs them. [This includes] cooking, baking, bringing medicine from one domain to another and the like. Similarly, one may have one's eyes treated37The Hebrew word כוחל refers to the application of powder or eye-paint to the area around the eyes. Although certain Talmudic passages appear to indicate that this was merely a cosmetic practice, in certain instances it had medical value. The leniency to treat the eyes is granted, because, as explained in the notes on Halachah 4, there is a connection between the eyes and the heart. by a gentile on the Sabbath even though there is no danger involved.
Furthermore, if [the sick] require treatment that does not involve the performance of [forbidden] labors,38There is a question regarding activities in which a Rabbinic prohibition must be transgressed. Although asking a gentile to perform a forbidden labor is also prohibited by the Rabbis, some commentaries make a distinction between such a prohibition and a prohibition that involves the performance of an activity.
The wording chosen by the Rambam in this halachah and in Chapter 21, Halachah 31, has left room for speculation concerning his ruling on this question. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam allows the performance of any activity even when there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved. The Kessef Mishneh differs, and explains that according to the Rambam, any activity forbidden by the Rabbis may not be performed despite the fact that a person is bedridden by illness.
The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) does not follow either of the interpretations of the Rambam's view, but instead suggests following the opinion of the Ramban, who permits the performance of any activity forbidden by the Rabbis, provided that it is performed in an abnormal manner. Furthermore, if there is a danger to a specific limb, the Rabbinic prohibitions are waived, and such activities may be performed in the normal manner. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:19 is even more lenient and allows one to perform activities that are forbidden by the Torah itself, provided one performs them in an uncharacteristic manner.
they may be treated even by Jews. For this reason, it is permitted to perform [physical activities for the benefit of the sick]; for example, one may lift [the tendons of] the ears, lift up cartilage around the heart,39There are times when the cartilage around the heart becomes compressed against the body and it must be lifted up in order to facilitate breathing (Avodah Zarah 29a). restore broken bones to their places, or perform other activities of this like.", + "When a woman in the process of childbirth squats to give birth,40Our translation is based on the description of the techniques of midwifery used in Talmudic and post-Talmudic times. Others translate the term as a woman being bent over with labor pains. Compare to Halachah 13, which mentions the possibility of performing forbidden labors on a woman's behalf from the time \"when there is a show of blood.\" See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:3), which mentions both these terms and also refers to the condition when a woman is overcome by labor pains to the point where she must be carried by her friends. Any one of these three conditions constitutes a danger to life for which the Sabbath laws may be broken. her life is considered in danger and the Sabbath laws may be violated on her behalf. A midwife may be called from a distant place41The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:3) states that this leniency applies even when she lives beyond the Sabbath limits (see Chapter 27). Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:9, which state that a mid-wife may be called in the preliminary stages of labor. and the umbilical cord may be cut and tied.
If she requires a light when she cries out because of labor pains, a candle may be lit for her. [This leniency is granted] even if she is blind, because light has a calming influence42She feels more secure knowing that she will be cared for properly in the light than if she were cared for in the dark (Tosafot, Shabbat 128b). even if she does not see.
If she needs oil or the like, it may be brought for her. If possible, the items that are brought should be brought in an uncharacteristic manner; for example, a friend should bring a utensil tied in her hair.43These rulings are based on Shabbat, ibid. In his commentary on that text, the Ramban explains that this principle applies regarding all instances when the Sabbath laws are violated because of a danger to life. If it is possible to reduce the extent to which they are violated, one should do so.
The Maggid Mishneh postulates that the Rambam would not require such stringencies at all times. Were that the case, the Rambam would have stated this principle earlier. Instead, this is a specific ruling applicable with regard to a woman in childbirth. Greater stringency is applied in this instance, because although there is a threat to the woman's life, the probability of a woman's actually dying is very low. (It can be explained that the difference of opinion between the Ramban and the Maggid Mishneh revolves around the question whether the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life, as explained in the notes on Halachot 1 and 2.)
If this not possible, it may be brought in the ordinary manner.44Note Sefer HaChasidim, which states that it is preferable that a woman prepare everything necessary for childbirth from the ninth month onward, so that if she gives birth on the Sabbath, only a minimal amount of forbidden labor will have to be performed.", + "We should not help an idolatress45The term \"idolatress\" is used here to refer to a gentile who actually worships idols. In contrast, the term ger toshav refers to a gentile who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. (See Hilchot Melachim 9:1-2 and Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6.)
In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:2, the Rambam writes that it is forbidden to offer medical treatment to an idolater even for a fee. Accordingly, this halachah extends that principle to include a woman in childbirth. The question is raised, however, concerning the majority of the gentiles in the present age. Although the Rambam considers Christianity as idol worship, many authorities do not. According to the latter opinions, although these gentiles are not idolaters, they have not gone through the formal process of acceptance of the seven laws commanded to Noach and cannot therefore be considered as gerim toshavim.
Many authorities (see the commentary on the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Avodat Kochavim) maintain that it is permitted to treat such people during the week. On the Sabbath, however, one may not perform forbidden labors on their behalf. (See the Mishnah Berurah 330:8, which speaks very critically about physicians who violate the Sabbath laws on behalf of gentiles.) According to these authorities, one would be allowed to treat these gentiles on the Sabbath provided that there was not any forbidden labor involved. Note, however, Rav Kapach, who quotes Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state \"gentile\" instead of \"idolatress.\"
give birth on the Sabbath, even if payment is offered. We do not worry about the possibility of ill-feelings being aroused.46According to the generally accepted interpretation of Avodah Zarah 26b, the intent is that the non-Jews will understand that the Sabbath is a sacred day for the Jews. Even when they see that the Sabbath laws are violated for the sake of saving a Jew's life, they will accept the rationalization that the Sabbath laws may be violated only on behalf of an individual who observes the Sabbath.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:8 mention that if a physician fears that ill-feeling will be generated by his refusal to care for gentiles, he may deliver their babies, provided that he does not perform labors that are forbidden by the Torah itself.
[This applies even when] there is no violation [of the Sabbath laws] involved.
[In contrast,] one may offer assistance to a daughter of a ger toshav who gives birth, since we are commanded to secure his well-being.47Based on Leviticus 25:35, Avodah Zarah 65a states that the Jews are required to maintain the well-being of such gentiles and, if necessary, the Jews should support the gentiles from their charitable funds. We may not, however, violate the Sabbath laws on her behalf.", + "From the time a woman in childbirth has a flow of blood48The Rambam chooses the more lenient of the opinions mentioned in Shabbat 129a, for a woman can begin bleeding well before she gives birth. until the birth - [and indeed,] after birth for three days49Although the Lechem Mishneh states that the counting of the three days should begin from the time the uterus opens, the consensus of halachic opinion is that the three days start from birth. (See the Be'ur Halachah 330.) - the Sabbath laws may be violated on her behalf, and all her needs should be met.50Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:12 explain that this refers to activities that a woman's friends will customarily perform on her behalf after she gives birth. A doctor need not be consulted about these matters. Nevertheless, if a doctor says that these activities are unnecessary, they should not be performed. [This applies] regardless of whether she says she requires such treatment or she maintains that she does not require such treatment.
Between the third and the seventh day [after childbirth], if she maintains that she does not require treatment, the Sabbath laws should not be violated on her behalf. If she remains silent,51From the Rambam's wording (and indeed, this is the ruling of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:14), it appears that the woman is still considered to be dangerously ill. Hence, unless she protests to the contrary, it is assumed that this treatment is necessary. and certainly if she maintains that she requires treatment,52Shulchan Aruch HaRav and the Mishnah Berurah, loc. cit., state that the woman's word is accepted even against the opinions of many doctors. the Sabbath laws should be violated on her behalf. Between the seventh and the thirtieth day, her status is analogous to that of a sick person who is not dangerously ill. Even if she maintains that she requires treatment, [forbidden] labors should be performed on her behalf only by a gentile.53According to the halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:21), there is one exception. A fire may be kindled for a woman within thirty days after she has given birth. See the notes on the following halachah.", + "A fire may be kindled54Preferably, the fire should be kindled by a gentile. If, however, there is no gentile available, the fire may be kindled by a Jew (Mishnah Berurah 330:21). for a woman after she has given birth55The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears to him that the Rambam (and Shabbat 129b, upon which this halachah is based) is speaking about a woman who gave birth less than a week previously. Although weight is given to this view (see Be'ur Halachah 330), the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:6) states that it refers to a woman within a month of childbirth. even in the summer, since cold is very difficult for a woman to bear after childbirth in the cold regions. In contrast, a fire should not be kindled for other sick people to warm themselves.56The commentaries question whether this refers to a person who is dangerously ill or to a person who is merely seriously ill, but in no danger of dying. According to the latter view, a fire may be kindled on behalf of someone who is dangerously ill. Nevertheless, if a person let blood and became chilled, a fire may be kindled for him even in the summer.
After cutting his umbilical cord,57Sefer HaKovetz states that cutting the umbilical cord involves the violation of a forbidden labor and is permitted only because of the danger involved. Most authorities, however, maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved. we may wash a new born baby on the day he is born, even when this requires heating the water on the Sabbath.58As mentioned above, most authorities maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition may be waived on behalf of a new-born. Thus, this is interpreted as referring to water that was heated on the Sabbath by a gentile. Herbal powder59מלח is usually rendered as \"salt.\" Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 18:3. (See also Mishnah Berurah 330:24.) can be applied to his skin and his limbs can be tied,60This is useful in straightening the child's limbs. for it is dangerous not to perform these activities for him.
Similarly, a baby may be washed before circumcision, after circumcision,61See Hilchot Milah 2:8. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 331:9) writes that although in Talmudic times, washing a baby at this time was considered as a matter of vital importance, it is no longer common practice. The Ramah (loc. cit.) explains that it is customary to wash the baby before the circumcision with water that was heated on Friday, and to wash him after the circumcision on Saturday night. and on the third day after circumcision62There is greater discomfort on the third day after the circumcision, as explained by the commentaries on Genesis 18:1 and 34:25. with water that is heated on the Sabbath,63At present, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if it appears necessary, the baby may be washed with water that was heated before the Sabbath. Needless to say, in all situations, should a doctor state that such a washing is necessary, his advice should be followed. because of the danger [to him].", + "When a woman dies while in labor on the Sabbath, a knife should be brought - even if it must be carried through the public domain - and the woman's womb cut open and the fetus removed, for it is possible that it will still be alive.64The Ramah (Orach Chayim 330:5) states that it is no longer customary to follow this practice even during the week. We wait a considerable time after the woman loses consciousness, because we are afraid that she did not die, but merely fainted. Hence, by the time we are certain that she has died, we can assume that the fetus is also no longer alive.
Needless to say, at present, when our improved technology makes it possible to monitor the physical functioning of both the mother and the fetus, the physicians should decide on the basis of the information before them. Regardless of the practical application of this ruling today, the principles on which it is based are significant and should be applied in other circumstances.

[The rationale for this ruling is] that the Sabbath laws are violated even when there is only a possibility of saving a life,65Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:7, which adds that this ruling is granted despite the fact that the fetus will normally die in such a situation. Although probability (רוב in Hebrew) is a significant factor in halachah, the possibility of saving a life overweighs it. and even in such instances, where there is no chazakah on which to base our presumption that the fetus is alive.66Generally, a living person can be assumed to continue to live (chezkat chayim) until we are certain that he has died. Although such a presumption cannot be made with regard to this fetus, permission is, nevertheless, granted for the Sabbath laws to be violated on its behalf.", + "[All] activities necessary to save a life should be performed on the Sabbath; there is no necessity to receive license from the court. The more zealous one is [in this regard], the more praiseworthy.
What is implied?67The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:13) rephrases the concepts stated in this halachah slightly, connecting the praise given a person for being zealous in saving a life with the situation concerning catching fish described afterwards. According to the Shulchan Aruch, this situation teaches us that a person is considered praiseworthy for saving a life on the Sabbath even if he accrues personal benefit through his actions - for example, in the case at hand, in addition to saving a life, the person also receives a catch of fish. If one sees that a child has fallen into the sea, one may spread out a net and hoist him up, although one catches fish together with him. If a person hears that a child fell into the sea and spreads out a net to hoist him up, but raises up only fish, he is absolutely free of liability.68The Rambam adds the term \"absolutely\" to indicate that it is desirable to spread out and raise one's nets to try to save the child (Lechem Mishneh). Significantly, the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 13:6, states that the person is not held liable even if he intended to catch the fish together with the child.
If he intended to raise up fish and [in fact] lifted up both fish and a child, he is not held liable.69The Or Sameach writes that he is given \"stripes for rebelliousness\" (the punishment usually given for the violation of a Rabbinic ordinance), since he intended to perform a forbidden activity. See a parallel ruling, Hilchot Nedarim 12:18.
Significantly, when mentioning this instance in Hilchot Shegagot 2:15, the Rambam states that the person acted בשוגג when catching the fish - i.e., he was unaware that it was the Sabbath or was unaware that it is forbidden to fish on the Sabbath.
Since he lifted up a child together with the fish, he is not held liable even when he did not hear that the child had fallen into the water.70This reflects the Rambam's decision regarding a difference of opinion between the Sages in Menachot 64a. One opinion holds the person liable for it considers his intent of primary importance, while the other frees him of liability for it views his actions as most significant.", + "If71These instances are cited by Yoma 84b as a continuation of the development of the concept mentioned in the previous halachah, that one may perform an activity to save someone else's life, although in the process of doing so, one derives benefit. The Talmud explains why it is necessary to mention all these different instances. a child fell into a pit, a person may dislodge a clod of earth, and lift [the child] up, even though he creates a step when he dislodges it. If a door was locked with a child inside, a person may break the door down and take the child out, even though he chops it into pieces of wood which are appropriate to use for work,72The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Rambam alters the text of the Talmud slightly to imply that the person breaking down the door did not do so with the intent of using the wood. Rav Kapach differs, noting that, as mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Rambam absolves the person of liability even when he has an intent to benefit from his actions. (See also the notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger.) lest the child become frightened and die.
If a fire broke out and a person is inside the building and we fear that he may be consumed by the flames,73Yoma, ibid., explains that this leniency is granted even when the fire breaks out in a courtyard other than that in which the person was located. If the fire appears to pose a danger to his life, it may be extinguished. a person may extinguish the fire to save him, although he prepares a pathway while extinguishing the fire. Whoever acts first to save him is praiseworthy. One does not need to ask permission from the court in all instances when there is a danger to a person's life.", + "When an avalanche has fallen, and there is a doubt whether or not74I.e., a person was seen in the vicinity of the avalanche and we are unsure whether or not he was able to escape or not. it has fallen over a person,75The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this leniency is granted even when there are several doubts involved: Perhaps the person was not trapped under the avalanche. Even if he was trapped, perhaps he is no longer alive and the performance of the labor of clearing will be to no avail. it may be cleared. If the person was discovered to be alive, but was crushed [by the fallen debris] to the extent that it is impossible that he will recover, [the debris] may be cleared and the person taken out to enable him to live [however] long he does.76This communicates a fundamental concept in Torah law: Even a fleeting moment of a Jew's life is precious enough for all possible efforts to be performed to save him even if it is necessary to violate Torah law.", + "If [in the process of clearing the debris,] they [reached] his nose and saw that he was not breathing, he should be left there,77Although we are commanded to show respect for a corpse and not to leave it exposed, we are not allowed to violate the Sabbath laws for such a purpose. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Yoma 8:5.) for he has died already.78Based on Genesis 7:22, \"all that has the breath of the spirit of life,\" Yoma 88b states that whether a person is breathing or not is the determining factor of whether he is considered alive or not. Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:11 rule that even if we see that his heart is not beating, he is not considered dead until we are certain that he is not breathing.
The conception of breath as the determinant of life is significant in the present age, when it is possible that a person will continue to breathe despite brain death. The question of whether such a person is considered alive has been raised today within the context of many contemporary medical issues. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah, Vol. II, Responsum 174) and other authorities of the present age have ruled that breath is still the fundamental determinant whether or not a person is alive.

Although it is discovered that people on the upper level of a landslide have died, one should not assume that those on the lower levels have died. Instead, [the debris] should be cleared away from all of the people, for in a landslide it is possible that those on the upper level will die, while those on the lower level will remain alive.", + "When an avalanche fell on a courtyard in which were located both gentiles and Jews - even if there were a thousand gentiles and only one Jew, we should remove all [the debris] for the sake of the Jew.79This halachah is based on the following principles:
a) As mentioned in Halachah 12, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to save a gentile's life.
b) כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה - \"Whenever there is a doubt concerning the identity of objects in a fixed position, we consider the probability as 50%.\" Since there is at least one Jew in this courtyard, until his body is located, it is considered as if there is a 50% probability that every body found is the Jew. (See also Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 8:11.)
Should one80Even if several people departed, the same rule would apply, as long as the entire group did not leave its original place. See the following halachah. of the individuals leave and enter another courtyard and that courtyard collapse upon him, we should remove [the debris]. Perhaps the person who departed was a Jew, and [all] those who remain were gentiles.81The Rambam's decision depends on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's text of Yoma 84b. There the Talmud explains that although in general we follow the principle, כל דפריש מרובא פריש - \"Whenever an entity separates itself from a group, we assume that it was part of the majority\" - in this instance, since the matter involves a possible threat to a Jewish life, this principle is given a slightly different interpretation. Since the group remains in its place, its fixed nature (קביעות) is not disrupted.
It must be emphasized that the Ra'avad, Rashi, and the Ramban have a different approach to the passage in Yoma. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 329:2) follows the opinion quoted by the Rambam.
", + "When they all left this courtyard to go to another courtyard, and as they were proceeding, one of them whose identity is unknown departed and entered a third courtyard and was covered by an avalanche, [the debris] should not be removed from him.82Again this ruling depends on Rav Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Yoma 84b. Other authorities differ, as mentioned above.
Since they left their original place, [the presence of] a Jew is not accepted as an established fact. Hence, we assume that anyone who separated from this group as it was proceeding was part of the majority. Accordingly, if the majority were Jewish,83This implies that if a person of unknown origin is found buried under a landslide in a place whose population is primarily gentile, we are not allowed to remove the debris from him. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:26.) This is a matter of question on which there is a responsum attributed to the Rambam (although its origins are disputed). (See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 4:34, which quotes the Rambam's opinion, and the Ramah, loc. cit., who allows the debris to be removed.) even a person separated from them [who entered] another courtyard after they left their original place - should he be covered by an avalanche, we should remove [the debris] from him.", + "A person who is traveling in the desert and does not know which day is the Sabbath should count84He should start counting the six days immediately on the day on which he realizes that he has lost touch with the weekly calendar. six days and consider the seventh day as holy. He should recite the blessing of the day [Kiddush] and recite Havdalah at the conclusion of this \"Sabbath\" day.85Similarly, in his daily prayers, he should recite the prayers of the Sabbath on that day. The recitation of these prayers was instituted so that the person should not lose consciousness of the observance of the Sabbath entirely.
Every day, even on the day on which he recites Kiddush and after which he recites Havdalah, he is allowed86The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 344:1) states that as long as the person has means, he is not allowed to work at all. Permission to work is granted only when it is a life and death matter. This explains why this halachah is included in this chapter. to earn87The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize that although there is a prohibition against walking beyond the Sabbath limits, it is not as serious as the prohibition against forbidden labors. Hence, it is waived in order to allow this person the opportunity to reach a settled area and observe the Sabbath in a proper manner. only enough for his livelihood, so that he will not die. It is forbidden for him to earn more than his livelihood, for there is a possibility that every day is the Sabbath.
If the person knows that the day is the eighth day or the fifteenth day after his departure, he is allowed to work on that day, for it is certain that he did not depart on the Sabbath.88If he earns enough on that day to support himself for several days, he must cease work until his means are exhausted (Mishnah Berurah 344:11). On the other days, he is allowed to earn merely his livelihood.", + "[The following rules apply] when gentiles lay siege to Jewish cities:89Although these laws surely apply to Jewish communities in Eretz Yisrael, these same laws are also relevant to Jewish communities in the diaspora. If their intent was financial gain, the Sabbath laws should not be violated because of them, nor are we allowed to wage war against them.90Since their intent is only financial, the Sabbath laws may not be violated for this reason. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:17, which state that at present, even when gentiles initially come only for pillage and plunder, since they have no compunctions about killing Jews, particularly if one will defend his property, any gentile raid on a Jewish community is considered a question of life and death warranting the violation of the Sabbath laws. If a city is located near the border, however, we should march against them with weapons and wage war against them even when they are demanding hay or straw.91The rationale is that if a border city is conquered, the enemies will have a vantage point from which to conquer the entire land. This concept has relevance beyond the Sabbath laws. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe Shelita has explained that these principles are relevant to the territorial disputes between Jews and gentiles in Eretz Yisrael today. Returning any territory to the Arabs would jeopardize the safety of the entire land.
In any location, if the gentiles' intent was Jewish lives, or if they engaged in battle with a city or laid siege to it without stating a specific intention,92War must be waged against them because it is possible that their intent is to kill. Hence, we follow the principle that the Sabbath laws may be violated even where there is merely a question of a threat to life. we must wage war against them, and the Sabbath laws should be violated because of them. It is a mitzvah93I.e., an obligation. See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 1:14, which describes the mitzvah (Leviticus 19:16 : \"Do not stand by idly while your neighbor's life is in danger.\"
It is told that in the Maccabean revolt, the Greeks once attacked the Jews on the Sabbath. The people, unaware of this law, refused to take up arms in defense and thousands died. Afterwards, the Rabbis publicized this ruling.
for every member of the Jewish people who can come [to their assistance] to go out and aid their brethren who are under siege and save them from the gentiles [although it is the] Sabbath. It is forbidden to wait until Saturday night.
After they have saved their brethren, they may return home with their weapons on the Sabbath, so that a dangerous situation will not be created in the future.94Eruvin 45a relates that originally it was forbidden for the people to return with their weapons, and they would leave them in a home within the city's wall. Once the enemy forces saw that the Jews were returning unarmed and attacked them. More Jews were killed in the confused scramble for their weapons than by the enemy attack. After this event, the Sages allowed those who come to assist a besieged city to return with their weapons.", + "Similarly, if a ship is sinking at sea95Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this applies only when one knows that there are Jews on the ship. If we do not have such information, it would appear that we should assume that the passengers of the ship are gentiles and should not endeavor to save their lives. or a city is surrounded by a [flooding] river, it is a mitzvah to go out on the Sabbath and use every possible means to save them.
Even when a single individual is being pursued by gentiles, by a snake, or by a bear with the intent to kill him, it is a mitzvah to save him, even when it is necessary to perform several forbidden labors on the Sabbath. It is even permitted to forge weapons to save him. Similarly, we should cry out [to God] on their behalf, make supplications,96Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that it is a mitzvah to cry out to God for assistance in the event of any distressing situation that affects a Jewish community. On the Sabbath, however, it is only proper to make such requests when there is an immediate threat to human life. Just as such requests are made on behalf of a community, they should also be made on behalf of a single individual whose life is threatened (Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6, Hilchot Shabbat 30:12). and sound the trumpets97Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that, as part of the mitzvah of entreating God's mercy, trumpets should be sounded. Nevertheless, trumpets should be not be sounded for this purpose on the Sabbath, since sounding the trumpets violates a Rabbinic prohibition (Hilchot Shofar 2:7). Here, however, the intent in sounding the trumpets is to alert the Jews in the surrounding area and to summon them. The prohibition is waived for this purpose. (See Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6.) to summon help for them.98Just as one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew's life, one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew who is being forced to adopt a gentile way of life (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:29 and the Mishnah Berurah 306:57).
We should not cry out [to God] or make supplications because of plague99See Ta'anit 22b. on the Sabbath.", + "We should lay siege to gentile cities [at least] three days before the Sabbath.100In Chapter 30, Halachah 13, the Rambam states that this requirement was instituted \"so that the soldiers' minds will be settled and they will not be overly preoccupied on the Sabbath.\" Although the war will require violation of the Sabbath laws, efforts should be made to minimize the tension and anxiety experienced by the soldiers to the greatest degree possible.
See Hilchot Melachim 6:11 which states that we can lay siege to gentile cities \"on the Sabbath.\" The Kessef Mishneh notes the contradiction and suggests amending the text of Hilchot Melachim in light of our halachah. The Lechem Mishneh, however, explains that this clause of our halachah speaks of a milchemet reshut, a war which we are not obligated to wage, while Hilchot Melachim speaks of a milchemet mitzvah, a war which we are obligated to wage.
We may wage war with them on any day, even on the Sabbath, until we conquer [the city], even if the war is voluntary in nature.101Hilchot Melachim describes a voluntary war, a milchemet reshut, as a war fought \"to expand the borders of Israel or magnify [the king's] greatness and reputation.\" In contrast, a war that is obligatory in nature, a milchemet mitzvah, refers to \"the war against the seven nations [who occupied Eretz Yisrael], the war against Amalek, and [a war] fought to assist Israel against an enemy which attacks her.\" The oral tradition,102Sifre on Deuteronomy (loc. cit.), Shabbat 19a. interprets [Deuteronomy 20:20] \"until you have subjugated it,\" as teaching that [one should wage war] even on the Sabbath.
Surely, the above applies103According to the Kessef Mishneh's (Hilchot Melachim 6:11), this refers to the leniency of waging war on the Sabbath. The restriction of laying siege to a city three days before the Sabbath, in contrast, applies only with regard to voluntary wars. In an obligatory war, we may lay siege to a city even on the Sabbath itself. with regard to a war that we are obligated to wage. Indeed, it was on the Sabbath that Joshua conquered Jericho.104Rav Kapach notes that the citation of a historical event as proof of a law is extremely out of character for the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah. He explains that the Rambam's statements are directed against statements of Rav Sa'adiah Gaon, who writes that Jericho did not fall on the Sabbath.
It is possible to explain the Rambam's statements from another perspective. Joshua was instructed concerning the conquest of Jericho by Divine command. Indeed, according to human reason, there was no reason why Jericho should have been conquered on the Sabbath. Hence, the fact that God delivered such a command is a clear directive that one may begin a milchemet mitzvah on the Sabbath.
" + ], + [ + "It is permissible to begin the performance of a [forbidden] labor on Friday, even though the labor is completed on its own accord on the Sabbath itself,1The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 252:1) emphasizes that this leniency applies even when one is certain that the forbidden labor will continue on its own accord on the Sabbath, as mentioned in the examples cited by the Rambam in the following halachah.
Having outlined the general principles governing the Sabbath laws in the first chapter, and the situations when leniency can be permitted because of a danger to life in the second chapter, the Rambam begins his discussion of the Sabbath laws themselves. He starts with an explanation of activities that are begun before the Sabbath actually commences.
[Significantly, although the Mishnah (Shabbat, Chapter 1) starts with a different concept, it also mentions many of the laws quoted by the Rambam towards the beginning of its treatment of the Sabbath laws.]
for the prohibition against work applies only on the Sabbath itself. Moreover, when a task is carried out on its own accord on the Sabbath,2Shabbat 18a explains that these laws reflect a difference of opinion between the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai. The School of Shammai maintains that just as a person is required to have his servants and livestock rest on the Sabbath, so, too, is he required to have his utensils rest. They may not be used for work on the Sabbath. The School of Hillel does not accept this thesis, and their opinion is adopted as halachah. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 16.) we are permitted to derive benefit from what was completed on the Sabbath.", + "What is implied?3The Rambam exemplifies the principle mentioned in the previous halachah, describing forbidden labors that are initiated by a person before the commencement of the Sabbath and continue without additional input from the person on the Sabbath. These examples are taken from the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:5-9) and the explanation of these mishnayot in the Talmud. We may open an irrigation channel to a garden on Friday, causing it to continue to fill throughout [the Sabbath] day. We may place [burning] incense under garments, causing them to continue to be made fragrant throughout the entire Sabbath. We may apply salve to an eye or a bandage to a wound, causing them to continue to heal throughout the Sabbath.
We may mix ink with herbs before night and let the mixture soak4Note the Rambam's description of the preparation of ink in Hilchot Tefillin 1:4:
One collects the vapors of oils, of tar, and of wax..., [causes it to condense,] and kneads it together with tree sap and a drop of honey... . When one desires to write with it, one soaks [the ink] in gallnut juice or the like.
throughout the entire Sabbath. We may place wool into a vat5To dye the wool another color. Note, however, the restrictions on this practice mentioned in Halachah 17. or strands of flax into an oven6In his Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:5, the Rambam writes that flax would be soaked, mixed with ash, and then heated in an oven to bleach it. (See also Halachah 14.) so that their [color] continues to change throughout the entire Sabbath.
We may lay out snares for wild beasts, birds, and fish at nightfall so that they continue being captured throughout the entire Sabbath. We may load the beams of an olive press or the round stones of a grape press7The process of preparing both olive oil and wine involved crushing the fruit and then pressing heavy weights over the olives or the grapes to extract the remaining liquids. at nightfall so that the liquids will continue to flow throughout the entire Sabbath. Similarly, we may light a candle or a fire [before] evening so that it continues to burn throughout the entire Sabbath.", + "A pot may be placed over a fire, or meat may be placed in an oven or over coals [on Friday], so that they continue to cook throughout the Sabbath [with the intent] that they be eaten on the Sabbath.8The Rambam is explaining that according to the Torah itself, leaving food over a fire to cook would resemble all the activities mentioned in the previous halachah. For although cooking is a forbidden labor, the cooking would continue without any further activity. Nevertheless, as is explained in the subsequent halachot, our Sages enacted certain restrictions because they were afraid that a person might stir the fire to cause the food to cook faster. With regard to this matter, however, there are certain restrictions that were enacted lest one stir the coals on the Sabbath.", + "What is implied? When food has not been cooked to the extent that it is ready to serve, water has not been boiled, or food has been cooked to the extent that it is ready to serve,9The Rambam's view is also shared by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and other Sephardic authorities and is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 253:1). Rashi (Shabbat 37b) and the Ashkenazic authorities who followed him are more lenient and maintain that when half (or according to others, a third - see Chapter 9, Halachah 5 and notes) of the cooking process has been completed, food may be left on a fire even when its taste is improved by continued cooking. The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that it is customary to follow this view. but the longer it cooks the better it tastes,10Even according to the Rambam, if continued cooking will impair the taste of a food or if food was not cooked at all, we are allowed to leave it on a flame, for it is unlikely that the person will continue to stir the flames to make it cook more, as will be explained in Halachah 8. it may not be left over a fire on the Sabbath11The contemporary Rabbinic authorities explain that these rules also apply to electric and gas ranges. In these instances as well, it is possible that a person may desire to turn the flame up to have the food cook faster or more thoroughly. even though it was placed there before the commencement of the Sabbath, lest one stir the coals to complete the cooking process or to cause it to cook more thoroughly.
Accordingly, it is permissible to leave [food cooking] if one removed the coals one covered the coals in the range12In contemporary terms, covering a stove top with a blech, a piece of metal, serves this purpose. If this is done, food that has not been cooked thoroughly may be left to continue cooking throughout the Sabbath. with ash or with thin chips from the combing of flax, the coals burned low, for then they are covered with ash, or the fuel used was straw, stubble, or the feces of a small animal, for then no coals will remain.
[In these instances, it is obvious that] the person has diverted his intention from this food. Hence, a decree was not [enacted forbidding food to be left on the fire] lest he stir the coals.", + "When does the above apply? With regard to a range13We have used a contemporary translation for the word kirah. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:3), the Rambam describes a kirah as \"a place built into the ground with openings for two pots. The fire is placed under both of them in a single place.\" whose heat is minimal. With regard to an oven,14Rabbenu Nissim states that the ovens of his time were constructed differently from those of the Talmudic era. Their heat is not as intense, and they are governed by the rules that apply to a range. This leniency is also accepted by the Ramah. Although the construction of ovens has changed further in contemporary times, most authorities continue to accept his ruling with regard to household ovens. (With regard to commercial ovens, there is a difference of opinion.) in contrast, even if one removed the coals,15The reasons why restrictions are mentioned even in such an instance are explained in the following halachah. covered them with ash, or used straw or stubble as fuel,16There are authorities (see Mishnah Berurah 253:22) who maintain that the Rambam would allow food to be left in an oven if it was fueled with straw and stubble and the fire was removed. Although the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 253:1) do not make such a distinction, the Mishnah Berurah explains that there is room for leniency. we are not allowed to leave food in it or on it. Similarly, one should not put food close to it.17The food may not be placed at any point where the heat is warm enough to scald a child's hand. In terms of modern measure, the Rabbis define this term as 107.8 degrees Farenheit.
[This applies to] food that was not cooked to completion or was completely cooked, but will benefit from continued cooking. Since [an oven] is very hot, a person will not divert his attention [from the fire]. Hence, we suspect that he will stir the small fire that remains, even if it is straw or stubble, or even if it is covered.", + "Why did [the Sages] forbid leaving food in the oven even if the fire was removed? Because a person can remove only the majority of the coals and their most intense [heat]. It is impossible to remove the entire fire so that not even a spark remains. Since [an oven's] heat is very warm, we suspect that he will stir [the fire] so that the sparks that remain in the oven will burn more.", + "A kopach18In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:3), the Rambam explains that a kopach is \"built over the fire with a place for one pot. Fire is placed below it.... The heat of a kopach is greater than that of a kirah, because in a kirah the fire is dispersed beneath two pots and there is a greater exposure to the air.\" is warmer than a range and not as warm as an oven. Therefore, if wood or gefet19The residue remaining after olives were pressed (ibid.). is used as fuel,20These materials are substantial and will supply heat over a lengthy period of time. it is considered equivalent to an oven, and we are not permitted to leave food within it, upon it, or next to it if it was not completely cooked, or even if it was completely cooked, but will benefit from continued cooking. This applies even if the fire was removed or covered with ash.
If straw or stubble was used as fuel,21These materials are not substantial and will be consumed by the flames in a short period. Hence, there is no need to suspect that the person will stir the flames. it is bound by the same rules as a range that was fueled with straw or stubble, and [food] may be left [cooking] on it. What is a range and what is a kopach? A range is a place with an opening for two pots. A kopach is a place with an opening for a single pot.22See also Hilchot Keilim 16:13, 17:4,6,7.", + "When food has not been cooked at all23Since the food has not been cooked at all, stirring the coals to intensify the fire will not bring much immediate benefit. By the following day, the food will cook sufficiently even without stirring. Hence, there is no need for safeguards (Rashi, Shabbat 18b). or has been cooked to completion, but will be impaired by further cooking,24In such a situation, the person will not desire to stir the coals to intensify the fire. it is permitted to leave it cooking whether on a range, a kopach, or an oven. Similarly, even when food has been cooked, but has not been cooked to completion, or when it has been cooked to completion, but will benefit from further cooking, it may be left on the fire if one placed an uncooked piece of meat25If, however, one places vegetables in the food that is cooking, this leniency does not apply. Meat takes a long time to cook, while vegetables cook quickly (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 253). See also the Kessef Mishneh. in it shortly before nightfall, for the whole dish is considered to be entirely uncooked. [This applies] although one has not removed or covered the coals, for he has diverted his attention [from this food] and will not stir the coals.", + "[The following rules apply] whenever a person left food [on a fire] in a situation where he was prohibited against doing so: If he transgressed and left [the food cooking intentionally],26The Rambam's ruling is based on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Shabbat 38a. Both the Ra'avad and the Tur (Orach Chayim 253) have different conceptions of that passage and hence raise objections. The Rambam's rulings are accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 253:1). The Ramah and the Ashkenazic authorities who follow prefer the Tur's interpretation, although as will be explained, in practice the differences between them concern only food that was not cooked to the point of completion before the commencement of the Sabbath. he is prohibited to eat it27The Merkevet HaMishneh notes that the Rambam's wording implies that only the person who left the food cooking is forbidden to eat it, but others are permitted. Rabbenu Asher, however, rules that the food is forbidden to be eaten by others as well. His view is accepted by the Magen Avraham 253:11 and the later authorities. until Saturday night, and must wait until enough time passes for it to have cooked.28The requirement to wait until the food could have cooked on Saturday night was instituted so that the person would derive no benefit from the forbidden act. Therefore, he will have no motivation to do so again. If he forgot [to remove it from the fire on Friday, greater leniency is allowed.] If the food was not completely cooked [before the commencement of the Sabbath], it is forbidden to eat it until Saturday night.29Shabbat (loc. cit.) states that normally there would be no reason to forbid this food from being eaten. It transpired, however, that many people were intentionally leaving food to cook, and if admonished would excuse themselves by claiming that they forgot. Accordingly, the Sages placed restrictions on those who forgot as well, forbidding them to partake of the food until Saturday night. (See the exception to this rule mentioned in the notes on Halachah 18.)
There is a question whether it is necessary to wait until the food has time to cook on Saturday night or not. From the Rambam's wording, it appears that this is unnecessary. Rabbenu Asher, however, rules that it is necessary to wait. His view is accepted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 253:12. (See the Mishnah Berurah 253:32.)
If it was completely cooked, but further cooking will benefit it,30Theoretically, according to Rabbenu Asher's interpretation of the passage in Shabbat cited above, such food should be prohibited until Saturday night. Nevertheless, Rabbenu Asher subscribes to the lenient view mentioned in note 9, which states that after food has been half- (or a third-) cooked, it may be left on a fire on the Sabbath even if it will benefit from continued cooking. Hence, in practice, he - and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities - do not differ with the Rambam on this point. it is permitted to be eaten immediately31Rav Kapach notes that this word is not included in the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The intent is also difficult to understand. on the Sabbath.", + "Whenever [food] is permitted to be left on a fire,32The Ra'avad questions the appropriateness of the Rambam's choice of the word \"permitted.\" The Maggid Mishneh states that this refers to foods that were totally uncooked, or foods into which an uncooked piece of meat was placed, as stated in Halachah 8. Although they are permitted to be left on a fire, once they are removed it is forbidden to return them. Surely this prohibition applies to foods that have not been cooked completely and, according to the Rambam, are forbidden to be left on a fire. Even the Ashkenazic authorities who allow such foods to be left on a fire, forbid their return if they were removed. if it was taken from [the fire] on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to return it to its place.33Returning food to a cooking surface causes it to cook, and cooking is one of the forbidden labors. Therefore, if the cooking process of a food has not been completed, it may not be returned to a cooking surface even when that surface is covered (Ramah, Orach Chayim 253:2). Even when the food has already been completely cooked, there is a Rabbinic prohibition against cooking it further, as the Rambam writes in Chapter 9, Halachah 3.
Other authorities (Rabbenu Nissim, Sefer HaMaor) mention that it is forbidden to return food to a cooking surface, because of the impression it might create. An observer might think that one is cooking. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 253:15 also mentions the possibility that one may stir the coals.
[Food[34The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 253:2) mentions that the food must still be boiling hot. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 253:18-19 and the Mishnah Berurah 253:54 allow leniency, provided the food has not become cooled totally.
The Magen Avraham 253:20 also mentions that the food may not be returned to a range if it has been transferred from the pot in which it was originally contained.
may be returned only to a range from which the coals have been removed or covered35In contemporary situations, placing a piece of metal (a blech) on a stove-top causes the fires to be considered as covered. In such a situation, food may be returned to the blech if:
a) originally, it was placed on the blech in a manner that was permitted;
b) it is completely cooked;
c) one did not divert one's attention from it.
or to a range or a kopach that was heated with straw or with stubble.36According to the Rambam, food is allowed to be returned in these instances because there is no possibility of the food cooking more. Hence, there is no reason to suspect that one will stir the coals. Others explain that the leniency was granted, because this is not the normal manner in which food is cooked. One is liable for the performance of a forbidden labor only when it is performed in an ordinary manner. Hence, in this instance, there is no reason for a Rabbinic decree.
(According to Rabbenu Nissim who maintains that returning food is forbidden because of the impression it creates, the reason for this leniency can be explained as follows: Since one may return the food only when one does not release it from one's hands, the probability that an observer will think that one is cooking is lower.)

[This leniency is granted] provided the food was not placed on the ground.37Based on Shabbat 38b, the Tur emphasizes that one must have removed the food from the range with the intent of returning it. Otherwise, it is considered as if one is placing on the fire anew. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam's view without mentioning this factor. The Ramah quotes the Tur's view. The Be'ur Halachah emphasizes, however, that there is room for leniency in this regard, even according to Ashkenazic authorities. If it was placed on the ground,38Many contemporary authorities allow one to return a pot to a covered range if one placed it on a table, provided one held the pot at all times. See Mishnah Berurah 253:56. it may not be returned even to a range whose coals were removed or covered. Similarly, [food] may not be returned to an oven39As mentioned in note 14, most contemporary authorities maintain that our household ovens are governed by the laws applying to ranges. or to a kopach that was heated with gefet or wood, despite the fact that one has removed or covered the coals, for they are very hot.
Whenever food should not be returned [to a cooking surface], it should also not be placed next to it40The Magen Avraham 253:5 states that this refers to placing - or returning - food near a source of heat on the Sabbath itself (Rabbi Akiva Eiger). One may, however, leave food near a source of heat on Friday so that it will remain warm on the Sabbath.
The Ramah [based on the Tur (Orach Chayim 253:5)] allows one to place food near a source of heat on the Sabbath as long as it was completely cooked previously.
[to warm].41This refers to a place which is יד סולדת בו (it is too hot to touch; alternatively, its heat could cause the food to become too hot to touch, see Shulchan Aruch HaRav 253:21 and the Kuntres Acharon).", + "It is forbidden to insert a ladle into a pot to remove [food] while it is on a fire on the Sabbath, because while doing so, one stirs it.42The Ra'avad protests against the Rambam's statements, for although stirring food is prohibited, here the person is merely removing food and he is not intentionally stirring. The Maggid Mishneh explains that if the food is not completely cooked, one is not allowed to stir the pot. Hence, removing food is forbidden. If, however, the food is completely cooked, there is no prohibition from the Torah in stirring it. Therefore, there is no Rabbinic prohibition against removing food.
In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo takes a much more stringent position. He accepts the Rambam's ruling without question. Furthermore, he adds that the same decision would apply even when the pot was removed from the fire as long as it is still boiling hot, and this is the ruling he states in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:18). The commentaries (see Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:30 and the Mishnah Berurah 318:117), however, state that as long as the food has been cooked completely and it has been removed from the fire, one may remove it with a ladle.
[Stirring] is one of the activities necessary for cooking,43For by stirring, one speeds the cooking process. See Chapter 9, Halachah 4 and notes. and thus one will be cooking on the Sabbath.
It is permissible to shift a pot from one range to another,44The Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 4:3, quotes Rabbi Yehoshua, \"When I attended Rabbi Chiyya, the great, I would take hot water from the lower storey and bring it to the upper storey and put it on the range.\" even when the heat of the first range is not as great as the heat of the second range. One may not, however, take food that was on a range and cover it to maintain its heat,45One may place food in objects (e.g., pillows or blankets) that preserve its heat for the Sabbath before the Sabbath, but not on the Sabbath itself (Chapter 4, Halachah 3). In the instance at hand, even though the food was being heated on the Sabbath, covering it to preserve its heat is forbidden.
This applies only when one covers the food entirely. If one leaves the top of the pot uncovered, one may cover the bottom to preserve its heat.
or take food that was covered to maintain its heat and place it on a range.46Even when the food is boiling hot, it is forbidden to put it on a source of heat on the Sabbath.", + "A person should not fill a pot with peas or beans or a jug with water and place them in an oven on Friday before nightfall and leave them [to cook]. Even when the above and other foods like them were not cooked at all, they are considered to be food that was not completely cooked, because they do not require a substantial [amount of time to] cook.47According to the Rambam, the principles mentioned in Law 8 do not apply here, because these entities are different. That halachah pertains to foods that require substantial time to cook - hence, the person cooking will divert his attention and not stir the coals. In contrast, the entities mentioned in this halachah do not require substantial time to cook, and there is the possibility that one will stir the coals.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:8) quotes the Rambam's words almost verbatim, and this interpretation is accepted by the later authorities. Nevertheless, Rashi (Shabbat 18b) and many authorities differ in their interpretation of this passage, noting that Beitzah 25b states that these beans must be cooked seven times before they are prepared to eat.
See also the Bayit Chadash (Orach Chayim 254), which juxtaposes the Rambam's position with Rashi's, explaining that the Rambam is talking about an instance when the beans have already been cooked six times. Hence, only a slight amount of further cooking is necessary. Rav Kapach substantiates this interpretation, explaining that beans with a similar name are still eaten in Yemen today. After having been cooked several times, these beans cook very fast.
Therefore, the person will continue to pay attention to them, for he intends to partake of them immediately. Accordingly, it is forbidden to leave them in an oven [unless they are completely cooked].48As mentioned above, according to Ashkenazic authorities, it is sufficient that they be half (or a third) cooked.
If one transgressed and left them in an oven, it is forbidden to partake of them until Saturday night. [Even then,] one must also wait the amount of time necessary for them to cook.", + "[The following rules apply when] meat was placed in an oven before nightfall and left [to roast49Previously, the Rambam had been speaking of meat that was cooked in a pot or roasted in a pan. This halachah describes meat roasted in an oven over a fire, which cooks faster. Hence, there is reason to suspect that one would stir the coals (Maggid Mishneh).] on the Sabbath: If the meat is from a kid or it is other [tender] flesh,50Needless to say this leniency applies to fowl. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 254:1.) it is permitted. [Such meat] requires only the warmth of the fire itself, and if one stirs the coals the meat will char. If the meat is from a goat or an ox, it is forbidden, lest he stir the coals to cause it to cook [faster].51The ovens of the Talmudic period opened on top. At times, the opening was sealed closed to allow for faster and more effective cooking. According to the Rambam (and the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.), the above clauses of the halachah deal with meat that is roasted with the oven open. Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Shabbat 18b) interprets these laws as applying when the oven is closed, but not sealed. According to his view, if the oven is open, there is always reason to suspect that one will stir the coals. The Tur and the Ramah follow this interpretation.
If, however, one sealed the opening of the oven closed with clay, [roasting even the latter meats] is permitted, for if one opens the oven to stir [the coals], the wind will enter and cause the meat to harden and spoil. The oven will cool [suddenly] and the meat will spoil.52The latter phrase is lacking in the authoritative Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah and appears redundant.
Because opening the oven will cause the meat to spoil, we do not suspect that one will do so to stir the coals.
", + "Similarly, whenever something would be spoiled by the wind, we do not decree [against its being heated], because someone might open [the oven] and stir [coals]. For this reason, we may place strands of flax into an oven [to bleach] before nightfall, for if one opens the oven, they will spoil.53As mentioned in Halachah 2, this law follows the principles of the School of Hillel. In this halachah, the Rambam is clarifying that in contrast to food which is being cooked for the Sabbath, there is no need for a Rabbinic prohibition either.", + "If one placed an entire kid54When the body of an animal or fowl is intact, the meat is not exposed to the heat of the fire on both sides. Therefore, its cooking process is slower, and there is reason to suspect that one will stir the coals.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 254:1) states that the entire body of the animal need not be intact. This law applies even when the head and the internal organs are removed, provided its rib cage remains intact.
into an oven, [the situation] is governed by the laws applying to meat from a goat or an ox, and it is forbidden, lest one stir the coals, unless one seals the oven [closed].
[If the fourteenth of Nisan falls on Friday,] it is, however, permitted to hang the Paschal lamb into an oven directly before nightfall,55The Paschal sacrifice is a lamb which must be roasted totally intact. Since this sacrifice could be offered only after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, and many thousands of lambs were brought, when that date fell on Friday it is possible that a company would not have time to have their sacrifice roasted before nightfall. Nevertheless, since the sacrifice must be eaten by an entire company, we assume that all the members of the company will remind each other. Hence, there is no need for a safeguard (see Rashi, Shabbat 19b). even though it is not sealed closed. The members of the company [gathered to eat the sacrifice] are careful.", + "Meat,56This applies to all meat, even that of a kid or fowl. onions, or eggs should not be roasted over an [open] fire,57In contrast to the previous two halachot, this halachah speaks of roasting food over an open fire and not within an oven. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:2) explains that in such an instance, a person is primarily concerned that the food cook rapidly and does not care that some becomes charred. unless they can be roasted before nightfall to the point where they are fit to be eaten.58This does not mean completely cooked but rather cooked כמאכל בן דרוסאי - \"as the food of ben D'rosai.\" Ben D'rosai was a notorious criminal who was constantly being chased and would eat his food before it had been completely cooked in his haste to avoid detection. As mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 5, according to the Rambam it must be half-cooked on both sides. According to Rashi, it is sufficient that it is one-third cooked.
Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil questions why the Rambam differentiates between roasting - where he allows food that is partially cooked to continue cooking - and cooking in a pot - where he requires the food to be completely cooked and that further cooking will not benefit it. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) explains that cooking in a pot requires more time and there is a greater possibility that one will stir the coals. See also the Merkevet HaMishneh.
[If they are roasted to this extent before the commencement of the Sabbath], it is permissible to leave them on the fire on the Sabbath to be roasted further.
[The rationale is] that [increased heat] will impair their taste. Since they are being cooked over a fire, if one stirs [the coals] they will char.
For this reason, we are allowed to leave incense under clothes before nightfall [to perfume them]. For if one stirs the coals, the incense will burn and the clothes will be [damaged by] the smoke.", + "From the above, we can conclude that all the prohibitions mentioned in this context were not enacted because [the cooking] was completed on the Sabbath.59With this statement, the Rambam refers to the principles he had mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. There it was explained that the halachah follows the School of Hillel, which allows us to benefit from forbidden labors that are completed on the Sabbath on their own accord. Nevertheless, there are certain restrictions instituted against leaving food to cook, lest one stir the coals, as explained. Instead, they are Rabbinic decrees [enacted] lest one stir the coals. Accordingly, wool should not be placed into a vat [to dye] unless it was removed from the fire, lest one stir the coals. Similarly, the vat should be sealed close with clay, lest one stir [the dye] after nightfall.", + "We should not place bread in an oven [directly] before nightfall, nor should we place a cake on coals unless [there is time] for the surface attached to the oven or [the side of the cake60The bracketed additions are made on the basis of the interpretation of the Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim, 254.] facing the fire to crust.61In the Talmudic period, bread was baked by attaching a loaf to the side of the oven. This surface would crust first. Nevertheless, this is sufficient for the bread to be considered to be baked before the commencement of the Sabbath.
It must be emphasized that this ruling represents a reversal of opinion for the Rambam. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:10, he rules that the outer surface must crust before the Sabbath. (The latter ruling also conforms to his thesis regarding cooked food: that it must be completely cooked before the commencement of the Sabbath.) It must be emphasized that the version of this halachah found in the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah are in accordance with the ruling in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:5) follows the more lenient ruling.
[Should this be done,] it is permissible to leave it to continue baking afterwards, for if one stirs [the coals], one will spoil the bread.62I.e., cause it to burn.
[The following rules apply when one places bread in an oven] before nightfall and there is not sufficient time for its surface to crust before nightfall. If one did so with a deliberate intent to violate [the above ruling], it is forbidden to partake of the bread until Saturday night, after sufficient time for it to bake has passed.63This resembles the ruling of Halachah 9 regarding food that was left to cook over a fire.If one did so unknowingly, it is permitted to remove bread64Not only is the person who baked the bread allowed to remove it himself, he may invite others to remove bread as well, as stated in Chapter 22, Halachah 1. for the three Sabbath meals.65Here the ruling is far more lenient than the ruling in Halachah 9 regarding food. The commentaries (Rabbenu Nissim, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 254:8 and the Mishnah Berurah 254:33) explain that the fundamental element of all meals is bread, and if the person does not have bread he will not be able to fulfill the mitzvah of eating three Sabbath meals. From this, one can postulate that if a person has no food other than that which has been left on a fire on the Sabbath, he is allowed to partake of that food so that he will not be required to fast on the Sabbath. When one removes the bread, one should not remove it using a baker's peel as one does during the week.66Since the removal of bread is forbidden, it should be done in an abnormal manner. The commentaries question whether one is required to remove the bread in an abnormal manner only when it was placed in the oven later than the desired time, or whether this is necessary even when the bread was permitted to be left baking.
From the Maggid Mishneh's notes on Chapter 5, Halachah 19, and from the simple interpretation of Chapter 22, Halachah 1, it would appear that one is always required to remove the bread in an abnormal manner. Nevertheless, Rabbenu Nissim maintains that this stringency applies only when one placed the bread in the oven after the desired time. If one placed the bread inside earlier, there is no necessity to deviate from one's ordinary practice. The Mishnah Berurah 254:36 accepts this ruling when there is no way that one can remove the bread in an abnormal way.
It must be emphasized that the above discussion applies only to the ovens of the Talmudic period. At present, our ovens are constructed in a different manner, and the loaves of bread are not stuck to the sides of the oven. Accordingly, any bread that is required for the Sabbath itself can be removed in an ordinary manner. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 254:9 and the Mishnah Berurah 254:42-43.)
Instead, one should use a knife or other similar utensil.", + "A person may make a fire from any substance he desires,67As is mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachot 5-8, there are certain substances that may not be used as wicks or fuel for a candle on the Sabbath. These restrictions apply only with regard to a candle, for it is a single light. (See Chapter 5, Halachah 7.) In contrast, greater leniency can be shown with regard to a fire. (See Rashi, Shabbat 21a and the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 255:1.) regardless of whether] he kindles it on the ground or in a torch holder. When he lights it before nightfall, he may use its light, or warm himself from it on the Sabbath.68See the Turei Zahav 275:6, which states that even in such a situation, one should not sit very close to the fire, lest one tend to it.
He must, however, kindle the majority of the fire before nightfall to the extent that the flame rises up on its own accord.69I.e., without the assistance of other fuels, blowing with a bellows, or kindling wood (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:11). If he did not kindle the majority of the fire, it is forbidden for him to benefit from it on the Sabbath, lest he stir or move the wood so the flame rises up.70This prohibition continues to apply even if the fire catches afterwards to the extent that there is no need to worry that a person will stir the coals. Since it was lit in a forbidden manner, one is forbidden to benefit from it (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 255:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 255:5). If he [desires to] burn a single piece of wood, he must kindle the majority of its thickness and the majority of its circumference before nightfall.", + "When does the above apply? Outside the Temple premises; but in the Temple, it is permissible to light a fire in the Chamber of the Hearth71The Chamber of the Hearth was a large structure at one of the side entrances to the Temple Courtyard where the priests would sleep at night. (See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 5:10-11.) directly before nightfall.72Even if there is not sufficient time for the fire to catch thoroughly. We do not suspect that anyone will stir the coals, for the priests are careful.73We do not suspect that they will stir the coals. See Halachah 15.", + "If a fire was made of reeds or of seeds, it is not necessary for the majority of it to be kindled before the Sabbath. Instead, since it caught fire before [the commencement] of the Sabbath, its use is permitted, for the fire will spread quickly through [these substances], and there is no necessity for one to stir it.
Therefore, if the reeds were bound together or the seeds were placed in palm baskets, the same laws applying to wood apply, and the flames must be powerful enough to rise up on their own accord before [the commencement] of the Sabbath.74The Rambam's rulings follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Shabbat 20a. Rabbenu Asher and the Tur (Orach Chayim 255) reverse the two decisions.", + "When a fire is fueled with tar, sulfur, oily substances, wax, straw, or stubble, it is not required that the majority be kindled before the commencement of the Sabbath, because these substances catch fire quickly.75Hence, there is no reason to suspect that one will stir the fire." + ], + [ + "There are substances which, if food is covered with them to preserve its heat,1The Rambam (following the order of the Mishnah, Shabbat, Chapters 3 and 4) continues to explain the possibilities for serving hot food on the Sabbath. In the previous chapter, he spoke about leaving food in an oven or on a range. In this chapter, he describes the possibilities of insulating food with other substances to preserve its heat. Among the other reasons for mentioning these laws in this place is that the activities mentioned must be performed before the commencement of the Sabbath. will raise its temperature and contribute to its being cooked as fire does2The Rambam explains the rationale for this prohibition in the following halachah. - e.g., gefet, manure, salt, lime, sand; nor may we use grape skins, unprocessed wool,3Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 4:1). Rashi (Shabbat 47b) offers a more inclusive interpretation. or grass4The Mishnah (Shabbat 4:1) also mentions hay. The Rambam omits it, probably on the basis of the Jerusalem Talmud, which maintains that this substance will not increase a food's temperature. [for this purpose] when they are damp, even5The word \"even\" has raised many problems, for it implies that these substances will generate more heat when they are moistened from an outside source than when their dampness is a result of their natural moisture. Rashi (Shabbat m49a) states the converse, and this appears to be the opinion of other authorities.
Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam does not mention the word \"even.\" Similarly, his grandson, Rav Yitzchak HaNagid, writes in a responsum that the inclusion of this word in some manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah was a scribal error.
when this is due to their natural moistness. These entities are referred to as substances that increase heat.
There are substances which, if food is covered with them to preserve its heat, will [accomplish that objective alone]. They will not contribute to the cooking process, but will merely prevent [the food] from cooling - e.g., grape skins, unprocessed fabrics, grass, when these are dry, garments, produce,6Rashi (loc. cit.) explains that this refers to grains - e.g., kernels of wheat, barley, and the like. Larger produce would not be an effective insulating agent. pigeon feathers, thin chips from the combing of flax, carpenters' sawdust, pelts, and the shearings of wool. These entities are referred to as substances which preserve heat.7The Rambam describes the laws pertaining to these substances in Halachot three and four.", + "[The Torah's definition of the Sabbath] laws would allow one to cover food with substances that raise its temperature before nightfall, and thus the food would be covered and its heat preserved on the Sabbath, for it is permitted to leave food cooking on a fire on the Sabbath.
The Sages, however, enacted a decree forbidding covering food with substances that raise its temperature before nightfall,8The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 257:1) states that if one violates this prohibition and covers food with these substances, it is forbidden to partake of the food until Saturday night. The Ramah, however, permits the food to be eaten on the Sabbath if one covered it without knowing of the prohibition. lest the pot boil on the Sabbath and it be necessary to uncover it until its boiling ceases. If one would then cover it again on the Sabbath, one would be covering food with a substance that increases its heat on the Sabbath, and this is forbidden.9In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 4:1), the Rambam explains that covering the food with these substances does not violate the prohibition against cooking. The prohibition against cooking involves only cooking with fire and heat that results from fire (see Chapter 9, Halachah 2), but not cooking substances with other sources of heat.
The Rabbis, nevertheless, forbade such an act, because it resembles cooking. Furthermore, as a safeguard to insure that this prohibition is not violated, the Sages also forbade covering food before the commencement of the Sabbath with substances that increase its heat.
The Rambam's interpretation is based on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version of Shabbat 34a,b. The Ra'avad, Rashi, Tosafot, and many others follow a different version of that passage, which explains that the reason it was forbidden to cover food with these substances is a safeguard against a person covering food with a mixture of ash and coals. (See the following halachah.) This view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 257:1).

Accordingly, it is permitted to cover food with substances that increase its temperature beyn hash'mashot,10The time between sunset and the appearance of three stars. The status of this time is a question of doubt: is it considered part of the day or the night? (See Chapter 5, Halachah 4.)
The Maggid Mishneh finds this law one of the more difficult aspects of the Rambam's explanation of this halachah, for there is no other instance where the laws that apply beyn hash'mashot are more lenient than those that apply before sunset.
since at that time most pots have already boiled, and they [have cooled, so that] they cease boiling. Since they have already ceased boiling, it is unlikely that they will boil again.", + "Similarly, [the Torah's definition of the Sabbath] laws would allow one to cover food with substances that do not raise its temperature on the Sabbath itself. The Sages, however, enacted a decree forbidding this, lest a person cover food with a mixture of ash and coals that has sparks of fire, and stir the coals.11As mentioned in note 9, the Rambam's interpretation is based on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version of Shabbat 34a,b, while other authorities have a different version of that passage. According to those authorities, there is no comparison between these substances, which do not raise the temperature of food, and a mixture of ash and coals. Nevertheless, our Sages forbade covering food with such substances to preserve its temperature on the Sabbath, because they suspected that a person may find the food he desires to cover cold, and put it on the fire to warm.
(It must be noted that according to the Rambam's interpretation, a mixture of ash and coals is considered somewhat analogous to substances that do not raise the temperature of food. The Maggid Mishneh considers this one of the major difficulties with the Rambam's interpretation. Rav Kapach justifies the Rambam's position with a reference to Beitzah 8a, which appears to indicate that such a mixture is not hot.)
[As a safeguard against this,12In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 4:1), the Rambam notes that this explanation appears to contradict one of the principles of Rabbinic law. Our Sages taught (Shabbat 11b), אין גוזרין גזירה לגזירה, \"We do not enact a decree to safeguard the observance of a decree that is itself a safeguard.\" The prohibition against covering the food with a mixture of ash and coals is itself a Rabbinic decree enacted lest one stir the coals. To uphold this decree, the Sages forbade covering food even with substances that will not increase its temperature.
In resolution of this difficulty, the Rambam implies that the principle mentioned above applies only when the two decrees are enacted in different times. When the two decrees are enacted simultaneously, there is no such difficulty (see Beitzah 3a). Since the Rabbis appreciated that the first element of the decree depends on the second, they enacted two safeguards at the same time.
the Sages] forbade covering food with any substance13In this instance, the Mishnah Berurah 257:8 states that if a person covered a food with these substances on the Sabbath, he may partake of them on the Sabbath. on the Sabbath, even when it will not raise the food's temperature.", + "If one is unsure whether it is before or after nightfall,14The Rambam is using the wording of the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:7). In his Commentary on the Mishnah, he explains that this refers to the period known as beyn hash'mashot. Since the prohibition against covering food is only a safeguard for a Rabbinic prohibition, it does not apply at this time. one may cover hot food.15According to the Rambam, this applies regardless of whether one uses a substance that will merely preserve the food's heat or a substance that will increase its heat. According to the other authorities (whose opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 257:1), the leniency applies only to substances that merely preserve heat. Similarly, it is permitted to cover cold food with a substance that will not raise its temperature, to prevent it from becoming colder or to remove its chill.
When hot food that was covered before the Sabbath becomes uncovered16The use of the passive voice by the Rambam (and by the Mishnah, Shabbat 4:2, his source) should not be interpreted to mean that this leniency is granted only when the food is uncovered accidentally. On the contrary, a person may recover the food even if he intentionally uncovered it, for example, he uncovered it to serve a portion (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 257:8 and the Mishnah Berurah 257:25). on the Sabbath,17If, however, the food became uncovered before the Sabbath, it is forbidden to cover it again on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 257:8 and the Mishnah Berurah 257:25). it may be covered again, since one is not increasing its temperature. It is permitted to change the covering of food on the Sabbath - e.g., one may replace clothing with pigeon feathers or replace pigeon feathers with clothing.18I.e., regardless of whether the second covering is more or less effective than the first, it is permitted to exchange them. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 257:4), which states that a more effective covering may be placed on food only when it has been thoroughly cooked. If the food is still in need of further cooking, this is forbidden.", + "Should one transfer hot food or water from the vessel [in which it was cooked]19The vessel in which an object is cooked is referred to as a כלי ראשון, \"a primary vessel.\" This term is relevant to the discussion of the Sabbath laws and the laws of Kashrut. into another vessel, it is permitted to cover the second vessel with a substance that does not raise its temperature on the Sabbath, as one is permitted to cover cold food.20Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 257:9 and the Mishnah Berurah 257:28, which state that this leniency applies even when the food is still scalding hot. They also state that if the food has cooled totally, it may be covered so that it does not chill even when it has not been removed from the pot in which it was cooked. The prohibition against covering [food] on the Sabbath applies only to hot food in the vessel in which it was cooked. If it was transferred, it is permitted.21The transfer of the food to a different pot cools it. Accordingly, the Sages did not consider it necessary to enact a decree as a safeguard to prevent a person from heating the pot in such a circumstance (Shabbat 51a).", + "One may place one metal pot on another metal pot, an earthenware pot on another earthenware pot,22Our translation is based on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh. an earthenware pot on a metal pot, and a metal pot on an earthenware pot, and one may seal [either an earthenware pot or a metal pot] closed with dough - one's intent being not that they should be heated more, but that their heat should be preserved.23The Mishnah Berurah 318:51 extends the scope of this leniency, stating that it applies even when one pot is covered with insulated substances to preserve its heat. The other pot may be placed on the pot and under the substances. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:14, however, forbids such an act, since by doing so, a person will be insulating food on the Sabbath and that is forbidden.
The [Sages] forbade only covering [food] with other substances on the Sabbath. It is, however, permissible to place one vessel on another vessel so that they remain hot.24Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7-8), which questions whether this leniency applies when the lower pot is cooking on a fire or not. One opinion maintains that if the food in the upper pot has been thoroughly cooked, there is no prohibition in placing it on a pot that is cooking on the fire. Since only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved and this does not resemble the normal manner of cooking, there is no reason for stringency. Another opinion maintains that placing food on such a pot is like placing it on the fire itself and is forbidden. The Shulchan Aruch favors the more lenient opinion, as do the later authorities. In contrast, we may not place a vessel containing a cold substance on a hot vessel on the Sabbath, for by doing so one introduces heat to it.25The Shulchan Aruch (loc cit.:6) explains when this prohibition applies: If the food can become hot enough to scald a child's hand, it may not be left on the other vessel. It is permissible, however, to place [cold food on a hot pot] before the Sabbath commences.26See the Beit Yosef (loc. cit. 258) which explains that one is not permitted to leave food that is covered with insulating materials on a fire even if this is done before the Sabbath. It is not considered analogous to covering food with a substance that raises its temperature.27The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 257:8) which differentiates between this law and the other laws mentioned in this chapter, explaining that the prohibition against covering food with substances that insulate it and preserve its temperature applies only when the substances cover the food entirely without leaving a portion of the food exposed." + ], + [ + "The kindling of a Sabbath lamp1Although the Rambam discusses the mitzvah of delighting in the Sabbath in Chapter 30, he mentions the kindling of the Sabbath lights in a separate chapter, for they require extensive discussion. He also positions this chapter relatively early in this set of Halachot, for the Sabbath candles are kindled before the Sabbath and bring the Sabbath into our homes. This also follows the pattern of the Mishnah which discusses the kindling of the Sabbath lamps in the first two chapters of the tractate. is not a matter left to our volition - i.e., [it is not a matter about which,] if one desires, one may kindle it, but if one does not desire, one need not. Nor is it a mitzvah that we are not obligated to pursue2See Hilchot Berachot 11:2; the Rambam differentiates between mitzvot that are obligations that a person must endeavor to fulfill, mentioning tefillin which is a daily obligation and sukkah and lulav which are obligations that are incumbent on us at a certain time each year, and mitzvot \"that are not obligations, but resemble voluntary activities.\"
In the latter category, he includes mitzvot that we are obligated to fulfill only when we put ourselves in a situation that require it - e.g., the mitzvah of mezuzah. A person is not required to live in a house that requires a mezuzah. If, however, he chooses to do so, he must fulfill that mitzvah.
Similarly, with regard to the mitzvot mentioned by Rambam in this halachah: There is no necessity to eat bread or other foods that require washing our hands, nor is it necessary to carry in a courtyard (or perform any of the other activities that require an eruv).
(Kinat Eliyahu comments that the Rambam chose the washing of the hands and eruv as examples in this halachah, because they - like the kindling of the Sabbath candles - are Rabbinic commandments.
See also Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 3:10 which mentions another dimension of the obligatory nature of this mitzvah.)
- e.g., making an eruv for a courtyard or washing one's hands before eating. Instead, it is an obligation.3Note the Maggid Mesharim, which states that there is another dimension to lighting Sabbath candles. The Karaites did not accept the Oral Law including the Sages' explanation that one could leave a light burning on the Sabbath and by kindling Sabbath lights, one made a statement countering their doctrine. Since the Rambam also strove against these heretics, one may assume that part of his emphasis on the obligatory nature of this mitzvah is directed toward them.
Both men and women are obligated to have a lamp lit in their homes on the Sabbath.4See Halachah 3. Even if a person does not have food to eat, he should beg from door to door and purchase oil to kindle a lamp,5In Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 7:7 (based on Pesachim 10:1), the Rambam states that even a person who derives his income from charity should not drink less than four cups of wine on Pesach, we can conclude that the same concept applies with regard to the Sabbath lights. Indeed, as the Rambam explains in the conclusion of Hilchot Chanukah, the Sabbath lights receives priority over the recitation of Kiddush. See also Megillah 27b which mentions selling or pawning one's clothes to perform a mitzvah. for this is included in [the mitzvah of] delighting in the Sabbath.6See Chapter 30, Halachah 5, which explains that kindling a Sabbath lamp is an expression of honor for the Sabbath. See also the conclusion of Hilchot Chanukah which explains that the Sabbath lamps bring about peace in the home, safeguarding the inhabitants from \"stumbling over wood and stones.\"
One is obligated to recite a blessing before kindling7Significantly, this blessing is not mentioned in the Talmud and even in Rav Sa'adiah Gaon's time was not a universally accepted practice. In the Rambam's time, however, it had been adopted already throughout the international Jewish community. [the Sabbath lamp], as one does before fulfilling any of the obligations incumbent upon us by virtue of Rabbinic decree.8See the Introduction to Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 1) and Hilchot Berachot 11:3, where the question is raised: How can we say that God has commanded us to perform these mitzvot, which are of Rabbinic origin? Seemingly, they were instituted by men.
The Rambam answers that since God commanded us to obey the decrees of the Sages, observing the mitzvot that they ordained is fulfilling His command.
[The blessing is:] Blessed are You, God, our Lord who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to light the Sabbath lamp.", + "It is permissible to make use of [the light of] a Sabbath lamp,9In contrast to the Chanukah candles, whose light we may not use (Hilchot Chanukah 4:6,8), we are permitted to use the light of the Sabbath candles. Indeed, Shabbat 23b associates the Sabbath candles with peace in the home, explaining that they prevent the members of the household from stumbling over obstacles, and also allow them to avoid the discomfort of sitting in darkness. provided that the matter does not require careful scrutiny.10See Halachot 14-16. If, however, a matter requires one to look precisely, it is forbidden to use the Sabbath lamp to inspect it, lest one tilt [the lamp].11Were one to tilt the lamp for it to burn brighter, one would be liable for the forbidden labor of kindling a fire.", + "The person who lights the Sabbath lamp should light it while it is still day, before sunset.12The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not mention the obligation to add from the weekday to the Sabbath. Note the Maggid Mishneh (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor, ch. 1) which states that although the Rambam maintains that we are obligated to make such an addition on Yom Kippur, he does not require such an addition to be made on the Sabbath. The wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 261:2) indicates that it does not consider the obligation to much such an addition on the Sabbath as an absolute requirement. Nevertheless, the later Ashkenazic authorities consider it as such.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) also mentions that it is customary to light candles before sunset when the sun is seen in the treetops.

Women have a greater obligation in this regard than men,13Bereshit Rabbah, ch. 17, associates the woman's responsibility to light the Sabbath lamp with the fact that, through the sin of the Tree of Knowledge, Chavah, the first woman, extinguished the light of the world. Shabbat 32a associates the lighting of the Sabbath candles with the woman's responsibility to insure the shining of (Proverbs 20:27 \"the lamp of G‑d, the soul of man.\" for they are normally at home and are involved in the household tasks. Nevertheless, a man should alert them concerning this matter and check that they have done so. He should tell14Shabbat 34a emphasizes that this statement should be made gently. The Rambam does not mention this point explicitly, for in Hilchot Ishut 15:19, when he describes the nature of the husband and wife relationship, he stresses how a husband must relate to his wife with tender care at all times. the members of his household on the Sabbath eve before nightfall, \"Kindle the lamp.\"
If there is a question whether night has fallen and the Sabbath has commenced or whether the Sabbath has not commenced,15In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:6), the Rambam interprets this as referring to beyn hash'mashot as described in the following halachah. the lamp should not be kindled.", + "The time from sunset until the appearance of three middle-sized stars is universally referred to as beyn hash'mashot.16There are three basic positions regarding the duration of beyn hash'mashot. Shabbat 34b relates that it refers to the time that it takes one to walk 3/4 of a mil after sunset. The other two positions are found in Pesachim 94a. One defines beyn hash'mashot as the amount of time needed to walk four mil after sunset, and the other, as the time necessary to walk five mil.
There are two different opinions concerning the duration of the time it takes to walk a mil. The Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 3:2), maintains that it takes 24 minutes to walk a mil. However, the most widely held opinion - and the opinion accepted regarding halachah l'ma'aseh, is that it takes 18 minutes to walk this distance.
The Rambam as well as many other Rishonim base their determination of beyn hash'mashot on Shabbat 34b. Thus in practice, the appearance of the stars is determined as 13 1/2 (3/4 x 18) minutes after sunset. Both the Vilna Gaon and Shulchan Aruch HaRav maintain that this is the duration of beyn hash'mashot. Thus, the proper local time may be calculated by extrapolation based on the amount of light visible 13 1/2 minutes after sunset in Eretz Yisrael on the day of the equinox. Generally, people wait up to 36 minutes after sunset on Saturday night in order to be certain.
According to Pesachim 94a, the appearance of the stars will be either 72 (4 x 18) minutes or 90 (5 x 18) minutes after sunset. Rabbenu Tam strongly suggests adhering to the position that צאת הכוכבים takes place 72 minutes after sunset. Though some authorities support the 90-minute position, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim, Vol. 1, Responsum 24), mentions only the position of the Vilna Gaon and Shulchan Aruch HaRav, on the one hand, and Rabbenu Tam on the other.
There is a doubt whether this time is considered as part of the day or as part of the night. [Accordingly,] it is accepted to rule stringently concerning [this time] in all places.17I.e., we are prohibited against performing forbidden labors during this time on both Friday and Saturday nights. Therefore, one should not kindle [a lamp at this time]. A person who performs a [forbidden] labor beyn hash'mashot [both] on the Sabbath eve and on Saturday night is required to bring a sin offering.18Had the person performed a forbidden labor during beyn hash'mashot on either Friday or Saturday, he would not be liable for a sin offering, since we are unsure whether beyn hash'mashot is day or night. If, however, he performed a forbidden labor at the same time beyn hash'mashot on both Friday and Saturday, he is surely liable, for at one of the two times, he performed a forbidden labor on the Sabbath day (Shabbat 35b).
The stars mentioned are not large stars that can be seen during the day or small stars that are seen only at night, but of moderate size. When such three medium-sized stars are seen, it is surely night.", + "The wick used for the Sabbath lights should not be made from a substance that causes the light to flicker - e.g., wool, goat's hair, silk, cedar fiber, uncarded flax, palm bast, various types of soft trees,19The definition of the last five substances is dependent on the Rambam's interpretation of the mishnah, Shabbat 2:1. See his Commentary on the Mishnah. and the like. Instead, [we should use] a substance that burns steadily - e.g., carded flax, [remnants of] linen clothes, cotton,20Although Rashi, Shabbat 27b, excludes cotton, the Rambam's view is accepted by most authorities including the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 264:1).
Note the gloss of the Ramah (loc. cit.) which states that if a person used any of these substances for a wick he is forbidden to benefit from the light, lest he tilt it to cause it to burn brighter. He does, however, also mention the possibility of leniency in certain instances.
and the like.
The person kindling [the lamp] should make sure that the fire has caught on the major portion of the wick that emerges [from the lamp].", + "[The following rules apply when] one winds a substance that one may use as a wick around a substance that one should not use as a wick: If one's intent was to make the wick thicker and thus increase its light, it is forbidden.21Rabbenu Asher in his gloss to Shabbat 21a explains that this was prohibited lest this leniency cause one to think that one may light a Shabbos lamp with the forbidden substances alone at a later date. If one's intent was to make the wick firmer so that it will stand erect and not hang downward, it is permitted.22Shabbat 21a relates that in Rabban Gamliel's household a wick was wound around a portion of a nut shell.", + "One may place a grain of salt23Rashi, Shabbat 67b, explains that this makes the oil burn brighter. or a bean24The Tosefta, Shabbat 2:6, explains that this will cause the wick to burn slower. at the opening of a lamp on Friday so that it will burn [better] on the Sabbath.
All [the substances] that may not be used as wicks on the Sabbath may be used in a large fire [that was kindled] either for warmth or for the purpose of light whether the fire is within a holder or on the ground. The prohibition against using them applies solely in regard to their use as wicks for a candle.25These substances were prohibited to be used as wicks lest one tilt the candle to produce a better light. When they are being used in a larger fire, the quantity of fuel will produce a steady light and there is no reason to suspect that one might tilt the fire. See Chapter 3, Halachah 19.", + "The fuel26We have used a non-literal translation for the Hebrew שמן, which literally means \"oil,\" since some of the substances mentioned in this halachah are not oils. used for kindling a Sabbath lamp must be drawn after the wick. Fuels that are not drawn after the wick may not be used. [These include] [molten] tar, [molten]27The word \"molten\" was added in both these instances on the basis of Shabbat 20b which notes that candles made of beeswax are acceptable. Rabbenu Asher states that the same principle applies regarding tar. The prohibition against using them applies only when they are molten and used as fuel for a lamp in the place of oil. beeswax, gourd oil,28In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:1, based on one of the opinion's in Shabbat 21a), the Rambam identifies kik oil with the kikayon plant mentioned in the Book of Yonah. [fat from a] sheep's tail, or tallow.
Why may we not kindle with wicks that do not catch the fire well and with fuels that are not drawn after the wick? This is a decree [enacted] lest29Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions a different reason, lest one be dissatisfied with the light and leave the room where it is burning. the light of the candle be dim and one tilt it in order to carry out an activity by its light.", + "One may use tallow or fish entrails that have been boiled [as fuel for a Sabbath lamp] provided that one mixes a minimal amount of oil with them.30Shabbat 21a explains that these two fuels are fit to use for a Sabbath light when they are in a liquid state. Nevertheless, the Sages forbid their use lest one use them as fuel when they were solid. Accordingly, when another fuel is mixed together with them, there is no necessity for a further safeguard.
Rav Kapach explains the reason for the Sages' decree as follows: Although tallow and fish entrails are acceptable as fuels when they are in a liquid state, the possibility exists that they will harden as the lamp is burning. Hence, it is prohibited to use them alone. In contrast, when other fuels are mixed with these substances, they prevent them from hardening and therefore, such a mixture may be used for the Sabbath lights.
[Other] fuels that may not be used [as fuel for a Sabbath lamp] may not be used even when they are mixed with fuels that may be used, since they are not drawn [after the wick].31The Rambam implies that even when these fuels are mixed with acceptable fuels they do not burn well. In contrast, Rashi, Shabbat 21a explains that when they were mixed with other fuels, they would burn well, the Sages, however, forbid the use of such mixtures, lest one use the unacceptable fuels alone.", + "We may not use pine sap32Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's version of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:2). A similar interpretation is attributed to Rav Sa'adiah Gaon. as fuel [for the Sabbath lamp], because it produces an unpleasant fragrance, lest one leave [the room] and [on the Sabbath,] there is an obligation to sit [in a room] illuminated by the light of a lamp.
Similarly, we may not use balsam oil, because it is very fragrant and it is possible that one will take some of the oil in the lamp [for use as perfume].33Removing fuel from a lamp is forbidden, for by doing, one causes the lamp to be extinguished sooner. This is included in the forbidden labor of extinguishing [Rav Kapach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:2,4); see also Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 264:3 and Beitzah 22a].
[Significantly, as Rav Kapach comments in his notes, the Rambam changed his mind concerning this matter several times (and thus there is a discrepancy between his version and the ordinary printed text of this work.]
Also, [balsam oil] is extremely flammable. For the latter reason, one may not use white naphtha [as fuel for a lamp] even during the week. It is extremely flammable and may cause a danger.", + "At the outset, one is permitted to use other oils - e.g., radish oil, sesame oil, turnip oil, or the like.34The Mishnah (Shabbat 2:2) relates that Rabbi Tarfon stated that olive oil is the only fuel acceptable for use in the Sabbath lamp. The Talmud (Shabbat 26a) relates that Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri protested this statement, \"What shall the Babylonians do, for they have only sesame oil? What shall the Medians do, for they have nothing but nut oil? What shall the Alexandrians do, for they have nothing but radish oil?\"
The Sages accepted Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri's view and accepted the possibility of using other oils. It is not merely after the fact that they are acceptable, but ab initio, they may be used. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 264:6) states that it is most desirable to use olive oil for this purpose.
It is forbidden to use only those which were explicitly mentioned by our Sages.", + "A person should not place a container with a hole filled with oil above the opening of a lamp so that the oil will drip in.35Lamps would be constructed in the following manner to prevent the flame from consuming a large quantity of oil. The wick would be placed inside a shallow dish that contained a minimal amount of oil. A container would be placed above the dish from which oil would flow into the dish (Shabbat 2:4). The Sages forbade using such a lamp on the Sabbath, even if the oil was placed in it before nightfall. Similarly, he should not fill a bowl with oil, put it next to a lamp, and place the end of the wick in it so that it will draw oil.36This instance is also mentioned in the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:4). The Talmud (Shabbat 29a) explains why it is necessary to cite both instances. [These were both forbidden as] a decree lest one remove the oil in the vessel37As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 10, removing oil designated to be used for a lamp from the lamp is forbidden and is considered equivalent to the forbidden labor of extinguishing a flame. which has not become repugnant in the lamp.38Were the oil to be in the lamp itself, there would be no worry that one would use it, the smut from the wick would cause it to become repugnant. Since, however, it is in a container separate from the lamp, there is the need for a Rabbinic decree.
It is forbidden to derive benefit on the Sabbath from oil that was used for kindling, even when the lamp has become extinguished or it has dripped from the lamp [into another container].39In these instances, there is no connection between using the oil and the forbidden labor of extinguishing a flame. Nevertheless, doing so is forbidden, because of the prohibition of muktzeh. [This is forbidden,] because the [oil] is considered muktzeh because it was set aside to be used for a forbidden [labor].40As will be explained in Chapters 24-26, the Sages forbade the handling of certain objects on the Sabbath because they were muktzeh, designated not to be used on the Sabbath. Among the categories of muktzeh are objects that are involved with a forbidden labor at the commencement of the Sabbath.
[In the instance mentioned in the first clause,] if one attached the container to the lamp with cement, clay, or the like, it is permissible [to be used].41The fact that the container is attached to the lamp will cause a person to remember the prohibition and refrain from taking oil from it on the Sabbath [Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 265:1)].", + "We may not place a container under a lamp to collect [the drippings of] oil, for by doing so, one nullifies the possibility of using that container.42In Chapter 25, Halachah 23, the Rambam explains the reason for this prohibition. Nullifying the potential to use a utensil is tantamount to breaking it and is, hence, forbidden on the Sabbath.
In this instance, it would no longer be permitted to use the container placed under the lamp for the following reason: As explained in Chapter 25, Halachah 17, when an article that is not forbidden to be moved is used as a container for an article that is forbidden, the container becomes forbidden. Accordingly, since the oil is muktzeh as explained in the previous halachah, it causes the container used to collect it to become forbidden as well. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 3:6.)
If, however, one placed it there before the commencement of the Sabbath, it is permitted.43If the container was placed there on Friday, the activity that causes the container to be forbidden is not being carried out on the Sabbath itself. Hence, there is no reason for it to be prohibited. It must be emphasized that the oil that collects in the lamp on the Sabbath may not be moved and this in turn causes the moving of the container to become likewise prohibited (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 265:3, Mishneh Berurah 265:10).
One may place a utensil beneath a lamp on the Sabbath to collect the sparks, because they have no substance and thus, one does not nullify the possibility of carrying [that utensil]. It is forbidden, however, to place water within it, even if one does so on Friday, since by doing so, one causes the sparks to be extinguished sooner.44In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit., Rav Kapach's version), the Rambam writes that by placing the water there, it is considered as if he extinguished the fire with his hands. Although this activity is performed before the Sabbath, the Rabbis forbade it. Unlike the activities mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3, they considered that in this instance, if a person was allowed to place a dish with water under the lamp before the Sabbath, he might do so on the Sabbath as well. See also Chapter 12, Halachah 4, and notes.", + "A person may not45In this and the following halachot, the Rambam elaborates on the principle he stated in Halachah 2, that activities that require careful discernment cannot be performed by the light of a lamp on the Sabbath, lest one tilt the lamp so that the light shines brighter. check his garments for lice46Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:3). The Ramah (Orach Chayim 275:1) interprets the phrase to mean \"remove lice from his garments.\" by the light of a lamp47This refers to an oil or kerosene lamp. There is a debate among the halachic authorities (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 275:1 and commentaries) if it also applies to wax candles. Today, most authorities do not forbid using the lights of the paraffin candles common today for such activities. Needless to say, there is no prohibition with regard to electric lights. or read by the light of a lamp. [This applies] even if the lamp was two storeys high.48The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that this prohibition applies even when the lamp is fixed in the wall. Even when there are ten storeys one on top of another, a person living in the bottom storey should not read or check his garments for lice by the light [of a lamp] in the highest storey, lest one forget and tilt the lamp.49The Rambam's intent is that the Sages enforced this decree universally even in situations where it is impossible that the person would tilt the lamp so that a person would never be motivated to do so.
If, however, two people are reading a single subject,50The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that this leniency does not apply when the two people are studying from two separate texts even when they are studying a single subject. they are permitted to read before a lamp, since one will remind the other if he forgets.51The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) states that if a person has someone else watch him, he is permitted to read by the light of a lamp. This is not allowed when [they are concerned] with two [separate] subjects,52Furthermore, when two people are studying separate subjects, they are forbidden to use a lamp even when they are studying from a single text (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 275:3). for each one will be occupied with his subject.53And will not pay attention to the activities of the other.", + "Children may read in the presence of their teacher by the light of a lamp, for their teacher will watch over them.54The Rambam appears to limit this leniency only to a situation where the teacher is actually present and is watching his students' conduct. The Rashba, by contrast, states that a child may read by a light even when his teacher is not in the room, for he is constantly worried that he may enter. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 275:6) appears to accept this view. The teacher, by contrast, may not read, for he is not in fear [of his charges]. He may, nevertheless, look at a scroll by the light of a lamp to find the beginning of the passage that he needs to have them read. Afterwards, he should place the scroll in their hands and have them read for him.", + "One may not take articles that resemble each other and can be discerned from each other only after careful inspection to the light of a lamp to identify them, lest one forget and tilt the lamp.
For this reason, an attendant who is not permanently employed is forbidden to check cups and bowls by the light of a lamp, since he does not recognize them. This applies regarding both a lamp that uses olive oil and a lamp that uses kerosene although the latter produces much light.55This halachah is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Shabbat 12b. The Ra'avad, Rashi, and others interpret that passage differently. The Rambam's perspective is followed by the Shulchan Orach (Orach Chayim 275:12), while the Ramah mentions that of Rashi.
In contrast, an attendant who is permanently employed may check cups and bowls by the light of a lamp, since he does not need to check them closely. Nevertheless, if olive oil was used as fuel for the lamp, he should not be instructed56I.e., although the attendant need not be prevented from checking the utensils by the light of the lamp if he does so on his own accord, if he asks whether it is proper to use the light of the lamp, he should be counseled against doing so. to check objects by its light although he is permitted to do so. This is a decree [enacted], lest he take from the oil.", + "When a lamp is burning behind a door,57Commenting on Shabbat 120b, Rabbenu Chanan'el interprets this as referring to a lamp fixed on the wall behind the door. Tosafot, by contrast, interprets this as referring to a lamp affixed on the door itself. Seemingly, the Rambam follows Rabbenu Chanan'el's view. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 277:1) mentions both opinions. it is forbidden to open and close the door in one's ordinary manner, because one [might] extinguish it.58Shabbat (loc. cit.) explains that although one has no intention of extinguishing the flame (and thus one would not be held liable, as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 5), in this instance, unless one opens the door carefully, there is a certainty that the light would be extinguished. Therefore, on the basis of Chapter 1, Halachah 6, opening the door in one's ordinary manner is forbidden. Instead, one should open and close the door carefully.
It is forbidden to open59One may, however, close a door in such a situation (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 277:2). a door opposite a fire on the Sabbath60The Merkevat HaMishneh notes that the Rambam mentions the Sabbath in this clause and not in the first clause. The laws in the first clause also apply on the festivals, while the laws in the second clause apply only on the Sabbath. so that the wind will blow upon it [and fan the fire], even if there is only an ordinary wind.61Shabbat (loc. cit.) explains that this was a Rabbinic decree enacted lest one open a door when a strong wind is blowing. A Sabbath lamp may be placed62Needless to say, the lamp must be placed there on Friday; on the Sabbath itself a lamp may not be moved. on a tree that is attached to the ground; there is no need for anxiety.63This represents a contrast to the laws of the festivals. As mentioned in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:5, it is forbidden to make use of a tree on a festival, but it is permissible to move a lamp. Therefore, it is forbidden to place a lamp in a tree, lest one make use of the tree. Since moving a lamp on the Sabbath is forbidden, there is no need to worry that one will make use of the tree.", + "Six shofar blasts64As obvious from the following halachah, the Rambam is referring to three series of blasts in which a teki'ah - a single long blast - a teru'ah - a series of short staccato blasts - and a final teki'ah were sounded. (See also Rashi, Shabbat 35b.) should be sounded in every Jewish city and town65When mentioning this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 256:1) states that it applies \"when Israel dwelled in its land.\" The Ramah, however, suggests that when possible announcements should be made in Jewish communities of the diaspora to inform the people of the advent of the Sabbath. (Note the Or Sameach, who brings support for this practice from Avodah Zarah 70a.) Accordingly, it is customary for a Sabbath alarm to be sounded in many communities. on Friday. These shofar blasts are sounded from a high place so that they can be heard by all the inhabitants of the city and its surroundings.", + "When the first shofar blast is sounded, the people in the fields should halt plowing, digging, and performing other labors in the fields. Those who are close to the city are not, however, permitted to enter the city until those who are distant come, so that they all enter at the same time.66Rashi, Shabbat 35b, states that this practice was adopted lest the workers in the outlying areas be suspected of continuing their activities past the desired time. The stores may still remain open with their shutters in place.
When the second shofar blast is sounded, the shutters should be secured and the stores closed. Hot water and pots may still be left [cooking] on the ranges. When the third shofar blast is sounded, one should remove those pots one intends to remove, cover those one wishes to cover with insulating materials,67As explained in Chapter 4. and light candles.68As mentioned, it is customary at present to light candles 18 minutes before sunset.
One should wait the time it takes to roast a small fish or to stick a loaf of bread on [the side of the] oven,69The commentaries, beginning with the Maggid Mishneh, note a difficulty with the Rambam's statements, since his wording appears to indicate that, ab initio, it is acceptable to stick dough on the side of the oven to bake at this time, even though it will have to be pealed off on the Sabbath itself. As mentioned in Chapter 20, Halachah 1, peeling bread off an oven wall does not constitute a forbidden labor. It is, however, forbidden on the Sabbath on the basis of a Rabbinic prohibition. Note the resolutions offered to this difficulty in Chapter 3, Halachah 18.
(Significantly, the Hagahot Maimoniot and others interpret this as an indication that the Rambam allows forbidden labors to be performed after candle-lighting.)
It must be noted that Rav Kapach offers a different interpretation of the Rambam's words. He explains that the Rambam is not saying that one should actually roast a fish or bake dough. Instead, he is merely giving a measure of time.
sound a teki'ah, a teru'ah, and a final teki'ah and cease activity.", + "The first teki'ah should be sounded at [plag] haminchah70One hour and fifteen minutes before sunset. This refers to sha'ot zemaniot, i.e., the term \"hour\" refers to one twelfth of the daytime period. and the third [teki'ah] close to sunset.71Eighteen minutes earlier. Similarly, the shofar should be sounded on Saturday night to [inform] the people that they are permitted [to tend] to their affairs.72This law is derived from the concluding Mishnah of the first chapter of Chulin. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, not all authorities agree that the shofar was sounded on Saturday night. Moreover, even with regard to the Rambam's intent, the commentaries are not in universal agreement. The Or Sameach, basing his statements on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin, loc. cit.), explains that the shofar was sounded only in the Temple and not in the Jewish community at large.
The Halichot Olam, by contrast, basing his statements on Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 7:5, maintains that the shofar was sounded at this time only in the community at large and not in the Temple.
", + "When Yom Kippur falls on Friday,73According to the fixed calendar employed at present, Yom Kippur cannot fall on Friday or on Sunday. Nevertheless, when the calendar was established according to the testimony of witnesses, it was possible for the holiday to be celebrated on either of these days.
[In this context, note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Menachot 11:7, which emphasizes the potential for such a possibility, negating the opinion of prominent sages (apparently Rav Sa'adiah Gaon and Rabbenu Chanan'el), who maintained that the oral tradition prohibits Yom Kippur's being celebrated on either of these days (Rav Kapach).]
the shofar is not sounded.74For it is forbidden to sound a shofar on the Sabbath or on Yom Kippur. [When Yom Kippur] begins on Saturday night, the shofar should not be sounded, nor should havdalah be recited.75Havdalah is recited to mark the transition from holiness to the mundane, and this is not relevant on such an occasion (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Chulin, loc. cit.).
This applies not only to the recitation of havdalah over a cup of wine, but also the mention of havdalah in our Yom Kippur prayers.

When a festival falls on Friday, the shofar should be sounded76This applies only in the Temple. Elsewhere, the shofar is not sounded on festivals. and havdalah should not be recited. When a festival begins directly after the Sabbath, havdalah should be recited,77For the festivals reflect a lower level of holiness than the Sabbath. Havdalah is recited both in our festival prayers and in our recitation of Kiddush. but the shofar should not be sounded." + ], + [ + "It is forbidden for us to tell1See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Machshirin 2:5-6), which states that it is forbidden even to hint to a gentile that one desires that he perform a forbidden labor on one's behalf. This ruling is accepted by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 307:22). Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 307:76 allow one to make an indirect hint in certain situations. a gentile to perform work on the Sabbath on our behalf, although they are not commanded [to observe] the Sabbath.2On the contrary, a gentile who observes the Sabbath is liable for death (Sanhedrin 58b, Hilchot Melachim 10:9). [This applies] even when the instructions were conveyed to them before the Sabbath and we do not require [the products of] their work until after the Sabbath.
The above is forbidden as a Rabbinical prohibition to prevent the people from regarding the Sabbath lightly, lest they perform [forbidden] labor themselves.3The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:1-2) mention another reason for the prohibition against conveying such instructions on the Sabbath itself, so that one should not talk about mundane matters on the Sabbath.
[On the basis of this rationale, we can understand the lenient opinions mentioned in note 1. Since the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform work stems from the prohibition against speaking of mundane matters, there is room for leniency if the instruction is conveyed without speech.]
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 243:1 also mentions an opinion that maintains that a gentile performing a labor on behalf of a Jew on the Sabbath is considered as the Jews's agent. Hence, the Jew is held responsible for the work.
", + "[The following rules4Examples of the principles mentioned in this halachah are given in Halachot 3-8. apply] when a gentile performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath on his own accord:5I.e., even without receiving specific instructions from a Jew. If he performed it on behalf of a Jew, it is forbidden to benefit from that labor6The entire Jewish people, not only the person for whom the forbidden labor was performed, are prohibited from benefiting from it (Maggid Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch 325:10). until one waits the amount of time necessary to perform the labor on Saturday night.7See Halachah 8.
[The latter leniency is granted] provided the matter is not public notice - i.e., everyone knows that a particular task is being performed for a person on the Sabbath.8The Rambam's mention of this principle is significant. In the interpretation of Shabbat 24:3 - the Mishnah that serves as the basis for Halachah 8 - there are authorities (e.g., Rabbenu Nissim) who explain that the prohibition against benefiting from forbidden labors performed by a gentile in public on the Sabbath applies only in the specific context mentioned in that Mishnah: a grave, coffin, or flutes for mourning a deceased person.
A prohibition was instituted in these instances alone, for it is improper that a person's final resting be associated with the performance of labor on the Sabbath. In contrast, when a Sabbath prohibition is performed on behalf of a living person, one may benefit from it after the Sabbath.
From the Rambam's statements in this halachah, it is obvious that he does not allow such leniency. Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 325:21 and the Mishnah Berurah 325:73, which explain that if the situation requires it, Rabbenu Nissim's opinion can be relied on.

If [the gentile] performed [the labor] for his own sake alone,9With this addition, the Rambam implies that if the gentile performs the forbidden labor for his own sake and with the intention that it also benefit a Jew, it is forbidden. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 276:2.) it is permitted to benefit from it on the Sabbath.", + "What is implied? If a gentile kindled a candle [for his own benefit], a Jew is also permitted to perform activity by its light.10The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) states that one may also benefit from a lamp kindled by a gentile on behalf of a person who is ill. If [the gentile] kindled the light on behalf of the Jew, it is forbidden.11The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if a gentile lights a lamp or a fire in a Jew's house on his own accord, the Jew is not required to leave his home. Although he should try not to benefit from the light, the fact that he receives benefit against his will is not of significance.
Similarly, if a gentile made a ramp to descend from a ship [himself], a Jew may descend after him.12Shabbat 122a gives a classic example of this halachah. Rabban Gamliel and several other Sages descended from a ship on a ramp made by a gentile on the Sabbath. If he made it for the Jew, it is forbidden.13Note the contrast between this pair of examples and the following pair, as explained in the following halachah. If he filled a trench with water to allow his animal to drink, a Jew may have his own animal drink afterwards. If he did so for the sake of the Jew, it is forbidden.14The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 325:10) states that this prohibition applies only when one is drawing from a well in a private domain into the public domain, for this involves the transgression of a Torah prohibition. More leniency is allowed when water is drawn from a well in a private domain to a carmelit, for then merely a Rabbinic prohibition is involved. In such an instance, anyone other than the person for whom the water was drawn may benefit from it.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) mentions a more lenient perspective, which states that whenever it is possible for a Jew to accomplish an objective without performing a forbidden labor, he may benefit from a forbidden labor that a gentile performed for the Jew's sake, which made the objective easier to accomplish. For example, since a Jew could have descended to a well to drink water, he is allowed to drink water that a gentile brought from the well for him.

If a [gentile] gathered grass to feed his animal, a Jew may bring his animal to eat from it15The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 325:11) explain that one may not give this grass to the animal or even lead him directly toward it, because the grass is muktzeh. provided that the gentile does not know this Jew. [If he does, it is forbidden,16Not only for him, but for other Jews as well (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:10).] lest he bring more on his behalf at which point he would be performing a [forbidden] labor on behalf of a Jew. Similarly, whenever there is a possibility that the gentile will add more [on a Jew's behalf], [a Jew] should not benefit unless [the gentile] does not know [the Jew].17For then we may be certain that the gentile did not make an increase for the Jew's sake.", + "In contrast, when a matter concerns a situation where there is no concept of increasing or decreasing [one's efforts for the sake of the Jew] - e.g., a light or a ramp18Once a lamp is lit or a ramp is laid down, many people can benefit from it. No additional effort is required on their behalf. - since [the gentile] performed these activities for his own sake, a Jew may benefit from them afterwards on the Sabbath, even when [the gentile] knows him.
[The following laws apply when] a lamp is kindled at a gathering [of Jews and gentiles] on the Sabbath: If most of the people in attendance are Jewish, it is forbidden to benefit from the light, since the one who kindles it does so for the sake of the majority.19The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 276:2) state that, even in such circumstances, if the gentile uses the light for the performance of a specific activity, it is clear that he kindled it for his own purposes. Hence, it is permitted for other Jews to benefit from it afterwards. If the majority are gentiles, it is permitted to benefit from the light. If the proportions are equal, it is forbidden.20The commentaries use this situation to exemplify the following principle: It is prohibited to benefit from the performance of a forbidden labor when it was performed for the sake of both a gentile and a Jew. (Note the Rambam's use of the expression \"for his own sake alone\" in Halachah 2).
Other commentaries (see Rashi, Shabbat 122a) offer different explanations for this ruling.
.
If a fire broke out on the Sabbath and a gentile comes to extinguish it, we may not tell him, \"Extinguish it,21Although the situation may arouse fear, we are still forbidden to instruct a gentile specifically to perform a forbidden labor.\" nor [must we tell him,] \"Do not extinguish it,\"22Furthermore, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 7, one may say, \"The person who extinguishes the fire will not suffer a loss,\" encouraging the gentile to do so.
From this law, Tosafot (Shabbat 122a) explains that a Jew is not obligated to prevent a gentile from carrying out a forbidden activity that benefits the Jew's property, if the gentile does so on his own initiative. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 325:13) accepts this principle, provided that the gentile does not do this on a continuous basis.
for his resting is not our responsibility.23With this expression, the Rambam (quoting Shabbat 16:6) contrasts a gentile with one's children - even minors - and one's servants - even gentiles - for whom one is responsible that they rest on the Sabbath, as mentioned in Exodus 20:10. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "[The following principles apply when] gentiles make a coffin, dig a grave, or bring flutes to play mourning dirges on behalf of a deceased person:
If this was done discreetly, one must wait until that activity could have been carried out on Saturday night, and then the person may be buried using the above. If, however, the grave was located in a public square, the coffin was placed upon it, and all those who pass by say, \"This activity that the gentiles are performing on the Sabbath is for the sake of so and so,\" that Jew may never be buried using the above, for this is a matter of public knowledge.24Even though a Jew did not instruct a gentile to perform any of these activities, since they were performed on behalf of a Jew in public, they may never be used on his behalf.
Another Jew, however, may be buried using the above, provided that the people wait the amount of time necessary for these activities to have been performed [after the Sabbath has concluded].25The Ra'avad objects to requiring one to wait when the product of the gentile's efforts is to be used for the sake of an individual other than the one for which they were originally intended. He explains that in Halachah 8, the Rambam states that this requirement was instituted, lest the person who benefits from the gentile's efforts instruct him to perform a forbidden labor. Needless to say, this does not apply in the situation under discussion, a burial.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 325:14) follows the Rambam's ruling. Although the rationale suggested by the Ra'avad is justifiable in this instance, the Rabbis did not accept it, in order to maintain a uniform policy regarding forbidden labor performed by a gentile on the Sabbath.
The same applies in all similar situations.", + "[The following rules apply when] a gentile brings flutes on the Sabbath to mourn a deceased person: Even though he brought them from just outside the wall,26In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 23:4), the Rambam explains that if the flutes were brought from outside the city, they were brought from a public domain to a private domain. Hence, a transgression was involved, and it is necessary to wait for the time to pass that it would take to bring them after the conclusion of the Sabbath. We must, however, wait longer than the minimal amount of time it takes to bring them from outside the wall inside the wall, because of the suspicion mentioned by the Rambam. See also Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:10.
Significantly, Rashi (Shabbat 151a) and others interpret this Mishnah as relating to the prohibition against bringing objects from beyond the Sabbath boundary. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 325:15-16) mentions both of these views.
we are required to wait the time it takes to bring them from a close place27Shulchan Aruch HaRav 325:22 and the Mishnah Berurah 325:76 explain this as referring to the Sabbath boundary - i.e., 2000 cubits. after the Sabbath has concluded, and afterwards we may mourn with them.28The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:15) emphasizes that a more lenient ruling is given if the gentile did not bring the flutes through the public domain, and traveled via a carmelit instead. Since the gentile violated a Rabbinic prohibition and not a prohibition of the Torah itself, the flutes are permitted to be used immediately on Saturday night. [This restriction stems from our suspicion] that he brought them from another place at night, and then entered with them in the morning.
If one is certain that they were brought from another place on the Sabbath, one should wait [the amount of time] until it was possible to bring them from that place after [the conclusion of] the Sabbath.29This can lead to both a more lenient and a more stringent ruling. If the place was within the Sabbath limits, one is required to wait less time. If the place is beyond the Sabbath limits, one is required to wait longer (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 325:22 and the Mishnah Berurah 325:77). [The above leniencies apply] only when [the flutes were not brought] in a public square, as mentioned above.", + "[The following rules apply with regard to] a city inhabited by both Jews and gentiles that possesses a bathhouse that is open on the Sabbath: If the majority [of the bathers30This addition was made on the basis of the Mishnah Berurah 326:38, which explains that the ruling depends, not on the proportion of the population of the city at large, but on that of the bathers. Since they are the ones who use the bath, the bath is considered as being heated for them.] are gentiles, it is permitted to bathe in it on Saturday night immediately [after the conclusion of the Sabbath].
If the majority of the bathers are Jewish, one must wait [the time it takes] for the water to heat.31In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Machshirin 2:5-6, the source for his halachah), the Rambam expounds on the principle stated in the following halachah to explain why it is necessary to wait until the water could have heated. [The rationale is that] the water was heated for the majority of [the city's bathers]. If [the numbers of Jews and gentiles are] equal, one must wait [the time it takes] for the water to heat.32In this instance, it is considered as if the baths were heated for the sake of both the Jews and the gentiles, as explained in the notes to Halachah 4. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "A Jew who instructs a gentile to perform a [forbidden] labor on his behalf on the Sabbath commits a transgression and should be given stripes for rebellion33The punishment given for the violation of Rabbinic prohibitions. [as punishment]. Nevertheless, he is permitted to benefit from the labor on Saturday night after waiting the time it takes for the labor to have been performed.34Although Rabbenu Yerucham forbids ever benefiting from such work, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:20) accepts the Rambam's ruling.
The following is the sole reason35This appears to differ from Rashi's interpretation (Beitzah 24b), which explains (with regard to the festivals) that the reason that one is required to wait until the time it takes to perform the forbidden labor after the festival passes is \"so that one will not benefit from a [forbidden] labor performed on a festival.\" Seemingly, he would accept the same rationale with regard to the Sabbath. for which [the Sages] forbade using [the products of forbidden labor] until the time to perform the labor passes on Saturday night: If one permitted the use of [the products of forbidden labor] immediately [on Saturday night], a person might tell a gentile to perform a [forbidden] labor on his behalf, so that [after the conclusion of the Sabbath], it will be immediately available for him. Since, however, [the products of forbidden labor] are forbidden until the time it takes for the labor to have been performed passes, he will not instruct a gentile to perform this task. It does not bring him any benefit at all, for on Saturday evening he must wait the time it takes for the labor to have been performed on the Sabbath.", + "A Jew is permitted to instruct a gentile to perform an activity that is not a [forbidden] labor36The Rambam derives this principle from Eruvin 67b, which mentions that one is permitted to instruct a gentile to bring hot water to wash a child after circumcision, provided he does not have to pass through the public domain. The Rambam maintains that one can extrapolate from this instance to other similar cases. Although Tosafot, Gittin 8b, differs, the Rambam's opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Orach (Orach Chayim 307:5) as well as the later Ashkenazic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:12, Mishnah Berurah 307:23).
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 276:2) states that there are authorities who allow one to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath so that a mitzvah can be performed. Although he does not accept this opinion, he allows for leniency in circumstances of great necessity.
and is prohibited from being performed on the Sabbath only as a sh'vut.37In Chapter 21, Halachah 1, the Rambam defines sh'vut as an activity forbidden by the Sages because it resembles a forbidden labor or because it might lead to the performance of a forbidden labor.
The rationale behind this leniency is the principle that a Rabbinic prohibition is not instituted to support another Rabbinic prohibition. Since the activity in question is merely a Rabbinic prohibition, and the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform a forbidden activity on the Sabbath is Rabbinic in origin, the two Rabbinic prohibitions should not be associated.
[This leniency applies] provided that this is necessary because of a minor infirmity,38In contrast to the situations mentioned in Chapter 2, here the Rambam is not speaking of a situation where the person is dangerously ill or even when there is a danger threatening one of the limbs of his body. Instead, the intent is situations that involve minor discomfort. Although a Jew himself is forbidden to perform certain activities that would relieve this uneasiness, a gentile is allowed to do so. a very pressing matter,39Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit., cites as an example of this principle, merchandise that would spoil if left in the rain. [See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:19) and commentaries.]
4 0. See Hilchot Milah 2:9. Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 331:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 331:22 rely on the leniency mentioned by the Ramah cited in note 36 in this instance. Since the circumcision itself involves carrying out a forbidden labor on the Sabbath, other labors that are necessary for the mitzvah to be performed may be carried out by a gentile even when instructed by a Jew.
or a mitzvah.", + "What is implied? On the Sabbath, a Jew may instruct a gentile to climb a tree or to swim across water to bring him a shofar or a knife for circumcision. Similarly, [one may instruct a gentile] to bring hot water from one courtyard to another to wash a child or a person experiencing difficulty,40As stated above, Eruvin 67b mentions this instance with regard to circumcision. As explained above, the Rambam extends the leniency beyond the specific instance and applies it to other similar circumstances. although an eruv was not made to join them.41Carrying in courtyards with an eruv is discussed in Chapters 16 and 17. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "When a person buys a house in Eretz Yisrael from a gentile,42The Magen Avraham 306:19-20 cites other authorities who state that a Jew should not complete the sale on the Sabbath. Even according to the Rambam, it appears that one is forbidden to give the gentile money on the Sabbath. he is permitted to tell the gentile to compose a deed of sale on the Sabbath.43From the fact that this law is cited in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:11), it is clear that it applies in the present era as well. Giving the gentile instructions [to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath] is a Rabbinic prohibition, and because [of the importance] of settling Eretz Yisrael44In contrast to the Ramban, the Rambam does not consider the settlement of Eretz Yisrael as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. There is, however, no question of the great importance he attaches to this activity. (See Hilchot Melachim, 5:9-12. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:3-4.)the Sages did not enforce their decree in this instance.
Similarly, the above principles apply when one purchases a house from [a gentile] in Syria, for Syria is equivalent to Eretz Yisrael in this regard.45In Hilchot Terumah 1:2-3, the Rambam defines Syria as the lands outside Eretz Yisrael conquered by King David. Generally, lands conquered by the entire Jewish people are included in Eretz Yisrael. In this instance, however, although David was a king and his wars were approved by the Sanhedrin, these lands did not become part of Eretz Yisrael, because he had not completed the conquest of all the lands of the Canaanite nations at that time. Nevertheless, because of the communal nature of his conquest, the Rabbis ordained that certain of the laws applicable within Eretz Yisrael should also apply there. Compare also to Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:3.", + "When a person contracts a gentile for a task and sets the price, the gentile [is considered] as acting in his own interests.46Since the gentile contractor has established a set price for his work, it does not matter when he performs the labor involved. Accordingly, he is considered as working for himself and not on behalf of the Jew.
The Rashba emphasizes that this leniency applies only when the gentile performs the task in question on his own premises. If he does so on premises belonging to a Jew, it is forbidden for him to work on the Sabbath even when the price is set beforehand. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 244:5, 252:2) quotes the Rashba's view.
[Therefore,] even if he performs the task on the Sabbath, it is permitted.47The Jew may not, however, explicitly tell the gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath even if he is hired on a contractual basis (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 252:2). Similarly, it is permissible to hire a gentile for a prolonged period, although he performs [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath.48The Rambam's decision is based on Mo'ed Katan 12a, which mentions a person hired on a weekly, monthly, or yearly basis - i.e., rather than receive a wage on an hourly basis, he is contracted to perform a particular task which his employer will present him from time to time.
The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this issue, maintaining that although a person who is hired on a weekly basis is not required to work on the Sabbath, the Jew receives a direct benefit from the fact that he does. Therefore, this is forbidden.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 244:5) accepts the Rambam's view. The Turei Zahav 244:5 emphasizes, however, that this ruling may be accepted only when the employer does not mind if the gentile does not work at any specific time. If he requires him to work a set number of hours, this is not acceptable.
(To explain the concept in contemporary terms: An employee who receives a weekly salary for a specific time commitment is not covered by this leniency. In contrast, an outside professional who is hired on a retainer basis is, for he is not bound by a time commitment to the employer.)
The Noda BiY'hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. II, Responsum 38) explains the difference between the Rambam's and the Ra'avad's view as follows: In the case of a contractor, the gentile is the one who benefits from his working on the Sabbath. Although he is not obligated to work then, by doing so he earns a fee that he would not have received otherwise.
In contrast, when an employee is paid on a retainer basis, he receives no benefit from working on the Sabbath, for he receives the same wage regardless. Therefore, the Ra'avad considers this to be forbidden. The Rambam, however, permits this, since the employer receives no additional profit from the task being completed on the Sabbath. Were it not to be completed then, it would have been completed on the following day.

What is implied? When a person hires a gentile for a year or two as a scribe or as a weaver,49The Ramah (loc. cit.) emphasizes that if the gentile is hired as a jack of all trades, it is forbidden for him to work on the Sabbath. In such an instance, the Jew has a distinct benefit from his working on the Sabbath, since there will surely be other work for him to do on the following day. it is permissible for the gentile to write or weave on the Sabbath. It is as though he contracted him to write a scroll or weave a garment, [in which case, he may] perform the task whenever he desires. [This leniency is granted] provided he does not pay him on a day to day basis.50In such an instance, the wage the gentile receives for the work performed on the Sabbath is distinct. Hence, it is forbidden.", + "When does the above51This restriction applies both to the leniency allowing a gentile to work as a contractor and to that which allows him to work on a retainer basis. apply? When the matter is discreet, and everyone52The Magen Avraham 244:2 states that this wording implies that if several individuals know that the task is being performed for the sake of a Jew, but the matter is not public knowledge, there is no prohibition involved. is not aware that the [forbidden] labor being performed on the Sabbath is for the sake of a Jew. If, however, it53It is of no importance to us whether people see the work being performed or not. What is significant is that they know that this work is being performed for the sake of a Jew (Rabbenu Yerucham). is a matter that is well known, open, and of public knowledge,54\"Public knowledge\" refers to matters known within the Jewish community. As reflected by the following halachah, if the matter is known to gentiles but not to Jews, there is no difficulty. it is forbidden [for a gentile to perform such work]. A person who sees the gentile working does not know that he has been hired on a contractual55See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 7:25, which states \"People at large do not know the difference between a contractor and a hired worker. Hence, it is forbidden.\"
Note also the Be'ur Halachah 244, which questions whether a gentile is permitted to perform work on behalf of a Jew if it is common custom for these tasks to be performed by a contractor. In such a situation, it is unlikely that an observer would assume that the gentile was hired to work on a daily basis. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the Mishnah Berurah 244:7, the Noda BiY'hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. I, Responsum 12), and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 244:8, the common custom is to allow such work to be performed.
basis and will say that so and so56From the wording the Rambam uses, one might infer that this restriction applies to a private individual. In contrast, if a community at large employs a gentile, it can be assumed that they hired him in a permitted manner. On this basis, there are opinions which allow a gentile contractor to perform services for the community on the Sabbath (Magen Avraham 244:8). hired a gentile to work for him on the Sabbath.", + "Therefore, [the following rules apply when] a person hires a gentile to build a courtyard or a wall or to harvest his field, or [hires him to work] at building his courtyard or planting a vineyard for him for a year or two:
If the project is located in a city57I.e., either the city in which the Jew contracting the gentile lives or another city populated by Jews. or within its Sabbath limits, it is forbidden for the Jew to allow them to work on the Sabbath,58Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 244:3), which states that if a gentile builds a house for a Jew on the Sabbath, it is proper not to enter it. because of [the impression this might create in the mind of] an observer who is unaware that they were hired on a contractual basis. If the project is located beyond the Sabbath limits, it is permitted, for there are no Jews who will see the laborers at work on the Sabbath.", + "Similarly, it is permitted for a Jew to hire out his vineyard or his field to a gentile, although the latter will sow and plant them on the Sabbath, since an observer will know that they have been hired out or given [to the gentile] under a sharecropping agreement.59Since these arrangements are commonplace, an observer will not think that the gentile was employed as a hired worker.
[In contrast,] when an enterprise60The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 243:1) gives as examples a bathhouse or an oven. As explained in the following note, the inclusion of an enterprise in this category is dependent on the business practices common in that locale. is known by the name of its Jewish owner and is not of the type that is hired out or contracted out under a profit sharing agreement by most people in that city, it is forbidden to be hired out to a gentile.61I.e., since the gentile will operate the enterprise on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to rent him the enterprise even on an annual or monthly basis.
As the Rambam mentions in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 1:8, the source for this halachah), the determination of which enterprises are included in this category is dependent on the local business practices. If it is commonplace for an enterprise to be rented out on an annual or monthly basis, an onlooker will not suppose that the gentile operating the enterprise is working for the Jew as a hired hand. (See also Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:2.)
The gentile will perform work in the establishment on the Sabbath, and [in the public's mind, the establishment] will be associated with the name of its Jewish owner.62Similarly, if it is publicized throughout the community that the enterprise has been hired to the gentile, there is no prohibition. (See Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit..)", + "It is permitted to lend63One may not, however, lend a utensil to a gentile on the Sabbath itself. Similarly, when a utensil is lent on Friday, the gentile must have time to bring it out of the Jew's premises before the commencement of the Sabbath [Halachah 19, Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 246:2)]. and hire out64The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) states that if a Jew receives payment for the Sabbath day, he must arrange to be paid on a weekly or monthly basis. It is forbidden to receive payment for the Sabbath as a distinct entity. utensils to a gentile although he will perform [forbidden] labors with them on the Sabbath,65The Ra'avad, based on his interpretation of Shabbat 19a, states that it is forbidden to rent an article to a gentile on Friday, since it will appear that one is receiving a wage for the Sabbath. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that according to the Rambam, the passage the Ra'avad cites follows the opinion of the School of Shammai, which is not accepted as halachah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 246:1) mentions both opinions, and the Ramah states that it is customary to follow the Ra'avad's ruling.
for we are not obligated to have our utensils rest [on the Sabbath].66Note the application of this principle in the first halachot of Chapter 3. It is, however, forbidden to [lend or hire out] one's servant or livestock67See Chapter 20, Halachah 1, which includes fowl, fish, and all other living beings in this prohibition. [to work on the Sabbath], for we are commanded that they rest.68Exodus 20:10 states \"You shall not perform any labor, neither you, your son, your daughter, your servant, your maid-servant, or your beast.\" See also Exodus 23:12 and other sources. The nature of this p rohibition is discussed in Chapter 20.", + "[The following rules apply when a Jew] enters into a partnership with a gentile concerning labor, merchandise, or the operation of a storefront:69In such a situation, although the Jew does not work on the Sabbath, if he benefited from his gentile partner's activity, the latter would be considered to be acting as his agent unless they make a stipulation clarifying the matter at the outset. If such a stipulation was made at the outset,70\"At the outset\" means when the partnership was originally established. If such an agreement was not made at that time, and the Jew made such an offer to the gentile afterwards, there are difficulties, for it appears that the Jew is paying the gentile for working on the Sabbath by working one day in the middle of the week. it is permissible71This leniency is not granted merely after the fact. On the contrary, it is a perfectly acceptable course of action according to Jewish law (Ba'er Heteiv 245:1). for the profits from the Sabbath - whether large or small - to be designated for the gentile alone, and the profits of another day to be given to the Jew alone in exchange.72Rabbenu Nissim emphasizes that the need for such a stipulation applies only in situations where one of the partners works one day and the other another day. If during the week both work together, the fact that the gentile works on the Sabbath does not cause the profits of that day to be forbidden for the Jew. The gentile knows that the Jew will not work on the Sabbath, nor will he work any more during the week. Therefore, the activity the gentile is performing is motivated by his own benefit. The fact that he gives a share to the Jew as well is of no consequence. The Ramah accepts this ruling (Orach Chayim 245:1).
If, however, such conditions were not made at the outset, when [the two] come to divide the profits, the gentile should take all the profits of the Sabbath for himself alone, and then the remainder should be divided [equally].73Avodah Zarah 22a does not make a final ruling in this situation, and the Rambam follows the more stringent position. (Note a similar ruling, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 10:14.)
In contrast, Rabbenu Asher states that in such a situation, if the gentile willingly gives the Jew a share of the Sabbath profits, the Jew is allowed to keep it. The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that after the fact, one may rely on this ruling. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 245:2 rules more stringently and states that one may rely on Rabbenu Asher's opinion only in the case of a major loss.
The [gentile] need not give [the Jew] anything extra for the Sabbath unless a stipulation to that effect was made at the outset.74The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 245:3) describes the procedure to follow when a Jew and gentile partner did not make such an agreement at the beginning of the partnership, and the Jew desires to do so afterwards. The same principles apply if [a Jew and a gentile] hired a field under a partnership arrangement.75Significantly, the Magen Avraham 245:1 differentiates between a field that requires work seven days a week and certain business establishments that do not require active effort on the part of their owner. For example, partners may own an oven and rent it out to others.
In the first instance, when the gentile works on the Sabbath, he appears to be working as the agent of the Jew. In the latter instance, by contrast, since there is no work required on the Sabbath, the gentile partner appears to be acting in his own interest by renting the establishment to others. Therefore, the Jew is allowed to receive a share of the profits.
", + "If the stipulation [mentioned above] was not made, [the partners] came to divide the profits, and the profits of the Sabbath were not distinct, it appears to me76This expression implies a ruling made by the Rambam that is not based on a previous Rabbinic source. that the gentile should take a seventh of the profits alone77Thus, retroactively the Jew renounces his portion in the gentile's activity. Hence, the gentile is no longer considered to be acting as his agent (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 245:6). and the remainder should be divided equally.78The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 245:1) accepts the Rambam's ruling. As mentioned, in a case of severe loss, the Ramah allows leniency in accordance with the opinion of Rabbenu Asher mentioned in note 74.
When a person gives a gentile money to invest, the two may divide the profits equally, despite the fact that the gentile engages in business dealings with these funds on the Sabbath.79In this instance, the Jew is not obligated to perform work at all. Hence, no one will say that the gentile is working as the Jew's agent (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:4). Furthermore, the gentile is not obligated to work on the Sabbath. Should he choose to do so, it is his own independent decision, which is not at all related to the Jew (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 245:16). All of the Geonim80The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 245) cites a responsum of Rav Sherirah Gaon. (See also Teshuvat HaGeonim, Responsum 43.) concur with this ruling.", + "A Jew should not give utensils to a gentile artisan to fashion81Or to fix, improve, or work on in any way. on Friday, despite the fact that he has established a set price,82Once a set price is established, there is no difficulty with the gentile's working on the utensil on the Sabbath. Since the same price would be paid whether the work is done on Saturday or another day, the gentile is considered to be working for himself if he decides to work on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, even though basis of the contractual arrangement is correct, this is forbidden, since the article was given to the gentile directly before the commencement of the Sabbath. unless there is time for him to remove them from [the Jew's] home before nightfall.83I.e., before the commencement of the Sabbath. Were the gentile to take the article from the Jew's home on the Sabbath, it would appear that he was working for him, as the Rambam states at the conclusion of this halachah.
Similarly, a person should not sell, lend, pawn, or give a present of his possessions to a gentile unless [the gentile] can leave the entrance of [the Jew's] house with that article before the Sabbath. As long as [the gentile] is in [the Jew's] house, no one knows when he gave it to him. Thus, should the gentile leave [the Jew's] house on the Sabbath with [the Jew's] possessions in his hand, it would appear that the object was lent, pawned, agreed to be worked on, or sold on the Sabbath.84As mentioned in Chapter 23, Halachah 12, these business transactions are forbidden on the Sabbath.", + "[The following rules apply when] a person gives a gentile a letter to bring to another city. If he fixed a fee for conveying [the letter], it is permitted [even if the gentile conveys it on the Sabbath].85The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 247:1) emphasizes that one may not specify that the gentile should convey the article on the Sabbath. [This leniency applies] even when [the Jew] gives [the letter] to [the gentile] on Friday at nightfall, provided [the gentile] leaves [the Jew's] home before the commencement of the Sabbath.
When a fee was not fixed [beforehand, the following rules apply]: If there is a designated person in the city86We have translated both the words and as \"city,\" since in other sources (see Hilchot Megillah, Chapter 1) we find them both used by the Rambam with that meaning. (More particularly, refers to a small city, while to a large metropolis.)
The Kessef Mishneh, however, interprets as referring to a province, and thus explains the halachah as referring to an instance where the person charged with conveying the letter travels from his city to another place.
who collects letters and sends them to other cities with his agents,87I.e., a post office. Since the post office charges fixed prices for its services, there is no difficulty in having it convey mail on the Sabbath. Accordingly, there is no difficulty at present in sending mail before the Sabbath. On the Sabbath itself, however, it is forbidden to send mail, even by means of the post office. it is permitted to give a gentile the letter,88I.e., this gentile does not bring the letter to its destination, but merely brings it to the post office. Nevertheless, since a fee has not been established for his services in bringing the letter to the post office, there must be enough time for him to do so before the commencement of the Sabbath. Otherwise, it would appear that he is acting as the Jew's agent. provided there is time [on Friday] for the letter to reach a house adjacent to [the city's] wall before [the commencement of] the Sabbath, lest the home of the gentile who collects and sends letters be located there.89The Rambam is referring to an instance where the gentile bringing the letter to the post office does not know the location of the post office. Nevertheless, since there is a post office in the city, there is no difficulty if there is time to reach the farthest point in the city before the commencement of the Sabbath.
If there is no person designated to fulfill this function and the gentile to whom one gives the letter is the one who brings it to the other city, it is always forbidden to send a letter with a gentile90For the gentile will be performing work on the Jew's behalf on the Sabbath. This ruling is based on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Shabbat 19a. Rashi and the Tur (Orach Chayim 247) offer a different interpretation of that source, which allows one to send a letter with a gentile even when a fixed fee was not set, provided one sent it with him on Thursday or earlier.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 247:1) quotes the Rambam's ruling, while the Ramah follows that of the Tur.
unless one establishes a fixed price [beforehand].", + "It is permissible for a gentile carrying his possessions to bring them into the Jew's house on the Sabbath.91Even though the gentile charges the Jew with watching his possessions, there is no prohibition (Maggid Mishneh). Similarly, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 307:22) mentions that a gentile may bring a Jew grain as payment for debts on the Sabbath. It is even permissible for [the Jew] to tell [the gentile], \"Place them in this corner.\"92Since this activity is being performed by the gentile for his own interests on his own volition, there is no prohibition against giving him instructions. A Jew may tell a gentile to perform labor for the gentile's own sake on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).
One may invite a gentile to visit on the Sabbath and serve food93In contrast, this is forbidden on a festival. In the latter instance, the possibility exists that for the sake of the gentile one may add to the food that one is cooking. Although one is permitted to cook for the sake of Jews on a festival, one may not do so for the sake of a gentile. In contrast, no cooking whatsoever is permitted on the Sabbath. Hence, there is no need for concern (Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:13). for him to eat.94One may not, however, give a gentile food with the intent that he take it out. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 325:1 and commentaries.) If he took the food outside [the Jew's] home, there is no difficulty, for one is not obligated to see that he observes the Sabbath.95The Mechilta, Parashat Bo, Chapter 9, derives this from the verse, \"Six days shall you perform your work, and on the seventh day you shall rest.\" The mitzvah of resting on the seventh day concerns only \"your work,\" and not that of a gentile. 97. As the Rambam writes in Chapter 21, Halachah 36, on the Sabbath a person is allowed to provide food only for animals that are dependent on him for their sustenance. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 324:11 and commentaries which question whether this also applies to a stray dog or not.)
Similarly, one may serve food to a dog in one's courtyard. If he takes it outside, there is no difficulty.", + "When a person is carrying money while traveling on a journey and the Sabbath commences, he should give his wallet to a gentile to carry for him. On Saturday night, he may take it back from him. This is permitted even though he did not pay the gentile for his services96Were the gentile to be paid a fixed fee, there would be no difficulty, because he would be carrying the wallet to earn the fee and not on behalf of the Jew. and even though he gave it to him after nightfall.97As mentioned in Halachot 19 and 20, a gentile must generally remove any objects he has been given to take from a Jew's domain before the commencement of the Sabbath.
These leniencies are granted because a person becomes distraught over his money and cannot bear to discard it. If we do not allow him [to have a gentile carry it for him] - a matter forbidden merely by Rabbinic decree - we fear that he will come to carry it himself98From the Rambam's statements, it appears that it is preferable for a person to have a gentile carry his wallet for him than for him to carry it himself less than four cubits at time. This and other related matters are discussed in Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7, and commentary.and thus transgress one of the Torah's prohibitions.99We find several instances where the Sages relaxed the prohibitions they imposed for fear that as a result a person would lose control, and ignore Torah law entirely. Similarly, in this instance, they felt it preferable to allow a person to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on his behalf - a Rabbinic prohibition, so that he would not come to carry the wallet himself in the public domain - a prohibition of the Torah.
On the basis of this principle. The Sefer HaTerumah offers a further leniency. A person who is pursued by gentiles may take his money and hide it. The Rashba and others do not, however, agree to this extension.

When do the above [leniencies] apply? With regard to one's wallet. In contrast, a person may not give an ownerless object that he discovered to a gentile [to carry for him].100Since this is money that did not belong to him originally, the person is less concerned about it. Hence, the Sages granted less leniency. Instead, he should carry it less than four cubits at a time101Many other authorities do not allow the finder to carry the object discovered at all. The Rambam's view is discussed in the notes on Chapter 20, Halachah 7. [until he reaches a place where he can deposit it].", + "[The following rules apply when] a Jew performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath: If he willingly transgressed, it is forbidden for him to benefit from this labor forever.102This is also a Rabbinic prohibition. (See Shabbat 38a and also Ketubot 34a, which mentions three different opinions of the Sages on this matter.) The Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, which is the intermediate view. The person may, however, benefit from the sale of the proceeds of such labor (Mishnah Berurah 218:4). Other Jews103Even a person for whom this labor was performed may benefit from it. Although this is forbidden with regard to other prohibitions, in this instance the Sages did not feel that such a restriction was necessary. It is unlikely that one Jew would ask another to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf, nor is likely that the person of whom such a request was made would agree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 218:1, Mishnah Berurah 218:5). may, however, benefit from this labor immediately after the conclusion of the Sabbath,104When a gentile performs a forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew (Halachah 8) and when food is left to warm in a forbidden fashion (Chapter 3, Halachah 9), a Jew is forbidden to benefit from these activities until enough time passes on Saturday night for the activity to have been performed. Nevertheless, these restrictions are punitive in nature, instituted so that one would not perform either of these forbidden activities. In contrast, as mentioned in the previous note, we do not suspect that one Jew will transgress the Sabbath laws on behalf of another individual. Hence, these restrictions were not applied under these circumstances. as [can be inferred from Exodus 31:14]: \"And you shall observe the Sabbath, for it is holy.\" [Our Sages105Ketubot 34a. commented,] \"It is holy, but the fruits of labor performed on it are not holy.\"106The Hebrew, translated as \"holy,\" also means \"consecrated.\" Consecrated articles may not be used for mundane purposes.
What is implied? When a Jew cooks [food] on the Sabbath in willful violation [of the Sabbath laws], other Jews may partake of it Saturday night. He, however, is forbidden to partake of it forever. If he cooked it without knowing of the prohibition he was violating, both he107Since the transgression was not willfully performed, the person is not prohibited from benefiting from his act. and others may eat it immediately after the conclusion of the Sabbath.108The fruits of the forbidden activity are forbidden until Saturday night, lest one willfully perform a transgression and seek license to benefit from his activity on the grounds that the transgression was performed inadvertently.
This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah (Shabbat 38a, Ketubot, loc. cit.). Tosafot, however, quotes the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who allows one to benefit on the Sabbath itself from a forbidden activity performed without a willful desire to transgress. The Mishnah Berurah 318:7 mentions opinions that allow one to rely on Tosafot's opinion in a situation of necessity. This leniency is not, however, accepted by all authorities.
In regard to deriving benefit from the performance of an activity on the Sabbath which was forbidden by the Sages, see also Chapter 23, Halachah 8.
The same principles apply in other similar situations.", + "When produce was taken outside a city's Sabbath limits and then brought back without the knowledge of the prohibition involved, one may partake of it on the Sabbath, since nothing was done to the fruits themselves, and their state did not change. If they were brought back in willful violation of the prohibition involved,109If they were brought back by a gentile, a deaf mute, a mentally incapable person, or a child, they are permitted, for these individuals are not obligated to keep the Sabbath prohibitions. one may not partake of them until after the conclusion of the Sabbath.110The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's opinion, noting that although there is a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah about the matter (see Eruvin 41b), Rav Pappa, one of the later Sages of the Talmud, adopted a more lenient opinion, allowing one to benefit from the produce if it was brought to its original place, even if this was done willfully. Significantly, the Rambam also quotes Rav Pappa's opinion in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 5:10. The Maggid Mishneh, however, supports the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the laws of the Sabbath are more stringent than those of the festivals in this context. (See also the distinction between the Sabbath and holidays made by the Tzafenat Paneach.)
The Maggid Mishneh also mentions an opinion of the Rashba which is more stringent than both the Rambam and the Ra'avad.
", + "When a person hires a worker to watch a cow or a baby, he should not pay him a wage for the Sabbath day.111When a worker is paid for serving as a watchman on a daily basis, he may not take a wage for watching on the Sabbath. Although watching a cow or a child is not a forbidden activity, it is forbidden to receive payment for the Sabbath as a separate and independent entity. Therefore, [the worker] is not responsible for what happens on the Sabbath.112Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:8, which states that although he does not have the responsibilities of a paid watchman on the Sabbath, he still has the responsibilities of an unpaid watchman.If a worker was hired on a weekly or annual basis, he is given full payment.113I.e., the payment he receives can include recompense for the services rendered on the Sabbath, as long as the number of days he works is not considered individually, but rather he receives payment for a month's work as a lump sum. Therefore, [the worker] is responsible for what happens on the Sabbath. [In the latter instance,] the worker should not say, \"Pay me for the Sabbath,\" but rather, \"Pay me for the year,\" or \"Pay me for the ten days.\"114I.e., he hires himself out for a ten day period. Each of these days may not be considered as an individual entity as above.
Alternatively, the Mishnah Berurah 306:18 explains that \"Pay me for the ten days\" can be interpreted as referring to a situation in which a worker accepted a monthly contract and left the job after working ten days. Since he worked on a monthly basis, he is entitled to payment for all ten days he worked, including the Sabbath. This, however, is a delicate manner, and the exact wording of the contract between an employer and employee should be checked with a Rabbinic authority to prevent any problems from arising in this regard.
It must be emphasized that the same principles also apply with regard to the rental of homes, or money lent at interest to a gentile. One may not receive payment for the Sabbath individually. Instead, one must receive payment on a weekly, monthly, or annual basis. Thus, problems may arise if interest is compounded daily and the Sabbath is included as one of the days. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:9.)
" + ], + [ + "With regard to the [forbidden] labors for which one is liable to be executed by stoning1when a forbidden labor is performed in the presence of witnesses who administer a warning (Chapter 1, Halachah 1) if one transgresses willingly,2when a forbidden labor is performed when witnesses are not present (ibid.) or for which one is obligated to bring a sin offering if one commits the transgression unknowingly,3i.e., one intended to perform the forbidden labor, but was not aware that doing so was breaking the Sabbath laws. there are primary categories and [their] derivatives.4In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), the Rambam explains that the primary categories are so defined because \"they were part of the work of the Sanctuary, which is termed melachah [the term used for the Torah for forbidden labor].\" The Rambam clarifies the definition of what constitutes a primary category and what constitutes a derivative in Halachot 2-6.
See Yereim (249) who notes that the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2) derives the existence of thirty nine categories of work from the exegesis of Exodus 38:2. There is a question if this difference in sources creates a difference in law as well. See also the preface to Eglei Tal, which questions whether the definition of the categories of forbidden labor are taken from the activities necessary for the offering of the sacrifices in the Sanctuary, or merely the activities necessary for construction of the Sanctuary. (In this context, see Rashi, Shabbat 73a, which states that the forbidden labor of baking was not practiced in the Sanctuary although one of the offerings was the showbread which was baked each week.)

The sum of all the primary categories of [forbidden] labor are forty minus one.5The commentaries question why the Rambam (and his source, Shabbat 7:2, use this expression, rather than merely stating \"thirty-nine.\" Some draw attention to the parallel found in the Mishnah's description of the number of lashes given a transgressor (Makkot 3:10). Others explain that this expression indicates that there is a fortieth activity - the spiritual service of prayer and study - which must be performed on the Sabbath day. They include:
1) plowing,6This and the ten labors that follow are described as sidura d'pat, the manner in which bread is baked. They were necessary to prepare the herbs used as dyes for the curtains of the Sanctuary. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.)
2) sowing,7Significantly, plowing is mentioned before sowing in the Mishnah. Shabbat 73b explains that this was done to teach that if the earth is hard, and it is necessary to re-plow the land after the first plowing, one is liable for the second plowing as well. The Rambam, however, follows the usual order of activities. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.)
3) reaping,8As explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 3, this refers to reaping with a utensil. Severing produce by hand is considered merely a derivative. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 3.)
4) collecting sheaves,9In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions that the reapers usually gather the grain in small sheaves. Others follow who collect these sheaves into larger bundles. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 5.)
According to one opinion in Shabbat 96b, there is an explicit reference to the prohibition of this labor on the Sabbath. Numbers, ch. 15, relates that a person was executed for collecting wood on the Sabbath. As the Rambam states Chapter 21, Halachah 11, this labor includes only the collection of produce. Gathering other substances - e.g., salt - is not included. It is, however, forbidden by Rabbinic decree.

5) threshing,10applying pressure to grain to extract the kernel from its husk. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 7.)
6) winnowing,11casting the mixture of kernels and husks to the wind. The wind will blow away the chaff, while the kernels that are heavier will fall to the ground.
7) separating,12separating stones and the like from the kernels of grain. This is usually done by hand.
8) grinding,13crushing the kernels into flour. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 15.)
9) sifting,14the flour with a sifter. Shabbat 74a (see also Chapter 8, Halachah 11) notes that the three labors - winnowing, separating, and sifting - are similar. Nevertheless, because they represent three different activities performed in the construction of the Sanctuary, each one is considered a separate primary category of forbidden labor.
10) kneading,15mixing the flour with water to create a dough. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 16.)
11) baking,16This also includes cooking, roasting, or the like. In the construction of the Sanctuary, cooking was necessary for the preparation of dyes. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.)
12) shearing,17This and the following twelve labors are necessary for the preparation of fabric. Shearing involves removing hair or wool from an animal, whether dead or alive. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 7.)
13) whitening,18After the wool is removed from the animal, it is washed to remove dirt. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 10.)
14) beating,19Unlike Rashi and others who interpret as combing the wool, in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah he translates the word into an Arabic term meaning \"beat it with a stick.\" This activity is necessary as a preliminary stage of the preparation of flax to be spun into linen. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 12.)
15) dyeing,20for most of the fabrics used in the curtains and roof-coverings of the Sanctuary were dyed. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 13.)
16) spinning,21intertwining the fibers to make thread. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 15.)
17) making heddles,22The Hebrew, literally means \"house of string.\" In the weaving process, it refers to the following practice: Weaving involves passing the threads of the woof over and under each of the consecutive threads of the warp. In order to facilitate this process, two frames are made, each possessing many threads with a loop (referred to as a \"heddle\") in the middle of these threads. The threads of the warp are passed through these loops, one from one frame, and the next from the other, consecutively. When this is completed, the weaver lifts the two frames alternately. As he raises one up, he passes the woof through. In this manner, he is able to thread the woof through the entire warp at one time. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:2; Keilim 21:1.)
18) mounting the warp,23See Chapter 9, Halachah 17-18, where the Rambam describes how a loom is set up. First, the threads of the warp are extended to the desired length and width. They are then attached to a rod on either side, and held taut. This is the activity referred to by this term.
19) weaving,24passing the threads of the woof between the threads of the warp. (See Chapter 9, loc. cit.)
20) undoing woven fabric,25See Chapter 9, Halachah 20.
21) tying,26This refers to a permanent knot whose tying requires professional expertise. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 1.) In the construction of the Sanctuary, the chilazon which were used for dye were caught with nets that had to be tied (Shabbat 74b).
22) untying,27This also includes untying only such knots. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 7.)
23) sewing,28at least two stitches. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 9.)
24) tearing,29in order to sew. Otherwise, one is not liable. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 10.) If a hole was found in one of the curtains of the Sanctuary, it was cut open and sewn close (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:4).
25) building,30any structure; similarly, leveling the ground is included in this category. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 12.) The Kiryat Sefer gives as an example, the placement of the boards of the Sanctuary in their sockets.
26) demolishing,31Here also the intent must be a constructive one: demolishing in order to rebuild. (See Chapter 10, Halachah 15.)
27) beating with a hammer,32The Kiryat Sefer points to the fashioning of the menorah in the Sanctuary.
A craftsman finishing the fashioning of a utensil concludes his work by giving several taps with a hammer to smooth the utensil's surface. Thus, this labor also includes all activities performed to apply the finishing touch to an object - e.g., polishing and shining. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit., and Chapter 10, Halachah 16.)

28) trapping,33The Mishnah mentions the following seven categories as activities necessary to write a scroll. Leather hides were used to cover the roof of the Sanctuary. (See also Chapter 10, Halachah 19.)
29) slaughtering,34Although this term is usually used to refer to ritual slaughter, the intent here is taking a life through any means. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 1.)
30) skinning,35the hide of an animal to use for leather. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.)
31) processing [hides],36into leather. (See Chapter 11, loc. cit.) Significantly, the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) also includes salting the hides as a separate category of labor. Shabbat 75b, however, includes this activity in the category of processing hides and includes ruling parchment as the thirty-ninth category of labor.
32) removing hair,37For leather or parchment, smooth skin is required. (See also Chapter 11, Halachah 5, 6.)
33) cutting [leather],38This refers to making an exact cut, so that the leather can be used for a purpose. Cutting indiscriminately is a destructive activity. Hence, one is not held liable. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 7.)
34) writing,39wo letters. This activity was necessary in the Sanctuary, for a mark was made on the boards so that the same boards could be matched to each other each time they were attached together. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.)
35) erasing,40For if the builders of the Sanctuary erred in making a sign, they would erase it and write another in its place. In this instance as well, one is held liable only when one erases with the intent of writing two letters in this place. (See Chapter 11, loc. cit.)
36) ruling lines,41For proper writing is possible only on ruled lines. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 17.) In the Sanctuary, this labor was performed to prepare the hides to be cut.
37) kindling a flame,42This was necessary to cook the dyes. As the Rambam explains in Chapter 12, Halachah 1, one is liable for kindling a flame only when when desires to cook with it, use it for light, or desires ash. Otherwise, it is considered a destructive activity.
38) extinguishing a flame,43Here also, one's intent must be constructive - e.g., to use the charcoal produced. In the Sanctuary, this was necessary to produce an even flame for the fashioning of the metal utensils (See Chapter 12, Halachah 2.)
39) transferring from one domain to another.44All the materials necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary were brought from the private domain to the public domain (Shabbat 96b). This forbidden labor is discussed in great length. (See Chapters 12-19.)", + "All of these [forbidden] labors and all analogous activities are referred to as primary categories of labor. What is meant by an \"analogous activity\"? Plowing, digging, or making a groove [in the ground] are all considered to be primary categories of work. For each one involves digging in the ground and they all reflect a single activity.1In this and the following two halachot, the Rambam emphasizes how other activities that are analogous to the thirty-nine mentioned in the previous halachah are not considered as solely derivatives of the primary category of labor; they have the same status as the primary categories themselves. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) and in Halachah 9 of this chapter, he uses the term - \"labors corresponding to a single category of labor\" to describe such activities. This phrase is also used by the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:1 (although interpreted differently by other authorities).
The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rav Moshe Kohen as objecting to the Rambam's statements, for the Mishnah specifically states that there are thirty-nine such categories of forbidden labor, while according to the Rambam there would be far more. He thus considers all these other activities as derivatives.
The Maggid Mishneh does not see such a difficulty, explaining that, as the Rambam illustrates in the examples he cites in this and the following halachot, the activity being performed is basically the same as the primary category of labor. Thus it is not proper for such an activity to be called a derivative. Similarly, since these activities are identical in nature to the existing categories, it is not proper to consider them as being an additional category with regard to the total sum.
Kalkalat Shabbat adds that the activities that the Rambam mentions as analogous to the primary categories of labor are not counted as additional categories because they were not necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary.
", + "Similarly, one who sows seeds, plants trees, extends trees,2One of the methods of agriculture common in the Talmudic period was to plant vines - and in certain instances, trees - by taking a branch from an existing vine or tree and, without severing it from its source, burying it in the ground. In this manner, it would sprout roots, and ultimately a new plant would grow from this base. grafts [branches to] trees,3Taking branches from one tree and grafting them to another so that they will grow. or prunes trees:4As the Rambam states in Chapter 8, Halachah 2, pruning a tree is beneficial in causing it to grow. He also explains this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sh'vi'it 4:5, \"One cuts off [branches] at a specific place to improve the tree.\"
The Eglei Tal and others note that the Rambam (Hilchot Shemitah 1:3, based on Mo'ed Katan 3a) considers pruning merely a derivative of planting with regard to the concept of forbidden labor in the Sabbatical year, while in the present context it is considered in the same status as planting itself.
The Eglei Tal resolves this difficulty on the basis of the principle that with regard to the Sabbath, it is, \"thoughtful work,\" that the Torah forbade. This principle does not apply with regard to the prohibitions against working the land in the Sabbatical year.
Accordingly, since the activities of planting and pruning are very different, pruning is considered only a derivative with regard to the Sabbatical year. With regard to the Sabbath labors, however, intent is of fundamental importance. Since the intent of both activities is the same - to enable the plant to grow - they are both given equal status.
All of these [activities] are considered a single primary category of [forbidden] labor, [for] they share a commonality, since all these activities have a single intent:5With this statement, the Rambam explains the difference between the sets of activities mentioned in the previous halachah, and those mentioned in this halachah. Plowing, digging, and making a groove are very similar activities, but they differ in their objectives. The activities mentioned in this halachah, by contrast, do not resemble each other; nevertheless, they share the same intent. to cause [a plant] to grow.", + "Similarly, a person who reaps grain or legumes, one who harvests grapes, dates, olives, or figs: All these [activities] are considered a single primary category of [forbidden] labor, [for] they share a commonality, since all these activities have a single intent:6The activities mentioned in this halachah differ from those mentioned in the previous halachah in that each of the activities in this halachah involves a different type of produce. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize that they are all considered in the same status. to remove produce from [the plant] on which it grows. [The same principle applies] with regard to other forbidden categories of labor.", + "A derivative is a labor that resembles one of these categories of [forbidden] labor.7In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), the Rambam explains that a derivative is an activity that produces a result similar to that produced by one of the forbidden labors, but differs both in the intent and the nature of the activity. What is implied? A person who cuts a vegetable into small pieces to cook is liable,8See Chapter 21, Halachah 18. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, for the activity to be forbidden as a derivative of grinding, one must have the intent to cook it. for this activity resembles grinding. When a person grinds, he takes one [large] entity, and divides it into smaller parts. Anyone who performs an activity that resembles this is [performing] a derivative of the labor of grinding. Similarly, a person who takes a strip of metal and pulverizes it to use the powder9See Chapter 8, Halachah 15. acts as goldsmiths do;10This phrase emphasizes that to be liable, one's intent in pulverizing the metal must be for a useful purpose. If one's intent is merely destructive in nature, one is not liable. he is [performing] a derivative of the labor of grinding.", + "Similarly, one who takes milk and inserts a [piece of intestine] in it so that it curdles is liable for [performing] a derivative of separating,11Note the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2), which states that with regard to both this activity and making cheese, one is liable for performing a derivative of kneading. for he separates the curds from the whey.
If one made cheese from it, one is liable for [performing a derivative of building]. Whenever one collects separate entities and bonds them together so that they form a single mass, [the activity] resembles building.
Similarly, each of the primary categories of [forbidden] labor [mentioned above] possesses derivatives,12The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) states that one of the determinants of a primary category of forbidden labor is that it has derivatives. Perhaps it is to emphasize this point that the Rambam mentions derivatives for each of the thirty-nine categories of labor in the succeeding chapters. Even when the derivatives are not explicitly mentioned in the Talmud, he uses logic to define activities that fall in these categories. (See Merkevet HaMishneh.) which are determined according to the principles explained above. From the nature of the [forbidden] labor performed on the Sabbath, one can determine in which category of [forbidden] labor it should be included, or which [forbidden] labor it is a derivative of.", + "A person who willingly, as a conscious act of defiance, performs an activity that constitutes one of the primary categories of [forbidden] labor or one of the derivatives [of these categories] is liable for karet.13The Rambam is restating the principles stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, in terms of the concepts of primary categories of forbidden labor and their derivatives. If witnesses come, he should be stoned [to death].14As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, a person is executed for the performance of a forbidden labor only if witnesses warn him of the nature of the prohibition beforehand. If [he performs such an activity] without being conscious of the transgression, he must bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.
If so, what is the difference between the primary categories of [forbidden] labor and the derivatives?15The Rambam's question is: Since one incurs the same liabilities regardless of whether one performs an activity that itself constitutes a forbidden category of labor or merely a derivative, of what importance is the definition of such categories? There is no difference except with regard to sacrifices. When a person, without being conscious of the transgression involved, performs many activities, each of which constitutes a different primary category [of forbidden labor] in one period of lack of awareness,16A person is obligated to bring a sin offering if he was unaware that the forbidden labor he performed involved a transgression, despite the fact that he performed it several times. Even if the period in which he is not conscious of the transgression lasts several weeks, he is obligated for only a single offering for each category of forbidden labor. (See Shabbat 7:1 and Hilchot Shegagot, Chapter 7.) he is obligated to bring a sin offering for every such category17Since each category of forbidden labor involves a different subject of which he was unaware, he is required to bring a different sin offering for it. [of forbidden labor].18As explained in the above- mentioned sources, a person is liable for the above only when he knows the day on which the Sabbath should be observed and is aware of the prohibition against work, but does not know of the prohibition involved in the performance of a (or several) forbidden labor(s). If, however, a person forgets the day on which the Sabbath should be observed, he is required to bring merely a single sin offering for each Sabbath he violated, regardless of how many forbidden labors he performed that day. Furthermore, a person who was totally unaware of the prohibition against working on the Sabbath is required to bring only one sin offering. This single sacrifice atones for all the Sabbaths that he did not observe.
If he performs an activity that constitutes a primary category [of forbidden labor] and its derivatives in one period of lack of awareness, he is obligated to bring merely one sin offering.19For it is the lack of knowledge of a single category of labor that is involved. All of the violations stem from the lack of awareness of a single matter. The same ruling applies if one performs several derivatives of the same category of labor (Hilchot Shegagot 7:5). If, however, one performed derivatives of two different categories of labor, one is required to bring two sin offerings (loc. cit.:6).", + "What is implied? If a person plows, sows, and reaps on the Sabbath in a single period of lack of awareness, he is required to bring three sin offerings. Even if he performs all thirty-nine [forbidden] labors without knowing of the prohibition involved - e.g., he forgot that it is forbidden to perform these labors on the Sabbath - he is obligated to bring one sin offering for each and every [forbidden] labor.20In his gloss to Hilchot Shegagot 7:3, the Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which focuses on the following question: If the person is unaware of the entire concept of forbidden labor, how can we say that he is aware of the concept of Sabbath in general? Seemingly, he should be obligated for only a single sin offering. [I.e., when a person is aware of the concept of the Sabbath, but is unaware of a (or several) particular labor(s), every labor is considered an entity that requires his attention. Hence, a sacrifice is required for each labor. When, however, the entire concept of the Sabbath is unknown to him, there is but one matter of which he is unaware. Hence, only one sacrifice is necessary.]
Among the resolutions offered are that the person knew of the positive commandments associated with the Sabbath or that he knew of the prohibition associated with going beyond the Sabbath limits. Alternatively, he knew of the prohibition against forbidden labor, but did not know which labors where forbidden. From the Rambam's wording itself, another resolution can be offered: The person knew that the labors were forbidden, but did not know that they were punishable by karet.

In contrast, if he ground [grain], cut a vegetable, and pulverized a strip of metal during a single period of lack of awareness, he is required to bring only one sin offering [for each Sabbath],21The bracketed addition is based on Hilchot Shegagot 7:8-9, which explains that in these circumstances, one is required to bring a sin offering for every Sabbath on which one transgressed. for he performed only a single primary [forbidden] labor and its derivatives. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "When a person performs many labors corresponding to a single category of labor in one period of lack of awareness, he is obligated to bring only one sin offering.22As mentioned in the commentary on Halachah 2, this refers to activities that so closely resemble the activities that constitute the primary categories of labor that they are also considered to be primary labors. Despite their having this distinction, since only a single category of forbidden labor is involved, only one sacrifice is required.
What is implied? When a person sowed, planted, extended, grafted, and pruned in a single period of lack of awareness, he is obligated to bring only a single sin offering, for all of these [activities] are included in the same primary category of labor. The same applies in all similar situations." + ], + [ + "A person who plows even the slightest amount [of earth] is liable.1Since one can plant a seed in even the tiniest hole, even the smallest amount of plowing is considered significant (Shabbat 103a). One who weeds around the roots of trees, cuts off grasses, or prunes shoots to beautify the land2Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 12:2. Note Rashi and others, who offer different interpretations.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam emphasizes that if one's intent when performing these activities is to gather the growths one is cutting, one is liable for reaping. If one's intent is to improve the tree so that it will grow better, one is liable for sowing, as stated in the following halachah.
- these are derivatives of plowing. One is liable for performing even the slightest amount of these activities.
Similarly, one who levels the surface of a field - e.g., one who lowers a mound and flattens it or fills a vale - is liable for [performing a derivative of] plowing.3Note Shabbat 73b, which states that the Rambam's statements apply when these activities are performed outside. A person who performs these activities inside a house is liable for building. See Chapter 10, Halachah 12. [One is liable for performing] the slightest amount of these activities. Similarly, one who levels cavities [in the ground] to even the slightest degree is liable.", + "A person who sows even the slightest amount is liable.4One is liable for sowing even the tiniest seed, since from it, a l arge plant can grow. A person who prunes a tree so that it grows performs an activity resembling sowing.5See Chapter 7, Halachah 3, and notes. In contrast, watering plants and trees on the Sabbath is considered merely a derivative of sowing.6Since watering does not involve a seed, plant, or tree itself (as do all of the activities mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachah 2), it is considered merely a derivative of sowing. One is liable for even the slightest amount. Similarly, one who soaks the seeds of wheat, barley, and the like in water [performs] a derivative of sowing7In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that the source for his statements is Zevachim 94b, which mentions that one is liable for soaking seeds so they sprout. Others point to Shabbat 17b, which states that one is liable for soaking vetch, a type of bean fed to cattle. and is liable for even the slightest amount.", + "One who reaps an amount the size of a dried fig is liable.8Reaping is important because it provides food for us to eat. Since an amount smaller than a dried fig is not considered a significant measure of food, one is not held liable for reaping until one reaps that amount. Plucking [fruit] is considered a derivative of reaping.9Plucking the fruit is considered merely as a derivative, because in contrast to reaping, which is done with a utensil, plucking is done by hand (Lechem Mishneh). Similarly, any person who removes produce from where it is growing is liable for reaping. Therefore, a person who removes grass growing from a rock, a parasite plant that grows on shrubs, or grasses that grow on a barrel is liable, for this is the place where they grow.10I.e., since these plants grow naturally in these places, one is held liable for removing them.
In contrast, a person who removes [fruit from a plant growing] in a flower pot that is not perforated is not liable, for this is not the [ordinary] place from which it grows.11Such plants grow naturally in the ground. By planting them in a flower pot, one separates them from their normal place of growth. Hence, they are no longer considered to be connected to their source, and according to the Torah there is no prohibition against picking fruit from such a plant. There is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition involved. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 336:7- 8.) If, however, the flower pot has a hole the size of a small root, [the plant] is considered as growing in the ground12It is able to receive nurture from the earth through the hole. (See Rashi, Shabbat 107b.) The above applies only in homes with earth floors where there is no interruption (except air) between the flower pot and the earth. See Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchasah, p. 326.
The difference between a flower pot that is perforated and one that is not perforated is relevant in many different contexts within Torah law. (See Hilchot Kilayim 1:2, 5:16; Hilchot Mechirah 3:16, and other sources.)
and a person who picks fruit from it is liable.", + "Whenever reaping from a plant causes it to grow larger - e.g., cattle-grass or beets - a person who harvests it without knowing of the prohibition involved is liable for two sin offerings: one because he [performed the labor of] reaping, and one because he [performed the labor of] planting.13Although the person performed merely one activity, since this activity produces effects that parallel those accomplished by two separate forbidden labors, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each. Similarly, a person who prunes [a tree] and desires to use [the branches he prunes] is liable for reaping and planting.
[The following rules apply to] a clod of earth on which grass is growing: If one lifted it from the earth and placed it on staves, one is liable for uprooting. If it was supported by staves and one placed it on the earth, one is liable for planting.14Significantly, Rashi (Shabbat 81b) and others maintain that one is not held liable in this instance. Although such activity is forbidden by Rabbinic decree, since the connection between the flower pot and the ground was never interrupted, one is not considered to have uprooted the plant (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 336:12).
When figs have dried out while on the tree, and similarly, [other] trees whose fruits have dried out - a person who picks them on the Sabbath is liable15Since they remain attached to the tree, they are governed by the same rules as other fruit.
Tosafot (Shabbat 150b) maintains that this ruling applies only when the stems attaching the fruit to the tree are still fresh. If they have also dried out, one is not held liable for picking the fruit. (See Be'ur Halachah 336.)
although they are considered to be detached [from the tree] with regard to the laws of ritual purity.16See Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 2:4-5.", + "[The following rules apply to] one who uproots chicory or who prunes moist shoots:17Although the latter are most frequently used as fodder for animals, at times they are cooked and eaten by human beings. (See Sh'vi'it 7:5 and the Rambam's Commentary.) If he intends to use them as food [for human beings], the minimum measure [for which one is held liable for reaping] is the size of a dried fig.18As evident from the laws that follow, this is the minimum measure for which one is liable for all forbidden labors associated with food. Eating a lesser amount is not significant.
The Nodeh BiY'hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. II, Responsum 34) notes that Shabbat 103a states that this measure applies when one gathers these substances in a field belonging to a colleague. When gathering in one's own field, by contrast, one is liable for even the slightest amount, since in doing so, one clears one's field, a derivative of the labor of plowing.
The Noda BiY'hudah explains that the Talmudic passage does not contradict the Rambam's decision. As mentioned in the previous halachot, one can be liable for transgressing two different forbidden labors when performing a single activity. Thus, as soon as one gathers any of these substances, one is liable for plowing. Should one one gather the amounts mentioned by the Rambam in this halachah, one is also liable for reaping.
If he intends to use them as animal [fodder], the minimum measure is the amount necessary to fill the mouth of a young kid.19Based on Shabbat 76a, it appears that a mouthful of a kid is slightly less than the size of a dried fig. If he intends to use them for kindling, the minimum measure is the amount necessary to cook an egg.20This is the smallest amount of kindling wood that will be useful for a person.
[Similar measures apply with regard to the forbidden labor of] collecting food:21Although collecting food is a forbidden labor in its own right, the Rambam mentions it within the context of this halachah, because the measures for which one is held liable correspond exactly to those mentioned with regard to the previous law. If [one's intent is to use it] as [food for human beings], the minimum measure [for which one is held liable] is the size of a dried fig. [If one's intent is] for animal [fodder], the minimum measure is the amount necessary to fill the mouth of a young kid. [If one's intent is] for kindling, the minimum measure is the amount necessary to cook an egg.
Whenever the term \"an egg\" is used, the intent is an average-size chicken egg.22In contemporary measure, the size of an egg is determined as 57.6 cubic centimeters by Shiurei Torah and 100 cubic centimeters by Chazon Ish. Whenever the term \"the amount necessary to cook an egg\" is used, the intent is the amount necessary to cook a portion of an egg the size of a dried fig. A dried fig is one-third the size of an egg.23The Ra'avad states that this measure is not exact, and the actual amount is slightly larger. The difference between their opinions is based on the interpretation of Eruvin 80b and 82b. Similarly, their understanding of those passages affects their determination of many different significant measures in Torah law, for example, כדי אכילת פרס (the measure of time associated with the mitzvot and prohibitions connected with eating). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 368:3) mentions both opinions.
[The forbidden labor of] collecting food applies only with regard to [collecting] the earth's produce.24Thus excluding salt or similar substances (Shabbat 73b). (Note the Kessef Mishneh's comments regarding the proper text of that Talmudic passage.) As the Rambam states in Chapter 21, Halachah 11, there is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition against gathering salt.
The Hagahot Maimoniot (21:8) state that just as sheaves are collected in a field - the place where produce grows - similarly, all activities that are derivatives of this forbidden labor must take place in or near the field or orchards in which the produce grows. The Tur (Orach Chayim 240) and others also accept this ruling. From Chapter 21, Halachah 11, it appears that the Rambam also follows this approach.
", + "A person who collects figs25Rav Moshe Kohen mentions that a person is liable only when he collects the fruit near the grooves of trees where they grow. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted outright by the later authorities. (See the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:15 and the Mishnah Berurah 340:38.) and makes a chain from them or one who pierces a hole through dates and passes a string through them until they are collected as a single entity performs a derivative26The commentaries have not cited a direct source for the laws stated in this halachah [although there is a parallel in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2)]. Some cite this as an example of the Rambam's use of his own powers of deduction to determine derivatives for forbidden labors, so that every category of forbidden labor will be associated with derivatives. of the forbidden labor of collecting sheaves. The same applies in other similar circumstances.", + "A person who threshes [an amount of grain the size of] a dried fig is liable. [The forbidden labor of] threshing applies only with regard to the earth's produce.27Rav Moshe Kohen questions this statement, for the derivatives of a forbidden labor must resemble the forbidden labor itself. Thus it is difficult to understand how the Rambam can make such a statement and also state that one is liable for extracting food or for milking an animal.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Rivash (Responsa 121) state that an animal that lives on the land (as opposed to fish and other creatures that live in the sea) can be considered as produce of the earth, because it derives its life from the earth's produce.
The Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham, however, does not accept the basic premise of the question and explains that a derivative of a forbidden labor can differ drastically from the forbidden labor itself. Accordingly, even though threshing applies only with regard to produce, its derivatives can involve animals (Birkat Avraham, Responsum 18).

Extracting produce from its shell28This applies to extracting kernels of grain from their husks or legumes from its pods. Nevertheless, the Eglei Tal allows one to remove the shells of onion and garlic, and Sh'vitat HaShabbat permits the removal of the hard shells of nuts. is a derivative of threshing; [a person who performs this activity] is liable. The same applies in all similar situations. Similarly, a person who milks an animal is liable for extracting food.29The Rambam's opinion is also accepted by Rashi (Shabbat 95a) and other authorities. Rabbenu Tam and other Rishonim agree that milking is forbidden according to Torah law, but consider it a derivative of other categories of labor. The Ramban (Shabbat 145) considers this merely a Rabbinic prohibition.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:20), which states that one may tell a gentile to milk an animal. This leniency is permitted because the animal will suffer pain if it is not milked. Other leniencies are also granted on the basis of the Rambam's statements in Halachah 10.
The question of milking animals attracted much attention in the early years of agricultural development in Eretz Yisrael, when the question arose regarding milking herds of animals when a gentile was not available. (See K'tzot HaShulchan, Vol. VI, p. 34 ff. and other sources.)

By the same token, a person who wounds an animal that has a hide30This concept is defined in Halachah 9.is liable for extracting,31Although it is universally accepted that one is liable for drawing blood from an animal, the Rishonim differ under which category of forbidden work this prohibition falls. Rashi, Shabbat 107a, mentions an opinion that extracting blood falls into the category of dyeing. Tosafot, Shabbat 75a, Ketubot 6b, offers a different interpretation, explaining that it is included in the category of slaughtering. provided he requires the blood32To use as a remedy or as food for a dog or other animal (Shabbat 106a; the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 14:1).that flows from the wound. If, however, his intent is merely to wound [the animal], he is not liable, because his activity is destructive in nature.33See Chapter 1, Halachah 17. One is not liable unless one extracts a quantity of blood or milk equivalent to the size of a dried fig.34The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that the minimum measures for liquids differ than those of foods. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's decision, explaining that since he considers these activities as derivatives of threshing, the minimum amount for which one is liable is the same as for threshing. It must be emphasized that according to the opinions of Rashi and Tosafot (see note 31), one is liable for extracting a quantity of blood smaller than the size of a dried fig.", + "When does the above apply? When one wounds an animal, a wild beast, a fowl, or the like. If one wounds a fellow man, by contrast, one is liable although one's intent is to injure, for [this activity generates] pleasure.35This ruling depends on the Rambam's decision, Chapter 1, Halachah 7, where he states that one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Although the person is performing the forbidden labor for reasons very different from those that were involved in the construction of the Sanctuary, he is held liable because he is fulfilling his intent. It causes one's feelings to cool and one's anger to subside. Therefore, it is considered \"constructive\" in nature. Accordingly, even if one does not require the blood that one extracts, one is liable.36The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, based on his interpretation (which parallels that of Rashi) of Shabbat 105b. The Rambam, however, interprets this passage differently. (See the Maggid Mishneh.)", + "The eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah37Leviticus 11:29,30 mentions that the carcasses of these animals convey ritual impurity. There are various different opinions regarding the meanings of the Hebrew names for the species mentioned there. The Living Torah offers the following interpretation: the weasel, the mouse, the ferret, the hedgehog, the chameleon, the lizard, the snail, and the mole. have hides whose status is analogous to those of animals, beasts, and fowl with regard to the Sabbath laws.38The hides of these animals are tougher than the flesh beneath them. Therefore, there is a possibility that a wound will cause internal bleeding and that the blood will never be reabsorbed by the body. Other small creatures and crawling animals are not considered to have a hide [whose status is significant with regard to the Sabbath laws]. Therefore, one who wounds them is not liable.39The Rambam states that one is not liable for wounding other creeping animals even if one causes them to bleed. This decision is not accepted by most authorities (see Rashi and others, Chulin 46b), who maintain that one is not liable for causing these creatures to bleed internally. If, however, one causes external bleeding, one is liable.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 316:8) accepts the opinion of the other authorities. This decision depends on the difference of opinion mentioned in note 31 as to the category of forbidden labor of which causing bleeding is a derivative. As mentioned, the Rambam considers this activity a derivative of the labor of threshing, and threshing involves removing a substance from a hard shell. Since the hides of the other crawling animals are not tough, causing them to bleed cannot be considered a derivative of this labor. According to the opinion that bleeding is a derivative of slaughtering, however, one is liable for making any animal bleed, regardless of the nature of its hide (Ziv HaMishneh).
The question whether one may kill creeping animals that are dangerous is discussed in Chapter 10, Halachah 25 and notes.

One who wounds an animal, beast, fowl, or one of the above-mentioned eight creeping animals is liable whether he caused an open wound from which they bled or he made a bruise that caused internal bleeding.", + "A person who squeezes fruit to extract its juice is liable for extracting. One is not liable until he extracts an amount of juice equivalent to the size of a dried fig. From the Torah itself, one is liable for pressing only grapes and olives.40Rashi, Shabbat 143b, explains that the reason is that the primary purpose which grapes and olives are grown is for these liquids. With regard to other fruits, by contrast, it is not as common to use them for juice. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), it appears that the Rambam also accepts this rationale.
(Rabbenu Nissim gives another reason: The juices of other fruits are not considered as liquids, but as food. See Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:4. The Pri Megadim and others consider these as two separate rationales.)
Note Chapter 21, Halachah 12, which states that there is a Rabbinic prohibition against squeezing other fruits that are frequently used for juice (Shabbat 144b gives as examples, berries and pomegranates). If, however, it is not common to use a fruit for juice, there is no prohibition at all against squeezing juice from it. Note also the discussion in the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 320) regarding squeezing lemons to make lemonade.

It is, [however,] permitted to squeeze a cluster of grapes directly into food, since a liquid that is absorbed into food is considered as food. Thus, one is considered to be extracting food from food.41Rabbenu Chanan'el does not accept this leniency and maintains that one is liable. In a responsum, Rabbenu Asher states that a person who observes this stringency will be blessed (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 320). Nevertheless, if one squeezes these liquids into a vessel that does not contain food,42It is prohibited to do this even if one ultimately intends to mix these beverages into food. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch Harav 320:6, which states that since one ultimately intends to mix the liquid into food, the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in nature. this is considered pressing and one is liable.
[Similarly,] one who milks directly into food43The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this law applies only on a festival, but not on the Sabbath. Since the animal may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath, it is not considered as \"food.\" Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 505) quotes this law with regard to the laws of festivals and not with regard to the Sabbath laws. or one who sucks with his mouth is not liable.44See Chapter 21, Halachah 14. Based on this leniency, there are authorities who allow one to suck the juice from grapes and other fruits. Other authorities forbid this. (See Ramah, Orach Chayim 320:1.) One is liable only when one milks into a container.45The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:21 states that a person who milks an animal and lets the milk flow from the animal to the ground is not liable, for this is not the normal manner in which an animal is milked. This can be interpreted as the implication of the Rambam's words: \"One is liable only when one milks into a container.\"", + "A person who winnows or separates [an amount of food the size of] a dried fig is liable.46With regard to separation, this can also be interpreted as separating the unwanted matter (whether more or less than the size of a dried fig) to produce an amount of food the size of a dried fig (Minchat Chinuch). The Yeshu'ot Ya'akov 319:1 differs and maintains that both the food and the unwanted matter are counted when reckoning the amount equal to the dried fig. Causing milk to curdle is a derivative [of the category] of separating.
Similarly, a person who separates the dregs from liquids is liable for having performed a derivative of separating or a derivative of sifting.47See Halachah 14 and also Chapter 21, Halachah 17, for more particulars regarding the separation of dregs from liquids. [The particular category of forbidden labor is not defined,] because the labors of winnowing, separating, and sifting resemble each other.48See the Eglei Tal, who questions whether these three activities can be combined. Thus, if one winnowed an amount of grain one third the size of a dried fig, and one separated and sifted the same amount, is one liable for a sin offering under such circumstances or not? [If so,] why were they reckoned as three [separate categories? Because every labor that was performed in the Sanctuary is counted as a separate category.", + "A person who separates food from unwanted matter49Primarily, the forbidden labor of separating involves separating unwanted matter from food. In the Sanctuary, it involved separating unwanted matter - pebbles and the like - from the herbs used for the dyes. Nevertheless, if one uses a utensil that is made for the purpose of separation, one is liable even when separating food from unwanted matter.
See also the Turei Zahav 319:12 who states that the prohibition against separation applies, not only to the separation of unwanted matter from food, but also to the separation of unwanted matter from substances other than food. This opinion is accepted by the later authorities.
and one who separates one type of food from another food50In this instance, since one does not wish to partake of the other food, it is considered unwanted matter, and it is forbidden to separate the food one desires from it. When, however, one separates one portion of one type of food from another portion of the same food, one is never considered to be separating (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 319:4-5; Mishnah Berurah 319:15). using a sifter or a strainer is liable. If one separates using a tray51Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Keilim 16:3. Rashi translates this as a sieve. His interpretation is accepted by most authorities. or a pot with compartments,52Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit:1. one is not liable. It is permitted to separate food by hand to eat immediately.53The Ramah (Orach Chayim 319:1) explains that \"immediately\" means \"for the purpose of the meal that one is attending.\" If one separates the food for use at a later time, one is liable, as stated in the following halachah.", + "A person who separates unwanted matter from food is liable,54As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, this is the primary form of the labor of separating. even if he does so using only one hand.55The word \"one\" is not found in the authoritative Yemenite manuscripts. It is, however, included in the quotation of this halachah in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:4). The Mishnah Berurah 319:17 notes that some texts of the Shulchan Aruch also do not include it.
According to those versions that do include it, the intent is that using only one hand is not considered an abnormal way of performing this labor.
A person who separates turmos beans from their shucks is liable, for the shucks sweeten them when they are cooked together. Therefore, one is considered to be taking unwanted matter from food and is held liable.56As explained in the notes on Chapter 3, Halachah 12, the turmos beans are very bitter and must be cooked seven times before they are edible. The shucks help absorb some of this bitterness. Hence, they are not considered as unwanted matter. (See Rashi, Shabbat 74a.)
A person who separates food from unwanted matter by hand and sets it aside [to serve] at a later time,57One is not held liable for separating food in the process of eating, for the Torah's intent was surely not to prevent a person from eating in the normal manner. Separating food and setting it aside to be used later is not necessary to allow one to eat normally. Hence, it is considered in the category of this forbidden labor (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 1-2). even later on [the Sabbath] itself, is considered to have separated for the purpose of storage and is held liable.
If there were two types of food mixed together before a person, he may separate one from the other and place it aside to eat immediately. If he separated [one from the other] and set it aside [to serve] at a later time, even later on [the Sabbath] itself, he is liable - for example, one separated food in the morning to eat in the late afternoon.58The Rambam's intent should not be misinterpreted: even if one decides to eat the food set aside at a second meal served earlier in the day, one is also held liable. It was merely common custom to eat two meals during the daytime on the Sabbath - one in the morning and one in the evening. (See Magen Avraham 319:6.)", + "A person who filters the dregs from wine, oil, water, or other liquids, using a utensil appropriate for this purpose59The Rambam's words literally mean \"their filter.\" The Shulchan Aruch 319:10 states \"filter,\" seemingly implying all filters, even one not specifically made for that liquid. is liable,60See Halachah 11. provided he removes the dregs from an amount of liquid equivalent to the size of a dried fig. One may, however, filter wine61One must, however, do so in a manner slightly different from the way one filters these liquids during the week, as the Rambam states in Chapter 21, Halachah 17. that has no dregs, or clear water, with a handkerchief or with an Egyptian basket62A basket made of woven palm branches. so they will become crystal clear.63The Rashba and other authorities differ with the Rambam, based on their interpretation of Shabbat 139b. According to the Rashba, one may filter even cloudy wine with a handkerchief or other strainer of this nature, since this is not the normal manner in which this activity is performed.
According to the Rambam, although one would not be liable for straining the wine in this manner, it would still be forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The only filtering that is permitted is filtering wine that is already fit to be drunk, so that it will become crystal clear. One might ask: Of what value is such an act? The answer is that precisely because most people would not consider this activity of value, and only the most spoiled individuals would require it, is it permitted. (According to the Rashba, such beverages may even be filtered with an ordinary filter.) Though the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:10) mentions the Rambam's view, the Rashba's ruling is favored.

We may pour water over wine dregs64The dregs were placed in a strainer on Friday, and one desires to pour the water over them on the Sabbath day (Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Shabbat 20:2). so they will become clear.65To remove any residue of wine that might be left in the dregs (ibid.). [Similarly,] we may place a raw egg in a mustard strainer so that it becomes clear.66The intent is to mix the egg with mustard lying at the bottom of the strainer that has already been strained before the Sabbath (Shabbat 134a). In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 20:2), the Rambam states that when raw eggs are mixed with coarse foods, they cause the lighter matter to rise above the heavier, coarse matter. Thus, by mixing the egg with the mustard, one will cause it to undergo a further process of refinement. Nevertheless, this is not included in the forbidden labor of separating.
It must be noted that the Tur (Orach Chayim 319) explains that the problem in question in this instance is that the egg yolk will pass through the strainer, while the albumen will not. Nevertheless, this is not considered a derivative of the forbidden labor of separating. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 319:15) follows this interpretation.

When one has mixed mustard on Friday, one may stir it by hand or with a utensil to make it fit to drink [on the Sabbath].67Since the mustard is already strained and is fit to be used, there is no difficulty in stirring it further. (See also Chapter 22, Halachah 12.) Similarly, while wine is in the process of fermentation, one may pour out a barrel of wine together with the dregs over handkerchiefs, for the dregs have not been finely separated from the wine and they are still considered a single mixture.68Rashi, Shabbat 139b, explains that this straining process will not be very effective. Hence, it is permitted. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 319:14 focuses on the Rambam's words and explains that since the wine and the dregs are considered a single mixture, the forbidden labor of separation does not apply. The concept of separation applies when the desired entity and the dregs are distinct, and this is not true until the wine has completed the fermentation process. The same applies to mustard and all similar substances.69I.e., although it is forbidden to strain mustard using a strainer on the Sabbath, one may strain it through a handkerchief (Or Sameach).", + "A person who grinds [an amount of grain the size of] a dried fig is liable. One who crushes spices or herbs in a mortar is performing the labor of grinding and is held liable.70Indeed, in the construction of the Sanctuary, it was herbs that were crushed for use as dyes.
A person who cuts a vegetable that has been detached from its source [into small pieces] performs a derivative of the labor of grinding.71See Chapter 7, Halachah 5, Chapter 21, Halachah 18. In those halachot, the Rambam adds the expression \"to cook it,\" implying that one is not liable for cutting vegetables one intends to eat raw. When the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:12) quotes this law, it omits the above term, leading to the conclusion that one is liable even for cutting vegetables that one desires to eat raw. For this reason, in his gloss the Ramah clarifies that one is liable only when one cuts the vegetables and then stores them for later use, if one partakes of them immediately, one is not liable.
Similarly, a person who saws wood in order to benefit from the sawdust, and similarly, one who files a piece of metal is liable72See Chapter 7, Halachah 5.for filing even the slightest amount.73Because any amount of the dust he desires will be useful for him. This is evident from Chapter 18, Halachah 5. A person who chops wood is not liable [for grinding] until he produces enough chips to cook an amount of egg the size of a dried fig.74Since he intends to use the wood for kindling, he must have enough wood to perform an an activity of at least minimal importance. (See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.)", + "A person who sifts [an amount of flour the size of] a dried fig is liable.75The Rambam does not mention derivatives for this category of forbidden labor, because, as mentioned in Halachah 11, sifting resembles the categories of separating and winnowing, and it is not clear which of these categories of forbidden labor the derivatives of these activities fall under.
A person who kneads [dough76This addition follows the opinion of the Minchat Chinuch. The Eglei Tal differs, maintaining that for a person to be liable, the flour used for the dough must be this size before water is added. the size of] a dried fig is liable. Mixing earth [for use as cement] is a derivative of kneading. What is the minimum amount for which one is liable? The amount necessary to make a crucible for a goldsmith.77This measure is derived from Chapter 18, Halachah 11. The activity of mixing cement cannot be performed with ash, coarse sand, bran, or the like.78The forbidden labor of kneading involves adding water to a collection of granular substances - e.g., flour or cement - and mixing them until they cling together as a single mass. Since the substances mentioned in this clause of the halachah do not adhere to each other, one can never be held liable for performing this forbidden labor with them. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 21, Halachot 33-34, this opinion is not accepted by all authorities.
There is another difference of opinion among the Sages and later Rabbis pertinent to this matter. Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah (Shabbat 155b) mentions that kneading involves actually mixing the dough with one's hands. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi differs and maintains that one is liable for kneading as soon as one pours water into flour. This opinion is accepted by some authorities (Sefer HaTerumot) and is referred to in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:16).

A person who places sesame seeds, flax seeds, or the like in water is liable for kneading,79As mentioned in Halachah 2, if a person places seeds into water so they sprout, he is liable for performing a derivative of sowing. (See Mishnah Berurah 336:51 which states that this applies only when one has the intent that they sprout. A person who soaks seeds so that they soften is not liable.) If one pours water over the seeds mentioned in this halachah, one is liable for kneading. because they become attached to each other." + ], + [ + "A person who bakes [an amount of food] the size of a dried fig is liable. Just as a person is liable for baking bread, he is liable for cooking food or herbs, or for heating water. These are all one type [of activity].1According to the opinion that reckons only the labors necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary, cooking - and not baking - was the labor performed. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the commentary on Chapter 7, Halachah 1, the Mishnah (and, therefore, the Rambam) mentioned these activities in the order associated with the preparation of bread, for this was more common (Shabbat 74b).
The minimum amount of water for which one is liable for heating2As obvious from the continuation of the halachah, the intent is not to boil the water, but to warm it enough so that it is comfortable to use for washing. is an amount sufficient to wash3The Mayim Chayim states that generally water was heated for the purpose of washing. (Although hot drinks were served in that age as well, the \"cooking\" of these beverages involves mixing in other ingredients.) Note the S'dei Chemed (Vol. III, Section 1, Chapter 230), which questions whether heating water (for purposes other than washing) is prohibited by the Torah. a small limb.4As stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 2, this refers to the amount of water necessary to wash the small toe of a newborn baby. The minimum amount of herbs for which one is liable is the amount required to serve the purpose for which they are being cooked.5The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's statements, stating that our Sages (Tosefta, Shabbat, Chapter 10) mentioned a minimum measure, the amount necessary to dye a small cloth used as a hair-net. The Lechem Mishneh attempts to resolve the difference of opinion, explaining that the Rambam also recognizes that measure (as reflected in Chapter 18, Halachah 2). Depending on the nature of the dye used, however, there is a difference in the amount of cooking necessary to dye the cloth.
Rav Kapach accepts the principle stated by the Lechem Mishneh, but notes that the minimum measure for dyeing is specifically stated by the Rambam in Halachah 14 of this chapter as \"enough to dye a thread four handbreadths long.\"
", + "A person who places an egg next to a kettle so that it will become slightly cooked6In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 3:2), the Rambam translates the Hebrew תתגלגל as referring to \"mixing\" or to \"becoming slightly cooked.\" is liable if the egg becomes cooked, for a person who cooks with a derivative of fire7In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that the kettle had already been removed from the fire. Nevertheless, because it remained hot from the fire's heat, it is considered a \"derivative of fire.\" is considered as if he cooked with fire itself.
Similarly, a person who washes aged salted fish8Before the era of refrigeration, salt was used a preservative. Rashi (Shabbat 145b) states that this refers to fish that was preserved by salt for over a year. or sole9Our text is based on Rav Kapach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Machshirin 6:3. Other commentaries offer different translations.- a very thin, soft fish - with hot water is liable. Washing them with hot water completes the cooking process they require.10Note Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 6:4, where the Rambam mentions small fish whose cooking is completed by washing them with hot water. Perhaps there he is also referring to sole. Alternatively, perhaps even large sole can be prepared merely by pouring hot water over them. The same principles apply in other similar situations.", + "A person who breaks open an egg over a warm cloth, over sand, or over the dust of the roads that are heated by the sun is not liable11Even if the food cooks thoroughly, one is not liable, because this is not the ordinary way food is cooked. even though it becomes roasted, for the derivatives of the heat of the sun are [governed by] different [laws than those governing] the derivatives of fire. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted a decree forbidding cooking with [the derivatives of the heat of the sun], lest [one cook with] the derivatives of fire.12Were one to be allowed to cook by using substances warmed by the sun, one might err and cook using substances warmed by fire. It is, however, permitted to leave food to be cooked by the sun itself (Shabbat 39a; Hilchot Shabbat, Chapter 22, Halachah 9). Similarly, a person who cooks using the [hot] springs of Tiberias and the like is not held liable.13Although one of the Sages states that a person who cooks in the hot springs of Tiberias is liable, the Talmud immediately clarifies that the intent is \"liable for 'stripes for rebelliousness,' the punishment given for violating a Rabbinic ordinance (Shabbat 40b).
A person who cooks food that has been completely cooked, on a fire,14This statement implies that until the food is completely cooked, one is liable for cooking. This relates one of the points of difference between the Rambam and the Ashkenazic halachic authorities who were cited in our commentary on Chapter 3, Halachah 4. The latter maintain that since food that is one-third or one-half cooked is fit to be eaten, there are leniencies with regard to the laws governing leaving food to warm on the Sabbath and returning food to a fire on the Sabbath. The Rashba (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh) develops this view further and maintains that once food has reached this stage of being cooked, one is not liable for cooking it further.
The Rambam (Chapter 22, Halachah 8), however, maintains that if food has been completely cooked one may place it in hot water on the Sabbath to warm. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:4), however, follows the view of the Ashkenazic authorities who accept this leniency only when the food is dry. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:5) also questions if this leniency also applies with regard to food that was baked or roasted.
or who cooks food that does not need to be cooked15Shabbat 40b mentions this principle with regard to oil. Other examples are fresh fruits and vegetables that are usually eaten raw (Rabbi Akiva Eiger). at all is not liable.16As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the term \"not liable,\" פטור in Hebrew, also implies that this activity is forbidden according to Rabbinic decree. Thus, recooking food or cooking fresh produce on the Sabbath is definitely forbidden.", + "When one person brought fire, another brought wood,1The Rambam's ruling is based on Beitzah 34a and the Tosefta, Shabbat 12:4. There are, however, slight differences between the wording chosen by the Rambam and the wording of those sources. Furthermore, the Talmud implies that the person who brought the fire is liable, not for performing a derivative of the labor of cooking, but for the labor of kindling. (See Rashi, loc. cit.) This is definitely not the Rambam's intent.
In resolution of this difficulty, the Kessef Mishneh quotes his teacher, Rav Ya'akov bei Rav, who explains that the first clause describes a situation in which all the individuals performed their act virtually simultaneously, with a shared intent. Hence, since the end result of their activity is the performance of a forbidden labor, all are held liable as if they had performed the labor themselves.
another brought a pot,2As the Ra'avad mentions, Beitzah (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to a situation where a new pot is used. Thus, heating the pot hardens it as would heating in a kiln. This is is also a derivative of the labor of cooking. (See Halachah 6 and Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 3:11.)
According to the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh mentioned above, this is unnecessary. Since the pot was brought together with the other elements for the sake of cooking, the person bringing it is liable, even if it is an old pot.
another added water,3Even those who do not accept the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh would hold such a person liable, since a person is liable for heating water, as explained in Halachah 1. another put in meat,4Here too, the obligation is clear, for the person is cooking food. another put in spices,5Since the spices contribute flavor to the food, adding them to the pot is sufficient to make one liable for cooking, even according to the opinions that do not accept the explanation of the Kessef Mishneh. and another stirred it,6for stirring hastens the cooking process. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:18) emphasizes that one is liable for stirring only when the food is not completely cooked. Once it is cooked, there is no prohibition against stirring.
The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that even after food is completely cooked, one should not stir it. The later authorities emphasize that although there is reason to follow this stringency with regard to stirring, there is no difficulty in removing food from the pot if it is already cooked and removed from the fire. (While the pot is cooking this is forbidden, for in the process of taking out the food, one will stir the remaining food.) See Chapter 3, Halachah 11.
all are liable for cooking. For anyone who performs an activity that is necessary for cooking is considered as [having performed that forbidden labor].
If, by contrast, one put down the pot, another came7According to the Kessef Mishneh, this is the key phrase in understanding the difference between the first clause and the second. \"Another came\" - i.e., he came after, and without any connection, to the first individual. Hence, the responsibility is not shared by the entire group. Accordingly, since the actions of the persons mentioned first could not bring about cooking in their own right, they are not held liable. and added water, another came and added meat, another came and added spices, another came and brought fire,8The person bringing the fire would probably be liable for kindling, but that is not the Rambam's concern in this halachah. He is not liable for cooking, for without the wood the flame would burn out in the near future. another came and placed wood on the fire,9Once the wood begins to burn, the fire will have the potential to cook the meat. Hence, the person who brings it is liable. and another came and stirred,10Since the person stirred the food after it began to cook, he is liable. Although he acted independently of the others, the act he performs in its own right is sufficient to incur liability. it is only the latter two who are liable for cooking.", + "When a person places meat over coals, and a portion the size of a dried fig becomes [thoroughly] roasted, he is liable even when the portions that are roasted are [separate, and located] in two or three portions [of the piece of meat].17Although the places where the meat cooked are separate, their size is combined, and the person is held liable if the sum reaches the size of a dried fig.
When there is not a portion the size of a dried fig that has become [thoroughly] roasted, but the entire [piece of meat] becomes half-cooked,18This is the Rambam's definition of the term used by our Sages' כמאכל בן דרוסאי, \"like the food of ben D'rosai.\" Rashi (Shabbat 20a) relates that ben D'rosai was a wanted bandit who would eat his food hurriedly because he was always running to avoid detection.
Significantly, Rashi interprets כמאכל בן דרוסאי as being only one-third cooked. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:2) and many later authorities quote the Rambam's view. The Mishnah Berurah 253:38, however, states that in a difficult situation, one may rely on Rashi's opinion.
one is liable.19Since the meat can be eaten in its present state, one is liable for cooking it. If, however, it is half-cooked from one side only, one is not liable until one turns it so that it becomes half-cooked on both sides.
If a person forgot20The addition of this term is significant. Shabbat 4a also mentions this law in an instance when one purposely violated the Sabbath laws. The Rambam explains that this leniency applies even when one performed such an activity בשוגג. (See the Maggid Mishneh; note also the Lechem Mishneh's objections.) and attached a loaf to an oven on the Sabbath, but remembered [the prohibition involved afterwards], he21But not a colleague (Magen Avraham 254:21). Since removing the loaf from the wall of the oven in previous eras involved a Rabbinic prohibition (as mentioned in Chapter 22, Halachah 1), this was forbidden. A person is not allowed to sin so that his colleague will merit. may remove it22The Rabbis explain that it is desirable to remove the bread in an abnormal manner, because of the prohibition mentioned above. Nevertheless, if it is impossible to do so before the loaf bakes, one may remove it in the ordinary fashion so that one does not transgress the prohibition against baking (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 254:12; Mishnah Berurah 254:41).
It must be emphasized that the baking procedure followed today is different from that referred to by the Rambam. At present, there is no prohibition involved in removing a loaf placed in the oven to bake.
before it bakes23The commentaries question when a person becomes liable for baking. Is it when a crust forms (see Chapter 3, Halachah 18), or must the loaf bake thoroughly? (See Tosafot, Menachot 57b, which compares the forming of a crust to food cooking to the point of being כמאכל בן דרוסאי.) and causes [him to be liable for performing a forbidden] labor.", + "A person who melts even the slightest amount of metal or who heats a piece of metal until [it glows like] a coal24The commentaries question the difference between this point and the ruling of Chapter 12, Halachah 1, that a person who heats iron is liable for kindling. Rav Kapach explains that the difference depends on the nature of the metals involved. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. Iron, in contrast, becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, its processing is associated with the labors of kindling and extinguishing, which have to do with making charcoal. (See the commentary on that halachah.) performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of cooking.25This halachah emphasizes that the forbidden labor of cooking applies to substances other than food. The Rambam explains this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) when defining the nature of the forbidden categories of labor. Similarly, a person who melts wax, tallow, tar, brown tar, or pitch, and the like performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of cooking and is liable.
Similarly, a person who heats an earthenware utensil until it becomes hard clay is liable for cooking. The general principle is: Whether one softens a firm entity with fire or hardens a soft entity, one is liable for cooking.", + "One who shears wool26The Rambam has concluded his description of the eleven categories of forbidden labors associated with the preparation of food, and with this halachah begins discussion of the categories of forbidden labors associated with the preparation of clothing. or hair from an animal or a beast - whether alive or dead - is liable. [This applies even when he] removes [these substances] from skin.27I.e., a surface where hair or wool that would be useful for making a garment does not grow.
What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? Enough to spin a thread that is twice the length of a width of a sit from it.28This is the minimum measure for which one is liable for performing the labors associated with making thread. How long is the width of a sit? The distance from the thumb to the first finger when they are extended as far as possible.29In three different places in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam defines the term \"the width of a sit\": Orlah 3:2, Shabbat 13:4, and Keilim 13:4. In these sources, he defines the width of sit as he does in this halachah. (See also Halachah 10 where the Rambam states that twice this measure is equivalent to four handbreadths.)
In the sources mentioned above, and similarly in Halachah 18, the Rambam differentiates between the terms sit and \"the width of a sit.\" Note that Rashi defines both these measures differently.
This is approximately two thirds of a zeret.30A zeret is defined as the distance between one's thumb and pinky when one's hand is fully extended. This is understood to be half a cubit, three handbreadths (24 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, 30 centimeters according to Chazon Ish).
A person who tears off the wing of a bird [is liable for performing] a derivative of shearing. One who spins wool from a living animal31Although the women preparing the goats' hair for the Sanctuary spun it while it was on the goats themselves (see commentaries to Exodus 35:26 , one is not liable for performing such an activity on the Sabbath, for this is not the ordinary manner in which one spins thread (Shabbat 74b). is not liable, for this is not the ordinary manner of shearing, nor is this the ordinary manner of beating, nor is this the ordinary manner of spinning.", + "A person who cuts his nails, his hair, his mustache, or his beard [performs a] derivative [of the forbidden labor] of shearing and is liable.32As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, the Rambam holds one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, a forbidden labor for a purpose different from the purpose for which the labor was performed in the Sanctuary. In the notes on that halachah, it is explained that this decision is not shared by all authorities.
According to the authorities who differ, there is a difference of opinion whether or not one is liable for cutting one's hair and nails. Tosafot (Shabbat 94b) maintains that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the labor of shearing was performed for the sake of the wool. Therefore, unless a person had a need for his hair or nails, he would not be held liable. The Rivash (Responsum 394), however, explains that before they were used, the tachash skins were shaved to remove the hair. Hence, if one cuts off one's hair or nails for cosmetic purposes, one is liable. (See, however, the notes on Chapter 11, Halachah 5, which differentiate between the forbidden labor of shearing and the forbidden labor of smoothing.)
[This applies] provided one cuts them using a utensil. If one removes them by hand, one is not liable.33Since this is not the usual way of cutting hair or nails, one is not liable. (See also Chapter 22, Halachot 13-14, which discuss the Rabbinical prohibitions involved with cutting hair.) [The above applies regarding both] one's own [nails and the like] and those of a colleague.34The popularly accepted text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:7) states that one who removes a colleague's hair or nails is liable even if he does so by hand. Rav Kapach maintains that the original text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah in fact makes such a statement, but that the Rambam amended the text, and the final version resembles the rulings of this halachah.
Similarly, a person who cuts a wart from his body, whether using a utensil35The Maggid Mishneh protests the decision that a person who cuts off a wart with a utensil is not liable, pointing to Eruvin 103a, which appears to obligate one for such an activity.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1521) explains the Rambam's ruling, stating that this applies only in the Temple. A wart is considered a blemish that makes an animal unfit for sacrifice and a priest unfit for service (see Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 7:10), and by removing the wart one becomes fit for service. Thus, one is liable, not for performing the forbidden labor of shearing, but for the labor of מכה בפטיש, making an entity ready for use. (See also the Tzafenat Paneach, who offers a similar interpretation.)
Note, however, Shulchan Aruch Harav 340:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 340:6, which state that the liability for cutting a wart stems from the forbidden labor of shearing.
or by hand is not liable. [The above applies regarding both] one's own [warts] and those of a colleague.
It is permitted to remove a wart in the Temple by hand,36Not only is one freed of liability, but doing so is permitted, because this is not the ordinary process. Although outside the Temple, this would be forbidden as a sh'vut (Rabbinic decree), there are no such restrictions in the Temple. but not with a utensil. If it is dry, one may cut it off with a utensil,37Note the Ma'aseh Rokeach, which states that since the wart was dry and shriveled, it is considered as if it had been removed already. Nevertheless, as Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc cit.) and the Mishnah Berurah (loc cit.) state that outside the Temple it is forbidden to remove a wart even if it is dry and shriveled. [in order to] take part in the Temple service.", + "How much hair is it necessary for a person to remove with a utensil to be liable? Two hairs.38Two hairs are significant, and, therefore, one who cuts them off is held liable. If one removes a grey hair from dark ones, one is liable for removing even one.39Since one desires to appear young, removing even a single grey hair is significant. This applies to both men and women. Note also the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:10, which prohibit a male from doing this even during the week, since by doing so, he would be adorning himself as a woman does.
[The following rules apply to] a nail when the majority of it has been split, or to strips of flesh that have begun to peel: If they have split upward40Note the gloss of Rav David Arameah and also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:31), which questions whether \"upward\" means towards the end of the finger or towards the body. Since there is no clear cut answer, one must act stringently; in practice, it is forbidden to remove such a nail at all (Mishnah Berurah 328:99). and annoy the person, one may remove them by hand, but not with a utensil. If, however, one removes them with a utensil, one is not liable.41Since the majority of the nail has split or the skin has peeled, the remainder is considered as if it has already been removed according to the Torah. The prohibition against removing it is merely Rabbinic in nature and is waived because of the annoyance the person is suffering when he removes them by hand - i.e., in an abnormal manner (Mishnah Berurah 328:96).
If they do not annoy the person, it is forbidden to remove them even by hand. If the majority has not been split [nor has begun to peel], it is forbidden to remove them even by hand, and one who removes them with a utensil is liable.", + "A person who whitens wool, linen, wool to be dyed crimson,42Our translation follows the Biblical meaning of the word שני. There is, however, a difficulty - what is the difference between this fabric and ordinary wool. The Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim 157) explains that this refers to wool that has already been dyed crimson. Others note that at times שני can also refer to silk. See Rav Kapach's notes to Hilchot Sefer Torah 9:3. or any other fabrics that are ordinarily whitened is liable.
What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? [An amount of fibers large enough] to produce a thread as long as twice the width of a sit - i.e., four handbreadths.43See Halachah 7.", + "Laundering clothes is a derivative of the [forbidden] labor of whitening and causes one to be liable.
A person who wrings out a garment until the water44Note the Kessef Mishneh, who states that according to the Rambam, this prohibition applies also to liquids other than water.
This is a matter of question. Tosafot (Ketubot 6a) and the Tur (Orach Chayim 320), differ, and maintain that one is liable only for wringing out water.
[absorbed] in it is discharged is considered as one who launders45The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rashba and others view wringing out liquids as related to two different forbidden labors. According to these authorities, wringing out water is a derivative of laundering, while wringing out other liquids relates to the forbidden labor of threshing.
The Ramban, however, states that although squeezing juice from fruits is considered to be a derivative of threshing, squeezing liquids other than water from garments is not. Some commentaries have associated this with the principle mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 7, \"[The forbidden labor of] threshing applies only with regard to the earth's produce.\"
and is held liable.46See Chapter 22, Halachah 15, which mentions the Rabbinic prohibitions enacted as safeguards for the Torah prohibition against wringing out liquid. Wringing out [a garment] is one of the activities necessary for laundering, as stirring is one of the activities necessary for cooking.
There is no concept of wringing out hair.47Rashi (Shabbat 128b) explains that hair never absorbs water. Similarly, one is not liable for wringing out leather.48The Avnei Nezer (Responsum 157) explains that since the Rambam considers wringing out liquids as a derivative of whitening, this will apply only when wringing out the liquid will affect the color of the entity from which one is extracting it. This will not happen with regard to hair or leather.
It must be noted that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:9) forbids rubbing leather to clean it. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:19 states this is merely a Rabbinic prohibition (thus following the Rambam's view). The Mishnah Berurah 302:39,42, however, differs and maintains that one is liable for such an act.
", + "One who beats49Our translation of the Hebrew נפץ is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2). Since these fabrics are natural, beating them makes them more pliable. Other authorities translate נפץ as \"comb\" - i.e., comb impurities from the fibers. wool, linen, wool to be dyed crimson, or any other similar fabrics is liable. What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? [An amount of fibers large enough] to produce a thread four handbreadths long.
A person who beats animal sinews until they become like wool, so that [cord]50Cord made from animal sinews is used to sew Torah scrolls and tefillin. can be spun from them, is liable for performing a derivative of beating.", + "A person who dyes a thread that is four handbreadths long or fabric from which a thread of this length can be spun is liable.
A person is not liable unless the dye he uses will make a permanent [change in the article's color]. When the application of color will not have a permanent effect - e.g., one who applies red clay or vermilion to iron or brass and colors it is not liable, for it can be removed immediately without dyeing it at all. Whenever a person performs a labor that does not have a permanent effect on the Sabbath,51We have translated the Rambam's wording literally, although it appears somewhat clumsy, because of a concept that can be derived from it. Permanence is a relative concept in our world. Hence, when a person performs an activity that appears permanent on the Sabbath itself, he can be held liable for it although later there is a possibility for change (Rav Kapach). he is not liable.52Shabbat 12:1 states, \"Anyone who performs a labor - and that labor has an enduring effect on the Sabbath - is liable.\"", + "A person who creates a color is liable [for performing] a derivative of the labor of dyeing.53The source for the Rambam's ruling is a matter of question. The Maggid Mishneh mentions Shabbat 18a, which states that a person who mixes a concentrate of ink with water is liable.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, noting that although in the construction of the Sanctuary, the dyes were made by cooking the herbs in water, the Talmud states that one is liable only for cooking and does not mention the dyeing of the water.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in truth, a person would be liable for two transgressions by cooking dyes: for cooking and for dyeing the water. The Talmud mentions cooking only, because that is the subject of the discussion. Rav Kapach offers a unique explanation, stating that the Rambam is not speaking about instances when water is dyed through cooking, but when two liquids of different colors are mixed to cause a new tint.
There are authorities [Ginat Veradim (Section 3, Chapter 9) and HaElef Lecha Shlomo] who accept the Rambam's ruling and on this basis state that one should not make tea or coffee on the Sabbath, for one is coloring the water. The Mishnah Berurah 318:39 and the K'tzot HaShulchan state emphatically that there is no concept of dyeing foods.
What is implied? One mixed gallnut juice into vitriol54Vitriol is produced by the rusting of metals. As mentioned in Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, when both these substances are mixed together, a black ink which leaves a permanent mark is produced. until the entire mixture turned black, or mixed isatis55A plant producing a deep blue dye. into saffron water56Which is yellow. until the entire mixture turned green and the like.
What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? [An amount of dye large enough] to dye a thread four handbreadths long.", + "A person who spins a thread four handbreadths long from any fibers [from] which [thread] is spun is liable. This includes spinning wool, linen, [camel] hair, goat's hair,57Others render the Hebrew notzah as \"down.\" animal sinews, and any other fibers of this nature.
A person who makes felt is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of spinning if he makes felt from fibers that could be used to spin a thread of ordinary thickness that is four handbreadths long.58The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling. Rav Levi ibn Chaviv supports the Rambam's position, explaining that the intertwining of fibers necessary to make felt resembles spinning.", + "A person who makes two heddles is liable.59The Hebrew בתי נירין is generally translated as \"houses of string.\" In the weaving process, it refers to the following practice: Weaving involves passing the threads of the woof over and under each of the consecutive threads of the warp. In order to facilitate this process, two frames are made, each possessing many threads with a loop (referred to as a \"heddle\") in the middle of these threads. The threads of the warp are passed through these loops, one from one frame, and next from the other consecutively. (See also Rav Kapach's commentary, which explains that nir in Arabic means woof. Thus בתי נירין would mean \"houses for the woof\" - i.e., holes through which the woof thread is passed.)
When this is completed, the weaver lifts the two frames alternately. As he raises one up, he passes the woof through. In this manner, he is able to thread the woof through the entire warp at one time. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:2 and Keilim 21:1.)

A person who makes a sifter, a strainer, a basket, a hairnet, or one who weaves a rope bed [performs] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of making heddles;60All these objects are made by weaving materials other than thread. It is questionable why the Rambam considers them as derivatives of this category of forbidden labor and not the labor of weaving. when he makes two frames of any one of the above, he is liable. Similarly, a person who makes two frames of any object that is made frame by frame like the above is liable.", + "Weavers generally stretch out the threads [of the warp] to the desired length and width of the fabric. Two people hold [the beams to which the ends of the threads are connected], one from one side and one from the other side. A person beats the threads with a rod and aligns them so that they lie one next to the other, [all of the] warp threads without the woof.
Extending the threads as the weavers do is called mounting the warp. A person who [extends these threads] so they are taut is called one who sets the warp. Bending [the loom] and inserting the woof between the warp [threads] is called weaving.", + "The person who mounts the warp is liable. This is one of the [39] primary categories of [forbidden] labor. The person who beats the threads until they separate and then aligns them performs a derivative of mounting the warp.61This halachah presents a unique question with regard to the authenticity of the different versions of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2). The popular version of the text cites Shabbat 75b, which relates that the number of categories of forbidden labor, \"forty minus one,\" is repeated at the conclusion of the Mishnah to negate the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that beating the threads of the warp and straightening them (see Halachah 19) should be considered as categories of forbidden labor. Instead, they are derivatives of the labors of mounting the warp and weaving.
In his version of the Commentary on the Mishnah, which is based on authoritative manuscripts, Rav Kapach states that these two activities are derivatives of מכה בפטיש , \"completing a task.\" (See Chapter 10, Halachah 16.) According to this version of the text, originally the Rambam relied on another source and later, when authoring the Mishneh Torah, he changed his opinion based on the Talmud.
What is the minimum measure for which one is liable? Preparing a fabric that is two fingerbreadths wide.62Shabbat 13:4 states that a person is liable for weaving the fullness of a sit. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam differentiates between \"the width of a sit\" as defined in Halachah 7, and \"the fullness of a sit.\" The latter term refers to the distance between the thumb and the index finger when open, but not stretched. This is two fingerbreadths. [Note Rashi (Shabbat 105b) who offers a different interpretation.]
Similarly, a person is liable for weaving two threads [of a fabric] two fingerbreadths wide. [The above applies] whether one began the weaving [of a garment] or whether one wove two additional threads on a garment that had already been begun by another weaver. If one wove only a single thread, but completed the garment by doing so, one is liable.63Since one completes the garment with this thread, one's actions are significant despite being slight.
If one weaves two threads a width of three frames at the end of a fabric, one is liable.64Here also, although the weaving does not have the width normally required, since it is significant (for it makes a hem), one is held liable. To what can this be compared? To weaving a thin belt, three frames wide.", + "A person who straightens the threads and separates them in the midst of the weaving process [performs] a derivative [of the labor] of weaving.65See the notes on the previous halachah, which discuss the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2).
Similarly, one who braids hair [performs] a derivative [of the labor] of weaving.66This refers to hair that has been cut already. Braiding hair that is still attached to a person's head is forbidden by the Rabbis. (See Chapter 22, Halachah 26.) The measure for which one is liable is making a braid two fingerbreadths long.", + "One who is בוצע two threads is liable. בוצע refers to the separation of woven fabric.67The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's definition of this activity. He offers a definition similar to that of Rashi, Shabbat 73a, stating that בוצע resembles פוצע and refers to cutting off the remaining unwoven threads after the weaving process is completed. One is liable for [the labor of] בוצע whether one removes the woof from the warp or the warp from woof.
[The above applies provided that] one is not acting with a destructive [intent], but rather with the intent to improve [the garment]. For example, there are people who mend [tears in] very light garments. First, they undo the weave. Afterwards, they mend the garment, and then reweave the threads that they undid.68When a garment is mended in this fashion, the mending is hard to detect, because it is rewoven. [In this manner,] they join two garments or two tears together.
A person who undoes a braid for the sake of fixing it [performs] a derivative [of the labor] of בוצע.69As mentioned previously, every category of labor has a derivative. If braiding is a derivative of weaving, one may assume that unbraiding is a derivative of unweaving. The minimum measure for which one is liable is the same as the minimum measure for בוצע." + ], + [ + "A person who ties a knot which is intended to remain permanently and which can be tied [only] by craftsmen1A knot that requires professional expertise and cannot be tied by an untrained person. is liable. Included in this category are the knots tied by camel drivers, the knots tied by seamen, the knots tied by shoemakers when making shoes and sandals.2The fishermen who would catch chilazon that were necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary would tie their nets with special knots that required professional expertise. Similarly, these knots were intended to remain permanently. Therefore, tying such a knot is considered a category of forbidden labor.
It must be emphasized that Rashi and Rabbenu Asher do not accept the criteria mentioned here by the Rambam (which are based on the Halachot of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi from Shabbat 111b). They maintain that tying a knot with the intention that it remain permanently causes one to be liable if the knot is strong enough to remain, even though tying the knot does not require professional expertise.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 317:1) follows the Rambam's perspective. The Ramah, however, rules according to the view of Rashi and Rabbenu Asher.

One who ties a knot that is intended to remain permanently, but does not require a craftsmen [to tie it], is not liable. A knot that will not remain permanently and does not require a craftsman may be tied with no compunctions.", + "How is [the intermediate category] defined? If one of a person's sandal straps tore and he tied it, a rope tore and one tied it, one tied a rope to a bucket, or one tied the bridle of an animal, the person is not liable. The same applies to all other knots that do not require professional expertise, but are always tied with the intention that they remain permanently.3According to Rashi and Rabbenu Asher, one would be liable for tying such knots.
Any knot that is not intended to remain permanently is forbidden to be tied using a knot that requires professional expertise.4Rabbi Yosef Korcus explains the difference between the two clauses of this halachah. Since the knots mentioned in the first clause are intended to last permanently, one would think that one is liable. Therefore, the Rambam emphasizes that one is not.
By contrast, since the knots mentioned in the second clause are not intended to last permanently, one would think that it is permitted to tie them. Hence, the Rambam emphasizes that this is forbidden.
", + "A woman may tie the opening of her cloak although it has two openings.5This law - and most of the subsequent clauses of this halachah - are based on Shabbat 15:2. In each of the clauses, the Rambam (based on the Talmud) further develops the concepts stated in the Mishnah.
In this instance, Shabbat 112a explains that such a cloak had two straps, each one extending from one corner of the garment to the other. Since a woman could remove the garment by untying only one strap and slipping it over her head, there is reason to think that one of the knots would be considered as permanent, and therefore forbidden to be tied on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is not accepted, and tying and untying both knots is permitted.
She may tie the strands of a hairnet although it hangs loosely on her head.6Shabbat (loc. cit.) relates that these nets are also tied to a woman's hair. Hence, since the net is not tight fitting, it could be slipped off without untying it. Thus one might consider the knot as permanent. Nevertheless, since usually, these nets are untied, there is no difficulty in tying them.
One may tie the straps of shoes and sandals that are tied around one's foot when donning them.7Since they will be untied when the shoes are removed, tying them is permitted. One may tie pouches of wine and pouches of oil although they have two protrusions.8Shabbat (loc. cit.) explains that the pouches were tied at each of these protrusions. Although the liquid could be removed by opening only one of them, neither of the knots is considered to be permanent, because it was customary to open both knots, for then the liquids flowed more freely. One may tie a pot of meat although it is possible to remove the meat without untying the knot.9Shabbat (loc. cit.) states that although the food could be removed from the pot without untying the knot, we do not consider the knot permanent. We assume that the people will follow the usual practice and untie the knots before opening the pot.
One may tie a bucket with a linen cord, a belt or another similar entity, but not with an ordinary rope.10It is forbidden to tie a bucket with an ordinary rope, because it is likely that one will leave the rope there permanently. A linen cord, a belt, or another similar entity is not really fit for this purpose. Hence, it is probable that one will untie it after using it (Maggid Mishneh, based on Shabbat 113a).
Even though the Rambam would maintain that tying an ordinary rope to a bucket does not make one liable according to Torah law, there is still reason for this additional decree.
One may tie a rope before an animal or tie it to an animal's foot so that it will not go out, although this involves two knots.11The animal's owner closed the stall by tying a rope before it, tying it to both ends of the entrance (or, according to other commentaries, by tying two ropes). Although the stall could be opened by untying only one knot, we do not assume that the rope(s) will be left there permanently (Shabbat 112b).
If a rope is tied to a cow, one may tie it to its feeding trough. If a rope is tied to a feeding trough, one may tie it to a cow. One may not, however, bring a rope from one's home and tie it to [both] a cow and a feeding trough. If, however, one has a weaver's rope which one is permitted to carry,12This phrase is the key to the Rambam's understanding of this law (which is based on Shabbat 113a). Since tying the animal does not necessitate using a knot that requires professional expertise, the Rambam would not consider it prohibited according to Torah law. And as the Rambam states, since the intention is not to leave the animal tied permanently, there is no reason for even a Rabbinic prohibition. Nevertheless, since it is forbidden to use a rope on the Sabbath unless it was designated for use beforehand, one may not bring a rope from home. If one tied the rope to the animal or to the feeding trough before the commencement of the Sabbath, however, it is obvious that one intended to use it on the Sabbath. one may bring it and tie it to both the cow and the feeding trough.
[The rationale for these laws is that] all [the above] knots do not require professional expertise, nor are they intended to remain. On the contrary, a person ties them and unties them at will. Therefore, it is permitted to tie them with no compunctions.
One may untie the openings of baskets of dates and dried figs, break off or cut off the cord, take them and eat them.13Shabbat 146a explains that dates and dried figs were strung on a cord and placed in palm branch baskets. One may untie the baskets and cut the cords and eat the fruit.", + "Any substance that is fit to be used as animal fodder may be used for tying on the Sabbath.14Other substances fit for tying would be muktzeh, forbidden to be carried on the Sabbath. Therefore, if the straps of a person's sandals snapped in a carmelit, he may take a moist reed15In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 24:5), the Rambam explains that a reed will never be used to tie a permanent knot. that is fit to be eaten by an animal, wind it around [the sandal] and tie it.16This halachah is based on Shabbat 112a, which relates that Rav Yirmiyah saw Rabbi Abahu act in this manner when his sandal strap snapped on the Sabbath. That narrative took place in a carmelit.
The Talmud continues mentioning a situation where Abbaye's sandal strap snapped in a private courtyard and Rav Yosef forbade him to employ a similar technique. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:15) mentions both these rulings.

If a sandal strap slips from its place, or one's foot slips from the sandal, one may return the strap to its place,17In his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 317:2), the Ramah mentions that this is permitted only when it does not involve much effort. provided one does not tie a knot.18The Magen Avraham 317:8 states that were one to tie a knot, it would be forbidden, because we can assume that the knot would be left permanently.", + "It is permitted to tie a loop [on the Sabbath],19The Ramah (Orach Chayim 317:5) states that one may even tie a single knot with a loop above it, provided one does not intend to leave it permanently. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 317:3, Mishnah Berurah 317:29. for it will not be interchanged with a knot.20I.e., there is no reason to decree that a loop is forbidden, lest one tie a knot. Therefore, if a rope snapped, one may gather the two ends together, wind a linen cord around them and tie a loop.21The Kessef Mishneh objects to the Rambam's decision, noting that Shabbat 113a states that if one employs a linen cord, one may tie a knot, but if one employs a rope, one must tie a loop. In his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 317:4), Rav Yosef Karo rules according to his understanding of that passage.
Yad David and others reconcile the Rambam's wording, explaining that he means \"wind a linen cord around it, or tie it [i.e., the rope itself] with a loop.\"
", + "It is permissible to tie a knot that is not permanent in nature for the purpose of a mitzvah.22In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 24:5), the Rambam states that leniency was granted with regard to tying knots that are intended to remain permanently if they are tied for the sake of a mitzvah on the Sabbath. Rashi, by contrast maintains that the Mishnah grants leniency with regard to measuring alone and not with regard to tying knots that are not temporary in nature.
On this basis, this halachah must be interpreted to mean that one is allowed to tie knots that will not remain permanently, even with a knot that requires professional expertise, or a knot that is intended to remain for an extended period if it does not require professional expertise. (See the Be'ur Halachah 317.)
For example, one may tie a knot to calibrate one of the Torah's measures.23The concluding Mishnah in the tractate of Shabbat states that \"In the days of Rabbi Tzadok's father and Abba Shaul ben Botnit, they... tied a cup with a reed to ascertain whether a vat possessed an opening that was a handbreadth in size.\"
One may tie a harp string that snaps in the Temple,24This is not considered a permanent knot, because we assume that after the Sabbath it will be changed. There are opinions in the Talmud (Eruvin 102b) that permit only a loop to be tied. Based on the p rinciple, \"Restrictions in the category of sh'vut are not enforced in the Temple,\" the Rambam, however, chooses the more lenient view (Kessef Mishneh, Or Sameach). but not anywhere else. One may not tie a harp string for the first time on the Sabbath, even in the Temple.", + "A person is liable for untying any knot that he is liable for tying.25Just as tying is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor, so is untying. Accordingly, all the principles described above concerning tying apply with regard to untying. Whenever a person is not liable for tying a knot, he is not liable for untying it. Whenever a person is permitted to tie a knot, he is permitted to untie it.26Tosafot (Shabbat 73a) states that one is liable only when one unties with the intent of retying, for this was the practice of the chilazon fishermen in the construction of the Sanctuary. Significantly, the Rambam does not mention that requirement. Rashi (Shabbat 74b) rules more stringently, holding one liable even when one does not have the intent of retying the knot immediately. Needless to say, even according to Rashi's view, one must untie the knot for a positive purpose.", + "A person who winds together a rope from palm branches, love grass,27Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's version of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 17:17). strands of wool, strands of flax, strands of goat's hair or the like is liable for performing a derivative of the [forbidden] labor of tying.28The commentaries question why this activity is not considered a derivative of the forbidden labor of spinning thread. The Migdal Oz resolves this question by citing as a source the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 15:1. That passage relates that an experienced tailor connects two ends of a thread together by undoing their twine, and then rewinding them. Since the tailor's object is to connect the two ends, the activity is considered a derivative of tying.
The minimum measure for which one is liable is a length of rope sufficient to remain wound without being tied, for then the work the person performed is permanent.29See Chapter 9, Halachah 13 and Halachah 1 of this chapter.
Similarly, a person who unwinds cords performs a derivative of the forbidden labor of untying and is liable. [This applies] provided one's intent is not merely destructive in nature.30See Chapter 1, Halachot 17-18. The minimum measure for which one is liable is the same as that for winding a cord.", + "A person who sews two stitches is liable,31This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. provided he ties32Many of the commentaries question why the Rambam does not mention that the person is also liable for tying. It would appear, however, that this knot does not require professional expertise. Furthermore, sewing and not tying, is the subject of the Rambam's statements here. the stitches at both ends so that they will remain and not slip out.33Only if the stitches are tied at both ends will they remain permanently. Rav Kapach notes that in Hilchot Kilayim 10:24, the Rambam does not require the two stitches to be attached for one to be liable for sha'atnez, echoing a similar ruling of the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:10).
Rav Kapach explains that the obligations of the two prohibitions differ. With regard to sha'atnez, there is no requirement that wool and linen be permanently attached for one to be liable. In contrast, if the forbidden activity one performs on the Sabbath is not lasting in nature, one is not liable.
If, however, one sews an additional stitch, one is liable even if one did not tie [the ends], for one's stitching will remain.
A person who pulls taut a thread used for sewing34After one sews several stitches, one pulls the thread taut (Shabbat 75a). on the Sabbath is liable, because this activity is necessary for sewing.", + "A person who tears [a length of a garment] sufficient to tie two stitches35Our translation is based on the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger. for the sake of tying two stitches is liable.36This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. Although this activity was performed in the Sanctuary for this purpose, the Rambam maintains that a person who performs a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is liable. Therefore, he maintains that one is liable even if he tears for other purposes. The Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), however, describes this forbidden labor as \"one who tears to sew two stitches.\" In contrast, one who tears with the intent to ruin is not liable, for [his activity] is destructive in nature.37See Chapter 1, Halachot 17-18.
A person who tears in a fit of rage or [one who rends his garments] for the sake of a deceased person for whom he is required to rend his garments38The Rambam discusses the obligation to rend one's garments over a deceased person in Hilchot Eivel, Chapters 8 and 9. is liable, for by doing so he settles his mind and calms his natural inclination. Since his anger is soothed through this act, it is considered to be constructive in nature and he is liable.39See Chapter 8, Halachah 8, and notes.
A person who makes an opening for a neck [in a garment] on the Sabbath is liable.40The Merkevet HaMishnah states that this refers to simply opening up a place for the head in a garment. Since the Rambam maintains that a person who performs a מלאכה שאינה צריכה ��גופה is liable, he maintains that a person is liable for cutting such an opening even if he does not sew it.
Rashi (Shabbat 48a) states that one is liable for this activity for performing a derivative of the forbidden category of labor מכה בפטיש, making an entity ready for use. (Rashi cannot hold one liable for tearing, since he differs with the Rambam and maintains that a person who performs a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is not liable.)
The latter interpretation is reflected in the statements of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, quoted in the Ma'aseh Rokeach, which explain that after a garment was completed, the neck was sewed up with temporary stitches to show that it was never worn. When the purchaser desired to put on the garment, these stitches were undone. See also Shulchan Aruch and Ramah (Orach Chayim 317:3).
", + "A person who attaches paper or hides together with scribe's glue and the like is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of sewing.41For just as a person who sews, he attaches two entities to each other.
Conversely, a person who separates papers or hides that are stuck together is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of tearing42See the Magen Avraham 340:18, which states that the entities one separates must have been attached to each other with the intent of remaining permanently. Based on a similar rationale, the Chacham Tzvi (Responsum 39) does not hold one liable for opening an envelope, since the flap is not intended to remain permanently closed.
There is a common application of this principle today: the use of disposable baby diapers. Since the flap is not intended to remain permanently closed, fastening it or unfastening it is not considered as related to the forbidden labors of sewing and tearing.
if his intent is not merely destructive.", + "A person is liable for building even the slightest amount.43This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. One is liable for even the smallest act of construction, because if there was even the slightest nick or hole in one of the walls of the Sanctuary, hot lead would be poured into it to fill it (Shabbat 102b).
A person who levels the floor inside a house is liable.44For building, since with this activity, he prepares the building's floor. As mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 1, a person who performs this activity in a field is liable for plowing.
Significantly, based on Rashi (Eruvin 104a), Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:24 also holds one liable for performing a derivative of building when one levels the ground in one's yard.
Whether he lowers a raised piece of earth or fills a cavity, he is considered to be building and is liable.
When one person places down a stone and another the mortar, the one who places down the mortar is liable.45Without the mortar, the stones would not hold in place. For the highest row [of stones], one is liable merely for lifting up the stone and placing it on the mortar, since other mortar is not placed upon it.
A person who builds on a base of utensils is not liable.46As the source for this halachah, the Maggid Mishneh points to the following passage from the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2, 12:1):
Where was [the forbidden labor of] building found in the Sanctuary? In the placement of the boards in their sockets.
Is this meant to imply that building on a base of utensils is considered building? The sockets are considered as the ground.
From this passage, it is clear that building on a base of utensils is not considered to be building according to Torah law. Note that this law refers to constructing a building by using a utensil as a base. The discussion of whether fashioning a utensil or connecting its parts is a derivative of the forbidden labor of building is discussed in the following halachah and notes.
", + "A person who erects a permanent tent is liable for performing a derivative47The commentaries question why the erection of a tent is merely given the status of a derivative and is not considered to be a מעין מלאכה of the forbidden labor of building. The P'nei Yehoshua (Sukkah 16b) explains that a building is a stable structure, while a tent is far more fragile in nature.
The Even HaEzel explains that building involves two actions:
a) joining separate entities into a single whole;
b) spreading a roof over a structure.
Constructing a structure - or part of a structure - which contains both these actions is considered to be building proper. If either - but only one - of the two is involved, the act is deemed a derivative. Thus, erecting a tent is considered a derivative, because it involves spreading a roof, and making cheese is considered a derivative, because it involves joining separate entities into a single whole.
[of the forbidden labor] of building.48Significantly, neither in this halachah nor in Chapter 22, Halachah 27, when he mentions the Rabbinic prohibition against erecting a temporary tent does the Rambam explain whether the concept of permanence depends on the strength of the structure or the intent of the builder. It appears that he relies on his statements in Chapter 9, Halachah 13, \"Whenever one performs a labor that does not have a permanent effect on the Sabbath, one is not liable.\" (See the notes on that halachah.)
Similarly, a person who fashions an earthenware utensil - e.g., an oven or a jug - before they are fired [in a kiln] is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.49Beitzah 22a relates a difference of opinion between the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai. The School of Shammai maintains that one is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of building when fashioning a utensil, while the School of Hillel rejects this thesis: \"There is no [concept of] building with regard to utensils.\"
There is, however, a difference of opinion between the Rabbis about the interpretation of this statement. Rashi understands the statement simply. Fashioning a utensil can never be a derivative of building. One is liable for making a utensil, but one's liability stems from the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש, completing a utensil. This view is shared by Rav Hai Gaon, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi (according to Rabbenu Nissim), and others.
As obvious from this halachah, the Rambam differs and maintains that one is liable for building when fashioning a utensil. The leniency mentioned by the School of Hillel refers only to putting together a utensil that is made up of several component parts. [This is, however, forbidden by Rabbinic decree, because it resembles building (Chapter 22, Halachah 26).] Fashioning a new utensil, by contrast, is surely considered a derivative of building.
This latter opinion is shared by Tosafot (Shabbat 74b), the Ramban, the Rashba, and others. It is also accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:1).

Similarly, one who makes cheese performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.50See Chapter 7, Halachah 6. One is not liable until one makes an amount of cheese equivalent to the size of a dried fig.51Although one is liable for building even the slightest amount, with regard to this derivative the minimum measure for which one is liable is the size of a dried fig - the minimum measure associated with the labors related to food. Unless one makes an amount of cheese that size, one's activity is not significant at all.
A person who inserts the blade of an axe onto its handle or one who performs any similar activity performs a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building. Similarly, one who attaches one piece of wood to another, whether he attaches them with a nail or by inserting one piece of wood into another until they become a single entity, is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.52The Rambam discusses the Rabbinic prohibitions associated with this activity in Chapter 22, Halachah 25. (See also the discussion of the issue in the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 313:9] and commentaries.)", + "A person who makes even the slightest hole in a chicken coop to let light in is liable for building.53Note that in Halachah 16, the Rambam states that one who makes a hole in a building is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש. Similarly, in Chapter 23, Halachah 1, he states that a person who makes a hole in a chicken coop for the sake of letting light in and letting foul air out is liable for performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש.
Among the resolutions offered is that in addition to being liable for מכה בפטיש, one is liable for building (Lechem Mishneh). Alternatively, in this halachah, the Rambam mentions making a hole of any size, while in Chapter 23, he mentions making an opening, implying that it is of a larger size, and only then is one liable for מכה בפטיש (Sefer HaKovetz).

A person who returns a door of a well, a cistern, or a wing of a building [to its place] is liable for building.54These doors serve as part of the floor of the building. Therefore, putting them in place is a derivative of building. (See also Chapter 22, Halachah 25, and the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh.)", + "A person who demolishes even the slightest amount is liable, provided he demolishes with the intent to build.55Whenever the encampment of the Jewish people moved, the Sanctuary was taken down and then reconstructed in the new camp (Shabbat 31b).
The commentaries note that in Chapter 1, Halachah 18, the Rambam mentions that one is liable for \"demolishing to build in its place,\" while in this halachah, the words \"in its place\" are not mentioned.
If his intent in demolishing is merely destructive, he is not liable.56As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 17, one is not liable for performing any forbidden labor with merely a destructive intent. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 8, if one destroys with the intent of venting one's anger, one is liable. Seemingly, the Rambam should have mentioned this point in this context as well.
A person who demolishes a permanent tent or separates a piece of wood attached to another is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of demolishing, provided his intent is to improve it [afterwards].57The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's intent is to illustrate how one is liable for demolishing for performing the converse of every positive activity for which one is liable for building.
Perhaps the Rambam's wording also alludes to the concept that a person is liable only when he demolishes a structure that is strong enough to last. If the structure he demolishes is not that sturdy, he is not liable. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:19.
", + "A person who gives the [final] blow with a hammer is liable. [Similarly,] a person who performs any activity that represents the completion of a task is liable for performing a derivative of dealing [the final] hammer blow.58In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), in definition of this category of forbidden labor, the Rambam writes:
A person who beats [an article] with a hammer, even at the conclusion of the work as the craftsmen do. They strike very light blows to straighten the surface of a utensil.... Therefore, every activity involved in fashioning and completing a utensil, planing it, polishing it, and making it attractive are all derivatives of dealing [the final] hammer blow.
This is what [our Sages implied with] their statement (Shabbat 75b), \"For any activity that constitutes the completion of a task, one is liable for dealing [the final] hammer blow.\"

What is implied? A person who blows a glass vessel,59Tosafot, Shabbat 74b, asks: Since glass utensils are fashioned by blowing, why is one not liable for building as one is for making any other vessel? (See Halachah 13.) Indeed, the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2) holds a person who blows a glass utensil liable for performing that forbidden labor.
The Yesodei Yeshurun and Rav Kapach point out that Rashi (Shabbat 75b) explains that the activity referred to involves cutting a glass utensil by exposing it to a current of air. This is also implied by the Hebrew words המנפח בכלי זכוכית - \"one who blows at a glass utensil.\"
one makes a design, or even a portion of a design, on a utensil,60If, however, one makes a drawing or a design on a paper (or on a similar substance), one is liable for performing a derivative of writing or dyeing (Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 7:2). (See also Chapter 11, Halachah 17, and Be'ur Halachah 340.) one who planes61The Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 11, Halachah 7, renders the term used in our halachah as מגרר, \"scrape.\" [the edges of a utensil],62See also Chapter 23, Halachah 4. one who makes a hole of even the smallest size in a piece of wood, a building, a piece of metal, or a utensil is liable for performing a derivative of dealing [the final] hammer blow.
One is not liable for making [a hole] unless it can be used to bring in and bring out.63I.e., to cause one to be held liable, any opening must be fit to be used as an entrance through which entities are brought in, and an exit through which entities are taken out.", + "A person who pierces a blister on the Sabbath to widen the opening of the wound, as physicians do, with the intent of widening the opening of the wound is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow,64The Ra'avad, Rashi (Shabbat 107a), and others maintain that performing this activity is a derivative of the labor of building. The Ziv HaMishnah explains the Rambam's position, focusing on the words \"for this is a labor performed by a physician\" - i.e., one is not building a structure, but completing a specific labor that physicians perform. for this is a labor performed by a physician.
If one pierced it to remove its pus, [the act] is permitted.65I.e., one may perform the act without any compunctions (Shabbat 107a). Although the Rambam's ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:28), Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:32 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:88 suggest that it is preferable to have this act performed by a gentile.
According to Rashi and many other authorities, this activity is permitted, because it is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Although generally there would be a Rabbinic prohibition against such an act, in this instance, no prohibition was enforced because of the suffering involved.
This explanation is, however, untenable for the Rambam, for as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, he holds one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Among the explanations given for the Rambam's position is that in removing the pus one does not complete the task involved, for an opening sufficient to be useful for another purpose has not been made (Maggid Mishneh). Similarly, Sefer HaBatim explains that in removing the pus, the person thinks only of relieving his pain and does not have any intent of making an opening. Thus the situation differs from the examples stated in Chapter 1, where the person performed the forbidden activity intentionally.
See also the commentary of Rav Chayim Soloveichik who explains that this decision is not dependent on the principle of מלאכה ש אינה צריכה לגופה, but rather on the concept of אינו מתכווין (see Chapter 1, Halachot 5-6) that a person who performs an activity which unintentionally causes a forbidden labor to be performed is not liable.
Although the Rambam agrees that when it is certain that one's actions will result in the performance of a forbidden labor, one is liable, the latter principle does not apply when one does not appreciate the results of the performance of the forbidden labor (פםיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). In such an instance, the Rambam follows the opinion of the Aruch who maintains that one is not liable.
", + "One who files a stone66Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 12:1), where he explains that this refers to \"smoothing it with a tool known to be used for this purpose.\" Rashi (Shabbat 102b) renders this term as \"chisel.\" to even the slightest degree is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow. A person who aligns a stone in the foundation of a building, adjusting its position with his hands and settling it in its proper place,67The Or Sameach (based on Shabbat 102b) states that this applies only in setting the stones of a building's foundation, and not those of its walls.
One might ask: Why is the person who performs this activity not liable for building (see Rashi and Tosafot, Shabbat, loc. cit.)? It is possible to explain that it goes without saying that the Rambam would hold such an individual liable for building, the new concept taught by this halachah is that he is also liable for dealing [the final] hammer blow.
is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow.
A person who removes threads, straws, or splinters of wood68Our translation is based on the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el on Shabbat 75b. from a garment by hand - for example, the splinters that are found in woolen garments - is liable for performing [a derivative of] dealing [the final] hammer blow. [This applies] provided the person is disturbed by them.69The Kessef Mishneh explains that this means that the person removes them from the garment with the intention of making it more attractive, even though he could wear the garment while they are still adhering to it. This interpretation is quoted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 302:10. If, however, he removes them as a matter of course, [without thinking,]70As explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 11, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden activity as a מתעסק - i.e., without consciously controlling his behavior. In this instance as well, it is common for people to pick at their clothes, without giving the matter any thought at all. he is not liable.71It is, nevertheless, forbidden according to Rabbinic decree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:6, Mishnah Berurah 302:11).
A person who shakes out a new black garment to make it attractive and to remove any remnants of white wool72The early manuscripts and printings of the Mishneh Torah state הציהוב הלבן. Based on the dictionary of Rabbi Tanchum of Jerusalem, this term is interpreted to mean \"bright white threads.\" adhering to it, as is a tailor's practice,73Based on Shabbat 147a, the Ra'avad, Rashi, and others, interpret this as shaking dew from a new garment, and the activity being a derivative of the forbidden labor of whitening. This interpretation is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:1). is liable to bring a sin offering.74Rav Sa'adiah Adana explains that according to the general principles the Rambam outlined in the beginning of the text, it would have been sufficient for him to state \"is liable,\" as is his practice throughout the text. Nevertheless, in this instance he quotes the Sages' expression (Shabbat 147a), \"is liable for a sin offering\"; because of the nature of the activity, one might think that one is liable only for stripes for rebelliousness, the punishment given for violating a Rabbinic decree. If he is not disturbed by them, it is permissible [to do so].", + "A person who traps a living creature from a species that is common to trap75See Halachah 24, where the Rambam mentions some of the species not included in this category. - e.g., beasts, fowl,76The commentaries note that Shabbat 106b differentiates between a צפור דרור - a swallow - and other fowl. On this basis, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 316:1) states that other birds are also considered trapped when enclosed in houses, and it is only a swallow - because it is small - that must be trapped in a closet.
The Merkevet HaMishneh and others explain that Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Rambam interpret the conclusion of that Talmudic passage as indicating that there is no difference between one type of fowl and another. It is too difficult to trap any bird when enclosed in a house.
or fish - is liable77This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. provided he traps them in a place where no further efforts are required to trap them.
What is implied? One chased after a deer until one caused it to enter a room,78The Hebrew בית usually means house. Here, however, it refers to a one-room structure. a garden, or a courtyard, and one locked it inside, one caused a fowl to fly into a closet and locked it, one removed a fish from the sea and placed it in a bowl of water. [In all these instances,] the person is liable.79The commentaries explain that a deer is trapped even when there are open windows and when there is no roof.
If, however, a person caused a bird to fly into a room and locked it, caused a fish to swim from the sea into a pool of water, or chased a deer until he caused it to enter a large hall, and locked it, he is not liable. [The living creature] is not completely trapped, for if he to desired to take it, he would have to chase it and trap it in [this new place].80See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:7, where the Rambam develops this principle. Therefore, a person who traps a lion is not liable until he causes it to enter the pen in which it will be enclosed.", + "[The following] - a place in which if a person ran, he could reach the animal in a single movement,81The Maggid Mishneh states that this means \"without having to pause.\" and a place so narrow that the shadow of both walls would merge in the middle - are considered to be small places. If one chased a deer or the like into such a place, one is liable. If a place is larger than this, a person who chases an animal or a fowl into it is not liable.", + "[The following principle applies regarding] the eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah82Leviticus 11:29. See Chapter 8, Halachah 9, for a definition of the species referred to. and similarly, other creeping animals and crawling things:83The distinction between the eight species mentioned in the Torah and other crawling animals is relevant within the context of the Mishnah, Shabbat 14:1, which follows the view of Rabbi Shimon that one is not held liable for performing a [forbidden] labor when he has no need for the actual labor he performed. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate between the eight species mentioned in the Torah (which are generally trapped for their hides) and other crawling animals when that is not necessarily the case. When a species is usually trapped, a person who traps any one of them - whether for a purpose, or without a purpose, even merely for the sake of sport - is liable, since he intended to trap and actually did so.84This ruling depends on the principle stated by the Rambam immediately afterwards, that one is held liable for performing a [forbidden] labor when he has no need for the actual labor he performed. A person is liable for performing a [forbidden] labor even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed.85This subject, referred to as a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה in Hebrew, is discussed at length in Chapter 1, Halachah 7. As mentioned, there are many authorities who differ with the Rambam's opinion on this issue.
A person who traps an animal that is sleeping or a blind animal is liable.86As obvious from Halachah 24, a person who traps an animal that is physically disabled is not liable. Shabbat 106b differentiates between the animals mentioned in that halachah and those mentioned in this halachah as follows: An animal that is sleeping or blind is sensitive to man's steps. Unless he approaches stealthily, the animal will be startled and flee. In contrast, those mentioned in Halachah 24 will not be able to escape capture.", + "When a person sends out dogs to trap deer, rabbits, and the like, the deer flees because of the dog,87Note the Maggid Mishneh, who quotes Rabbenu Chanan'el's commentary, which explains this as a continuation of the concepts mentioned in the previous halachah. Rashi (Shabbat 106b) interprets the passage differently. (See the Be'ur Halachah 316.) and the person chases after the deer or stands before it and as such, frightens it so that the dog can catch it,88The Ramah (Orach Chayim 316:2) emphasizes that even during the week, this behavior is undesirable. In his Darchei Moshe, he emphasizes that such cruelty will prevent a person from participating in the feast of the Leviathan in the era of the redemption. he is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of trapping.89The Magen Avraham 316:4 emphasizes that if the person merely sends out the dogs and is not personally involved in the deer's capture, he is not held liable at all. There is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition involved. The same applies with regard to [trapping] fowl.", + "When a deer enters a room and one person closes90Here, we have chosen to translate the Hebrew נעל as \"close,\" rather than \"lock.\" Closing the door is sufficient to confine the deer inside and cause one to be liable for trapping it. it, the latter is liable.91Although he did not actively pursue the deer into the room, since it becomes trapped through his deed, he is responsible. If two people close it, they are not liable. If the door cannot be closed by a single person and they both close it, they are both liable.92This halachah illustrates the principle stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 15- 16:
Whenever two people share in the performance of a [forbidden] labor that one of them could have performed by himself, they are [both] free of liability.... When, however, a single individual cannot perform [the forbidden labor] alone and must be joined by others, [all the individuals involved are held liable].
See Sefer HaKovetz and others for explanations why this is not a mere reiteration of the principles stated previously.

When one person sat in the entrance and did not block it, and a second person sat down and blocked it, the second person is liable.93The first person's act did not obstruct the deer's escape, while the second person's did. Although the first person assisted the second, since his assistance was passive - he did absolutely nothing - he does not share in the liability. Furthermore, as the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 13:7), he is permitted to remain seated.
When the one person blocks the entrance when he sits down, and a second person sits down next to him [in a manner that also obstructs the entrance], the first person [alone] is liable.94For he completed the capture of the animal by sitting down. This is a fait acccompli to which the second person adds nothing. [This applies] even if he later rises and leaves, [and the second person remains blocking the entrance],95Without moving. for the second person has not done anything. He is permitted to remain seated in the doorway until the evening and then take the deer.96He may not, however, take the deer on the Sabbath itself. Although it is already trapped, it is muktzeh, forbidden to be handled. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 26.) To what could this be compared? To one who locks his house to protect it and finds a trapped deer inside.97In this instance, we have translated the Hebrew נע ל as \"lock\" rather than \"close\" as above. Were a person to close the door and thus trap the deer, he would be liable. The Rambam is speaking of a situation where the deer was trapped previously (in the analogy, by the first person) and then locked in (blocked further by the second person).
If a fowl enters under the edge of a person's clothes, he may [continue] sitting and watch it until nightfall.98In this instance as well, it is forbidden to take the bird on the Sabbath because it is muktzeh. It is [then] permitted [to take it].", + "A person who traps a deer that is old, limping, sick, or small is not liable.99As explained in the notes on Halachah 21, one is not liable for trapping these creatures, because no real effort is required in doing so.
A person who releases an animal, a beast, or a fowl from a trap is not liable.100The Maggid Mishneh questions why the Rambam uses the term \"is not liable,\" which implies that it is forbidden to do so by Rabbinic decree. What prohibition is there in releasing an animal from a trap? He answers that perhaps the intent is that the person is liable for violating the Rabbinic prohibition that deems an animal as muktzeh. Note the Magen Avraham 316:11 which states that one may release an animal or a fowl from a trap, provided one does not touch them. A person who traps a beast or a fowl that is in his domain - e.g., ducks, chickens, or doves from a cote - is not liable.101See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:5, where the Rambam states that chickens and ducks are considered as within a person's grasp. Note, however, the distinction between the different types of doves mentioned in that halachah and in this halachah. Because of that difference, the Maggid Mishneh considers the mention of doves in this halachah as a printing error. Mention of them is found, however, in most early manuscripts and printings, and other authorities justify their mention. A person who traps a living being whose species is not usually trapped - e.g., locusts,102Rav Kapach states that this refers to non-kosher locusts. A person who catches kosher locusts is liable. The Mishnah Berurah 316:13, however, differs, and maintains that the Rambam does not hold one liable for trapping such species. wild bees, hornets, mosquitoes, fleas, and the like - is not liable.103Since it is not customary to trap these species, even a person who traps them for a specific purpose is not held liable (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 316:4). There is, however, a Rabbinic prohibition involved. For that reason, one must even take precautions not to trap such creatures accidentally (Ramah, Orach Chayim 316:3).", + "Crawling beasts that are dangerous - e.g., snakes, scorpions and the like - may be trapped104I.e., not only is one not liable, but is permitted to do so. on the Sabbath. [This leniency is granted] even when they are not deadly, but merely bite, provided one's intent is to prevent [someone from] being bitten.105Most commentaries explain this ruling according to the opinions that do not hold one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Although generally there would be a Rabbinic prohibition against such an act, in this instance no prohibition was enforced because of the danger involved.
This explanation is, however, untenable for the Rambam, for as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, he follows Rabbi Yehudah's ruling that holds one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
The Avnei Nezer (Likkutim 189) explains that this situation is different, because of the unique nature of the labor of trapping. The concept of trapping is relevant only when one traps an object of value. Therefore even Rabbi Yehudah frees one of liability when trapping an animal whose species is not usually trapped.
Similarly, in the instance at hand, since one has no concern for the object one is trapping, merely for one's personal welfare, the entire concept of trapping does not apply. See also the notes on Halachah 17 of this chapter and Chapter 11, Halachah 4.

What should one do? Place a utensil over them, cover them with something, or tie them so they cannot cause damage." + ], + [ + "A person who slaughters is liable. This does not apply only to [ritual] slaughter. Anyone who takes the life of a living beast, an animal, fowl, fish, or crawling animal - whether by slaughtering, stabbing, or beating1In all three of these activities, the animal dies because of bleeding. For this reason, although beating may cause the animal to die because of internal bleeding, it is included in the same category. - is liable.
A person who strangles a living creature performs a derivative of slaughtering.2Since no blood is shed, this is considered a derivative and not a מלאכה מעין. Therefore, if one removed a fish from the glass of water [in which it was being kept] until it died, one is liable for strangling it. [Indeed, one is liable even if one returns it to the water before] the fish actually dies. As long as [a portion of its body as wide as] a sela3A coin of the Talmudic period. Based on Yoreh De'ah 30, it appears that a sela is approximately 2.6 or 3.2 cm in diameter according to the different opinions. between its fins becomes dry, one is liable, for it will not be able to live afterwards.
A person who inserts his hand into an animal's womb and removes a fetus [from] the womb is liable.4Based on Avodah Zarah 26a, the Eglei Tal quotes opinions which state that if a person performs such an act, he is liable for reaping - i.e., removing an entity from its source of nurture. The difference between these two rationales is that when an animal is prepared to give birth, the concept of reaping no longer applies, for the fetus no longer needs its mother's nurture.", + "A person who kills insects and worms that are conceived through male-female relations or fleas that come into being from the dust is liable as if he killed an animal or a beast.5This follows the Rambam's ruling that one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. The authorities who differ on this principle will hold one liable only if one kills these creatures for the sake of something that one needs from their bodies. In contrast, a person is not liable for killing insects and worms that come into being from dung, rotten fruit, or the like - e.g., the worms found in meat or those found in legumes.6In view of the experiments of Pasteur, there are many Rabbis who maintain that this ruling should be disregarded and we should refrain from killing any creatures on the Sabbath. Others, even contemporary authorities with scientific backgrounds, such as the Lubavitcher Rebbe Shelita (see Emunah UMada, p. 130 ff), maintain that our inability to observe spontaneous generation is not absolute proof that such a phenomenon does not exist. Consequently, it is inappropriate for us to think of altering the halachah.
In this context, it is significant to quote the Rambam's statements, Hilchot Shechitah 10:13:
Similarly, with regard to the conditions that we have enumerated as causing an animal to be trefah (unable to live for an extended period): Even though it appears from the medical knowledge available to us at present, that some of these conditions are not fatal... all that is significant to us is what our Sages said, as [implied by Deuteronomy 17:11]: \"[You shall act] according to the instructions that they will give you.\"
See also the introductions to Chapter 3 of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah and to Chapter 4 of Hilchot De'ot in the Moznaim Mishneh Torah series.
", + "A person who checks his clothes for lice on the Sabbath may rub off the lice and discard them.7See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 316:9. It is is permitted to kill lice on the Sabbath, for they come into being from sweat.8The difference of Rabbinic opinion mentioned with regard to the previous halachah applies in this instance as well.", + "It is permitted to kill beasts or insects whose bites are surely deadly, as soon as one sees them9Shabbat 121b explains that this leniency applies even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Because of the danger these species pose, they are allowed to be killed even when they are not pursuing a person. For it can be assumed that as soon as they become aware of a person, they will pursue him. - for example,10The Rambam cites these examples to illustrate the principle he states, not to be restrictive. If other species pose mortal danger in a manner similar to the five mentioned here, the same laws apply (Kessef Mishneh). flies in Egypt, hornets in Nineveh, scorpions in Adiabena, snakes in Eretz Yisrael, and rabid dogs in all places.
[The following rules apply with regard to] other dangerous animals:11I.e., creatures that can inflict mortal wounds, but will not necessarily do so. If they are chasing a person, one may kill them.12In this instance as well, Rabbi Yehudah would accept this leniency, for the person is concerned only with saving his life and not with the performance of the forbidden activity. (See the interpretation of Sefer HaBatim mentioned in the notes on Chapter 10, Halachah 17.)If they are staying in their place or fleeing from the person, it is forbidden to kill them.13For there is no immediate danger involved. If one steps on them accidentally as one is walking and kills them, this is permitted.14The wording used by the Rambam (based on Shabbat 121b) is somewhat problematic. The expression \"if one steps on them accidentally,\" implies that we are speaking after the fact, after one has already crushed them, while the expression \"it is permitted\" appears to indicate that this license is granted at the outset.
The Rashba explains that, indeed, license to kill these creatures is granted outright. One should merely make it appear that one is stepping on them accidentally. This ruling applies, however, only according to Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold one liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. According to Rabbi Yehudah, the intent is that one may proceed without taking care to check whether one kills them or not.
", + "A person who skins [a portion of an animal's] hide large enough to make an amulet is liable.15This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. Similarly, one who processes [a portion of an animal's] hide large enough to make an amulet16The Maggid Mishneh cites Shabbat 8:3, which states that one is liable for transferring a hide this size from one domain to another. Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that this refers not to the skin used to make parchment on which the amulet is written, but rather the leather used as a covering for the amulet. is liable.17This is also one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor.
Just as one who processes [a hide is liable], so too, is one who salts [a hide], for salting is one of the methods of processing.18See Hilchot Tefillin 1:6. [Prohibitions associated with the forbidden labor of] processing do not apply with regard to foodstuffs.19The Rambam's ruling differs from that of Rabbenu Chanan'el, who holds one liable for salting meat to preserve it for an extended period. (See also the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 321:2-6, which mentions several Rabbinic prohibitions in connection with salting food. Note the explanation of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:2.) The Ma'aseh Rokeach states that the Rambam maintains, by contrast, that there are no Rabbinic prohibitions associated with salting food in this context. Note, however, Chapter 22, Halachah 10, which mentions a Rabbinic prohibition against salting food as part of the pickling process.
Similarly, one who smooths [a portion of an animal's] hide large enough to make an amulet is liable.20This is also one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. What is meant by smoothing? Removing the hair or the wool from the hide after [the animal's] death21Apparently, the Rambam adds this phrase to distinguish between this category of forbidden labor and the category of shearing. Shearing refers to removing an animal's wool or hair when alive, while smoothing refers to performing the same activity after the animal's death (Yesodei Yeshurun). Note, however, Chapter 9, Halachah 7, which states that one is liable for shearing an animal's wool even when the animal is dead.
See also the Responsum of the Beit Meir (Vol. IV, p. 142), which explains that although the activities included in the two categories of labor are similar, their objectives differ. The object of the labor of shearing is to obtain wool, while the object of the labor of smoothing is to produce a smooth hide.
[According to the Rivosh (cited in Chapter 9, Halachah 7), shearing applies when wool is removed from a live animal, while smoothing applies when the same activity is performed after an animal has died (Eglei Tal).
so that the surface of the hide will be smooth.", + "A person who separates duchsustos from k'laf22See Hilchot Tefillin 1:7-8, where the Rambam explains that a hide used for parchment is divided in half. The thin upper side of the hide where the hair grows is called k'laf. The thick portion on the side of the flesh is called duchsustos. Tefillin should be written on k'laf, while mezuzot should be written on duchsustos.
At present, the parchment used for writing sacred articles is no longer processed in this fashion.
is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of skinning. A person who separates [a portion] from a hide large enough to make an amulet is liable.23This phrase is not included in the early manuscripts and printings of the Mishneh Torah. Its addition appears to be a printing error.
A person who treads upon a hide with his feet until it becomes hard, or one who softens it with his hands, extending it, and leveling it as the leather workers do is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of processing.24See Chapter 23, Halachah 10, for Rabbinical prohibitions associated with leather working.
A person who pulls a feather from the wing of a fowl is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of smoothing. Similarly, a person who smears a poultice of even the smallest size, beeswax,25See Chapter 23, Halachah 11, for Rabbinical prohibitions associated with smoothing wax. tar, or other entities that are smeared until a smooth surface is produced is liable for [performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of] smoothing.
A person who rubs a hide that is suspended between pillars is liable for smoothing.26The Maggid Mishneh cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2), which explains that preparation of the hides used for the Sanctuary involved suspending them on pillars and rubbing them so that their surface would be smooth.", + "A person who cuts [a portion] from a hide large enough to make an amulet is liable,27This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. provided he cuts with a specific length and width in mind. Cutting in this manner is considered as labor [forbidden on the Sabbath]. If, however, one cuts with a destructive intent,28As explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 17, anyone who performs a forbidden labor for a destructive intent is not liable. or without a precise measure, doing so either without thought entirely29As explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 11, anyone who performs a forbidden labor casually, without intent, is not liable. or for pleasure,30Rav Kapach explains that here also the intent is performing the activity for the sake of tension release, without any concern for what one is doing. he is not liable.
A person who trims [the down from] a wing [of a fowl]31To use in stuffing a pillow or a blanket (Rashi, Shabbat 74b). is liable [for performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of cutting. Similarly, one who planes32Our translation is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, who contrasts this halachah with Chapter 10, Halachah 16. (See the notes on that halachah.) a beam of cedar wood is liable for cutting. Similarly, anyone who cuts a piece of wood or a piece of metal is liable for cutting.
A person who takes a small piece of wood33As is obvious from the following halachah, this refers to a twig or piece of wood that is not fit to be used as food for an animal. and trims it to use as a toothpick or to pry open a door is liable.34The Maggid Mishneh and others question the Rambam's ruling, noting that according to Beitzah 33a-b, it would appear that one is liable only if one trims a piece of wood with a utensil. Significantly, however, the Magen Avraham 322:4 quotes the Rambam's decision without objection.", + "Any article that is fit to be used as animal fodder35Although the Rambam's ruling is accepted as halachah by the later authorities, the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol and other Rishonim differ. - e.g., straw, soft grasses, palm branches, and the like, may be trimmed on the Sabbath, because the the concept of preparing a utensil does not apply in this context.
It is permitted to break fragrant branches [by hand] for the sake of their scent36E.g., myrtle branches, which give off their fragrance when they are broken open and rubbed. Significantly, when mentioning this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 322:5) states that this is permitted \"for the sake of a sick person.\" Nevertheless, the conclusion of the later authorities is that a healthy person may also do so (Mishnah Berurah 322:16). although they are hard and dry. One may strip [their bark] as one desires, regardless of whether one strips [the bark] of a small branch or a large branch.", + "A person who writes37This is one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. two38One is liable for writing two letters because this resembles the activity necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary. A mark was made on each of the sides of the walls, so that it would be used to match the same walls to each other every time the Sanctuary was erected (Shabbat 12:3, Rashi, Shabbat 75b). letters39The same also applies to a person who writes two numerals (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:8). See the notes on the following halachah and on Halachah 17, which discuss the use of marks or symbols. is liable. A person who erases writing so that he can write40One's intent need not be to write on the Sabbath itself. As long as one erases with the intent of writing, one is liable regardless of when one actually writes (Mishnah Berurah 340:13). two letters is liable.41This is also one of the 39 categories of forbidden labor. If a mark was made in error on one of the walls, it was erased so that the correct mark could be made.
A person who writes one large letter the size of two [ordinary] letters is not liable.42For he has only written one letter. One is not liable until one writes two letters, regardless of their size. Nevertheless, writing even a single letter is considered as חצי שיעור (the performance of half the forbidden measure of a prohibition) and forbidden according to the Torah itself (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:4, Mishnah Berurah 340:12). In contrast, a person who erases one large letter in a place where two letters can be written is liable.43For his erasure is sufficient to enable two letters to be written.
A person who wrote one letter that concluded a scroll is liable.44In this instance, although only one letter was written, the act is significant, because it completed an entire scroll. There are commentaries on Shabbat 104b, the source for this halachah, who maintain that, in this instance, one is liable for performing the labor מכה בפטיש, completing an article. From the Rambam's wording, however, it appears that he holds him liable for writing.
We see a similar decision with regard to the forbidden labor of weaving. In Chapter 9, Halachah 18, the Rambam writes that one is liable for weaving one thread if by doing so, one completes a garment (Rav Kapach).
A person who writes for the sake of ruining the parchment is liable,45I.e., one writes an ordinary letter on parchment fit to write a Torah scroll (Rav Kapach). for one is liable for the writing itself46Although one has ruined the parchment and thus there is a destructive aspect to one's activity, since the words one wrote are significant, one is liable. and the surface on which [the letters] are written is not significant. If one rubs out writing with the intent of ruining [the writing surface], one is not liable.47For the entire purpose of the labor of erasing is to prepare a writing surface for use.
Should one rub out ink that fell on a scroll or rub out wax that fell on a writing tablet,48In Talmudic times, the word פנקס referred to a book of tablets coated with wax upon which merchants would write with a stylus (Rashi, Shabbat 104b). one is liable49For erasing. With this act, one prepares a writing surface. Note the Sh'vut Ya'akov and others who explain that one is liable for smearing the wax (see Halachah 6). Most authorities, however, accept the Rambam's ruling that one is liable for erasing. if [the rubbed out] portion is large enough for two letters to be written upon it.", + "A person who writes the same letter twice and thus produces a word [that has meaning] - e.g., דד תת גג רר שש סס חח50All these pairs of letters have meaning. Hence, one is liable. If, however, one writes a pair of letters that has no meaning, even if it is the beginning of a word - e.g., אא, one is not liable (Maggid Mishneh, based on Shabbat 103b). - is liable.
One is liable for writing in any language and with any characters,51It is necessary for the Rambam to mention both other languages and other characters. Otherwise, one might think that with regard to other languages, one is liable only for writing words from other languages when one transliterates them into Hebrew characters - or conversely, that one is liable for writing with other characters only when writing Hebrew words. With the wording he chose, the Rambam makes it clear that one is liable even when one writes words from another language in the characters of that language.
It must be emphasized that there are authorities who differ with the Rambam's decision. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 306:11) quotes the Or Zarua, who states that one is liable for writing only when one writes in the Assyrian script (i.e., the Hebrew script used for Torah scrolls) or in the classic Greek script. Note, however, the Noda BiY'hudah (Orach Chayim, Vol. II, Responsum 32) and the Be'ur Halachah 306, who refute the Or Zarua's opinion and state that it is not accepted by others. And note the S'dei Chemed (ma'arechet kaf, sec. 111), who brings other opinions in support of the Or Zarua.
or even for making two marks.52In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 12:3), the Rambam explains the term \"signs\" as referring to the use of letters as numbers - e.g., א for one, ב for two.
The Maggid Mishneh interprets these \"signs\" as referring to symbols that are not letters, but are significant to a reader, such as the reversed nunnim found in the Torah, Numbers 10:35-36. (See also Halachah 17 and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:7-8.)
", + "Left: Two zeinim in the Assyrian script. Right: A chet in the Assyrian script.
A person is not liable for writing in the following circumstances:
He writes one letter next to writing that existed previously;53Even when the letter he wrote completes a word when combined with the writing that existed previously. Since he has not written two letters on the Sabbath, he is not liable (Rashi, Shabbat 104b).
he writes on top of writing that existed previously;54Superimposing his writing on top of a letter that had been written previously. Although this writing made the existent letters clearer, since nothing essentially new is achieved, the person is not liable (ibid.). (See also the latter portion of Halachah 16 and notes.)
he intended to write a chet and instead wrote two zeinim55In the Assyrian script used for Torah scrolls and the like, a chet resembles two zeinim that are connected by two lines referred to as the ch'totrot. or makes a similar error with regard to other letters;
he writes one letter on the floor [of a house] and one letter on [one of] the beams [of the ceiling], for they are not read as a single unit;56Letters that cannot be read together are considered two separate units, and writing each of them a separate activity. Since the obligation for writing on the Sabbath is for writing two letters, as explained above, one is not liable unless the two letters can be read together.
he writes two letters on two pages of a writing tablet that are not read as a single unit.57In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 12:5), the Rambam emphasizes that letters must be on the same line to be able to read as a single unit. (See also Shabbat 104b, which emphasizes that the distance between the two letters can also be a significant factor.)
When a person writes [two letters] in two corners [of the walls of a house] or on two pages of a writing tablet and they can be read as a single unit,58This resembles the letters written on the beams of the Sanctuary, the source for the prohibition against writing on the Sabbath. he is liable.", + "If a person took a parchment or the like and wrote one letter upon it in one city and traveled on that same [Sabbath] day to another city where he wrote another letter on another scroll, he is liable.59The Maggid Mishneh states that this ruling, based on Shabbat 104b, applies even when it is necessary to fold the two parchments so that the two letters can be placed in juxtaposition to each other. [This decision is rendered] because when the [two parchments] are brought close to each other, they can be read as a single unit. All that is necessary is to bring them together.", + "
The dark portion is the letter reish. When the serrated lines are filled in, the letter dalet is formed.
A person who writes merely one letter is not liable even when [that letter] is representative of an entire word. What is implied? One wrote a מ and everyone knows that the intent is the word ma'aser60The word ma'aser means \"tithes.\" This abbreviation was often used to refer to money or produce that was ma'aser sheni, \"the second tithe,\" which could be used only to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. The same applies regarding other abbreviations. or one wrote [that letter] in the place where a number is required and thus it is as if one wrote [the word] \"forty,61The numerical equivalent of מ according to the accepted principles of gematria, Hebrew numerology.\" one is not liable.
If one was checking a single letter and divided it, [creating] two [letters], one is liable; for example, one divided the connecting lines of a chet, thus creating two zeinim.62See the notes and diagrams accompanying Halachah 11.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:8 mentions that a person who writes a zayin or any other of the letters שטנ\"ז ג\"ץ that require taggim, \"crowns,\" without these crowns is not liable. From this halachah, it would appear that the Rambam does not accept this ruling, for the zeinim created when the connecting lines of a chet are divided do not have crowns.
The same applies in all similar situations.63As another possibility, Shabbat 104b mentions erasing the projection in the right corner of a dalet to create a reish.", + "A person who writes with his left hand, with the back of one's hand,64Rashi, Shabbat 104b, interprets this to mean that the person holds a pen in his hand and turns his hand upside down to write.
Based on this source, the expression כלאחר יד is used throughout the Rabbinic literature on the Sabbath laws to mean \"in an unusual manner.\"
with his feet, his mouth, or with his elbow, is not liable.65A person is liable for performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath only when he does so in an ordinary manner. Although there is a Rabbinic prohibition against performing a forbidden labor in an unusual manner, one is not held liable.
A left-handed person who writes with his right hand - which for him is equivalent to other people's left hand - is not liable. If he writes with his left hand, he is liable. A person who is ambidextrous66The precise translation of the Rambam's wording is \"uses both of his hands with equal dexterity.\" On this basis, there is room for question regarding a left-handed person who writes with his right hand, but less comfortably than he does with his left hand. Is he liable for writing with his right hand on the Sabbath or not? is liable regardless of whether he writes with his right or left hand.
When a child holds the pen and an adult holds his hand and moves it, causing him to write, the adult is liable. When an adult holds a pen and a child holds his hand and moves it, causing him to write, the adult is exempt.", + "A person who writes is not liable until he writes with a substance that leaves a permanent mark67As mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 13, \"Whenever one performs a labor that does not have a permanent effect on the Sabbath, one is not liable.\" To apply a principle mentioned in the notes to that halachah, if the writing will remain on the Sabbath itself, even if it will fade afterwards, one is liable.
See also the Be'ur Halachah 340 who quotes the opinion of the Rashba (Shabbat 115b) which explains that permanency in this context refers to writing that will last an ordinary period of time.
- e.g., with ink,68In Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, the Rambam describes the preparation of ink as follows:
One collects the vapor of oils, of tar, of wax, or the like, [causes it to condense,] and kneads it together with sap from a tree and a drop of honey. It is moistened extensively, crushed until it is formed into flat cakes, dried, and then stored.
When one desires to write with it, one soaks [the cakes of ink] in gallnut juice or the like and writes with it. Thus, if one attempts to rub it out, he would be able to.
black tint,69The commentaries associate this with a tint produced from the residue of an oven. vermilion,70In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 12:4, Megillah 2:2), the Rambam translates this term into Arabic. Rav Kapach states that the Arabic term he uses refers to red colored clay used for drawing. gum, vitriol,71In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam describes these substances, using Arabic terms which Rav Kapach translates as referring to saps from trees that are yellow and green in color. When they are mixed with gallnut juice, they turn black, as the Rambam mentions in Chapter 9, Halachah 14. and the like - on a surface on which the writing will remain preserved - e.g., a skin, parchment, paper, wood,72As mentioned previously, the forbidden labor of writing has its source in the letters written as symbols for the walls of the Sanctuary. and the like.
[In contrast,] a person is not liable if he writes with a substance that does not leave a permanent mark - e.g., beverages or fruit juice - or if he writes with ink and the like on a substance like vegetable leaves where the writing will not be preserved. One is liable only when writing with a substance that leaves a permanent mark on a surface where that mark will be preserved.
Similarly with regard to [the forbidden labor of erasing]: A person who erases is liable only when erasing writing that would leave a permanent mark from a surface where that mark will be preserved.73Unless the writing is written with such substances and on such substances, the person's activity is considered insignificant, for the writing would soon fade in any event.", + "A person who writes on his skin is liable, because his flesh is [comparable to an animal] hide.74A surface on which writing would be preserved, as mentioned in the previous halachah. Even though the warmth of his flesh will cause the writing to fade afterwards, this is comparable to writing that was erased.75The writing is considered permanent, because the body's heat is considered as an external force that wipes out writing that, in and of itself, would remain permanently. In contrast, a person who engraves the forms of letters onto his skin is not liable.76Engraving is considered equivalent to writing - as is obvious from the law stated immediately afterwards. Nevertheless, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 12:4), the Rambam writes that the person is exempt, because engraving on human skin is not an ordinary way of writing.
A person who cuts out the form of letters on a hide is liable. In contrast, a person who makes a mark in the shape of letters on a hide is not liable.77From the Be'ur Halachah 340 and others, it appears that this refers to a mark that is made with a stylus or the like that will not remain permanently on the hide. (Note the contrast to Hilchot Gerushin 4:7.)
A person who traces over letters that were written with vermilion with ink is liable for two [transgressions]: one for writing and one for erasing.78Letters written with ink are much more attractive and distinctive than letters written with vermilion. Nevertheless, letters written with vermilion are also significant. Hence, by tracing over the initial writing, one performs two activities: the nullification of the letters written previously (erasing) and the composition of new letters (writing). [In contrast,] a person who traces with ink over letters that were written with ink,79To reinforce the previous writing. In this instance, one is not liable, as stated in Halachah 11. who traces with vermilion over letters that were written with vermilion, or who traces with vermilion over letters that were written with ink, is not liable.", + "Making designs is a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of writing. What is implied? A person who makes designs or who creates forms80Note the Be'ur Halachah 340, who questions whether one must make two designs to be held liable (as one is liable only when one writes two letters) or one is liable for making a single design. It is explained that from the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 7:2), it appears that a single design is sufficient. on a wall81Our translation follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. Significantly, some authoritative manuscripts use the Hebrew כחול, meaning \"blue,\" rather that כותל meaning \"wall.\" According to this version, the halachah would read \"One who makes designs and forms with blue, red and other [colors] of the like....\" or with red color and the like as artists do is liable [for performing a derivative of] writing.82See also Chapter 10, Halachah 16, and notes in regard to making forms on utensils. Similarly, a person who erases a design for the sake of correcting [it]83Alternatively, one is liable if one erases a design to draw a different design in its place. is liable [for performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of erasing.
A person who rules a line in order to write two letters below that line is liable.84This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. Carpenters who draw a red line on a beam to enable them to saw evenly perform a derivative of ruling a line.85From this halachah and from the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), it would appear that the category of labor of ruling lines is associated with writing only. This is somewhat difficult, because writing per se, was not performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. Rashi, Shabbat 75b, states that ruling lines was necessary to cut the hides carefully. According to his opinion, it is possible to say that ruling a line in order to saw in a straight line would be considered as the forbidden labor itself and not merely a derivative. See also Shulchan Aruch HaRav 340:11. Similarly, stonemasons who [make lines] on a stone so that they will cut it evenly [perform a derivative of ruling a line.]
One is liable regardless of whether the line one rules is colored or without color.86As the lines of a Torah scroll are ruled." + ], + [ + "A person who kindles even the smallest fire is liable,1This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. provided he needs the ash that it creates.2In the construction of the Sanctuary, it was necessary to kindle a fire in order to cook the herbs used for the dyes. Similarly, much of the metal work was perfomed after the metals were heated in a fire. However, should a person kindle a fire with a destructive intent, he is not liable, for he is causing ruin.3See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.
Nevertheless, a person who sets fire to a heap of produce or a dwelling belonging to a colleague is liable, because his intent is to take revenge on his enemies. [Through this act,] he calms his feelings and vents his rage. He is comparable to a person who rends his garments over a deceased person or in rage [on the Sabbath],4See Chapter 8, Halachah 8. or a person who injures a colleague in an argument.5See Chapter 10, Halachah 10. These individuals are all considered to be performing a constructive activity, because of their evil inclinations.
Similarly, a person who lights a candle or wood, whether to generate warmth or light, is liable.6Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Kuntres Acharon 495, which explains that in this halachah, the Rambam outlines two types of fires for which one is liable. He begins the halachah with the statement that a person is liable for kindling a fire, \"provided he needs the ash that it creates.\" This refers to a fire kindled for no purpose other than the production of ash.
Afterwards, the Rambam begins to describe when a person is liable for kindling fires that are used for constructive activity. e.g., to generate warmth or to cook. In these instances, there is no requirement that one require the ash.

A person who heats iron in order to strengthen it by submerging it in water is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of kindling.7The commentaries have raised many questions concerning this ruling and have also noted the apparent contradiction to the ruling in Chapter 9, Halachah 6, which holds a person who heats metal liable for cooking.
There are three positions among the Rishonim in this regard:
a) That of the Rambam, mentioned in this and the following halachah, which holds one liable for heating and extinguishing iron in order to strengthen it;
b) That of the Ra'avad, which exempts a person for both kindling and extinguishing metal. He maintains, however, that a person who performs these actvities is liable, the liability stemming from other categories of forbidden labors;
c) That of Rashi (Shabbat 42a, 134a), which holds a person liable for kindling metal, but exempts him for extinguishing. (See also the Sefer Yereim, which explains that, in the construction of the Sanctuary, the heating of metal and its refinement was necessary for the goldsmiths and silversmiths.)
Rav Kapach explains the Rambam's position, emphasizing that there is a difference between iron and other metals. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. In contrast, as iron is made into steel, it becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, just as the labors of kindling and extinguishing are associated with making charcoal - a new entity - so, too, it is these categories of labor that relate to the process of making steel. (See also the responsum of Rav Avraham, the Rambam's son, mentioned in the notes on the following halachah.)
", + "A person who extinguishes [a fire]8This is one of the 39 categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. Extinguishing was necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary, because it was used to create coals that were needed for the fires used to cook the herbs used for dye. Although these fires could also have been heated with wood, a fire heated with coals burns better (Kiryat Sefer).
See also the Sefer Yereim which mentions that extinguishing was necessary for the work of the goldsmiths and silversmiths.
of even the smallest size is liable.9Regardless of the size of the fire, a piece of charcoal is created. [This includes both] one who extinguishes a candle and one who extinguishes a coal that comes from wood.10As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 7, this ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that one is liable for the performance of a [forbidden] labor even if he has no need for the actual labor he performed (a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה).
As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 27:1, 334:27, differ and do not hold a person liable in such an instance. According to these authorities, a person is liable for extinguishing only when he requires the coals produced.
In contrast, a person who extinguishes a glowing piece of metal is not liable.11In one of his responsa, Rav Avraham, the Rambam's son, mentions the difference between a glowing piece of metal and a coal that comes from wood. When a fire fueled with wood is extinguished, a new entity - charcoal - is produced. Hence, one is liable for performing a forbidden labor. In contrast, when a glowing piece of metal is extinguished, no change is made in the metal itself unless the metal was heated with the intent of purifying it.
It must be noted that there are authorities who preceded the Rambam - Rav Yehudai Gaon, Rav Hai Gaon, and Rabbenu Chanan'el - who hold a person liable for extinguishing a glowing piece of metal. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, most of the authorities in the Rambam's era, and surely those in the subsequent eras, exempt a person for such an activity.
It also must be noted that different rulings apply with regard to extinguishing an electric light or heater. In this instance, there are recent authorities who maintain that one is surely liable for kindling and extinguishing glowing metal. (See Achiezer, Vol. III, Responsum 60 and Tzafenat Paneach, Responsum 273.)

If, however, the person's intent is to purify the metal, he is liable. This indeed is the practice of blacksmiths; they heat the iron until it glows like a coal, and extinguish it in water to seal it. This is the process of purification for which one is liable. It is a derivative [of the category of forbidden labor] of extinguishing.
It is permissible to extinguish a glowing piece of metal12According to the Rambam, this applies only with regard to a glowing piece of metal and not to a burning coal. The authorities who maintain that one is not liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, however, would allow one to extinguish a burning coal in this instance. Because of the danger involved, the Rabbinic prohibition against performing such an activity is waived (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:27). in the public domain so that many people will not be injured by it.13As mentioned above, although there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, it is waived because of the danger.
A person who pours oil into a burning lamp is liable for kindling. [Similarly,] a person who takes oil from a lamp is liable for extinguishing.14The Maggid Mishneh states that seemingly the opinions that do not accept Rabbi Yehudah's view regarding a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה would not hold the person liable unless his intent in extinguishing the candle was for the charcoal produced. See the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:1).", + "Should a fire break out on the Sabbath, a person is liable if he extinguishes it because of fear of monetary loss.15As the Ra'avad emphasizes, this ruling follows those views which maintain that a person is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. According to the view which differs, even though it is forbidden to extinguish a fire to save one's money, one would not be liable. This allows for greater leniencies, as will be explained. It is only the threat of loss of life,16Needless to say, if there is a threat to life the fire may be extinguished. and not monetary loss, that supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions.17See Chapter 2, Halachah 23.
Therefore, all people should leave [the area of the blaze] so they do not die. They should let the fire continue to burn, even if it consumes the entire city.18The Ramah (Orach Chayim 334:26) follows the view that one is not liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צ ריכה לגופה, and the prohibition against extinguishing a fire is merely Rabbinic in nature. Accordingly, he states that in the present time, it is permissible to extinguish a fire that has begun to blaze in a city.
In his time, it was common for the commotion caused by a fire to serve as an invitation for the gentiles to raid the Jewish quarters of the city, rampaging, pillaging, and creating havoc. In such a situation, it was very possible that Jewish lives would be threatened. Hence, he maintains that it is preferable for the fire to be extinguished than for such a situation to be created. Furthermore, in the cramped conditions of the ghettos, it was highly possible that the lives of the children, the elderly, and the disabled would be threatened by a fire.
Nevertheless, even the Ramah did not grant wholesale leniency on this matter and stated that, in practice, the ruling must be determined on the basis of our appreciation of whether there is a threat to life according to the circumstances at hand. Contemporary authorities add that because of the threat of electrical fires, gas explosions, and the like, a fire constitutes a real danger and should not be allowed to spread.
", + "It is permissible to construct a barrier using any type of container - whether full or empty - so that a fire will not spread. One may even construct a barrier using new earthen vessels filled with water, although they will surely break and extinguish [the fire].19Although there is a Rabbinic prohibition against even indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished, this prohibition is waived in the face of property loss (Ramah, Orach Chayim 334:22). It is permissible to cause [a fire to be] extinguished [indirectly].20The printed text of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 2:2) states \"It is forbidden to cause [indirectly] a fire to be extinguished.\" Rav Kapach notes, however, that in authoritative manuscripts of that text, this line is erased. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 13.
This equivocation in the Rambam's mind is also reflected in a difference of opinion between the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:22) quotes the Rambam's ruling that it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly. The Ramah, however, states that this is permitted lest a loss occur. This implies that there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, but that the prohibition is waived because of the possibility of property loss.

One may place a bowl21This act is permitted on the Sabbath itself. Although the bowl is being used for the sake of the beam, an article which may not be moved on the Sabbath, there is no prohibition involved (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 277:8; Mishnah Berurah 277:23). over a candle22Needless to say, the bowl must be suspended in a manner that allows enough ventilation for the lamp to continue burning. so that [the light] will not catch on the beams [of the roof].", + "When a fire catches on to a perfume box,23Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's version of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:5). a chest, or a [wooden] cabinet, one may bring a goat's skin24In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that a goat skin will become singed by a fire, but will not burst into flames. or another substance that will not catch fire and spread it over the portion that has not been consumed, so that the fire will not reach there.", + "When a garment [that is folded] catches on fire, one may spread it out and don it; if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant.25I.e., one is not liable. Furthermore, it is permissible to do so. Since it is not a certainty (פסיק רישא, see Chapter 1, Halachah 6) that the fire will be extinguished, this was not forbidden.
The Tur (Orach Chayim 334) states that one may not have the intention of extinguishing the fire, but merely of preventing it from spreading further. Note the difference of opinion between the Magen Avraham and the Turei Zahav if that ruling is accepted.
Similarly, if a Torah scroll has caught fire, one may unroll it and read from it, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant. One may place water26Tosafot, Shabbat 120a, accept the basis of the ruling cited by the Rambam, but maintain that one must use liquids other than water. Pouring water over a garment resembles the forbidden activity of laundering and is not permitted on the Sabbath, even in this situation. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:24) favors Tosafot's opinion. on the portion that has not yet caught fire, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant.27Based on Shabbat (loc. cit.), Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Ra'avad differ and forbid this leniency. They maintain that although it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly, placing water in such proximity to the fire is no longer considered an indirect activity. As obvious from the previous note, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this opinion.
If a person left a burning candle on a board,28I.e., it was not placed there with the intention that it remain there on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 277:12). one may shake the board, causing the candle to fall. If it is extinguished, it is not significant.29The commentaries have raised many questions about this ruling, since it is almost certain that the candle will be extinguished when it falls. Although the person does not intend to extinguish the candle, since this is an inevitable result of his actions (פסיק רישא), seemingly, it should be forbidden, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6. (Note, however, Mishnah Berurah 277:14). For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 277:3) states that this applies only with regard to a wax candle or an oil lamp if the oil has already burned out. In this instance, it is possible that the candle will continue burning even if it falls. In contrast, an oil lamp that contains oil may not be moved in this manner.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that the Rambam's ruling can be accepted even with regard to an oil lamp which contains oil. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). To apply that concept to the present situation, although spilling the oil from the lamp is considered as extinguishing the lamp, since th person did not intentionally desire to spill it and he regrets the loss of the oil, he should not be held liable. The commentaries also point to several other rulings that indicate that the Rambam accepts this principle.
If he [intentionally] placed it down [before] nightfall, it is forbidden to move [the board]30Our translation is a slight extension of the actual text of the Mishneh Torah, which states לטלטלו, concluding with a masculine suffix that seemingly refers to the candle, rather than the board. Nevertheless, as the commentaries point out, it is self-evident that the candle is forbidden to be moved. The new concept brought out by this law is that since the candle was intentionally left on the board before the commencement of the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 25, Halachah 17, the board is considered a base for a forbidden object and is also muktzeh, forbidden to be moved (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). even after the candle is extinguished.", + "If a fire broke out on the Sabbath and a gentile comes to extinguish it, we may not tell him, \"Extinguish it,\" nor [must we tell him,] \"Do not extinguish it,\" for his resting is not our responsibility.31As explained in Chapter 6, our Sages forbade a Jew to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on the Jew's behalf on the Sabbath. We are not, however, obligated to prevent the gentile from performing a forbidden labor for his own sake. Thus, we cannot tell him to extinguish the fire, nor are we required to tell him to refrain from doing so. Indeed, this portion of the halachah is quoted in Halachah 4 of that chapter.
In contrast, should a child desire to extinguish [the fire], he should not be allowed if he is acting on his father's behalf.32Exodus 20:10 states, \"Do not perform any work, neither you, your son, your daughter,...\" implying that a father is responsible for seeing that his children rest on the Sabbath. For this reason, any forbidden labor that will benefit his father may not be performed by a child (Maggid Mishneh). If he is acting on his own initiative, the court is not obligated to restrain him.33The expression \"the court\" refers to the communal authorities of the Jewish people. In a larger sense, it refers to the community as a whole.
From Chapter 24, Halachah 11, it would appear that the Jewish court is required to restrain a child from performing any violation of the Sabbath laws that originates in the Torah itself. This contradicts the Rambam's statements here and in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:27. Among the resolutions of this difficulty is that in the halachah cited, the Rambam is speaking about an activity that will benefit the child's father. See the notes on that halachah.

In the instance of a fire, [our Sages34Shabbat 121a, Ketubot 70b.] permitted a person to say, \"Anyone who extinguishes the fire will not suffer a loss.\"35I.e., as long as one does not instruct a gentile to extinguish the fire, one may indirectly encourage him to do so. Since the gentile has not been promised anything specific, he is considered to be working on his own behalf.", + "Transferring36Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The translation of the standard printed version of the text would be \"Bringing articles or removing articles from....\" Whether one is bringing an article in or removing it, one is transferring it. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1).
The wording of the manuscripts avoids the difficulties mentioned by the Lechem Mishneh and others that arise from Shabbat 96b.
objects from one domain to another is one of the categories of labor [forbidden on the Sabbath].
Although this [prohibition], as all other elements of the body of Torah law, was communicated orally by Moses [as he received them] from Sinai, it is also [alluded to within] the Torah itself. [Exodus 36:6] relates: \"[Moses ordered that an announcement be made:] 'No man or woman should do any further work concerning the donations to the Sanctuary.' And the people stopped bringing [their gifts].\" From this, one can infer that bringing [an article from one domain to another] is [also] referred to as \"labor.\"37Tosafot, Shabbat 2a, explain that this verse is necessary because, in contrast to the other activities classified as forbidden labors, transferring articles is \"an inferior labor\" - i.e., we would not ordinarily conceive of it as being forbidden. (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, which states that transferring articles does not appear to be an activity fit to be considered a forbidden labor.)
Eruvin 17b derives the prohibition against the transfer of articles from one domain to another from the exegesis of Exodus 16:29. Tosafot (Eruvin, loc. cit.; Shabbat, loc. cit.) explain that both verses are necessary: one to teach that bringing an article in from the public domain to a private domain is forbidden, and the other to teach the converse, that it is forbidden to take an article out from the private domain to the public domain.
The Rambam (particularly according to the version of the Mishneh Torah we have quoted) appears to view the concept of transferring as one activity which is prohibited on the basis of the oral tradition. Nevertheless, unlike the other categories of forbidden labor, in this instance there are allusions within the Torah itself. To make this point, he quotes the most obvious allusion, leaving the one in Eruvin for the scholars.

Similarly, we have learned according to the oral tradition38Shabbat 96b. that a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square39The bracketed additions are based on Halachot 15 and 18.] four cubits long to the end [of that square] is comparable to a person who transfers an article from one domain to another and is liable.", + "A person who transfers an object from one domain to another is not liable until1his act meets the following three criteria: he transfers an object of sufficient size to be useful2As explained in the notes on Chapter 1, it is \"purposeful work,\" מלאכת מחשבת, which the Torah has forbidden. Accordingly, if an object is not of sufficient size to be useful, transferring it on the Sabbath is not considered labor. This minimum amount is referred to with the term שיעור. In Chapter 18, the Rambam lists the minimum amounts of specific substances that are considered useful. from a private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to a private domain.3One is not liable for transferring an article from one private domain to another, nor is one liable for transferring an article from a private domain into a carmelit, a domain which is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The definitions of the various domains with regard to the Sabbath laws are found in Chapter 14.
Similarly, one must remove the article from one domain4This is referred to as עקירה. and place it down in the second domain.5This is referred to as הנחה. Unless a person performs both these actions himself, he is not liable. A person is not liable if he merely:
removed the article and did not place it down [and another person took it from his hand and placed it down],
placed6This situation is described in the opening Mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. If a homeowner picked something up to give to a poor man standing outside, and the poor man took it from his hand - since the homeowner did not place the article down (הנחה), he is not liable. it down [after taking it from the hand of the person who removed it], but did not remove it [himself], or
transferred7In the example cited above, since the poor man did not pick the article up (עקירה), he is not liable. As the above-mentioned mishnah elaborates, there are several different possibilities for two people to combine in transferring an object, one performing the עקירה, and the other the הנחה. less than an amount [that is useful].8Since carrying in the public domain is a derivative of transferring from one domain to another
Similarly, a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is not liable unless he removes9performing the עקירה himself an article of significant size10so that his act is of value from one side [of the square] and places it down on the other side [of the square].11performing the הנחה himself.", + "A person who throws an article from one domain40Rashi (Shabbat 8a) states that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the craftsmen would throw their needles to each other. to another or who hands41The Maggid Mishneh defines passing over as dragging an article along the ground. The Merkevet HaMishneh and others interpret it as passing an article from hand to hand. It appears that the Maggid Mishneh does not accept that interpretation, because the opening passage of Shabbat describes the transfer of objects from hand to hand as transfer (הוצ אה) and not handing over (הושטה). (See also the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger to this halachah.) [an article from one domain to a person in another domain]42In the construction of the Sanctuary, the beams for the walls of the Sanctuary were passed from the public domain to the storage wagons, which were considered as private domains (Shabbat 11:2). Tosafot, Shabbat 2a explain that, in contrast to the other categories of forbidden labor, the consequence of the fact that the status of transferring is \"an inferior labor,\" is that if the derivatives had not been found in the construction of the Sanctuary, they would not had been forbidden. is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.
Similarly a person who throws or passes an article by hand from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.
A person who throws in an abnormal manner is not liable.43As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 11, Halachah 14, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath unless he performs it in an ordinary manner.", + "A person who transfers part of an object from one of these two domains [a private domain or a public domain] to the other is not liable until he transfers the entire object from one domain into the other.
[For example,] if a container is filled with articles, even if it is filled with mustard [seed],44Mustard seed is very small. The Rambam chooses this example for certainly a sufficient quantity of mustard seed will have been transferred to the other domain if the majority of the container has been transferred. In contrast, were the container to hold larger articles, it is possible that no one article would have been transferred. Nevertheless, even when the contents are mustard seed, the person is not liable for the reasons stated by the Rambam. and a person transferred the majority of it from one domain to the other, the person is not liable unless he transfers the entire container.45Based on Shabbat 91b, the Merkevet HaMishneh draws attention to an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's decision here and in Hilchot Geneivah 3:2. The same applies in other similar situations. [The rationale is that] the container causes all the articles within it to be considered a single entity.46This reflects the Rambam's interpretation of the expression, Shabbat, loc. cit., אגד כלי שמיה אגד. Rashi and Rabbenu Chanan'el interpret this phrase slightly differently.
In this context, it is worthy to note Rabbi Akiva Eiger's reference to Tosafot, Pesachim 85b. There it is explained that this principle applies only to a container that has a receptacle. If, however, an entity is suspended from a stave, different rules apply.
", + "A person who transfers an article in the ordinary fashion in which the article is transferred is liable, whether he transferred it [by carrying it] in his right hand, in his left hand,47As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 14, usually a right-handed person is not liable if he performs a labor with his left hand. With regard to carrying, however, this is not the case, since a person will frequently carry an object with his weaker hand. or in his bosom, or whether he transfers money bound up in a cloth.48Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:39 interprets this as referring to a cloth that one is wearing. Even though the person is not holding the money in his hand, he is liable for transferring it. From this ruling, it is clear that a person who transfers objects in his pockets is liable just as if he transferred them by hand.
Similarly, one is liable if one transferred the articles on one's shoulder. [This applies] although the article is [being carried] more than ten handbreadths high in the public domain,49As the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7, the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying an object on his shoulders, for surely it would be held above that height. for this was the manner in which the sons of Kehat would carry50When the Jews broke camp in their journeys through the desert, the Sanctuary was taken down, and erected again at the site of the new encampment. The boards, coverings, and curtains of the Sanctuary would be transported by the other Levite families on wagons. The sons of Kehat would carry the ark, the table, the menorah, and the altars on their shoulders. [the sacred articles] of the Sanctuary above ten handbreadths high as [Numbers 7:9] states, \"They shall carry them on their shoulders.\"51More specifically, the verse cited states, \"the labor of the Sanctuary is upon them.\" Since the Torah specifically refers to carrying in this fashion as \"labor,\" although, as explained above, there is reason to exempt a person who carries an object on his shoulder, the person is held liable. As mentioned, all [the obligations for Sabbath] labors are derived from the Sanctuary.", + "In contrast, a person is not liable for transferring an article on the back of his hand,52Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:3). Others render this term as \"in an abnormal manner.\" with his foot, in his mouth,53The Maggid Mishneh explains that this does not refer to food. If a person walks from one domain to another while eating, he is liable for carrying the food he is holding in his mouth. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 3.) in the crook of his arm,54Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.). in his ear, in a pocket sewn into his garment when the opening of the garment is facing downward,55With this phrase, the Rambam explains the term אפנדתו, Shabbat, loc. cit., according to his Commentary on the Mishnah. Others render this term as \"money belt.\" between one garment and another,56But not in a pocket. in the hem of one's garment,57Here also, our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.). in his shoe, and in his sandal. [The rationale is that] he did not transfer the articles as people usually do.", + "[The following rules apply when] a person transfers a burden, carrying it on his head: If the burden was heavy58Bava Metzia 105b relates that it was customary to carry a burden weighing four kabbim or more on one's head. In contemporary measure, this figure is approximately five and a half kilograms or twelve pounds. - e.g., a full sack, a chest, a cabinet, or the like - and the person places it on his head and holds it with his hands,59The Ma'aseh Rokeach states that a person who does not hold the article with his hand is not liable. Balancing a heavy article on one's head is a skilled task that only few individuals are capable of performing. Hence, it is not considered an ordinary manner of transferring an article. he is liable. This is the normal manner in which these articles are transferred, and this is thus equivalent to a person carrying an article on his shoulder or in his hand.
If, however, the person placed a light article - e.g., a garment, a book, or a knife - on his head and transferred them without holding them in his hand,60The Ma'aseh Rokeach states that in this instance, even if one holds the article in one's hands, one is not liable, since this is not the ordinary way in which an article is transferred. he is not liable. He did not transfer them in the ordinary manner, for most people do not transfer articles by placing them on their heads.61This law applies universally, even in places where it is common to carry articles on one's head. See Shabbat 92a regarding the practice of the inhabitants of Hotzel, a city in Babylon (Maggid Mishneh).
A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head.62As mentioned above, the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 7 that the space ten handbreadths above the ground in a public domain is a makom patur, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying if he lifts an object above that height while transferring it in the public domain. Nevertheless, since the article does not come to rest in the makom patur, one is held liable (Shabbat 8b,9a).
The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's interpretation of that Talmudic passage and offers an alternative, which is accepted by the Rashba and Tosafot. The Rambam's interpretation is also offered by Rashi. (Alternatively, it is possible to explain that the Rambam's intent is that this is an ordinary, and not an abnormal, manner of carrying.
", + "It is permissible for a person to move objects in the public within a square four cubits by four cubits adjacent to the place where he is standing. He is allowed to move articles [freely] throughout this square.63As reflected in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and Chapter 20, Halachah 7, the Rambam does not place any restrictions on carrying within a square of four cubits in the public domain.
In contrast, the Ra'avad maintains that the leniency to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits in the public domain was granted a person only in abnormal situations - e.g., when one established this portion of the public domain as the place where he would spend the Sabbath or when he left the Sabbath limits. Under ordinary circumstances, one is not permitted to carry in the public domain at all. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:1) accepts the Rambam's ruling.

These cubits are measured according to the size of the person's arm.64I.e., the distance from his elbow to the tip of his middle finger. This measure is adapted to each individual instead of establishing a single uniform figure to allow every individual the opportunity of moving articles from his head to his feet when he is lying down (Eiruvin 48a). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). If, however, his arms are dwarf-sized,65But his body is of ordinary size (Rashi, Eiruvin 48a, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:1). he is granted four cubits according to the size of an average person's arms.66According to Shiurei Torah, a cubit is 48 centimeters; according to Chazon Ish, it is 57.7 centimeters
According to the oral tradition,67Eruvin 48a, Mechilta, Beshalach 5, and other sources. this is the interpretation of the Torah's statement [Exodus 16:29]: \"Every person should remain in his place,\" that every person should not move an article outside this square, only within it. [This square] represents the length of a human body when one extends one's hands and feet; only within it is one allowed to move objects.68The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to a difference of opinion among the Sages, Eruvin 48a, regarding the extent to which one is allowed to carry in the public domain. Although the prevailing view is that one is allowed to carry in a square four cubits long, there are interpretations that state that one may carry four cubits in any direction. This means that although one may not carry an object eight cubits, one may carry an object four cubits on one side and four cubits on the other side.
The view that the Rambam appears to accept, however, maintains that one may carry only in a single square four cubits long. (See also Chapter 27, Halachah 11.)
", + "When two people [are standing near each other] and a portion of the four cubits [in which one may carry] extends into the four cubits [in which the other may carry],69I.e., they are less than eight cubits apart. There was no Rabbinic prohibition instituted lest one carry beyond the permitted space. they may both bring [food] and eat in the center, provided one does not take something from [the area which is solely] his and bring it into [the area which is solely] his colleague's.
If three people [are standing near each other] and the middle individual's [space] is enclosed within their space,70I.e., the individuals on the extremes are standing between eight cubits and twelve cubits from each other. Thus the squares four cubits long of those on the extremes do not overlap, yet each share a certain portion with the person in the center. he is permitted [to share] with them and they are permitted [to share] with him. The two individuals on the extremes, however, are forbidden [to share] with each other.71Although they are forbidden to share with each other directly, as explained in the following halachah, each of them may pass an article to the person in the center, who may pass it to the other.", + "Based on the above, it is permitted for a person to lift up an article from the public domain and give it to a colleague who is near him, within his four cubits.72As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the transfer must take place within the four cubits, the colleague may be standing slightly further removed. The colleague may give it to another colleague standing at his side [who may pass it further]. Even if the article changes hands hundreds of times or is transferred several millim73A mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure. on the Sabbath, this is permissible,74The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, noting that this leniency was mentioned in Eruvin 95b only with regard to an extreme situation - i.e., an instance where tefillin or other sacred articles might be desecrated. He contends that it should not be extended beyond that context.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:3) quotes the Rambam's ruling, some of the later authorities (see Turei Zahav 349:1) raise questions about this leniency.
because each individual moved it only within the four cubits [granted] him.", + "Since each person is allowed to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits, he is permitted to carry along the diagonal of this square which is five and three-fifths cubits long.75The Rambam is not speaking in exact figures; the actual length of the diagonal is a fraction larger. Accordingly, a person who carries or throws an article in the public domain is not liable unless he moves it beyond five and three-fifths cubits [from its original place].76The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there were earlier authorities who maintain that one is liable for moving an article a measure of four cubits. Nevertheless, all the later authorities accept the law stated by the Rambam.
Whenever we have mentioned [the phrases], \"from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square]\" or \"one who carries an object four cubits is liable,\" the intent was [the distance] from the beginning of the diagonal of a four cubit [square] until its end. If a person carries an object for a shorter distance, he is not liable.", + "Thus, there are three [levels of responsibility that apply when] a person lifts up an object from one place in the public domain and places it down in another place in the public domain: If there are less than four cubits between these two places, the act is permitted.
If there are more than four cubits but less than five and three-fifths cubits between the two places, [the act is forbidden, but the person] is not liable.77Based on Eruvin 98b, Rashi, Tosafot, and Rabbenu Asher (see also the gloss of the Ra'avad) do not accept the Rambam's ruling and place no restrictions on carrying within five and three-fifths cubits. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:2) mentions the Rambam's view, it accepts the decision of the other authorities. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:2, however, states that at the outset, the Rambam's view should be followed. If there are more than five and three-fifths cubits, the person is liable, because he moved an article beyond the diagonal of a square [four cubits long]." + ], + [ + "A person who transfers an object from one domain into another1The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to the fact that there are authorities who hold a person liable if he places an object down on a place in a private domain that is smaller than four handbreadths by four handbreadths. (See the notes on Chapter 14, Halachah 17.) or one who carries an object beyond four cubits in the public domain is not liable unless he lifts the object up from a place that is [at least] four handbreadths by four handbreadths, and places it down in a place that is [at least] four handbreadths by four handbreadths.2In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1), the Rambam explains the rationale for this law: An object of significant size will not remain at rest if put down in such a small place. Therefore, one is not liable for placing down any objects there.
An object that is positioned on a person, animal, or utensil located in a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths is considered as if it has been placed down on a place that size.
", + "A person's hand is considered equivalent to a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in size.3This concept is also explained in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1): The adroitness and dexterity of a human hand makes it fit to hold even very large articles that are placed in it. Therefore, an object placed in a person's hand is considered as if it were placed on the ground on which he was standing. Therefore, a person who removes an object from another person's hand in one domain and places it in the hand of a third person in a second domain is liable.4The Maggid Mishneh cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 1:1) as stating that a person is not liable for placing an object in the hand of another person standing in the public domain unless the latter's hand is held below ten handbreadths high. Nevertheless, as Chapter 12, Halachah 14, appears to indicate, the Rambam does not necessarily make such a distinction.
Similarly, a person is liable if he was standing in one of these two domains and stretched his hand into the other, removed an article from there or from the hand of a person standing there, and then returned his hand. [This applies] even though he did not place down the article in the domain in which he is standing.5It must be emphasized that a person's hand is considered as equivalent to a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in size only when that hand is located in the same domain as he is. When, however, a person is standing in the public domain and his hand is extended into a private domain, an object placed in his hand is not considered to have been put down in the private domain. See Chapter 15, Halachah 1. Since it is in his hand, it is considered as if it were placed on the ground.", + "When a person was eating and passed from one domain to another, he is liable if he thought to carry the food in his mouth from one domain to the other. Although this is not the ordinary way in which articles are transferred,6See Chapter 12, Halachah 13. his intent causes his mouth to be considered as a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in size.
Similarly, if a person who was standing in one domain urinated or spit into the other domain, he is liable, because he removed [a substance] from one domain and placed it down in another. His conscious [performance of this activity] causes it to be considered as if he removed [an object] from a space four [handbreadths by four handbreadths]. If a person is standing in one domain and the opening of his penis is in a second domain and he urinates into that domain, he is not liable.7Eruvin 99a questions whether a person would be held liable in such an instance, and leaves the matter unresolved. Therefore, the Rambam rules that a person is not held liable.", + "If a person standing in one of two domains extended his hand into the other, removed water from a pit full of water,8Rav David Arameah emphasizes that this halachah is speaking about an instance in which the water is at rest and not flowing. and transferred it [to another domain], he is liable.9In contrast, if a person in a similar situation catches rain water in his hand and transfers it, he is not liable, because it is not considered to have come to rest (Shabbat 5a,b). The entire [quantity of] water is considered as if it is placed on the ground.
In contrast, when a container of fruit is floating on the water, a person who extends his hand and takes some of the fruit and transfers it [to the domain in which he is standing] is not liable. Since the fruit was not resting on the ground, the person did not remove [an object] from a space four [handbreadths by four handbreadths].10In this instance as well, since our Sages (Shabbat 5b) do not resolve whether or not a person should be held liable in such an instance, the Rambam exempts him.
Needless to say, if the fruit itself was floating on the water and one transferred it [to another domain], he is not liable.11The Rambam appears to interpret the passage cited above as emphasizing that an object that floats on water is not considered to be at rest. Hence, the criteria from removing an object from a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths cannot be met. See (Tosafot, Shabbat, loc. cit.), which interprets the passage slightly differently. Similarly, if oil was floating on water and one scooped up some of the oil and transferred it [to another domain], he is not liable.12Although the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, the majority rule that since oil remains a distinct entity and floats on the water (see Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 8:3), it is not considered to be resting in place.", + "As mentioned above,13Chapter 12, Halachah 9. a person who transfers [an object] from one domain to another is not liable unless he removes the object from its place and places it down [in a new place]. When, however, one removes [an object], but does not place it down or places it down without lifting it up, one is not liable.
Therefore, when a person standing in one of two domains extends his hand into another domain while holding an object, and another person takes it from him, or if another person places an article in his hand and he retracts his hand, neither is liable,14This is the contents of the first Mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. neither the person who removed the article nor the one who placed it down.15The rationale for this decision is that a person is liable only when he both begins and completes a forbidden labor himself. There is no liability when one person begins a forbidden labor and it is completed by another. Shabbat 93a derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, \"when one performs one...,\" as implying that \"a person who completes its performance, and not one who performs only a portion [of the forbidden labor].\" (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, and also Chapter 1, Halachah 15.)", + "When does the above apply? When [the giver's] hand is held more than three [handbreadths above the ground]. If, however, [the giver's] hand is held less than three handbreadths16One of the principles of Torah law that is applied in several other different contexts (e.g., constructing an eruv or a sukkah) is l'vud - i.e., that an object less than three cubits away from another entity is considered to be connected to it. above the ground, [holding the article at that height] is equivalent to placing it on the ground,17And thus, in addition to the removal of the article from its place, he is considered to have performed the hanachah, the placement of the article in its new place (Rashi, Shabbat 92a).
Rashi also emphasizes that although the person is standing in another domain and holding the article in his hand, the fact that his hand is attached to his body does not prevent us from considering the object as having been placed on the ground.
In this context, the commentaries note the contrast to Halachah 14. The Or Sameach explains that the leniency mentioned there applies only when one throws an object, and not when one moves it from domain to domain by hand.
and one is liable.", + "When one person is standing in either of these two domains and a colleague extends his hand from the second domain, takes an object from the person standing in the first domain and brings it in, or [the colleague] takes an object from his [domain] and places it in the hand of the person who is standing, the person who is standing [is not liable at all].18This halachah is also based on the opening mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. Although the person standing is not liable at all with regard to the Sabbath laws, he transgresses the prohibition (Leviticus 19:14 , \"Do not place a stumbling block in the path of the blind.\" See Tosafot, Shabbat 3a, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 347. He did absolutely nothing; it was [his colleague who] placed the object in his hand or took it from his hand. The colleague is therefore liable, for he removed the object [from its original place] and put it down [in a new place].", + "When a person is standing in either of these two domains and a colleague puts an object in his hand or [loads it] on his back, and the [first] person goes out to another domain [carrying] this object, he becomes liable [when] he stands [still]. Removing his body while bearing the object is considered as removing the object from that domain, and standing while carrying the object is considered as placing the object down on the ground where he is standing. Therefore, if he went out holding the object in his hand or [carrying] it on his back and did not stand [still] in the second domain, but rather returned to the first domain while he was still holding the object, he is not liable. [This applies] even if he goes in and out [carrying the object] for the entire day until its conclusion. Although he removed [the object from its original place], he did not put it down [in a new place].19There appears to be a slight difference between the Rambam's interpretation of the source for this law, Shabbat 5b, and that of Rashi. Note the commentaries of the Lechem Mishneh and Merkevet HaMishneh. Even if he stands [still] to adjust his load, he is not liable.20Unless a person's intent is to rest, his standing is not significant, for it is only circumstance and not conscious decision that causes him to stand still. He is still in the midst of the activity he is performing and has not come to rest. See Halachah 10 and notes. [To be held liable, he must] stand [still] to rest.", + "For this reason, a person who is carrying a burden on his shoulders and running is not liable until he stands, even if he runs the entire day. He must, however, be running. If he is walking slowly, it is tantamount to having removed the article and having placed it down. [Hence,] this is forbidden.21By using the term \"forbidden\" rather than \"liable,\" the Rambam emphasizes that the prohibition is Rabbinic in nature. Since this does not represent a departure from one's ordinary conduct, there is the possibility that one will stop, and thus perform an activity for which one is liable. Hence, the Rabbis forbade such conduct (Rashi, Shabbat 153b, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 266:11). Others explain that the Sages issued this prohibition because this leniency might cause the person to carry on a future occasion, or because others might carry after they saw him do so. For this reason, a person who was carrying an article on his shoulders when the Sabbath commences should run with it until he reaches his home and then throw it inside in an abnormal manner.22Shabbat (loc. cit.) emphasizes that there are two difficulties involved in the person's conduct: a) carrying the object four cubits in the public domain, and b) taking the object from the public domain to his home, a private domain (for most likely, the person stopped at least momentarily before entering).
Since the person began carrying the object before the commencement of the Sabbath, he has not removed the article from its place (akirah) in a forbidden manner. Hence, carrying the object four cubits in the public domain does not constitute a difficulty. In contrast, transferring the object from the public domain into one's home is problematic. Nevertheless, since this transfer is carried out in an abnormal manner, one is not liable.
Shabbat (loc. cit.) mentions this law with regard to a person carrying a package. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:12) questions whether the same leniency applies when a person is carrying a wallet or another small article of that nature. The commentaries explain that since a person does not usually run when carrying a burden, the fact that he runs is a sufficient departure from the norm to remind him that stopping is forbidden. In contrast, since it is not a departure from the norm for a person to run while carrying a wallet, the Rabbis forbade doing so.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:13 and the Mishnah Berurah 266:34 state that in their time, when according to most authorities there is no concept of a public domain, one may follow the lenient view. There is some question, however, if this applies at present.
(See also the notes on Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7. See also the comments of the Mishnah Berurah 266:29, which states that preferably one should have even a package carried by a gentile or an animal, or one should walk with it less than four cubits at a time.)
", + "When a person removes an article from its place in the public domain and walks, [carrying] it less than four cubits and stands, [he is not liable].23As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 15, one is allowed to carry within one's four cubits. [Moreover, even if he continues this pattern[ the entire day, carrying the article less than four cubits, stopping, and then proceeding further, he is not liable.24The Rambam uses the past tense, implying that this ruling applies only after the fact, בדעיבד. At the outset, לכתחילה, one is allowed to carry an object less than four cubits at a time only in certain extraordinary situations. (See Chapter 20, Halachah 7, and notes.)
This represents the perspective taken by most commentaries (see Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:5). Rav Kapach, however, cites manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state מותר, \"permitted,\" rather than פטור, \"not liable,\" implying that there are no restrictions against carrying in this manner.
When does the above apply? When he stands in order to rest.25Only then is he considered to have placed the article down (hanachah). (See Halachah 8.) If, however, he stands to adjust his load [within four cubits], it is considered as if he is still walking. Thus, when he stands after moving four cubits [from his original place], he is liable.26The first time he stood, he is not considered to have performed a hanachah. In contrast, when he stood the second time, he is considered to have done so. Hence, he is liable for carrying. The [latter ruling applies, however,] when he stops [a second time] after moving four cubits [from his original place] for the purpose of resting. If he stops for the purpose of adjusting his load [again], he is considered as if he is still walking. He is not liable until he stood to rest more than four cubits [from his original place].", + "[The following rules apply when] a pole, spear, or the like is lying on the ground: If a person lifts up one end without lifting the other from the ground, and then thrusts the pole forward, [he is not liable]. [Moreover, even if he continues this pattern,] picking up the second end which had remained in contact with the earth [while leaving the other end in contact with the earth], and thrusting it forward, and continuing to do so until the object moved several millim, he is not liable. [The rationale is that] the person never lifted the object from the earth.27One is liable for moving an article only when there is akirah and hanachah. In this instance, neither of these actions had taken place. If, however, he pulls the article and drags it on the ground from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square], he is liable. [The rationale is that] rolling the article is comparable to picking it up from its place.28The difference between dragging and rolling and the previous instance appears to be that although the article remains in contact with the ground while being rolled, the entire article is moved from its original place at the same time. In contrast, when one lifts up the pole, one side always remains in its original place.", + "When a person removes an article from one corner [of a private domain] with the intent of placing it down in another corner [of the same domain], the removal of the article in such a manner is permitted. Should he then change his mind and take the article out to another domain, he is not liable.
[The rationale is that] the removal [of the article from its original place] was not [performed] with that intent.29Rashi (Shabbat 5b) explains that since the person did not perform the akirah with the intent of transferring the article to the public domain, he is not considered to have performed the forbidden labor as a purposeful act. Since it is purposeful activity, מלאכת מחשבת, that the Torah forbade on the Sabbath, he is not liable at all. Although he did perform the transfer and the hanachah intentionally, since he did not have such a thought when performing the akirah, the entire action is considered to have been performed unintentionally.
According to the Rambam, however, the rationale appears to be that since the entire labor was not performed in a forbidden manner, one is not held liable.
Thus, the placement of the article was [performed in a forbidden manner], but not its removal.
Similarly, a person is not liable if he removes an article [from its original position] and places it on the back of a colleague who is walking, but removes it from his colleague's back when30I.e., before. the latter desires to stand.31Were the person carrying the object to have stood still, he would have performed a forbidden hanachah, as mentioned in Halachah 8. Although even in such circumstances, neither of the two would have been liable (as stated in Halachah 5), when the article is taken in the manner described by the Rambam, neither is considered to have performed a forbidden hanachah.
There is no prohibition in taking an article off a colleague's back in the public domain, even when the latter is walking. Taking the article from a person in this manner is not considered a continuation of the first transfer of the article, but rather an independent act. (See also the notes on Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7.)
The removal of the article was [performed in a forbidden manner], but not its placement.", + "A person who throws an object from one domain to another, or from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] is not liable if another person caught it in his hands,32Rashi (Shabbat 102a) states that this refers to a situation where the other person had to leave his original place to catch the article which was thrown. The Sefer HaKovetz and the Merkevet HaMishneh state that according to the Rambam, the thrower is not liable even if the other person who caught the article did not move, for the article did not come to rest in the place intended by the thrower. a dog caught it, or it was consumed by flames before it came to rest. [The rationale is that] this was not the manner in which the thrower intended that the article come to rest. Accordingly, if this, in fact, was his intent, he is liable.33Even if the dog's mouth or the opening of the fire is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths (see Halachah 1), the person is liable. The fact that this was the person's intent causes the place the article comes to rest to be considered as significant (Shabbat, loc. cit.).", + "A person is not liable if he throws an article that is tied to a rope he is holding in his hand from one domain to another, if he can pull the article back to him. [The rationale is that] the article is not considered to have been placed down in a definitive manner.34The commentaries note the contrast to Halachah 6. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Or Sameach differentiates between throwing an object and moving it by hand. Thus, the person is considered to have removed the article [from its original place],35In his gloss on the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger emphasizes that the rope is not considered part of the article itself (in which case the person would be exempted because he did transfer the entire article). (See Chapter 12, Halachah 11.) but not to have placed it down [in a new place].", + "[The following rules apply when] a person throws an object and it comes to rest in the hands of a colleague: If the colleague stood in his place and received the object, the person who threw it is liable, for he both removed [the object from its original place] and caused it to come to rest.36Throwing the object into his hands is equivalent to placing it there. If the recipient of the article must move in order to catch it, he is not liable, because the article did not come to rest in the desied place. If the colleague [was forced to] leave his place to receive it, the one who threw it is not liable. If a person threw an article and then ran after the article himself and caught it in his hands in another domain or beyond four cubits [in the public domain], he is not liable. It is as if [the intended recipient was forced to] leave his place to catch it.37Shabbat 5a questions whether these two separate actions, throwing and catching the article, are considered as having been performed in one continuum or not. Since this matter is left unresolved, the Rambam does not hold one liable. [The rationale for these rulings is: The person who throws an article is not considered to have] caused [the article] to come to rest in a definitive manner until it comes to rest in the place in which it was intended to come to rest when it was removed [from its original place].", + "A person who throws an article from one private domain to another private domain is not liable, even if the article passes through the space of a public domain that separates them from each other.38Although Rabbi Akiva maintains that an object that passes through the space above a domain is considered as if it came to rest in that domain, his opinion is not accepted by the majority of the Sages. The halachah follows the majority opinion (Shabbat 11:1). [The above applies] provided the article passes more than three handbreadths above the ground.39As mentioned previously, the space within three handbreadths of the ground is considered as l'vud, an extension of the ground. If, however, the article passes less than three handbreadths above the earth and comes to rest on another object,40There are several other opinions among the Rishonim on this issue. Rashi (Shabbat 100a) states that this ruling applies even if the article is being blown by the wind and pauses in its progress in the midst of the air. Since it is less than three handbreadths above the ground, it is considered as being in contact with the ground. Nevertheless, if it does not pause even momentarily in its progress towards the other domain, it is not considered to have come to rest.
Both the Rambam's ruling and that of Rashi are based on the opinion of Ravvah (Shabbat 97a). That Talmudic passage also mentions another opinion, that of Rav Chilkiyah who maintains that, based on the principle of l'vud, the article is considered to have come to rest even though its progress is not halted even momentarily. Rabbenu Chanan'el and the Ramban accept this view.
the person is liable even though [afterwards,] the object [continues to] move and rolls into the other private domain.41If, however, the article passes more than three handbreadths above the ground, the person who throws it is not liable even if it comes to rest. As mentioned in Halachah 1, a person is not liable unless the article comes to rest on a surface at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Lechem Mishneh). [Nevertheless,] it is considered as if it had remained in the public domain. Therefore, the person is liable. Similarly, when a person throws an article from one public domain to another public domain that is separated from the first by a private domain, the person is not liable.42Note, however, the following halachah. If, however, the article passes less than three handbreadths above the earth and comes to rest on another object, the person is liable even though [afterwards,] the object rolls into the other public domain.43In his gloss to the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger draws attention to Chapter 14, Halachah 17, which appears to indicate that the Rambam does not require an object to be placed down on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths in the private domain. From this halachah, however, it would appear that he maintains that such a condition is necessary. Otherwise, there would be no difference whether the article was thrown three handbreadths above the ground or not. [Nevertheless,] it is considered as if it had remained in the private domain. Therefore, the person is liable.", + "A person is, however, liable if he carries44Although Shabbat 97b-98a, the source for this halachah, states this concept with regard to a person who throws an article, the Rambam alters the wording and mentions \"a person who carries....\" He did not make this change to exclude one who throws an article, but rather to emphasize that a person who carries an article in this manner is also liable.
The commentaries offer several reasons why this emphasis is necessary. Among them: A person who throws an article does not have it in his power to return it. Hence, it is logical to assume that the area in the two public domains can be combined. In contrast, a person carrying an article can change his mind at any time. Therefore, it would have been possible to think that his entrance into the second public domain is an independent act. Hence, it is necessary for the Rambam to mention carrying (Or Sameach).
Alternatively, the Rambam's choice of wording was intended to differentiate between the instance described here, and the circumstances described in Chapter 18, Halachah 24 (Sefer HaKovetz).
an object more than four cubits [in the public domain as he proceeds from] one public domain to another [although he passes through a private domain in the interim].45E.g., the person was standing two cubits from the end of one public domain. He carried or threw an article over a private domain and it came to rest more than three and a third cubits within a second public domain. Although the article did not travel four cubits in either of the two public domains, when the sum of the space it traveled in both public domains is taken, it exceeds the diagonal of a square of four cubits. Hence, he is liable. See the diagram on the opposite page. The rationale is that the total of four cubits [can be reached by] combining [the area traversed in] both public domains, because the object did not come to rest in the domain between them.", + "A person is liable if he passes46As the Rambam emphasizes in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:2), a person is liable only when he passes an article in this fashion, and not when he throws one. The circumstances in which one is liable are derived from the Sanctuary, and in that instance the Levites would pass the boards only; they would not throw them. an article from one private domain to another private domain when they are separated by a public domain.47The description of this situation is completed in the following halachah.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that it would be logical to assume that a person who passes in article from one private domain to another in this manner would also be exempt, as explained in the following note. Nevertheless, since this constituted part of the service of the Levites in the Sanctuary, one is held liable.
[This law applies] even when he passed the article above the space of the public domain, for this was [part of] the service of the Levites in the Sanctuary.48Generally, the space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is considered a makom patur, and one is not held liable for transferring an object through it (Chapter 14, Halachah 7). Nevertheless, since the service of the Levites involved carrying in this manner, one is liable under such circumstances as well.
The Merkevet HaMishneh questions the Rambam's use of the word \"even,\" which implies that one is surely liable for passing an article in the manner described above when one passes the article below ten handbreadths. This is problematic: Since logically a person would not be held liable in such an instance, and the obligation stems only from the parallel to the service of the Levites, why is it extended beyond the parameters of their service? Since they would pass the boards more than ten handbreadths above the ground, why is one liable when passing an article at a lower height? (See Tosafot, Shabbat 4a.)
They would pass the boards from wagon to wagon.49As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 12, Halachah 12, during the Jews' journey through the desert they would dismantle, transport, and re-erect the Sanctuary. In this process, the boards for the walls of the sanctuary were carried on four wagons. They would line up in pairs on either side of the Sanctuary. The boards would be lifted from the ground to the front wagon and then passed from one wagon to the other above the space of the public domain. See the accompanying diagram taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.). [This is analogous to the above situation, because] the public domain passed between each wagon and each wagon was considered as a private domain.50Since the wagons were ten handbreadths above the ground, each of them was considered a separate private domain.", + "When does the above apply? When the two private domains are positioned [parallel to each other] along the length of the public domain,51The Mishnah (Shabbat 11:2) gives an example of such a situation: Two balconies in a row above the public domain. Note the diagram on the opposite page taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah. as the wagons would proceed behind each other in the public domain. If, however, the two private domains are positioned opposite each other on either side of the public domain,52E.g., two balconies on either side of a street (Shabbat, loc. cit.). one is not liable even if one passes53The word \"even\" is used to imply that not only is one free of liability when one throws from one balcony to another, even when an article is passed by hand in this fashion, one is exempt.
The reason for this exemption is that the Levites would pass the boards from wagon to wagon along the length of the public domain, but not across it. As mentioned above, logically one would not necessarily infer that a person should be held liable for transferring an article in this manner. Nevertheless, since we find that the Levites would transfer the boards in this manner, one is held liable. This applies, however, only when one transfers an article in the same manner as they would transfer the boards.
an article from one domain to the other.
Passing from One Balcony to Another
", + "[The following rules apply when] a person forgot54I.e., forgot that it was the Sabbath or forgot that it was forbidden to transfer articles in this manner on the Sabbath. Hence, the person is considered as having performed the act בשוגג, \"inadvertently.\" and reached his hand out from one courtyard with the intent of extending it into another courtyard to its side55Seemingly, this law is dependent on the situation described in the previous two halachot. A person desired to pass an object (fruit) from one courtyard (a private domain) to another courtyard, which was separated from the first by the public domain. Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 348:2 states that it also applies when taking the article into the other courtyard would not make one liable for a sin offering - e.g., when they are positioned on opposite sides of the public domain.
while he was holding fruit: If he remembered before his hand entered [the other courtyard], and his hand is thus extended above the space of the public domain,56Rav Moshe Cohen and the Maggid Mishneh maintain that this law applies only when the person's hand is held less than ten handbreadths above the public domain. If, however, the person extends his hand higher then ten handbreadths from the ground, he is allowed to return it, since it is being held in a makom patur. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 348:1) accepts this interpretation. he is permitted to return it to the courtyard in which he [is located]. He is, however, forbidden to extend it into the second courtyard, so that he will not accomplish the intent he had in mind when he performed this act inadvertently. If he extended his hand with a conscious intent to violate [the Sabbath laws and then changed his mind], he is [even] forbidden to return it. [The Sages] punished him [and decreed] that his hand must remain extended until nightfall.57I.e., the conclusion of the Sabbath. The Rashba in his notes on Shabbat 3a states that this restriction applies only when a person extended his hand to transfer the article before the commencement of the Sabbath. If he extended his hand outward after the commencement of the Sabbath, he is allowed to return it, lest he drop the article into the public domain, and in doing so perform a forbidden labor.
(According to the Rambam, he would not be liable in such an instance. Even if he dropped the article, it would not have been placed down in the place he originally intended. Hence, he would be exempt, as stated in Halachah 15.)
Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions the Rashba's view, it rules according to the Rambam. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 348:1 quotes solely the Rambam's view. The Mishnah Berurah 348:8, however, mentions authorities who accept the Rashba's opinion.
", + "When a person intended to throw an article eight cubits in the public domain, but the article came to rest [just] beyond four cubits, he is liable, because the minimum measure of the forbidden labor was performed and the person's intent was completed. [Why is this so?]58The question is based on the concept expressed in Halachah 15: A person is liable for transferring an article only when it comes to rest in the place where he intended it to when he removed it from its original place. Because it is known that an article cannot reach a range of eight cubits without first passing through every space within that distance.59Accordingly, it is considered as if this was implicit in his original intent.
Rashi and Tosafot differ with the Rambam in their interpretation of the source for this halachah, Shabbat 97b. According to their perspective, the thrower is liable only when it makes no difference to him where the article lands. If his intent was for it to travel eight cubits, he is not liable.
See the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim 254), which explains the theoretical difference between this view and the Rambam's ruling.
In contrast, if a person intended to throw an article [just beyond] four [cubits] and the article came to rest at a distance of eight cubits, he is not liable, because the article came to rest in a place where he did not expect it to pass and certainly not to come to rest. Accordingly, if a person threw an object with the intent that it come to rest wherever it [landed], he is liable.", + "When a person throws an article [within] four cubits and it rolls beyond that distance, he is not liable.60In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:3), the Rambam explains that the person is not liable because he did not intend to throw the article beyond the permitted distance.
The Rashba offers a different explanation of this Mishnah, that the article came to rest momentarily within four cubits and then rolled beyond that distance. Since the Rambam does not mention the object coming to rest at all in this clause, he does not follow this interpretation.
The Rambam would surely agree that one is not liable in the situation described by the Rashba. It is a matter of question, however, whether the Rashba would agree that the person is not liable in the situation described by the Rambam.
[The following rules apply] if a person throws an article beyond four cubits and it rolls back within four cubits: If it came to rest on an object beyond four cubits and afterwards rolled back within four cubits, he is liable.61Since the object came to rest, albeit momentarily, it is considered as if his intent were completed. If it did not come to rest at all [beyond four cubits], he is not liable.62Because there is no forbidden hanachah." + ], + [ + "There are four domains1An ancient commentary on the Mishneh Torah from Egypt emphasizes that the word רשות, translated as \"domain,\" means \"authority.\" Thus, in the context of space, a \"private domain\" would refer to a place that is controlled by a single authority, and a \"public domain\" to a place that is not controlled by such an authority. See Hilchot Eiruvin 1:4-5. [referred to by our Sages with regard to transferring objects on the Sabbath]: a private domain,2In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1), the Rambam describes a private domain as \"a place that is not traversed by many people.\" a public domain,3In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam describes a public domain as \"a place traversed by many people.\" a carmelit,4In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains the meaning of this term: ארמלית is the Aramaic for \"widow\" and the prefix כ means \"like.\" Thus, the term means \"like a widow\" - i.e., neither an unmarried maiden nor a married woman. Similarly, since a carmelit is not a place traversed by many people (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 345:14), it is not classified as a public domain. Nevertheless, it is not set off from the public sufficiently to meet the criteria of a private domain.
(Others, based on the Jerusalem Talmud, define carmelit as having its root in the word carmel, which means \"partially ripe grain.\" The intent is also similar, an intermediate state. Note also the interpretation of Rashi mentioned below.)
The restrictions against carrying in a carmelit are Rabbinic in origin. According to the Torah, all the places defined as a carmelit are considered as a makom patur (or in certain unique instances, a private domain).
and a makom patur.5This term literally means \"a place with no liability.\" It refers to a place that is neither a public domain, nor a private domain. The forbidden labor of transferring objects was derived from the Sanctuary and involved carrying from the private domain to the public domain or vice versa. Accordingly, one is not held liable for carrying to, from, or within any place that does not meet the criteria of these categories.
What constitutes a public domain?6Significantly, the Rambam does not mention that a public domain must have 600,000 people passing through it. Rashi (Eruvin 6a) mentions this opinion, and it was accepted by the Ashkenazic authorities after him. The rationale for this ruling is that all the forbidden labors - and particularly, the labor of transferring - are derived from the construction of the Sanctuary. The public domain in that time was the encampment of the Jewish people in which 600,000 lived.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:7) mentions this view, but does not accept it. Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:11 and the Mishnah Berurah 345:23 write that it has already become public custom to accept the view that there is no possibility of a public domain in the present age. These texts do suggest that a God-fearing person should act stringently and should not rely on this leniency.
(It also must be noted that in many major cities today - e.g., New York, London, Paris - there are 600,000 people walking through a particular area. Hence, in a metropolis of this size, there are definitely places which could be categorized as public domains.)
Deserts,7This statement has raised many questions among the commentaries based on Shabbat 6b, which appears to imply that a desert was considered a public domain only when the Jews were encamped there. At the present time, a desert is considered as a carmelit and not as a public domain (Maggid Mishneh).
The Kessef Mishneh attempts to resolve these difficulties by quoting a responsum of the Rambam's son, Rabbenu Avraham. Rabbenu Avraham explains that the deserts his father refers to are those wastelands that are frequently used as caravan routes. These are traversed by many merchants and are not under the control of any authority. Hence, these can surely be referred to as a public domain.
When defining a public domain and a carmelit in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:7, 14), Rabbi Yosef Karo does not mention a desert at all. (See also the Bayit Chadash, Orach Chayim 345.)
forests,8With regard to this particular as well, the Maggid Mishneh raises a question, noting that many authorities consider forests a carmelit. Indeed, Rashi (Shabbat 3b) interprets the meaning of the term carmelit as referring to a \"wood.\"
The Kessef Mishneh also attempts to resolve this objection, explaining that the intent is a forest with paths that many people enter to collect wood. Thus, it refers to a place used by the public and not under the authority of a single owner.
marketplaces, and the thoroughfares leading to them, provided that the thoroughfares are sixteen cubits wide9Shabbat 99a derives the necessity for the thoroughfares to be sixteen cubits wide from the way in which the boards of the Sanctuary were transferred. There were two wagons that traveled side by side, each five cubits wide. There were five cubits between them and a half a cubit on either side for a Levite to stand (Rashi). The same passage also specifies that these thoroughfares must be at least sixteen cubits in length.
Michah diagram
and are not covered by a roof.10Shabbat 5a also derives this concept from the encampment of the Jews in the desert. There, the public domain was not covered by a roof. Therefore, even if an area meets the other criteria of a public domain, it is not considered to be in this category if it has a roof. (See Halachah 6.)
What constitutes a private domain? A mound that is at least ten handbreadths high and at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area;11A space that is smaller in height or area is not fit to be used for any significant purpose (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:1).
a groove that is at least ten handbreadths deep and at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area;
a place that is surrounded by four walls that are [at least] ten handbreadths high and whose inner space is at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area. Even if such an area is several millim in size, [it is considered a private domain] if it was enclosed for the purpose of [creating] a dwelling12The Rambam's intent is not that an area that is not enclosed for the purpose of dwelling is not considered a private domain at all. Rather, as obvious from his decisions in Chapter 16, Halachah 1, it is a private domain according to Torah law. Therefore, a person who transfers an object to it from a public domain is liable. Nevertheless, if such an area is very large, the Rabbis forbade carrying within it as explained in Chapter 16. - e.g., a city surrounded by a wall whose gates are closed13See Chapter 17, Halachah 10, and the Kessef Mishneh, which deal with the question of whether these walls must actually be closed. at night14See Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-2, where the Rambam states that although a city of this type is considered a private domain according to Torah law, the Rabbis forbade carrying within such a city unless an eruv is made. and a lane that has three walls and a lechi at its fourth side.15The lechi serves in place of the fourth wall. (See Chapter 17, Halachah 2.) Rav Moshe Cohen quotes an opinion that maintains that three walls are sufficient for an area to be considered a private domain. This difference of opinion is explained in the opening halachot of Chapter 17. Similarly, a courtyard, a corral, and a stable that were enclosed for the purpose of [creating] a dwelling16The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that by mentioning these places, the Rambam implies that we can generally assume that they have been enclosed to serve as a dwelling. are considered private domains in a complete sense.", + "Even vessels17This refers to a vessel of this size that is placed in the public domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:10; Mishnah Berurah 345:13). - e.g., a boat, a wooden closet, a beehive, or the like - are considered private domains18This refers to both the inside and the upper surface of the vessel (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:10; Mishnah Berurah 345:16). in a complete sense if they are at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths19If the container is round, its surface must be large enough to contain a square of that size (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:10; Mishnah Berurah 345:15). in area and ten handbreadths high.", + "The span of the walls of the private domain is considered to be like the private domain.20This applies even when the upper surface of these walls is less than four handbreadths wide (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 345:3). This ruling was rendered, because it is possible to place a board on the walls and place articles upon it. Furthermore, the width of the walls can be added to the width of the private domain to reach a total of four cubits (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:7) If the [walls] create a distinction [from the public domain] for another [area - i.e., the space they contain], surely they create a distinction for themselves.
The space above a private domain until [the highest point] in the heavens is considered a private domain.21See Halachah 17. The space ten handbreadths above the public domain, [by contrast,] is considered a makom patur.22See Halachah 18. The difference between a private domain and a public domain in this particular case stems from the fact that the space above a person's domain belongs to him. He will build his own property high and place objects within this space. In contrast, the public domain is set aside for people to pass through, and no one has permission to build in the space above it (Kinat Eliyahu).", + "What is a carmelit? A mound that is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area and between three [handbreadths]23If the mound is less than three handbreadths high, the principle of l'vud is applied, and it is considered part of the public domain (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1).and ten [handbreadths] high.24Just as a public domain does not occupy the space ten handbreadths above the ground, so too, a carmelit does not extend above that height. For a carmelit occupies only the space ten [handbreadths] or less above the ground and is not less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths in area].25A mound with a smaller area is a makom patur, as mentioned in Halachah 7.
Each of the following is [also considered] a carmelit:
a groove that is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area and between three [handbreadths] and ten [handbreadths] deep,26The converse of the principles applying to a mound apply in this instance.
a place that is surrounded by four walls that are between three and ten27See Halachah 8 with regard to a pillar nine handbreadths high. [handbreadths] high28These walls are sufficiently high to separate the place from the public domain, but not high enough to set it off as a private domain. and enclose an area at least four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths],29Were the space to be smaller than this, it would not be considered significant, and would be classified as a makom patur. a corner next to the public domain - i.e., an area surrounded by three walls with the public domain on the fourth side30As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, many authorities differ with the Rambam and also consider such an area a private domain. This issue is discussed in Chapter 17. (See also Halachah 6.) - e.g., a passageway that does not have a lechi or a korah on the fourth side,31See Chapter 17, Halachah 2. seas, a valley [of fields],32These fields are not surrounded by fences ten handbreadths high (Maggid Mishneh). whether in the summer or in the rainy season.33Even in the winter, when crops do not grow, it is not common for people to walk through fields. (See also Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah 20:1-6).)", + "The space above a carmelit is considered equivalent to a carmelit for ten handbreadths. The space ten handbreadths above a carmelit, however, is considered a makom patur.34As mentioned in Halachah 3, the space more than ten handbreadths above the public domain is considered as a makom patur and not a public domain. Surely, this applies with regard to a carmelit, which - in most instances - is a makom patur according to the Torah and was taken out of this category only by Rabbinic decree.
Therefore, the space above the water in a sea or river is considered a carmelit for ten [handbreadths], the space higher than ten [handbreadths above the water] is considered a makom patur.35The practical ramifications of this concept are mentioned in Chapter 15, Halachah 20. The entire depth of the water by contrast is considered as thick earth [and thus is deemed a carmelit].36I.e., even if the sea is hundreds of cubits deep, the entire depth is considered a carmelit, and the leniencies of a makom patur are not granted. See also the responsum of the Rambam quoted by the Kessef Mishneh Chapter 27, Halachah 3.", + "A storage vat in a carmelit is considered a carmelit even if it is 100 cubits deep, if it is not four [handbreadths by four handbreadths in area].37The text of the Rambam's wording in this halachah and its interpretation are a subject of debate among the commentaries. Some texts of the Mishneh Torah read \"A storage vat in a carmelit is considered a carmelit even if it is 100 cubits deep and four [handbreadths by four handbreadths].\" (Note Rav Kapach's text of the Mishneh Torah, which follows the latter version with a slight emendation, \"even if it is 100 cubits deep and 100 cubits wide.\")
The essence of the issue is as follows: Were the vat to be more than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it would be appropriate to consider it to be a private domain, since it meets all the criteria mentioned in Halachah 1. (Rav Kapach, however, maintains that in this instance, because the vat is filled with water and located in a carmelit, the fact that it meets the criteria of a private domain is insignificant.)
On the other hand, the Rashba and other authorities object to the Rambam's ruling as stated in our text. Since this vat can be considered an independent entity, seemingly, it would be more appropriate that it be considered a makom patur and not a carmelit. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the decision quoted in our text, explaining that since a carmelit is itself a makom patur according to Torah law, it is impossible for a makom patur to be established within it. Instead, the entire area is considered a single carmelit. Note a similar concept in Chapter 17, Halachah 11. This rationale is accepted as halachah by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 345:18-19).

A public domain that is covered by a roof38E.g., in Talmudic times, a market place with a roof; in contemporary situations, a shopping mall. or that is not sixteen cubits wide is considered a carmelit.39The encampment of the Jewish people in the desert, the source for the prohibition against carrying, was not covered and had paths that were sixteen cubits wide. Accordingly, although an area would for all intents and purposes be considered a public domain, it is not placed in that category with regard to the Sabbath laws unless it confirms to these criteria.
A stall between the pillars of the public domain40Where merchants display their wares. and the narrow space at the side of the public domain41The commentaries to Eruvin 94a describe this as referring to the space left between the public domain and a house built in an abnormal manner that causes obstructions to passersby. is considered a carmelit. In contrast, the space between the pillars is considered a public domain, because many people walk there.42The Rashba and others differ with the Rambam's ruling and maintain that the space between the pillars is not considered part of the public domain, because the merchants hang their wares there. Moreover, the very structure of the space does not allow people to walk there comfortably.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:14) appears to accept the Rambam's ruling, and this decision is accepted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:21. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah 345:50, which maintains that the majority of halachic authorities follow the more lenient view.
", + "What is meant by a makom patur? An area that is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths43Since it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is not considered significant enough to be deemed a private domain. in area and more than three handbreadths above the earth, even if it reaches the heavens themselves. An elevation less than three handbreadths high, by contrast, is considered as [being on] ground level.44Because of the principle of l'vud.
Even brambles, briers, and dung that are located in the public domain45A makom patur can exist only in the public domain, and, according to certain opinions, in a carmelit. (With regard to a carmelit, note the difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Rashba mentioned in the previous halachah.) In a private domain, by contrast, there is no concept of a makom patur. and are more than three [handbreadths] high and less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] are deemed a makom patur.
Similarly, a groove that is less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] and more than three handbreadths deep, even if it reaches the earth's very depths, and a place that is surrounded by walls, but is not four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area and is more than three handbreadths high, are both considered a makom patur.46The concept that a private domain must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths and not merely sixteen square handbreadths is derived from two laws mentioned in Shabbat 8b. Thus, a makom patur may have a very large total area. Even if they are one thousand millim long, but the length of a barley corn less than four handbreadths wide, [they are still considered as a makom patur.
Also considered a makom patur is the space above a public domain and the space above a carmelit that is more than ten handbreadths high.", + "A place that is exactly nine handbreadths high, neither more or less, in the public domain is considered part of the public domain. [It is placed in this category47According to the general principles mentioned previously, it would be classified as either a carmelit or a makom patur, as is obvious from the conclusion of the halachah. Nevertheless, since its height is appropriate to unload and load burdens, it is used frequently by the passersby in the public domain. Hence, it is considered an extension of that domain.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ra'avad as maintaining that the pillar must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths to be considered part of the public domain. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:10) does not place a limit on the pillar's size.
] regardless of its width or length - whether large or small - because many people use it to arrange their loads.48Most authorities have interpreted the Rambam's words to mean that since the pillar is this height, it is fit to be used to load and unload. Even if it is not used for this purpose, since it is suited for it it is considered part of the public domain.
The Ra'avad and others do not accept this decision and maintain that such a pillar is not considered part of the public domain unless people actually use it frequently to arrange their loads. (Note the Sha'ar HaTziyun 345:36, which cites opinions that interpret the Rambam's words in accordance with the Ra'avad's decision.)
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the Ra'avad's decision. Nevertheless, the Eliyahu Rabbah suggests respecting the popular interpretation of the Rambam's view.

If, however, it is more49In his gloss on Shabbat 8a, Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that a pillar that is between nine and ten handbreadths high is also considered par4t of the public domain. This slight addition in height does not make it uncomfortable to use. Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes this view as well, the Rambam's ruling is accepted by most authorities (Mishnah Berurah 345:36). or less than nine handbreadths high, [different rules apply]: If it is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] or more [in area], it is a carmelit. If it is less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths in area], it is a makom patur.", + "When a roof that is less than ten handbreadths [high]50Although the roof is less than ten handbreadths high when measured from the side of the public domain, it is ten handbreadths high from the side of the courtyard (Maggid Mishneh citing the Rashba). is located in proximity to the public domain and many use it for their loads, it is forbidden to carry on this roof51According to the Torah, this roof is a private domain and there is no reason why it should not be used by its owner. Nevertheless, since it is easily accessible from the public domain and is used by passersby there during the week, the Rabbis forbade its owner from carrying upon it on the Sabbath (Eruvin 84b).
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 361:1), which accepts a differing interpretation of the passage offered by the Rashba and permits carrying on the roof, but prohibits transferring an article from the adjoining courtyard to the roof.
unless a ladder [leading to the owner's courtyard] is permanently affixed52I.e., it remains there during the week as well as on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh). there. [If this is done,] it is permitted [to carry on the roof].53Since the owner has set up a ladder leading to the roof from the adjoining courtyard, it is obvious that he intends to use the roof and that it is part of his domain. This makes it distinct from the public domain.
A pillar that is located in the public domain and is ten handbreadths high and four [handbreadths by four handbreadths in area] is deemed a private domain.54Since it is ten handbreadths high, it is not part of the public domain, and since it is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is of significant size to be considered a domain in its own right. If, however, one inserted a spike in its side,55This ruling follows Rabbenu Chanan'el's interpretation of Eruvin 78a. Rashi and the Ra'avad interpret that passage differently. even if [the spike is] less than three handbreadths high,56And thus is considered to be an extension of the ground, because of the principle of l'vud. since articles may be hung from it or it may be used [for other purposes], it reduces the height of the pillar and it is deemed to be a carmelit.57Since these spikes are used by the passersby in the public domain, they are considered part of that domain. Therefore, the height of the pillar is calculated from the highest spike. If it is not ten handbreadths high from that point upward, it is not considered to be a private domain. See the above diagram. [The pillar's] height is calculated beginning from the highest spike.", + "Holes [in the wall of] a private domain58This refers to holes in the wall that face the private domain. Even if they extend through the entire breadth of the wall and also open up to the public domain, they are considered part of the private domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:8; Mishnah Berurah 345:9). are [considered part of] the private domain.59The Rambam does not not make any specifications regarding the size or the height of these holes. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 345:4), although other Rishonim differ. Holes in the public domain, by contrast, [are not considered part of the public domain, but rather] are judged according to their size.
What is implied? Holes located at the side of the public domain which are four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] and ten [handbreadths] high60The intent is not necessarily that the hole be ten handbreadths high, but that its floor be ten handbreadths above the ground. are considered as a private domain.61An area that is four handbreadths by four handbreadths is significant enough to be considered a separate domain. If they [are this length and width, but] are not ten [handbreadths] high, they are considered to be a carmelit. If they are smaller than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths], they are considered to be a makom patur.
[The above applies] provided that they are three [handbreadths above the ground]. Anything below three [handbreadths]62This ruling applies even if the holes are four handbreadths by four handbreadths and thus are of significant enough size to be be considered a separate space. Since they are within three handbreadths of the ground, they are considered part of the public domain (Mishnah Berurah 345:46). is considered to be [an extension] of the ground.63Because of the principle of l'vud.", + "It is permitted to carry throughout a private domain and a makom patur. Even if such a domain is several millim long, one is permitted to carry throughout the entire area. In contrast, one may carry only within [a square of] four cubits in a public domain and in a carmelit.
If a person carried [an article], passed [it] to another person or threw [it] beyond four cubits in the public domain, he is liable. In a carmelit, one is not liable, since the prohibition against [carrying in] a carmelit is a Rabbinic decree, [enacted because] the area resembles a public domain and [the Sages were concerned] that a distinction between the two would not be made.
Accordingly, if one removed [an article] for which one had no purpose - e.g., one removed a thorn from a carmelit64As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, according to the Rambam, who maintains that one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, this leniency applies only in a carmelit and not in the public domain. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities differ with the Rambam and maintain that the prohibition against performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה is Rabbinic in origin. Therefore, it is bypassed when there is a danger involved. This view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1). so that people would not be injured by it, the act is permitted. This applies even if one carries it several cubits. The same applies in other similar instances.", + "Just as one is permitted to carry within a makom patur, so too, is one permitted to transfer articles from it to a private domain, a public domain, and, needless to say, a carmelit. Similarly, one may transfer articles to it from a private domain, a public domain, and, needless to say, a carmelit.65Accordingly, if a person discovers that he is unwittingly carrying an object in the public domain, he should deposit it in a makom patur.", + "Just as one is forbidden to carry within a carmelit, so, too, is one forbidden to remove articles from it to a private domain or a public domain. [Similarly, it is forbidden] to bring in an article from a private domain or a public domain to a carmelit.66The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 346:2) states that one may pass an article from one carmelit to another - e.g., from a sea to a valley [of fields] - provided one does not pass it more than four cubits. See also Chapter 16, Halachah 2. If one removes or brings in [an article], one is not liable.", + "A person is not liable for transferring an article from one private domain to another private domain via a carmelit,67One is, however, liable for transferring an article from a private domain to a public domain via a carmelit, provided one does not stand in the carmelit (Shabbat 5b). (See also the notes on the following halachah.) nor [is he liable for transferring an article] from one public domain to another public domain via a carmelit.68This ruling applies only when one does not carry the article more than a total of four cubits in both public domains combined, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 17. Similarly, a person who passes or throws an article from either of these types of domains to another similar domain via a carmelit is not liable.
When a person transfers an article from the public domain to a carmelit, puts it down in the latter domain, and afterwards, picks it up from the carmelit and brings it into a private domain, [he is not liable].69A person is liable for transferring an article only when he removes an article from either a private or a public domain and places it down in the other in one uninterrupted sequence. [Similarly, a person who transfers an article] from a private domain to a carmelit, puts it down in the latter domain, and afterwards, picks it up from the carmelit and brings it into a public domain, is not liable.", + "A person is liable if he transfers an article from a private domain to a public domain even though he passes through a makom patur, because a person who is walking is not considered to have stood [in the places through which he passed].70This concept is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages (Shabbat 5b). Although the majority of the Sages follow the ruling quoted by the Rambam, ben Azzai differs. He maintains that a person who walks through a domain - even though he does not stop to rest - is considered to have stood there. Thus, in the above instance, the article the person is carrying is considered to have been placed down in the makom patur. Hence, he would not be held liable. Surely, when a person throws an article through a makom patur, the article is not considered to have come to rest.71The Maggid Mishneh mentions that in this halachah, the term makom patur also applies to a carmelit, since according to Torah law, a carmelit is also a makom patur.
A person is not liable if, while standing in a makom patur, he took an article from a private domain or from a person standing there and placed it down in the public domain or in the hands of a person standing there.72The rationale for the Rambam's ruling can be understood based on the comments of the Radbaz cited in the notes to Chapter 15, Halachah 1. According to the Rambam, a person is liable for transferring an article only when he is standing in one of the domains involved in the prohibited transfer. If he is standing in another domain, he is not liable. As mentioned in the notes to that halachah, most other authorities do not accept the Rambam's basic principle. Needless to say, even according to the Rambam, transferring an article in this manner is forbidden.
Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 346:2, which states that if the person transfers the article immediately, without resting his hand at all in the makom patur, he is liable.
Similarly, if one brought an article from a public domain to a private domain [via a] makom patur and stood in the latter domain, one is not liable.73This ruling applies only when one stands to rest. Should the person stand merely to adjust his load, he is liable. See Chapter 13, Halachot 8 -10.", + "A pillar that is located in the public domain [is considered] a private domain [in the following situation]: It is ten [handbreadths] high and [possesses an upper surface] of four [handbreadths by four handbreadths] in area, but a lower surface that is not four [handbreadths by four handbreadths]. [This applies even] when its smaller end is more than three [handbreadths] high.74The pillar is considered to be a private domain because it is ten handbreadths high. Were the smaller surface to be less than three handbreadths above the ground, there would be no difficulty in such a statement, because of the principle of l'vud. The new concept taught by this ruling, which is based on Shabbat 101a, is gud acheit mechitzata, \"pull down and extend the partition downward\" - i.e., the circumference of the pillar is considered to extend to the ground, and thus the entire pillar is considered as being ten handbreadths high.
The above explanation follows the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah, which have the support of some early texts. It parallels Rashi's understanding of the above Talmudic passage. Tosafot and the Rashba, however, interpret that passage differently and maintain that there is a proviso that must be met in regard to the principle gud acheit mechitzata: It is accepted only when young goats are not able to pass under the partition in question. Therefore, in this instance, since the narrow portion of the base is small, it would appear that young goats would be able to pass under the open portion. Accordingly, they offer a different interpretation, stating that this ruling is applicable only when the lower surface of the pillar is less than three handbreadths above the ground.
There are many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah whose text indicates that the Rambam subscribes to this latter view. Furthermore, this perspective parallels the Rambam's rulings in Hilchot Sukkot 4:4. This view is quoted as halachah by the Magen Avraham 345:1. It must be emphasized, however, that the halachot that follow and their interpretation appear - although not conclusively so - to indicate that the Rambam subscribes to the principle of gud acheit in other contexts similar to the situation described here.
[Therefore,] if a person throws an article from the public domain and it lands on [this pillar], he is liable.
", + "When a person throws an article from the public domain and it lands upon a reed77The mention of a \"reed\" by Shabbat 7a, the source for this halachah, is very significant, because a reed is narrow. In Chapter 13, Halachah 1, the Rambam states that a person is not liable for transferring an article unless he places it down on a surface that is at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths. A reed is obviously not that size.
Based on that passage, Rashi, the Ramban, and the Rashba maintain that the above principle applies only in the public domain and not within a private domain. The Maggid Mishneh and others interpret the Rambam as accepting this principle as well. Accordingly, they question why he did not state this exception in Chapter 13, when laying down the general principles regarding this forbidden labor.
The Ma'aseh Rokeach offers an alternative to this explanation, noting that Shabbat 102b holds one liable for throwing an article into the mouth of a dog or into the mouth of a furnace even though they are less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Why? Since this was the person's desire, this intent causes the place to be considered as if it were the required size. Similarly, in this instance, if one desired the article to rest on top of the reed, that intent is sufficient to cause one to be liable.
- even one that is 100 cubits high - which is implanted in a private domain, he is liable, for a private domain extends until the very heavens.
When a tree's [trunk] is located in a private domain and its branches extend into the public domain, a person who throws [an article from the public domain that] lands in its branches is not liable, because the branches78Rav David Arameah states that the branches are considered to be a makom patur. Surely this would be true if the branches are ten handbreadths high. are not [automatically considered as being] in the same domain as the stem.", + "When a person throws an article that lands upon a reed with a basket79Although Rav David Arameah offers a different interpretation, most commentaries render טרסקל as \"basket. at its top which is implanted in a public domain, he is not liable,80This ruling applies regardless of whether the article is thrown from a private domain or a public domain. Were the article to have been thrown from a private domain, the person would not be liable, for the space more than ten handbreaths above a public domain is not considered to be part of that domain.
Were the article to have been thrown from the public domain, the person is not liable, for the basket is not considered to be a private domain. This decision applies even when the basket is four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Shabbat 101a relates that one might think that since the surface is four handbreadths by four handbreadths and it is more than ten handbreadths high, it would meet the criteria for a private domain. Nevertheless, this is possible only based on the principle gud acheit mechitzata, \"pull down and extend the partition downward\" - i.e., that the edges of the basket would be considered as extending to the ground.
This principle is not applicable in the present instance. The principle gud acheit is applicable (see Halachah 16) only when the area through which one would like to \"extend the partition\" could not be \"entered by young goats.\" Since the entire area beneath the basket is open, the principle cannot be applied.
for a public domain extends only ten [handbreadths high].81The Ra'avad objects to the addition of the latter phrase, maintaining that even if the basket were less than ten handbreadths high, it would be considered a carmelit, and a person who threw an object into it would not be liable.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam was not focusing on that dimension, but rather was differentiating between this halachah and the previous one, which describes a reed implanted in a private domain. The intent was to emphasize that unlike a private domain, the rules governing a public domain apply only within ten handbreadths.
See also the Or Sameach, who brings a proof from Halachah 19 that although utensils can create a private domain, they cannot create a carmelit.

[The following rules apply when] a person throws an article in the public domain and it comes to rest on a wall - e.g., one threw fats or dough and they became attached to the wall: If they become attached above ten handbreadths [from the ground], it is considered as if he threw the article into the air, for the space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is a makom patur.
If it becomes attached below ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw the article on the ground and he is liable.82Provided the article traveled four cubits. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:3), the Rambam mentions that the four cubits are measured in a direct line from where the person is standing to where the article became attached to the wall. If he threw the article above ten [handbreadths high]83The same ruling would apply if the hole were less than ten handbreadths high. The Rambam quotes this law in this fashion to negate the opinion of Rabbi Meir, Shabbat 7b. and it came to rest in a hole that is of inconsequential size,84If, however, the hole is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, he is liable, as stated in Halachah 10. he is not liable.", + "If a person throws a reed or a spear from a private domain [to a public domain] and [the spear] becomes implanted in the public domain in an upright position, he is not liable, for a portion [of the article] is in a makom patur.85Since the reed is more than ten handbreadths high, its upper end is in a makom patur. One is liable only when the entire article comes to rest in the public domain (Rashi, Shabbat 8a). Compare to Chapter 13, Halachah 11.
If a person throws a large utensil which is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths in area] and ten handbreadths high, he is not liable. The utensil itself constitutes a private domain, and thus the person is considered as one who transfers an article from one private domain to another.86The Rambam's interpretation of this law is paralleled by Tosafot, Shabbat 8a. Note Rashi, who offers a different i nterpretation.", + "When a person uproots a clod of earth from the bottom of a pit that is nine handbreadths deep,87As mentioned in Halachah 1, if the pit is ten handbreadths deep, it is considered to be a private domain. If its depth is even slightly less, it is considered to be a carmelit, and one is not liable for throwing an article into it from the public domain. and [by doing so] makes it ten handbreadths deep, he is not liable. [This decision is rendered] despite the fact that the removal of the article and the creation of the domain occur simultaneously, because the domain was not originally ten [handbreadths] deep.88Shabbat 99b leaves this and the law mentioned in the latter clause of this halachah as unresolved questions. Therefore, the Rambam rules that the person is not liable.
A pit whose depth of 10 handbreadths is reduced by the addition of earth
[Conversely,] if a person throws a clod of earth into a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, and [by doing so] causes it to become less than ten handbreadths [deep], he is not liable. [This decision is rendered] because the placement of the article and the nullification of the domain occur simultaneously.", + "A person is not liable if he throws a board that lands on spikes [implanted] in the public domain [even when] by doing so, he creates a private domain.89Such a situation could arise if the spikes were more than ten handbreadths high, and the board - four handbreadths by four handbreadths. In such a situation, the criteria for a private domain would be met.
The Rashba questions this, noting that \"goats could enter\" the space beneath the spikes, and thus, the principle gud acheit mechitzata could not apply, as explained in the notes on Halachah 18. He interprets this as referring to a situation where spikes were implanted in a wall at the side of a private domain.
Note also the interpretation of Tosafot, Shabbat 99b who interpret this as referring to a situation in which the spikes on two sides of the board are close enough to constitute an actual wall. Therefore, the roof can be considered as creating the third and fourth sides. According to the Rambam, as is explained in Chapter 17, Halachot 3 and 35, three walls of spikes would be required.
[This applies] although a utensil was on the board. [The rationale for this decision is] that the creation of the domain occurs at the same time that the utensil comes to rest.90Although the article comes to rest slightly after the board does, the Talmud does not resolve the question whether this brief amount of time is of consequence or not. Therefore, the Rambam does not hold the person liable.
A Board Being Placed on Spikes in the Public Domain
", + "When a person throws a mat from91Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text reads \"in a public domain,\" which is enigmatic. a public domain into a pit that is ten handbreadths deep and [precisely] eight handbreadths wide, [and the mat falls in an upright position in the exact center of the pit,] dividing the width of the pit in half, he is not liable.92Shabbat 100a mentions a difference of opinion regarding this matter. The Rambam follows the opinion of Abbaye, for he is the latest of the Sages to venture an opinion on this question.
The Rashba notes that this law applies only when one intends to leave the mat in this place permanently. If one intends to remove it, it is not considered to have divided the pit.
[The rationale is] that when the article lands, it nullifies the domain, causing each of the halves to be less than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths].93Since the mat has a minimal thickness of its own, each side of the pit is slightly less than four handbreadths.", + "When a person throws an article into a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and four [handbreadths by four handbreadths] in area and is filled with water, he is liable although the article lands on the water, for the water does not nullify the domain.94Rav Kapach explains that this law does not represent a contradiction to Chapter 13, Halachah 4, for in a private domain it is not necessary that an object come to rest on a surface that is four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Nevertheless, with regard to the removal of an object, it is necessary that it be at rest on a surface of four handbreadths by four handbreadths for the person to be liable.
[In contrast,] were [such a pit] to be filled with produce, a person who throws [an article] into it would not be liable, for the produce reduces the size of the pit.95The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between water and a pit as follows: The water is clear and the contours of the pit can be seen. Therefore, the domain is not considered to be nullified. In contrast, the produce covers the pit and prevents its contours from being seen. Therefore, it is considered to have reduced its size.
The Maggid Mishneh also mentions opinions of the geonim who maintain that the produce in question must be of a type that the person intends to continue storing within the pit. A similar thrust is apparent in the Rashba's interpretation of this law as referring to produce that is tevel and may not be moved on the Sabbath.
Note the Or Sameach, who cites Hilchot Eruvin 3:13, which states that an article that can be taken on the Sabbath does not reduce the size of a domain. Accordingly, he suggests an original explanation, stating that this law refers to a pit filled with produce that the public could walk on - e.g., nuts or grain. Since people at large will not hesitate to walk over such a surface, the pit is no longer considered to be a private domain.
", + "[The following rules apply to] an irrigation ditch that contains water that passes through the public domain, and which people [usually] walk through: If it is not ten handbreadths deep, it is considered to be a public domain regardless of whether it is four cubits [or more] wide or less than four handbreadths wide. [It is placed in this category, despite the fact that, in the latter instance,] most people would jump over it, rather than walk through it.96Although a place is not considered a public domain unless people actually walk through it, since there are some individuals who walk through this ditch - although they are in the minority - it is still placed in this category. [Regardless of its width,] since it is not ten handbreadths deep, it is considered to be [part] of the public domain.97Although a pit between three and ten handbreadths deep is usually regarded as a carmelit if it is four handbreadths wide, or a makom patur if it is narrower, an exception is made in this instance. Since the traffic of the public domain continues to pass, albeit with difficulty, through this ditch, it is not considered to be a separate domain (Shabbat 100b).
If it is ten handbreadths or more deep,98Since it has walls steep enough to be considered a domain of its own, it may not be considered part of the public domain. it is considered a carmelit like other bodies of water.99The Or Sameach questions why this irrigation ditch is not considered to be a private domain; he explains that since water is flowing through it rapidly, it may not be used as a private domain. A similar conception is also reflected in the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 345:15,19 which states that according to the Torah, this would be considered as a private domain. Nevertheless, since it resembles a sea, the Rabbis applied the laws of a carmelit to it.
See also the Pri Megadim 345:11 which deals with this difficulty, based on a principle explained by the Maggid Mishneh cited above. He explains that this halachah refers to a ditch with dirty water. Hence, its contours cannot be seen and therefore it is not considered as a private domain.
[The above applies] when the ditch is at least four handbreadths wide, for there is no concept of a carmelit that is less than four handbreadths [wide].100Hence, the area would be considered to be a makom patur." + ], + [ + "A person standing in a public domain may move [articles] throughout a private domain. Similarly, a person standing in a private domain may move [articles] within a public domain, provided he does not transfer them beyond four cubits.1In both these instances, there is not even a Rabbinic prohibition against moving the articles. As mentioned in the notes on the following halachah, Rashi and the Rashba state that this leniency applies only with regard to articles the person does not require in the domain in which he is standing. If he needs them, the Rabbis decreed that they may not be moved, lest the person forget and bring the articles into the domain where he is standing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 350:1) appears to favor the view of these authorities. If he transfers an article [beyond that distance], he is not liable, because he is located in a different domain.2The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's decision, noting that Eruvin 99a would appear to hold a person liable in such a situation. The difficulty with the Rambam's statements is compounded by the fact that the passage cited above associates the law in question with the following decision, \"A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head.\" Since the Rambam holds one liable in the latter instance (see Chapter 12, Halachah 14), it would seem that he would hold one liable with regard to the law under discussion. The Ra'avad's arguments are so powerful that the Maggid Mishneh suggests amending the text of the Mishneh Torah accordingly.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1527) notes the Ra'avad's question, and states that he checked all the ancient manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah available to him, and they all state that the person is not liable. Therefore, he explains that a person is not liable for transfering an article unless he is standing in one of the domains involved in the transfer. This concept is derived from the transfer of the articles in the construction of the Sanctuary. In this instance, the people were not standing in a domain other than those involved in the transfer. Based on this foundation, he offers an interpretation - albeit a slightly strained one - for the passage in Eruvin.

Similarly, a person standing in a private domain may open [a door with a key3This and the following law refer to situations where the key is located in the domain where the door is located.] in a public domain.4The Maggid Mishneh mentions the possibility of placing the key in the door as a forbidden transfer. In the present day, almost every keyhole would be considered to be a makom patur. [One standing] in a public domain may open [a door with a key] in a private domain.
One may force feed an animal whose head is inside [a stall, although] the major portion of its body is outside.5I.e., we are not worried that perhaps the animal will withdraw its neck and the person will carry the food outside the stall. Note the apparent contradiction to Chapter 17, Halachah 29. One may not, [however, force feed a] camel unless its head and the major portion of its body is within [the stall], since its neck is long.", + "A person should not stand in a private domain and [extend his head into] the public domain to drink, nor [should he stand] in a public domain and [extend his head into] a private domain to drink, unless he brings his head and the majority of his body into the domain in which he is drinking.
When do the above [restrictions] apply? When he is drinking with attractive vessels that he needs.6As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, in their commentary on Eruvin 99a, the source for these halachot, Rashi and the Rashba maintain that if the person requires the vessels, the above restrictions apply even if the vessels are not attractive. The Maggid Mishneh states that although the Rambam's ruling appears most appropriate within the context of the Talmudic passage, in practice the more stringent ruling should be followed. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch also rules accordingly. [In this instance, our Sages instituted a] decree, lest he transfer [the drinking vessels]. If, however, [the person uses] vessels that are not attractive and which he does not require, all that is necessary is that he bring in his head; it is not necessary that he bring in the majority of his body.7This relects a significant leniency. We are requiring the person to drink while bent over. Even so, the Rabbis did not feel it necessary to forbid the person from drinking, lest he forget, stand upright, and thus bring the drinking vessel into the other domain. If a cistern of water is located in a carmelit, [the above leniency applies] even when [the person] uses vessels that are attractive.8The prohibition against transferring an article from a carmelit is Rabbinic in nature. Hence, even if the person were to forget and transfer the drinking vessels to his domain, he would not violate Torah law. Accordingly, there is no need to prohibit him from drinking as a further safeguard.
This represents the opinion of Ravvah (Eruvin 99a) and is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 350:1). Significantly, however, the Talmud also records the opinion of Abbaye, who differs and maintains that since the forbidden labor of transferring articles is a matter that may be taken lightly, the Sages instituted safeguards with regard to Rabbinic decrees as well.
", + "A person may stand in a public domain, [extend his hand,] collect water that is flowing from a drainpipe or a wall [while the water is] in the air, and drink, provided he does not touch the drainpipe or the wall and collect the water from them.9As long as he takes the water from the air, there is no difficulty. If he takes the water from ten handbreadths or more above the ground, he has taken it from a makom patur. If he takes it from less than ten handbreadths, he has moved an article less than four cubits in the public domain.
[The following rules apply] should he [in fact] touch [the drainpipe or the wall]: If the place he touches is more than ten [handbreadths] high and within three handbreadths of the roof, the act is forbidden.10Based on the principle of l'vud, since the pipe is within three handbreadths of a private domain, it is considered to be an extension of that domain.
From the Rambam's wording, it appears that if the roof is less than thirteen handbreadths above the ground, the principle of l'vud does not apply. This is so because the principle of l'vud cannot cause a space that is part of the public domain to be considered an extension of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh).
It is as if he removed [the water] from the roof, which is a private domain.
Similarly, if the drainpipe was four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] and one collected water from it, this is forbidden regardless of whether the pipe is within ten handbreadths of the ground11In this instance, the pipe would be considered to be a carmelit. Transferring from a carmelit to a public domain is forbidden. or above ten handbreadths.12In this instance, the drainpipe is considered to be a private domain in its own right. Why is the person not held liable? Because the water is not at rest, but rather continuing to flow.13Note the distinction between this ruling and Chapter 13, Halachah 4, which describes removing water that is at rest.", + "[The following rules apply when] a projection extends [from the wall of a building] near a window: If the projection is above ten handbreadths high, its use is permitted,14I.e., to place articles upon it, transferring them from the building. Note, however, the restrictions mentioned in Halachah 7. for the public domain extends only ten handbreadths [above the ground].15The space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is a makom patur. Hence, one may transfer articles to and from it (Chapter 14, Halachah 12). Therefore, it is permissible to use the entire wall, with the exception of the bottom ten handbreadths.16This applies even if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area and directly below an open window. Since it is low enough to be used by the passersby in the public domain, it is considered to be a carmelit.", + "When does the above apply? When there is [only] one projection extending into the space. When, however, there are two projections extending from the wall, one below the other,17The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, these restrictions apply even when the two projections are not directly above each other. even though they are both more than ten handbreadths high,18As the Rambam explains, the difficulty is that people from different properties cannot both use a third property which adjoins them - for example (Hilchot Eruvin 3:16), a wall that is four handbreadths wide that separates between two different properties. In particular, there are two conceptions of the Rambam's statements:
a) that of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 353:2), which explains that the two projections extend from two windows belonging to two different individuals who have not made an eruv. Since these individuals are forbidden to transfer articles from one projection to the other by Rabbinical decree, certain restrictions were also placed on using the projections themselves.
b) that of the Ritba, who explains that we are speaking of a wall that possesses only a single window. Nevertheless, the lower projection may be used by the passersby in the public domain. (Although the public domain extends only to ten handbreadths, the people in the public domain have the right to use projections and holes in the wall that are above that height.) When there is only one projection, they refrain from using it, because it will be used by the inhabitants of the house. When, however, there are two projections, the passersby feel free to use the lower one. This in turn causes there to be certain restrictions with regard to the use of both projections on the Sabbath. See the diagram on the opposite page.
Although the Merkevet HaMishneh and others explain that the Ritba's interpretation is more appropriate to the wording chosen by the Rambam, our notes will follow the approach of the Shulchan Aruch, for it is accepted by the subsequent halachic authorities. It also must be noted that Rashi's version of the text of Eruvin 98b differs from that of the Rambam. Accordingly, he and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities have a different conception of these rulings.
[different rules apply]: If the upper projection near the window is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area, its use is forbidden,19Note that Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 353:11 explain that this refers to articles that were kept inside the house. Articles that were left on the projection before the Sabbath may be moved on it. See Hilchot Eruvin 3:18-19. for it is a domain in its own right, and the projection below it is a separate domain.20This applies even if the lower projection is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:4; Mishnah Berurah 353:12). Accordingly, they each cause the other to be forbidden,21Note the Mishnah Berurah 353:12, which cites opinions that allow the people whose window opens up to the lower projection to use it when it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths. for [the people in] two domains cannot [jointly] use the space of one domain.", + "If both the upper projection and the lower projection are not four [handbreadths by four handbreadths], both of them may be used.22There are no restrictions whatsoever, for neither projection is a domain in its own right. Similarly, [in such a situation,] one may use the entire wall with the exception of the bottom ten handbreadths.
If the lower projection was four [handbreadths by four handbreadths], but the upper projection was not four [handbreadths by four handbreadths], [an individual dwelling in the upper storey] may use only that portion of the upper [projection] that is directly opposite his window.23This is permitted, because the projection is considered to be an extension of the window, like a hole in the wall of a private domain (Maggid Mishneh). It is forbidden to use the remainder of the projection that extends on either side of the window, because of the lower projection, which is considered to be a separate domain.24Since the lower projection is a domain in its own right, it includes the space above it until the heavens, and the entire wall is considered as a part of it. In this instance, since the upper projection is not considered to be a domain in its own right, it is divided into portions. The portion directly opposite the window is considered an extension of the window as in the previous note, but the portion on either side is considered part of the lower projection.", + "Whenever there is a projection that extends over the public domain25If the projection extends over a carmelit and is ten handbreadths high, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 353:3). and may be used, one may place upon it and remove from it only utensils of earthenware, glass, or the like, for if they fall into the public domain they will break. Other utensils and food are prohibited [to be placed there], lest they fall into the public domain, and [one descend and] bring them [into the home].26Bringing the articles from the public domain to the home constitutes a forbidden activity. Hence, our Sages instituted this safeguard.
Note the Rashba, who states that if a projection is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, there are no restrictions regarding the articles that may be used on it. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 353:3) quotes the Rambam's ruling, the Ramah states that on a roof or balcony on which a person stands comfortably, all articles may be carried.
", + "[The following rules apply when] there are two houses on opposite sides of the public domain: If a person throws an article from one to the other and the article is ten [handbreadths] above the ground, he is not liable,27Our translation follows the version of the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. Many early printings and manuscripts of the text state \"one is permitted....\" From the context, the latter version appears more appropriate.
One is forbidden to transfer from one private domain to another private domain when they are separated by a public domain. Nevertheless, since the public domain extends for only ten handbreadths above the ground, the transfer is not being made through a public domain, but rather through a makom patur (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 353:1).
provided both houses belong to him or there is an eruv between them.28See Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-4, which explains that although according to the Torah itself, one may transfer from one private domain to another, our Sages forbade this unless an eruv was constructed. One may throw even garments and metal utensils.29These articles are not breakable. Nevertheless, since the houses are on the same level, it is not difficult to throw from one to the other. Accordingly, our Sages did not feel the need for a safeguard, lest the article fall and the person descend to the public domain and bring them into his home, a private domain.
Two Houses of Different Heights on Opposite Sides of the Public Domain
If one of [the two houses] was higher than the other, and they were thus not on the same level, it is forbidden to throw a garment or the like, lest it fall and [one descend and] bring it. One may, however, throw earthenware utensils and the like.30Even if the articles fall into the public domain, they will break. Hence, there is no need to worry that the person may bring them home.
The above restrictions apply only to houses on two sides of a public domain. If two houses are located on two sides of a carmelit, there are no restrictions regarding the type of articles that may be thrown, because there is no possibility of a Torah prohibition being violated (Maggid Mishneh).
", + "[The following rules apply when] a cistern located in the public domain has an opening [to a home] above it: The cistern and the sand [piled around it] are measured together [to see if their height reaches] ten [handbreadths]. [If it does,31A cistern that is ten handbreadths deep is considered as a private domain. Were the sand piled around the cistern to be ten handbreadths high, the enclosure would be considered a private domain. Eruvin 99b teaches us a new concept, that the sum of ten handbreadths can be reached by combining the two together.
Hence, there is no difficulty in drawing water from the enclosure to the house, since one is transferring from one private domain to another. Needless to say, it is forbidden to transfer from such an enclosure to the public domain.
] one may draw water from it on the Sabbath.
When does the above apply? When [the cistern] is within four handbreadths of the wall, for then a person cannot pass between them.32Since there is no room for a person to pass comfortably between the sand pile and the wall of the house, the space between them is not considered as part of the public domain, but rather as a carmelit (compare to Chapter 14, Halachah 6). Therefore, the space above it is also considered as a carmelit. Thus, one would be transferring from a private domain to a private domain via a carmelit. In this instance (in contrast to Chapter 14, Halachah 14), our Sages allowed such a transfer. If, however, it is further removed,33When there is room for people to pass between the cistern and the house in a normal manner, the space between them is considered as part of the public domain. Therefore, a person who draws water through the opening to his home would be considered to be transferring from a private domain - the cistern - through a public domain - the area above the space between the sand pile and the home - to one's home - a private domain. See Chapter 13, Halachah 16. one may not draw water from it unless the sand [piled around it] is ten [handbreadths] high.34Here, the importance of the height of ten handbreadths is not significant because it creates a private domain, but because, as explained in the following note, this will cause the bucket to be more than ten handbreadths above the ground as it passes over the sand pile. Thus, when the bucket is raised above the sand [pile],35I.e., as the bucket is transferred from the enclosure to the home, it passes above the public domain. In this instance, since the sand pile is ten handbreadths high, there is no difficulty, because the space ten handbreadths above the public domain is a makom patur. it enters a makom patur.", + "It is permitted to pour water [from] a window [of a home] to a garbage heap located in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high, on the Sabbath.36Since the garbage heap is ten handbreadths high, it constitutes a private domain.
Thus, when water is poured from the house, the water will pass from a private domain through a makom patur - the space more than ten handbreadths above the public domain - to another private domain. This is permitted.

To what does the above apply? To a garbage heap belonging to the community, for this is unlikely to be removed. We may not, however, pour water onto a garbage heap belonging to an individual.37This is a Rabbinic decree, instituted for the reason to be explained. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 354:3 states that this restriction applies even if the garbage heap is located in a carmelit.
It is possible that the garbage heap was cleared away 38Eruvin 99b cites an example where the Sages considered such a possibility. and thus, [unknowingly,39I.e., we suspect that without looking, the person will follow his usual habit and pour water onto the place where the garbage heap was located previously without noticing that it had been removed.] one will be pouring into the public domain.", + "[The following rules apply to] a water conduit that passes through a courtyard: If it is ten [handbreadths] high and between four [handbreadths] and ten cubits wide, we may not draw water from it on the Sabbath, unless one erects a partition [in the water] ten handbreadths high at its entrance [to the courtyard] and its exit.
If it is not ten [handbreadths] high or is less than four [handbreadths] wide, we may draw water from it without [erecting] a partition.", + "When [the water conduit that passes through the courtyard]40In this halachah as well, most commentaries maintain that the Rambam is referring to a water conduit that passes through a place where a portion of the wall of the courtyard has been taken down. As mentioned above, the Ra'avad interprets Eruvin 12b, the source for this halachah, differently, and therefore objects to the Rambam's ruling.
Significantly, the Merkevet HaMishneh notes that the second clause of the halachah appears to indicate that the conduit breaks through the wall entirely, and it therefore offers a different interpretation of the Rambam's words.
is more than ten cubits wide, although it is less than ten handbreadths high, we may not draw water from it unless a partition is erected. Since it is more than ten [cubits] wide, it is considered to be an open space and nullifies the existence of the divider.41Since the conduit is not deep enough to constitute a domain of its own, it would normally be considered part of the domain through which it passes. (See Chapter 14, Halachah 24.) Nevertheless, since this conduit is so wide, it is no longer considered part of the private domain.
What is the ruling regarding carrying in the courtyard as a whole?42I.e., does the conduit nullify the courtyard's distinction as a private domain? Significantly, this question is asked in this halachah and not in the previous one. In the previous halachah, although the conduit itself was considered a separate domain, since the opening was less than ten handbreadths, it is considered as an entrance and the enclosure is not nullified. This halachah, however, mentions an opening of more than ten cubits, an aperture which ordinarily nullifies an enclosure. If there is even a small portion [of the wall] remaining on both sides of the opening, or if a portion [of the wall] four handbreadths in size remains on one side of the opening, it is permitted to carry in the entire courtyard.43Several explanations have been offered for the Rambam's ruling. Among them: the small portion of the wall which remains juts out over the water. Therefore, the opening to the courtyard is less than ten cubits (Rabbenu Yonason, commenting on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The portions of the wall which remain on either side are considered like poles. As stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 7, it is permitted to carry in a courtyard with poles on either edges of the entrance to the fourth side (an ancient commentary on the Mishneh Torah from Egypt). See also the Or Sameach. It is forbidden only to draw water from the conduit.44For the reasons mentioned above, the wall of the courtyard is an acceptable divider, and thus the courtyard as a whole is still considered to be a private domain. Nevertheless, since the wall was not made for the purpose of distinguishing the water that is outside the courtyard from that which is within the courtyard, a separate partition is required for that purpose (ibid.). If, however, no portion of the wall remains, it is forbidden to carry in the entire courtyard, for it has been opened up to the sea,45When there are no portions jutting out over the water (according to the first interpretation in note 49) or when the entire wall is destroyed (according to the second), the courtyard is considered as enclosed on three sides alone and it is forbidden to carry within. which is a carmelit.", + "How must the partitions be erected in the water? If [the majority of the partition] is above the water, at least a handbreadth of the partition must descend into the water.46For the entire intent of this partition is to make a distinct separation between the water in the courtyard and the water in the public domain outside of it. [See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishneh (Eruvin 8:6). See also Hilchot Eruvin 3:21-22 where the Rambam mentions a similar requirement.] If the partition as a whole descends into the water, at least a handbreadth must rise above the water level. [In this manner,] the water in the courtyard will be distinct, [from the water in the conduit on either side of the courtyard].
Although the partition does not reach the ground [in the conduit], since it is ten handbreadths high, it is permitted. The use of a partition that remains hanging was allowed only with regard to water.47Generally, a partition must descend within three handbreadths of the ground. Since the prohibition against carrying this water is Rabbinic in origin,48For, as mentioned above, the courtyard is a private domain, and carrying within it is permitted. Furthermore, even the water conduit is considered as a private domain according to the Torah itself and its designation as a carmelit is Rabbinic in origin. [the Sages] were lenient regarding [the nature of] the partition [required], for its purpose is only to create a distinction.", + "[The following rules apply] when a conduit of water passes between several courtyards and there are openings [from the courtyards] to it:49In contrast to the conduit mentioned in the previous halachot, this conduit does not pass through the courtyards, but merely by their side. Hence, it cannot be considered as part of the courtyard itself. If it is not the minimum size [of a domain],50I.e., ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide.one may lower buckets from the windows and draw water from it on the Sabbath.51The conduit is considered to be a carmelit; the windows, the holes adjacent to a carmelit. One may transfer an article from a carmelit to such holes. This interpretation follows Rabbenu Chanan'el's interpretation of Eruvin 87b. The Ra'avad has a different conception of this passage, and hence objects to the Rambam's rulings.
The extension of the wall 3 handbreadths
When does the above apply? When [the conduit] is not more than three handbreadths away from the wall. If, however, [the conduit] is more than three handbreadths away from the wall, we may not draw water from it52Since the opening is more than three handbreadths away, it is no longer considered to be a hole adjacent to the carmelit, but rather a separate entity. Hence, it is forbidden to transfer from the carmelit to it. unless there are projections extending from the walls on either side. Thus the conduit would be considered as if it passes through the courtyard.53I.e., the projections would cause the courtyard to be considered as extending beyond its wall, into the space of the conduit. Therefore, taking water from the conduit would be considered as moving an article within a single private domain.", + "[The following rules govern] a balcony54In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 8:8), the Rambam explains that just as it is customary to erect balconies over the public domain, it is also customary to erect balconies over bodies of water. that extends over a body of water with an aperture55The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:1) states that the aperture must be four handbreadths by four handbreadths. [in its floor] that opens to the water: We may not draw water from it on the Sabbath56Since the body of water is considered to be a carmelit. It is forbidden to transfer from a carmelit to a private domain. unless a partition ten handbreadths high is constructed over the water parallel to the opening in the balcony.57The partition need not reach the water itself. Because of the principle gud acheit mechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends into the water, even though it actually ends above its surface. This leniency is granted, because the entire prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
Thus it is considered as if the hole extends into the water itself. Accordingly, we are allowed to draw water through it, because the portion of the body of water beneath it is considered to be an extension of the private domain [the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.)].
Alternatively, we may construct a partition descending from the balcony to the water. Then, we consider this partition as descending until it touches the water.58The partition need not reach the balcony. Because of the principle gud asik mechitzata, the partition is considered as if it extends to the balcony, even though it actually ends below it (ibid.). See also Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 355:1).
Just as we may draw water from [the body of water] after making the partition, so too we may pour water from the balcony to the water.59Eruvin 88a explains that the leniency of pouring into the body of water has an added dimension of severity. The current of the water will cause the water that has been poured to flow beyond the periphery of the aperture and into the portion of the body of water that is a carmelit. Nevertheless, since the person does not perform this transfer himself, there is no restriction. [The rationale is:] One is pouring into a carmelit.60Since the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, the construction of such a partition is sufficient (Ma'aseh Rokeach).", + "We must not pour water into a courtyard that is less than four cubits by four cubits61The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam's wording is intended to negate an opinion mentioned in Eruvin 88a, which states that even if a courtyard is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths, if its total area is 16 square handbreadths (e.g., it is is eight cubits by two), the restrictions mentioned in this halachah do not apply. Significantly, the Rashba accepts the more lenient view and, in this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 357:1) follows his ruling. on the Sabbath, because [the water] will flow into the public domain rapidly.62Pouring the water into the courtyard does not violate a Torah prohibition, because the courtyard itself is an extension of the home. Although the water flows into the public domain, this is due to the forces of gravity and inertia. Thus, the person's pouring of the water is considered as merely a cause; it is not considered as if he poured the water into the public domain directly. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade pouring the water in this manner.
Therefore, it is necessary to dig a pit that contains two seah63A seah is approxinmately 8.25 liters according to Shiurei Torah and 14.4 liters according to the Chazon Ish. The Sages chose this measure because they considered this to be the average quantity of water used by a person every day (the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 8:9). in the courtyard or in the public domain next to the courtyard, so that the water will collect there. [If the pit is within the public domain], one must build a domed covering64Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which differs and mentions a covering of boards, which most likely is flat. over this pit from the outside so that the pit will not be seen in the public domain.65In his Commentary on the Mishnah (op. cit.), the Rambam explains that the covering will cause the pit to be separated from the public domain. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 357:1 and the Be'ur Halachah, which explain that because of its dome-like cover, people will not walk over it easily. Hence, since its opening faces the private domain, it is considered to be a hole adjacent to the private domain or a makom patur.) Note the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 357) who explains that the reason for the cover is to prevent people's suspicions from being aroused.
The courtyard and the patio adjoining it are combined [when calculating] the four cubits. How large is a pit that contains two seah? [A pit] half a cubit by a half a cubit in area and three fifths of a cubit high.", + "If the pit cannot contain two seah, we may pour [no more than] its contents into it. If it can contain two seah, we may pour [any amount of] water into it, even 60 seah, despite the fact that the water will overflow and spill from the pit outward.
When does the above apply? In the rainy season, at which time the courtyards are muddied and many drainpipes spread water. Thus, onlookers will not say that this person is making use of the courtyard and the water is flowing into the courtyard because of his power. In the summer, by contrast, if [the pit] can contain two seah, only that amount may be poured into it. If it cannot contain two seah, no water at all may be poured into it.", + "[The following rules apply] to a drain through which water is poured and the water flows under the ground into the public domain, and to a gutter when water is poured over its mouth and the water flows down a wall and descends to the public domain: Even if the wall is 100 cubits long or the stretch of ground under which [the water] passes is 100 cubits long, it is forbidden to pour into the mouth of this drain or this gutter, for because of one's power, the water flows into the public domain. Instead, one should pour outside the drain, [allowing the water to] flow into the drain on its own accord.
", + "When does the above apply? In the summer. In the winter, by contrast, one may pour [water as mentioned above], and indeed, do so repeatedly, without inhibition. At that time, the gutters are flowing [with water], and a person desires that the water will be absorbed in its place.
The protrusion extending above the sea
[In contrast,] it is permitted for a person to pour water over a drain which flows into the carmelit, even in the summer. No decrees were enacted against [the effect of] a person's power in a carmelit. For this reason, it is permitted to pour [water] down the side of a ship and have it descend to the sea.", + "A person who is standing in a ship should not draw water from the sea unless he builds a protrusion, four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths], extending from the ship above the sea.
When does the above apply? When [the deck of the ship] is within ten [handbreadths of the water level]. If, however, [the deck] is more than ten [handbreadths above the water level], he may draw water after erecting a protrusion of the smallest size. [The rationale for this leniency is that] he is drawing water through a makom patur, and the protrusion is necessary only to make a distinction.", + "[The following rules apply when] a person was reading a scroll in a carmelit, a portion of the scroll rolled into the public domain, and a portion remained in his hand: If it rolled more than four cubits, he should turn it face down and leave it. This is a decree, enacted lest [the scroll] drop from his hand and he carry it [more than] four cubits. If it rolled less than four cubits, he should roll it back toward himself. Similarly, if it rolled into a private domain, he should roll it back towards himself.
[The following rules apply when] a person was reading in a private domain and the scroll rolled into a public domain]: If it came to rest, he should turn the scroll face down. If it did not come to rest, but rather remained suspended in the air above the public domain and did not reach the earth, he may roll it back to himself.", + "A person who moves thorns so that the public at large will not be injured [should adhere to the following guidelines]: If [the thorns] were in the public domain, he should move them less than four cubits at a time. If they were located in a carmelit, he may move them even 100 cubits in a normal manner.
Similarly, if a corpse [began to decompose,] emit foul odors, and become extremely abhorrent to the extent that the neighbors cannot bear to remain [in the same place], it may be taken from a private domain to a carmelit.
After a person descends to bathe in the sea, he should dry himself when he ascends, lest he carry the water that is on him more than four cubits in a carmelit." + ], + [ + "[The following rules pertain to] a place that is enclosed for purposes other than habitation, and is used as an open space - e.g., gardens and orchards, an open area that is enclosed to protect it, or the like: If the walls surrounding it are ten handbreadths or more high, it is considered to be a private domain with regard to a person's being liable for transferring, throwing, or passing an object from it to the public domain, or from the public domain to it.1The majority of this chapter is devoted to an explanation of the laws pertaining to a karpef, a large area that is enclosed by four walls, but these walls were not constructed for the purpose of habitation.
Since this area is enclosed by four walls, it is considered a private domain according to Torah law. Therefore, one is liable for transferring articles to and from it. Nevertheless, as the Rambam continues, the Rabbis imposed certain restrictions on carrying within this space for the reasons mentioned below. We are, however, allowed to carry within an area enclosed for the purpose of habitation regardless of how large it is (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 2:5).

We are not allowed to carry within it, unless its area is equivalent to that necessary to sow two seah [of grain]2The size of this space is defined in Halachah 3. or less. If its area is larger than the space necessary to sow two seah, we may not carry more than four cubits within it, as in a carmelit.3Since this is a large space in which there are no inhabitants, it appears to resemble a public domain or a carmelit. Accordingly, the Sages placed certain restrictions on carrying within it, lest one err and carry in the public domain as well (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 358:1).", + "Similarly, if a surface is elevated more than ten handbreadths high4A surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths that is elevated ten handbreadths above the ground is considered to be a private domain. and whose area is equivalent to the space necessary to sow two seah or less, we may carry on the entire surface. If its area exceeds the space necessary to sow two seah, we may carry only within a space of four cubits upon it.5I.e., although it is a private domain according to Torah law, our Sages forbade carrying upon it for the reasons explained in the previous halachah.
When a rock in the sea is less than ten handbreadths high, we may carry from it to the sea, and from the sea to it, for the entire area is a carmelit.6Although one is allowed to carry from one carmelit to another, one may not carry more than a total of four cubits. If [the rock] is ten handbreadths high, [different rules apply]. If the size of its area is between7If it is less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is a makom patur, and there is no difficulty in carrying from it to the sea or from the sea to it.four handbreadths [by four handbreadths]8A rock that is this high above the sea and this size is considered to be a private domain. and the space necessary to sow two seah, [our Sages forbade] carrying from [the rock] to the sea or from the sea to the rock. [This restriction is a safeguard, instituted,] because we are permitted to carry on the entire [rock].
If its area exceeds the space necessary to sow two seah, although it is a private domain and yet it is forbidden to carry more than four cubits upon it as in a carmelit, it is permitted to carry from it to the sea and from the sea to it. This is an atypical situation. Hence, the Sages did not [include] it [in their] decree.9Although our Sages generally forbade transferring an article from a private domain to a carmelit, since this is a very unusual circumstance they did not include it in their decree.", + "How large is an area in which a seah [of grain can be sown]? Fifty cubits by fifty cubits. Thus, the area in which two seah [of grain can be sown] is 5000 square cubits.10Eruvin 23b identifies the area in which two seah of grain can be sown with the courtyard of the Sanctuary in the desert, which was 100 cubits by 50 cubits.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav explains the significance of this concept. All of the prohibitions against labor on the Sabbath are derived from the Sanctuary. The courtyard of the Sanctuary was a large area which was enclosed for purposes other than habitation. Nevertheless, it was permitted to carry within it. Therefore, when the Sages prohibited carrying in large areas that were enclosed for purposes other than habitation, they used the size of the courtyard of the Sanctuary as the lower limit.

This measure11Here we see a contrast to the measures of four handbreadths by four handbreadths or four cubits by four cubits, where the intent is a square or a larger area in which such a square could be inscribed. applies whether the area is a square of 70 cubits and a fraction by 70 cubits and a fraction,12In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 2:5), the Rambam states that the square is approximately 70 cubits and five sevenths of a cubit by 70 cubits and five sevenths of a cubit, but that there is no perfect square root for the number 5000.or it is a circle, or it is of another shape.13This is obvious from the connection to the courtyard of the Sanctuary, which, as mentioned, was a rectangle and not a square. [If its area equals the sum mentioned,] it is considered as \"the area in which two seah [of grain can be sown].\"", + "[The following rules apply when] an area that is enclosed for purposes other than habitation and is large enough for two seah [of grain to be sown within is rectangular in shape]: If its length is twice its width - for example, it is 100 by 50, as was the courtyard of the Sanctuary - carrying is permitted within it.
If, however, [it is more elongated] and its length exceeds twice its width by even one handbreadth,14Note the Rambam's explanation of the difference in opinion between Rabbi Yosse and Rabbi Eliezer, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 2:5). On the basis of this explanation, it would appear that his conception of the Mishnah is closer to that of Tosafot, Eruvin 23b than to that of Rashi (loc. cit.). we are permitted to carry only four cubits within it.15As in a carmelit. [This restriction is imposed because the permission to carry as one may carry] in other courtyards [within] an open space large enough for two seah [of grain to be sown within], is derived from the courtyard of the Sanctuary.16Hence, when such an open area does not resemble the courtyard of the Sanctuary, the leniency does not apply.", + "[The status of] a place that was originally enclosed for purposes other than habitation [may be changed in the following manner]. A person tears down [a portion of the wall, creating] an open space that is more than ten cubits long and ten handbreadths high17Once this extent of a wall has been broken down, it is considered as if the entire wall is no longer of significance as indicated in Halachah 16. and then re-encloses that space for the purpose of habitation.18When one re-encloses the wall, it is considered as if the entire enclosure has been made for the purpose of habitation. Therefore, the area is considered to be an ordinary private domain, and one is allowed to carry within without restriction.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam's statements on the basis of those of Rashi, Eruvin 24a, which state that the intent to use the enclosure for habitation is not sufficient. There must be a house that opens up to the enclosure.
The Merkevet HaMishneh states that, according to the Rambam, \"habitation\" does not necessarily mean \"human habitation.\" Therefore, the intent could be to use the enclosure as a corral for animals or the like. Rav Kapach cites the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 2:5), from which it appears that as long as there is a storage vat in the enclosure, it is considered as \"enclosed for the purpose of habitation,\" although it does not contain a house or lead to a house.
Thus according to the Rambam, \"everything depends on the person's intention.\" If he encloses the area for the sake of habitation, he is allowed to carry freely within it. Why is this leniency granted? Because the prohibition against carrying within such an area is Rabbinic in origin, and the Sages enforced this stringency only when a person's intent was not for the sake of habitation, for then the enclosure resembles a public domain. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:2), however, follows Rashi's view, that a house is required within the enclosure or the enclosure must lead to a home.
[After this has been done,] one may carry within the entire enclosure.
Moreover, even if one [did not complete the entire process at once, but rather] tore down a single cubit and re-enclosed that space for the purpose of habitation, tore down another single cubit and re-enclosed that space for the purpose of habitation19Since the entire enclosure was never opened up for ten cubits at one time, one might assume that the original enclosure was never nullified. Nevertheless, since ultimately a span of ten cubits was constructed, the enclosure is considered as פנים חדשות, \"a new entity\" (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 358:8). Note a parallel ruling in Hilchot Kellim 6:2. - [when one continues this process until] one re-encloses a space greater than ten cubits one may carry within the entire enclosure, even though it is several millim20A mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure. in size.", + "When [produce] is sown in the majority of an area that is larger than the space [necessary to sow] two seah [of grain] that was enclosed for the sake of habitation, the area is considered to be a garden,21Although the area was enclosed for the purpose of habitation originally, since it is large and the person sowed produce within the majority of its space, it is clear that he considers it to be a commercial field or garden. It is not common for people to dwell in such a place (Rashi, Eruvin 23b). and it is forbidden to carry within it in its totality.22I.e., one may carry only within a square of four cubits even in the portion of the enclosure where the produce was not sown, because there is no barrier enclosing the area on the side that faces the portion where the produce has been sown (Maggid Mishneh). Alternatively, the portion in which the produce was not sown is considered to be a secondary part of the entire field in which it is forbidden to carry (Rashi, Eruvin 24a).
[The following rules apply when produce] is sown merely within a minor portion [of the enclosure]: If the portion [where the produce] was sown is equal23Obviously, if produce was sown in a smaller portion of the enclosure, the same leniency applies. The portion of a field necessary to sow two seah of grain is the upper limit. to the space [necessary to sow] two seah [of grain], one may carry within the entire [enclosure].24In such an instance, the portion of the enclosure in which produce was sown is considered like a private garden a person has in his yard.
It must be noted that in this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:10, following the opinion of Rabbenu Asher) is more stringent than the Rambam and forbids carrying an article from the garden to the house.
If the portion [where the produce] was sown is larger than the space [necessary to sow] two seah [of grain],25Since the produce was planted in such a large area, it is considered like a commercial garden or field.one may not carry within the entire [enclosure].26In this instance, the commentaries quote the opinion of the Maggid Mishneh mentioned above: that the portion of the enclosure facing the side where the produce has been sown is not considered to be enclosed.
The Turei Zahav 358:6 is more lenient and explains that since according to the Torah, one could carry within the entire enclosure, even according to Rabbinic law one should be allowed to carry within the portion where produce was not sown. His opinion is not, however, accepted by the later authorities.

When trees are planted in the majority [of the enclosure],27The Mishnah Berurah 358:63 states that this ruling applies even when one planted trees throughout the entire enclosure. it is considered to be a courtyard, and one may carry within the entire [enclosure].28It is a common practice to plant trees in one's yard for shade. Hence, planting them is not considered to be a sign that one no longer considers the enclosure to be intended for the purpose of habitation.
Should [the enclosure] become filled with water,29The Rashba states that this applies when the water is ten handbreadths or more deep. If it is shallower than that, there are no restrictions on carrying within the enclosure. Although Sefer HaBatim differs with this interpretation, the Rashba's ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:11). [the following rules apply]: If [the water] is fit to be used [by humans],30Rashi (Eruvin, loc. cit.) states that the water must be fit to drink. The Rashba and other Sephardic authorities state that it is sufficient that the water be fit for laundry and the like. This appears to be the Rambam's view. Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes Rashi's view, Sha'ar HaTziyun 358:81 states that one may rely on the Rashba's ruling. [the water] is considered to be like trees,31For, indeed, it is an advantage to have a source of water near one's home. Hence, the water does not nullify the enclosure (Rashi, loc. cit.). and it is permitted to carry within the entire enclosure. If [the water] is not fit to be used [by humans], we may carry only [within a square of] four cubits in [the enclosure].32From the gloss of the Magen Avraham 358:15, it appears that if the area in which the water is collected is set off from the enclosure as a whole because its height descends abruptly, we may carry within the remainder of the enclosure.", + "[The following rule applies when a roof is constructed33The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam's interpretation of Eruvin 25a, this refers to a roof that is open on all sides, which the watchmen in a garden construct for shade. The Rashba interprets that passage as referring to a roof with two proper walls that are joined at one corner. Rabbenu Chanan'el's interpretation of that passage also indicates that the sides of the covered area are entirely open.over a portion of] an area large enough for three seah [of grain to be sown within] which originally had been enclosed for purposes other than habitation: If the roof34Note the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:12), where Rabbi Yosef Karo states that this principle applies even when the roof is sloped. Generally, the principle, \"The edge of the roof is considered to descend and close off,\" does not apply with regard to a sloped roof. Nevertheless, since according to the Torah itself, it is permitted to carry within this enclosure, leniency is allowed. (Compare also to Chapter 17, Halachah 35.)
It must be emphasized that according to the Maggid Mishneh's understanding of the Rambam's rulings (see note 33), this entire matter is extraneous.
covers [a portion of this area] large enough for a seah [of grain to be sown], we are permitted [to carry throughout the entire enclosure] because of the roof. [The rationale is:] The edge of the roof is considered to descend and close off [the covered portion from the enclosure as a whole].35Thus, the remainder of the enclosure is not larger than the space necessary to sow two seah of grain. Hence, there are no restrictions against carrying within it.
[The following rule applies when the wall surrounding an area that was enclosed for purposes other than habitation] was torn down,36This represents the Rambam's interpretation of a passage in Eruvin 25b. Although Rabbenu Chanan'el and Rav Zerachiah HaLevi interpret the passage in this manner, the Ra'avad, Rashi, the Rashba and others follow a slightly different version of the text, and therefore interpret the passage differently. Their interpretation is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:13). opening the enclosure up to an adjoining courtyard, and [a portion of the wall of the courtyard] opposite [the enclosure] was also torn down:
37According to the Maggid Mishneh (and seemingly, also according to Rabbenu Chanan'el), both openings are no more than ten cubits wide. Otherwise, it would be forbidden to carry within the courtyard. [We are] permitted [to carry] within the courtyard as [we] previously [were], and [we are] forbidden [to carry] within the enclosure as [we] previously [were].38The Maggid Mishneh and others explain that the Rambam is referring to a T-shaped area in which the enclosure opens up to the courtyard, which extends on either side. The enclosure is not considered part of the courtyard, nor is the courtyard considered part of the enclosure, and the laws that originally applied to both areas continue to apply.
According to the Maggid Mishneh, this clause is not a continuation of the first clause of this halachah, but rather a separate concept in its own right. Rav Kapach, however, notes that both the Talmud (Eruvin, loc. cit.) and the Rambam link this and the previous clause together. On this basis, he follows the interpretation of Rabbenu Chanan'el, which states that the unroofed area of the enclosure was originally not larger than the space for two seah of grain to be sown within it. Therefore, we were permitted to carry within it. When, however, the wall connecting it to the courtyard was torn down, the open space was increased and became larger than the space for two seah of grain to be sown within it. Hence, it became forbidden to carry within it.
[The rationale is:] The open space of the courtyard does not cause [carrying] to be permitted [within the enclosure].39I.e., we do not say that the enclosure becomes considered as an extension of the courtyard.", + "When [the area of an enclosure] is greater than the space necessary [to sow] two seah [of grain], and one attempts to reduce its size40So that one will be able to carry within it. by planting trees, its [size is not considered to have been] reduced.41Since it is common to plant trees in such enclosures, even when the trees are ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area (at which point they are considered to be a separate domain in certain contexts), they do not reduce the size of the enclosure (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba).
If one builds a pillar ten [handbreadths] high and three or more [handbreadths] wide at the side of the wall,42Rashi interprets Eruvin 25a, the source for this halachah, as referring to a pillar of this size, whether it is in the middle of the enclosure or next to the wall. Rashi's interpretation is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:5). [the size of the enclosure is considered to have been] reduced.43Thus, if the area of the enclosure minus the area of the pillar is less than 5000 square cubits, one is allowed to carry within it. If, however, [the pillar] is less than three [handbreadths] wide, [the size of the enclosure is not considered to have been] reduced, for an entity that is within three handbreadths of an existing entity is considered to be an extension of the latter entity.44Based on the principle of l'vud, the pillar is not considered to be an independent entity, but rather an extension of the wall. Therefore, although in practice, the open space within the enclosure has been reduced in size, this reduction is not considered as halachically significant.
Similarly, a person who erects a partition that is more than three [handbreadths] removed from the wall [is considered to have] reduced [the size of the enclosure].45I.e., the size of the enclosure is calculated from the new partitions. If it is less than 5000 square cubits, one may carry within. It must be noted that, with regard to this clause as well, Rashi interprets the Talmudic passage differently, explaining that the new partition is erected to enclose the area for the purpose of habitation. His interpretation is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:6). If [the partition] is less than three [handbreadths from the wall], it is of no consequence.46Because of the principle of l'vud.
The Maggid Mishneh questions this ruling on the basis of the first clause of the following halachah, which states, \"If one applies cement to the wall, one reduces [the size of the enclosure].\" Since the cement reduces the size of the enclosure, even though it actually becomes part of the wall, one could surely assume that a new partition would reduce the size of the wall although it is considered part of the wall because of the principle of l'vud.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that since the partition is halachically insignificant, it cannot take the place of the previous wall. Hence, it is not considered to reduce the size of the enclosure. In contrast, the cement adds on to the size of the previous wall, and the space it takes up is subtracted from the open space of the enclosure.
", + "If one applies cement to the wall, one reduces [the size of the enclosure],47I.e., if the entire space taken up by the cement that is added to the wall is sufficient to reduce the size of the enclosure to less than 5000 square cubits, one may carry within the enclosure. although [the cement] is not substantial enough to stand as a separate entity.48In this instance as well, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam. Based on his interpretation of Eruvin 25a, the cement is counted only when it is substantial enough to stand on it is own if the original wall was removed. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 358:7) follows the Ra'avad's view, the Mishnah Berurah 358:55 states that the Rambam's opinion may be relied upon in time of need.
[The following rule applies when an area which is larger than the space required to sow two seah of grain is located on a mound:] If one builds a wall [with the intent of enclosing the area for habitation] at the edge of the mound, it is not of consequence,49We are speaking about a mound ten handbreadths high which is considered as set apart as a separate domain. Since the area is being surrounded by a partition that is constructed for the purpose of dwelling, one might think that it would be permissible to carry within the enclosure. Nevertheless, this is forbidden for the reason stated by the Rambam. for a partition that is built on top of another partition is of no consequence.50Since the mound, the original dividing point for the enclosure, is still standing, the new walls built are not considered significant.
[The following rule applies when] a wall [that was constructed for the purpose of habitation was built] on top of a wall [that was not constructed for the purpose of habitation,]51As mentioned in the previous clause, as long as the original wall is visible, the new wall is of no consequence. the lower wall sunk within the ground,52And less than ten handbreadths of the original wall extends above the ground (Mishneh Berurah 358:57). and the upper wall remained: Since the upper wall was constructed for the purpose of dwelling, and it is the only [wall] visible at present, it is [now] considered of consequence and one may carry within the entire [enclosure].", + "We may carry only within [a square of] four cubits in a yard53Our translation is based on the Mishnah Berurah 359:1, which states that in Talmudic times there would be yards both in front and behind the homes. A yard in front of a home was referred to as a חצר. These were frequently used by the people of that era and mentioned often in the Talmud. A yard behind a home was referred to as a רחבה, a term used comparatively rarely in the Talmud. These yards were used infrequently by people of that era. that is located behind [a group of] houses larger than the space necessary [to sow] two seah [of grain], even when there is an opening from [one of] the homes to [the yard].54As apparent from the following clause, this applies when the yard was enclosed before an entrance leading to one of the homes was opened.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 359:1) rules that the restriction mentioned in this law does not apply at present, since it has become customary to use our back yards. Hence, we assume that they were enclosed for the purpose of habitation.

If one opens an entrance [from one of the homes] to [the yard] and then encloses it, [the yard] is considered as enclosed for the purpose of habitation, and we are permitted to carry throughout its total [area].55Eruvin 24a states that this leniency applies even when a portion of the yard is used as a threshing floor. Since the person enclosed the area after opening an entrance to his home, we assume that the yard's primary purpose is to serve the home.", + "[Permission is granted to carry within] a yard56The yard is larger than 5000 square meters and was enclosed for purposes other than habitation (Rashi, Eruvin 24b). that opens to a city at one side and a path that leads to a river on the other [in the following manner]:57The Rambam's decision is based on the description of such a yard in Eruvin 24b. If one erects a post58Using a post, a lechi, as a divider is discussed in Chapter 17, Halachot 2 and 9.
As the Rambam mentions there, the post is considered as a fourth wall. In this instance, by erecting the post, one will be considered as erecting a new wall to enclose the yard for the sake of habitation (Rashi, loc. cit.).
at the side near the city, it is permitted to carry within [the yard], from [the yard] to the city,59This refers to a city surrounded by a wall, which is considered to be a private domain. and from the city to [the yard].", + "[The following rules apply when] an individual spends the Sabbath in an open valley and constructs a partition60This refers even to an inferior partition, such as those mentioned in Halachah 18. Rashi (Eruvin 16b, the source for this halachah) states that the restrictions of this law apply only when the enclosure uses such an inferior partition. If a proper partition is erected, one may carry within the entire enclosure, since the enclosure was erected for the purpose of habitation. Note the Merkevet HaMishneh, who emphasizes that the Rambam does not accept this leniency.
The wording of the Shulchan Aruch and the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 360:1) appears to concur with Rashi's view. The later authorities also accept his ruling.
around his [immediate area]: If [the enclosed area] is the size of the area in which two seah [of grain can be sown] or less, he may carry within the entire [enclosed area]. If [the enclosed area] is larger, he may carry only within [a square of] four cubits.61Since the area is so large and it is enclosed only for a temporary period, the Sages placed restrictions on carrying within it.
It must, however, be emphasized that according to Torah law, the enclosure is considered a private domain. Accordingly, a person who carries from it to a public domain or from a public domain to it is liable (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 360:1; Mishnah Berurah 360:5).

The same [rules apply when] two individuals [spend the Sabbath in an open valley]. When, however, three or more Jews62With this term, the Rambam excludes a gentile. The Ramah (loc. cit.) also rules that a gentile may not be included in a caravan. spend the Sabbath in an open valley [and erect a partition enclosing their immediate area], they are considered a caravan and they are allowed to carry as far as necessary,63According to Torah law, such an area is a private domain. The Rabbis did not place any restrictions upon it, because it has - albeit temporarily - been enclosed for the purpose of habitation. even several millim, provided there is not a space larger than the area [necessary to sow] two seah left vacant without utensils. If, however, [the enclosed area] includes a space larger than the area [necessary to sow] two seah that is left vacant without utensils, and that is of no use to them,64See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 360:2, which mentions that it is acceptable if the land is used for pasture. they are allowed to carry only within [a square of] four cubits within the enclosure.65Since the enclosure includes such a large empty space, our Sages forbade carrying within it.
Based on the Mordechai, the Shulchan Aruch mentions a further leniency: If three people spend the Sabbath in an enclosure whose area is less than 18,000 square cubits, they are allowed to carry without restriction. The rationale is: Each individual is granted 5000 square cubits. Thus, there are less than 5000 square cubits that are not accounted for. This leniency is not, however, accepted by the other authorities.

A minor66The Jerusalem Talmud (Eruvin 1:10) does not resolve the question whether or not to count a child as a member of the caravan. In his Beit Yosef (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo questions the Rambam's decision, for generally we follow the rule that when a doubt exists pertaining to a question of Rabbinic law, the more lenient view should be followed. Accordingly, he does not mention the matter in his Shulchan Aruch. The Ramah cites the Rambam's view, but prefaces it with the phrase \"There are those who maintain,\" which implies that the opinion cited is not accepted universally. is not included in [the reckoning of the minimum number of people necessary to compose] a caravan.", + "When three people enclose an area large enough for their needs67I.e., greater than 5000 square cubits. and establish this as their place for the Sabbath, [those who remain] are allowed to [continue] carrying within the entire [enclosure]68This leniency applies only on the Sabbath on which the person dies. On the following Sabbath, they are forbidden to carry unless they are joined by a third individual. despite the fact that one of them dies [on the Sabbath].
When [by contrast] two individuals establish [an enclosed area] larger than the space [necessary to sow] two seah [of grain] as their place for the Sabbath, they may carry only within four cubits despite the fact that a third person joins them [on the Sabbath]. [The rationale for both decisions is that the ruling] is determined by the manner in which the individuals establish [a site as] their place for the Sabbath [at the commencement of the Sabbath], and not on the number of people who are actually present [on the Sabbath day].69See a further expression of this principle in Hilchot Eruvin 3:25.", + "[Our Sages did not establish restrictions against carrying in the following instance:] Three areas that are enclosed for purposes other than habitation are located adjacent to each other, and lead70I.e., the middle enclosure does not have a wall, but is totally open on either side (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 360:3). The Shulchan Aruch, however, follows the interpretation of the Ritba, who requires the walls of the narrow courtyard to enter into the space of the wider courtyard. The Rambam, however, does not appear to make such a requirement. to each other. The two outer enclosures are wide, while the middle enclosure is narrow. Thus, there are barriers around the outer enclosures on either side. If [three people spend the Sabbath in this place,] one in each of these enclosures, [the three] are considered as a caravan,71Since the individuals in each of the outer courtyards are considered as sharing the space of the middle courtyard. and they are allowed to carry [wherever] necessary.72I.e., they may carry freely from one enclosure to another. Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which states that they must make an eruv to join their respective enclosures together. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch mentions a more restrictive opinion, which allows the individuals to carry freely only when the outer enclosures are less than 5000 square cubits in size.
If the middle enclosure is wide, while the two outer enclosures are narrow, there are barriers around the middle enclosure on either side. [Thus,] it is considered separate. Therefore, [if three people spend the Sabbath in this place,] one in each of these enclosures, they are not allowed to carry without restriction.73I.e., the outer enclosures are considered to be distinct entities without any connection to each other. Thus it is not considered as if three people are spending the Sabbath in the same place. Instead, each one is allowed to carry within his own enclosure [provided it is smaller74The bracketed additions are based on the commentary of Rashi (Eruvin 93a, the source for this halachah) and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).than the space necessary to sow] two seah [of grain].
If a single individual [spends the Sabbath] in each [of the outer enclosures], while two people are in the middle enclosure, or two people [spend the Sabbath] in each [of the outer enclosures], while one person is in the middle enclosure, they are allowed to carry [wherever] necessary.75In both of these instances, three individuals share a single portion of space. Therefore, they are allowed to carry freely from one enclosure to another.", + "Any partition76In this halachah, the Rambam begins to describe the rules that govern the walls that enclose a private domain. The concepts he mentions are also relevant to the laws of sukkah and other contexts within Jewish law. that cannot stand in the face of an ordinary wind is not considered a significant partition.77I.e., it is as if the partition were not there. See notes below.
Rashi, Sukkah 24b, states that this applies not only when the wall will fall because of the wind, but also to a cloth wall that will blow back and forth. From Halachah 24, it appears that this ruling is also accepted by the Rambam. It is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:1 and 630:10).
[Similarly,] any partition which is not constructed in a lasting manner78Our translation follows Rabbenu Chanan'el's text of Eruvin 26a. According to this interpretation, our Sages are teaching us that a partition must be constructed in a firm and sturdy fashion. (See also the interpretation of the term in the Aruch.) See also Halachah 12 and notes.
The Ra'avad, Rashi, and others follow a different text of the Talmud, which reads כל מחיצה העשויה לנח ת. According to this interpretation, this refers to a partition erected for storage purposes and not for people to dwell within. This latter view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:1).
is not considered a significant partition. [Likewise,] a partition constructed only for the purpose of modesty79The commentaries on Eruvin (loc. cit.) interpret this as a temporary partition that builders construct for shade. (Rav Kapach, however, cites interpretations of the Geonim that interpret the term \"for the sake of modesty\" literally, to change one's clothes behind.)
Thus, all three partitions mentioned in this halachah share the same drawback; they are not constructed in a lasting or sturdy manner.
In his gloss on this halachah, the Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba, who mentions that since all these partitions are valid according to Torah law, the expression \"they are not partitions\" must be interpreted as follows: They are not partitions constructed for the purpose of habitation. Therefore, if an area larger than 5000 square cubits is enclosed with such a partition, it is forbidden to carry within. If, however, an area less than 5000 square cubits is enclosed by such a partition, one may carry within. This opinion is quoted by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).
The Lechem Mishneh, the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 362) and others maintain that the Rambam does not accept the Rashba's view. Kinat Eliyahu, however, notes that the fact that the Rambam mentions these laws directly after the laws concerning a karpef may have been intended to allude to the Rashba's concept.
is not considered a significant partition.
Any partition that is not ten handbreadths high is not considered to be a complete partition.80The Maggid Mishneh interprets the phrase \"it is not a complete partition\" to mean: It is not a partition significant enough to cause an enclosure to be considered to be a private domain. It may, however, cause an enclosure to be considered to be a carmelit. A mound81Our translation is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:2).
See also the interpretation of Rabbenu Chanan'el to Eruvin 93b, which interprets it as a \"rock.\" From a halachic perspective, these interpretations are not mutually exclusive. See Chapter 15, Halachah 9.
five handbreadths high and a partition [on top of it] five handbreadths [high] are combined [and together are considered to be a valid partition].", + "Any partition whose open portion exceeds its closed portion is not considered to be a partition.82I.e., if a wall includes open spaces, the area that is open may not exceed the area that is enclosed. As mentioned in the following halachah, this refers to open spaces that are larger than three handbreadths wide. As the Rambam states in Halachah 18, this refers to spaces in the horizontal as well as the vertical portion of the wall. If, however, the open portion is equivalent to its closed portion, it is permitted [to carry within the enclosure], provided none of the open portions is larger than ten cubits wide.83I.e., when there is an open space larger than ten cubits wide, the entire partition is nullified. [The rationale for this leniency is that an open space] ten cubits [or less] is considered to be an entrance.84As long as the opening is ten cubits wide or less, there is no need to enclose it with a frame of an entrance. It is commonplace for a wall to have an entrance that is less than ten cubits wide without a frame.
If, however, this open space [is enclosed by] the frame of an entrance,85The Rambam explains the structure of a frame of an entrance (tzurat hapetach) in Halachah 19., even if it is wider than ten cubits the partition is not considered to be nullified,86I.e., by erecting the frame of an entrance, one enables a partition to be considered acceptable despite the fact that it has an opening that is larger than ten cubits. provided the open space does not exceed the closed portion.87This ruling represents a point of difference between the Rambam and most other authorities. According to the Rambam, although the frame of an entrance enables an opening larger than ten cubits to be accepted, the opening is still considered an open space. Accordingly, if the total amount of open space on any one side of a partition exceeds the closed space, the partition is unacceptable, even though portions of the open space possess a frame of an entrance.
Many authorities (e.g., the Rashba and Tosafot, Eruvin 11a) differ and maintain that once a frame of an entrance is constructed, the space below it is deemed closed and should be considered as such when calculating whether the enclosed portion of a partition exceeds its open area. The opinion of these authorities is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:10). Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 362:19 and the Mishnah Berurah 362:59 state that it is proper to be stringent and follow the Rambam's ruling.
Rabbenu Asher cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Eruvin 1:9) and Kilayim 4:2 as the source for the Rambam's ruling. (See also Hilchot Shofar V'Sukkah V'Lulav 4:12, where the Rambam accepts a more lenient view regarding the walls of a sukkah. Note also the glosses of the Kessef Mishneh and the Maggid Mishneh there.)
See also the commentary of Rav Kapach, who advances an interpretation of the Rambam's statements here and in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:8) that maintains that the Rambam follows the view advanced by the Rashba. Even those who reject this interpretation in most instances are forced to accept it with regard to the third side of an alley, as stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 3. (Note also Chapter 17, Halachah 27.)
The difference between the Rambam's ruling and that of the other authorities is particularly relevant in contemporary communities that permit carrying because of an eruv. Most of these communities are enclosed, not by a proper wall, but by a series of \"frames of an entrance\" constructed using telephone poles and the like. According to the Rambam, these enclosures are not acceptable. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the carefully observant refrain from carrying in these communities.
", + "When does the above apply? When the open spaces are three handbreadths or wider. If, however, the open spaces are each less than three handbreadths,88More precisely, the same ruling applies if some of the spaces are wider than three handbreadths, as long as the size of the total of the open spaces wider than three handbreadths does not exceed the remainder of the partition. the partition is acceptable although the total open space exceeds the space which is enclosed. For whenever there is an opening of less than three handbreadths, the portions separated in this manner are considered as parts of a solid partition.", + "What does the above imply? For example, a person makes an enclosure with reeds - as long as there is less than three handbreadths between one reed and the next, the partition is fully acceptable. Similarly, if one makes a partition with ropes, as long as there is less than three handbreadths between one rope and the next [the partition is fully acceptable]. [The above applies] even when the [reeds or ropes] run vertically but not horizontally,89As the Rambam continues, a partition of reeds will generally be constructed by implanting them upright in the ground, one near the other. As long as the reeds are not three handbreadths apart, the partition is acceptable even if there are no reeds that run horizontally. or horizontally but not vertically.90Generally, a partition of ropes will be constructed by stretching them from one post to another. As long as the ropes are not three handbreadths apart, the partition is acceptable, even if there are no ropes that run vertically.
The height of the reeds must be at least ten [handbreadths], or there must be ten handbreadths from the earth to the top of the highest rope if one makes an enclosure with rope. For a partition cannot be less than ten handbreadths high. All these measures are part of the oral tradition transmitted to Moses on Mount Sinai.91In the Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam defines the Hebrew term halachah l'Mosheh miSinai as referring to laws that have no obvious source in the Written Torah, yet have been accepted throughout the centuries as an integral part of the Torah tradition.", + "Whenever the term \"frame of an entrance\" is mentioned, it refers to a structure that has at the very least one reed at either side and another reed above them.92As the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:11) emphasizes, the reed must be placed exactly above the two side posts. It is not acceptable for it to be attached to their sides, for then it does not resemble the lintel of a doorway. [There is a further leniency:] The height of the posts at the sides must be at least ten handbreadths, but it is not necessary for the reed or other material placed above them to touch them. Even if it is several cubits above them,93In his gloss on this halachah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that this is acceptable because of the principle gud asik - i.e., the posts at the side are considered to be extended until they reach the crossbar. Based on this rationale, it follows that the two posts need not be of the same height. Even if one is higher than the other, they may still be considered as part of the same frame of an entrance. (Note also the application of this principle in Hilchot Sukkah 4:2.) since the posts at the side are ten [handbreadths] high, [the structure] is considered to be a frame of an entrance.
The frame of an entrance mentioned94According to the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), this refers to the posts on the side. The crossbar above need not be sturdy at all. must be sturdy enough to hold a door.95The Rambam's decision is based on Eruvin 11b. His ruling, however, has aroused questions. The passage cited also mentions opinions that require the post to have a hinge for the door on at least one side. Although there are authorities who also accept the latter requirement, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the Rambam's view. Nevertheless, [the door need not be of a heavy substance;] a door of straw is also sufficient.", + "When the upright portions of the sides of an entrance that is structured in the form of an arch are ten [handbreadths] high,96I.e., the circular portion of the arch is not counted in the calculation of the entrance's height.
The commentaries draw attention to the Rambam's decision in Hilchot Mezuzah 6:4, where he also requires an arched doorway to have doorposts ten handbreadths high in addition to the arch, for the doorway to need a mezuzah. There is, however, a difference - and somewhat of a divergence - between the rationales the Rambam gives in both sources.
it is considered to be a \"frame of an entrance.\"
A frame of an entrance that is constructed at the side of a partition97I.e., there is an opening of more than ten cubits at the corner where two walls would merge if they were continued. Even if one constructs a frame of an entrance at this opening, it is not acceptable. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 9:3.)
It must be noted that in their commentaries on Eruvin 11b, the source for this halachah, Rashi and the Rashba interpret the passage as referring, not to an entrance constructed at the corner of a wall, but to a lintel, projecting from the side of a doorpost. As mentioned in Halachah 19, the requirement for a frame of an entrance is for the lintel to be above the door posts and not projecting from their sides (Kessef Mishneh).
is not significant, for it is not common for entrances to be constructed at the corner [of a wall],98Note Chapter 17, Halachah 35, which mentions another law based on this same principle. but rather in its center.", + "A partition may be made from any substances:99See parallels in Chapter 17, Halachah 12, and Hilchot Sukkah 4:16. utensils, food stuffs, or human beings.100Unlike the animals that the Rambam proceeds to mention, a human being need not be bound, as is obvious from Halachah 23. Even livestock101If the animal is standing and there are three handbreadths b etween the animal's body and the ground, that space must be filled with other substances (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 362:12). and other animals and birds [may be used for this purpose] provided they are bound102Note that in Hilchot Sukkot (loc. cit.), the Rambam does not require that animals be bound when they serve as part of a wall. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 630:11) states that the animals must be bound even when used for the purpose of a sukkah's wall. so that they will not depart.", + "A partition that arises on its own accord103The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:3) explains this as referring to a structure that was not built with the intent of enclosing an area, but accomplished that purpose nonetheless. is acceptable. Similarly, a partition that is erected on the Sabbath is considered to be a partition.104I.e., in all instances, the partition is considered valid, and the enclosure is considered a private domain. Therefore, a person who transfers an article into this enclosure from the public domain is liable. Our Sages, however, placed certain restrictions on carrying within such an enclosure, as the Rambam continues to explain. If it is constructed unintentionally, carrying within [the enclosed area] is permitted on that Sabbath,105I.e., the person who constructed the partition did so without knowing that it was the Sabbath or without knowing that it is forbidden to build on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 362:18). provided it is not constructed with the knowledge of those who carry within.
If, however, a person intends that a partition be erected on the Sabbath, he is forbidden to carry within [the enclosure] on that Sabbath, even though the person who actually constructed the partition did not do so with the intent of violating [the Sabbath laws].106According to the Chemed Mosheh, this refers to a situation in which one person had another construct an enclosure for the former to carry within on the Sabbath. Although the person who actually constructed the enclosure did not intend to violate the Sabbath laws, the person for whom he performed the labor desired that such a violation take place. Hence, that person is prohibited from carrying within. This explanation resolves the question raised by the Rashba that is quoted by the Maggid Mishneh. Similarly, if [a partition] is erected with a conscious intent to violate [the Sabbath laws], it is forbidden to carry within [the enclosure]107As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 6, Halachah 23, when a Jew intentionally performs a forbidden labor on the Sabbath, it is forbidden for other Jews to benefit from that labor on that Sabbath itself. The person who performed the labor, by contrast, is never permitted to benefit from it. Thus, in this instance, he would be forbidden from ever carrying within this enclosure on the Sabbath. (See Or Sameach.)
Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which states that if a partition had been standing before the Sabbath, it was removed on the Sabbath and then reconstructed on the Sabbath, it is permitted to carry within the enclosure. This applies even if the partition was rebuilt intentionally on the Sabbath. The Mishnah Berurah 362:26, however, cites authorities that do not accept this leniency.
even if [the person who erected the structure] did not intend to carry within it.", + "It is permitted to erect a human partition on the Sabbath - i.e., people standing next to each other108I.e., within three handbreadths of each other (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 362:5). Note the Bayit Chadash (Orach Chayim 362) and the Be'ur Halachah 362, which question why the people may not be even further separated. - provided that the people whose bodies form the partition do not know that they are standing there for that purpose.109Although constructing a partition of this nature is not considered as building, it is still forbidden for the people who stand there to have in mind that their bodies serve as an enclosure, lest they come to treat the Sabbath prohibitions lightly (Mishnah Berurah 362:39). Nor may the person who desires to use this enclosure be the one who has them stand there.110The Rashba differs with this ruling and maintains that there is no difficulty if the person who desires to use the enclosure has the people stand there. According to his opinion, the only difficulty is when the people forming the partition have such an intent. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 362:7) prefaces the quotation of the Rambam's ruling with the words, \"There is one who says,\" which implies that it is not accepted by all. Similarly, the later authorities do not obligate compliance with this stringency.
Significantly, when discussing the use of human beings as part of the wall of a sukkah on the holiday, the Rambam (Hilchot Sukkah 4:16) states that the people serving as the wall may not know that their bodies are being used in that capacity, but the person sitting in the sukkah may have that intent.
Instead, another person should have them stand there without the knowledge of [the person who will benefit from the enclosure].111Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 362:7), who states that the leniency of using human beings to form an enclosure on the Sabbath should be employed only in a very extreme situation. He maintains that it is preferable to have a child bring in an article from the public domain without making an enclosure, rather than to have an adult carry the article in within an enclosure consisting of human beings. Although the later authorities raise questions regarding employing a child for this purpose, they accept the Ramah's hesitation about using an enclosure of human bodies.", + "The branches of a tree which hang downward and which reach within three handbreadths of the earth [may serve as an enclosure].112For this rule to apply, there must be a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in area and ten handbreadths high beneath the tree. Otherwise, the space is considered as a carmelit (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 362:2; Mishnah Berurah 362:5). One should place straw, stubble, and the like between the branches and the leaves, and should tie them to the earth so that they will stand firmly and not flutter in the face of an ordinary wind.113See Halachah 15. (See also Hilchot Sukkah 4:5, where the Rambam mentions similar concepts with regard to using a tree as a wall for a sukkah.) [When this is done,] one may carry under the entire [tree].
[The above applies] when there is less than the space [necessary to sow] two seah [of grain beneath the tree]. If, however, the area [below the tree] is larger than that, we are allowed to carry only within four cubits [in this space], since the space beneath [the tree] was enclosed for purposes other than dwelling.114As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, when an area was enclosed for purposes other than habitation, one may not carry within it, if it is larger than the space necessary to sow two seah of grain - i.e., 5000 square cubits." + ], + [ + "A lane with three walls is called a closed lane.1In Talmudic times, it was not customary that homes open to streets, as is the practice today. Instead, several homes would open up to a single courtyard. These courtyards would open up to paths or lanes that led to the public marketplaces and the thoroughfares of the towns. Sometimes, these paths or lanes would end in a cul-de- sac, and on other occasions they would lead from one thoroughfare to another. In contrast, a lane that has only two walls, one opposite the other, and thus passersby enter from one end and leave from the other, is referred to as an open lane.2This refers to a lane leading from one marketplace or thoroughfare to another. Needless to say, the lane must be less than sixteen cubits wide. If it is sixteen cubits wide, it would be deemed as a public domain according to the Rambam, as mentioned in Chapter 14, Halachah 1.", + "What must be done to allow people to carry within a closed lane?3This question applies within a city that is not surrounded by an eruv. As the Rambam explains in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:2), a lane with three walls is considered to be a carmelit. Thus according to the Torah itself, such an area is regarded as a makom patur, and one is permitted to carry within it. The Rabbis nevertheless forbade carrying within such an area, unless a person constructed either of the following structures: a lechi - a pole constructed at one of the corners of the fourth side - or a korah - a beam constructed across the entrance. (See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh.) We should erect one pole4The dimensions required for a pole and a beam are mentioned in Halachot 12 and 13. When a pole is constructed at the corner of the fourth side of the lane, the lane is considered to be enclosed and thus is viewed as a private domain. (See Halachah 9 of this chapter and Chapter 14, Halachah 1.) at the fourth side or extend a beam above it;5As explained in Halachah 9, extending a beam over the lane is a Rabbinic measure that makes a distinction between such a lane and a lane that is not enclosed at all. Because of this distinction, the Rabbinic prohibition against carrying in such a lane is lifted. this is sufficient.6This refers merely to the process of enclosing the area in question. In addition, as mentioned in Hilchot Eruvin 1:1-2, it is necessary for the people who share the lane to join together in an eruv, each contributing a certain measure of food. The beam or the pole is considered to have enclosed the fourth side, making it [equivalent to] a private domain.7The Rambam's definition of a lane follows the conception of Rabbenu Chanan'el in his commentary on Eruvin 12a. Most other Rishonim [including Rashi (Eruvin, loc. cit.), Tosafot, the Rashba, and the Ra'avad] differ, and maintain that as long as a lane has three walls (or two walls and a pole on the third side), it is considered a private domain according to the Torah. (See Be'ur Halachah 363:1.)
The difference between the Rambam's view and that of these other authorities does not concern the license to carry, for all agree that it is forbidden to carry within the lane until a pole or a beam is constructed at the fourth side. Instead, the difference involves transferring an article into such a lane with three walls from the public domain. According to the Rambam, one is not liable from such a transfer, while according to the other authorities, one is.

Thus, carrying is permitted within it.
According to Torah law, one is permitted to carry [within an area enclosed] by three partitions.8As mentioned above, according to the Rambam, one may carry in this lane, because any enclosure with three walls or less is deemed as a carmelit. According to the Torah, there is no restriction against carrying in such a domain. [The requirement to enclose the] fourth side is Rabbinic [in origin]. Therefore, it is sufficient to erect a pole or a beam.", + "What must be done to allow people to carry within an open lane? A frame of an entrance must be erected at one side and either a pole or a beam must be erected at the other side.9This ruling follows that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi in his Halachot. Nevertheless, there are many authorities who differ and maintain that this ruling applies only when the lane opens to a carmelit on at least one side. If it opens up to a public domain on both sides, it is not sufficient to erect a frame of an entrance, and a proper gate must be erected (Maggid Mishneh). The Rambam's ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 364:1).
An L-shaped10Our translation is based on the gloss and drawings of the Maggid Mishneh. lane is governed by the same rules as an open lane.11The Rambam rules that all that is necessary is a frame of an entrance at one opening of the lane, and a pole or a beam at the other end. Nothing is necessary at the bend of the lane. This follows the opinion of Rav (Eruvin 6a, 8b).
Rashi and Rabbenu Asher, however, interpret Rav's ruling differently and require that a frame of an entrance be constructed at the lane's bend, and a pole or a beam be constructed at both the lane's openings. They explain that this is necessary because, unless the frame of an entrance is constructed at the bend, a person who does not walk through the entire lane will not be aware of the pole or the beam at the other entrance to the lane. This is the view accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3).
", + "When a lane is level, but descends on an incline to the public domain, or if its entrance to the public domain is level but it itself descends on an incline,12Based on Shabbat 100a and the Tosefta, Shabbat 11:4, the Ra'avad and the Rashba define this as referring to an incline of ten handbreadths within four cubits. If the incline is gentler than that, this leniency does not apply. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:36) accepts this definition. it does not require either a pole or a beam, for it is clearly distinct from the public domain.13According to the Torah, one is allowed to carry within the lane, and the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin. Thus, since the steep incline makes the lane distinct from the public domain (and distinct from other lanes), there is no need for any further measures to permit carrying.
From the wording chosen by the Rambam, however, it appears that he does not consider the incline as a wall enclosing the lane (see the Ramah, Orach Chayim, loc. cit.), but rather as a distinguishing factor similar to a beam. Accordingly, a person who transfers an article into this lane from the public domain would not be held liable.
", + "When one side of a lane ends at the sea and the other side ends at a public garbage dump, there is no need for [further measures to enable carrying to be permitted].14This refers to a lane that has walls on either side. Thus, it is considered as if the lane had barriers on all four sides. For the garbage dump can be assumed to be ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. Thus, it is considered to be an added wall, and the sea itself can be assumed to be ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is also considered to be a wall (Mishnah Berurah 363:118).
[Leniency is granted,] because a public garbage dump is unlikely to be removed,15This law does not apply regarding a private garbage dump, because the possibility exists that such a dump will be removed at any time. and we do not suspect that the sea will wash up mud and rocks [which will dry out and create a surface level with that of the lane].16Our translation follows the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el and Rashi on Eruvin 8a. Although both these authorities agree on the definition of the word שרטון, they quote different versions of that Talmudic passage. Rabbenu Chanan'el follows the version quoted here by the Rambam, which states that \"we do not suspect that the sea will wash up a שרטון.\" The version of the passage quoted by Rashi (and printed in our texts of the Talmud today) states, \"we suspect that the sea will wash up a שרטון.\"
Significantly, this difference in approach to this passage has been preserved. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:29) follows the ruling of the Rambam, while subsequent Ashkenazic authorities and the Ramah follow that of Rashi which forbids carrying in such a lane. According to this view, it is impossible to enclose it with an eruv.
", + "[The following rules apply to] an open lane that ends in the middle of a yard17See the definition of the term רחבה in Chapter 16, Halachah 10. belonging to many different people: If [the end of the lane] is not opposite the entrance to the yard,18Were the lane to end directly opposite the entrance from the yard to the public domain, a more stringent ruling would be applied and it would be necessary to construct a frame of an entrance. See Halachot 3 and 18. it is considered to be closed and does not require any further measures at the side of the yard. If, however, it ends at the sides of the yard, it is forbidden [to carry within the lane].19The Maggid Mishneh explains that were the lane to end at the side of the yard, it would resemble an L-shaped lane. Hence, the laws mentioned in Halachah 3 would apply. When, however, the lane does not end at the side of the yard, it has no resemblance to an L-shaped lane. Therefore, the entrance to the yard is itself considered a distinguishing factor. (Note, however, Rabbenu Asher and the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 365:3, which require that the people whose homes open up to the lane and the yard join together in an eruv.)
Significantly, according to the Maggid Mishneh, the word \"forbidden\" used by the Rambam, appears to mean \"requires an eruv.\" This would concur with the Ra'avad's interpretation of Eruvin 7b which states that if the people whose homes open to the yard join in an eruv together with the people whose homes open to the lane, it is permitted to carry in the lane even if it ends in the side of the yard.
Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) which mentions that an eruv can never be effective for such a lane. See the explanation of this ruling in the Mishnah Berurah 365:23.

Moreover, if the yard belongs to a single individual, it is forbidden [to carry within the lane] even if the lane leads into the middle of the yard. [The rationale for this prohibition is that] at times, [the owner] may build on one of the sides of the yard. [After these improvements have been made,] it is possible that the lane will end at the side of the yard.", + "Permission [to carry within] a lane because a pole or a beam was erected is granted only when [the following conditions are met]:20The fundamental principle behind these conditions is that an enclosure that is used by a private person will afford greater privacy than an enclosure used by many people. Therefore, it is necessary that the enclosure be more substantial (the Rashba as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh).
[several] houses and courtyards open into it;21When only a single house or courtyard opens to a lane, it bears a far closer resemblance to private property.
it is four cubits long or more;22If a lane is not more than four cubits or if it is square shaped, it appears like a courtyard. and
its length exceeds its width.
If, however, the length23I.e., the distance from one entrance to the other. and the width24The distance between the two walls on either side. of a lane are equal, it is considered to be a courtyard, and permission [to carry within is granted] only [when one erects] two poles - there is no minimum requirement with regard to their width - one at each of its sides, or one erects a barrier four handbreadths [wide]25A barrier of this length is considered to be a wall, and thus a portion of this side of the lane is also considered to be enclosed. at one side.26Although the requirement to construct two poles or a barrier is more stringent than the norm for a lane, it still represents a leniency. There is no need to construct the frame of an entrance as in a courtyard.
The Rambam's ruling (with several additions) is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26). In his gloss, the Ramah adds that it has become customary to enclose all lanes with the frame of an entrance - i.e., two poles, and a cord above them.
", + "When the length27The length of a courtyard refers to the space from its entrance to the opposite wall (Maggid Mishneh). Although there are other interpretations, this is the definition accepted as halachah (Mishnah Berurah 363:116). of a courtyard exceeds its width, it is considered to be a lane, and [carrying within it] is permitted [only when one erects] a pole or a beam.
[When several] houses and courtyards28Our translation is based on the second interpretation of the Rambam's words offered by the Maggid Mishneh, which is supported by the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Eruvin 5:15. From that source, it appears that the Rambam conceives of a lane as having several courtyards and several houses open up to it. If, however, there is only one house opening up to it, although it contains several courtyards, or one courtyard although it contains several houses, it is not sufficient.
Rashi (Eruvin 12b), however, offers a different interpretation, explaining that to be considered a lane, an enclosure must have two courtyards open up to it, and each of the courtyards must have two houses open up to it. This view is accepted by the Rashba and by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26).
do not open into a lane - e.g., only one house or one courtyard does - and similarly, [when] a lane is not four cubits long, permission [to carry within is granted] only [when one erects] two poles29Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which states that when a lane is less than four cubits long, the frame of an entrance is required to enclose it. Significantly, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:27 quotes the Rambam's ruling and not that of the Shulchan Aruch. (See also Mishnah Berurah 363:93.) or a barrier (more than)30In the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, the word, ומשהו (lit. \"and something\") is added in parentheses. Rav David Arameah and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) interpret this to mean that the four handbreadths must be \"ample.\" B'nei Binyamin explains that there is a printing error and the word משהו refers to the poles as in the previous halachah. Rav Kapach maintains that the word is a printer's addition and does not exist in the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. four handbreadths [wide].", + "When a lane is not three handbreadths wide,31The Kessef Mishneh (and his view is quoted by the Magen Avraham 363:29) explains that even if the majority of the lane is wider than three handbreadths, since its entrance is less than three handbreadths it is considered to be closed, and no further measures are necessary. one may carry throughout it; it does not require either a pole or a beam. [This leniency is granted because] an opening less than three handbreadths wide is considered to be an extension of the existing wall.32I.e., based on the principle of l'vud, the lane is considered to be a closed space and not open (Kessef Mishneh). Although there are more lenient opinions, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:28) accepts the Rambam's ruling.
When a beam is erected over a lane to make it possible for people to carry within as in a private domain, [the lane is not considered to be a private domain, and] a person who throws an article from it to the public domain or from the public domain into it is not liable. The beam is [there merely] to create a distinction.33As mentioned in the notes on the first halachah of this chapter, the Rambam differs with many of the other Rishonim and maintains that, according to Torah law, an area enclosed by three partitions is a makom patur and not a private domain. Therefore, a person who transfers an article to it from the public domain or vice versa is not liable.
As mentioned in several places throughout the first chapter of the tractate of Eruvin, there is a difference of opinion among the Sages regarding why one is permitted to carry within a lane when a beam is erected over its fourth side. The opinion quoted by the Rambam maintains that although the Sages forbade carrying in such a domain, their prohibition is lifted because the beam serves as a distinction, setting this lane apart, physically and conceptually, from the public domain.
The other opinion maintains that the beam is considered to be a wall (i.e., it is considered as if there were a wall descending from the beam downward enclosing the lane). Hence, the lane is considered to be enclosed on all four sides and therefore, as a private domain.

When, by contrast, a pole is erected [to make it possible for people to carry], [the lane is a private domain, and] a person who throws an article from it to the public domain or from the public domain into it, is liable. The pole is considered to be a wall on the fourth side.34In the first chapter of the tractate of Eruvin, our Sages also differ regarding why permission is granted to carry in a lane when a pole is erected at its fourth side. According to the opinion quoted by the Rambam, it is considered as if a wall emerges from the pole, and thus the lane is considered to be enclosed by a wall on all of its sides.
There is, however, another opinion, which states that the pole is erected merely to create a distinction and it is not considered to be a wall.
", + "How is it possible to [make it permissible for people to carry] between two walls of the public domain through which people [frequently] pass? One makes gates on both sides,35Some of the authorities who maintain that an enclosure with three walls is considered to be a private domain according to Torah law, permit carrying within a public domain if gates are erected on one side and a frame of an entrance, pole, or beam is erected on the other. (See the Mishnah Berurah 364:6.) causing the space between them to be considered to be a private domain.36The definition of a public domain is taken from the encampment of the Jewish people in the desert, and there the public domain did not have gates (Mishnah Berurah 364:7). The gates enclose the domain on all four sides. Hence, even though many people walk through it, it is still considered as \"private.\"
[In practice,] the gates need not be locked at night, but they must be fit to lock.37Based on Eruvin 6a-b, many Rishonim differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that not only must the gates be fit to be closed at night, they must actually be closed, in order for carrying to be permitted in a public domain. Gates that can be closed, but are not actually closed, are effective only in an open lane. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 364:2) mentions the Rambam's view, the more stringent opinion is favored.
It must be emphasized that from Chapter 14, Halachah 1, and Hilchot Eruvin 1:1, it appears that the Rambam also requires doors that are actually closed. Several explanations are offered by the commentaries in resolution of this difficulty.
If they are sunken in the earth, [the earth must be] cleared away and [the gates] adjusted so that they can be locked. The frame of an entrance,38Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 364:4, which states that a frame of an entrance is considered to be a wall. Therefore, if one erected poles on each corner of a square and connected them with a string above, one creates a private domain. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade carrying within an area fit to be considered a public domain unless it has a proper gate at its entrance. The Rambam, however, could not accept this ruling, because as stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 16, if the open portions of a barrier exceed the enclosed portions, it is not acceptable. a pole, or a beam are not sufficient to make it possible for people to carry within a public domain.39Herein lies one of the points of controversy regarding the eruvim that are constructed around communities today. For few modern cities or villages are enclosed by actual walls with gates, and in practice, most of these eruvim employ a frame of an entrance, using telephone wires and the like.
As mentioned in Chapter 14, Halachah 1, and its notes, the Rambam does not subscribe to the opinion that a public domain must contain 600,000 people passing through it. Although the later Ashkenazic authorities accept this more lenient view, they also suggest that those who are careful in their observance accept the Rambam's ruling.
Whether this principle is to be applied with regard to great metropolises like Manhattan, Brooklyn, London, and the like which have more than 600,000 passersby or with regard to smaller communities which are considered a public domain only according to the more stringent view, the public domain must be enclosed by proper walls. The use of a frame of an entrance employing telephone or electric wires and the like is not sufficient.
", + "It is permissible to carry in [the portion of] the lane that is under the beam or opposite the pole.40Although the inner portion of the beam or the pole is of most importance, it is, nevertheless, permitted to carry under the beam or opposite the pole, because that area is considered to be a makom patur (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 365:6). When does the above apply? When these structures are constructed near a public domain.
When, by contrast, [a lane is] near a carmelit, it is forbidden to carry in [the portion of] the lane that is under the beam or opposite the pole,41The Rambam's ruling is based on Rabbenu Chanan'el's interpretation of Eruvin 8b,9a. The Ra'avad and most Ashkenazic authorities (among them Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher) interpret that passage differently and maintain that we are permitted to carry beneath a beam when it opens up to a carmelit.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:4) follows the Rambam's ruling. The Mishnah Berurah 365:27, however, mentions the more lenient views. Furthermore, many authorities (e.g., Maggid Mishnah, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 365:6) agree that if a beam is four handbreadths wide and is strong enough to support a roof, it is permitted to carry beneath it. In that instance, the outer end of the beam is considered to descend and serve as a fourth wall.
unless one erects another pole to permit carrying within the entrance.42In that instance, the area between the poles is considered to be a distinct entity, with walls on either side.
[The rationale for this stringency is that according to the Torah, a carmelit is a makom patur. Therefore, when] this entity, [the space opposite the pole or under the beam, which is also a makom patur, is adjacent] to an entity of this type, [the carmelit,] its presence is deemed significant [and it is considered to be an extension of the carmelit].43Generally, one is allowed to carry within a makom patur. Nevertheless, our Sages forbade carrying in a carmelit, a makom patur which resembles a public domain. In the situation at hand, since one makom patur (the carmelit) is adjacent to another makom patur (the area opposite the pole or beneath the beam), the two are combined and form a single entity. Therefore, carrying is forbidden, not only in the carmelit, but also between the poles.", + "A pole may be constructed employing any substance, even a living entity,44The Maggid Mishneh states that an animal used as a pole must be bound and may not be free to move. This concept can be derived from Chapter 16, Halachah 21, which states that an animal used for a partition may be bound. As mentioned in Halachah 9, a pole is considered to be a partition. or even an object from which we are forbidden to benefit. [For example, if] a false deity or a tree that is worshiped45See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:10-15 and 8:3 with regard to the different laws pertaining to an asherah, a tree that is worshiped. is employed as a pole, it is acceptable.46The leniency mentioned represents a novel concept, for seemingly it applies even when the pole is associated with the idol worship of a Jew. (A pole worshiped by gentiles can be used if the gentiles nullfiy its connection with idol worship before it comes into the possession of a Jew. If, however, it is owned by a Jew, the connection with idol worship can never be nullified.)
Generally, since we are obligated to destroy objects that are associated with idol worship, from a halachic perspective, they are considered as if they have already been burnt to ashes. For example, Hilchot Shofar 1:3 states that it is forbidden to use a shofar belonging to an עיר הנדחת (\"an apostate city\") and Hilchot Lulav 8:1 states that a palm branch used for idol worship is unacceptable for use as a lulav. Since both a shofar and lulav have a minimum requirement for their length, an object that must be destroyed because of its connection with idol worship is unacceptable.
In the case at hand, however, since there is no minimum requirement for the width or breadth of a pole, there is no difficulty in using a tree that has been worshiped.
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's explanation, for although there is no minimum width or breadth required for a pole, there is a minimum requirement for its height. Since the wood of the tree that has been worshiped is considered as though it had been burned to ash already, it lacks this minimum height.
(The Ra'avad, therefore, differs with the Rambam and maintains that a pole, like a beam, is merely a distinction. Therefore, no minimum height is required.)
Many of the other Rishonim differ with the Ra'avad and accept the Rambam's decision. The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between a shofar and a lulav - which must have three coordinates: width, breadth, and height - and a beam, which requires only one: height. The fundamental point of his explanation is that although such a beam is considered to lack dimensions, it exists and in this instance all that is necessary is its existence. See the notes of Rav Chayim Soloveichik to this halachah.
Tosafot (Eruvin 80b) offers a different explanation, stating that even if the tree was burned, one could stick its ashes together and obtain a pole ten handbreadths high.
[The rationale for this ruling is that] there is no minimum requirement regarding the width of a pole.
The height of the pole may not be less than ten handbreadths.47In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:6), the Rambam explains that this height is required for a pole, because the minimum height of a lane is ten handbreadths. Thus, the pole would extend for the entire height of the lane. Even if the lane is higher, the pole is not required to be more than ten handbreadths high. There is not, however, a minimum requirement for its width and breadth.", + "A beam may be constructed employing any substance, with the exception of a tree that has been worshiped.48Based on Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 8:9, it can be inferred that this refers to a tree that was worshiped by a Jew or a tree that was worshiped by a gentile, but which was cut down before the gentile nullified its connection with idol worship. [The latter restriction is applied] because there is a minimum measure for the width of a beam, and a tree that has been worshiped is forbidden to be used whenever there is a minimum measure specified.
The width of a beam may be no less than a handbreadth;49Even though the beam must be sturdy enough to support a brick that is one and a half handbreadths wide, it is possible for there to be a portion of the brick extending on either side of the beam (Eruvin 14a, Kessef Mishneh). there is, however, no minimum measure for its thickness. Nevertheless, it must be sturdy enough50When a beam is built in such a sturdy fashion, it is obviously placed there as a permanent part of the lane, and thus will serve as a distinction for the people inside of it. to hold a brick51Based on the Jerusalem Talmud, the Maggid Mishneh states that it is not enough for the beam to support a single brick. It must be sturdy enough to support an entire row of bricks of this size. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:17) quotes the Rambam's wording, the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:19, Mishnah Berurah 363:59) quote the Maggid Mishneh's view.
Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:18) also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher that if the beam is more than four handbreadths wide, it does not have to be sturdy enough to hold a brick.
that is one and a half handbreadths by three handbreadths.52Literally \"half of three handbreadths by three handbreadths.\" The supports53I.e., the supports that are attached to the walls on which the beam is placed. for the beam must be sturdy enough to hold the beam and a brick of the size mentioned above.54Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the supports need not be that sturdy. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:18) quotes both opinions without coming to a final decision. Similarly, there is a difference of opinion among the later authorities concerning this issue.", + "Of what size may the entrance of a lane be for a pole or a beam to be sufficient to allow [people to carry within]? Its height may not be less than ten handbreadths,55If the walls of the lane are not ten handbreadths high, they are not significant and it is considered as if the lane lacks enclosures on either side. nor more than twenty cubits.56The Maggid Mishneh states that this restriction applies only when a beam is being used, for the passersby will not notice a beam that is more than twenty cubits high. If, however, a pole is used, there is no limitation on the height of the lane. This interpretation is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26). Its width may not be more than ten cubits.57As mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachah 16, an opening that is larger than ten cubits is too large to be considered to be an entrance.
[The above applies] when [the opening] is not built with a frame of an entrance.58I.e., the entrance to the lane is an open space without a doorway or gate. If, however, [the opening] is built with the frame of an entrance, even if it is 100 cubits high, less than ten [handbreadths high],59The Ra'avad and others object to this ruling, stating that if the walls of a lane are not ten handbreadths high, the fact that the opening is constructed in the form of a frame of an entrance is of no significance. Since the walls of the lane are not high enough to be considered significant entities, of what value is the fact that the opening is constructed in the form of a frame of an entrance?
The Meiri explains that since the frame of the entrance is at least ten handbreadths high, the fact that the walls of the lane themselves are lower is insignificant. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam's opinion. Note the explanation of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:27, which explains that this applies in a situation when the walls of the lane are not ten handbreadths high. Nevertheless, the lane is considered a private domain because of the walls of houses and courtyards that adjoin it.
See also the Mishnah Berurah 363:93, which mentions that many later authorities accept the Ra'avad's objection and allow people to carry in such a lane only when the walls are ten handbreadths high. These authorities, however, explain that if the walls of the lane are ten handbreadths throughout the lane, with the exception of its opening, the construction of a frame of an entrance at the opening makes it permissible for people to carry within.
or more than 100 cubits wide, it is permissible [to carry within].60When the frame of an entrance is constructed, there is no need for a post or a beam. For the construction of a frame of an entrance causes an entrance to be considered as if it were enclosed, as stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 16.", + "Similarly, if the beam over a lane is ornamented or it has designs61From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:1), it is clear that he is speaking about designs and ornaments on the beam itself. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 363:26, based on Rabbenu Asher's interpretation of Eruvin 3a), states that it is sufficient for there to be designs on the wall next to the beam. For when people look at the designs, their attention will also be drawn to the beam. so that everyone looks at it, it is acceptable even if it is more than 20 cubits high.62Note the Kessef Mishneh's statements that permission is not granted to carry in a lane that is more than ten handbreadths wide, despite the fact that the beam placed above it has designs. A beam serves as a distinguishing factor. Therefore, [generally,] if it is higher than 20 cubits, [it is not acceptable because] it will not be noticed.63The principle that objects above 20 cubits high will not be noticed easily by the human eye is also applied with reference to a sukkah (the s'chach may not be more than 20 cubits high) and with regard to a Chanukah candelabra (which may not be placed 20 cubits above the ground). If, however, it is ornamented or if it has designs - since it attracts attention, it serves as a distinguishing factor.", + "When the height of a lane, from the earth until the bottom of the beam is 20 cubits, it is acceptable even though the width of the beam extends higher than 20 [cubits above the ground.]
If the lane is more than 20 cubits high and one desires to reduce its height by placing a beam lower than it,64We have translated the Rambam's words in the most simple fashion, following Rav Kapach's interpretation. The Maggid Mishneh (based on Eruvin 4b) offers a much more complicated interpretation, explaining that if originally a beam was erected more than 20 cubits above the ground and then a second beam was erected above the floor to reduce its height, there may not be more than 20 cubits between the first beam and the second. This approach is also followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:26).
the beam must be a handbreadth wide. If the lane is less than ten handbreadths high, one should dig out a portion that is four cubits by four cubits65Rashi (Eruvin 5a) explains that a smaller area is not sufficient. A lane is not considered significant unless it is more than four cubits by four cubits, as explained in Halachah 7. Thus, there must be a portion of the lane with walls that are ten handbreadths high, with at least this area. in area, deep enough so that [the walls of the lane will be] a full ten handbreadths [in height].", + "[The following rules apply when] an opening is made in the side of a lane,66Leading to a public domain or a carmelit (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 365:1). near its front:67I.e., the opening is made in the side wall of the lane. Nevertheless, it is very close to the opening of the lane where the pole or the beam erected to permit carrying was placed. If a portion of the wall four handbreadths wide touching the front [wall] remains standing, it is permissible [to carry within the lane],68Although generally the walls of a lane must be four cubits long, as mentioned in Halachah 7, leniency is allowed in this instance, since the lane existed previously (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit.; Mishnah Berurah 365:2). provided the opening is not more than ten cubits wide.69As mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachah 16, an opening that is larger than ten cubits causes the entire side to be considered to be unenclosed, unless a frame of an entrance is constructed above it.
If, however, a portion of the wall four handbreadths wide does not remain, it is forbidden [to carry within the lane]70Although the opening is not too large to nullify the enclosure, since the people will be going in and out through the new opening, they will not notice the beam or the pole erected at the original entrance (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit.). unless the opening is less than three handbreadths. [Any opening] less than three handbreadths [is considered to be closed,] based on the principle of l'vud.", + "[The following rules apply when] a lane opens up entirely71When the walls of the lane open to the courtyard and there is an opening to the public domain on the opposite side, it appears as if the lane leads directly into the public domain. If, however, there are projections remaining at the side of the entrance from the lane to the courtyard, they are considered to be equivalent to a pole, and it is permitted to carry within the lane. (See Mishnah Berurah 365:12- 13.) to a courtyard and the courtyard opens up on the opposite side72See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:3), which states that the question of whether the opening to the public domain must be directly opposite the opening to the lane for the restriction to apply depends on whether or not an eruv has been made between the inhabitants of the lane and the inhabitants of the courtyard. See the notes to Halachah 1. to the public domain: it is forbidden [to carry within], because it is like an open lane. It is [however] permissible to carry within the courtyard, for although many people pass through a courtyard - entering from this side and departing from the other - it is still considered a private domain.73This clarifies the definition of \"private domain\" given at the beginning of Chapter 14 - i.e., private property belonging to a single individual, a group, or a collective.", + "[The following rules apply when] there are several paths leading [from the public domain] to a lane, [merging with it] at different points.74Eruvin 8b describes this situation as \"a lane structured like a centipede\" - i.e., that has different paths leading into it like the legs of a centipede. The Maggid Mishneh depicts this as follows.
There is, however, some difficulty with his interpretation, because the Rambam specifically states, \"Although the openings are not opposite one another.\" Accordingly, Rav Kapach has drawn the following diagram.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 364:5) mentions both possibilities, stating that they are both governed by the same laws. As will be mentioned, its rulings are based on a different perspective than that of the Rambam.

Although the entrances are not opposite one another, since they all lead to the public domain, every one is considered to be an open lane.75See Halachah 3 with regard to an L-shaped lane.
What must be done [to make it possible to carry within this lane]? A frame of an entrance should be constructed for each of the paths at one end.76The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam's words as requiring the frame of an entrance to be constructed at the entrance from the path to the public domain on one side. On the other side of the path, at the entrances that lead to the public domain, a pole or a beam is sufficient.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) differs and maintains that the frame of an entrance should be made at the entrance of the path to the main lane. At the entrance to the public domain, a pole or a beam is sufficient. The difference between these rulings depends on their rulings regarding an L-shaped lane, as mentioned in the notes on Halachah 3.
Similarly, [a frame of an entrance should be constructed] at the main entrance [of the lane to the public domain]. At the other side of all the paths, one should construct a pole or a beam.", + "When one of the walls of a lane [that leads to the public domain] is
long and the other is short,77At one side of the lane the wall protrudes further than the other, so that the opening to the lane is a diagonal. one should place the beam near the shorter wall.78Placing the beam at a diagonal is not acceptable, because a beam is intended to create a distinction between the lane and the public domain. When the beam is positioned at a diagonal, a person carrying in the extension of the lane will not differentiate between it and the public domain.
The Rashba (quoted in the Maggid Mishneh) states that one may carry in the extended portion of the lane only by erecting the frame of an entrance across the diagonal. This ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:30). If, however, one erects a pole at both sides of the entrance to the lane, it is not acceptable. One may, however, carry in the area behind the inner pole (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:36; Mishnah Berurah 363:125).

When a pole79The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as saying that the same laws apply if one erected a beam over the midst of a lane. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:32). is constructed in the midst of a lane, it is permissible to carry within the inner portion of the lane80Eruvin 14b explains that this law is seemingly self-evident. Nevertheless, it was necessary to mention it, for one might think that carrying would be forbidden within the inner half lest one carry in the outer half. that is behind the pole.81The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize that the inner portion must meet all the criteria for a lane mentioned in Halachah 7. It is, however, forbidden [to carry] in the outer portion of the lane that is beyond the pole.", + "When a lane is twenty cubits wide, [it is possible to enable people to carry within by erecting a pole or a board in the following manner]:82As mentioned in Halachah 14, it is possible to enable people to carry within a lane by erecting a beam or a pole only when the opening to a lane is ten cubits or less wide. If the opening is wider, a frame of an entrance is necessary. One may build a wall ten handbreadths high and four cubits long - the latter being the minimum length of a lane - and place [the wall perpendicularly] in the middle [of the entrance].
[As such,] it is as if there are two lanes, each with an entrance of ten cubits.83The fact that the two lanes merge is not significant, for it is the width at the entrance that is the determining factor. In this instance as well, the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:33) follow the rationale mentioned in the notes to the previous halachah and emphasize that both the new lanes created by the erection of the wall must meet all the conditions for a lane mentioned in Halachah 7.
Alternatively, one may leave a space of two cubits from [one side of the lane] and set up a wall three cubits long, and [similarly,] leave a space of two cubits [from the other side of the lane] and set up a wall three cubits long. Thus, the opening of the lane will be ten cubits wide,84The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:34) states that the measures cited by the Rambam are not arbitrary figures. As long as the walls erected exceed the size of the empty space between them and the wall, and the opening is ten cubits wide or less, it is possible to allow people to carry within the lane by erecting a pole or a beam.
Eruvin 10a mentions that generally as long as the enclosed portion of a side is equal to the open portion, it is acceptable. (See Chapter 16, Halachah 16.) In this instance, however, since a majority of the side is left open for the entrance, the enclosed portion of the remainder must exceed the open portion.
and the sides will be considered to be closed, because the enclosed portions exceed the open portions.85The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) underscores that the leniency mentioned in this halachah applies only when people do not enter and leave through the spaces on the sides. It is, nevertheless, unlikely that they would do so unless there is a clear indication that this is the common practice (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:40; Mishnah Berurah 363:148). See Halachah 17.", + "A pole that projects outward from the wall of the lane is acceptable.86Based on Eruvin 5 a-b, the Maggid Mishneh interprets this as referring to a portion of the wall that projects into the lane, but which was not constructed for the purpose of serving as a pole. It is, nevertheless, acceptable.
The Maggid Mishneh also mentions other opinions that interpret the above Talmudic portion as referring to a projection that is less than four cubits wide. If the width of the projection exceeds four cubits, the projection is considered to be a wall. If the width of the entire side exceeds eight cubits, another pole is required. This opinion is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:12).
[Similarly,] a pole that is standing [at the side of the entrance to a lane] without having been placed there [intentionally]87E.g., a tree that is growing at the side of the lane. is acceptable, provided one has the intent of relying on it before [the commencement of] the Sabbath.88The Maggid Mishneh interprets Eruvin 15a, the source for this halachah, as referring to a situation where a tree was growing near a pole at the side of the lane, and the pole was removed. If it was removed before the Sabbath, we can assume that the people relied on the tree to use as a pole. Hence, it is acceptable. If, however, the pole was removed on the Sabbath itself, the tree is not acceptable, for there was no intent to use it for this purpose before the commencement of the Sabbath. This conception is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:11).
When a pole can be seen from the inside of a lane but cannot be seen from the outside,89This diagram, taken from the Maggid Mishneh, is also repeated in Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:11 and the Mishneh Berurah 363:31. See the accompanying diagram. In this way, the projection is seen only by those standing within the lane and not by those standing outside. or conversely, when it can be seen from the outside, but from within the lane appears flush with the wall, it is acceptable as a pole.90This is a matter of controversy among the commentaries. Rashi, Eruvin 9b, interprets this as a direct opposite of the above diagram. Tosafot objects, and reverses the interpretation of the terms.
A pole that is lifted three handbreadths above the ground91The Mishnah Berurah 363:35 explains that even when the pole is ten handbreadths high, it is not acceptable if it is more than three handbreadths above the ground. The rationale for this ruling is that a pole is considered like a wall, and a wall must reach within three handbreadths of the ground. or that is more than three handbreadths away from the wall,92Note the Mishnah Berurah 363:22, which states that this restriction applies regardless of the size of the pole. is not at all significant. Anything less than three handbreadths is, however, acceptable, based on the principle of l'vud.
When a pole is very wide - whether its width is less than or equal to half the width of the lane, it is acceptable and is considered to be a pole. If, however, [its width] exceeds half the width of the lane, [it is considered to be a wall and this side is considered to be enclosed], because the enclosed portion exceeds the open portion.93As mentioned in the notes on the beginning of the halachah, the Rambam's ruling is not accepted by all the authorities.", + "When a mat is spread over a beam, the beam's [function in making it possible to carry within the lane] is nullified, for it is no longer conspicuous.94As mentioned in Halachah 9, a beam that is placed over the entrance of a lane differentiates between the lane and the public domain. When, however, this beam is covered by a mat, it appears that it was placed there to hang objects on it and thus no longer serves its original function. [It is possible, however, for it still to be possible to carry within the lane, provided the mat reaches within three handbreadths of the ground.95Although the beam is no longer considered significant for its original purpose. If the mat reaches the ground - or because of the principle of l'vud, within three handbreadths of the ground - it is considered to be a wall, provided it is tied so that it will not be moved by the wind. (See Chapter 16, Halachah 24.)] If the mat is three handbreadths or more from the ground, it is not considered to be a wall [and carrying is forbidden within the lane].
If one implants two spikes into the front of the wall96The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:25) mentions that these spikes are implanted at an angle, inclined toward the inside of the lane. Thus, there are two difficulties with the beam:
a) It is placed on the spikes and not on the walls of the lane itself,
b) Its span is shorter than the width of the lane itself.
From the diagram drawn by the Maggid Mishneh to depict the Rambam's conception, it would appear that there is a difference of opinion and the difficulty is that the spikes and the beam are outside the lane.
of a lane and places a beam upon them, one's actions are of no significance [and it is forbidden to carry within the lane]. For a beam [to be significant, it] must be positioned over a lane and not next to it.97The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions that if the pole is within three handbreadths of the wall of the lane, it is acceptable, based on the principle of l'vud.", + "[The following rules apply when] a beam extends outward from one wall of a lane,98The Maggid Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:23, and the Mishnah Berurah 363:67 explain that even if the beam does not reach either wall (e.g., it is placed atop a pillar, in the midst of the lane), it is acceptable as long as it is within three handbreadths of both walls. but does not reach the second wall, or if one beam extends outward from one wall and another beam extends outward from the second wall: If they reach within three [handbreadths] of each other, there is no need to bring another beam.99For they are considered as though they are connected, based on the principle of l'vud. If there is more than three handbreadths between them, one must bring another beam.", + "Similarly, when two beams are positioned parallel to each other and neither of them is able to support a brick [of the required size],100See Halachah 13. there is no need to bring another beam if the two beams can support the brick together.101Based on Eruvin 14a, the Ra'avad explains that the beams must be close enough to each other actually to support the brick if placed there. The Rambam (see the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh) explains that as long as the beams are within three handbreadths of each other, and their combined width is a handbreadth, theoretically, they would be strong enough to support a brick placed upon them. Hence, it is sufficient even though in their present position, the beams are unable to support a brick.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 363:22) mentions both interpretations, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 363:24, which states that one should be stringent and follow the Ra'avad's view.

If one is on a higher plane and the other is on a lower plane, we see the upper one as if it were lower and the lower one as if it were raised [and thus the two are regarded as though they were on the same plane].102This is based on the principle of chavot rami, literally, \"cast it down.\" We find this principle also applied in Hilchot Sukkah 5:21 and Hilchot Tum'at Meit 16:6.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh, however, both note the apparent differences between the Rambam's citation of this principle here and in Hilchot Sukkah, where the Rambam states:
If the s'chach was uneven - i.e., some of it high and some of it low, it is kosher, provided there is less than three handbreadths between the [height of the] upper and lower [portions of the s'chach].
If the upper portion [of the s'chach] is a handbreadth or more wide, even though it is more than three handbreadths above [the lower portion], we consider it to be descending and touching the edge of the lower portion.
Since as mentioned in the previous notes, it is only the combined width of the beams which is a handbreadth, and each beam is smaller, the Maggid Mishneh asks why the principle of chavut rami applies. Seemingly, it would be necessary for the upper beam to be a handbreadth wide as well.
[This applies] provided the upper board is not higher than 20 cubits high,103The maximum acceptable height for a beam (Halachah 14). the lower board is not less than ten handbreadths high104The minimum acceptable height for a beam (ibid.). and there would be less than three handbreadths between the two if the upper one were lowered and the lower one were raised until they were parallel to each other on the same plane.105As explained in the opening clause of this halachah. With regard to this clause as well, the objection raised by the Ra'avad with regard to the first clause is also relevant. Indeed, it is far more applicable in this instance, for when the boards are not on the same plane, it is impossible for them to hold a brick.
As in the first clause, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:23) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor the Rambam's view. In this instance, however, most of the later authorities suggest accepting the stringency suggested by the Ra'avad.
", + "If the beam is crooked, we consider it as if it were straight. If it is rounded,106The Mishnah Berurah 363:63 explains that this law involves a further leniency: Since the beam is rounded, it will not be able to support a brick. Nevertheless, since it would be strong enough to accept a brick if it were straight, it is acceptable. we consider it as if it were linear. Thus, if its circumference is three handbreadths, it is a handbreadth in diameter.107The Rambam's words are a direct quote from the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:5). In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam notes that the relation mentioned here is merely an approximation, and the ratio of the diameter of a circle to its circumference is pi.
[The following rules apply when] a beam is located in the midst of a lane, but because it is crooked, a portion projects outside the lane, or because it is crooked, a portion projects above twenty [cubits] or below ten [handbreadths] high: We consider the distance that would remain between the two ends of the beam were the crooked portion [which projects outside the desired area] to be removed:108I.e., the portion of the beam that extends beyond its place is considered as if it did not exist, and we calculate the distance - on a straight line - between the two points of the beam on the extremity of the permitted area. If that distance is less than three handbreadths, it is acceptable, because of the principle of l'vud. If not, a new beam is required. If less than three handbreadths remain, there is no need to bring another beam. If [more remain], another beam is required.", + "When eight walls are positioned at the corners [of a square around] a well,109Wells are generally ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide, thus constituting a private domain. Accordingly, if the area around them is not enclosed, it is forbidden to draw water and drink, since by doing so one will be removing an article from a private domain to a carmelit or to a public domain.
As mentioned in Halachah 30, our Sages granted the leniency mentioned in this halachah as a specific dispensation to the pilgrims journeying to Jerusalem for the festivals. Rather than require the well to be surrounded by a proper wall, they allowed the use of such a structure.
two attached [perpendicularly] at each corner, they are considered to be an enclosure. Even though [the length of the] open portion exceeds that of the walls on each of the sides, since [there are walls] standing at all of the corners, it is permitted to draw water from the well and permit an animal to drink.110See Figure A. Note the Mishnah, Eruvin 2:1, which uses the term d'yomdin, which literally means \"two pillars\" to describe the structure positioned at each of the corners of the square.
How high must each of these walls be? Ten handbreadths. The walls must each be six handbreadths wide,111This is the minimum length of the walls placed at each side of the corner. Although a wall of four handbreadths is considered significant in many instances, in the case at hand a larger measure is required, because the majority of the enclosure remains open. and there must be space between each wall for two teams - each consisting of four cattle - one entering and one departing. This measure is not more than thirteen and one third cubits.112This is the maximum size of the space allowed between walls. As obvious from Halachah 29, it may be smaller.", + "[It is not always necessary for this space to have actual walls positioned at its corners]. If at one of the corners, or at all four of the corners, there is positioned a large stone, a tree, a mound whose incline is more than ten handbreadths within four cubits, or a bundle of reeds, [the following rules apply]: We see whether the article in question has a section one cubit long on either side that is ten handbreadths high when divided [at the corner].113See Figure B. [If this is true,] it is considered to be two walls positioned at a corner.
When five reeds are erected [around the corner of such a square] with less than three [handbreadths] between each pair of them,114See Figure C. [the space between them is considered to be closed].115Based on the principle of l'vud. If there are six handbreadths on one side and six handbreadths on the other side, they are considered to be two walls positioned at a corner.", + "It is permissible to bring these four corners closer to the well, provided there is still enough space for the majority of a cow's body to be within these walls when it is drinking.116If the enclosure was any smaller, it is likely that an animal may turn and its owner would carry the bucket out of the enclosure. Eruvin 19a states that this distance is two cubits in length on each side. Although one does not hold the head of the animal together with the vessel from which it is drinking, since there is space for the head [of a cow] and the majority [of its body] within [the square], it is permitted.
[If the square is this size,] it is permissible even for a camel117A camel is much larger than a cow and its head and the majority of its body cannot fit into the space for the head and the majority of the body of a cow. [to use] it. If [the square] is smaller, it is forbidden to draw water within [the square], even for a kid whose entire body can enter within.
It is permissible to separate [the walls] from the well as far as one desires, provided that one adds straight walls on every side,118I.e., the further the distance from the well, the larger the distance between the corners becomes. Rather than make the corner walls larger, it is proper to add a third (or more) wall to each side, to maintain the distance between each wall at thirteen and one third cubits or less (Eruvin 18a). See the accompanying diagram. so that there will never be more than thirteen and one third cubits between each of the two walls.", + "[The use of] such walls was permitted only in Eretz Yisrael, and for the sake of the herds119As the halachah mentions below, this leniency was generally allowed for animals; only when the well was very wide were men also allowed to benefit from it. of the festive pilgrims. Similarly, [this leniency] was granted only with regard to a fresh-water well120I.e., a well - which is itself a source of water - but not a reservoir or cistern in which water was stored. See the following halachah. that belongs to the public.121I.e., in contrast to one belonging to a private individual. See the following halachah..
In contrast, should a person desire to drink, he should descend to the well and drink, or should make a barrier ten handbreadths high around the wall,122This distinguishes the area as a private domain. In regard to descending to drink from the well see Chapter 24, Halachah 4. stand within it, draw water, and drink. If the well is very wide and a man is unable to climb down it, he may draw water and drink within [a structure of] corner walls [as described above].", + "Similarly, it is forbidden to draw water from a cistern that belongs to the public or from a well that belongs to a private individual - even in Eretz Yisrael - unless one constructs a barrier123This interpretation of the Hebrew חגורה follows the commentary of Tosafot, rather than Rashi (Eruvin 22b). ten handbreadths high around them.", + "When a person was drawing [water] for his animal that is standing between the walls [of the abovementioned enclosure], he may draw water and place it before [the animal] in the vessel [with which it was drawn].
If the [animal was in] a stall ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths [by four handbreadths] wide, whose front portion projected within such walls, the person should not draw water and place [the vessel] before [the animal].124Although there is no transgression in performing such an activity, since the stall projects within the enclosure, our Sages forbade this for the reasons stated by the Rambam. [This restriction was instituted] lest the stall be broken and the person carry the bucket into the stall, and from the stall [bring it] to the ground of the public domain.125The Rambam's ststements are based on Eruvin 20b, which explains that while attempting to fix the broken stall, the person may carry the bucket to the public domain. Nevertheless, as the Merkevet HaMishneh notes, the Rambam slightly changes the description of the situation mentioned in the Talmud to allow for a shorter, more concise text. Instead, he should draw water, pour it before [his animal], who will drink it itself.", + "When a person throws [an article] from the public domain into [a space surrounded by] walls of this nature, he is liable. Since there is an actual wall that is ten [handbreadths] high and more than four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths] in area in every corner, the square is a definitive and distinct entity.126Note the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim, Responsum 265), who question how large an area may be included with such walls for the area to be considered a private domain according to the Torah. From the Rambam's statements, it appears that even if there are more than thirteen and one third handbreadths between the walls, it is still considered a private domain. Hence, the entire [enclosure] is considered to be a private domain.127Thus, the restrictions against drawing water from such a well mentioned in Halachah 30 and 31 are Rabbinic in origin. When our Sages instituted these restrictions, they considered the difficulties that might be caused to the festive pilgrims and did not impose them in regard to their animals.
[The above applies] even [were such a structure to be built] in a valley where there is no well, for there is a wall on each side of each corner [of the enclosure]. Even if many people pass through the enclosure, the walls are not considered to have been nullified.128Eruvin 22a explains that even if a public thoroughfare passes through such a structure, it is still considered to be a private domain, because it has the abovementioned walls. Note the statements of the Baal HaHashlamah, who differs with the Rambam's ruling.[Instead, the enclosure] is considered to be like a courtyard through which many people pass. [All agree that] a person who throws [an object] into [such a courtyard] is liable.129See Halachah 18.If there is a well located within such an enclosure, [our Sages relaxed some of their restrictions and] permitted drawing water for an animal.", + "When one end of a courtyard enters between the walls of the abovementioned enclosure, it is permitted to carry from [the courtyard] into the enclosure and from the enclosure into [the courtyard].130For it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another. Since there are no people dwelling in the enclosure, an eruv is not required (Rashi, Eruvin 20a). When [portions of] two courtyards enter between the walls of the abovementioned enclosure, it is forbidden to carry [from the enclosure to the courtyards and from the courtyard to the enclosure] unless an eruv is made.131Since people from two different courtyards are using the area, an eruv is required. Nevertheless, once an eruv is made, there is no difficulty in carrying from the courtyards to the enclosure. Although there is an opinion (Eruvin 20a) that forbids carrying in such a situation even when an eruv has been made, it is not accepted as halachah.
Rashi (loc. cit.) explains that the two courtyards must enter between the same walls of the enclosure and share a common divider. The eruv must be placed in an opening in this divider. If, however, the courtyards are on opposite sides of the enclosure, the eruv is not effective. Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that there is no indication of such a restriction in the Rambam's words.

If the well dries up on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to carry between the walls [of the enclosure].132We do not say that since it was permitted to carry in the enclosure for a portion of the Sabbath, we are able to continue carrying within (Rashi, loc. cit.). [Our Sages133According to the Torah itself, however, the enclosure is a private domain, as reflected in the previous halachah.] considered these walls to be an acceptable enclosure to allow [people] to carry within, only because of the water. If the well begins to flow with water on the Sabbath,134From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that this leniency applies regardless of whether the well had dried up on the Sabbath or was dry even before the Sabbath commenced. If it begins to flow with water, one may carry within the enclosure. Note, however, Rashi (loc. cit.) and the Baal HaHashlamah, who maintain that the leniency applies only when originally there was water in the well at the commencement of the Sabbath. Since the walls of the enclosure were not considered to be an acceptable partition at the commencement of the Sabbath, they cannot become acceptable on that Sabbath. it is permitted to carry within [the enclosure], for an enclosure that is established on the Sabbath is an [acceptable] enclosure.135See Chapter 16, Halachah 22.
When the beam or pole [used to permit people to carry within] a lane is removed on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to carry within,136In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 9:3), the Rambam differentiates between this instance and others (e.g., Chapter 16, Halachah 13), where, since permission is granted to carry within an area at the commencement of the Sabbath, that permission is continued throughout the Sabbath. These leniencies are granted when the difficulties arise because of the restrictions involved in making an eruv.
A more stringent ruling is applied in this situation, because if the pole or beam is removed, it is as if the area is open entirely. The difficulty is not in the status of the people within the enclosure, but in the enclosure itself. It no longer fits the standards required by the Sages.
even if it opens up to a carmelit.137And there is thus no possibility of one of the Torah's prohibitions being violated. Nevertheless, carrying in such a lane is forbidden because of Rabbinic decree.", + "When an excedra138A Greek architectural structure with three (and sometimes two) walls and a roof with an aperture for sunlight in the center. Often translated as \"a porch.\" is constructed in an open area, it is permitted to carry within its entire space although it has only three walls and a roof.139Generally, as reflected by his statements in Halachah 2, the Rambam prohibits carrying in a structure with only three walls unless an additional measure is taken - e.g., the construction of a pole or a beam. In this instance, as he explains, that function is served by the edge of the roof, which is considered to descend and form the fourth wall. (See Chapter 16, Halachah 7.) We consider it to be as though the edge of the roof descends and closes off the fourth side.140Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 361:2), which states that this applies even when the opening is more than ten cubits wide. See also the Maggid Mishneh, who mentions that there are opinions that require a portion of the wall to remain at either corner for this principle to apply.
Note also the Ramah (Orach Chayim 361:2), who applies the principle, \"the edge of the roof is considered to descend,\" even with regard to a structure of two walls, provided the walls are built as an L.
A person who throws an article into it from the public domain is not liable.141The Ra'avad and others object to this ruling, for as mentioned in the notes on Halachot 2 and 9, they maintain that a structure with three walls is considered to be a private domain according to the Torah. It is as if one throws an article into a closed lane that possesses a roof.
When the corner of a house or a courtyard is broken and an opening of ten cubits is created, it is forbidden to carry within it at all. Although [generally] whenever an opening is ten cubits or less we consider it to be an entrance,142See Chapter 16, Halachah 16. [no leniency is granted in this instance, because] an entrance is not made in a corner.143See Chapter 16, Halachah 20.
Should there be a board extending across the length of the opening, it is considered as if it descends and closes the opening.144I.e., were there to be a beam of the roof of the house extending over the portion that was open, we can apply the principle stated in the above portion of the halachah, \"the edge of the roof is considered to descend,\" and on this basis allow one to carry within. Thus, it is permitted to carry within the entire area. [This leniency applies] provided [the beams] are not [constructed at] an angle.145This clause - which significantly is lacking in some authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah - has created discussion among the commentaries. In his commentary on Eruvin 94a, Rashi explains that the word \"angle\" mentioned in the Talmud refers to roofs which, like most of the roofs in Europe, descend at a slant. When a roof is flat, the principle \"the edge of the roof is considered to descend\" applies. If the roof descends at an angle, the principle does not. This interpretation is quoted by Rav Yosef Karo, both in his Kessef Mishneh and in his Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) as a different interpretation than that of the Rambam.
The Rambam's conception is clearly expressed in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 9:3), where he interprets the term \"angle\" to mean that the beams of the roof were built on a slant, as in the accompanying diagram. Since the beams do not end in the place where the opening was made - but were rather broken off abruptly - the principle \"the edge of the roof is considered to descend\" does not apply.
", + "The term \"fingerbreadth\" when used as a measurement, universally refers to the width of a thumb.146This measure is not particularly relevant with regard to the laws of the Sabbath. Nevertheless, it is mentioned here, because the measures of a handbreadth and a cubit, which are extremely relevant, are dependent on it. See Hilchot Sefer Torah 9:9, which defines a fingerbreadth as the length of two barley corns. In modern measure, it is 2 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 2.4 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish. A handbreadth is the size of four fingerbreadths.147Thus, 8 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 9.6 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish. Whenever the term \"cubit\" is used whether with regard to the laws of the Sabbath, a sukkah, or the prohibition of growing mixed species, it refers to a cubit of six handbreadths.148Note Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:6, which explains that some of the cubits used for the altar's dimensions contained only five handbreadths.
There are times when we measure a cubit as six handbreadths pressed one to the other, and other occasions when we consider the handbreadths as amply spaced one from the other.149I.e., when a more stringent approach would call for a larger measure, it is the larger measure that is required. When a more stringent approach would call for a smaller measure, it is the smaller measure that is required.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that the difference between these two measurements is half a fingerbreadth.
In both instances, the intent is that this lead to a more stringent ruling.
For example, the length of a lane [is required to be a minimum of] four cubits. These are measured in amply spaced cubits. The height [of a lane may not exceed] twenty cubits. These are measured in constricted cubits. Similarly, the length of an opening [may not exceed] ten cubits. These are measured in constricted cubits. Similar principles apply regarding the laws of a sukkah and the prohibition of growing mixed species." + ], + [ + "A person who transfers an article from a private domain into the public domain, or from the public domain into the private domain is not liable,1All the authorities agree that a person is not liable until he transfers an amount of a substance large enough to be of benefit to a person, and that it is forbidden to transfer any article regardless of its size. The commentaries question, however, whether transferring less than a beneficial amount is forbidden according to Torah law or whether the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin.
Liability for most of the prohibitions of the Torah is associated with a specific measure (שיעור). For example, with regard to the majority of the prohibitions against eating forbidden foods, one is liable only if one eats a k'zayit (a measure of food the size of an olive). Should one eat less than that amount (חצי שיעור), one is considered to have transgressed the Torah's commandment. Nevertheless, one is not liable for punishment. (See Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 3:6, 7:15.)
The Mishneh LaMelech states that this same principle applies with regard to transferring objects on the Sabbath. Although one is liable only for transferring a beneficial amount, transferring any amount is forbidden by the Torah itself.
Note, however, Totza'ot Chayim (8) and others, who explain that according to the Rambam, there is no concept of חצי שיע ור with regard to the prohibition against work on the Sabbath. On the Sabbath, a person is liable only for performing מלאכת מחשבת, \"purposeful work.\" If an activity is not in itself beneficial, it does not serve a purpose. Therefore, it is not forbidden by the Torah on the Sabbath.
Kinat Eliyahu notes that in Halachah 23, the Rambam states that \"A person who transfers half of the prescribed measure [of a substance] is not liable.\" According to the principles the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the term \"is not liable\" (פטור) indicates that the prohibition was instituted by our Sages. Significantly, in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, loc. cit., and in other places where the Rambam discusses this issue, he uses the term אסור, \"forbidden.\" Thus the use of the term פטור in regard to the Sabbath laws clearly indicates a difference. See also S'dei Chemed, Klallim, Ma'areches Chatzi Shiur.
unless he transfers an amount that will be beneficial [to accomplish a purpose].2See Chapter 12, Halachah 9, and notes. The following are the minimum amounts for which one is liable for transferring:3In this and in the following halachot, the Rambam proceeds to list the minimum amounts for which one is liable for transferring particular substances. As explained in Halachot 20-21, this applies when one transfers an object without any specific intent. If, however, one intends to use the article one transfers for a specific purpose, one is liable for transferring even a smaller amount.
Human food, the size of a dried fig.4As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 8, Halachah 5, he considers a dried fig to be one-third the size of an egg. (As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, there are differing opinions regarding this measure.) Eating a smaller amount of food would not be significant at all. Therefore, one is not liable. This quantity may include a combination of [different types of foods],5I.e., it is not that one must transfer an amount equal to the size of a dried fig from one particular type of food. Even if one transfers this amount from a combination of different foods, one is liable. provided the amount of food itself is the size of a dried fig. The shells, the seeds, the stems, the chaff, and the bran are not included [in this measure].6For they are not food.", + "[The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring] wine is a quarter of a revi'it;7Shabbat 8:1 states \"wine, enough to mix a cup.\" In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that a cup refers to the cup over which the grace after meals was recited, which must contain a revi'it. The wines of the Talmudic period were stronger, and it was customary to mix three portions of water to every portion of wine. if it has congealed, a k'zayit. For the milk of a kosher animal, a gulp.8Tosafot 76b defines this as מלא לוגמיו, \"a cheekful.\" The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that a smaller measure is intended. For non-kosher milk, enough to apply to one eye. For a woman's milk and egg-white, enough to put in an ointment. For oil, enough to anoint the the small toe of a newborn infant.
Dew, enough to serve as a base for an eye ointment.9The popular translation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.) mentions \"river water\" instead of \"dew.\" Rav Kapach explains, however, that this is an erroneous translation of the Arabic, and there, too, the Rambam's intent is \"dew.\" An eye ointment, enough to be mixed with water [and be applied to an eye]. Water, enough for washing the surface of a mortar.10Rav Moshe Cohen objects to the fact that the Rambam mentioned a measure that is not spoken of in the Babylonian Talmud. The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam's source is in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 8:1), which he favors in this instance, because there is a difference of opinion on this matter in the Babylonian Talmud. Honey,11This represents somewhat of a new concept, because generally the Sages followed the principle (Shabbat 78a) that whenever an object has both an uncommon use and a common use, we follow the more lenient measure. For this reason, kosher milk, although just as beneficial as an eyewash as non-kosher milk, is considered to be a food. Accordingly, it is given a more lenient measure.
If so, the fact that honey is considered to be a salve instead of food raises questions. The Talmud, however, explains that since honey is also very commonly used as a salve, there is no difficulty.
enough to apply to a wound.12In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:8), the Rambam interprets this is as sores that come from improper amputations. (Note Rav Kapach's translation, which differs slightly from the standard text.) Blood, all other liquids, and all sewage water,13This is useful for mixing clay for building (Shabbat 78a). a revi'it.", + "[The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring] straw from grain is a cow's mouthful.14This is the most common use for this substance. Straw from beans, a camel's mouthful.15A larger measure than stated previously. Bean straw is harder than grain straw and is therefore given to camels, who have stronger jaws and larger mouths. If, however, one transfers bean straw with the expressed purpose of feeding it to a cow, one is liable for transferring a cow's mouthful.16This reflects a general principle applicable with regard to the minimum measures for which one is liable for transferring: When a person has an individual desire for an object that makes it beneficial for him, he is liable even though most people would not use that object for that purpose. (See Halachah 20.) Eating that involves difficulty is still considered to be eating. Straws from the ears of grain,17This refers to softer straw that need not be chewed as forcefully as the straw from grain mentioned at the beginning of the halachah ( Tiferet Yisrael, Shabbat 7:4). Hence, it is suitable for smaller animals with smaller and less-powerful mouths. a lamb's mouthful.18A lamb's mouthful is equal to the size of a dried fig. Nevertheless, our Sages speak in terms of a lamb so that we will understand the motivating principle for this measure (Tosafot, Shabbat 76a). Grass, a kid's mouthful.19This is the smallest measure in this halachah.
Leaves of garlic and leaves of onion20I.e., the leaves that sprout above ground (Tosefot Yom Tov, Shabbat 7:4). when fresh are considered to be human food. Hence, their measure is the size of a dried fig. When they are dry, their measure is a kid's mouthful.
[Should one take out a combination of these substances,] their amounts should not be combined to hold one liable according to the more stringent measure. They should, however, be combined to hold one liable according to the more lenient measure. What is implied? When a person takes out both straw from grain and straw from beans, if the amount he takes out is enough to fill a cow's mouth, he is not liable.21Since the cow will not normally eat the bean straw, the amount of straw the person has taken out is not beneficial. Hence, he is not l iable. If it is enough to fill a camel's mouth, he is liable.22For the camel will eat the grain straw. Thus, the person has taken out an amount of fodder that will be beneficial. The same applies regarding all similar dimensions of the Sabbath laws.", + "[The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring] wood is the amount necessary to cook a portion of a chicken's egg23This is the food that requires the least heat to cook (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 8:5). the size of a dried fig, when the egg is beaten and mixed with oil24The egg will then cook faster. Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.). and placed in a pot.25In the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), he mentions that the pot is already preheated, so that the wood must produce sufficient heat to cook the egg alone, and not to warm the pot as well.
A person who transfers a reed is liable when it is large enough to make a pen26In the Talmudic era, it was common for the point of a reed to be sharpened to serve as a pen in a manner similar to a quill. that reaches to the top of his fingers. If, however, the reed is thick or crushed, [and thus is unfit for use as a pen,] the measure [for which one is liable] is the same as for wood.27I.e., the amount to cook a portion of an egg, as mentioned in the beginning of the halachah.", + "[The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring] spices is the amount necessary to spice an egg. [Different] spices can be combined [to make up this measure].28The rationale is that all spices serve a similar purpose (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 9:5).
Pepper,29Rashi (Shabbat 90a) explains that this does not refer to the species of pepper used as a spice (for if so, there is no reason to differentiate between it and other spices), but rather to a different species, which is used as a breath freshener. even the slightest amount. Pine sap,30See the notes on Chapter 5, Halachah 10, regarding our translation of the name of this substance. even the slightest amount.31Rashi (Shabbat 90a) states that this was used as a remedy for headaches. Even the slightest amount was beneficial. A substance with a pleasant fragrance, even the slightest amount.32For people will appreciate its fragrance. A substance with an unpleasant fragrance, even the slightest amount.33For people will appreciate the removal of an unpleasant odor. Rashi (Shabbat 90a) offers a different interpretation. Perfumes, even the slightest amount. Fine purpled dye,34This also has a pleasant fragrance (Rashi). even the slightest amount. Rosebuds, one.
Pieces from utensils made from hard metal35Our translation follows the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:6), which notes that these metals are mentioned in connection with spices and explains that this refers to parts of a utensil used for crushing spices. Even a small portion of metal is beneficial, because it can be fashioned into a needle or pin. - e.g., bronze or iron - even the slightest amount. [Chips] from the stones of the altar, or from the earth of the altar,36See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:15. [pieces] of decayed scrolls or their wrapping cloths,37See Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:3-4. even the slightest amount, for [these articles] are [required to be] entombed.38As mentioned in the sources cited in the previous two notes, we are obligated to show respect for even the slightest piece of any of these articles and entomb them, rather than allow them to be discarded as trash. Accordingly, even the smallest amount is considered significant. Hence, one is liable for transferring it on the Sabbath.
A coal, even the slightest amount.39For it may be used for cooking, or kindling a fire. A person who transfers a flame is not liable.40Beitzah 39a explains that a flame has no substance. Hence, one is not liable. This applies, however, only when the person carries only a flame and not the coal, or the piece of wood that is burning.", + "A person who transfers seeds of garden plants41In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:7), the Rambam interprets this as referring to carrot seeds, turnip seeds, or onion seeds. (We have used Rav Kapach's translation which differs slightly from the standard text.) that are not fit for human consumption42Were the seeds fit for human consumption, the minimum measure for which one would be liable would be the size of a dried fig. We assume that the primary reason for which a person would transfer seeds is to serve as food. Since these seeds, by contrast, are not fit for human consumption, they are given a smaller measure.
Rashi (Shabbat 90a) differs and explains that this law applies even to seeds that are fit for human consumption. Although these seeds are also fit to be eaten, a person usually takes them out with the intent of sowing them.
is liable for [transferring] a measure that is almost the size of a dried fig.43Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), where he interprets the Mishnaic phrase, פחות מכגר��גרת in this fashion. Note the Mayim Chayim, which interprets this as referring to a k'zayit. [A person is liable for transferring] two cucumber seeds, two gourd seeds, and five Egyptian bean seeds.44Since these seeds were more valuable than those of most garden vegetables, they were assigned a smaller measure.
[A person who] transfers coarse bran [is liable for transferring a quantity] fit to place on the opening of the crucible of a gold refiner.45In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4), the Rambam explains that bran is placed on the opening of the crucible during the smelting process. Rav Kapach explains (based on his experience as a jeweler) that the bran is intended to burn, and in that process to clear away impurities that cloud the smelter's vision. [The measure for which a person is liable for transferring] fine bran [depends on his intent]: If [he intends to use the bran as] food [for humans], the measure is the size of a dried fig. As food for animals, a kid's mouthful. For paint, enough to paint a small cloth.
The buds of shrubs46Which grow in vineyards. Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shvi'it 7:5). and carobs that have not yet become sweet, the size of a dried fig. After they become sweet, a mouthful of a kid. In contrast, luf,47In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe'ah 6:10), the Rambam defines luf as a sub-species of onion. mustard, turmos,48A species of beans.and all other foods that are pickled, whether they have become sweet or not, [the measure for which one is liable is] the size of a dried fig.49The commentaries note that although the Rambam's statements are based on the Tosefta, Shabbat 9:8, they are problematic, for there is another Tosefta (Ma'aser Sheni 1:13) that appears to be a direct contradiction. The difficulty is intensified by the fact that the Rambam also quotes the latter Tosefta in Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 7:8. It is possible, however, to explain the contradiction based on the possibility that in our halachah, the word ימתיקו, translated as \"become sweet,\" is a euphemism and means \"become bitter.\" See also Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:14 and Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:6, where the Rambam mentions similar subjects, and the Responsa of the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1425) and the Merkevet HaMishneh, who offer possible resolutions.", + "[When a person] transfers seeds50Shabbat 90b quotes a similar, but slightly different passage from the Tosefta. We can assume that the Rambam's text of that passage differed from the one in our text of the Talmud. to eat, [he is liable for transferring] five. [If his intent] is to use them as fuel, they are considered to be wood.51The amount necessary to cook an egg, as mentioned in Halachah 4. For counting,52The seeds were used as a primitive calculator. Rashi (Shabbat 90b) explains that when transactions were made, a seed was used as a symbol for a gold coin. two, for sowing, two.
[Similarly, the measure for which a person is liable for transferring] hyssop [depends on his intent]. If [his intent] is for human consumption, he is liable for [an amount equal to] the size of a dried fig. For animal consumption, a kid's mouthful. For fuel, the measure of wood; for sprinkling,53I.e., to use in the purification process of a metzora or a person who came into contact with a human corpse. (See Leviticus 14:6 and Numbers 19:18.) the measure acceptable for sprinkling.", + "[A person who] transfers nut shells, pomegranate shells, isatis,54Isatis is a substance which produces an indigo dye. Similarly, nut shells and pomegranate shells are used to produce dyes. pu'ah,55A root that produces a red dye. and other dyes [is liable for transferring a quantity] that is sufficient to dye a small garment - e.g.,56This represents a difference between the Rambam's interpretation of Shabbat 9:5 and that of other commentaries, including Rashi and Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro. Instead of stating בגד קטן כסבכה, as in the Rambam's version of the Mishnah, the text quoted by the latter authorities states בגד קטן בסבכה, \"a small cloth in the hairnet,\" referring not to the entire hairnet, but to one cloth within it. the hairnet young girls place on their heads.
Similarly, one who transfers urine that is forty days old,57Note Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 9:37, which states that aged urine is one of the cleansing agents used to determine whether a stain is blood or not. Alexandrian niter, soap, cimonia, ashlag,58These are also cleansing agents and are mentioned in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah (loc. cit.). and all other cleansing agents [is liable for transferring] the amount necessary to wash a small garment - e.g., the hairnet young girls place on their heads.
A person who transfers herbs that are soaking [is liable for transferring] an amount sufficient to dye a sample for a weaver.", + "A person who transfers ink on a quill [is liable for transferring] a measure sufficient to write two letters.59The Mishnah (Shabbat 8:3) states that one is liable for transferring an amount of ink sufficient to write two letters. The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) states that one is not liable unless one transfers this amount of ink while it is on the pen. Otherwise, there is a doubt (as reflected in the following clause), for it is difficult for all the ink that is in an inkwell to be picked up by a pen. If, however, a person removes [the dried concentrate used to make] ink or ink in an inkwell, a larger amount is necessary [for him to be liable], i.e., the amount necessary for a person to dip a pen in and write two letters.
If [a person transfers] enough [ink] to write one letter in an inkwell and enough [ink] to write one letter on a quill or enough dry ink to write one letter and enough ink to write one letter on a quill, there is a doubt whether he is liable or not.60The person is not liable for transferring the quill or the inkwell, for they are considered secondary to the ink. As the Rambam states in Halachah 28, when a person transfers a measure for which he is not liable in a utensil, he is not liable for transferring the utensil, since it is considered secondary to its contents.
[When a person takes out enough ink to write] two letters and writes them as he is walking, he is liable. Writing them is considered to be placing them down.61The hanachah without which one is not liable for transferring. [When a person takes out enough ink to write] one letter and writes and then takes out [enough ink to write] a second letter and writes it, he is not liable.62He is not liable for transferring. He is, however, liable for writing. For [the ink for] the first letter is lacking.63At no one time did he transfer the minimum measure for which he would be held liable, for by the time he transfers the second portion of ink, part of the first portion will have dried. Therefore, he remains exempt (Rashi, Shabbat 80a).", + "[A person who transfers] eye paint, whether for medicinal64כחול, rendered by some translators as \"stibium,\" was reputed to have medicinal properties in addition to its cosmetic qualities. Even if only one of a person's eyes was affected, it would be common for him to apply כחול to that eye alone. Hence, one is liable for transferring the amount necessary to paint one eye. or cosmetic purposes, [is liable for transferring an amount sufficient] to paint one eye.65Rashi, Shabbat 80a, relates that modest women would veil their faces entirely, exposing only one eye to enable them to see. They would, however, paint this eye. In places where [a woman] would not apply eye paint to less than two eyes as a cosmetic practice,66Rashi (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to small villages, where frivolity was not commonplace. Therefore, women would walk outside with their faces uncovered. Hence, if a woman painted her eyes for cosmetic purposes, she would paint both eyes. Note the Ra'avad, who offers a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage. a person who takes out eye paint for cosmetic purposes is not liable unless he takes out a quantity sufficient to paint two eyes.
Tar or sulfur, enough to make a hole.67Rashi (Shabbat 78a) interprets this as referring to a phial of mercury that is sealed closed with these substances. Afterwards, a hole is made in the sulfur or tar with a pin through which the mercury can be poured, but through which it will not spill excessively if the b ottle falls on its side. The Meiri interprets the Talmud as referring to making a seal for a jug of wine. Wax, enough to place on a small hole.68The Maggid Mishneh interprets this as referring to stopping a hole in a wine barrel. Paste, enough to place on a board to catch birds.69In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a board with paste taken into a dovecote on which the fledglings perch and are thus captured. Rashi (Shabbat 80a) interprets this as a board with paste used to catch wild fowl. Fat, enough to grease [a space] the size of a sela70A coin of the Talmudic period with a width of a handbreadth, approximately 8 cm. according to Shiurei Torah. under a cake [in an oven].", + "[A person who transfers] red clay71Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:5), where he emphasizes that the Hebrew אדמה means both \"earth\" and \"red.\" [is liable for transferring an amount] sufficient to make a seal for a letter.72In the Talmudic period, letters were sealed with clay. This refers to a seal like that of a notary placed on a letter to testify to its authenticity.Clay, enough to make the opening of a crucible.73Rav Kapach notes that in this instance the Rambam does not state \"a goldsmith's crucible,\" for crucibles used for smelting other metals need not be as heat-resistant as those used for gold.
Manure or fine sand, enough to fertilize a leek. Coarse sand, enough to mix with a full trowel of lime.74Shabbat 80b relates that plaster is mixed with sand in order to strengthen the structure. Firm clay,75Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4). Rashi (Shabbat 78b) interprets חרסית as \"crushed brick.\" enough to make the opening of a goldsmith's crucible. Hair, enough to mix with clay to make the opening of a goldsmith's crucible.76Shabbat 80b states that hair was mixed with clay when a crucible was fashioned for smelting gold. Lime, enough to apply to a girl's smallest finger.77Shabbat 80b states that lime would be applied to the bodies of young girls, one limb at a time. Rashi states it would make their skin red. Tosafot maintains that it would whiten their skin. Dust or ash, enough to cover the blood of a small bird.78As Leviticus 17:13 states that after a bird or a wild animal is slaughtered, its blood must be covered with earth or ashes. (See Hilchot Shechitah, Chapter 14.) A pebble, enough for an animal to feel if it was thrown at it79For in this way, the pebble will be beneficial in shooing the animal (Shabbat 81a). - i.e., the weight of ten zuzim. A shard, enough to contain a revi'it.", + "[A person who transfers] rope [is liable for transferring an amount] sufficient to make a handle for a container. Reeds,80In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:2), the Rambam gives a more specific definition, mentioning an Arabic term that Rav Kapach identifies as cypress. enough to make a hook to hang a sifter or a sieve.81This is a smaller measure than the amount sufficient to make a handle. Nevertheless, rope would not be used for this purpose, because it is coarse and might damage the utensil (Shabbat 78b). Palm leaves, enough to make a handle for an Egyptian basket. Palm bast, enough to use as a stopper for a small pitcher of wine.82To use as a filter (ibid.). Unprocessed wool, enough to make a ball the size of a nut.
Bone, enough to make a spoon. Glass, to sharpen the point of a weaver's needle or to cut two threads at once.83The Mishnah (Shabbat 8:6) mentions sharpening a needle. The Talmud (Shabbat 81a) mentions cutting threads. Apparently, the Rambam considers the two measures to be identical.", + "[A person] is liable for transferring two hairs from the tail of a horse or of a cow.84Rashi, Shabbat 90b, states that these hairs were used by bird hunters. If he transfers one bristle from a pig's [back],85Rashi (ibid.) states these hairs are used in sewing leather. he is liable. Fibers from a date palm, two. The bark of the date branches, one.86From the Rambam's statements, it appears that his interpretation - a nd perhaps even the wording in his text - of Shabbat 90b was different from Rashi's interpretation of our version of that passage. (See the commentaries of the Meiri and Rabbenu Chanan'el on that passage.)
From cotton, from silk, camel's wool, rabbit's wool, wool from an animal of the sea, or any other fibers that can be spun, enough to spin a thread four handbreadths long.87The Rambam's source appears to be the Tosefta, Shabbat 9:3 which states m'lo hasit kaful which, as mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 10, is equivalent to four handbreadths.
When a person transfers cloth, sack, or leather, the same minimum measurements that apply with regard to the laws of ritual purity also apply with regard to transferring [on the Sabbath]: [The size of] a cloth for which one is liable for transferring] is three [fingerbreadths] by three [fingerbreadths];88See Hilchot Keilim 22:1.) sackcloth,89Fabric made from camel's hair and other fibers that are rough and are therefore generally not used to make garments for humans. four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths]; leather, five [handbreadths] by five [handbreadths].90See Hilchot Keilim 23:3.", + "When a person transfers an animal hide that was not processed at all and is thus soft, the measure [for which he is liable] is enough to wrap a small weight the size of a shekel. When [it is in the first stages of being processed - i.e.,] salt has been applied to it, but not flour and gall-nut juice, the measure [for which one is liable] is enough to make an amulet.91In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:3), the Rambam interprets this as referring to the wrapping in which the amulet was held, and not to the amulet itself. If flour has been applied to it, but not gall-nut juice, the measure is enough to write a bill of divorce upon it. If it has been processed entirely, its measure is five [handbreadths] by five [handbreadths].", + "[A person who transfers] processed parchment92Although at present, the word k'laf is commonly translated as \"parchment,\" the Rambam is referring to a more specific meaning. In Hilchot Tefillin 1:6-8, he differentiates between three types of parchment, stating:
There are three types of parchment: g'vil, k'laf, and duchsustos.
What is implied? The hide of a domesticated or wild animal is taken. F irst, the hair is removed from it. Afterwards, it is salted and then prepared with flour. Then resin and other substances that cause the skin to contract and become harder are applied to it. In this state, it is called g'vil.
After the hair is removed, the hide may be taken and divided in half in the manner known to the parchment processors. Thus, there are two pieces of parchment: a thin one, which is on the side where the hair grew, and a thicker one, on the side of the flesh.
After it has been processed using salt, then flour, and then resin and the like, the portion on the side where the hair grew is called k'laf and the portion on the side of the flesh is called duchsustos.
It is a halachah transmitted to Moses on Mount Sinai that a Torah scroll should be written on g'vil on the side on which the hair had grown. When tefillin are written on k'laf, they should be written on the side of the flesh. When a mezuzah is written on duchsustos, it should be written on the side of the hair.
[is liable for transferring a piece] sufficient for the passage from Shema to uvish'arecha.93This is the shortest passage of the four passages included in the tefillin. In the head-tefillin, each of these passages is written on a separate piece of parchment. Duchsustos, enough to write a mezuzah on it.
Paper, enough to write on it two letters for a customs officer's receipt. These two letters are larger than the letters we [usually write]. A person who transfers a customs officer's receipt is liable even though he has already shown it to the customs officer and has been exempted because of it,94This appears to be the Rambam's interpretation of the statement of the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:2), \"One who transfers a customs officer's receipt is liable.\" Since the Mishnah already stated that a person who transfers a piece of paper large enough to write such a receipt is liable, it goes without saying that a person who transfers an unused receipt is liable. When explicitly telling us that a person is liable for transferring such a receipt, the Mishnah is obviously referring to a receipt that has already been used. See Shabbat 78b. for it will serve forever as proof [of his having paid].
A person who transfers a promissory note that has been paid95Note Shabbat 78b, 79a which discusses the propriety of maintaining possession of such a promissory note. or a paper that has been erased [is liable for transferring] enough to wrap around a small flask of perfume.96Since the paper has already been erased, it is no longer fit for writing. Therefore, it is considered to be suitable for other purposes and requires a larger measurement. If it has a portion of clean paper large enough to write two letters for a custom officer's receipt, he is liable.", + "A person who transfers an animal, a wild beast, or a fowl is liable even if it is alive. A living person, by contrast, is not considered to be a burden.97Shabbat 94a quotes Rabbi Natan as stating, \"A living creature carries itself.\" Although the Sages differ with him, their objections concern animals only, for the latter resist being carried and struggle to free themselves. In contrast, a human being assists in being carried. This is obvious from the fact that it is far easier to carry a living person than the same amount of \"dead weight.\"
It must be emphasized that although there is no prohibition from the Torah against carrying a living person, our Sages forbade this. (See Mishnah Berurah 308:153,154.)
Nevertheless, if he is bound or sick, a person who transfers him is liable.98For in this instance, the person being carried is unable to assist the one carrying him.
A woman may walk her son if he can pick up one foot and place down the other.99I.e., the child must propel himself forward. His mother may not, however, drag him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:41). Note the Mishnah Berurah 308:154, which states that the principle, \"A living being carries itself,\" does not apply to a child unless he is old enough to take steps by himself.", + "A person who transfers a living child with a purse hanging around his neck is liable, because of the purse, for the purse is not considered to be subsidiary to the child.100As reflected in Halachah 28, when a person transfers two articles, one of primary importance and one of secondary importance, whether or not he is liable depends on the article of primary importance. If he would be liable for transferring this article by itself, he is liable. If not, he is not liable. The article of secondary importance is of no significance whatsoever.
When does this apply? When the article of secondary importance is subsidiary to the article of primary importance. If they are, as in the example cited in this halachah, two unrelated objects, the person is liable for transferring the article of secondary importance.
If, however, one transfers an adult who is wearing clothes and rings on his hands, one is not liable, for everything is considered to be subsidiary to him. If, by contrast, his garments were folded [and held] on his shoulder,101They are considered to be separate objects, unrelated to the person who is holding them. a person who carries him is liable.", + "[A person who transfers] a live locust of the smallest size [is liable].102Shabbat 90b states that locusts are often used as playthings for children. Hence, regardless of the locust's size, one is liable.
The Rambam's ruling is quoted from the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:7), which also mentions two opinions: One that maintains that this applies only to a kosher locust, and that of Rabbi Yehudah, which states that it applies to all locusts, whether kosher or nonkosher. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that the halachah does not follow Rabbi Yehudah's opinion.
From the fact that the Rambam does not mention whether the locust must be kosher or not in this halachah, the Merkevet HaMishneh concludes that he has reversed his opinion and accepts Rav Yehudah's view. Others differ and maintain that this is clarified by the second clause, which mentions \"[an amount] the size of a dried fig\" - i.e., the measure applying to food. Just as the second clause applies only to kosher locusts, so too, does the first clause.
If it is dead, [he is liable for transferring an amount] the size of a dried fig.103As mentioned in the previous note, this is the minimum measurement for food. [For transferring] \"a bird of the vineyards,\"104In Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:21 the Rambam (as does Rabbenu Chanan'el and the Aruch) defines this as a species of kosher locusts. Others define it as a bird. [one is liable for transferring] even the smallest amount, regardless of whether it is alive or dead, since it is preserved for medicinal105Shabbat 10:1 states that one is liable for transferring even the slightest amount of any substance that is retained for its medicinal purposes. purposes.106According to Shabbat 90b, partaking of such a creature enhances one's intellectual capacities. The same applies in all similar cases.
The minimum measure for which one is liable for transferring [flesh from] a human corpse, [flesh from] the carcass of an animal, or [flesh from] a dead crawling animal107Shabbat 93b-94a states that Rabbi Shimon exempts a person from liability in this instance, for in contrast to other situations, the person is not removing the impure object because he desires it itself, but because he desires the place to be free of impurity. Hence, this is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, a labor that is not performed for the same purpose for which the labor was performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In the construction of the Sanctuary, articles were transfered because they were, themselves, desired. In contrast, in this instance, the person's intent is to remove impurity. Nevertheless, as the Rambam rules in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, one is liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. is the same as the minimum amount of these substances capable of imparting ritual impurity: From a human corpse108See Hilchot Tum'at Meit 2:1-2. and from an animal carcass,109See Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah 1:1. the size of an olive. From a crawling animal,110More specifically, this refers to the eight species mentioned in Leviticus 11:29- 30. (See Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTum'ah 4:2.) the size of a lentil.", + "If there is exactly an olive-sized portion [of an animal carcass in one place] and a person removes a portion half the size of an olive111In this instance, the phrase \"half the size of an olive\" is not intended to serve as an exact measure. The intent is any measure that will reduce the size of the portion of the animal carcass to less than the size of an olive. The same principles apply to flesh from a human corpse. from it, he is liable. [This decision is rendered,] because his actions are effective in reducing [the amount of impure substance to the extent] that the minimum amount that can convey impurity is no longer present.
If, however, he removes a quantity aproximately half the size of an olive from a quantity that is one and a half times the size of an olive, he is not liable.112For an amount large enough to convey ritual impurity still remains intact. The same principles apply with regard to other sources of impurity.", + "When does [the abovementioned rule,] that a person is liable only when he transfers the minimum of a standard measure of a substance, apply? When the person transfers the substance without any specific intent.113Since even the small amount of the substance the person transfers is valuable to him, he has a reason for transferring it. Accordingly, his act is considered to be \"purposeful.\" See the notes to Halachah 1. If, however, a person transfers a [seed] to sow,114The commentaries note that Halachah 6 mentions taking seeds for sowing and mentions specific measures. Among the possible resolutions is that there is ordinarily a measure for seeds as well. This halachah, however, specifically focuses on the exceptions to the general rule, and there are indeed individuals who will sow a single seed in a flower pot (Rav Kapach, Kinat Eliyahu). or a substance for medicinal purposes, to show as an example, or the like,115Note the Mishneh LaMelech, who states that with this statement the Rambam does not intend to negate totally the measures he mentioned previously. For example, if a person transfers food, he is not liable unless it is the size of a dried fig. Even if a particular person desires to eat a smaller amount, that intent is not considered significant, since most people would not appreciate such an amount. In this halachah, the Rambam is stating that in certain instances, as in the examples he mentions, there is a particular intent which requires merely a tiny amount of a substance to be accomplished. In such an instance, the person is liable for transferring an object of this small size. he is liable for the slightest amount.", + "Should a person who stores a substance to use as seed, or to use for medicinal purposes, or a substance to be shown as a sample, [afterwards,] forget the reason for which he stored the substance,116Before the commencement of the Sabbath (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:1). and remove it117On the Sabbath (ibid.). without any specific intent,118I.e., even if he forgot the intent for which he originally stored away the article. he is liable regardless of its size.119By setting the article aside for a specific purpose, the person shows that it is important to him, regardless of its size. Therefore, if he later transfers the article, he is liable (Shabbat 90b, 91a). Another person, by contrast, is not liable [if he transfers this article] unless it is of the prescribed measure.120I.e., the intent a particular individual has for an article is important regarding the measure for which he is liable for transferring that article. It does not affect the status of that article vis-a-vis others.
If after transferring the article [for the intent he originally had], the person throws it into a storeroom, even if it is [set aside] in a distinct place,121As opposed to being mixed together with the other objects in the storeroom. This might be considered to be a sign that it is being saved for a specific purpose. his original intent is considered to have been nullified. Therefore, if he brings in the article afterwards, he is not liable unless it is of the prescribed measure.", + "When an entity is not usually stored away,122In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:3), the Rambam interprets this phrase as excluding an article that is commonplace and easily obtainable. Therefore, it is not stored away. [Note Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro and Rashi (Shabbat 75b), who interpret this as excluding an amount of a substance smaller than the prescribed measure.] nor is it fit to be stored away123In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam explains that this excludes objects that will spoil if stored. - e.g., a woman's menstrual discharge - a person who stores it and then transfers it is liable.124By storing the article in question, the person indicates that he considers it important. Therefore, he is liable for transferring it. Other people, by contrast, are exempt for [transferring] such an article, for [in general] one is not liable unless one transfers an article that is fit to be stored and that people generally store.", + "A person who transfers half125The intent is any amount less than the full measure. of the prescribed measure [of a substance] is not liable.126See the notes on the first halachah of this chapter which discuss whether the prohibition against this activity stems from the Torah itself or is Rabbinic in origin. As mentioned there, according to the principles the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the word פטור indicates that the prohibition was instituted by our Sages. Similarly, a person who performs half the measure of any of the other [forbidden] labors is not liable.
If a person transfers half of the prescribed measure [of a substance], places it down, and then returns and transfers the second half, he is liable.127For he has transferred a full measure of the article in question. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, it is clear from the following halachah that this refers to actions performed in a single period of unawareness. If, however, he picks up the first half before he places down the second half, it is as if [the first half] were burned,128Since a full measure of the entity in question was never transferred into the second domain and placed down there at a single time, the person is not liable. and he is not liable.
When a person transfers half of the prescribed measure [of a substance], places it down, and then returns and transfers the second half, passing it over the first [half without placing it on the ground], he is liable [if the second half] is [held] within three handbreadths of the first half.129Based on the principle of l'vud, an article held within three handbreadths of a second article is considered as having been placed down on that article, as implied by Chapter 13, Halachah 6. Therefore, the two half-measures of the substance in question are considered to have been placed down in the same place. Hence, the person who placed them down is liable. See the commentary of Rabbenu Chananel to Shabbat 80a. [The rationale is] that transferring is considered equivalent to placing the object down on a substance.
If, by contrast, he throws the second half,130Even if it passes within three handbreadths of the ground, as long as it does not come to rest even momentarily (see Chapter 13, Halachah 16, and notes). he is not liable unless it comes to rest on a substance [within the domain where the first half was placed].131As mentioned in the notes on the halachah cited above, it would appear that the object would have to come to rest on a substance four handbreadths by four handbreadths, or come to rest within three handbreadths of the ground.", + "[When a person] transfers half the prescribed measure [of a substance], and afterwards transfers another half of the prescribed measure [of that substance] to the same domain in a single period of unawareness, he is liable.132One is liable to bring a sin offering for performing a forbidden labor only if one performed the labor without intent to violate the Torah's commandments. Furthermore, if in the midst of one's performance of a forbidden activity, one becomes conscious of the prohibition involved, even if one loses awareness immediately afterwards and completes the measure of forbidden activity without the desire to violate the law, one is not liable. (See Hilchot Shegagot 6:8.)
[Different rules apply if] he transfers [the two half-measures] to two different domains. If there is a domain into which one would be liable [for transferring an article interposed] between [the two domains], one is not liable [for transferring these two halves].133As long as the two half-measures were taken from the same original domain and placed down together in the same domain, they can be combined. If, however, a totally separate domain interposes between them, the two actions cannot be considered to be complementary. If there is a carmelit between them, they are considered to be a single domain,134For according to the Torah, a carmelit is considered to be a makom patur. (See the notes on Chapter 14, Halachah 1). Hence, it is not considered to be an interruption between the two domains. and [the person who transfers the two half-measures] is liable to bring a sin offering.135The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:11. (See the gloss of the Lechem Mishneh on that halachah.)", + "When a person transfers less than the prescribed measure [of a substance], but before he places it down, [the substance] swells in size and reaches the prescribed measure [he is not liable].136As explained in Chapter 13, Halachah 5, the forbidden labor of transferring involves removing an article from one domain and placing it down in another domain. A sin offering is not required unless both activities are performed in a forbidden manner. Similarly, one is not liable if one transfers more than the prescribed measure [of a substance], but before he places it down [the substance] diminishes in size and becomes less than the prescribed measure.", + "[The following rule applies when] a person transfers a portion [of a food] the size of a dried fig with the intent of eating it,137Thus the akirah (removal) of the article is performed when the article is of sufficient size to incur liability (Halachah 1). but before he places it down it diminishes in size: If he [reconsiders and] decides to use it to sow, or for medicinal purposes,138In which case, he is liable, regardless of the size of the article (Halachah 20). he is liable, because of the intent he had at the time he placed it down.139Since at the time of both the removal and the placing down (hanachah) of the substance, its size was sufficient to incur liability according to the intent which the person had in mind, he is liable. The fact that he experienced a change of mind in the interim is not of consequence.
If a person transfers [a quantity of seeds] smaller than the size of a dried fig with the intent of sowing them, but before he places them down, changes his mind and decides to eat them, he is not liable.140For at the time he placed the object down, it was not of sufficient size to incur liability. If [the seeds] swell in size before they are placed down and reach the size of a dried fig before141Based on the following halachah, it is clear that the increase in the seed's size must take place before the person's change of mind. he changes his mind [and decides to] eat them, he is liable.142For at the time the article was removed from its original place and it the time it was placed down, it was of sufficient size to incur liability. Even if he had not change his mind, he would still have been liable because of his original intent.", + "When a person transfers a portion [of a food] the size of a dried fig with the intent of eating it, it diminishes in size, and then it swells [to the size of a dried fig] again before it is placed down, there is a question [whether he is liable or not]: [Does the fact that in the interim, it was not of sufficient size for its transfer to incur liability cause that liability] to be deferred [forever] or not?143The question of the Rambam (based on Shabbat 91b) is whether the fact that the object was too small for its transfer to incur liability in the time between its akirah and its hanachah causes these actions to be considered as unconnected or not.
Note the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Hilchot Sh'ar Avot HaTum'ah 4:13, which quotes the distinction made by Rav Yitzchak Korcus between that halachah and the present one.

When a person throws a portion of the food the size of an olive into a house that is impure144Because of the presence of a corpse or the presence of tzara'at. and by doing so, complements the quantity of food145The Maggid Mishneh questions why the Rambam changes the wording used in the source for this teaching (Shabbat, loc. cit.), which mentions food that is terumah and applies this concept to all foods. The Mishneh LaMelech, however, resolves this difficulty, explaining that according to the Rambam's conception of the laws of ritual impurity (see Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 4:1), there is no difference between terumah and other foods. that was already in the house, causing there to be an amount [of food] the size of an egg [in the impure house], there is a question [whether he is liable or not]: Is he liable for transferring [the portion of] food that is equivalent to the size of an olive, because he completed the measure of food that is significant with regard to the laws of ritual impurity, or is he not liable?146The commentaries cite this passage as a source, teaching that a dried fig is larger than an olive. Ordinarily, a person who transfers an amount of food the size of an olive is not liable. Nevertheless, this instance is different, because of the laws of ritual impurity.
Food cannot impart ritual impurity to other substances unless a portion equivalent to the size of an egg is present. Thus, before the person threw the food into the house, there was not sufficient food there to impart impurity, and the food he threw in completed that measure. Hence, the Rambam (based on Shabbat, loc. cit.) asks whether the fact that the transfer of the food is significant with regard to the laws of ritual impurity is of consequence with regard to the Sabbath laws.
", + "A person who transfers less than the standard measure [of a substance] is not liable even though he transfers it in a container. [The rationale is that] the container is subsidiary [to its contents]; [when the person transfers it,] he is concerned not with the container, but with its contents.147Since the container is desired only because of its function as an accessory for its contents, it is not considered to be an entity in its own right. Unless the person has a desire for it itself, he is not liable for transferring it, regardless of its size. (See Shabbat 93b.)
Likkutei Sichot (Vol. XVII, p. 48, Vol. XIX, p. 193) focuses on the homiletic dimensions of this halachah, interpreting it as an indication of how an object's spiritual qualities are of such primacy that they eclipse totally its material dimensions.

Accordingly, if a person transfers a man who is alive and who is not bound on a bed, he is not liable,148This ruling depends on the principle stated in Halachah 16: \"A living creature carries itself.\" As mentioned in that halachah, this principle does not apply if the person is bound. Since the person would not be liable for carrying the man, he is also not liable for carrying the bed on which he is lying. for the bed is considered to be subsidiary to the man. These principles apply in all similar situations.
A person who transfers a perfumer's box is liable for only a single [sin offering], although it contains many different types [of scents].149Although the box contains several distinct entities, the person is considered to have performed a single forbidden activity. Therefore, he is not liable for a separate sin offering for every article he transfers. [Similarly,] even if he transfers [several items] in his hand,150With this clause, the Rambam indicates that this ruling is not dependent on the principle (see Chapter 12, Halachah 11) that the contents of a box are considered to be a single entity, but on a different rationale. he is liable for only a single sin offering, for [he has performed] a single act of transfer." + ], + [ + "We may not go out [wearing] any weaponry on the Sabbath.1I.e., this prohibition applies to all weaponry. As the Rambam continues, there are instances where carrying such weaponry violates a Torah prohibition, and other instances where the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
This chapter represents a turning point in the structure of this text. From the middle of Chapter 12 onward, the Rambam has delineated the various factors involved in the forbidden labor of transferring articles from one domain to another. In this halachah, he begins speaking of the Rabbinic safeguards associated with this forbidden labor.
[The following rules apply should one] go out [wearing weaponry]: If they are objects that are worn as garments - e.g., a coat of mail, a helmet, or iron boots2Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:2). - one is not liable. If, however, one goes out [carrying]3Even when hanging from one's garments - e.g., a sword in a scabbard attached to one's belt. articles that are not worn as garments - e.g., a spear, a sword, a bow, a round shield4Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:4). Rashi (Shabbat 63a) renders this term as \"a mace.\" or a triangular shield - he is liable.5The Rambam's ruling is based on Shabbat 63a, which mentions a difference of opinion between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer. Our Sages rule that one is liable, while Rabbi Eliezer differs and states that one is not liable for carrying weapons, for they are ornaments, like jewelry.
Our Sages support their position by quoting Isaiah's (2:4) prophecy of the Era of the Redemption, \"And they shall beat their swords into plowshares.... Nation shall not lift up sword against nation....\" Since weaponry will be nullified in that era of ultimate fulfillment, it is a sign that it is not a true and genuine ornament.
The Lechem Mishneh (in his gloss on Hilchot Teshuvah 8:7) notes that there is a slight difficulty with the Rambam's ruling. The Talmud associates the opinion of the Sages (which the Rambam accepts) with the conception that Mashiach's coming will initiate a miraculous world order, and Rabbi Eliezer's ruling with the opinion of Shemuel that \"there is no difference between the present era and the Messianic era except [for the emancipation from] the dominion of [gentile] powers.\" In Hilchot Teshuvah 9:2, and more explicitly in Hilchot Melachim 12:1-2, the Rambam explains Shmuel's position, stating:
One should not entertain the thought that in the Messianic era any element of the natural order will be nullified, or that there will be an innovation in the order of creation. On the contrary, the world will continue according to its pattern.
Nevertheless, this approach does not necessarily contradict the Rambam's rulings here. The Rambam also maintains that war will be nullified in the Messianic era, as he writes (loc. cit. 12:5): \"In that era, there will be neither famine nor war, neither envy nor competition.\" Nevertheless, its nullification will not come because of miracles that defy the natural order, but because of the reasons he continues to mention in that halachah - that \"good will flow in abundance\" and \"'the world will be filled with the knowledge of God' (Isaiah 11:9 .\"
", + "We may not go out wearing a sandal studded with nails to fasten it.6The Ritba (in his gloss on Shabbat 60a) states that these nails were used to fasten the soles of the sandals to the upper portion.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 6:2 (based on Shabbat, loc. cit., and Beitzah 14b)], the Rambam explains that in an era of religious oppression, many Jews gathered together for prayer and study in a hidden place. When they heard a noise outside, they suspected that they had been discovered by their enemies and panicked. In the confusion, hundreds were crushed by these nailed sandals.
Even on festivals, the Sages decreed that we should not go out wearing [such sandals].7Since these are days of public assembly, our Sages felt that wearing these sandals would arouse disturbing memories of the abovementioned incident.
There is a question whether the prohibitions against wearing such sandals apply at present despite the fact that our nailed sandals are made differently from those of Talmudic times. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi quotes this prohibition in his Halachot. Since he mentions only those laws that are relevant in the post-Talmudic era, this inclusion would seem to imply that the prohibition should be followed now as well. Rabbenu Asher differs. Significantly, Rav Yosef Karo does not mention this prohibition in his Shulchan Aruch, nor does the Ramah refer to it in his gloss on that text.

It is permitted to go out wearing a belt with pieces of gold and silver imbedded into it as kings wear, for this is a piece of jewelry, and it is permitted [to wear] all jewelry. [This license is granted] provided [the belt] does not hang loosely, lest it fall in the public domain and one go and bring it.8This reason, that perhaps an article will fall and be carried in the public domain, is mentioned several times throughout this chapter and is relevant to both men and women.", + "A ring that has a seal9As reflected by Esther 3:10 and other sources, in Biblical and Talmudic times men wore signet rings, using the seal to authorize their approval of documents. is considered to be a piece of jewelry for a man, but not for a woman. A ring without a seal, by contrast, is considered to be a piece of jewelry for a woman,10The commentaries draw attention to a problematic statement in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:1), where he states that a ring without a seal is somewhat like, but not exactly, a piece of jewelry for women. but not for a man. Accordingly, a woman who goes out wearing a ring that has a seal and a man who goes out wearing a ring without a seal are liable.11Since these rings are not considered to be jewelry for these individuals, they are considered to be carrying them in the public domain.
Why are they liable? They did not transfer them in an ordinary manner12As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachot 12-14, a person is liable for transferring an article only when he does so in an ordinary fashion. - i.e., it is not an ordinary practice for a man to wear a ring on his finger that is not appropriate for him, nor for a woman to wear a ring on her finger that is not appropriate for her. [Nevertheless,] there are times when a man gives his ring to his wife to hide at home and she places it on her finger while she is walking. Similarly, there are times when a woman gives her ring to her husband to take to a jeweler to fix, and he places it on his finger while he is walking to the jeweler's store. Therefore, [although the rings are not appropriate for the individuals mentioned above, because they do occasionally wear such rings,] they are considered to have transferred them in an ordinary manner. Accordingly, they are liable.", + "Although a ring that does not have a seal is considered to be a piece of jewelry for a woman, a woman should not go out wearing such a ring, lest she take it off in the public domain and show it to her friends, as women often do.13This point is mentioned several times in this chapter as a rationale for restrictions governing women's wearing jewelry in the public domain. If, however, she went out wearing such a ring, she is not liable.14Although all Talmudic authorities prohibit women from wearing jewelry in public on the Sabbath, from the era of the Geonim onward, and particularly in the Ashkenazic community, it has become customary for women to do so. Among the rationales offered by the Rabbis (Tosafot, Shabbat 64b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 303:18) for this leniency are:
a) Today, there is no concept of a true public domain, for there are no places through which 600,000 people pass at one time. Since the restrictions against carrying in a carmelit are only safeguards against carrying in a public domain, it would be improper to impose a safeguard against carrying in a carmelit, for a safeguard is not instituted to protect a safeguard.
[There are several difficulties with this rationale: Firstly, many Rishonim (including the Rambam) do not accept this principle. Furthermore, today many large metropolises are a public domain according to all views.]
b) The socio-economic climate of the age has changed. In the Talmudic period, most women did not have jewelry, nor did they see their friends that often, nor did they have private places in which to socialize. Therefore, there was reason for the concern that jewelry would be taken off and displayed in the public domain. When the above mentioned conditions changed, this suspicion no longer applied, and there was no reason for this stringency.

A man, by contrast, may go out wearing a ring that has a seal, for it is considered to be a piece of jewelry for him and it is not usual practice for a man to show off [his jewelry to others].15Indeed, our Sages never imposed any restrictions on men's carrying in the public domain for this reason. It has, [nevertheless,] become accepted practice for people to go out without wearing any rings at all.", + "A woman who goes out [wearing] a pin with an eye is liable,16Since it has an eye, it is used as a needle for sewing, and therefore is not considered an ornament. Women are liable for transferring them on the Sabbath, because they frequently sew, and often carry needles by sticking them in their clothes. Hence, they are considered to have carried the needle in an ordinary manner. while a man is not liable.17With the exception of a tailor, a man is not liable for carrying a needle stuck in his clothes on the Sabbath, since this is not the ordinary way in which these items are carried.
Our explanation in this and the previous note follows the interpretation of Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham 16). It must be emphasized that the Rambam's rulings in Halachah 21 present a difficulty to this explanation. Rav Kapach offers a resolution to this difficulty by explaining that Halachah 20 refers to a needle which is a symbol of the tailor's trade. Wearing it is not considered to be transferring an article in the ordinary manner. In contrast, the present halachah refers to a functional needle that is carried in a craftsman's garment from time to time.
Significantly, Rashi and other Rishonim interpret Shabbat 62a, the source for this halachah, differently. Their views are given greater emphasis by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:8).
A man who goes out [wearing] a pin without an eye is liable,18Since it is not a piece of jewelry for him. while a woman is not liable, for this is considered to be a piece of jewelry for her.19Shabbat 60a relates that ordinarily these pins would have a gold plate attached to them. The pointed end of the pin would be stuck into her head-covering, and the plate would hang down over her forehead. She is prohibited against wearing it only because of a decree lest she [take it off and] show it to her friends.
The [following] general principles apply: Whenever a person goes out wearing an item that is not considered to be jewelry for him, and it is not [worn as] a garment, he is liable if he transfers it in an ordinary manner.
Whenever a man goes out wearing a piece of jewelry that hangs loosely and could easily fall and thus cause him to bring it through the public domain, and similarly, whenever a woman goes out wearing a piece of jewelry that she is likely to take off and show [to her friends], they are not liable.
Whenever an adornment that is not likely to fall, nor is it likely to be shown to others, [a woman] is permitted to go out [wearing] it. Therefore, she may go out [wearing] a bracelet that is placed on the forearm or [a garter that is placed on] the thigh if it clings tightly to the flesh and will not slip off.20Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:4). As mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 303:15), there are authorities who forbid the wearing of forearm bracelets. These rules apply in other similar situations.", + "A woman should not go out with woolen strands, linen strands, or straps attached to her head lest she remove them when she immerses herself21These threads are tied to the woman's hair. Accordingly, they would be considered to be a חציצה, \"intervening substance,\" and would have to be removed before immersion (see Hilchot Mikvaot 1:12, 2:5). The suspicion is that afterwards, they would be carried in the public domain. and carry them in the public domain.
She should not go out [wearing] a frontlet on her forehead,22In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 6:1 (based on Shabbat 57b), the Rambam describes this as a gold plate extending on the forehead from ear to ear. nor with bangles of gold that hang from the frontlet on her cheeks if they are not sewn together.23In his Commentary on the Mishnah [loc. cit. (according to Rav Kapach's translation), which is based on Shabbat 57b], the Rambam adds \"and are sewn into her head-covering.\" Since a woman is not likely to remove her head-covering entirely when her jewelry is sewn into it, we do not suspect that she will take it off and show it to her friends in the public domain. (See Halachah 10.)
This interpretation (which resolves the question the Ra'avad raises in his gloss on this halachah and which reflects the interpretation of our Sages, Shabbat 57b) presents difficulties, because of the Rambam's final clause, \"It is forbidden to go out [wearing] any of these articles, lest they fall and one carry them by hand.\" Note the commentaries of the Merkevet HaMishneh and the Seder HaMishneh, who address themselves to this difficulty.
Nor may [she go out wearing] a crown of gold on her head,24A golden crown engraved with an impression of the city of Jerusalem. nor with the ankle chains worn by maidens so that they will not take long strides and thus destroy [the signs of] their virginity.
It is forbidden to go out [wearing] any of these articles lest they fall and one carry them by hand.", + "A woman should not go out [wearing] a necklace,25In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:1), the Rambam interprets this as a necklace with golden beads. Rashi (Shabbat 57b, 59b) interprets this as referring to a golden choker necklace. (See the notes on Halachah 4 regarding the Rabbinic opinions regarding wearing jewelry at present.) a nose ring,26Significantly, even in Talmudic times earrings were permitted. Rashi explains that this leniency was granted because earrings are difficult to remove. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 303:8) offers a different rationale: that a woman's head covering would cover her ears as well. Hence, there is no need to worry about her showing the earrings to her friends. a flask of perfume27In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:3), the Rambam mentions that musk would usually be carried. attached to her forearm, a small round pouch28In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions that this pouch was also attractive, being made of gold or silver. in which balsam oil29Balsam oil is renowned for its pleasant fragrance. is placed, referred to as a cochellet.30Significantly, our text of the Mishnah states kovellet, replacing the כ with a ב. The meaning of the term, however, does not change.
Nor should she wear a wig that will give the appearance that she has a full head of hair,31This refers to attractive hair glued to a thin surface and placed on a woman's head (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:5).
Needless to say, in addition to the more inclusive leniencies involving jewelry in general, the nature of wigs and false teeth are different today. Therefore, there is no difficulty in wearing these items in the public domain.
nor a woolen pad that goes around her face,32This pad was placed on a woman's forehead beneath the frontlet of gold (Shabbat 57b) in a manner similar to the woolen pad that the High Priest would wear under his forehead plate (Chulin 138a). Apparently this pad was also attractive and could serve as an ornament in its own right. nor a false tooth, nor a golden crown that she places over a black tooth or a red blemish that she has on her teeth. She may go out with a silver tooth, because this is not obvious.
All these prohibitions were instituted lest {the article fall and [the woman] carry it in her hand or}33This clause is set off by braces, because based on manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah and early printings, it appears to be a printer's addition and not part of the Rambam's original text. According to the Rambam, this suspicion is not relevant with regard to these particular articles. lest she remove it and show it to a friend.", + "Whenever the Sages forbade wearing an item in the public domain, it is forbidden to go out [wearing] that item even in a courtyard for which there is no eruv.34Although the prohibition against carrying in such a courtyard is Rabbinic in origin and there is no possibility of transgressing a Torah prohibition, our Sages imposed the restrictions against carrying there as well. The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is not considered as instituting \"a safeguard for a safeguard.\" Were women allowed to wear these adornments in a courtyard, they would most likely inadvertently proceed into the public domain while wearing them.
The Maggid Mishneh also explains that according to the Rambam, there appears to be no prohibition against women wearing such articles at home. We do not suspect that they will inadvertently go outside while wearing them. Other Rishonim (the Ramban and the Rashba) differ and prohibit wearing ornaments even in one's home. As mentioned above, however, at present it is customary to adopt a more lenient approach regarding the entire issue of wearing jewelry.
An exception is made with regard to a face pad and a wig; permission is granted to go out [wearing] them to a courtyard where there is no eruv so that [the woman] would not appear unattractive to her husband.
A woman who goes out [carrying] an empty flask with no perfume is liable.", + "A woman may go out [wearing] strands of hair that are attached to her head.35In contrast to the strands of wool or linen mentioned in Halachah 6. As the Rambam continues to explain, the reasons the Sages forbade wearing strands from other fabrics do not apply in this instance. Water passes through them and they are therefore not considered to be an interposing substance were she to immerse herself. [Consequently,] she will not remove them. Hence, there is no necessity to prohibit [wearing them lest she remove them] and carry them into the public domain.
This applies regardless of whether [the strands of hair were taken from] the woman's own tresses, those of another woman, or from an animal.36See Shabbat 64b for an explanation why it is necessary to mention all three instances. An elderly woman should not, however, go out [wearing strands of hair from] a young woman, for they are becoming to her, [and we fear that] she might remove them and show them to a friend. A young woman, by contrast, may go out [wearing] strands of hair from an elderly woman.37Based on an alternate interpretation [or perhaps an alternate version] of Shabbat 64b, Rabbenu Asher and others differ and also forbid a young woman from wearing strands of hair from an elderly woman.
Any woven hair-covering may be worn.", + "A woman may go out [wearing] strands38Even of wool and linen. As the Rambam continues to explain, the reasons why it was forbidden to wear strands of these fabrics tied to one's hair do not apply in this instance. [tied around] her neck, because she does not tie them tightly,39It is, however, forbidden for a woman to wear a choker necklace (Maggid Mishneh). and they are therefore not considered to be an interposing substance [with regard to ritual immersion]. If, however, they are colored, she may not go out wearing them, lest she show them to a friend.
A woman may go out wearing a golden diadem, since these are worn only by dignified woman who are not accustomed to removing [their jewelry] and showing them to their friends.40This ruling serves as the basis for some of the lenient opinions mentioned in the notes on Halachah 4, which allow women to wear jewelry in the public domain at present. All our women are dignified and are not accustomed to removing their jewelry and showing it to their friends. A woman may also go out [wearing] a frontlet on her forehead with bangles of gold [that hang from the frontlet], provided they are sewn into her head-covering so that they do not fall.41See Halachah 6 and notes. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "A woman may go out with wadding in her ear42To absorb the fluids it produces (Rashi, Shabbat 64b). provided it is attached to her ear, with wadding in her sandal43To make walking more comfortable (ibid.). provided it is attached to her sandal, and with wadding for her menstrual discharge44As reflected by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:13), this applies only when the woman's intent is that the blood from the discharge will not cause her discomfort when it dries. If her intent is to prevent the discharge from soiling her clothes, it is forbidden. See Halachah 22. even though it is not attached. [The latter rule applies] even if it has a handle. Since it is repulsive, even if it falls, she would not carry it.", + "She may go out with pepper, a grain of salt, or any other substance that is placed in the mouth [to prevent] bad breath. She should not, however, place these substances in her mouth on the Sabbath itself.45I.e., if a woman had such a substance in her mouth before the Sabbath, she may continue holding it in her mouth on the Sabbath. She may not, however, place these substances in her mouth on the Sabbath itself, nor may she return such a substance to her mouth if it falls out.
Based on Chapter 21, Halachah 24, it appears that the restrictions on placing a substance in one's mouth on the Sabbath to prevent bad breath apply only when one will continue carrying those substances in one's mouth outside.

Women may go out [wearing] slivers of wood in their ears,46So that the holes in their pierced ears will not close (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:6). or with bells47Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid. Rashi (Shabbat 65a) and others translate רעולות as \"veiled.\" See the notes on Halachah 18, which discuss the laws regarding wearing bells on the Sabbath. on their necks or garments, and with a cloak fastened with a make-shift button.48Jewish women living in Media would wear a coat with a strap in one of its upper corners. They would place a stone, nut, coin, or the like under the cloak to serve as a makeshift button. The strap would be looped around this button to fasten the cloak closed (Rashi, loc. cit.).
Indeed, a woman may fasten her cloak in this manner using a stone or a nut49The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 303:22) emphasizes that a stone must be set aside for this purpose before the commencement of the Sabbath. Otherwise, it is muktzeh and is forbidden to be moved. on the Sabbath and go out, provided she does not [use this leniency as] a ruse and use a nut for this purpose in order to bring it to her young son. Similarly, she should not fasten her cloak in this manner using a coin,50Even if a coin was set aside for this purpose before the Sabbath, it is still considered to be muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). for it is forbidden to carry it. If her cloak was fastened [using a coin],51Before the commencement of the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). she may go out wearing it.", + "A man may go out to the public domain with a sliver of wood in his teeth52A toothpick. or in his sandal. If, however, it falls, he should not put it back. [He may go out with] wadding or a sponge over a wound,53We are permitted to wear any entity that heals the body on the Sabbath. Such articles are not considered to be a burden, but a garment or jewelry. In Chapter 21, Halachot 26-27, the Rambam discusses whether it is permissible to place wadding or bandages on a wound on the Sabbath. provided he does not wind a cord or a string over them. [The latter restriction applies] because he considers the cord or the string as important and they do not assist [the healing of] the wound.54These restrictions do not apply to a rag, because it is inconsequential. Since a cord or a string is considered somewhat important, it is not considered to be subsidiary to the bandage. Hence, the person is considered to be carrying them in the public domain.
[He may go out with] a garlic peel or an onion peel on a wound, and with a bandage on a wound. He may open and close [the bandage] on the Sabbath. [He may go out with] a compress, a plaster, or a dressing on a wound. [Similarly, one may go out with] a sela55A coin from the Talmudic period. on a footsore, a locust's egg,56A cure for weak thighs (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:10). a fox's tooth,57A cure for both insomnia and hyperactivity (ibid.). a nail from a gallows,58A cure for continuous high fever (ibid.). and any other entity that is hung on a person's body to [bring] a cure, provided that physicians say that it is effective.59This halachah is very problematic for the Rambam. As explained at length in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 11, the Rambam maintains that all occult arts and superstitious practices are not only prohibited, but are absolute nonsense. It would appear that the latter cures mentioned are surely not practical medical advice, but rather a charm stemming from folklore (and perhaps pagan folklore). Indeed, for the latter reason, Rabbi Meir (according to the Rambam's text of Shabbat 6:10, our version states \"the Sages\") forbids the use of these practices even during the week.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1436) compounds our difficulty in understanding the Rambam's view, citing the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Yoma 8:4), which states:
We do not transgress a commandment except for the purpose of healing, [using] an entity that both logic and experience say is necessary, but not to heal through charms, for these are weak matters that have no logical support, nor has experience proven them.
The Radbaz, therefore, maintains that the Rambam is describing a situation where these articles are worn as pendants. Hence, they can be considered equivalent to pieces of jewelry. (See the following halachah with regard to an amulet that has not proved its efficacy.) If, however, they are carried by hand, it is forbidden to go out to the public domain with them on the Sabbath. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:27) does not make such a stipulation and quotes the Rambam's words in this halachah without emendation.
", + "[A woman] may go out with a tekumah60A stone worn by a woman to prevent a miscarriage (Rashi, Shabbat 66b). stone or with the weight of a tekumah stone61A weight equivalent to that of the tekumah stone, which is purported to have a similar positive effect (ibid.)., which was weighed [and carried] with the intent that it serve as a remedy. This applies not only to a pregnant woman, but to all women, [as a safeguard] lest they become pregnant and miscarry.
One may go out [wearing] an amulet that has proven its efficacy. What is an amulet that has proven its efficacy? [An amulet] that has cured three individuals62The Maggid Mishneh states that, in contrast to Rashi's view, according to the Rambam, an amulet that healed one person three times is not considered to have proved its efficacy. or that was prepared by an individual who cured three people with other amulets. If a person goes out wearing an amulet that has not proved its efficacy, he is not liable.63At the outset, however, one is forbidden to go out wearing such an amulet. [The rationale:] he carried it out as a garment.64I.e., the amulet is considered to be an ornament, like a piece of jewelry. Similarly, a person who goes out [wearing] tefillin is not liable.65There is no obligation to wear tefillin on the Sabbath, and we are therefore forbidden to wear them in most circumstances. (See Halachah 23 with regard to the exceptions.) Nevertheless, since they are worn as a garment, a person is not liable for wearing them.", + "A person who has a wound on his foot may go out [wearing] one sandal on his healthy foot. If, however, a person does not have a wound on his foot, he may not go out [wearing] a single sandal.66Rashi (Shabbat 60a) gives two rationales for this ruling:
a) The Jerusalem Talmud states that a person who wears only one shoe will be suspected of carrying the other in his cloak.
b) Wearing one shoe may arouse the attention of others and cause them to mock him. We fear that in such a situation the person will remove the sandal that he is wearing and carry it.
It is questionable whether the Rambam accepts the latter rationale. Although Rashi suggests that it applies with regard to several of the items mentioned in the previous halachot, the Rambam does not mention it - neither in this chapter nor in his Commentary on the Mishnah.

A child67This is the simple interpretation of the word קטן. Note, however, the commentary of Rashi on Shabbat 141b, where he interprets the term as referring to a small adult. Since the obligation of a child is Rabbinic in origin, the Sages would not enforce any further safeguards on his conduct. should not go out [wearing] the sandals of an adult.68The rationale is that the sandal may fall off and the child might carry it in the public domain. He may, however, go out [wearing] the cloak of an adult. A woman should not go out [on the Sabbath], [wearing] a loose-fitting sandal,69Rashi interprets the Talmud (loc. cit.) as referring to a torn sandal. nor [wearing] a new sandal that she did not wear for even a short period of time before [the commencement of the Sabbath].70Lest the sandal prove uncomfortable and the woman carry it.
A one-legged man may not go out [wearing] his wooden leg. We may not go out [wearing] wooden shoes,71Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:8). Shabbat 66b offers three different Aramaic interpretations of this term. These interpretations, in turn, are understood differently by the later commentaries.
In the above source, the Rambam states that since it is uncomfortable to walk in wooden shoes, they are not considered to be garments.
because it is not the ordinary practice to wear them. If, however, one goes out [wearing] them, he is not liable.72For he did not transfer them in an ordinary manner (Merkevet HaMishneh).", + "[A man] may go out [wearing] tufts of flax or a woolen wig worn by men with sores on their heads.73This reflects a fusion of the interpretation by Rav Hai Gaon (and Tosafot) of Shabbat 50a, which understands these substances to be makeshift wigs to cover baldness, and that of Rashi, who explains that these terms refer to wool that is placed on wounds. When does this apply? When he colored them with oil and wound them,74I.e., he performed a deed that indicates that he desires to use the wool as a wig. or he went out [wearing] them [at least] momentarily75If he wore the wool as a wig once before the Sabbath, this indicates that he is willing to use it for this purpose. Otherwise, since most people would not wear a wig of this nature, it is forbidden to wear it on the Sabbath because it is muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:62). before the commencement of the Sabbath. If, however, he did not perform a deed [that indicated his desire to use these articles], nor did he go out [wearing] them before the Sabbath, it is forbidden for him to go out [wearing] them.", + "We may go out [wearing] coarse sackcloth, tent-cloth,76The source for this halachah is Nedarim 55b. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nedarim 7:3), the Rambam defines this term as \"coarsely woven material that is not sown.\"a thick woolen blanket,77Our translation is taken from Rav Kapach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Oholot 11:3). or a coarse wrap78In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nedarim 7:3), the Rambam defines this term as \"a wrap made from an extremely coarse and thick fabric... used for protection from rain.\" [as protection] against rain.79Although these are not proper garments, since they resemble clothing and are useful in protecting one against the rain, they may be worn. We may not, however, go out [wearing] a chest, a container, or a mat, [as protection] against the rain.80In this instance, although the person is seeking protection from the rain, since these are not garments, he is considered to be carrying a burden (Rashi Nedarim, loc. cit.).
When a pillow and a blanket are soft and thin as garments are, one may go out [wearing] them as a wrap on one's head on the Sabbath. When they are firm, they are considered to be burdens and it is forbidden.", + "We may go out with bells woven81If, however, the bells are not woven into the garment, there are restrictions against wearing them, lest they become severed and the person carry them in the public domain. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:21, Mishnah Berurah 301:80.) into our clothes.82Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 301:23), who states that this leniency applies only to bells whose clappers have been removed. Otherwise, it is forbidden to wear them, for jingling a bell is forbidden on the Sabbath. A servant83This refers to an eved Cana'ani - i.e., a servant who has been circumcised and has been immersed in the mikveh, and who has accepted the observance of the Torah's laws. Such a servant is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot incumbent on a woman (Chaggigah 4a). (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 12:11, 13:18.) may go out [wearing] a clay seal84A seal of identification, indicating to whom he belongs. The seal is permitted because it resembles a piece of jewelry. In contrast to a metal seal, the servant is allowed to go out wearing a clay seal, since were it to fall, it would break and would be worthless. around his neck,85But not hanging from his clothes (Maggid Mishneh). but not with a metal seal, lest it fall and he carry it.
[The following rules apply when] a person wraps himself in a tallit86The intent here is not necessarily a prayer shawl, but also a garment worn for mundane purposes as well. We have, nevertheless, merely transliterated the Hebrew term rather than translate it as \"garment,\" to indicate the type of clothing that is under discussion. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:31) specifically states that this restriction does not apply to contemporary garments, because they are of a different type.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:36 and the Mishnah Berurah 301:117 emphasize that even the garments worn at present should not be lifted up extremely high.
and folds it, either [holding the folds] in his hand, or [placing them] on his shoulder: If his intent is that [the ends of the garment] should not tear or become soiled, it is forbidden.87The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not state that the person is liable, for the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. If his intent is for the sake of fashion, since this is the style in which people of his locale wear their clothes, it is permitted.", + "A person who goes out [to the public domain] with a garment that is folded and placed on his shoulders is liable. He may, however, go out with a wrap [folded] around his shoulders even though a thread is not tied to his fingers.88Rashi (Shabbat 147a) explains that tying the string around one's finger will prevent the wrap from falling. We do not fear that the wrap will fall and the person will carry it in the public domain.
The commentaries explain that in contrast to the garment mentioned in the first clause, since it is customary to wear a wrap folded, there is no difficulty in wearing it in this manner on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, in light of the final clause, they require that the wrap be large enough to cover one's head and the majority of one's body.
Although there are more stringent opinions, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:37 and the Mishnah Berurah 301:115 permit the wearing of scarfs that are not this large if it is accepted practice in a community to wear such garments.

Whenever a wrap does not cover [a person's] head and the majority of his body,89The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh explain that this clause refers to a passage from Shabbat 147b which describes a wrap worn by women after a bath. he is forbidden to go out [wearing it]. A cloth that is worn as a head covering90Our translation is based on Rashi, Shabbat 147b. Rav Kapach suggests a different version of that text. Since this cloth is not large enough to cover the person's head and the majority of his body, the only way it may be worn is when one ties it as a belt. that is short and not wide should be tied below one's shoulders. Thus, it will serve as a belt and one will be permitted to go out [wearing] it.", + "It is permitted to wrap oneself in a tallit91This does not refer to a tallit used for prayer, but rather to an ordinary shawl that resembles such a garment. that has unwoven strands92See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 29:1). at its edges, even though they are long and do not enhance the appearance of the tallit, because they are considered to be subsidiary to it. The person [wearing the tallit] does not care whether they exist or not.93Since they are of no consequence to the person whatsoever, they have no halachic importance either. It is as if they did not exist at all. If, however, the person was disturbed by their presence, it would be forbidden.
Based on the above, a person who goes out [wearing] a tallit whose tzitzit are not halachically acceptable is liable. For these strands are important to him and he is concerned with completing what they are lacking, so that they can be considered to be tzitzit.94Since the tzitzit are important to the person, they are not considered to be subsidiary to the garment. Hence, wearing a garment to which they are attached is considered to be carrying a burden.
When, however, the tzitzit are halachically acceptable, it is permitted to go out [wearing this garment] during the day and during the night.95The Rambam elaborates slightly in this instance to negate the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who maintains that it is forbidden to wear tzitzit on Friday night. He explains that since one does not fulfill a mitzvah by wearing tzitzit at night, and yet the tzitzit are important, wearing a garment to which they are attached is equivalent to carrying a burden on the Sabbath.
The Rambam does not accept this rationale, explaining that since the tzitzit are halachically acceptable, they are considered to be an adornment of the garment even when a mitzvah is not fulfilled by wearing them. In one of his responsa, the Rambam deals with this issue at length.
In this context, note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:45, which states that this applies to a man, but not to a woman. For a woman, tzitzit are always considered a burden on the Sabbath. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah, which cites differing views.
Tzitzit that are halachically acceptable are not considered to be a burden, but rather to be an article that enhances the garment and beautifies it. Were the strands of tzitzit that are halachically acceptable to be considered a burden, one would be liable [for wearing such a garment] even on the Sabbath day, since a positive commandment [whose negation] is not [punishable by] karet does not supersede the Sabbath [prohibitions].96The commentaries note a slight difficulty with the Rambam's statements. Although there are only two positive commandments whose observance supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions - circumcision and the offering of the Paschal sacrifice - it is because of a specific divine decree and not because of the fact that they are punishable by karet that these mitzvot supersede the Sabbath laws.", + "A tailor should not go out on the Sabbath with a needle stuck into his clothes, nor a carpenter with a sliver of wood behind his ear,97Used by a carpenter to see if the different pieces of wood are level (Rashi, Shabbat 11b). This and all the other items mentioned are symbols that the various artisans would wear so that people could identify their professions. nor a weaver with wool in his ear, nor a carder of flax with a string around his neck, nor a money-changer with a dinar in his ear, nor a dyer with a sample in his ear.
If one [of these individuals] goes out [wearing such an article], he is not liable. Although this is the usual practice for artisans of this craft, [he is not liable,] because he is not considered to have transferred the article in an ordinary manner.98I.e., since it is not the ordinary practice for most people to carry an article in this fashion, the fact that certain people do carry in this manner is not significant.
It must be noted that this ruling (which follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, Shabbat 11b) appears to contradict the explanation given by Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, to Halachah 5. (See the notes on that halachah.)
", + "A zav99A man with a discharge from his sexual organ resembling that resulting from venereal disease. (See Leviticus, chapter 15; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah, chapter 2.) who goes out with his receptacle is liable, for this is the only way this receptacle is transferred. [He is liable] although he has no need to take out [the receptacle] itself; [he needs it] only to prevent his clothes from being soiled.100As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, it is forbidden to wear an article merely to prevent one's clothes from being soiled. For a person who performs a labor is liable even when he has no need for the actual labor he performed.101See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.", + "What should a man102We have used the word \"man\" in consideration of the ruling of the Magen Avraham 301:53, who states that for a woman, tefillin are always considered to be a burden. (See the Mishnah Berurah 301:158, which cites a differing opinion. do when he finds tefillin in the public domain on the Sabbath?103Halachah 14 states that a person who wears tefillin is not liable - i.e., since tefillin are worn as a garment, he is exempt. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade wearing tefillin, because there is no mitzvah to do so on the Sabbath. They did not, however, apply this prohibition in this instance out of reverence for the sacred articles. Were the tefillin to be left there, they might be treated with disrespect.
The Sha'agat Aryeh (Responsum 41) questions the Rambam's ruling, because - as reflected by Hilchot Tefillin 4:11 - the Rambam maintains that there is a prohibition from the Torah against putting on tefillin when there is no obligation to do so. He resolves that difficulty by stating that the prohibition applies only when one puts them on at an improper time, with the intent of fulfilling a mitzvah. If that is not one's intent, there is no prohibition.
He should wear them in the ordinary fashion, placing the head tefillin on his head and the arm tefillin on his arm, enter a home and remove them there. Afterwards, he should go out, return, put on a second pair, [return to the home,] remove them, and [continue this pattern] until he brings in all [the tefillin].
If there were many pairs of tefillin and there was not enough time to bring them in during the time by wearing them as garments, he should remain [watching] them until [after] nightfall, and bring them in on Saturday night.104Since he will not have time to bring them in until after nightfall, it is preferable to stay there and protect them all rather than bring them in one pair at a time. When, by contrast, there is a possibility of bringing them in before nightfall, the Sages were willing to allow him to leave the remainder of the tefillin unattended briefly, so that he could complete the task earlier. In a time of oppressive decrees,105Shabbat 130a relates that the Romans made the wearing of tefillin punishable by death. when one might fear to linger and watch them until the evening because of the gentiles, he should cover them where they are located, leave them, and proceed [on his way].", + "Should he be afraid to wait until after nightfall because of thieves, he should take the entire group at once and carry them less than four cubits at a time, or he should give them to a colleague [standing within four cubits], who in turn will give them to another colleague106See Chapter 12, Halachah 17, which explains this leniency applies even with regard to one's personal concerns. Surely, it applies with regard to matters associated with a mitzvah. until they reach the courtyard at the extremity of the city.107There, a person in the courtyard should remove the tefillin from the body of the person who was carrying them while he is still walking outside the courtyard. Thus, one person will have performed the akirah (the removal of the article from its original place) and another the hanachah [the placement of the article (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:52)].
When does the above apply? When they are found together with their straps that are tied with the knots with which tefillin are tied, since then they are surely tefillin. If, however, their straps are not tied, one should not pay attention to them.108For the possibility exists that they are merely an amulet (Eruvin 97a).
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's conception of that Talmudic passage and maintains that there is no question concerning the identity of the tefillin, for we do not suspect that a person would make an amulet that resembles tefillin. The difficulty is that if the knots of the tefillin are not tied, it is forbidden to tie them on the Sabbath. Thus, it will be impossible to wear the tefillin on the Sabbath.
The difference between these two views is that, according to the Ra'avad, if one finds tefillin without straps, one is obligated to remain watching them until after nightfall. The Rambam, by contrast, would allow a person to leave them.
The Maggid Mishneh cites a responsum purported to be written by the Rambam to the scholars of Lunil concerning tzitzit, which indicates that he accepted the Ra'avad's position. When citing the law regarding tefillin, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:42) quotes the Rambam's view. The Magen Avraham 301:53 states that even if the Rambam's view would have applied in previous generations, it is not relevant at present, for amulets are not commonly made in the form of tefillin. Therefore, he suggests following the Ra'avad's ruling.
", + "A person who finds a Torah scroll should linger and watch it until after nightfall.109Since a Torah scroll is not usually worn as a covering, the person is not allowed to cover himself with it under ordinary circumstances. Rather, he must linger and protect the scroll until after nightfall. In a time of danger, he may leave it110Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:54 states that one should cover the scroll to protect it. It is questionable why the Rambam makes such a statement with regard to tefillin (Halachah 23), but does not do so in this instance. and go on his way. If rain is descending, one should wrap himself in the parchment,111Although a Torah scroll is not usually worn, and indeed, doing so is not respectful to the scroll, this leniency is granted lest the scroll become ruined.
The Or Sameach questions why the person cannot carry the scroll less than four cubits at a time, as mentioned in the previous halachah. He explains that the problem is transferring the scroll from the public domain to the home. In Chapter 13, Halachah 9, the Rambam states that one should throw an article that one is carrying from the public domain into a courtyard in an abnormal manner. This would be disrespectful to the Torah scroll. Therefore, it is preferable to wear the scroll. With regard to the propriety of wearing parchment as a garment, the Or Sameach cites the use of similar substances, as mentioned in Halachah 17. See also the suggestion of Shulchan Aruch HaRav mentioned in Note 107.
cover it [with one's outer garments], and enter [a home] with it.", + "On Friday, shortly before nightfall, a tailor should not go carrying a needle in his hand,112The Maggid Mishneh cites Shabbat 11b, which, as the Rambam states in Halachah 21, rules that a tailor is not liable for carrying his needle stuck into his clothes. Therefore, forbidding a tailor from wearing his needle on Friday afternoon would be a \"safeguard to a safeguard,\" a Rabbinic decree enforced to insure the observance of another Rabbinic decree. Therefore, the prohibition is directed only at carrying a needle in one's hand. nor should a scribe [go out carrying] his pen, lest he forget and transfer it on the Sabbath.
A person is obligated to check his clothes on Friday before nightfall, lest he forget something in them and [inadvertently] transfer it on the Sabbath.
It is permissible to go out wearing tefillin on Friday shortly before sunset. Since a person is obligated to touch his tefillin at all times,113See Hilchot Tefillin 4:14, which states that the holiness of tefillin surpasses that of the tzitz, the frontlet worn by the High Priest. Hence, they are worthy of such constant attention. there is no possibility that he will forget them. If a person forgets and goes out to the public domain [wearing] tefillin,114Compare to Hilchot Tefillin 4:12, which mentions similar concepts. [when] he remembers the tefillin on his head, he should cover his head115The commentaries state that this is necessary lest others receive the impression that it is permissible to wear tefillin on the Sabbath. until he reaches his home or the house of study." + ], + [ + "It is forbidden to transfer a burden on an animal on the Sabbath, as [Exodus 23:12] states, \"[On the seventh day, you shall cease activity,] and thus your ox and your donkey may rest.\"1We have translated the verse as it appears in the Torah. The standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah include several words that are not included in the original verse. This includes [not only] an ox and a donkey, but all animals, beasts, and fowl.2Bava Kama 54b explains that although the verse mentions only an ox and a donkey, the obligation to rest refers to all animals. \"The Torah referred to common circumstances\" - i.e., since these animals are generally those used for work, they were the ones mentioned specifically.
Although a person is commanded to have [his animals] rest, he is not liable [for causing them to work], for the prohibition is derived from a positive commandment.3I.e., the positive commandment of resting on the Sabbath also implies not having one's beasts perform labor. Therefore, a person who directs his animal [while] it is carrying a burden on the Sabbath is not liable.4See Halachah 6 and notes.", + "Behold, there is [also] an explicit prohibition in the Torah [against working with an animal] as [Exodus 20:10] states: \"Do not do any work on the Sabbath. [This includes] you, your son, your daughter, your servant, your maidservant and your beast.\"5This is the prohibition against working on the Sabbath mentioned in the Ten Commandments.
[This means that one should not perform forbidden labors such as] plowing and the like [together with an animal]. Since this is a prohibition which is punishable by death, [its violation does not incur] lashes.6This principle (which has its source in Makkot 13b and which the Rambam quotes in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2) generally means that if a person transgresses a prohibition punishable by death, but for certain reasons that punishment cannot be administered, he should not be lashed instead. The rationale is that the only punishment which the Torah prescribed for this transgression is execution. There is no source in the Torah which prescribes a lesser punishment.
Nevertheless, within the context of this principle is also the concept that if a certain dimension of a prohibition involves capital punishment, the punishment of lashes is not given to a person who violates another act that is included in this prohibition, but is not punishable by death.
To apply these concepts to the case at hand: Working with an animal is the subject of a Torah prohibition. When a person works with an animal, however, he is not punished by lashes as are others who violate Torah prohibitions. Why? Because there are certain instances when working with an animal is punishable by death - i.e., when the activity is performed by a man and the animal together - for example, plowing. Therefore, even when the labor a person has the animal perform does not cause that person to incur the death sentence - for example, leading it while it is carrying a burden - he is not punished by lashes.
This is the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh. The Ramban (in his gloss on Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 14), however, interprets the Rambam's words to mean that the Torah's prohibition against working with an animal applies only to activities like plowing when the activity is performed by the man and the beast together. The only prohibition stemming from the Torah against having an animal carry a burden is the prohibition derived from the positive commandment mentioned in Halachah 1. Both these interpretations and their implications are discussed at length by the later commentaries.
", + "It is forbidden for a Jew to lend or hire a large animal to a gentile so that the latter may perform work with it on the Sabbath, since [the Jew] is commanded to have his animal rest.7Although the Jew is not making the animal work himself, he is not fulfilling the Torah's command that his animal rest.
Our Sages forbade selling a large animal to a gentile,8In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3), the Rambam emphasizes that there is no difference in this instance whether the gentile is an idolater or not.
Based on the rulings of the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 151:4) states that it is customary not to enforce this prohibition in the present age. The Siftei Cohen 151:12 states that the socio-economic conditions under which our people live have changed, and substantial losses would be sustained if the prohibition were observed. Furthermore, the reason for the prohibition is no longer applicable, for it is uncommon for a Jew to lend or hire his animals to a gentile.
lest one come to lend or hire [an animal to work on the Sabbath].9The Kessef Mishneh and others note that Avodah Zarah 15a mentions another reason for this prohibition: A Jew who sells an animal to a gentile on Friday afternoon may be required to assist him in training it to follow its new master. This activity may be prolonged past the commencement of the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since this is an infrequent possibility, and the Jew is not performing this task entirely by himself, the Rambam does not mention this matter here. (Significantly, however, he does mention it in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Pesachim, loc. cit.) A person who makes such a sale is penalized and is required to repurchase the animal, even if this requires paying ten times its worth.10Note the parallel in Hilchot Avadim 8:1. Significantly, in that halachah, the Rambam states that if the gentile demands a price greater than this figure, the Jew has no further obligation.
Even an animal that is injured11And is unfit for most labor. Since, however, there are tasks that it can perform, the prohibition is not nullified (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.). should not be sold [to a gentile]. It is, however, permitted to sell [an animal to a gentile] through a broker,12In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam emphasizes that the Jewish owner must not be present while the broker is making the sale. since a broker neither lends nor hires [beasts].", + "It is permitted to sell a gentile a horse, since a horse is used only for human transportation13Note the differences between this ruling and the Rambam's statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3). The Rambam interprets that Mishnah to be referring to a specific type of horse that is used for transporting birds and not humans. Nevertheless, even according to the Commentary on the Mishnah, ordinary horses are primarily used for human transport. and not for transporting burdens.14Note the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 151), which states that even though it is now customary to perform other tasks with horses, since our Sages did not apply the prohibition to them originally, the scope of their decree need not be extended in the present age. See the notes on the previous halachah. [Hence, there is no forbidden labor involved, because] \"a living entity carries itself.\"15See the explanation of this principle in Chapter 18, Halachah 16.
Just as it is forbidden to sell [such an animal] to a gentile, so too is it forbidden to sell it to a Jew who, we suspect, might sell it to a gentile.16Note the parallel in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:8.
One may, however, sell [a gentile] a cow for the purpose of slaughter, [provided] he slaughters it in the seller's presence. One should not, however, sell [any animal], even an ox fattened for slaughter, without an explicit condition, lest the purchaser delay and work with it [on the Sabbath in the interim].17The Lechem Mishneh and others question if this prohibition applies when one sells an animal to a gentile butcher as well. Even if the butcher does not slaughter the animal in one's presence, it is clear that he did not purchase it for the sake of labor.", + "In a place where the accepted custom is to sell a small animal18E.g., a sheep or a goat. to gentiles, one may make such a sale. In a place where the accepted custom is not to make such sales, one should not.19The Siftei Cohen (based on Rashi, Avodah Zarah 14b) explains that the reason for the prohibition is our suspicion that the gentile may sodomize the animal, and there is no relation to the Sabbath prohibitions at all.
Work is generally not performed with a small animal, nor would it be proper to forbid the sale of a small animal lest one sell a large animal. The sale of a large animal is only a Rabbinic prohibition. Accordingly, instituting another prohibition because of it would be improper, since the Rabbis did not \"institute a safeguard for a safeguard.\"
Note, however, the Sefer HaKovetz, which differs and maintains that the prohibition against selling a small animal is a safeguard for the prohibition against selling a larger one. Were this not so, the Rambam would not have mentioned the prohibition against selling a small animal in these halachot.

In all places, however, a large non-domesticated animal should not be sold [to a gentile], just as a large domesticated animal should not be sold unless one does so via a broker.", + "[The following rules apply when] a person is on a journey and night falls on Friday, [but] he is not accompanied by a gentile to whom he could give his purse:20Although we are forbidden to ask a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on our behalf on the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 6, leniency is granted in this case. We suspect that if the person was required to abandon his money on the Sabbath, he would disobey the law and carry it himself instead. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 24:1.) If he has an animal with him,21Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:4, which states that this ruling applies only when the animal belongs to him, for the verse mentioned at the beginning of the chapter states \"and thus your ox and your donkey may rest.\" When the animal belongs to another individual, it is preferable to have the animal carry the purse. Although we are forbidden to perform a forbidden labor with an animal (Halachah 2), that prohibition can be avoided by making sure the animal does not perform the akirah or the hanachah. There is also a Rabbinic prohibition against working with an animal that belongs to another person. That prohibition is, however, less severe than the prohibition against asking a gentile to perform labor on one's behalf. he should place his purse on [the animal] while it is walking, and when [the animal] desires to stand, he should remove [the purse] from it, so that it will not stand still while carrying [the purse]. [In this manner,] neither the removal of an article from its place, nor placing it down in a new position will have been performed [by the animal].22The Mishnah Berurah 266:7 explains that the prohibition against working with an animal also mentions the term melachah. Accordingly, it is the same activities that a man is prohibited from performing on the Sabbath that are forbidden to be done with an animal.
As mentioned previously, the forbidden labor of transferring involves akirah, removing the article from its previous position, and hanachah, placing the article down in a new position. When a person - or an animal - who is carrying an article begins walking, he is considered to have performed an akirah, and when he stops he is considered to have performed a hanachah. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 8.)
Accordingly, were a person to place a burden on an animal while it is at rest and remove it from him after the animal has come to rest again, he would be considered as having performed labor with the animal, for the animal will have performed both the akirah and the hanachah.
If, however, one follows the course of action suggested by the Rambam, the animal will have performed neither of these acts. Since the article was placed upon the animal after it began to walk, it is not considered to have performed the akirah. Similarly, if the article was removed from the animal before it halted, it is not considered to have performed the hanachah.

It is forbidden for him to direct the animal, even with his voice alone, as long as the purse is on it, so that he will not be considered to be directing his animal on the Sabbath.23The Rashba and others question the Rambam's ruling in this instance, arguing that since the animal does not perform the akirah and the hanachah (as explained above), what difference does it make whether one leads the animal or not? There is no possibility of the animal's performing a forbidden labor.
The Rambam, however, maintains that leading an animal carrying a burden is also forbidden. Otherwise, the license granted a person would be too extensive (Maggid Mishneh).
Our Sages decreed24Shabbat 17b. that one should not place a purse on an animal on the Sabbath unless one is not accompanied by a gentile.25As the Rambam states in Chapter 6, Halachah 16, we are not commanded to see that a gentile rests on the Sabbath, while we do have such an obligation with regard to our animals.
(See also Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 266:6, which state that the above rules also apply when a person is accompanied by a gentile whom he does not trust.)
", + "Although the person is also accompanied by a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual, and a minor26These three types of individuals are often mentioned together in the Talmudic literature. They are all considered to be lacking the intellectual capacity to control their conduct. Hence, they are not obligated to observe the mitzvot., he should place his purse on the donkey rather than give to one of these individuals, for they are humans and are members of the Jewish people.27Rashi (Shabbat 153a) adds that if one of these individuals were allowed to carry the purse, one might err and think that an ordinary Jew is also allowed to carry.
If he is accompanied by a deaf-mute and a mentally incompetent individual, and does not have an animal with him, he should give it to the mentally incompetent individual.28The deaf-mute has a minimal amount of understanding, and thus, were he to carry an article on the Sabbath, the potential for making an error and thinking that all are allowed to carry is greater (ibid.). If [he is accompanied by] a mentally incompetent individual and a minor, he should give it29The Rashba, the Ramban, Rav Moshe Cohen, and others differ with the Rambam and maintain that one should should give the individual the purse while he is walking, and should remove the purse from him before he stands (as explained in the previous halachah), so that the individual carrying the purse will perform neither the akirah nor the hanachah. They maintain that although a mentally incompetent individual (and similarly, the others mentioned) are not obligated to observe the mitzvot, it is forbidden to \"feed him non-kosher food with one's hands.\" (See Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:27.) Similarly, in this instance it is forbidden to give these individuals an article and tell them to carry it. See also Chapter 24, Halachah 11, and notes.
This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:6) and accepted by the later authorities. There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether the above law applies if one gives the article to one of these individuals before the commencement of the Sabbath. On the one hand, it is obvious that one's intent is to have the individual carry the article on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since one gives the article to him before the commencement of the Sabbath, one is not considered to be \"feeding him non-kosher food with one's hands.\" (See the glosses of the Ramah and the Magen Avraham on that law.)
to the mentally incompetent individual.30Since the child will ultimately become obligated to perform mitzvot, it is preferable that he not violate them in his childhood. If [he is accompanied by] a deaf-mute and a minor, he may give it to whomever he desires.31Shabbat 153b explains that on the one hand, it is preferable to give it to the child, because when the deaf-mute carries, the impression will be created that an adult may carry on the Sabbath. Conversely, however, there is a disadvantage in giving it to the child, for he will ultimately mature and become obligated to observe the mitzvot.
The Be'ur Halachah 266 emphasizes that when the minor is one's own son, it is definitely preferable to give the purse to the deaf-mute, for a person is obligated to train his children in the observance of the mitzvot.

If he does not have an animal with him, nor is he accompanied by one of these individuals, he should walk [carrying his purse] less than four cubits [at a time].32As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachot 15 and 19, a person is permitted to carry within a space of four cubits. Thus, each time he stops, the four cubits in which he is allowed to carry become redefined, and in this manner he can carry the article several miles on the Sabbath. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 10, and Chapter 6, Halachah 22.)
It must be emphasized that transferring the article less than four cubits at a time is permitted only when carrying the article in the public domain, but not with regard to transferring the article into the private domain. This must be accomplished by throwing the article in an irregular manner (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:12; Mishnah Berurah 266:17).
Significantly, in contrast to Chapter 13, Halachah 9, the Rambam does not say that the person should run without stopping until he arrives home. It is possible to differentiate between the two instances by explaining that the present halachah refers to an instance when the person had stopped after the commencement of the Sabbath, while the halachah cited refers to an instance when the person had continued walking.
Even if he has acquired a lost article,33The leniencies granted to allow a person to maintain possession of his own property do not apply to a lost object that he discovered, since he will not suffer a loss by leaving it. Nevertheless, once a person has already taken possession of the lost object, it is considered to be his own property. he may [move it] by walking less than four cubits [at a time].
[Different rules, however, apply to a lost article that] he has not acquired: If he can linger and wait until nightfall, he should. If not,34I.e., if there is a danger, because of thieves or the like. he may [carry it] by walking less than four cubits [at a time].35According to the Rambam, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, there is no prohibition against carrying an article less than four cubits at a time. Most authorities, however, differ with him on this issue and maintain that this is a leniency that is permitted only in rare instances. Hence, in the case of a lost article when a person will not suffer a loss, the leniency is not granted. It is the opinion of these authorities that is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:7).", + "It is permitted to lead an animal in the public domain with its reins and its bridle,36The bridle and reins are not considered muktzeh, because the person had the intent of using them before the Sabbath. One must, however, be careful not to lean on the animal when putting the bridle and the reins on it, for it is forbidden to make use of a live animal (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:1 and commentaries). provided the bridle and reins are appropriate for it37This halachah revolves around the following principle: A restraint that is necessary to control an animal is not considered to be a burden and may be borne by the animal on the Sabbath. - for example, a horse with a neck-ring, a camel with a rope tied to its mouth, a female camel with an iron bit,38In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:1), the Rambam writes that female camels are more powerful than males and need stronger restraints. The rope used to tie a male camel is, however, apparently different from that mentioned later in the halachah in regard to a horse. and a dog with a muzzle.
If, however, one took out an animal with a bridle that is insufficient - e.g., one tied a rope in the mouth of a horse - or with a bridle that is excessive, for it would be controlled with a lesser one, - for example one took out a donkey with a horse's neck-ring, or a cat with a muzzle, it is considered to be a burden.39A person who leads an animal into the public domain with such a restraint is thus considered as having violated the prohibition against having an animal work on the Sabbath. For any excessive or insufficient restraint is considered to be a burden.40When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions \"a very excessive restraint\" - i.e., we are not expected to measure exactly the strength of the animal and the restraint. As long as the restraint is more or less appropriate for the animal, it is not considered to be a burden.", + "A person should not tie camels together and lead them. [Moreover,] even when they were tied together on Friday, he should not lead them on the Sabbath. One may, however, gather the ropes [of many camels] in one's hand,41The Tur (Orach Chayim 305) appears to differ and to allow one to lead merely one camel at a time. provided none of the ropes extends more than a handbreadth outside one's hand42If the rope extends longer, it might appear that one is carrying the rope and not using it as a restraint for the animal (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:3). and the rope leading from [each] camel's mouth to one's hand is at least a handbreadth above the earth.43If the rope hangs lower, it does not appear to be a restraint for the animal, but rather an unnecessary burden (Rashi, Shabbat 54b).
Why is one prohibited from leading camels that are tied to each other? Because it appears as if he is leading them to the marketplace where animals are sold or used for sport.44Shabbat 54a states that a person leading a group of camels appears as if he is going to a חנגא. The Rambam, based on the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el, interprets that term as having both the meanings mentioned above. It appears to refer to a country-fair that was an occasion for both commerce and celebration for the populace at large. For this reason, a person should not go out [leading] an animal wearing a bell around its neck, even if its clapper is plugged [so that] it does not produce a sound.45A bell will make the animal look more attractive (Rashi, Shabbat 54b). Alternatively, a bell's sound will invite the attention of prospective customers. An onlooker may not realize that the bell has been plugged (Tiferet Yisrael, Shabbat 5:4).", + "An animal should not go out with a bell [attached to] its coverings,46Rashi and Tosafot (Shabbat 58a) states that the reason stated in the previous halachah - that one appears to be taking them to a fair - applies in this instance as well. a seal47Identifying it as belonging to its master. [attached to] its neck, a seal [attached to] its coverings,48This prohibition applies even if the seal is woven into the animal's covering (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:15; Mishnah Berurah 305:45).
From the context here, it would appear that the reason for the prohibition is that the seal is considered to be an unnecessary burden. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.), which states that the prohibition was instituted lest the seal fall and the owner pick it up and carry it.
a strap on its foot,49In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4, based on Shabbat 54b), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a leather strap tied around the hoof of an animal that has been wounded. or a ladder on its neck.50This refers to wooden restraint placed on the animal's neck to prevent it from being able to turn its head backwards. Such a restraint would be placed on an animal to deter it from chewing on a wound on its back (ibid.).
A donkey may not go out with a saddle-cloth unless it is tied to it on Friday.51Shabbat 53a states that a donkey is always cold, and hence, a saddle-cloth is necessary, even in the summer, to keep it warm. Accordingly, the saddle-cloth is considered to be a garment and not a burden.
The saddlecloth must be tied to the animal, lest it fall and its owner carry it on the Sabbath. It must be tied before the Sabbath, because there is no way that it can be tied on the Sabbath itself without leaning on the animal, which is a forbidden act. Our Sages prohibited a person who violated their decree and tied the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath from taking out his donkey on that day (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2).
Other commentaries explain that if the saddle-cloth was not tied to the animal on Friday, we can assume that it does not suffer from cold so seriously. Hence, it is forbidden for it to wear the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath.
A camel should not go out with a patch attached to its hump or its tail52In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.:3), the Rambam states that the patch is used as a sign of identification or for superstitious reasons. Note Rashi (Shabbat 54a), who translates מטוטלת as a \"small cushion\" rather than as a patch. unless it is tied to both its hump and its tail.53Our translation is based on Rav Kapach's commentary.
A camel should not go out with its foreleg tied to its hind leg54Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.).or its foreleg bound.55I.e., one of its back feet to one of its front legs, so that it can walk on only three legs (ibid.). In both these instances, the animal is able to walk, but cannot walk fast. The same applies to all other animals.", + "Chickens56In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4), the Rambam emphasizes that this applies to both male and female chickens. may not go out with cords,57Attached to their feet for the purpose of identification (ibid., based on Shabbat 54b). nor with straps on their feet.58The Rambam (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to straps that hang loosely from a chicken's feet. He does not explain their purpose. Others (based on Shabbat 54b) explain that these straps served as a restraint. Rams may not go out with a small wagon under their fat tail.59The Rambam (loc. cit.) explains that this refers to a unique species of rams. When they are fattened, all the fat collects in the fat tail, which swells in size. Because of its size, the ram is unable to lift it easily. Therefore, a small wagon is constructed and attached to them to support their tails and prevent them from dragging on the ground and becoming bruised and cut. The Rambam states that he was familiar with such a species of rams. Ewes may not go out with [chips of] wood that are placed in their nostrils so that they sneeze and dislodge the worms in their brains.60The Rambam (ibid.) states that this refers to chips from the yachnun tree. Based on Shabbat 54b, he explains that these chips were not necessary for rams. Since they butt each other frequently, this would dislodge the worms from their heads.
A calf may not go out with a small yoke [that is placed] on its neck to break [its nature] and accustom it [to bearing a yoke so that later it will wear a larger yoke for] plowing. An animal may not go out with a muzzle placed in its mouth so that it will neither bite nor eat. A cow may not go out with a hedgehog skin on its teats so that crawling animals61Significantly, Shabbat 54b singles out the species yalei, which Tosafot (based on Bava Batra 4a) identifies as the hedgehog itself. The Biblical name for this species anaka (Leviticus 11:30 resembles the word yenikah, \"sucking,\" and refers to this species' tendency to suck milk. will not suck from it when it sleeps,62The sharp prickles of the hedgehog skin will annoy the crawling animals and prevent them from sucking the cow's milk (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit., based on Shabbat 54b). nor may it go out with a strap between its horns, regardless of whether it is placed there as an ornament or as a restraint.63In his Commentary on the Mishnah [loc. cit. (based on Shabbat, loc. cit.), the Rambam relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah had a neighbor who let his cow go out with a strap between its horns. Rabbi Elazar did not rebuke him for this act, and hence the responsibility for this transgression was considered his. The Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 5:4) relates that as penance, Rabbi Elazar fasted until his teeth became black.
When a goat's horns are pierced, it may go out with a rope tied to its horns on the Sabbath. If the rope is tied to [the goat's] beard, it is forbidden, lest it tear off and the person carry it in his hands in the public domain. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "Rams may go out with a wide strap tied against their genitals so that they will not copulate with females, with a hard piece of leather strapped over their hearts so that they will not be attacked by wolves,64Shabbat 53b offers both these interpretations for the word לבובין in the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2. The Rambam interprets them as not being mutually exclusive and hence cites both of them as halachah. See also the following note. and with an embroidered cloth that is placed on them to make them more attractive.65Shabbat (loc. cit.) also offers this as an interpretation of the term לבובין. The Ra'avad, however, objects to this particular interpretation, explaining that, as obvious from the ruling in the previous halachah regarding a strap tied between a cow's horns, any article placed on an animal for the purpose of ornamentation is considered to be a burden and forbidden.
The Maggid Mishneh (in his notes on the following halachah) offers an explanation that can resolve this difficulty. An ornament that an animal wears during the week is also permitted on the Sabbath. The ornaments that are forbidden are those that are placed on the animal for the Sabbath day alone.
Note also an original interpretation offered by the Or Sameach, which explains that ornamentation that makes an animal attractive in the eyes of humans is forbidden. The cloth mentioned in this halachah is, by contrast, intended to make the animal attractive in the eyes of the other animals. Some support for this thesis can be derived from comparison to the other articles mentioned in this halachah.

Ewes may go out with their fat tail tied to their backs, [exposing them] so that rams will copulate with them, or tied downward so that rams will not copulate with them. They may go out covered with a cloth so that their wool will remain clean.66In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:2), the Rambam states that these coverings are placed over ewes and not over rams, because ewes' wool is softer than that of rams.
Goats may go out with their teats tied so that their milk will dry up.67This may be done to change the goats' hormonal balance so that they will conceive faster. They should not go out, however, [with their teats tied] so that no milk will flow out until they are milked in the evening.68Rabbenu Yonah explains that the goats' teats were tied for this purpose on the Sabbath and not during the week. During the week, they would be milked in the morning and in the evening, and there was little chance of sufficient pressure building up to cause the milk to ooze out. On the Sabbath, by contrast, they could not be milked from sunset until after nightfall on the next day, and the possibility existed that extra milk would ooze out.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:6) follows the interpretation of Rashi, who explains that these ties are not bound tightly and the possibility exists that they will fall and that the owner will carry them in the public domain.
", + "A donkey should not go out [wearing] a saddle even when it is tied upon it on Friday.69Although a donkey may go out wearing a saddlecloth, as stated in Halachah 10, a saddle itself is considered a burden. A horse may not go out wearing a fox's tail70Rashi (Shabbat 53a) explains that this was used as a talisman to ward off the evil eye. or with a scarlet thread between its eyes.71Because it is an unnecessary ornament and therefore considered a burden. See the notes on the previous halachah.
An animal should not go out with a feeding bag [attached] to its mouth, nor with metal shoes,72Note the Mishnah Berurah 305:41, which states that this restriction does not apply to iron horseshoes that are permanently affixed to the animal's feet. nor with an amulet that has not proven its efficacy for an animal.73Even if an amulet has proven its efficacy for a human, as long as it has not proven its efficacy for an animal, we are in doubt of its usefulness. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:21 states that a human being has angels and spiritual forces that will assist his recovery, and an animal lacks these. Therefore, the amulet used by a human need not be as powerful. An animal may, however, go out with a bandage placed on a wound,74Chapter 19, Halachah 13 grants a person license to go out with a bandage on a wound. The same concept applies regarding an animal. with plates placed on a broken bone,75So that it will set in place and heal (Maggid Mishneh). or with a placenta that is hanging from it.
We may plug up a bell hanging around its neck76The bell must be plugged, since it is forbidden to ring bells on the Sabbath as stated in Chapter 23, Halachah 4. and allow [an animal] to stroll with it in a courtyard.77In this and the following instance, the leniency is granted in a courtyard, but not in the public domain. Similarly, one may place78The saddle cloth may not be tied, since by doing so one would be making use of an animal. (See the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:8 and the notes on Halachah 10.) a saddlecloth on a donkey79This leniency applies only to a donkey that chronically suffers from cold, as explained in the notes on Halachah 10, and not to a horse or other similar species (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). and allow it to stroll in a courtyard. One may not, however, attach a feeding bag to [an animal] on the Sabbath [even when it will not go beyond a courtyard].80The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:10) mentions that, in a courtyard, a feeding bag may be attached to calves and ponies which do not have long necks and find it uncomfortable to eat by themselves.", + "Just as a person is commanded that his animals rest on the Sabbath, so too, he is commanded that his servants and maidservants rest. Although they have the power of thought, and act according to their own volition, [their master] is obligated to watch over them and prevent them from performing [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, as [Exodus 23:12] states: \"Thus your ox and your donkey may rest, and the son of your maidservant and the foreigner may find repose.\"81The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's decision, explaining that since the servants are themselves obligated to observe the prohibition against working on the Sabbath, of what purpose is the prohibition imposed on their master? The Maggid Mishneh and Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1525) explain that the servants may be lax in their observance. Therefore, an additional command is given to their master.
The servants and maidservants whom we are commanded to have rest [on the Sabbath] are servants that have been circumcised and have immersed themselves [in the mikveh], so that they be granted the status of servants who have accepted the mitzvot that servants are obligated to observe.82In Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 14;9, the Rambam explains that a Cana'anite servant goes through a process similar to that of conversion when purchased by a Jewish master. This process includes circumcision, immersion in the mikveh, and the acceptance of mitzvot. Once this process is completed, the servant is bound to observe all the mitzvot that are incumbent upon Jewish women. By contrast, servants who have not been circumcised and have not immersed themselves, but have merely accepted [the observance of] the seven [universal] laws commanded to the descendants of Noach,83These seven universal laws include the prohibitions against the worship of false gods, cursing God, killing, stealing, incest and adultery, eating a limb torn from a living animal and the obligation to set up courts of law to judge civil matters. The Rambam explains these laws in Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 9 and 10.
A servant may temporarily refuse to accept the mitzvot incumbent upon Jewish servants. In this instance, he does not undergo the process of circumcision and immersion and is given twelve months to decide whether to accept Jewish observance or not. If he refuses, he must be sold (Hilchot Avadim 8:12).
In the interim, this servant must accept the observance of these seven universal laws. If not, he should be killed immediately (see Hilchot Avadim 1:6 and commentaries).
are considered equivalent to \"resident aliens\" and are permitted to perform [forbidden] labors for their own sake84But not for the sake of a Jew. In Chapter 6, it was explained that there is a Rabbinic prohibition preventing a Jew from instructing a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on his behalf. This halachah emphasizes that when a gentile is the Jew's servant, the Jew is violating a positive commandment of the Torah itself by having the gentile work for him on the Sabbath. See notes 87 and 88 below. in public as the Jews may during the week. [The status of] a resident alien is granted only in the era when the Jubilee year is observed.85As explained in Hilchot Shemitah V'Yovel 10:9, there are many mitzvot whose observance is dependent on the observance of the yovel, the Jubilee year. The observance of the Jubilee year itself is dependent on the proportion of the Jewish people living in Eretz Yisrael. Only when the majority of our people live in the holy land is this mitzvah observed.
[One might ask:] Since a resident alien may perform [forbidden] labors on his own behalf on the Sabbath, and a convert is considered equivalent to a native-born Jew in all matters, who is referred to with [the term הגר] in the phrase, \"and the son of your maidservant and the foreigner [הגר] may find repose\"?86The intent of this question is not directly obvious in a translated text. The Hebrew word גר has two meanings in Halachic terminology: a convert - גר צדק - and a resident alien - גר תושב. Since, as the Rambam indicates, the verse does not appear to refer to either of these individuals, what is the intent of the word גר in that verse?
This refers to a resident alien who is an employee of a Jew, like \"the son of [his] maidservant.\" Such a resident alien may not perform [forbidden] labors on behalf of his Jewish master on the Sabbath.87The Maggid Mishneh states that this positive mitzvah prohibits not only one's servant or one's hired hand, but any gentile who has accepted the observance of these seven universal laws, from working on one's behalf on the Sabbath. For as soon as the gentile agrees to perform the forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew, he is considered as the Jew's hired hand.
The question may arise: Concerning whom is the Rambam speaking in Chapter 6 when he states that asking a gentile to work on our behalf is prohibited merely by virtue of Rabbinic decree? A gentile who has not accepted the observance of any mitzvot at all.
He may, however, perform [such labors] on his own behalf. Moreover, even if this foreigner is a servant [belonging to a Jewish master], [this foreigner] may perform [labors] for his own sake [on the Sabbath].88Thus, according to the Rambam, the verse quoted above contains two prohibitions: one requiring one to watch that any servants who have accepted the mitzvot observe the Sabbath laws, and another, prohibiting us from benefiting from any work done on our behalf by a gentile who has not accepted these mitzvot." + ], + [ + "[Regarding the Sabbath,] the Torah [Exodus 23:12] states: \"[On the seventh day,] you shall cease activity.\" [This implies] ceasing [even the performance of certain] activities that are not [included in the categories of the forbidden] labors.1As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, this statement has raised the attention of the commentaries concerned with how the Rambam defines the scope of the positive commandment to cease activity on the Sabbath. Many authorities explain that this positive commandment is merely a restatement of the prohibition against performing forbidden labors. Others (see the commentary of the Ramban on Exodus 23:12 encompasses holding back from performing any activity that will disturb the atmosphere of rest and peace that characterizes the Sabbath.
[The Torah left the definition of the scope of this commandment to] the Sages, [who] forbade many activities as sh'vut. Some activities are forbidden because they resemble the forbidden labors, while other activities are forbidden lest they lead one to commit a forbidden labor. These [activities] include the following:2The Rambam uses the next four chapters to delineate various activities that were forbidden because of the two reasons he mentions above. In his discussion of this matter, he gives examples of activities that are related to each of the categories of forbidden labor.", + "A person who levels crevices [in the ground] is liable for [performing the forbidden labor of] plowing.3This refers to a person who levels crevices in a field (Chapter 8, Halachah 1). If one performs such an activity in a home, one is liable for performing the forbidden labor of building (Chapter 10, Halachah 12). For this reason, it is forbidden to defecate in a field that is lying fallow, lest one come to level crevices.
A person who empties a storeroom [of its contents]4See Chapter 26, Halachah 15. on the Sabbath, because he needs [the storeroom] for the sake of a mitzvah - e.g., to house guests or to use as a study hall - should not empty the storeroom entirely, lest he come to level crevices within.5In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:1), the Rambam elaborates on this concept, explaining that a person who removes the contents of a storeroom is likely to discover cracks and crevices in the ground. Our Sages, therefore, imposed this restriction lest he level the floor. Indeed, the only reason the person is allowed to empty the storeroom is that he intends to perform a mitzvah.
[A person who] has mud on his feet6Or shoes (Ramah, Orach Chayim 302:6). may clean it off on a wall7The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions an opinion that forbids wiping the mud on a stone wall, lest it appear that one is replastering the wall. or on a beam, but not on the ground, lest he level crevices. A person should not spit on the ground and wipe it with his feet, lest crevices be leveled.8See the Mishnah Berurah 316:49, which questions whether this restriction applies to a paved or unpaved floor. (In this context, see also the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 7:2.) It is, however, permitted to step on spittle that is lying on the ground as one walks, without having any specific intent.9The Maggid Mishneh cites the use of a similar expression in Chapter 11, Halachah 4. In the notes on that halachah, it is explained that there are two interpretations of the phrase: a) that one may intentionally step on the substance in question and merely make it appear that one is doing so accidentally; b) that one may proceed without worrying whether one steps on the substance or not. (See also the restatement of this law in Chapter 26, Halachah 13.)", + "It is forbidden for women who [often] play with nuts, almonds, or the like, to play with them on the Sabbath,10When mentioning this law, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 338:5) cites the Rambam's statements in Chapter 23, Halachah 17, which forbid gambling on the Sabbath. Thus, to avoid redundancy, we are forced to say that the play mentioned here is obviously mere sport. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for the reasons mentioned above. lest they be motivated to level crevices.
It is forbidden to sweep the ground, lest one level crevices,11The Rambam appears to forbid sweeping the floor, lest in the process of doing so, one decides to level the floor. Since both sweeping and leveling are intended to make one's floor look attractive, it is likely that while a person is involved in one activity, he will also perform the other (Rav Yitzchak ben Sheshet, Responsum 394).
Other commentaries explain that the reason is that it is inevitable that a person will level an earthen floor while sweeping it. Therefore, sweeping is forbidden even though the person does not intend to level the floor, based on the principle the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 6.
unless [the floor] is paved with stone.12The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 337:2) follows the Rambam's ruling and allows one to sweep a paved floor. The Ramah, however, differs and maintains that it is forbidden. (See the Be'ur Halachah 337, which cites many opinions that encourage leniency.) Even those opinions that allow one to sweep emphasize that one must be careful regarding the type of broom used. A broom whose bristles are likely to break may not be used. One may, however, sprinkle water on the ground. There is no suspicion that the person will level crevices, since this is not his intent.13This refers to sprinkling water in a house to keep the dust from rising. Although there is a possibility that the water and the dust will collect and cause the floor to become level, there is no prohibition because this is not the person's intent. As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 1, Halachah 5, a person may perform an act that causes a forbidden labor to be accomplished if he does not intend for that labor to be accomplished, and there is not an absolute certainty that it will be accomplished.
One may not apply oil to the floor,14In Talmudic times, oil was frequently applied to the floor of a bathhouse. (See Shabbat 40b.) even if it is paved, nor may one blow [dust from the floor], nor may one wash it.15Sweeping a floor is considered a necessary act to maintain an atmosphere of cleanliness on the Sabbath. These other activities, however, are not as essential (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 337:4; Mishnah Berurah 337:17). This applies on a holiday,16Note, however, Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:16, which states that after the Paschal offerings had been sacrificed, the floor of the Temple courtyard was washed, even when the celebration of Pesach began on the Sabbath. All the prohibitions of the category of sh'vut were not enforced in the Temple. and surely on the Sabbath. These acts were forbidden lest a person follow his usual weekday pattern and thus come to level crevices in a place which is not paved.", + "When a courtyard has become soiled in the rainy season, one may bring straw17Straw is acceptable for this purpose since it is fit to be eaten by an animal. Hence, it will not be considered as having been made a permanent part of the courtyard. If, by contrast, earth, pebbles, or sand are used, they would be considered as having been permanently incorporated into the floor of the courtyard. This is considered as building and is, hence, forbidden (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:24; Mishnah Berurah 313:55). and spread18When quoting this halachah (which is based on Eruvin 104a), the Shulchan Aruch uses a different verb, זורה, which means \"toss into.\" This difference also leads to a variation in the manner in which the concept mentioned in our halachah's final clause is interpreted there. it over [the courtyard]. When a person spreads [the straw], he should not spread it with a basket or with a container, but rather with the underside of the container, so that he will not follow his usual weekday pattern and thus come to level crevices.", + "A person who waters seeds [that have been planted] is liable for [performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of] sowing.19See Chapter 8, Halachah 2. Therefore, it is forbidden to draw water from a cistern using a pulley,20Eruvin 104a relates that water was drawn from a cistern by a pulley in the Temple, but that this is forbidden outside the Temple premises. lest one draw water for one's garden and one's ruin. On this basis, if a cistern with a pulley is located in one's courtyard, it is permitted to use the pulley to draw water.21The location of the cistern clearly indicates that its water is intended to be used for household purposes. In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that even if a cistern is not located in a courtyard, as long as it is distant from a place where the water might be used for commercial purposes, one may draw water with a pulley. In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 338:6), he mentions further leniencies.", + "A person who detaches [produce or wood] is liable for [performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of] reaping.22See Chapter 8, Halachah 3. Accordingly, it is forbidden to remove honey from a beehive on the Sabbath,23If, however, the honey has oozed or has been removed from the beehive before the commencement of the Sabbath, it may be used. (See the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah [Orach Chayim 321:13].) because this resembles detaching [produce].24Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:7).
We may not climb a tree;25This prohibition, as all the others mentioned in this halachah, was also instituted lest one detach fruit from a tree. (Note also the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 372:15], which mentions an exception to this principle.) [this includes both] a fresh tree and one that has dried out.26The commentaries question whether the Rambam's intent is that one is liable for detaching wood from a dried tree, or that this is merely a safeguard. (See Magen Avraham 336:1.) We may not suspend [articles from] a tree, nor may we lean on a tree. We may not climb a tree before the commencement of the Sabbath [with the intent of] remaining there for the entire day.27See Halachah 9 regarding whether or not a person who climbs a tree is allowed to descend on the Sabbath.
We may not use any [plant] that is attached to the ground.28Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 312:6), which mentions an exception to this principle. This is a decree, lest one detach [produce].", + "Fruit that falls from a tree on the Sabbath may not be eaten until Saturday night; this is a decree lest one detach [produce].29Rav Moshe Cohen differs with the rationale given by the Rambam and explains that the reason these fruits are forbidden is that they are considered muktzeh, i.e., since picking them would involve transgressing a prohibition, one does not consider using them on the Sabbath. Others explain that they are forbidden, because they are nolad, i.e., the potential to use them did not come about until after the commencement of the Sabbath. Accordingly, it is forbidden to move them on the Sabbath. From the location in the Shulchan Aruch in which this law appears, Orach Chayim 322:3, one might infer that Rav Yosef Karo follows Rav Moshe Cohen's opinion.
The Rambam accepts the principle of nolad only in regard to the festivals, and not in regard to the Sabbath (see Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:17) and does not consider the concept of muktzeh applicable here.

One may smell a myrtle that is attached [to its bush], because the only benefit one has from it is its fragrance, and its fragrance can be appreciated even when it is attached. In contrast, it is forbidden to smell an etrog, an apple, or any other [fruit] that is fit to be eaten while it is attached [to its tree]. This is a decree enacted lest one pick it to partake of it.30The Rambam follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version of Sukkot 37b. Rabbenu Chanan'el and others reverse the laws and grant the leniency regarding smelling an etrog and the like, but not a myrtle. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 336:10) quotes the Rambam's view.", + "It is forbidden to sit on the roots of a tree that project more than three handbreadths above the ground.31This is considered equivalent to climbing a tree (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 10:8). If, however, they are less than three [handbreadths above the ground], they are considered as the ground itself.32Based on the principle of l'vud.
If [the roots] descend from three [handbreadths] above the ground to within three [handbreadths of the ground], it is permitted to make use of them.33I.e., the portion that is within three handbreadths of the ground. If they are three handbreadths above the ground [on one side] or if there is a cavity three [handbreadths high below them], it is forbidden to sit on them even when one side [of the roots] is level with the ground.34The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 336:2) mentions that it is even forbidden for them to sit on the side of the roots that is level with the ground. The difference between this law and the previous one is that in the previous law, the roots themselves descended within three handbreadths of the ground. In this law, a portion of the ground is upraised and is level with the roots.", + "We may not ride on an animal on the Sabbath; this is a decree enacted35Although one is forbidden to cause an animal to carry a burden, riding an animal is not forbidden according to the Torah, because of the principle, \"a living being carries itself.\" Nevertheless, there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, as the Rambam explains. lest one cut a branch [to use as a switch] to guide it.36Beitzah 36b mentions another reason: perhaps one will ride beyond the Sabbath limits. Apparently the Rambam does not see these two positions as mutually exclusive.
Note, however, the Chatam Sofer (Vol. VI, Responsum 96), who writes that our Sages were motivated by a desire to have animals rest on the Sabbath, and the rationales mentioned in the Talmud were of secondary importance. Sefer HaKovetz notes that, in fact, the Jerusalem Talmud mentions the desire that animals rest as the source for this law.
We may not hang from an animal, nor may we climb onto an animal before the Sabbath so that we can sit upon it on the Sabbath.
We may not support ourselves by leaning on an animal;37When our Sages forbade riding on an animal, they also forbade using an animal for any other purpose (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:23; Mishnah Berurah 305:62). These prohibitions apply in all places, even in a desert where there are no trees from which one might detach a branch.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this prohibition applies also regarding articles hanging from trees. Support for this position can be derived from the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Sukkah 4:6, which prohibit use of both a sukkah constructed in a tree as well as one on an animal's back on the first day of the holiday.
we may, however use articles hanging from an animal as a support.
A person38If, however, a utensil was placed in a tree on or before the Sabbath, it may not be removed (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah [Orach Chayim 336:1]). who climbs a tree on the Sabbath39If, however, he climbed the tree before the commencement of the Sabbath, he may descend on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh). Although the Rambam's view is accepted by most authorities, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions a more stringent opinion. without being aware of the prohibition involved is allowed to descend.40Although the person makes use of the tree in his process of descent, this is not forbidden. For the alternative available to him, staying in the tree for the entire Sabbath, also involves making use of the tree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 336:2; Mishnah Berurah 336:6). [In contrast, one who climbs up] in conscious violation [of the prohibition] is forbidden to descend.
[In contrast, should one mount] an animal, one may descend even if one [mounted it] in conscious violation of the prohibition. [This leniency is granted] in consideration of the pain [endured] by the animal.41See Chapter 25, Halachah 26, for added leniencies granted in consideration of suffering endured by an animal. (See also the commentaries on Hilchot Rotzeach 13:9,13, which discuss the halachic ramifications of this principle. Note also The Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. III, chapter 17.) Similarly, we may remove a load from an animal on the Sabbath, because of the pain [endured] by the animal.", + "What is implied?42The restrictive process of unloading an animal's burden described by the Rambam in this halachah is necessary only when the articles the animal is carrying are muktzeh (forbidden to be moved on the Sabbath day). If the articles are not muktzeh, they may be unloaded in an ordinary manner, provided one does not lean on the animal.
From this, the Mishnah Berurah 305:65 derives that the prohibition against causing an animal's suffering is not strong enough to supersede the prohibition against muktzeh.
If a person's animal is carrying a haversack of grain, [he may unload the animal in an irregular manner; he should insert his head under [the load, so that] it will be shifted to the other side and fall.43Although the grain is muktzeh, as long as one does not move it with one's hands, one is not violating the prohibition (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:24). See also Chapter 24:14-15.
[The following rules apply when a person] enters [a city] from a journey on Friday night and his animal is carrying a burden: When he reaches the outermost courtyard of the city, he should remove the utensils that may be carried on the Sabbath. Regarding those that may not be carried, he should loosen the ropes that are holding the bags, and allow the sacks to fall.
[The following rules apply] if the sacks contain articles that might break. If the sacks are small, one may bring pillows and blankets and place them under them, so that the sacks will fall on the pillows. [This is permitted] because, if the person desires, he could slip the pillows out from under the sacks, since these sacks are small and light. Thus, one has not nullified the possibility of using a utensil prepared for use on the Sabbath.44There are commentaries that emphasize that this is also a leniency. It is forbidden to nullify the possibility of using a utensil even temporarily. Hence, the only reason that putting the pillows under the sacks is permitted is that there is a substantial loss involved (Mishnah Berurah 266:27).
Note, however, the Maggid Mishneh, who mentions opinions that explain that since one can remove the pillows one by one at any time, one is never nullifying a utensil from being used.

If [the sacks are large and contain] large pieces of glass, one should release the sacks and let them fall. Even if they break, there will not be a great loss, for [such pieces of glass] are intended to be melted down.45Rashi (Shabbat 154b) offers a slightly different interpretation of the type of glass used and the purpose for which it was intended. [Therefore, only] a small loss [will be incurred],46I.e., although the larger pieces will break when they fall, the broken pieces that will remain will also be able to be used for the original purpose. Only a small quantity of glass will be totally useless.and this is of no concern to the Sages.
If the sacks are large and contain glass utensils and the like, one should unload the sacks gently.47Although unloading the glass utensils slowly will inevitably involve lifting the forbidden articles slightly, the Sages permitted this because of the loss involved (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:24).
Note also Shulchan Aruch Harav 266:25, which grants a further leniency and allows pillows and covers to be placed under large utensils in the case of a substantial loss, if there is no other alternative. Even though there is no way to remove the pillows from under the utensils on the Sabbath, this leniency is permitted because of the potential loss. The Be'ur Halachah 266 explains that this is a matter of controversy among the halachic authorities.
One may not, however, leave them on the animal [for the entire Sabbath], because of the pain the animal [will suffer].", + "A person who presses fruits together until they become a single entity is liable for [performing the forbidden labor of] collecting food.48See Chapter 8, Halachah 6. Therefore, a person whose fruits have been spread throughout his courtyard49The commentaries note that the Rambam's words seem to indicate that one is liable for collecting produce even when one does so far from the place where the produce originally grew. This issue is a point of disagreement among the commentaries. (See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 5.) may collect them by hand and partake of them.50Significantly, Tosafot, Shabbat 143b, suggests omitting the phrase \"and partake of them.\" (Note the Be'ur Halachah 335.) He should not, however, place them into a basket or into a container as he does during the week. Were he to follow his ordinary weekday practice, there is the possibility that he would press them with his hands in the container and perform the forbidden labor of collecting food.51Although the prohibition against gathering produce is explicitly stated in Shabbat 143b, the rationale for the prohibition is a matter of debate among the halachic authorities. The reason suggested by the Rambam is not accepted by most, and other reasons are offered:
a) it is possible that pebbles might be mixed in with the produce and thus one might come to perform the forbidden labor of separating (Rashba);
b) gathering produce is a weekday activity and its performance runs contrary to the atmosphere of peace and rest prevalent on the Sabbath (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 335). These are the rationales reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 335:5).

Similarly, salt or the like should not be collected into a single block, because it appears as if one is collecting food.52According to the Torah, the forbidden labor of collecting food applies only with regard to the produce of the earth (Shabbat 73b; Chapter 8, Halachah 5). Nevertheless, the Rabbis extended the scope of the prohibition and forbade collecting other foods as well.", + "A person who extracts [food from raw produce is liable for performing a derivative of] threshing. One who squeezes olives and grapes is liable for extracting.53See Chapter 8, Halachot 7 and 10. Rashi, Shabbat 143b, explains that the reason is that the primary purpose that grapes and olives are grown is for these liquids. With regard to other fruits, by contrast, it is not as common to use them for juice. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), it appears that the Rambam also accepts this rationale.
(Rabbenu Nissim gives another reason: The juices of other fruits are not considered to be liquids, but rather food. See Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:4. The Pri Megadim and others consider these to be two separate rationales.)
Therefore, it is forbidden to squeeze berries or pomegranates. Since some people squeeze them [for juice]54This prohibition includes all fruits that are frequently used for juice (Ramah, Orach Chayim 320:1). Significantly, however, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:6) states that one may squeeze lemons. The Mishnah Berurah 320:22, however, questions that decision, because it is customary in many places to use lemons for juice. A similar question applies regarding many other fruit juices that are now far more popular than they were in previous generations. like olives and grapes, [were this to be allowed,] one might come to squeeze olives and grapes. It is, however, permitted to squeeze other fruit - e.g., quince, apples, and crab apples - on the Sabbath, since they are not usually squeezed.55The basis for this opinion is that even if a person desires to squeeze the fruit juice for use as a beverage, since the popular practice is not to do so, his individual intent is of no consequence. There are, however, opinions that maintain that a person is forbidden to squeeze juice from fruit if he desires to use it as a beverage.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:1 states that, even though the halachic basis of the first view is sounder, in places where it is customary to follow the second view, the stringency should be maintained. (See also the Be'ur Halachah 320.)
", + "It is permitted to squeeze pickled or cooked foods to soften them.56Or to prepare them to be used as food in any other way. For example, to squeeze the oil from noodles (Mishnah Berurah 320:24,25). If, however, one's intent is to extract liquid from them,57As mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 10, even when one squeezes a food with the intent of removing its liquid, there is no prohibition involved if one squeezes the liquid directly into food. The rationale is that when a liquid is absorbed in food, its own identity is of no consequence. Hence, it is as if one is separating food from food. This concept is reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:7). it is forbidden.58The prohibition is, however, only Rabbinic in origin. This follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Shabbat 145a. Rabbenu Chanan'el rules that a person who squeezes these foods for the sake of their liquids is liable for transgressing a Torah prohibition.
We may not crush snow, so that liquid will flow from it.59For this resembles crushing grapes or olives to produce wine or oil (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba). The Maggid Mishneh continues, explaining that other commentaries (see Rashi, Shabbat 51b, Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 320) maintain that the prohibition stems from the fact that one is bringing into existence a new entity (nolad) on the Sabbath. It appears that the Rambam and the Rashba do not accept that rationale. One may, however, crush [snow] into a bowl or into a cup.60Rashi, Rabbenu Nissim, and others state that this refers to a cup or a bowl filled with liquid. They explain that this is permitted because the water from the snow will flow directly into this other liquid and will never exist as a separate distinct entity. The Rambam does not make such a distinction, and appears to allow squeezing the snow into an empty cup. It is possible that, according to the Rambam, this leniency also applies to the pickled and cooked foods mentioned in the first clause of this halachah. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:6.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:9) states this law slightly differently: \"One may place [snow] into a cup of wine or water so that it melts.\" Here, also, the Rambam is being more lenient, allowing the person to crush the snow by hand. The later authorities follow the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.

[The following rules apply to] garlic, unripe grapes, and unripe grain that were crushed before the commencement of the Sabbath: If it is necessary that they be crushed [further], it is forbidden to continue crushing them on the Sabbath. If it is necessary that they [merely] be ground by hand,61Note the Maggid Mishneh's treatment of this subject in his gloss on Chapter 3, Halachah 2. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, the leniency of this halachah is that one may perform an act to continue grinding these substances. it is permitted to complete grinding them on the Sabbath.
Accordingly, it is permitted to continue grinding kernels of grain with a wooden spoon in a pot62In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that this refers to mixing meat, grain, and soup into a single mixture. on the Sabbath after [the pot] was removed from the fire.63It is, however, forbidden to perform this activity while the pot is on the fire. Inevitably, one will stir the pot's contents, and this is considered part of the cooking process (Chapter 9, Halachah 4).", + "One may remove grain from husks in an abnormal manner so that it does not appear that one is extracting.64It is, however, forbidden to perform this activity while the pot is on the fire. Inevitably, one will stir the pot's contents, and this is considered part of the cooking process (Chapter 9, Halachah 4).
[An adult] who sucks milk with his mouth is not liable.65See Chapter 8, Halachah 10. If, however, he is groaning [from pain],66We have quoted the view of Tosafot (Yevamot 113a). Sucking milk fresh from an animal is considered a cure for pain felt in one's heart. The Rabbis question if this leniency also extends to a person groaning from hunger. it is permissible. Since he is extracting [the milk] in an abnormal manner67An animal is generally milked into a container. and he is in pain, the Sages do not forbid this, despite the fact that there is no danger involved.", + "The following rules apply when] liquids flow from fruit on the Sabbath:68I.e., without any human activity being performed on the Sabbath day. As opposed to the following halachah, this applies to fruit that was not crushed before the Sabbath. If they are olives or grapes,69Since the primary purpose for which these fruits are used is to produce beverages, the Rabbis instituted the following prohibition even when the person purchased these fruits to eat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 320:1). it is forbidden to partake of these liquids until Saturday night, lest one intentionally squeeze [these fruits] on the Sabbath.
If they are berries or pomegranates,70Which are often used to produce juice, as mentioned in Halachah 12. As mentioned in that halachah, the Rambam allows one to squeeze other fruits for juice. Surely there are no prohibitions against liquids that flow from them.
As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that whenever it is customary to drink a fruit's juice, the situation is governed by the laws that apply to pomegranates and berries.
[the following rules apply]: If the person takes them [home] to eat, the beverages that flow from them are permitted.71Since the person intended to eat the fruit, he does not appreciate the fact that liquid has flowed from them and is not likely to squeeze them to produce more (Mishnah Berurah 320:6).
If the person brought them home with no specific intention, any liquid that flows from them is prohibited (ibid.).
If he takes them [home] to press them [and extract their juice], the beverages that flow from them are forbidden until Saturday night.", + "When grapes or olives are crushed on Friday, the liquids that flow from them on the Sabbath on their own accord are permitted. Similarly, when honeycombs are crushed on Friday, the liquid that flows out on its own accord on the Sabbath is permitted. There is no reason for a prohibition [to be imposed], since they were already crushed on [Friday].72There is another opinion in the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), which forbids using liquid that flows from crushed honeycombs, lest one come to crush other ones on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, in practice, the more lenient view is accepted.", + "Winnowing and selecting are primary categories of [forbidden] labor.73See Chapter 8, Halachah 11. Therefore, even though a person is permitted to remove grain from husks with his fingertips,74See Halachah 14. when he blows air [over them to cause the husks to fall],75By blowing the air over them, he causes the husks to fall. Alternatively, this prohibition can be interpreted to refer to fanning the grain with one's hand or sifting it in the air. This appears to be the conception of the Shulchan Aruch which employs the word מנפה, \"sift,\" rather than מנפח, \"blow.\"
Although blowing away the chaff is part of the forbidden labor of winnowing, it is permitted, because one's intent is to partake of the food directly afterwards. See a parallel in Chapter 8, Halachah 12, in regard to the forbidden labor of separating.
he may do so [only while holding them] in one hand,76Implied is that using two hands is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 319:7) blowing with all his strength. He may not, however, use a tray or a pot with compartments,77As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 12, our translation of these terms is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Keilim 16:3. Most commentaries follow other interpretations. (See Ramah, loc. cit..) lest he use a sifter or a strainer, for which he is liable.
Filtering dregs is a derivative [of either of the forbidden labors] of selecting or of sifting.78See Chapter 8, Halachah 11, which states that three forbidden categories of labor - winnowing, selecting, and sifting - are very similar. Nevertheless, \"every labor that was performed in the Sanctuary is counted as a separate category.\"
In Chapter 8, Halachah 14, the Rambam speaks of filtering wine and water, mentioning several of the points touched on in this halachah.
Therefore, even though it is permitted to filter clear wine or clear water79But not wine or water that is filled with dregs. using a handkerchief or an Egyptian basket,80See, however, Chapter 22, Halachah 33, where the Rambam mentions how one must hold the Egyptian basket lest one violate a Rabbinic prohibition against erecting a tent.one should not make a hollow in the handkerchief [to gather the dregs] as one does during the week, lest one filter [dregs] with a filter. Similarly, it is forbidden to hang a filter as one does during the week, lest one filter [dregs with it].81Significantly, there are authorities who associate this prohibition with the prohibition against erecting a tent. (See also the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:14 and the Mishnah Berurah 319:49, which explain that the prohibition against hanging a filter was instituted to prevent involvement with \"mundane activity.\")
This refers to hanging the filter over a container in the manner in which one filters beverages. There is no prohibition, however, against hanging the filter in the open air (Mishnah Berurah 315:36).

Causing milk to curdle [to make cheese] is a derivative [of the category] of separating.82See Chapter 8, Halachah 11. Therefore, even though it is permitted to place sesame seeds and nuts into honey, one should not mix them into a block with one's hands.83Note the gloss of Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil and the Magen Avraham 319:19, who question the connection between mixing nuts into honey and making cheese. The Tosefta, Shabbat 13:12, mentions mixing nuts and honey in connection with the forbidden labor of kneading. Kinat Eliyahu explains that the Rambam's intent might be that just as when curdling milk for cheese one makes a single block of food from liquid, so too, one accomplishes the same objective by making such a candy.", + "[A person who] cuts vegetables into small pieces in order to cook84In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo notes that the Rambam's wording here (and in Chapter 7, Halachah 5) appears to indicate that one is liable for grinding only when cutting produce with the intention of cooking it. If, however, one intends to eat the produce raw - e.g., in a salad - one is not liable.
In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo concludes by stating that this interpretation is not absolutely imperative. In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:12), however, he states that one who cuts produce is liable for grinding without any qualification. The Ramah, in his gloss, clarifies that one is liable only when one cuts the vegetables and then stores them for later use. If one partakes of them immediately, one is not liable.
The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:10; Mishnah Berurah 321:45) mention opinions that question the leniency mentioned by the Ramah. They also emphasize that the Ramah granted permission to cut the vegetables only with a knife. Even he forbids using a grater or similar utensil.
them is liable [for performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of grinding.85See Chapter 8, Halachah 15. Therefore, it is forbidden to shred straw86In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 24:2), the Rambam explains that this refers to stalks of grain or beans that are harvested as animal fodder, before their produce matures. or carobs87The Mishnah Berurah 324:23 states that this refers to soft carobs that can be eaten without difficulty even when they are not cut. Carobs that have already hardened are forbidden to be cut. There is, however, room for questioning whether the Rambam would make such a distinction. for animals, whether in large or small pieces, because it appears as if one is grinding.88In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 324:7), Rav Yosef Karo differs with the Rambam and states that the reason for these prohibitions is that it is forbidden to undertake any unnecessary effort to prepare food for animals. Since these foods could be eaten without being shredded, it is forbidden to shred them on the Sabbath. One may, however, cut gourds for an animal, or an animal carcass89This refers even to an animal that died on the Sabbath itself. It is not considered muktzeh and may be served to dogs. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah 324:17, which questions whether this leniency applies if the animal was healthy before the commencement of the Sabbath. In this context, note Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:17, 2:16. for dogs, for there is no concept of grinding regarding fruit.90In this instance, we have translated the word פירות as \"fruit,\" rather than \"produce\" in order to avoid a difficulty mentioned by the commentaries. The Maggid Mishneh states that he has seen texts of the Mishneh Torah that read \"for grinding applies only regarding produce.\" Although he favors that version over the one found in the standard texts, he finds neither to be fully satisfying.
The Kessef Mishneh explains the Maggid Mishneh's equivocation as follows. The standard text is problematic, since straw and carobs are also produce, and if there were no prohibition against grinding produce, there would be no reason to forbid shredding them. The amended version, however, is also somewhat difficult, since gourds are also produce.
Rav Yosef Karo himself favors the standard text and states that the phrase \"there is no concept of grinding regarding...\" is the rationale for the prohibition against shredding carobs.
To explain: The word פירות in this instance has a more restricted meaning, meaning \"fruit\" rather than \"produce.\" The concept of grinding applies only with regard to grains and vegetables, but not with regard to fruit. Therefore, the prohibition against shredding carobs is only Rabbinic in origin. Although the clause pertaining to gourds and animal carcasses interposes between the clause regarding carobs and the rationale explaining it, that is not an insurmountable difficulty.

We may untie bundles of straw for an animal. One may spread out91With the palms of one's hands (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 24:2). small sheaves, but not large ones,92Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), which interprets all the terms in the relevant clause as referring to sheaves of straw, in contrast to Rashi and others, who interpret one term as referring to cedar bows. (See also the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh, who struggle to explain how the Rambam's ruling is derived from Shabbat 155a, the source for this halachah.) because this entails effort.93This refers to the principle stated in Shabbat (ibid.) and quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4), which states that we are able to lay out food for an animal to eat. We may not, however, undertake any extra difficulty to make the food more attractive and more accessible for the animal.", + "One may partake of bundles of siah, ezov, and kornit94From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 8:1), it appears that all three of these terms refer to species of hyssop. Hyssop is often used as animal fodder, but is occasionally employed as food for humans, and at times is used as kindling wood. and the like that were stored for use as animal fodder.95If, however, they are stored for use as kindling wood, it is forbidden to take them, as stated in Chapter 26, Halachah 18. One may break off some with one's fingertips, but should not break off a large amount with one's hands, so that one does not follow one's weekday practice and come to crush them.96Note the slight difference in the manner in which this law is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:1).", + "A person who must pulverize pepper and the like to season food on the Sabbath should crush it with the handle of a knife against the bowl.97Compare to Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 3:12, which states that one may crush peppers with a mortar and pestle. It is forbidden to use a pestle, for one is grinding.98Thus, one must depart from one's ordinary process in two ways, using the handle of a knife instead of a mortar, and using a bowl instead of a pestle. For this reason, it is forbidden for a healthy person to take medication on the Sabbath. This is a decree [enacted] lest one grind herbs.", + "What is implied? A person99This refers to a person who feels discomfort, but whose life is not in danger, nor would he be classified as being חולה, \"sick.\" Therefore, the various leniencies mentioned in Chapter 2 do not apply to him. should not partake of foods that are not ordinarily eaten by healthy people100The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) states that these restrictions apply only to a person who feels discomfort. A person who is totally healthy may partake of foods that are usually eaten only for medicinal purposes. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:43 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:120, however, qualify this leniency and state that if the person's intent is to enhance his health, it is forbidden even when he has no signs of illness. - e.g., hyssop and piah101A plant with red roots, used for dyeing or for medical purposes. - nor herbs that cause diarrhea - e.g., wormwood and the like. Nor should one drink beverages that are not ordinarily drunk by healthy people - e.g., water cooked with herbs and grasses.", + "A person102Even one suffering from discomfort. may, however, partake of coriander seed, hops, hyssop,103As reflected by a comparison to the previous halachah, there are several species of hyssop, some eaten by healthy people and some used primarily for medicinal purposes. and other foods and beverages that healthy people frequently eat and drink. Although they are being healed as they eat, this is permitted, since the food is ordinarily eaten by healthy people.104When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) mentions that even if it is obvious that the person is partaking of the food for medicinal purposes, since this food is also frequently eaten for other reasons, there is no prohibition.
A person who has drunk chiltit105A plant known as asafetida, possessing a resin that is bitter tasting, and which is used as a remedy for chest pains (Meiri).
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:3), the Rambam states that a beverage produced from this plant is often drunk by people in cold lands because of the warm sensation it produces.
before the Sabbath on several occasions may drink it on the Sabbath,106As indicated by Chapter 22, Halachah 7, once a person has begun drinking chiltit, he should continue. Otherwise, he risks the possibility of falling sick. Therefore, even though most healthy people in a community do not partake of this beverage, a person who has become accustomed to it may continue. even in places where it is not customary for healthy people to drink chiltit.107This is the text recommended by the Maggid Mishneh according to the explanation given in the previous note. There are, however, versions of the Mishneh Torah that read, \"A person who has drunk chiltit... may drink it in places where it is not customary for healthy people to drink chiltit.\" According to this version, chiltit is being given as an example of the concept stated in the first clause of this halachah. Egyptian beer108In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 3:1), the Rambam defines this as a beverage made from water, into which salt, barley flour, and wild saffron are mixed. Shabbat 101a explains that this beer helps people with stomach discomforts. may be drunk in all places.", + "[Similar concepts apply regarding oils:] A person is allowed to anoint himself on the Sabbath with oils that healthy people use to anoint themselves, even though his intent is for healing purposes. It is, however, forbidden [to anoint oneself with oils] that are not used by healthy people.109Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 327:1), who writes that at present it is not common for healthy people to apply oil to themselves. Therefore, it is forbidden to apply oil to oneself with any oil on the Sabbath for therapeutic purposes.
A person who has groinal discomfort may not apply wine or vinegar.110These liquids are not usually applied to the body. Therefore, when one applies them, it is obvious that one's intent is for medicinal purposes. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 327:1), which states \"one may not apply a mixture of oil and vinegar\" and does not mention the application of vinegar alone. He may, however, apply oil. One may use rose oil only in places where healthy people anoint themselves with it.111The Mishnah (Shabbat 14:4) records an opinion that states that only \"the sons of kings\" may apply rose oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, grants this license universally, for \"all Jews are the sons of kings.\" Shabbat 111b, however, restricts this leniency to places where this oil is freely available. It is permitted to anoint oneself with oil and salt in all places.112Shabbat 66b mentions that soaking one's hands and feet in a mixture of oil and salt is a remedy for intoxication.
A person who wounded his hand or foot may soak it in wine,113To stop the flow of blood. This refers to a wound that was not caused by an iron utensil, nor one that is located in a place where bleeding might be dangerous. In these instances, one may dress the wound in a normal manner even if it is necessary to violate the Sabbath laws (Shulchan Aruch Harav 328:34; Mishnah Berurah 328:91). but not in vinegar.114Nor in beverages with high alcoholic content (Mishnah Berurah 328:92). If his [constitution] is delicate, he is even forbidden [to soak it] in wine.", + "A person who feels discomfort in his teeth may not sip vinegar and spit it out.115The Mishnah (Shabbat 14:4) gives another alternative: Dipping one's food in vinegar. He may, however, sip it and swallow it. A person who has a sore throat may not gargle with oil. He may, however, drink large amounts of oil, and if he is cured in this manner, it is [welcome].116Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:39 mentions opinions that permit this only when the oil is mixed with vegetable juice, since otherwise it is not the usual practice to drink oil.
We may not chew gum.117This refers to raw gum taken from trees, and not to commercially prepared chewing gum. A person may not brush his teeth with herbs on the Sabbath if his intent is to cure [discomfort].118Some authorities forbid brushing one's teeth if one's gums are likely to bleed. Similarly, using toothpaste is forbidden. If, however, he intends to improve the fragrance of his breath, it is permitted.119The same principles apply to the use of mouthwash.", + "One may not apply wine to one's eyes, but one may place it on one's eyelids.120Based on Rashi, Shabbat 108b, the Shulchan Aruch 328:20 forbids opening and closing one's eye to let the wine in, even when the wine was applied to one's eyelids. It is forbidden to apply saliva taken from a person before he ate - even to one's eyelids. An eye salve that was left to soak on Friday121Note the apparent contradiction to Chapter 3, Halachah 2, which states that one may leave eye salve on one's eye on Friday, implying that the salve must be applied before the commencement of the Sabbath, and not afterwards.
From a comparison to the quotation of the laws in the Shulchan Aruch 252:5 and 328:21, the following resolution may be offered. When one applies an eye salve itself to one eye, it must be applied before the Sabbath. If, however, the salve is mixed with water and is no longer a distinct entity, one may rinse one's eyes with it on the Sabbath.
may be applied to one's eyes on the Sabbath without hesitation.
A person whose finger becomes wounded should not wind a reed122From the manner in which the Ramah (Orach Chayim 328:24) and others state this law, it would appear that the intent is not that the reed be used as a bandage, but that it has other therapeutic qualities as well. around it to heal it,123Eruvin 10:14 mentions that this was permitted in the Temple, because it was not necessary to observe the prohibitions classified as sh'vut there. (See Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 10:9.) From this statement, the Rambam derived that this is forbidden outside the Temple's premises. nor should he squeeze it tightly with his hand so that it bleeds.", + "We may not place hot water or oil124Although this appears to be the Rambam's intent, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:22) quotes this prohibition as referring to oil and hot water mixed together. on a wound, nor on a wad of unprocessed fabric that is above a wound, nor on a wad of unprocessed fabric to be placed on a wound.125Here there is an added difficulty. One may squeeze the liquids from the wadding when applying them to the wound and it is forbidden to squeeze liquids from a cloth. We may, however, apply it outside the wound [so that] it will flow into the wound.
We may place a dry wad of unprocessed fabric on a wound. If, however, it is aged fabric, this is forbidden, since this is like applying a bandage.126Note the differences between the manner in which this law is stated by the Rambam and by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:23).", + "A bandage that has fallen onto a utensil may be put back [on a wound].127As long as the bandage has not fallen on the ground, it is considered as if it merely slipped off the wound, and therefore it may be returned to its place.
It must be emphasized that the bandages referred to here are those to which salves or other liquids have been applied. Applying such a bandage resembles smearing substances. There is no restriction against placing a bandaid or other dry bandage on a wound on the Sabbath. See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:23-24).
If, however, it falls to the ground, one is forbidden to put it back.128Eruvin 102b and the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:25) interpret this prohibition as a safeguard, lest one come to spread a salve. Since the bandage was applied on Friday, there is no reason for a safeguard lest one grind herbs.
We may place a bandage on a wound for the first time in the Temple [on the Sabbath],129Outside the Temple, there is a prohibition against placing a bandage on a wound for the first time on the Sabbath, lest one grind herbs, and lest one spread the salves. Nevertheless, since both these prohibitions are considered in the category of sh'vut, they are waived in the Temple.
This is the explanation according to the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, and this text is accepted by Rav Kapach and Rav Frankel in their texts of the Mishneh Torah. The Maggid Mishneh, however, questions this version of the text based on the Eruvin 10:13, which states, \"We may return a bandage [to a wound] in the Temple, but not elsewhere.\" Indeed, his question is reinforced by the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, which states that outside of the Temple, one may not return a bandage to its place after it has fallen to the ground. In the Temple, however, this is permitted. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to place a bandage on a wound for the first time on the Sabbath even in the Temple.
Nevertheless, several of the later commentaries (Seder HaMishneh; Or Sameach) attempt to justify the standard text of the Mishneh Torah, basing their explanations on the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:16, where the Rambam states that when Pesach was celebrated on the Sabbath, the priests would wash the floor of the Temple Courtyard on the Sabbath to clean away the blood and refuse from the Paschal sacrifices.
In the source for that halachah, Pesachim 65a, there is a difference of opinion on this matter among the Sages. Rabbi Natan maintains that the only time a prohibition that is in the category of sh'vut is suspended in the Temple is when transgressing it is necessary for the Temple service. Therefore, he rules that it is forbidden to wash the Temple floor on such an occasion, for doing so is an expression of respect for the Temple, but is not a necessity for its service to continue.
From the fact that the Rambam rejects Rabbi Natan's view, it is clear that he maintains that - as he says simply in this halachah - \"The prohibitions classified as sh'vut do not apply in the Temple\" - i.e., they do not apply at all. The Mishnah in Eruvin follows Rabbi Natan's opinion. Therefore, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains Rabbi Natan's position. This explanation does not reflect the Rambam's own view; that is expressed in our halachah.
for the prohibitions classified as sh'vut do not apply in the Temple.130For the priests were careful and would not come to violate a Torah prohibition (the gloss of Rabbenu Yehonatan, Eruvin 102b). In all places, one is allowed to clean the opening of a wound. One may not, however, clean a bandage, lest one spread [a salve].131Significantly, when the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:26 cites this law, it changes the wording slightly and states, \"for one is spreading [a salve].\" Spreading a salve is a derivative of the forbidden labor of smoothing, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 6.", + "One may apply oil and massage132Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:6). the intestines on the Sabbath, provided that one applies oil and massages at the same time, so that one will not follow one's weekday practice.
One may not work-out on the Sabbath. What is meant by a work-out? Others tread on a person's body forcefully until he becomes exerted and begins to perspire, or a person walks [vigorously]133The Tosefta (Shabbat 17:22) states, \"One may not run for exercise on the Sabbath, but one may walk leisurely the entire day.\" Note also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:2), which grants license for youths to perform calisthenics on the Sabbath if they enjoy doing so. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah, which emphasizes that the license is granted only when one enjoys the physical activity, and not when one does so for health purposes. until he exerts himself and begins to perspire. It is forbidden to exert oneself on the Sabbath to the extent of perspiring, for this is a therapeutic practice. Similarly, one may not stand in mud baths in Eretz Yisrael, because this is exerting and therapeutic.", + "One may not wash in water that causes diarrhea, nor in quicksand,134The Maggid Mishneh notes that these two phrases refer to alternate explanations offered by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi of the expression, \"We do not go down to Kordima (alt. Poltima),\" in the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:6). Although in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that Mishnah differently, both the interpretations given by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi represent valid halachic points. nor in water [in which flax was left to] soak and which has turned foul smelling, nor in the Dead Sea, nor in the foul water in the Mediterranean,135One may, however, bathe in the pleasant waters of the Mediterranean, even though they are salty (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:44). because all of these cause discomfort, and [Isaiah 58:13] states, \"And you shall call the Sabbath a delight.\"
Accordingly, if one does not remain in these [bodies of water] for an extended time, but rather emerges immediately, it is permitted136For it appears that one has entered these bodies of water to cool off (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).even though one has sores on one's scalp.", + "We may not scrape our skin with a utensil used for that purpose.137Rashi, Shabbat 147b, explains that this prohibition was instituted to prevent \"ordinary activity.\" On this basis, the Magen Avraham 327:1 relates that if one has a utensil designated for use on the Sabbath, this would be permitted. It is questionable, however, whether the Rambam accepts that rationale and that leniency. If, however, one's hands are soiled with feces or with mud, one may scrape in one's ordinary manner without concern.
We may apply oil to and peel off [the scabs of] a human's [wound]138The bracketed additions are based on Rashi's commentary, Shabbat 53b. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:28) which states that this leniency applies only in places where it is common for people to annoint themselves with oil. for pleasure,139I.e., even when the wound has begun to heal and the scabs have dried (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:22). but not those of an animal. If, however, the animal is in discomfort, we may apply oil and peel off [its scabs] to eliminate aggravation.140The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 332:2) is slightly more specific regarding this law, explaining that one may not treat an animal's scabs when they have already dried out and have begun to heal. When, however, the scabs are fresh and the wound still smarts, the scabs may be treated.
When an animal has eaten an excessive amount of beans, we may have it run in the courtyard so that it is cured. If it turns red,141Literally, \"was taken by blood.\" we may have it stand in water so that it will cool. We do not suspect that one will grind herbs.142Although a person is forbidden to perform any activity that is solely therapeutic in nature for the sake of a human being who is in discomfort, this restriction is not imposed regarding an animal's discomfort. The rationale is that a person generally is not disturbed about his animal's discomfort to the extent that he might be motivated to grind herbs for medication on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 332:3; Mishnah Berurah 332:5).
It must, however, be emphasized that when an animal is very seriously afflicted, greater leniency is allowed. For example, one may have a gentile perform forbidden labors to save the animal. This is allowed because our Sages feared that when an animal's life was in danger, its owner would not hesitate to perform the forbidden labors himself to save the animal if he were not given any other alternative (ibid.).
", + "A person may not cause himself to vomit food on the Sabbath. When does this apply? When he uses a drug,143Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:39), which states that because this is a wasteful activity, it is forbidden during the week as well, unless one is suffering discomfort. for he may come to crush herbs. It is, however, permitted to place one's hand down one's throat so that one will vomit.
It is forbidden to press the stomach of an infant so that he will defecate,144This is one of the instances where the commentaries have difficulty discovering the Rambam's source. There is no explicit statement to this effect in the Talmud, and the Rabbis have offered several possible references from which it is possible that this concept could have been derived. lest one give him curative herbs. It is permitted to place a cup over an [infant's] navel to lift it up.145Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:40) permits placing hot cups to cure a stomach ailment. It is permitted to place a neck-brace or hip-girdle around a child.146The latter practice involves tying a newborn baby's limbs with cloth so that they grow straight. This practice is still followed in several Yemenite communities. Similarly, one may lift up [the tendons of a child's] ears, whether by hand or with an instrument, and lift up cartilage on one's chest.147See Chapter 2, Halachah 10. For all of these [activities] are performed [by hand], and not with herbs. Since [the person] is in pain and there is no suspicion that one may crush [herbs,] [these activities are permitted].148To relate the Rambam's decision to terms of our contemporary experience: Medication may not be given on the Sabbath. Physiotherapy, by contrast, is permitted.", + "Sifting is one of the categories of forbidden labor.149See Chapter 8, Halachot 11 and 16. Therefore, we may not sift straw in a sieve or place a sieve with straw in a high place so that the chaff will fall,150I.e., exposing the straw to the wind so that the chaff will be blown away. since this is like sifting. One may, however, place straw in a sieve and carry it to [an animal's] feeding trough, even though the chaff falls while one is transferring it, since this is not one's intent.151Rashi explains that this act is permitted, because although it is possible that a forbidden labor, sifting, might be performed, it is done unintentionally. Hence, there is no prohibition involved. Kinat Eliyahu adds that here we are speaking about an activity that resembles sifting and which is forbidden by the Rabbis for that reason, but not about the forbidden labor of sifting itself. Therefore, forbidding carrying the straw in a sieve because some might unintentionally be sifted would be \"a safeguard for a Rabbinic decree.\" Hence, there is no prohibition.", + "A person who creates a mixture of small particles and water is liable for [performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of] kneading.152See Chapter 8, Halachah 16. Therefore, one may not make a mixture of a large amount of roasted flour,153According to the Rambam, mixing roasted flour with water is forbidden by the Rabbis, but does not violate the Torah's prohibition against making a mixture of solid particles and water. The Torah's prohibition involves adding water to a collection of granular substances - e.g., flour or cement - and mixing them until they cling together as a single mass.
Other authorities [Tosafot (Shabbat 18a), the Ra'avad (see Chapter 18, Halachah 15), the Ramban, and the Rashba] differ and maintain that according to the Torah, one is liable for mixing any substance with water, even if its particles do not stick together. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:16 and Be'ur Halachah 321.)
lest one come to knead unroasted flour.154Mixing even small amounts of unroasted flour, by contrast, is forbidden (Mishnah Berurah 321:53). One may, however, mix [small amounts] of roasted [flour] a little at a time.
In contrast, shatit, i.e., grain that has not matured to a third of its fullness155Rashi (Shabbat 155b) does not differentiate between shatit and roasted flour. and is roasted and coarsely ground, resembles sand. Large quantities of it may be mixed with vinegar and the like at once, provided the mixture is soft.156I.e., free-flowing as opposed to viscous. If it is firm, it is forbidden, for it appears as though one is kneading.
[Even when making a soft mixture,] one must deviate from one's ordinary practice. What is implied? First, one must put in the shatit and then the vinegar.157During the week, by contrast, the vinegar is usually put in first (Shabbat 156a).", + "Although bran does not produce a mixture resembling a dough,158When bran is mixed into water, the particles remain separate and do not stick together, as mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah. it is forbidden to be mixed with water, lest one mix earth159I.e., substances whose particles do adhere to each other when mixed with water. and the like.
One may pour water over bran and stir it with a spoon in all directions.160But not in circular movement, lest it appear that one is kneading (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 324:3).
This ruling relates to another difference of opinion among the Sages which was not resolved and was, therefore, perpetuated by the later Rabbis. Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah (Shabbat 155b) mentions that kneading involves actually mixing the dough with one's hands. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi differs and maintains that one is liable for kneading as soon as one pours water into flour.
The Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's opinion is, however, accepted by some authorities (Sefer HaTerumot), is referred to in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:16), and is preferred by the Ramah. According to this view, we may not stir a mixture of bran and water on the Sabbath unless the water was added before the commencement of the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).
One may not mix it with one's hands, so that it will not appear that one is kneading. If it does not mix well, one may pour it from one container to another until it mixes well, and then give it to the chickens or the oxen.
It is permissible to mix bran in the above manner in one container and then divide it into several containers, giving each animal [its portion]. One may mix even a kor or two korim [of bran together] in one container.161I.e., one is allowed to mix as large a quantity as one needs for that Sabbath. One may not, however, mix bran that one does not need on that Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 324:9).", + "One may not [force-]feed domesticated animals, beasts, or fowl on the Sabbath in the same way as one feeds them during the week, lest one crush beans, knead flour, or [perform another] similar [activity].162Note the Levush (Orach Chayim 324), which offers a different reason for this prohibition: It represents an expenditure of effort that is not necessary to provide the animal with food for the Sabbath.
What is implied? On the Sabbath, one should not feed a camel enough food for three or four days.163Before a camel-driver set out on a journey with his beast, he would force-feed it enough food to last several days, to minimize the amount of fodder he would have to carry (Meiri). One may not throw down a calf or the like, hold its mouth open and pour in beans and water at one time.164This refers to calves that are force-fed to fatten them for slaughter. Similarly, one may not place [food deep] in the mouths of doves or chickens, in a place from which they cannot spit it out.
One may, however, feed an animal while it is standing and give it water while it is standing,165See Chapter 15, Halachah 1. or one may place both water and beans separately in its mouth,166The Mishnah Berurah 324:28 emphasizes that even if one is allowed to force feed-animals, one must do so without moving the animal, for an animal is muktzeh. provided it is possible for [the animal] to spit them up. Similarly, one may feed fowl by hand as long as they can spit the food up.167This issue has import within the context of the socio-economic history of the Jewish people. In Eastern Europe, one of the main sources of income for the Jewish people was raising fattened geese. These geese were force-fed during the week to the extent that they were unable to consume enough food to satiate themselves on the Sabbath unless they were force-fed. Some Rabbis allowed force-feeding them on the Sabbath, while others forbade it. (See Mishnah Berurah 324:27.) There are authorities who forbade the practice entirely, because of cruelty to animals, and because of the problems in kashrut that might arise. Needless to say, one may place food before the animals so that they can eat.", + "When does [the license to feed animals] mentioned above apply? Regarding an animal that one is responsible for feeding - e.g., one's domesticated animals, one's beasts, doves raised within one's home, geese, and chickens.168Note the Be'ur Halachah 324, which draws attention to the following question: Is one Jew allowed to feed animals that another Jew is responsible to feed? Seemingly, since their owner is allowed to feed them, that same license is granted to other Jews. The Be'ur Halachah favors granting this leniency. One may not, by contrast, provide food or water for animals that one is not responsible for feeding - e.g., pigs,169Even if the pigs belong to a Jew, he is forbidden to feed them on the Sabbath. This decree was imposed because the Rabbis prohibited raising pigs (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 409). Therefore, if one possesses pigs in a manner that does not violate this prohibition - e.g., a gentile pays one a debt with a pig - one may feed them on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 324:30). doves raised in a dovecote, and bees.170In this instance, even though a person owns these animals, since they usually are left to find their own food, providing them with food is considered to be an unnecessary expenditure of effort (Shulchan Aruch Harav 324:7; Mishnah Berurah 324:29).
A person may lead his animal directly to grass that is still growing and allow it to eat. He may not, by contrast, lead it to [food] that has been set aside [not to be used on the Sabbath].171Rav David Arameah explains that this is a decree imposed lest one pick up the food that has been set aside and feed it to the animal.One may, nevertheless, stand in front of the animal until it turns, and, on its own accord, heads to the food that has been set aside and partakes of it. The same [laws apply] on the holidays." + ], + [ + "Although removing a loaf [of bread from the side of an oven] does not involve a [forbidden] labor, our Sages forbade doing so, lest one be prompted to bake.1See Chapter 3, Halachah 18, and Chapter 5, Halachah 19, where this subject is discussed at length. As the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 254:5) states, if one places the loaf of bread into the oven in time for it to form a crust, there is no prohibition against removing it on the Sabbath. When, however, there was not enough time for a crust to form, one must follow the instructions mentioned by the Rambam.
If one stuck a loaf to [the side of] an oven before the commencement of the Sabbath, and afterwards the Sabbath began, one may remove enough for three meals. Similarly, one may tell others, \"Come and take for yourselves.\"2Note the parallel in Chapter 23, Halachah 24. Although removing a loaf does not involve a [forbidden] labor, in this situation, when one removes a loaf, one should not do so with a baker's peel, but rather with a knife, in order to deviate from one's ordinary procedure.", + "Why did the Sages forbid entering a bathhouse on the Sabbath?3I.e., according to the Torah, there is no prohibition against bathing. Because the attendants would heat up water on the Sabbath, and say that it has been heated before the commencement of the Sabbath. For this reason, our Sages decreed that one should not enter a bathhouse4Even one without attendants (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:1). on the Sabbath, even to use [merely] as a steam bath.5As Shabbat 40a relates, a series of Rabbinic decrees were passed regarding bathhouses. When the Sages saw that the bath attendants would heat up water on the Sabbath, they forbade bathing, but allowed the people to enter a bathhouse to use as a steam bath. Afterwards, they saw that because of this leniency their original prohibition was not being observed, and they forbade entering a bathhouse altogether.
The Rambam permits bathing in cold water, and this ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 326:1). Nevertheless, most of the later Ashkenazic halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:6; Mishnah Berurah 326:21) state that it is customary not to bathe on the Sabbath at all, even in cold water. As is mentioned in Chapter 23, Halachah 8, an exception to the above rules is made regarding immersion in the mikveh.

Similarly, they decreed that a person should not rinse his entire body with hot water6I.e., even when one does not enter a bath. - even if the water was heated on Friday. One may, however, wash one's face, hands, and feet7Or other select portions of the body. A woman may wash her vaginal area in preparation for a hefsek taharah. [with hot water that was heated before the commencement of the Sabbath]. When do the above [restrictions] apply? To water that is heated by fire. One may, however, rinse one's entire body in the hot springs of Tiberias and the like.8Similarly, leniency is granted regarding open bodies of water that have been heated by the sun, as stated in Halachah 9.
It is forbidden to bathe in hot springs located in caves, for the cave is filled with hot air, and one will sweat [as in a steam bath].9Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 326:11, which favor opinions that do not accept this restriction. Thus, it resembles a bathhouse.", + "A person may warm himself before a fire and then go out and rinse his entire body in cold water. He may not, however, rinse his entire body in cold water10See the following halachah and notes, which deal with the question whether this restriction applies after rinsing, not only one's entire body, but even a single limb. and then warm himself by a fire. By doing so, the water on his body will become lukewarm, and it would be as if he washed his entire body in warm water.11The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that in this instance, it is not heating the water in itself that is forbidden, since one is heating it to a minimal temperature. (See the following halachah.) Rather, the problem stems from the resemblance to bathing in warm water.
When a person causes a duct of cold water to pass through hot water,12I.e., a duct or pipe containing cold water passes through a body of hot water and thus becomes warm. Even if one does not take the water from the duct itself, but has the duct flow into a pool, the water is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:3). Shabbat 3:3 relates that the inhabitants of Tiberias actually had such a heating system constructed, but the Sages forbade its use. even water coming from the hot springs of Tiberias, the water is considered as if it was heated [by fire] on the Sabbath13The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions that even if the pipe was brought into the hot water on Friday, the water may not be used on the Sabbath. and one is forbidden to wash in it or drink it.", + "A person may bring a cask of water and place it in front of a fire, not in order that it will be warmed, but to dispel its chill. Similarly, one may place a flask of oil in front of a fire so that it will become lukewarm, but not so that it will be heated.14The Rambam's intent is that the water or the oil may be heated to the point that it becomes hot enough to burn a infant's belly.
This decision is questioned by the Rabbis. Rashi and the Rambam interpret the Talmudic passage (Shabbat 40b) that serves as the source for this halachah as meaning that one may not allow the temperature of the liquid to reach the point where it could burn an infant's belly. The Rashba, Tosafot and others, however, follow a more stringent ruling and forbid placing a liquid in a place where the potential exists for it to become hot enough to burn a infant's belly, even if one removes it before that time. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:14) accepts the latter view.

A person may dip his hand in water or oil and warm it in front of a fire,15The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 326:5) mentions opinions that differ and maintain that the restriction mentioned in the previous halachah applies not only after rinsing one's entire body, but after washing a single limb. For example, a person who washes his hands should not warm them by a fire. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:4 counsels following this stringency. provided the water [or oil] on his hand will not become so hot that it could burn an infant's belly.16This is the halachic definition of the term יד סולדת בו. In contemporary measure, this is defined as 42 to 45 degrees centigrade by contemporary authorities. One may warm a cloth and place it on one's stomach on the Sabbath.", + "We may not place cold water in a tub in a bathhouse17With this statement, the Rambam emphasizes that the tub is very hot and contains a large amount of water. Therefore, even though it is a כלי שני - i.e., not a vessel that was itself heated on a fire, but a vessel into which hot water was poured - there are still restrictions, as the Rambam explains. Implied is that even though we generally follow the rule that the heat of a כלי שני is not sufficient to cook something placed within, a tub in a bathhouse is an exception.
The above represents the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh. In the Kessef Mishneh, by contrast, Rav Yosef Karo explains that the tub we are speaking about is a כלי ראשון, a vessel in which water was heated. Were it to be a כלי שני, there would be no restrictions. His ruling in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:11), appears to reflect this same view. The Ramah differs and clarifies in his gloss that the tub here is a כלי שני, adopting the explanation of the Maggid Mishneh.
that is filled with hot water, for [the cold water] will become very hot.18The Ramah 318:12 states that if the amount of cold water the person adds at one time is so great that the it will not become hot, there is no prohibition against adding it, even to a כלי ראשון. Similarly, one may not place a flask of oil in such a tub, for it is considered as if one is cooking it.19Shabbat 40b mentions that oil that is placed in a כלי שני does not cook. The Kessef Mishneh thus uses this as a support for his thesis that the Rambam is speaking about a tub that is a כלי ראשון. Others explain that, as stated above, even though in most instances we follow the rule that the heat of a כלי שני is not sufficient to cook something placed within, a tub in a bathhouse is an exception.
See also Hilchot Ma'aser 3:15, where it appears that the Rambam maintains that if a כלי שני is hot enough to burn a person's hand, oil that is placed inside will be cooked. The Radbaz, however, explains that the laws applying to cooking on the Sabbath are different from those applying to cooking regarding ma'aser.
One may, however, place hot water in a tub of cold water.20Even according to the opinions that the Rambam is referring to a כלי ראשון, this is permitted. Although there are restrictions against pouring water from a כלי ראשון onto spices and the like, these restrictions do not apply when water is poured into other water. The rationale is that the waters mix and there is no time when the heat of the water from the כלי ראשון will be concentrated in a single space (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:20; Mishnah Berurah 318:78).", + "After hot water was removed from a cooking urn, it is permitted to pour in cold water so that it will become lukewarm.21According to Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch 318:12), this refers to a heating urn that was emptied entirely of hot water. One might think that pouring cold water in it would be forbidden, since the possibility exists that by doing so one will refine the metal of the urn. (See Chapter 12, Halachah 2, and notes.) Nevertheless, since this is not one's intent (אינו מתכוין), nor is it absolutely certain that this will take place (i.e., it is not a פסיק רישא), this is permitted (Chapter 1, Halachah 6).
The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah accept this law, but they explain that it is also possible to interpret the Rambam's words as referring to an urn that was partially emptied of the water that was cooked in it, and then cold water was added. Even though the urn is a כלי ראשון, as long as so much cold water is poured in that it cannot become hot enough to burn an infant's belly, there is no prohibition involved.
It is permitted to pour hot water22I.e., even hot water that is in a כלי ראשון. into cold water or cold water into hot water,23Which is in a כלי שני. provided [the hot water] is not in a vessel that was cooked on a fire,24The Mishnah Berurah 318:82 emphasizes that if there is a small quantity of cold water, the restriction against using water from a כלי ראשון applies in both instances. One may not pour a small amount of cold water into a large amount of hot water, nor may one pour a large amount of hot water into a small amount of cold water. This ruling is not, however, accepted by all authorities. As mentioned above, according to the Ramah, one may pour hot water into a large amount of cold water, and a large amount of cold water into hot water, even if the hot water is in a כלי ראשון. since this will raise the temperature [of the cold water] greatly.
Similarly, when a pot is boiling, one should not place spices in it, even after one has removed it from the fire.25This law applies to most other substances, for most substances will cook in a כלי ראשון even after it is removed from a fire. One may, however, salt it, since salt cooks only on a very large flame.26There is a difference of opinion concerning this matter among the Rabbis. The Tur (Orach Chayim 318) and Tosafot (Shabbat 40b) differ and maintain that salt requires only a minimal amount of cooking and should not even be placed in a כלי שני. The later authorities emphasize that this depends on the type of salt used. In many communities, it is common to follow the more stringent ruling. If one poured the food from a pot to a bowl, one may place spices on it, even if it is boiling, since a vessel into which food has been poured does not [possess sufficient heat to] cook.27It must be emphasized that our Sages mention that there are certain substances that do not require much cooking and can be cooked even in a כלי שני. For that reason, some authorities maintain that we should be stringent and not place any uncooked articles in a כלי שני, for we are unsure of which substances are included in the category of foods that do not require much cooking. See Ramah, Orach Chayim 318:5.", + "[On the Sabbath,] we may not place chiltit28See Chapter 21, Halachah 22. in hot water nor in cold water to soak.29From the Rambam's placement of this halachah in this chapter, it would appear that he sees this as falling into the category of prohibitions instituted as a safeguard against cooking on the Sabbath, and not as one of the prohibitions instituted because it is forbidden to prepare remedies on the Sabbath. One may, however, soak it in vinegar. If one drank chiltit on Thursday and on Friday, one may soak it in cold water on the Sabbath, place it in the sun to warm, and drink it, lest ceasing to drink it cause one to become sick.30Since soaking chiltit in cold water is forbidden only because of a Rabbinic prohibition, this prohibition is overridden because of the possibility of the person's becoming ill.", + "When food has been cooked before the Sabbath or soaked in hot water before the Sabbath, one is permitted to soak it in hot water on the Sabbath even though it is presently cold.31This law touches on the principle, אין בישול אחר בישול, \"One is not liable for cooking something that is already cooked.\" Although this principle is accepted by all authorities, the scope of its application varies. To focus on the approach of the Rambam and to compare it to the perspective of other authorities, it is worthy to focus on each point in particular:
When food has been cooked before the Sabbath - According to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:4), this refers only to food that has been thoroughly cooked.
or soaked in hot water before the Sabbath - In contrast to the Rambam's decision, the Mishnah Berurah 318:31 rules that food that was soaked in hot water before the Sabbath may be placed in hot water in a כלי שני, but should not be placed in hot water in a כלי ראשון.
one is permitted to soak it in hot water - This refers to water in a כלי ראשון that was removed from its cooking surface. It is forbidden to place any food in a pot on a cooking surface after the Sabbath has commenced (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:9; Mishnah Berurah 318:33).
on the Sabbath even though it is presently cold. - The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that this leniency applies only to cooked food that is dry. If the food is liquid, placing it in a כלי ראשון that is hot is considered to be cooking. From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:2), it would appear that he also accepts this limitation. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 318), however, maintains that the Rambam does not hold one liable, even when one reheats foods that are not dry.

Although food is cold, and it had never been placed in hot water previously, it may be rinsed in hot water on the Sabbath,32From the Rambam's wording, it is unclear if this refers to water that was in a כלי ראשון or in a כלי שני. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 3:4), it would appear that he maintains that it is permitted to pour water from a כלי ראשון directly on foods.
According to the Ashkenazic authorities, we are permitted to pour hot water on uncooked foods only from a כלי שני (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:11; Mishnah Berurah 318:35). Hot water from a כלי ראשון will cook the surface of the food onto which it is poured.
if this rinsing does not complete its preparation.33This clause comes to eliminate foods like aged salted fish or sole, whose preparation is completed by washing them with hot water. As the Rambam writes in Chapter 9, Halachah 2, one is liable for violating the forbidden labor of cooking merely by rinsing these foods with hot water. One may not, however, soak it for the first time on the Sabbath.34The prohibition applies only to soaking the food in hot water. One may soak it in cold water (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 318:11; Mishnah Berurah 318:37).", + "Although it is forbidden to heat [food or water] using substances that derive their heat from the sun,35See Chapter 9, Halachah 3. This prohibition was instituted lest one err and think that just as it is permitted to cook using articles heated by the sun, it is permitted to cook using articles heated by fire. it is permitted to heat [them] in the heat of the sun itself, for one will not err between the sun and fire.36I.e., the leniency of placing water in the sun will not cause one to think that it is permitted to place food on a fire. Therefore, it is permitted to place water in the sun to warm.37In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:4), the Rambam emphasizes that this law is mentioned because one might think that placing the water in the sun is forbidden, lest one place food in hot ashes.
On this basis, many authorities allow the use of water that has been heated by solar energy units on the Sabbath. Even the more stringent opinions, which object to such use, have no difficulty with the concept of using water heated by the sun. They base their objections on other rationales, among them:
That water heated by the solar energy units is heated by an object heated by the sun and not by the sun itself.
The water in the urn of the solar energy unit is very hot. When cold water enters that unit, it will be heated by the water and produce a situation resembling that of the tub mentioned in Halachah 5.

Similarly, we may place [a bottle of] pleasant water into [a pool of] stagnant water so that it cool.38The bracketed additions are taken from Rashi's commentary (Shabbat 146b). Similarly, we may place a [dish of] cooked food into a cistern to preserve it.39Rashi (loc. cit.) explains that were the food left in the sun, it might spoil. By placing it in the cistern, one preserves it.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit., based on Shabbat 146b), the Rambam emphasizes that this law is mentioned because one might think that placing the food in the cistern is forbidden lest one smooth out the cistern's floor.
", + "A person may mix water, salt and oil, and dip his bread in the mixture or pour it onto cooked food. This is permitted provided one makes only a small amount.40Enough for one meal (Ba'er Heteiv 321:4). Making a large amount is forbidden,41Significantly, Rashi (Shabbat 108b) explains that the rationale for all the laws in this halachah is that salting or pickling foods is comparable to processing leather. This rationale is mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:2). The Rambam, however, maintains that the forbidden labor of processing does not apply with regard to food (Chapter 11, Halachah 5). for it appears that one is performing one of the labors associated with cooking. Similarly, one may not make strong salt water42In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo states that it is forbidden to make even a small amount of such a mixture. - i.e., two thirds salt and one third water - for it would appear as if one is making fish-brine.43In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that usually fish-brine is preserved. Hence, it would appear that one is pickling food.
One may salt an egg, but not radishes and the like,44Included in the latter category are any vegetables that salt softens or makes less bitter. This includes onions, cucumbers, and most vegetables used for salads (Magen Avraham 321:7). because it would appear that one is pickling food on the Sabbath. Pickling is forbidden, because it is as though one is cooking.45The Rambam's intent is not that pickling is forbidden as a derivative of cooking, but that there is a Rabbinic prohibition against doing so (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:3; Mishnah Berurah 321:16). Note, however, Karti Ufalti 105:2, which maintains that the Rambam considers that there is a Torah prohibition involved. One may, however, dip radishes and the like into salt and eat them [directly afterwards].46Similarly, a mixture of salt, vinegar, and oil (or other substances used for salad dressings) may be placed on these vegetables, because it no longer appears that one is salting the vegetables to pickle them (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:4; Mishnah Berurah 321:14).", + "One may mix wine, honey, and peppers together47Note the Mishnah Berurah 321:69, which permits making this mixture only when one does not undertake much effort in doing so. on the Sabbath to partake of them. Wine, water, and balsam oil are forbidden to be mixed, because this mixture is not fit to be eaten by healthy people.48Hence, this mixture, like any other remedy, may not be drunk on the Sabbath even if it was prepared before the Sabbath.", + "When mustard has been mixed on Friday, one may blend49The Rambam appears to be saying that one may stir the mixture. The Mishnah Berurah 321:58, however, quotes this law as meaning that one may add water or wine to the mixture. Although the Rambam would probably accept that ruling as well, based on his conception of the Rabbinic prohibitions against kneading (see Chapter 21, Halachot 33-34 and notes), this is not likely his intent here. it [on the Sabbath] by hand or with a utensil50The Hebrew word כלי can be rendered as either \"utensil\" or \"container.\" On this basis, the Kessef Mishneh mentions the interpretation of Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 53), which explains that one may shake a container to blend the mixture, but one may not stir it by hand. He does not, however, accept this as reflecting the Rambam's intent. and add honey to it. One may not stir it forcefully,51I.e., whip it forcefully by hand to produce a smooth, evenly flowing mixture. however; [all that is permitted is to] mix it.
Oil, vinegar, and spices may be added [on the Sabbath] to cress52A leafy vegetable that is used as a spice or dip when mixed with the abovementioned substances.that was stirred on Friday. One may not stir the mixture] forcefully, however; [all that is permitted is to] mix in [these ingredients]. Garlic that was crushed on Friday may be placed into groats on the Sabbath. One may not grind [the mixture]; [all that is permitted is to] mix in [the garlic].", + "A person who removes hair from a person's body is liable for [performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of] shearing.53As explained in Chapter 9, Halachot 8-9. Therefore, it is forbidden to wash one's hands with a substance that will without doubt remove hair - e.g., ohaloh54A fragrant spice, noted for its cleansing powers. and the like.55This follows the principle of פסיק רישא stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6 - i.e., since one's act will surely result in the performance of a prohibited act, it is considered as if this is one's intent. Although a Rabbinic prohibition is involved here, the same principle still holds.
One may cleanse one's hands with frankincense powder, pepper powder, jasmine powder, and the like, without concern that one might remove the hair on one's hands, for this is not one's intent.56This decision is based on the principle of אינו מתכוין, that an act that results in the performance of a forbidden labor is permitted if it is not a certainty that the forbidden labor will indeed come about. Indeed, the Rambam uses this law to exemplify this principle in Chapter 1, Halachah 5.
[The following rules apply when] one mixes a substance that will undoubtedly remove hair together with a substance that will not necessarily remove hair: If the majority [of the mixture] is composed of a substance that will undoubtedly remove hair, it is forbidden to clean one's hands with it.57This is the version in the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah. The Maggid Mishneh notes that there is another version of the text which reverses the order in this clause, stating, \"If the majority was a substance that will not necessarily remove hair, it is permitted.\" There is a difference in the rulings resulting from these two versions of the text when the amount of both substances is equal. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 326:9) follows the version of the standard text.
Sefer HaKovetz questions why such a leniency is allowed, and explains that all prohibitions based on the principle of פסיק רישא are merely Rabbinic in origin. Accordingly, since the substances that undoubtedly remove hair are not in the majority, leniency is granted. (It must be noted that it is difficult to reconcile the statements of Sefer HaKovetz with the Rambam's own statements, Chapter 1, Halachah 6, that one is liable for performing such an act.)
If not, it is permitted.", + "One may not look at oneself in a mirror of [polished] metal on the Sabbath. [This is] a decree [enacted] lest one use it to remove loose hanging strands of hair.58I.e., as Shabbat 149b emphasizes, the difficulty is because a metal mirror can serve as a cutting article itself. This applies even if the mirror is affixed to the wall.59The Sages desired that their decrees be applied uniformly. One may, by contrast, look at oneself in a mirror that is not made of metal, even if it is not affixed [to a wall].60This includes a glass mirror, as is used today (Maggid Mishneh; Mishnah Berurah 302:63).", + "A person who launders is liable for [performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of] whitening, and one who wrings out a garment is liable because he is [performing one of the activities involved in] laundering.61See Chapter 9, Halachah 11. Therefore, it is forbidden to press a piece of cloth, unprocessed fabric, or the like into the opening of a flask to plug it, lest one squeeze62Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil questions the Rambam's ruling, since one's intent is not to wring out the liquid, but to plug the flask. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:22 states that when one plugs the opening firmly, one will certainly squeeze water from it. Hence, this is considered a פסיק רישא. Furthermore, our Sages forbade plugging the opening loosely, lest one plug it firmly. liquids from it.63The Kessef Mishneh (in the gloss on Chapter 9, Halachah 11) uses this law to refute the Maggid Mishneh's thesis that, according to the Rambam, the prohibition against wringing out liquids applies only to water, since it is generally beverages other than water that are contained in a flask.
One may not clean with a sponge unless it has a handle, lest one squeeze [water from it].64As evident from his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 21:3), the Rambam explains that if the sponge does not have a handle, it is a פסיק רישא that one will squeeze water from it when cleaning with it. If it has a handle, that is not a certainty. This interpretation is also reflected in Rashi's commentary, Shabbat 143a.
Although the Ra'avad accepts the law, he objects to this explanation, maintaining that whether or not the sponge has a handle, one will squeeze water out when cleaning with it. Why then is one allowed to use it? Once the handle is attached, it is no longer considered to be a piece of fabric, but rather a container that is made to hold water. By using it, one is not squeezing the water directly, but merely causing it to be squeezed.
One may not cover a jug of water65Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:21, which states that this decree applies only to a jug of water, but not to one containing other beverages. See, however, the Kessef Mishneh's statements cited in note 63. or the like with a cloth that is not set aside for this purpose. [This is] a decree [enacted] lest one squeeze [water from it].66I.e., unless the cloth was designated for this purpose, it is possible that if it gets wet, one will wring out the water so that one can use it for another purpose. If, however, one has set aside the cloth for this use, one will not be concerned with its getting wet.", + "When a cask [of liquids] breaks67Based on the ruling of Tosafot (Shabbat 143b), the Ramah (Orach Chayim 335:1) emphasizes that this law applies only when the cask breaks. If it has a slow leak, there are no restrictions. Since there is no possibility of the person's losing the entire contents of the cask at once, our Sages did not fear that he would panic and violate the Sabbath laws to save his property.
The Ramah also mentions the ruling of Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 196) that these restrictions apply only when one desires to bring containers from one courtyard to another. There are, however, no restrictions on using different containers within one's own property. This leniency is accepted by the later Ashkenazic authorities.
on the Sabbath, one may save what one needs for oneself and one's guests on the Sabbath,68According to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 335:1), one may save enough for one's Sabbath needs and the needs of one's guests, even if it is necessary to use several containers. As Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes in his gloss, the Rambam's wording does not appear to fit this interpretation. provided one does not sponge up wine with a sponge69The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that this restriction applies even when a sponge has a handle. (See the previous halachah.) Since the person is distressed about the loss of his property, our Sages fear that he might violate the Sabbath laws in this instance. or scoop up oil with his hands.70I.e., there are two restrictions: that one may save only a limited amount of wine or oil, and that the manner in which one saves these liquids must differ from one's ordinary practice. [These restrictions were instituted, because] were one allowed to follow one's ordinary weekday practice, there is the possibility that one would squeeze [the liquids from it].
How must he save [the liquid]? He should bring a container and place it under [the liquid].71According to the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), there is no restriction on the size of this container. Any container may be used, regardless of the amount it can hold. As mentioned, the Rambam's wording does not appear to fit this interpretation. He may not bring one container to catch [the liquid] in the air, and another into which to collect [the liquid]. This [restriction] is a decree, lest one carry a container through the public domain.
[An exception is made] if guests unexpectedly arrive. [In this instance,] he may bring one container to catch [the liquid] in the air, another into which to collect [the liquid], and then combine it with the first. He should not collect [the liquid] and then invite guests. Instead, he should invite guests and then collect [the liquid]. If one acts with guile in this matter,72I.e., invite guests who he knows will not want to partake of the liquids. In this way, he will be able to save the liquids because of them, even though they will not partake of them. (See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 3:17, where the Rambam mentions a similar instance where the Sages permitted one to act with guile.) it is permitted.73The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) states that it is forbidden to invite guests with this intent. If, however, one does so, it is permitted to use the wine. It is possible that this is the Rambam's intent. (The Shulchan Aruch's leniency is actually even more encompassing, and allows one to use the wine if one invites the guests after collecting it.) Based on the Maggid Mishneh, the Magen Avraham 335:2, however, states that according to the Rambam, one is permitted to act with guile in this manner.
(Kinat Eliyahu objects to this interpretation, noting the difference in the Rambam's wording in this halachah, \"If one acted with guile in this matter, it is permitted,\" and his wording in Chapter 23, Halachah 3, \"It is permitted to act with guile in this matter.\")
", + "[A person who has] mud on his garments may rub the inner [surface of the garment so that the mud falls],74Since the person rubs it from the inside, it is not obvious that his intent is to launder the garment (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 302:7). but not the outer surface. [This is] a decree, [enacted] lest one launder it. One may, however, scrape it75Even from the outside. with one's nails,76Or with a knife (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:17; Mishnah Berurah 302:34). without concern that one might whiten it.77The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the opinion of the Tur, which states that both rubbing the inside of a garment and scraping off mud are permitted only when the mud is moist. When the mud has dried, these acts are forbidden, because it is as if one is grinding the mud.
It is forbidden to rub clean a scarf, since this launders it.78The Ramban and the Ra'avad follow a different version of the text of Shabbat 140a, and therefore rule that it is also permitted to rub a scarf. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit:5) follows the Rambam's decision, explaining that when rubbing a scarf, one's intent is to make it glistening clean.
The Be'ur Halachah cites support for the Rambam's ruling from Mo'ed Katan 10b, which states that it is permitted to rub clean one's garments on Chol HaMo'ed (see Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 8:14). This indicates that such an act is forbidden on the Sabbath.
One may, however, rub a cloak, because one's intent is merely to soften it.79I.e., a cloak becomes stiff after being laundered, and before putting it on one generally rubs it (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).", + "It is permitted to use water to rub clean a shoe or a sandal that has become soiled with mud or excrement. It is, however, forbidden to wash them.80Note Chapter 9, Halachah 11, where the Rambam states that one is not liable for wringing out leather. Similarly, the fact that he mentions the prohibition against laundering leather in this chapter appears to indicate that he considers it to be merely a Rabbinic prohibition. This perspective is also quoted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:19. The Be'ur Halachah 302, however, explains that one is liable for laundering leather. We may not scrape new sandals or shoes,81The Rambam appears to allow one to scrape old shoes. The Ra'avad and the Maggid Mishneh object to this ruling, based on Shabbat 141a-b, which states that it is forbidden to scrape both new and old shoes.
The commentaries offer several resolutions of this difficulty. Some point to manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah that omit the word \"new\" entirely (Radbaz, Vol. V, Responsum 1628). Others explain that the Rambam mentions \"new\" shoes for specific reasons, but not to imply that scraping old shoes is permitted (Rabbenu Meir of Padua). Others find sources to substantiate the Rambam's ruling (Sefer HaKovetz).
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:8) forbids scraping both old and new shoes. Significantly, however, the prohibition is associated with the forbidden labor of removing hair. Note also the Magen Avraham 302:17 who emphasizes that the prohibition applies only when using a knife. Using dull metal is permitted.
but we may apply oil to them.82See Chapter 23, Halachah 10, which appears to contradict this ruling. Similarly, the Ra'avad and others question the text here. Significantly, Rav Kapach mentions that the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah follow an alternate version of the text, which does not present a difficulty. [Similarly,] we may clean old [sandals and shoes].
A pillow or a blanket [soiled] with mud or excrement may be cleaned with a rag.83Care must be taken not to press the rag firmly, lest one squeeze out water from it (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:9). If it is made of leather, one may pour water over it until the stain is removed.84One may not, however, rub them under water to remove the stain (Maggid Mishneh). Washing a cloth in water would be considered as laundering, even according to Torah law (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:20).", + "A person whose hands have become soiled with mud may clean them with a horse's tail, a cow's tail, or a firm cloth used to hold thorns.85The Mishnah Berurah 302:57 states that one may also use a rag that is of no importance. [One may] not, [however, use a] cloth that is used to clean one's hands. [These restrictions were instituted] so that one will not follow one's weekday practice and come to launder the cloth.86I.e., the prohibition was not instituted because of the act of washing one's hands with the cloth, but because one might wash the cloth later.", + "A person who washes himself in water may dry himself with a towel and carry it by hand; we do not suspect that he might wring [water from it].87The Magen Avraham 301:58 focuses on this law as an example of the relation of the principles of Rabbinic authority to the changes in the cultural conditions under which Jews lived. Originally, this leniency was granted, because in the Talmudic era washing every day was considered a necessity, and a person who washes himself must dry himself. In his own time, washing was not considered as great a necessity. Hence, some thought of ruling that using a towel would be prohibited. Nevertheless, since the Sages of the Talmud did not institute a prohibition in this regard, the later Rabbis left the status quo unchanged. The Magen Avraham, however, concludes that it is preferable to dry oneself with a towel that one would not normally wring out during the week.
Similarly, a person whose clothes become soaked with water88I.e., from rain, or because he fell into a body of water. may continue walking in them; we do not suspect that he might wring [water from them].89He must, however, be careful not to shake the water from them. [When he removes them,] he may not, however, hang them out to dry even within his home, lest an observer suppose that he laundered his garment on the Sabbath and hung it out to dry.90We are not, however, obligated to remove clothes that were hanging on a clothesline before the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:45). Whenever the Sages instituted a prohibition because of the impression it might create,91The Mishnah Berurah 301:165 cites authorities who maintain that this applies only with respect to a safeguard instituted because of the possibility that an observer might think a prohibition from the Torah was violated. When the question revolves around a Rabbinic prohibition, there is room for leniency. the act is forbidden even in one's private chambers.92For the Sages wanted to established a uniform standard, applicable at all times.", + "When two mikvaot are located one on top of the other, one may remove the plug between them and connect them. Afterwards, one may return the plug to its place. There is no concern that one might squeeze out water [in the process of doing so], since one's intent is that the water should flow out.93The Kessef Mishneh explains that since the person desires to connect the two mikvaot, he will not insert the plug firmly to the extent that he will squeeze water from it.
One may plug a drain with clothes or with any article that can be carried so that water will not inundate food and utensils.94In this instance, the person's concern is to prevent the food and utensils from being inundated by the flow of water. Accordingly, his intent will be to plug the drain in a manner that will prevent a great flow. He, however, is not concerned that there will be a slight leak and will not necessarily plug the drain tightly (Kessef Mishneh).
Merkevet HaMishneh offers a different interpretation. The Rambam is referring to a plug for a hole in a cistern. The person sees that the drain pipes leading to the cistern are full and soon the water level will reach the hole. He therefore plugs the hole so that the water will not flow out and flood the courtyard. Although he plugs the hole tightly, since the water level has not yet reached this height, there is no possibility that he will squeeze out water in the process.
We may not, however, plug a drain so that water will descend into a cistern.95I.e., there is a drain-pipe that leads in two directions. By plugging one end, the water can be directed into a cistern. The plug is resting in water and the possibility exists that one may squeeze [water from the plug] when one presses it into place.96Since in this instance, the person wants to direct the flow of the water and preserve all of it, he will plug the other end of the pipe tightly. When doing so, the possibility exists that he will squeeze water from the plug.", + "It is forbidden to fix the sleeves of garments, adjusting them to form layers of cuffs97Our translation is based on Rashi's commentary, Beitzah 23a. as is one's ordinary practice during the week after washing clothes.98See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 8:14, which states that this is forbidden on Chol HaMo'ed because it requires professional expertise.
Similarly, we may not fold clothes on the Sabbath in the same way as we fold clothes during the week after laundering them. If one does not possess a change of clothes, one may fold a garment,99This appears to refer to folding a garment with the intent of smoothing out wrinkles that already exist. Similarly, one may fold a garment after removing it, in order that it remain uncreased so it can be worn again on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:8). stretch it out, and wear it so that one will [be dressed] attractively on the Sabbath.100One may fold and refold a garment several times on the Sabbath (Shabbat 15:3). If, however, there is no need to wear a garment again on the Sabbath, one may not fold it so that it will remain uncreased for the following day. For this reason, it is forbidden to fold one's tallit on the Sabbath after the morning prayers (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:8; Mishnah Berurah 302:13). The above [restrictions] apply only to a new white garment that may become wrinkled and soiled immediately.101Note Rashi (Shabbat 113a), who offers a different explanation of the Talmudic passage that serves as the source for the Rambam's ruling.
Only one person may fold [a garment]; folding it by two people [together] is forbidden.102When two people fold a garment, the possibility exists that one will smooth out the creases by hand. This is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 302:9).", + "Dyeing is one of the categories of [forbidden] labor.103See Chapter 9, Halachah 13.Accordingly, it is forbidden for a woman to apply rouge to her face,104Similarly, the application of other forms of makeup is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 303:25 and commentaries). because this resembles dyeing.
Sewing is one of the categories of [forbidden] labor.105See Chapter 10, Halachah 9.Accordingly, it is forbidden to fill a new pillow or blanket with unprocessed fabric, lest one sew it closed.106Note Rashi (Shabbat 48a), who offers a different rationale for this restriction: that this resembles making a utensil. On the Sabbath one may, however, return fabric that has fallen out from a pillow or blanket107The Mishnah Berurah 340:32 emphasizes that one may return them to the same pillow or blanket, but may not transfer them to another one on the Sabbath..", + "Tearing is one of the categories of [forbidden] labor.108See Chapter 10, Halachah 10.Accordingly, a person whose garments catch onto thorns should separate them carefully109Our translation has parallels in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, D'mai 6:6 and Kilayim 9:5. The Merkevet HaMishneh, however, renders this word as \"modestly\" - i.e., so others will not see him and think that he is tearing. and patiently, so that they do not tear. If they tear, he is not liable, for this is not his intent.110As mentioned several times, a person is not liable for performing a forbidden labor without intention. In this instance, there is an even greater reason for leniency, since the concept of intent is particularly important regarding this category of forbidden labor. As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 10, the forbidden labor of tearing consists of tearing for the sake of resewing.
It is permitted to wear new clothes; if they tear, it is of no consequence. We may crack open a nut in a piece of cloth without concern that [the cloth] might tear.", + "A person who attaches [building materials to each other] is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.111See Chapter 10, Halachot 12-14. Therefore, all doors that are attached to the ground should not be removed, nor should they be returned to their place, lest one attach them.112The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam's statements here, noting that from the halachot cited above, it would appear that by returning the doors to their place one would be liable for performing the forbidden labor of building.
The doors of a cabinet, chest, or closet, or the doors of other utensils may be removed, but they may not be returned to their place.113According to the Ramah (Orach Chayim 314:1), this law applies only to small cabinents and chests, those smaller than 40 seah, approximately .375 square meters in modern measure.
In a related matter, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:34-35 emphasizes that in contrast to the doors of a building, the doors of cabinets, chests, and the like are not considered muktzeh on the Sabbath. Since they were part of a utensil before they were removed, they are still considered to be utensils afterwards. In contrast, the doors of a building were not considered utensils before the commencement of the Sabbath. Hence, if they are removed on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to carry them.
If their bottom hinge slips [partially out of place], it may be pushed back into place.114If, however, it slips off entirely, it may not be returned outside the Temple (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 313:5). In the Temple, it may be returned to its place.115Since the prohibitions in the category of sh'vut need not be observed in the Temple. If, however, the upper hinge slips [out of place], it is forbidden to return it. [This is] a decree [applying] in all places,116I.e., even in the Temple. This is an exception to the principle mentioned in the previous note, because, in this instance it is very likely that one will perform a forbidden labor (Tosafot, Eruvin 102b). [enacted] lest one attach it.117There is a greater concern that one will attach the upper hinge firmly, because if it becomes detached the door will fall. If, by contrast, the upper hinge remains attached but the lower hinge slips off, the door will still remain hanging.", + "One may not braid one's hair, or set one's hair around one's forehead,118Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:7). Rashi interprets this term to refer to \"parting the hair.\" Note also the Mishnah Berurah 303:83, which discusses whether this restriction applies regarding only a woman's natural hair, or also regarding a wig. for this would appear to resemble building.
A candelabrum made up of separate pieces may not be reassembled on the Sabbath, nor may a chair or a table made up of pieces be reconstructed,119See also Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:5), which - albeit in a different context - allows the use of folding chairs on the Sabbath. One may add a leaf to a table, but one may not construct a table by placing the table board on its legs. for this resembles building.120Many other authorities differ and explain that the prohibition was instituted lest one firmly attach the parts to each other. Were one to do so, one would be liable for performing the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש, completing a utensil (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 313:6). If, however, one does reassemble these objects, one is not liable,121It appears that, accordingly to the Rambam, even if a person were to attach the parts firmly to each other, he would not be liable. As mentioned, others differ. since [the forbidden labors] of building and demolishing do not apply regarding utensils.122The Rambam's perspective on this issue requires clarification: Beitzah 22a states, \"There is no [concept of] building regarding utensils.\"
The Rambam explains that this refers only to putting together a utensil that is made up of several component parts. Fashioning a new utensil, by contrast, is surely considered building, as explained in Chapter 10, Halachah 13 and notes. As mentioned, others differ and maintain that a person who fashions a new utensil is liable for performing the forbidden labor of מכה בפטיש, completing a utensil.
If [the parts of such a utensil] remain loosely put together, one may [complete] its assembly.123According to the Rambam, the rationale for the leniency appears to be that since the parts hang loosely, one would not confuse assembling such a structure with erecting a building. According to the other authorities, the rationale is that since the parts of the utensil hang loosely, there is little likelihood that one will attach the parts firmly to each other.
We may not adjust the vertebra in a child's backbone [so that they are aligned] one above the other,124This refers to adjusting the child's limbs by hand. As mentioned in Chapter 21, Halachah 31, one may tie clothes around the child to adjust his limbs. Furthermore, on the day of a child's birth, it is permitted to adjust his limbs (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:10; Mishnah Berurah 330:34). Even afterwards, many authorities allow the adjustment of other limbs, with the exception of the backbone. since this resembles building.", + "A person who erects a permanent tent is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of building.125See Chapter 10, Halachah 13. Accordingly, at the outset, it is forbidden to erect or demolish a temporary126In this context, the word \"temporary\" is defined as \"not constructed to remain for a prolonged period\" (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:1). It would appear that, according to the Rambam, even if a tent has a roof that is a handbreadth wide, its classification as permanent or temporary depends on the intent of the person who erects it. (See the Noda BiY'hudah, Vol. II, Orach Chayim, Responsum 30.)
Based on this restriction, the Noda BiY'hudah (loc. cit.) forbids opening an umbrella on the Sabbath. Similarly, because of the appearance that might be created, he forbids carrying an umbrella on the Sabbath even when: a) it was opened before the Sabbath, and b) the community possesses an eruv that makes it permitted to carry.
tent, lest one erect or demolish a permanent tent. If, however, one erects or demolishes a temporary tent, he is not liable.
One may add to a temporary tent on the Sabbath. What is implied? If a cloth was spread over pillars or over walls and was rolled up before the Sabbath, [the following rule applies]: If there was a portion the size of a handbreadth extended before the Sabbath,127If, however, the overhang was not at all extended before the commencement of the Sabbath, it may not be extended on the Sabbath. Although it was suspended above the wall before the Sabbath, since it was completely rolled up, it may not be used. one may extend it until its full width on the Sabbath, causing it to become a large tent. The same applies in other similar situations.", + "One may not hang a canopy over a bed, because a temporary tent is created beneath it. It is, by contrast, permissible to set down a bed, a chair, and a table128Similarly, it is permitted to place a table-top on its legs (Maggid Mishneh). Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:3), which forbids placing a table-top on legs that appear as walls. even though a tent is created below them,129I.e., a space is covered by a surface supported by four legs. since this is not the way either a permanent or temporary tent is fashioned.130Since one does not use the space below them (Maggid Mishneh).
Note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:15, and the resolution offered by the Lechem Mishneh there.
", + "Any tent with a slanted roof whose roof is not a handbreadth wide,131I.e., the walls of the tent slant downward, and it does not have a straight roof that is a handbreadth wide. nor is the span three handbreadths below its roof a handbreadth wide,132Based on the principle of l'vud, the space within three handbreadths is considered to be a single entity. Thus, were it to be a handbreadth wide, the tent would be considered as having a roof of significant size (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:15). is considered to be a temporary tent. A person who erects it for the first time on the Sabbath is not liable.133This follows the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Chanan'el. Rashi and Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, maintain that since the tent does not have a roof that is a handbreadth wide, it can never be considered even a temporary tent, and there is no prohibition in constructing it. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:8) follows the Rambam's ruling.
A cloth that is hanging134I.e., there is a beam in the middle of a room on which a cloth is rolled that will be spread out to serve as a cover for a bed. Cords are attached to the cloth, and when they are pulled it is extended to form the canopy. Needless to say, such a canopy must meet the criteria mentioned in the first clause of this halachah regarding the width of its roof (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:16; Mishnah Berurah 315:37). doubled over on Friday135As implied by the first clause, had the cloth not been hanging before the commencement of the Sabbath, hanging it on the Sabbath itself would have been forbidden. Nevertheless, since it was hanging before the Sabbath and the cords that extend it are already in place, it is considered already to have been extended the length of a handbreadth. Therefore, extending it further is permitted, as mentioned in Halachah 27 (ibid.). with cords from which its ends are suspended may be spread out and rolled up136Since spreading out the cloth is not considered to be building a tent, closing it is not considered to be demolishing one (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:16; Mishnah Berurah 315:38). This and all the other leniencies associated with a temporary tent apply when the roof of the temporary tent is less than a handbreadth wide (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:17; Mishnah Berurah 315:38). This ruling is also reflected in the following halachah. [on the Sabbath]. The same [rules] apply to a curtain.137Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 315:1), who states that one may hang a curtain on the Sabbath, even if one intends to leave it hanging permanently, provided there is no halachic significance to its being hung - e.g., to hang a curtain in front of a toilet so that one could pray in that same room.
Note also the Mishnah Berurah 315:38, which states that the wording of this halachah indicates that the cords from which a curtain hangs must be prepared before the commencement of the Sabbath, as the cords of the cloth mentioned immediately before. There are, however, other authorities who do not accept this view. (See also Halachah 32, which describes the manner in which a curtain may be hung.)
", + "[The following rules apply to a bed over which is hung] a bridal canopy whose roof is not a handbreadth wide, nor is the span three handbreadths below its roof a handbreadth wide:138Thus, it meets the criteria of a temporary tent mentioned in the previous halachah. Since it was prepared to serve this purpose [before the commencement of the Sabbath], it may be spread out and rolled up [on the Sabbath].139This represents a greater leniency than the previous halachah. In that halachah, leniency was granted only because the ends of the canopy were hanging from the curtain rods and attached by strings. In this instance, the canopy was not hanging before the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since it was prepared to serve this purpose, it is permitted. [This leniency is granted,] provided it does not hang more than a handbreadth above the bed.140The Maggid Mishneh cites the interpretation of the Rashba, who explains that this refers to a canopy that hangs down a handbreadth below the bed. The part that hangs down is thus considered to be a wall - and the slanted portion of the canopy, a roof.
Based on this interpretation, he finds it necessary to differentiate between such a canopy and a sheet or blanket extended over a bed that is used at present. In the latter instance, even though the sheet or blanket extends more than a handbreadth on either side of the bed, it is not considered a tent, since it was not spread out with the purpose of enclosing space. The canopy, by contrast, was spread out for that purpose and hence is considered a tent in certain instances.
Although this interpretation is accepted by the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:18; Mishnah Berurah 315:42), Rav Kapach notes that it does not fit the wording used by the Rambam, \"provided it does not hang more than a handbreadth above the bed.\" He thus explains that if the canopy hangs more than a handbreadth above the bed, that open space is considered a wall, and the canopy, its roof.

A curtain141Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:7). Others render this as \"a shutter.\" It would, however, appear that the Rambam would not object to the use of a shutter for this purpose. Indeed, as indicated by Shabbat 24:5, it is permitted to use any utensil for this purpose. Compare also to Chapter 26, Halachah 10. used to close a window142The rationale for this leniency is that this is considered equivalent to closing a window or a door which is permitted on the Sabbath (Shabbat 125b).
The same rules apply regarding an aperture in the roof (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:1; Mishnah Berurah 313:1).
may be employed for that purpose even though it was not attached [to the window] or hanging [from it, because] it was prepared to be used for this intent.", + "It is permitted to wear a hat with a brim that provides shade for the person wearing143In this instance, we have adopted the version of this halachah found in the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The version of the standard published texts would be rendered \"on one's garments.\" it.144The Maggid Mishneh and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:40), interpret this as referring to a hat with a brim less than a handbreadth. According to their interpretation, putting on such a hat is forbidden even in one's home. The Noda BiY'hudah (Vol. II, Orach Chayim, Responsum 30), however, explains that there is no prohibition against putting on a hat, regardless of how wide its brim is. If, however, one extends the clothes one is wearing above one's head or in front of one's face like a tent and: a) [the clothes] are tightly fitted around one's head, and b) the brim that one extends is very firm like a roof,145Note the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1450), who explains that both of these stipulations are derived from the Hebrew word מהודק used in Shabbat 138b, the source for this halachah. מהודק means \"firm,\" and in this context, the use of the word implies both \"firmly attached\" and that the brim is firm. When both these stipulations are fulfilled, the garment resembles a tent.
Note Rashi, however, who explains that the head-covering must be firmly attached to one's head. Otherwise, one may not wear it in the public domain, lest the wind blow it from one's head. Rashi's interpretation is followed by most later commentaries and accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:41).
this is forbidden, because one is making a temporary tent.", + "A person who hangs a curtain or the like should take care not to create a tent while he is doing so.146I.e., there is no prohibition against hanging the curtain if one holds it upright. This, however, is difficult when hanging a large curtain. Inevitably, one will hold one portion of the curtain with one's left hand and fold at least a handbreadth or more over with one's right hand while hanging it. Thus, a temporary tent will have been created.
This represents the Rambam's conception of the passage in Shabbat 138b, the source for this halachah. Although the Ra'avad and others interpret that passage differently, the Rambam's view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:12). (See also the final clause of Halachah 29 and notes.)
Therefore, a large curtain should be hung by two individuals and is forbidden to be hung by a single person.
[Moreover,] a canopy with a roof147I.e., in contrast to the canopy described in Halachah 29. may not be extended even if ten people help in doing so. For it is impossible that it will not be lifted up slightly above the ground [in the process] and thus form a temporary tent.", + "[A person] who covers a jug with a cloth should not cover it entirely, for this is considered to be making148Similarly, removing the cover is forbidden, since it is considered to be demolishing a tent (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:19). a tent.149The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this restriction applies only when there is a handbreadth or more of empty space in the jug. This qualification is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 315:13).
The Maggid Mishneh also mentions that the Rashba and the Ra'avad interpret Shabbat 139b, the source for this halachah, differently, and therefore reach a more lenient decision. Although their view is mentioned by the later authorities, the general consensus is to follow the Rambam's ruling.
Instead, he should cover [merely] a portion of its opening.
A person who filters using an Egyptian basket150See Chapter 21, Halachah 17, and notes. should not lift the bottom of the basket above the utensil on the Sabbath so that he will not be creating a temporary tent.151Rashi (Shabbat, loc. cit.) interprets the passage that serves as the source for this halachah as the Rambam does. Others, however, explain that this restriction was instituted to make one deviate from one's ordinary practice as a safeguard associated with the forbidden labor of sifting." + ], + [ + "A person who makes a hole that can be used as an entrance and as an exit - e.g., a hole in a chicken coop that is used to allow light to enter and to allow foul air to leave - is liable [for performing the forbidden labor] of dealing [the final] hammer blow.1See Chapter 10, Halachah 16. Note, however, Halachah 14 of that chapter, which mentions making a hole in a chicken coop in connection with the forbidden labor of building.
Accordingly, [the Sages instituted] a decree [forbidding] the opening of any hole, even one intended to be used only as an outlet or only as an inlet, lest one open a hole for which one is liable.2Accordingly, many authorities forbid opening cans or bags on the Sabbath. The more lenient opinions, which allow this, base themselves on the concept that after the contents are removed from the can or bag, it is no longer considered a useful article. Alternatively, these opinions maintain that the can is considered to be a utensil even before it is opened, and the cover is not at all significant. For this reason, it is forbidden to make a new hole in a cask or to widen an existing one.3The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:1) states that this restriction applies only when the person has the intent to widen the hole. If he does not have this intent, there is no prohibition. As an example, that text mentions a knife inserted into a barrel, even though the hole may be widened when the knife is removed; since that is not one's intent, there is no prohibition involved. The Ramah emphasizes, however, that this leniency applies only when it is not a certainty (פסיק רישא) that the hole will be opened further. One may, however, open an existing hole [that has been plugged].4The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) quotes the opinion of the Kolbo, which states that this leniency applies only regarding barrels of earthenware. A hole made in a wooden barrel which is tightly plugged may not be opened.
[The above leniency applies] provided the hole is not located below the level of the dregs [in the cask],5Shabbat 146a mentions three levels where holes might be made: a) a hole above the level of the wine. This is intended merely to protect the fragrance of the wine.
b) a hole in the middle of the wine. Since the wine is not entirely above the hole, it needed not be fastened so tightly. This is the subject of the present clause.
c) a hole below the dregs. This is the subject of the following clause.
for a hole made below the level of the dregs is intended to hold fast.6Since the entire weight of the wine rests on this hole, it must be fastened very tightly. Accordingly, opening it is considered tantamount to opening a new hole. [Therefore,] it is forbidden to open it.", + "One may make a hole in the seal7Barrels would be sealed closed with clay that was spread out and hardened at their opening. of a cask in order to pour out wine from it, provided one opens it from the top.8Opening the seal in this irregular manner clearly indicates that one did not intend to fashion an opening. An opening is generally not located on the top of a cask (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:6). It is, however, forbidden to open it from the side [of the seal],9A careful reading of the Rambam's wording indicates the need for this bracketed addition (Maggid Mishneh). Significantly, this represents a reversal of the Rambam's approach in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:3), where he mentions making a hole in the side of the barrel. for this resembles making a utensil.
A person may break a barrel10The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:1) states that it is forbidden to break a complete barrel. Just as one is liable for performing the forbidden labor of building when fashioning a vessel, one is liable for performing the forbidden labor of demolishing when destroying one. Although one is not liable unless one breaks the barrel as a constructive act, even when one's intent is destructive, doing so is forbidden by Rabbinic decree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 314:1; Mishnah Berurah 314:7). There are, however, later authorities who follow the Rambam's ruling, which permits destroying a utensil if one does not fashion it into a different utensil in the process. to eat dried figs contained in it, provided he does not intend to make a utensil.11Were one to make a carefully perforated hole, one would be fashioning it into a utensil (Rashi, Shabbat 146a). Similarly, a person may bring a cask of wine and slash its top off with a sword12Although a sword may not usually be carried on the Sabbath, it may be handled to perform a task that is permitted (Mishnah Berurah 314:24). for his guests13The Mishnah Berurah 314:25 states that this leniency applies only when guests are present. without any concern [about the above restrictions], for his intent is [not to make a utensil, but solely] to show his feelings of generosity.", + "Just as it is forbidden to open any hole, so too, is it forbidden to close any hole.14This is also a restriction imposed, lest one complete the construction of a utensil. Therefore, it is forbidden to close a hole in a barrel, even when one employs an article that need not be spread,15See Halachah 11 of this chapter and also Chapter 11, Halachah 6. or one that will not lead to squeezing - 16See Chapter 22, Halachah 15. e.g., to plug it with a piece of wood or with a small stone.17Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:11) follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and others, who maintain that one is allowed to close a barrel with a stone or a piece of wood, provided that one does not close it when wine is flowing out. The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 314:20; Mishnah Berurah 314:47), however, differ, and rule that the Rambam's decision should be followed.
One may, however, store food [by placing it the opening of the barrel]. This is permitted even though, in the process, the barrel is stopped up. It is permitted to act with guile in this matter.18Based on Shabbat 139b, many other authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), grant this leniency only to a Torah Sage, but not to a common person. Moreover, since Torah Sages of the caliber of those of the Talmudic era do not exist at present, there are authorities who do not permit this leniency at all in the present era.", + "[Performing] any action that completes the fashioning [of an object] causes one to be liable for [the forbidden labor of] dealing the final blow. For this reason, a person who files [the smallest amount of an object] or who repairs an article in any way is liable.19See Chapter 10, Halachah 16.
Accordingly, it is forbidden to sound musical tones on the Sabbath, whether using a musical instrument - e.g., a harp or a lyre - or using another object. It is even forbidden to tap with one's fingers on the ground or on a board,20See the Hagahot Maimoniot, which states that one may knock on a door, because this is not a musical tone. Although there are stringent opinions, common practice is to follow the more lenient view. to snap one's fingers rhythmically21Our translation is taken from the Mishnah Berurah 339:9. (See also the Be'ur Halachah, which mentions that some versions of the Mishneh Torah omit the Hebrew word או. According to this version, the meaning would be \"to bang rhythmically on a board as singers do.\") as singers do,22Note the Mishnah Berurah (ibid.), which cites authorities who interpret the phrase \"rhythmically as singers do\" as an exclusion. These opinions maintain that snapping one's fingers to catch a colleague's attention is not forbidden. Nevertheless, it is common practice to act stringently and not to snap one's fingers at all. to shake a nut [like a rattle] for a child, or to ring a bell to quiet [a child]. All of these [restrictions were instituted as] a decree, lest one repair a musical instrument.", + "We may not drum, nor dance, nor clap hands on the Sabbath.23Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 339:3), who states that it is customary to allow clapping one's hands and dancing on the Sabbath and holidays. The rationale for this leniency is that today most people are not able to repair a musical instrument, and thus the rationale for our Sages' decree is no longer applicable.
It must, however, be noted that this leniency is granted only with regard to dancing and clapping hands, not playing drums or performing any of the activities mentioned in the previous halachah. Even dancing and clapping hands is allowed only in rejoicing associated with a mitzvah (Mishnah Berurah 339:10).
[These are] decrees, [instituted] lest one repair a musical instrument. One may, however, clap using the back of one's hands.
One may not swim24Although bathing is permitted, as above (Chapter 22, Halachah 20), swimming is not. in water. [This is] a decree, instituted lest one make a float. It is permitted to swim in a pool in one's courtyard,25If the pool is located in the public domain, it is forbidden to swim within it for another reason: It is possible that one will spray water for more than four cubits (Mishnah Berurah 339:4). provided the pool has an edge jutting up so that the water does not flow out of it. This serves as a distinguishing factor between a pool and the sea.", + "One may not cut a reed, since this resembles preparing a utensil.26As the Rambam continues to mention, the reed serves as a spigot through which water flowing from a cask can be directed. If [a reed] is cut27Opened at the ends so that the wine can flow through it like a pipe. [before the commencement of the Sabbath], even though it has not been adjusted,28Measured and trimmed to fit the barrel. This leniency is granted even if this reed has never been used for this purpose before (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 314:5). it may be inserted into a hole in the barrel on the Sabbath. We are not concerned that one might adjust it.
It is forbidden to place a myrtle leaf or the like in the opening of a cask so that the wine will flow through it, since this resembles making a faucet29In contrast to the reed mentioned above, which must merely be inserted into the barrel, it is necessary to fold the leaf and adjust it so that the wine will flow through (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). on the Sabbath.30Rabbenu Asher and others follow the opinion of other Sages (Shabbat 146b), who explain that the reason for this decree is concern that one might pick a leaf on the Sabbath to use for this purpose. According to that opinion, if before the commencement of the Sabbath one has available many leaves that have been picked, one may use them for this purpose.
In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo defends the Rambam's ruling, and he quotes it in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). The Ramah, however, quotes Rabbenu Asher's view.
We may not break a shard or tear a piece of paper,31The Maggid Mishneh and others cite Beitzah 4:4, which states that these items were used as makeshift frying pans. (Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah and Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:8.) Rav Kapach, however, raises the question: Since frying is forbidden on the Sabbath, of what use would these articles be? since this resembles preparing a utensil.", + "One may draw water using a branch that is tied to the cup [used to draw water from the well]. If it is not tied to the cup, we may not draw water with it. [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest one trim [the branch] and adjust it.
It is forbidden to polish silverware with greitikon,32A white powder, referred to as alum or tartar which serves as a natural polish. because this makes it shine as if it had been treated by a craftsman. Thus, it appears as if one is repairing a utensil and completing one's work on the Sabbath.33Rashi (Shabbat 50a) and other commentaries differ and state that the prohibition stems from the forbidden labor of removing hair. One may, however, polish it with sand34See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 323:11 and the Mishnah Berurah 323:38, which mention several restrictions regarding the use of sand for this purpose. and neter.35In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 2:1), the Rambam describes neter as a blue pumice stone used for detergent purposes. (See also Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 9:37.) It must noted that sodium is called natrium in Latin. This has led some to think that the intent is sodium bicarbonate, a natural cleanser. Similarly, all [other] utensils may be polished with any substance.
It is forbidden to wash plates, cooking dishes, or the like, because it is as if one is improving them,36The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam concerning the rationale for this restriction, explaining that it is not associated with the forbidden labor of dealing the final blow. Instead, it is prohibited so that one does not prepare on the Sabbath for a weekday. This opinion is also quoted by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 323:6. unless one washes them for the sake of using them to eat another meal on this Sabbath.37The intent is that one may wash only those utensils that one intends to use again. Even when a person will serve another meal on the Sabbath, if he is not intending to use certain utensils, he may not wash them. One may, however, wash utensils on Friday night, even though one does not intend to use them until Saturday afternoon (Mishnah Berurah 323:27-28). Utensils used for drinking, by contrast - e.g., glasses and pitchers - may be washed at any time, for there is no limit to [the number of times a person may desire to] drink.38I.e., one may wash the glasses at any time, because it may be assumed that one will desire to drink later. If, however, a person knows that he will not drink again on the Sabbath, it is forbidden for him to wash pitchers and glasses as well (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 323:6; Mishnah Berurah 323:29).
One may not make beds on the Sabbath in order to sleep on them on Saturday night.39Note, however, the Magen Avraham 302:6, who states that one may make a bed if the disorder in the room makes one extremely uncomfortable. One may, however, make the beds [after sleeping on them] Friday night in order to use them again on the Sabbath.", + "On the Sabbath, it is forbidden to immerse [in a mikveh] utensils that are ritually impure, because it resembles repairing the utensil.40I.e., since the utensil was unfit for use before it was immersed, immersing it is equivalent to repairing it (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Beitzah 2:2; compare to Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:17). Based on Beitzah 18a, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher offer other rationales for this prohibition.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 323:7), which mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether it is permitted on the Sabbath to immerse a vessel that one has purchased from gentiles. The Maggid Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, this would be forbidden. Accordingly, the Pri Megadim questions why the Shulchan Aruch ignores the Rambam's ruling. The Be'ur Halachah, however, differentiates between the immersion of vessels purchased from a gentile and the immersion of impure vessels.
An impure person, by contrast, may immerse himself,41The Mishneh Torah also contains laws that will be relevant when the Temple is rebuilt, and the observance of all the laws of ritual impurity will be restored. At present this halachah is relevant in the following contexts: Women are permitted to immerse themselves in the mikveh on Friday night (with certain restrictions) and men are allowed to immerse themselves on the Sabbath for the sake of holiness (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 326:7; Mishnah Berurah 326:24). Care, however, must be taken when toweling oneself dry not to squeeze water from the towel.
Originally, the license to immerse oneself in the mikveh on the Sabbath was given before it was customary to heat mikvaot. At present, the leniency is continued in most communities, even when the mikveh has been heated.
because it appears [as if his intent] is to cool off. One may not sprinkle [ashes from the red heifer] on the Sabbath.42This activity is necessary as part of the purification process for a person who became impure because of contact with a human corpse. Rashi (Pesachim 65b) explains that this is forbidden because it is obvious that one's intent is to purify oneself. Rav Kapach, however, points to Pesachim 69a, which states that the prohibition was instituted lest one carry in the public domain.
A person who immerses utensils on the Sabbath without knowing of the prohibition involved may use them [on the Sabbath]. If [by contrast,] he violates the prohibition intentionally, he should not use them until Saturday night.
It is permitted to immerse impure water on the Sabbath. What should be done? The water should be placed in a container that is not susceptible to contracting ritual impurity43In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 2:2), the Rambam explains that if the utensil contracted ritual impurity, its immersion would be forbidden, since one would be purifying not only the water it contains, but also the utensil itself. - e.g., a container made of stone44See Hilchot Keilim 1:6. - and the container should be immersed until it is submerged in the waters of the mikveh and thus purified.", + "We may not separate terumah or tithes on the Sabbath,45The Ra'avad mentions that terumah may not be separated even if one's intent is to give it to the priest to use on the Sabbath itself. because it appears as if one is repairing an article that requires repair.46See Halachah 14, where the Rambam offers another reason for this same prohibition.", + "Processing leather is one of the categories of [forbidden] labor.47The Merkevet HaMishneh notes that the Rambam does not mention Rabbinic prohibitions in connection with the forbidden labors of hunting, slaughtering, and skinning. The commentaries do note, however, that in Chapter 10 the Rambam mentions Rabbinic prohibitions in connection with hunting, and in Chapter 11 Rabbinic prohibitions in connection with slaughtering. A person who softens a hide with oil as the leather-workers do is liable for processing leather.48See Chapter 11, Halachot 5-6. Therefore, a person should not anoint his foot49As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 21, Halachah 23, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 327:1) writes that at present, it is not common for healthy people to apply oil to themselves. Therefore, it is forbidden to apply any type of oil to oneself on the Sabbath for therapeutic purposes. with oil while wearing a new shoe or sandal.50See Chapter 22, Halachah 18, and notes. He may, however, anoint his foot with oil and put on his shoes or sandals, even though they are new. Similarly, he may apply oil to his entire body and roll on a new bed cover51Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 26:5). Obviously, this bed-cover is made of leather. The Maggid Mishneh offers a different interpretation. without any concern.
When does the above apply? When only a small amount [of oil] is used, enough merely to polish the leather. If, however, he has a large quantity of oil on his skin that would soften the leather, this is forbidden, since this resembles processing it. All [the above restrictions] apply with regard only to new items. It is permitted to do so with old ones.52Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah 327:12, which cites opinions that prohibit applying oil to used leather.", + "A person who spreads a plaster on the Sabbath is liable for [performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of] smoothing a hide.53See Chapter 11, Halachah 6. Therefore, it is forbidden to close a hole with wax and the like, lest one spread it.54See Halachah 3, which prohibits closing a hole in connection with the forbidden labors of dealing the final blow or of building. It is even forbidden to close a hole with fat. [This is] a decree, [enacted] lest [one use] wax.", + "Writing is one of the categories of [forbidden] labor.55See Chapter 11, Halachah 9. Accordingly, it is forbidden to apply eye-paint with a brush and the like on the Sabbath, because this resembles writing.56It must be emphasized that according to the text of Shabbat 94b, it would appear that applying eye-paint is associated with the forbidden labor of dyeing. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Rambam and many other Rishonim had a different version of the text, upon which he based his ruling in this halachah.
[Similarly,] it is forbidden to give a loan or to take a loan. [These are] decrees, [instituted] lest one write. By the same token, it is forbidden to buy,57See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 323), which mentions several leniencies and restrictions regarding the acquisition of foodstuffs on the Sabbath. to sell,58One may, however, give a present to a colleague. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3:11.) to rent,59Note, however, Hilchot Eruvin 2:12, which allows one to rent a gentile's property on the Sabbath in order to complete an eruv. or to rent out. [These are all] decrees, [instituted] lest one write.
A person should not hire workers on the Sabbath,60The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:2) offers another rationale for the restriction against hiring workers, the prohibitions stemming from Isaiah 58:13, \"If you refrain... from [ordinary] speech\" - i.e., that our speech on the Sabbath be distinguished from our speech during the week. The Rambam mentions prohibitions of this nature in Chapter 24. nor should he tell a colleague to hire workers for him.61See related matters in Chapter 6. One may, however, borrow and lend [objects]. A person may [even] borrow jugs of wine or jugs of oil62The difference between borrowing such commodities and lending objects is that when one borrows an object, one intends to return the same object. When one borrows a commodity, by contrast, one intends to use it and return a different one. Thus, it bears a far greater resemblance to a loan. from a colleague, provided he does not say \"Give me... as a loan.\"63Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi explains that \"Give me as a loan\" implies that the loan will be for an extended period. Hence, it is more likely that one will write it down.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:11) notes that in languages other than Hebrew, the difference between offering a loan and lending appears as one of semantics. Rather than say \"Lend me\" or \"Give me as a loan,\" one should say merely \"Give me.\"
", + "It is forbidden to make a sale with a verbal [agreement] or to transfer the article [to the purchaser], whether one weighs it or not.64The Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 323) follow a slightly more lenient approach and allow certain products to be sold by number and in vessels from which a measure can be obtained. Just as it is forbidden to weigh, so too is it forbidden to count and to measure, whether using a measuring container, one's hands, or a rope.65Compare to similar laws mentioned in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:19-24.", + "Court is not convened on the Sabbath, nor are [the rites of] chalitzah66The ceremony through which a childless widow frees her brother-in-law from the obligation of yibbum. (See the following note and Deuteronomy 25:7-10.) or yibbum67This refers to the rite in which the brother-in-law of a childless widow marries her in order to perpetuate the name of her dead husband. (See Deuteronomy 25:5-6.) conducted, nor are women betrothed,68According to Torah law, marriage is a two-staged process, including erusin (betrothal) - when a bond between a husband and wife is established, but the two still live separately - and nisuin (marriage) - when the couple begin their lives together.
Betrothal is initiated by the act of kiddushin. At present, this is effected by the groom's giving the wedding ring to his wife. It must be added that it is also forbidden to carry out nisuin on the Sabbath, but for a different reason: lest one violate the Sabbath laws when preparing for the wedding feast. (See Hilchot Ishut 10:14.)
lest one write.69When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 339:4) states that divorce proceedings may not generally be carried out on the Sabbath, even if the bill of divorce was written beforehand.
[Property] may not be consecrated,70This refers to the dedication of property to the Temple treasury or the consecration of an animal to be offered as a sacrifice. nor may endowment evaluations be made,71See Leviticus 27:1-27. nor may [property] be set aside,72See Leviticus 27:28-29. because this resembles a sale.
Nor may terumah and the tithes be separated, for this resembles consecrating the produce one has separated, and also because, [through this ritual,] one makes [the produce] fit [for use] on the Sabbath.73See Halachah 9, where this reason is mentioned in connection with this prohibition.
One may not tithe one's animals.74See Leviticus 27:32. [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest one mark [the animal] with red paint.75For this was the common practice, as the Rambam mentions in Hilchot Bechorot 7:1. As mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 17, making a mark is considered a derivative of the forbidden labor of writing. Rabbenu Chanan'el, by contrast, explains that the prohibition against making this mark stems from the forbidden labor of dyeing.
Rav Moshe HaCohen of Lunil notes that, in contrast to produce, the Rambam does not mention the prohibition against tithing animals in connection with the forbidden labor of dealing the final blow. Unlike produce, according to Torah law, one is allowed to partake of meat from an animal even if it has not been tithed. Although there is a Rabbinic prohibition against partaking of such meat, tithing a herd is not considered as making an object fit for use.
A person may consecrate his Paschal sacrifice on the Sabbath76When the fourteenth of Nisan falls on the Sabbath. and his festive offering on a holiday, for this is the mitzvah associated with that day.77Since these offerings are associated with a fixed time, they will stand out distinctly in one's mind and will not cause one to forget the Sabbath prohibitions (Shabbat 148b, Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:19).
Just as property may not be consecrated, so too, water may not be consecrated for use [in sprinkling the ashes of the red heifer].78The laws associated with sprinkling the water that has been mixed with the ashes of the red heifer are described in Numbers 19:11-21.", + "When a person separates terumot and tithes on the Sabbath or on a holiday without intentionally desiring to transgress the prohibition involved, he may partake of the produce that he made fit to eat. If he intentionally desired to violate the prohibition, [the produce] is forbidden until Saturday night.79Note the Lechem Mishneh (in the gloss on Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 6:10), which states that this prohibition applies even when one has no other produce available. See also Sha'ar HaMelech, which questions whether the prohibition applies to others besides the person who violated the prohibition. Note also Chapter 3, Halachah 9, and Chapter 6, Halachah 23. The separation is, nevertheless, effective.
Similarly, when a person consecrates [an object], makes an endowment evaluation, or sets property aside on the Sabbath, with or without the intention to violate the prohibition, the act he performs is effective. Needless to say, this applies on a holiday. Similarly, a business transaction that a person makes with a colleague on the Sabbath is effective.80The participants in the transaction are, however, given stripes for rebelliousness, the prohibition instituted for the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition (Hilchot Mechirah 30:7).
Between sunset and the appearance of the stars [on Friday], we may separate tithes81Although the Rabbis forbade partaking of such produce before tithing it, they considered this as merely a safeguard, for the majority of the common people did separate the tithes. Therefore, one is not considered to be making an article fit for use to the same extent as when one separates tithes from produce that has surely not been tithed (Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Shabbat 2:7). This law is also mentioned in Chapter 24, Halachah 10. from produce that is d'mai.82Produce purchased from a common person, which we are unsure whether or not it has been tithed. [This leniency] is not, however, [granted] for produce from which one knows that the tithes have not been separated.", + "A person who designates83But did not separate these portions (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, D'mai 4:5). [a portion of produce] that is d'mai as terumat ma'aser,84The tenth of the tithe, which the Levites were required to give to the priests. or [who designates a portion of produce as] the tithe for the poor85Which was given instead of the second tithe in the third and sixth years of the seven-year cycle. should not take these portions [and give them to the individuals entitled to receive them]86The bracketed additions are based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.). There the Rambam emphasizes that the prohibition centers on giving the designated portions. This is borne out by his rulings in Hilchot Ma'aser 9:8-11, where he mentions leniencies in regard to the separation of the designated portions on the Sabbath if one makes a condition before the commencement of the Sabbath. on the Sabbath. [This restriction applies] despite the fact that the place [of these portions] is designated before the Sabbath and they are placed in a known location at the side of [the remainder of] the produce.
If, however, a priest or a poor person is accustomed to be hosted by this person, he may come and partake [of these designated portions,] provided the person informs87If he does not inform them, it is as if he were using the designated gifts for his own personal purposes (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.). the priest that he is feeding him from terumat ma'aser, or the poor person that he is feeding him from the tithe of the poor.", + "It is forbidden to draw lots or to play dice88This is forbidden even during the week, because the Rabbis deemed gambling to be theft, and also because this reflects conduct that does not contribute to the stability of society (Hilchot Gezeilah 6:7,11). on the Sabbath, because this is equivalent to commercial activity. A person may draw lots with his children and the members of his household,89But not with outsiders, as reflected in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 23:2) and his rulings in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 4:20. [determining who will receive] large and small portions,90In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 322:6), Rav Yosef Karo follows the interpretation of Shabbat 148b by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher, and forbids casting lots, even among one's own household, unless the portions are equal. for they will not take issue [among themselves].", + "On the Sabbath a person is forbidden to calculate accounts that he requires, whether concerning matters of the past or matters of the future. [This is] a decree, [enacted] lest one write.
Therefore, calculations that are of no practical benefit may be performed on the Sabbath. What is implied? [A person may calculate] how many seah of grain he possessed in a particular year, how many dinarim his son's wedding cost, or the like. [Since] these are insignificant matters with no usefulness, there is no difference between making these calculations on the Sabbath or during the week.91See, however, Chapter 24, Halachah 4, which states that one should minimize one's involvement in such idle matters on the Sabbath. Indeed, as is evident from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Avot 1:16) and Hilchot De'ot 2:4, the Rambam frowns on such conversation during the week as well. To quote Hilchot Gezeilah 6:11: \"It is not for a person to spend any of his days involved in anything other than the words of wisdom and the matters that lead to the settlement of the world.\"", + "It is forbidden to read mundane documents92The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:13) renders the Hebrew שטרי הדיוטות as \"account sheets.\" Rashi (Shabbat 149a) interprets this as also referring to social correspondence. Based on the Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 23:2), the Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam follows Rashi's view.
[The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:14) permits reading a social letter on the Sabbath only if one is unaware of its contents.]
on the Sabbath, lest one conduct oneself in an ordinary manner and be provoked to make an erasure.93Erasing is one of the categories of forbidden labor, as the Rambam explains in Chapter 11, Halachah 9. Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss to Shabbat 149b) differs and explains that the restriction mentioned stems from the prohibitions derived from Isaiah 58:13, which distinguish between one's conduct on the Sabbath and one's involvement in mundane, weekday concerns.
A person may verbally count his guests and the desserts [he will serve them],94Regarding this ruling, the Rambam writes (Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.), \"On the Sabbath, it is forbidden to read anything other than the words of prophecy and their explanations [i.e., the Oral Law]. Among the matters excluded are [works of secular] wisdom and science.\" but may not read a written list, lest he read a mundane document. Therefore, if the names were engraved into a tablet or into the wall, one is allowed to read them, for [such writing] will not be interchanged with a [written] document.
It is forbidden to read the writing under a figure or an image95Rashi (Shabbat 149a) and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:15) interpret this as referring to descriptions written under works of art. Others explain that this refers to images of false deities. (In the Talmudic period, these two interpretations could easily be interrelated, because the subject matter of most gentile art was the false deities they worshiped.)on the Sabbath. It is even forbidden to read the Sacred Writings96I.e., the Holy Writings, in contrast to the Torah and the prophets. This interpretation is obvious from the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:1). Rashi (Shabbat 115a) mentions other opinions which forbid reading the works of the prophets as well. during the time the House of Study is in session, lest this lead to the neglect of the House of Study - i.e., so that no one should stay home and read the Sacred Writings and thus be held back from attending the House of Study.97See Chapter 30, Halachah 10, where the Rambam describes the attendance at the House of Study on the Sabbath.", + "[When] a fire breaks out in a courtyard on the Sabbath, a person may not save all [his possessions] in the courtyard98The Maggid Mishneh states that the wording used by the Rambam indicates that a person in an adjoining courtyard where the fire has not yet caught may transfer all his property to a further removed courtyard if an eruv has been made. This concept is also mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:1). [by transferring them] to another courtyard99The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:11) mentions a further leniency: One may transfer property from a house to an adjoining house or to another courtyard that one owns. There is, however, a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether this leniency is accepted or not. in the same lane, despite the fact [that carrying is permitted because] of an eruv. [This is a] decree, [instituted] lest a person extinguish the fire in order to save his property. [This is necessary because] a person panics when his property [is in danger of] being lost.100Another example of a leniency granted because of this principle is found in Chapter 6, Halachah 22.
For this reason, [our Sages] decreed that a person may save only the food he needs for that Sabbath,101The particular laws stemming from this principle are described in Halachot 21-25. the utensils he needs to use on that Sabbath,102As examples, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7) mentions cups and pitchers. From the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:8 and the Mishnah Berurah 334:17, it would appear that permission is granted only to save utensils one needs for eating, but not other articles - e.g., pillows and blankets - that might be required on the Sabbath. and the clothes that he can wear.103See Halachah 25. Thus, he will despair of saving his property and he will not be motivated to extinguish the fire.
If there is no eruv, one may not even save one's food and one's utensils.104This restriction applies even according to the authorities who maintain that the prohibition against carrying in a lane is Rabbinic in origin. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:10 and the Mishnah Berurah 334:26 mention that these restrictions do not apply with regard to saving clothes. Since one must wear them as garments, one may take them out to the public domain as well.", + "What food may a person save? If a fire breaks out on Friday night, one may save enough food for three meals.105One may save enough for three meals for every member of his household. Regardless of whether a person eats a large amount or a small amount, a standard measure - and only that standard measure - of food may be saved for him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:5). Foodstuffs that are fit for human consumption may be saved for humans, and fodder that is fit for animals may be saved for animals.
If the fire breaks out in the morning, one may save enough for two meals; in the afternoon, enough for one meal.", + "When does the [restriction] on taking only the food for one's needs apply? When one uses many containers to save [the food] or one uses a single container, removes it, empties it, and fills it again. If, however, one removes a single container at one time, it is permitted to remove it even though it contains enough food for many meals.", + "What is implied? One may save a basket filled with loaves of bread, even though it contains enough for several meals. [One also may save] a cake of dried figs and a cask of wine.106This indicates that one may save several different containers containing different types of food. Similarly, it is permitted to spread out a garment, collect all [the food]107The bracketed additions are made on the basis of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:6 and the Mishnah Berurah 334:16, which emphasize that, even though one may pour the contents of several containers into a garment, one must empty the containers. It is forbidden to place the containers themselves in a garment and remove them. one can within it, and remove it at one time.", + "One may tell others, \"Come and save for yourselves.\"108I.e., even though the person who owns the property may not save more than his household needs, all of his food stores need not be left to the flames. Other people may be invited to save for themselves. Every individual is allowed to save enough food for his needs or a single container that holds a large amount. [The food that] these individuals save belongs to them.109Since our Sages forbade the person from saving it, he despairs of ever recovering it and relinquishes his ownership.
The above applies only when the person makes an explicit statement inviting others to save the property. If he does not issue such an invitation, we cannot assume that he has relinquished ownership. Although he is forbidden from saving more himself, others are not allowed to take for themselves, for the owner may yet hope to find friends who will save the food and return it to him at no cost (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:7; Mishnah Berurah 334:22).

If the person who saves it does not want to take it and returns it to its [original] owner,110In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 16:3 (based on Shabbat 120a)], the Rambam describes this as \"God-fearing conduct,\" for it reflects an unwillingness to benefit from property that is not one's own. In this instance, this is particularly true, for the owner does not willingly abandon ownership of his property. it is permitted for him to take payment for his efforts after [the conclusion of] the Sabbath.111It is, however, pious conduct not to accept payment (Shabbat, loc. cit.). It is not considered a wage [paid for working on] the Sabbath,112The Maggid Mishneh and others draw attention to the Rambam's statements at the conclusion of Chapter 6, which forbid taking payment even for activities that are permitted on the Sabbath unless the wage is paid for a larger span of time. Rav David Arameah explains that the prohibition against taking payment for one's Sabbath activities is Rabbinic in origin. In this instance, because of the positive nature of the activity involved, the Sages did not impose any restrictions.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.) explains that the article rightfully belongs to the person who saved it. Although he relinquishes ownership in favor of his original owner, he does not relinquish ownership of that portion of the article that is equivalent to his wage. What he is receiving from the owner is, in fact, payment for property that he was entitled to take possession of.
since no [forbidden] labor was [performed], nor was a prohibition [transgressed], for one [merely] removed the food into a place [enclosed in the same] eruv.", + "A person who saves a loaf of fine flour may not return and save a loaf of coarse flour. If, however, one saved a loaf of coarse flour, one may return and save a loaf of fine flour.113Since one is required to partake of the finest foods on the Sabbath, one is permitted to return and take the loaf baked with fine flour. It is possible to explain that because of the confusion caused by the fire, one forgot to take the better loaf originally.
The Rabbis explained that one may act with guile in this matter and, at the outset, take a loaf of lesser quality so that one can return and take a better loaf afterwards. Since one is not even transgressing a Rabbinic prohibition and will always be able to excuse oneself afterwards that this choice was due to confusion, no restrictions were imposed.
This leads to a further leniency. One may save, for example, a meal of fish, and then return and save a meal of meat, excusing oneself saying, \"At first, I desired to partake of the fish. Afterwards, my appetite changed and I preferred the meat\" (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:3; Mishnah Berurah 334:12).

When Yom Kippur falls on Friday,114According to the fixed calendar we follow at present, Yom Kippur will not fall on either a Friday or a Sunday. This law, as many of the other laws in the Mishneh Torah, will apply only after the coming of the Redemption. a person may save [food] on Yom Kippur that he needs for the Sabbath.115If Yom Kippur falls on Thursday and one knows that it will be impossible to prepare one's Sabbath needs on Friday, one is permitted to save food on Yom Kippur for the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:4; Mishnah Berurah 334:13). Similarly, one may save food on Yom Kippur for the meal following the fast, regardless of the day of week (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:4). One may not, however, save [food] on the Sabbath for Yom Kippur. Needless to say, one may not [save food on the Sabbath] for a holiday, nor may one save on one Sabbath for the following Sabbath.
Which garments may one save? One may put on all the clothes one can wear and wrap oneself in all the cloaks one can and remove them.116It appears that, according to the Rambam, one may not return and save other clothes. This is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages in the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:4). Rabbi Yosse maintains that one may return and put on a second set of clothes. Since one is not carrying the garments, but wearing them, we rule more leniently than regarding foodstuffs. This ruling is followed by the Rashba and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:8). [Similarly,] one may tell others, \"Come and save for yourselves.\" Every individual [who desires] may put on all the clothes he can wear and wrap himself in all the cloaks he can and remove them. The clothes he saves belong to him, like the food [described above], for he is acquiring an ownerless object.117Since our Sages forbade a person from saving any more clothes, we assume that he despaired of recovering any more of his property. As mentioned above, many authorities accept this rationale only when the person actually invites others to save the clothes.", + "It is permitted to save118Although the Rambam is speaking about saving sacred texts from fire, the same laws apply to another factor - e.g., a flood - that might cause their ruin (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 334:19). all sacred writings119This term refers to the books of the Bible.
There is somewhat of a difficulty with the Rambam's ruling. He is quoting the Mishnah (Shabbat 16:1). Nevertheless, the teachings of the Mishnah were appropriate in the beginning of the Talmudic era, when it was only the Written Law and not the Oral Law that was written down. The composition of the Mishnah marked a turning point in Jewish history, and from that point onward, it was permitted to write down the teachings of the Oral Law. (See the Rambam's Introduction to the Mishneh Torah.) Texts containing such teachings are also considered sacred articles and may be saved from a fire, just like the books of the Bible (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:12; Mishnah Berurah 334:31). Since the Rambam wrote the Mishneh Torah after it became permitted to write down the Oral Law, seemingly, it would have been appropriate for him to refer to texts of the Oral Law as well.
that are found in one courtyard [by transferring them] to another courtyard in the same lane, even though an eruv was not made, provided the lane has three walls and a pole [in the place of the fourth wall].120According to the Rambam, such an lane is considered a private domain according to Torah law, and the prohibition against carrying within it is only Rabbinic in origin (Chapter 17, Halachah 2). Accordingly, this restriction is relaxed in order to save the sacred articles. Although some authorities differ with the Rambam regarding the above halachah, they also require an lane to have three walls and a pole in this instance (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:17; Mishnah Berurah 334:48).
[The above leniencies apply] provided that the [sacred writings] are written in the Assyrian script121I.e., the script in which tefillin, mezuzot, and Torah scrolls are written. (See Sanhedrin 22a; the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Yadayim 4:5; and the Moznaim Mishneh Torah series, Hilchot Tefillin 1:19.) and in Hebrew.122I.e., and not a transliteration of other languages. If, by contrast, they are written in any other language or using any other script, we should not save them even if there is an eruv.123As explained above, the Rambam's ruling applied in the Talmudic period, before it became acceptable to write the Oral Law. Once that was permitted, translations of the Bible were also permitted, and the same laws apply to them. Similarly, siddurim and other similar texts may be saved.[Indeed,] even during the week, we are forbidden to read124As mentioned above, after permission was granted to write the Oral Law, this prohibition no longer applies. from such texts. Rather, they should be left in an open place125Our translation is based on Rashi (Shabbat 115a) and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 334:12). where they will become spoiled as a matter of course.", + "Even if [these sacred texts] are written with other tints or with red ink,126Which are not acceptable for writing a Torah scroll (Hilchot Tefillin 1:5). or even if the writing is not permanent, since they are written in the Assyrian script and in Hebrew, we should save them.
The blank portions of parchment for scrolls,127See Hilchot Sefer Torah, Chapters 8 and 9, which mention how much empty parchment must be left for each of the situations mentioned by the Rambam. whether above or below the writing, between one passage and another, between one column and another, or at the beginning and at the conclusion of a Torah scroll, should not be saved.128This refers to an instance where these blank portions of parchment had been cut from the Torah scroll. When a portion of a scroll does not contain 85 letters (see the following halachah), it is no longer considered to be sacred articles (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:20; Mishnah Berurah 334:50). Surely this applies to the margins of the scroll that the Rambam is referring to in this halachah.
Tables of blessings129I.e., a text similar to our siddurim (Rashi, Shabbat 115b). and amulets, even if they contain the letters of [God's] name and many Torah verses, should not be saved from a fire.130As mentioned above, after permission was granted to write the Oral Law, siddurim were also accorded the status of sacred articles (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:12).
Regarding amulets containing verses, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. The Tur (Orach Chayim 334) differs with the Rambam and maintains that in the present age, such amulets may be saved. Even though most of the later authorities follow the Rambam's ruling, the Pri Megadim suggests saving amulets with verses that contain God's name.
", + "We should save from fire a [worn] Torah scroll that has a total of 85 letters131The expression \"a total\" implies that the letters need not be in the same word, but may be scattered throughout the scroll (Rashi, Shabbat 115b).
In certain contexts, the passage ויהי בנסוע הארון is considered a separate book of the Torah. (See Rashi's commentary on the verse.) Since that passage contains 85 letters, any parchment with 85 letters can be considered a scroll.
from complete words,132I.e., the scroll may contain more letters, but if the letters are in words that are partially torn or rubbed out, they are not included in this sum. even if this includes [words like] יגר שהדותא.133I.e., words whose origin is not Hebrew. Similarly, [we should save a scroll] that contains a passage that has fewer than 85 letters if it contains God's name - e.g., ויהי בנסוע הארון.134The commentaries question the Rambam's statements, since as stated above, the passage ויהי בנסוע הארון contains 85 letters. See also the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:15 which states that if a scroll contains God's name, it should be saved even though it contains less than 85 letters.
We may save the scroll's carrying case with the scroll135I.e., the carrying case is considered as subordinate to the scroll. Therefore, it is not considered an independent entity, but is rather governed by the more lenient laws that govern the Torah scroll. and the carrying case of tefillin with tefillin, even if the carrying case contains money.136Although the money is muktzeh, there is no need to shake it from the carrying case, and it may be taken to the same place as the tefillin. This leniency was granted so that a person would not be required to delay in saving the property that he was entitled to save (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 334:18)." + ], + [ + "There are activities that are forbidden on the Sabbath despite the fact that they do not resemble the [forbidden] labors, nor will they lead to [the performance of] the [forbidden] labors.1As stated in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, these two reasons are the source for the prohibitions placed in the category of sh'vut.
Why then are [these activities] forbidden? Because it is written [Isaiah 58:13], \"If you restrain your feet, because of the Sabbath, and [refrain] from pursuing your desires on My holy day...\" and it is written [ibid.], \" And you shall honor it [by refraining] from following your [ordinary] ways, attending to your wants, and speaking about [mundane] matters.\"
Therefore, it is forbidden for a person to go2This restriction stems from the fact that the verse mentions, \"Restraining your feet.\" and tend to his [mundane] concerns on the Sabbath, or even to speak about them3Rabbenu Asher, in his gloss on Shabbat 150a, associates this prohibition with discussing matters that are forbidden to be performed on the Sabbath itself. This thrust is reflected in the decisions of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 307:1.
The Rambam mentions these principles in Halachah 3. In this context, it can be noted that all the examples the Rambam gives in this halachah reflect activities forbidden on the Sabbath.
- e.g., to discuss with a partner which merchandise should be sold on the morrow or which should be bought, how this building should be constructed, or which merchandise should be taken to a particular place. Speaking about all matters of this like is included in the prohibition [against] \"...speaking about [mundane] matters.\"
It is speaking that is forbidden. Thinking [about such matters] is permitted.4For the verse specifically mentions speech, thus excluding thought from the prohibition. Nevertheless, as the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:8) emphasizes, \"It is a mitzvah not to think of these matters at all. Instead, one's attitude should be that all of one's work has been completed.\"", + "It is forbidden for a person to check his gardens and fields on the Sabbath to see what they require or to see how their fruit is growing, for this involves going to \"pursue your desires.\"5According to the later authorities, this prohibition applies only when it is obvious that one's intent is to take care of one's own needs. If, however, it appears that one is merely taking a pleasure stroll, there is no prohibition (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:2; Mishnah Berurah 306:1). See, however, the notes on the following halachah.
Similarly, it is forbidden for a person to go to the end of the Sabbath boundary62000 cubits from one's place at the commencement of the Sabbath. (See Chapter 27, where this concept is discussed at length.)
The Maggid Mishneh states that by mentioning \"the end of the Sabbath boundary,\" the Rambam alludes to a concept stated by Tosafot (Shabbat 150a) - i.e., that if one's field is within the Sabbath boundary, there is no difficulty and one may walk to it on the Sabbath so that one can begin work on Saturday night. If the field is at the end of the Sabbath boundary, it is obvious that one is walking to proceed to one's field. When the field is within the Sabbath limits, by contrast, it is not obvious that one's intent is to perform forbidden labor.
Although the Shulchan Aruch 307:9 quotes this law, the Magen Avraham 307:13 questions the rationale, for the verse from Isaiah quoted above appears to prohibit walking to facilitate the performance of any activity forbidden on the Sabbath, regardless of the appearance created.
on the Sabbath and wait there until nightfall so that he will be closer to performing a task7As explained in the following halachah, this refers to a task that is prohibited on the Sabbath itself. he desires to fulfill on Saturday night, for in this manner he is walking on the Sabbath in \"pursuit of his desires.\"", + "When does the above apply? When one goes to the end of the Sabbath boundary to wait until nightfall to perform an activity that is forbidden on the Sabbath itself. It is, however, permitted to [go to the boundary and] wait until nightfall in order to perform a task that is permitted on the Sabbath.
What is implied? We may not go to the boundary and wait until nightfall in order to bring produce that is still attached to the ground or to hire workers. One may, however, go and wait until nightfall in order to guard one's produce, since it is permitted to guard [produce] on the Sabbath.8See Halachah 8.
Similarly, one may go and wait until nightfall in order to bring an animal or fruit that has already been detached. For one calls to an animal and it will come even if it is outside the [Sabbath] boundary,9Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:1), which states that this refers only to an animal that is able to walk on its own. If the animal is too young to walk on its own, it is forbidden to go and wait for it, since even if there were houses, one would be forbidden to carry the animal, because of the prohibition of muktzeh. and had there been enclosures, one would have been able to bring the detached produce on the Sabbath.
Similarly, a person may tell a colleague, \"I am going10One may not, however, say, \"I am riding,\" for riding is forbidden on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 307:30). to this or that city tomorrow,\"11Similarly, he may ask the colleague to accompany him (Maggid Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 307:8). for if there were [a chain of] huts [located between the two places], one would be permitted to walk there on the Sabbath. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "It is permitted for a person to tell a worker whom he sees [on the Sabbath], \"Stand near me in the evening.\"12Although both the employer and the employee understand the implication, since the employer is not making a direct statement - but merely an allusion - this is permitted. The Maggid Mishneh associates this with the concept mentioned at the conclusion of the first halachah: speaking about forbidden matters is prohibited, but not thought. Since no forbidden matters are discussed, the fact that they are implied is of no consequence. One may not, however, tell him, \"Be prepared for me in the evening,\" since by doing so,\" the person is attending to his wants on the Sabbath.
It is forbidden to run and jump on the Sabbath, as [Isaiah, loc. cit.] states, \"[Refraining] from following your [ordinary] ways\" - i.e., the manner in which you walk on the Sabbath should not resemble the manner in which you walk during the week. A person may, however, descend to a cistern, pit, or cave, even if they are 100 cubits deep, climb down to drink and then climb up.
It is forbidden to speak extensively about idle matters, as it is written [ibid.], \"...speaking about [mundane] matters\" - i.e., the manner in which you speak on the Sabbath should not resemble the manner in which you speak during the week.13The Ramah (Orach Chayim 307:1) mentions that a person who enjoys talking about news and matters of this nature may engage in such discussions on the Sabbath, since this brings him pleasure. Needless to say, Torah scholars are encouraged to direct their attention to loftier matters (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:2).", + "It is permitted to run on the Sabbath for matters involved with a mitzvah14The Maggid Mishneh equates activities which involve a mitzvah with matters of communal interest. He emphasizes that it is only the prohibitions against involvement with mundane matters that are relaxed because of the performance of a mitzvah. Other prohibitions - e.g., telling a gentile to perform a forbidden activity, or performing an act that resembles or that may lead to the performance of a forbidden labor (i.e., shvut) - are never relaxed, even for the sake of a mitzvah .
As the Rambam mentions (Chapter 6, Halachot 9-10), the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform an act that is forbidden as a sh'vut is relaxed when a mitzvah is involved, but only when the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:5) mentions an opinion permitting us to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden act for matters of serious communal need, and also a more stringent opinion, that even forbids giving a gentile such instructions. The Ramah also notes a more lenient approach that allows one to tell a gentile to perform a task forbidden by the Torah. In practice, the Rambam's view, as interpreted by the Maggid Mishneh, is accepted by most authorities except in cases where a great loss is involved. In those instances, the leniency mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch is accepted.
- e.g., to run to the synagogue or the house of study.
We are permitted to calculate accounts associated with a mitzvah,15The Magen Avraham 306:10 gives as an example, calculating the cost of a feast associated with a mitzvah. to make measurements concerning a mitzvah - e.g., to measure a mikveh to see if it contains [the required] quantity,16A mikveh must contain 40 seah to be halachically acceptable. or a cloth to see if it is [large enough to] contract ritual impurity.17As mentioned in Hilchot Keilim, Chapter 22, a piece of cloth is susceptible to contracting ritual impurity only if it is of a specific size. There are different sizes, depending on the type of cloth.
Charity may be pledged to the poor.18Or for the benefit of a synagogue or other charitable cause. We may go to synagogues and houses of study - and even to theaters and halls of gentiles - to take care19From the discussion of this matter by the later Rabbis, it appears that this phrase has two meanings: a) to examine and inspect a situation where the communal interest is involved; b) to plan out a course of action to deal with questions of this nature, and even to execute that plan, provided the only prohibition being violated is involvement in mundane affairs - for example, to speak to the gentile communal authorities. of matters of public interest on the Sabbath.
One may speak about arranging a marriage for a girl, or arranging study - whether the study of Torah or the study of a profession20For earning one's livelihood is a mitzvah of great esteem. (See also Hilchot Matnot Ani'im 10:18 and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Avot 4:5.) - for a boy.21The details of financial arrangements involved in the marriage or the instructions should not, however, be discussed on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306:6). We may visit the sick and comfort mourners.22See Shabbat 12b, which states that permission to visit the sick and comfort mourners on the Sabbath was granted \"with difficulty,\" because it runs contrary to the mood of pleasure that should characterize the Sabbath (Rashi). Significantly, the treatment of this subject in Shulchan Aruch HaRav 287:1-3 appears to reflect a different emphasis from that of the Rambam. A person who goes to visit a sick person should say, \"It is the Sabbath [when it is forbidden] to plead;23In this context, note one of the Rambam's responsa (208), which emphasizes the importance of refraining from reciting any prayers containing requests whether of a communal or an individual nature on the Sabbath or on festivals. healing will come soon.\"24As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Eivel 14:6, one of the fundamental aspects of the mitzvah of visiting the sick is to arouse divine mercy on their behalf. Nevertheless, since it is forbidden to plead on the Sabbath, one makes a statement that acknowledges God's kindness. The phrase cited by the Rambam is also used as the basis of the Mi Sheberach prayers recited for a sick person in the synagogue on the Sabbath.
One may go to the end of the Sabbath boundary to wait until nightfall to take care of the needs of a bride or to take care of the needs of a deceased person [- e.g.], to bring a coffin or shrouds.
[When involved in these matters,] one may tell [a colleague,] \"Go to.... If you don't find [the required object] there, bring it from....\" \"If you can't find it at one hundred, bring it [even] at two hundred.\" [This is permitted] as long as one does not mention the [maximum] sum he is willing to pay.25Our translation is based on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:3).
[The rationale for] all these and similar [leniencies] is that [they concern] a mitzvah. And the [verse from which the prohibitions against mundane activity is derived] states, \"pursuing your desires.\" \"Your desires\" are forbidden; God's desires are permitted.", + "One may set out on a ship on the Mediterranean Sea on Friday for the sake of the fulfillment of a mitzvah.26As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 30, Halachah 13, generally one is not allowed to set out on a sea journey less than three days before the Sabbath so that one will have already acclimated oneself to the travails of sea travel by the Sabbath. Nevertheless, because of the person's involvement in the performance of a mitzvah, this restriction is waived. One [must] make an agreement with [the captain] to halt [the journey] on the Sabbath. If, [however,] he does not halt [the journey, it is of no consequence].27The later authorities maintain that particularly because a mitzvah is involved, if the gentile does not agree to halt the journey at the outset, one need not refrain from traveling with him (Mishnah Berurah 248:2).
We may nullify28The Torah gives a husband and a father the right to nullify vows made by his wife and daughter. (See Numbers, Chapter 30.) vows on the Sabbath, both vows that must be nullified for the sake of the Sabbath and vows whose nullification is not related to the Sabbath.29The reason that all vows may be nullified on the Sabbath is that a vow can be nullified by a husband or father only on the day that he hears it. Therefore, if he were not able to nullify it on the Sabbath, he would never be able to nullify it in the future. To preserve this right, our Sages did not forbid nullifying vows on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh). One may ask a wise man to absolve [a person] of a vow if this is necessary for the sake of the Sabbath.30In this instance, only the vows that are necessary to be absolved for the sake of the Sabbath may be absolved on the Sabbath, since there is nothing preventing one from absolving the other vows on the following day (Maggid Mishneh).This is possible despite the fact that the person had the opportunity to have [himself] absolved [of the vow] before the Sabbath. [This license is granted] because all of the above matters concern a mitzvah.", + "Punishments may not be administered [by the court] on the Sabbath. Although [administering] punishment fulfills a positive command [of the Torah], the observance of a positive commandment does not supersede [the observance of] the Sabbath [laws].
What is implied? A person who was sentenced to be lashed or executed by [the court] should not be lashed or executed on the Sabbath, as [Exodus 35:3] states: \"Do not kindle a fire in all of your dwellings on the Sabbath.\"31Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 322) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 114) count this commandment as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Note the Magen Avraham 339:3, which questions the Rambam's statements, asking why lashes that do not involve the violation of the Sabbath laws ares included in this prohibition. He explains that it is inevitable that the administration of lashes will result in bleeding.
Alternatively, the commandment teaches us that no cases of this nature may be judged on the Sabbath. The Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 114) favors this answer, for it also resolves another problem: Why is this restriction given the status of a separate mitzvah? Since the principle that the observance of a positive commandment does not supersede the observance of the Sabbath laws is already known, why is it necessary for the Torah to give us this commandment?
This [verse serves as] a warning to the court not to [execute a person by] burning on the Sabbath. The same principle applies regarding other punishments [administered by the court].32In his gloss on the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that there is a principle that a person who refrains from performing a positive commandment should be beaten until he agrees to perform it. Since these blows are not given as punishment, but rather as a prod to motivate the person to observe the commandments, they may be administered on the Sabbath.", + "A person is permitted to guard his produce on the Sabbath regardless of whether it is detached from the earth or not. If another person comes to take it, or an animal or a wild beast comes to eat it, he may shout at them and beat them to drive them away.
[One might ask:] This involves tending to one's own concerns. Why is it permitted? Because33The Maggid Mishneh states that this explanation is an original thought developed by the Rambam. one is prohibited only against acquiring new property that one does not possess, earning a wage, making a profit, or seeking to accrue [new] benefits. It is, however, permitted for a person to protect the interests that he already possesses. To what can this be compared? To locking one's house [to prevent] thieves [from entering].", + "A person who protects his grains from birds or who protects his cucumbers and squash from beasts should not clap his hands and dance as he does during the week. [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest one pick up a pebble and throw it four cubits in the public domain.34The Tzafenat Paneach notes that when considering the minimum size of a pebble one is liable for carrying, Shabbat 81a mentions two opinions: a pebble large enough to throw at an animal and a pebble large enough to throw at a bird. He questions why in Chapter 18, Halachah 11, the Rambam follows the opinion that requires a pebble large enough to throw at an animal, when in this halachah the Rambam mentions a purpose to be served by a pebble large enough to scare away a bird.
In resolution, the Tzafenat Paneach explains that a pebble large enough to scare away a bird can serve a purpose as mentioned in this halachah. Nevertheless, as stated in Shabbat 79a, a person will not take the trouble of carrying an article that is tiny. Hence, the minimum measure for which one is liable for carrying must be more substantial.
", + "All the actions that are forbidden as [part of the category of] sh'vut are not forbidden beyn hash'mashot,35Note the Mishnah Berurah 342:1, which states that this applies only when a person has not accepted the Sabbath. If, however, the person or the community in which he is living has accepted the Sabbath, these activities are forbidden even if a mitzvah is involved.[between sunset and the appearance of the stars].36See Chapter 5, Halachah 4, which states that, \"There is a doubt whether beyn hash'mashot is considered as part of the day or as part of the night.\" Although, as mentioned there, we act stringently regarding the observance of Torah prohibitions during this time, certain leniencies are granted regarding Rabbinic prohibitions, as the Rambam explains. They are forbidden only on the Sabbath itself, and they are permitted during beyn hash'mashot,37See S'deh Chemed (K'lalim, Pe'at HaSadeh 2:2) and others, who question whether or not the leniencies mentioned by the Rambam apply both beyn hash'mashot on Friday and beyn hash'mashot on Saturday. There is room to differentiate between them, because during beyn hash'mashot on Friday, the prohibition against these activities has not yet taken effect. On Saturday evening, by contrast, since the prohibitions have been in effect throughout the Sabbath, one might think that they need not be relaxed until the Sabbath has definitely concluded. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 342:1 rules that one may follow the more lenient view. See also the Be'ur Halachah 342 who mentions this issue. provided that [the activity] is necessary because of a mitzvah or a pressing matter.38Significantly, most manuscript copies of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 3:3) state that the prohibitions in the category of sh'vut do not apply during beyn hash'mashot, without mentioning the qualification that the matter must be pressing or involve a mitzvah. In one of his responsa (Birkat Avraham, Responsum 14), Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, explains that the Rambam changed his perspective when composing the Mishneh Torah and adopted a more stringent view than he had originally held.
What is implied? During beyn hash'mashot it is permitted to climb a tree39This is forbidden as a sh'vut, as stated in Chapter 21, Halachah 6. or to swim across water40This is forbidden as a sh'vut, as stated in Chapter 23, Halachah 5. to bring a lulav or a shofar. Similarly, one may take an eruv that one has made down from a tree or out from a carmelit.41This refers to an eruv t'chumim (which allows a person to extend his Sabbath boundary), as stated in Hilchot Eruvin 6:9-10. Hilchot Eruvin 6:13, the Rambam states that during beyn hash'mashot, only an eruv chatzerot (which allows a person to carry in an enclosed area) may be made, but not an eruv t'chumim). The present ruling does not, however, represent a change of opinion. It is referring to an instance where the eruv was made before the commencement of the Sabbath, and the person merely desired to move it on the Sabbth.
Similarly, if one is concerned, anxious, and pressed concerning a matter, [an activity forbidden as] a sh'vut is permitted during beyn hash'mashot. If, however, the matter is not pressing, nor does it concern a mitzvah, it is forbidden. Therefore, one may not tithe produce that definitely has not been tithed,42Note the Birkat Avraham, loc. cit.,, which states that, even though tithing is itself a mitzvah, there is no obligation to tithe at a particular time. Here, the intent is that carrying out the activity beyn hash'mashot will allow the performance of a mitzvah that could not otherwise be performed. If that is true regarding tithing produce that definitely has not been tithed - e.g., to provide one with food for the Sabbath - one may separate tithes beyn hash'mashot. although the prohibition against tithing produce on the Sabbath was instituted as a sh'vut.43As mentioned in Chapter 23, Halachot 9 and 14. One may, however, tithe produce of which one is unsure whether or not it has been tithed.44See Chapter 23, Halachah 15. Although tithing this produce involves a shvut and there is no mitzvah involved, this tithing is permitted, because the prohibition against using the produce is not that severe.", + "When a minor performs an activity on the Sabbath that is forbidden as a sh'vut - e.g., he plucks from [a plant growing in] a flower pot that does not have a hole, or he carries in a carmelit - the court is not obligated to prevent him from doing so. Similarly, if his father allows him to act in this manner, [the father] need not be rebuked.45The Rambam's rulings here have aroused the attention of the commentaries. To understand his perspective, it is worthy to quote Chapter 12, Halachah 7:
Should a child desire to extinguish [a fire], he should not be allowed if he is acting on his father's behalf. If he is acting on his own initiative, the court is not obligated to restrain him.
Relevant concepts are also reflected in the Rambam's rulings, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:27- 28:
[When] a minor eats a forbidden food or performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, the court is not obligated to restrain him, for he is not of intellectual maturity.
When does the above apply? When [the child] acts on his own initiative. We may not, however, feed him [forbidden food] ourselves. This applies even to foods that are forbidden because of Rabbinic decree. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom him to desecrating the Sabbath, even regarding matters that are forbidden as a sh'vut.
Although the court is not obligated to restrain a child [from eating forbidden foods], the [child's] father is obligated to rebuke him... to train him [to conduct himself] in a holy manner.
According to the Rambam, the court is never obligated to restrain a child from performing a prohibited act, regardless of whether it originates from the Torah itself, or from Rabbinic decree. The child's father, however, is obligated to educate him. If the father fails to do so, the court should rebuke the father if he allows his child to violate prohibitions that stem from the Torah. If, however, the prohibitions stem from Rabbinic law, the court is not obligated to rebuke the father.
This explanation of the Rambam's approach is based on the statements of Rav Yosef Karo in the Kessef Mishneh and on his rulings in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 343:1). The Ramah (based on Tosafot, Shabbat 121a) introduces a different perspective: that when a child has reached an age when it is fit to educate him in the performance of the mitzvot, the obligation to educate him falls on the court as well. Therefore, they are obligated to restrain him from transgressing Jewish law.
", + "The Sages forbade the carrying of certain objects on the Sabbath in the same manner as [one carries] during the week. Why was this prohibition instituted?46In this and in the following halachah, the Rambam sets the conceptual basis for the prohibitions described as muktzeh. The particular laws that result from these principles are described in the following two chapters. [Our Sages] said: If the prophets warned that the manner in which a person walks on the Sabbath should not resemble the manner in which he walks during the week, and similarly, one's conversation on the Sabbath should not resemble one's conversation during the week, as it is written, \"[refraining from]... speaking about [mundane] matters,\" surely the manner in which one carries on the Sabbath should not resemble the manner in which one carries during the week.
In this manner, no one will regard [the Sabbath] as an ordinary weekday and lift up and repair articles, [carrying them] from room to room, or from house to house, or set aside stones and the like. [These restrictions are necessary] for since the person is idle and sitting at home, [it is likely that] he will seek something with which to occupy himself. Thus, he will not have ceased activity and will have negated the motivating principle for the Torah's commandment [Deuteronomy 5:14], \"Thus... will rest.\"47See the notes on the beginning of Chapter 21, which use this halachah as a support for the principle that the positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath is more than just a restatement of the negative commandment not to perform forbidden labor.", + "Furthermore, when one searches for and carries articles that are used for a forbidden activity, it is possible that one will use them and thus be motivated to perform a [forbidden] labor.
[Another reason for this prohibition is] that there are some people who are not craftsmen and are always idle - e.g., tourists and those that stand on the street corners. These individuals never perform labor. Were they to be allowed to walk, talk, and carry as they do during the week, the result would be that their cessation of activity on [the Sabbath] would not be discernible. For this reason, [our Sages instituted] refraining from such activities,48Walking, talking, and carrying. for the cessation of such activities is universally applicable.
These are the reasons for the restrictions against carrying [objects].49The three reasons mentioned by the Rambam are the product of his own original thought. The Ra'avad notes that the Talmud (Shabbat 124b) mentions a further reason: lest one come to carry articles from one domain to another.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam did not intend to negate the reason mentioned by the Talmud. Nevertheless, as Shabbat 123b mentions, the prohibition originally instituted was partially relaxed. The reasons why it was not relaxed entirely are stated by the Rambam.
The Sages forbade a person from carrying on the Sabbath, with the exception of articles that he requires, as will be explained.50The Rambam's wording implies that it is forbidden for a person to carry an article unless his act is purposeful. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 3 regarding which purposes are acceptable.) One may not carry a utensil, even one that is used for a permitted activity, without a purpose. (See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.)" + ], + [ + "There are utensils that are used for permitted purposes - i.e., a utensil that may be used on the Sabbath for the same purpose for which it is used during the week - e.g., a cup to drink from, a bowl to eat from, a knife to cut meat or bread, a hatchet to crack open nuts,1In many manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah, the text reads \"a hammer to crack open nuts.\" A blacksmith's hammer is considered as a utensil that is used for purposes that are forbidden (see Halachah 7). Nevertheless, a hammer specifically used to crack nuts is placed in a different category. The need to make this distinction is avoided by our version of the text which refers to a hatchet. and the like.", + "There are utensils that are used for forbidden purposes - i.e., a utensil that is forbidden to be used on the Sabbath for the same purpose that it is [ordinarily] used - e.g., a grinder, a mill, and the like - for it is forbidden to crush or grind on the Sabbath.", + "All utensils used for purposes that are permitted may be carried on the Sabbath, whether they are made of wood, earthenware, stone, or metal. [They may be moved] for the sake of the utensil, for the use of the place [it occupies], or to use it [for a purpose that is permitted].2As mentioned in the conclusion of the previous chapter, the Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam's statements as meaning that we are not allowed to carry a utensil for no purpose at all, even one that is generally used for a permitted purpose. This law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:4).
All utensils used for purposes that are forbidden, whether they are made of wood, earthenware, stone, or metal may be moved [with certain restrictions]. [Such a utensil may be moved] for the use of the place [it occupies], or to use it [for a purpose that is permitted]. It is, however, forbidden [to move it] for its own sake.3There are, however, several leniencies suggested by the later authorities - e.g., using such a utensil for a permitted purpose and then placing it down where one desires (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:12; Mishnah Berurah 308:16). Alternatively, one may move it with one's feet or in a manner that is considered irregular (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:15).", + "What is implied? One may move a wooden bowl to eat from it, to sit in the place [where it is located], or so that it will not be stolen. The latter is [what is meant by the expression] \"for the sake of [the utensil] itself.\"
Similarly, [a utensil] may be taken out of the sun so that it will not become parched and break. It may also be removed from the rain so that it will not become saturated with water and deteriorate. These are considered \"for the sake of [the utensil] itself\" and are permitted, since the tasks performed with this utensil are permitted.", + "Similarly, one may move a mill or a grinder4I.e., utensils that are used for a forbidden purpose, as mentioned in Halachah 2. in order to crack nuts open on it5After one picks up such a utensil and uses it for a permitted purpose, one may continue carrying it and place it wherever one desires (Maggid Mishneh). or to climb up to a couch on it. This is [what is meant by the expression] \"to use it [for a purpose that is permitted].\"
[Similarly, one may move it] to sit in the place where it is located. One may not, however, move it so that it will not break, so that it will not be stolen, or the like.", + "Any entity that is not a utensil - e.g., stones, money, rods, beams, and the like - is forbidden to be carried.6They may not be moved at all, even if one desires to use them for a purpose that is permitted, or one requires the place that they are occupying (Ramah, Orach Chayim 308:7). [Nevertheless,] even a large stone or a large beam that requires ten people to carry it, if it is deemed a utensil7I.e., as indicated in the subsequent halachot, if a person set aside or prepared a stone or board for a specific purpose, it is considered a utensil and may be moved on the Sabbath. it may be carried.8No matter how large a utensil is, it is permitted to be carried it on the Sabbath if one would ordinarily carry such a utensil during the week (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:2). (See, however, Chapter 26, Halachah 11, and notes.)
The doors of a house are considered to be utensils; they have not, however, been prepared for use.9Shabbat 122b differentiates between the doors of a chest - which are permitted to be carried if removed on the Sabbath (see Halachah 12) - and the doors of a house, which are not. The Rambam explains that the reason for this distinction is that, even though the doors of a house are considered utensils, it is unlikely that before the Sabbath commenced, one considered using them on the Sabbath. Therefore, they are considered muktzeh, as is explained in Halachah 9 and notes.
Rashi, by contrast, maintains that these doors are not utensils, and that is the reason it is forbidden to carry them.
Therefore, if they are detached - even on the Sabbath10The Rambam uses the word \"even\" both here and in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:1). It would appear that his intent is that it is taken for granted that doors that were removed before the Sabbath and were not prepared to be used for another purpose may not be used on the Sabbath. Even doors that were removed on the Sabbath and had been used as doors on this Sabbath may not be carried if they are removed. - they may not be moved.
Earth, sand, and a corpse11See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311), which mentions certain leniencies regarding moving a corpse if one fears that it will begin to decompose. may not be moved from their place. Similarly, an infant born in the eighth month, [although] he is alive, is considered as a stone and it is forbidden to move him.12Yevamot 80b states that a child born after only eight months will surely die. Therefore, even while he is still living, it is forbidden to carry him on the Sabbath.
Tosafot, Shabbat 135a, states that this ruling is no longer followed, since at present it is impossible to determine exactly when a child was conceived. Therefore, we cannot be certain of the length of time the mother was pregnant. Furthermore, the advances in medical technology have enabled us to save the lives of many babies who would surely not have survived in previous generations. At present, it is a mitzvah to attempt to save the lives of all premature babies, even if doing so involves performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath.
", + "It is permitted to carry a utensil to perform tasks other than those for which it is intended to be used. What is implied? One may take a hammer to crack nuts, a hatchet to cut a dried fig, a saw to cut cheese, a rake to collect dried figs, a winnowing shovel or a pitchfork to feed a child, a spindle or a weaver's shuttle to pierce with, a sack-maker's needle to pick a lock,13Our translation of the above terms is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:2). or a mill-stone to sit on.14Significantly, this is the only one of the examples given by the Rambam that is not mentioned in the Mishnah (op. cit.). The Rabbis cite Eruvin 102b or Shabbat 124b as possible sources. The same principle applies in other similar situations.", + "A person may carry a sewing needle that is whole to remove a splinter.15In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam uses this statement as proof that there is no prohibition against removing a splinter on the Sabbath. If, however, its head or its point has been broken off, it may not be carried.16Because it is no longer useful as a utensil (Shabbat 123a). Thus it resembles a stone which cannot be carried on the Sabbath. See Halachah 12. If it is still in an incomplete state and its head has not been pierced, it may be carried.17Since there are times when it is preserved in this state for the purpose of removing thorns and the like (Rashi, Shabbat, loc. cit.).", + "Whenever a person is careful [not to use] a utensil lest its value depreciate - e.g., utensils that are set aside as merchandise,18Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:3, which states that not all utensils that are set aside as merchandise are intended solely for that purpose. Many storekeepers consider making personal use of the wares in their shops. In such an instance, one would be allowed to move the article on the Sabbath. or very expensive utensils of which one is extremely careful lest they spoil - carrying it is forbidden on the Sabbath.19The word muktzeh means \"set aside.\" Since a person would ordinarily have no thought of using such a utensil on the Sabbath, it is placed in this category. Even if he changes his mind afterwards and decides to use it on the Sabbath, this is forbidden. Since at the commencement of the Sabbath it was not his intent to use it, it may not be moved for the entire day.
The commentaries compare this law regarding merchandise to Chapter 26, Halachah 14, which states that food, even when set aside to be sold, is never considered muktzeh.
This [category] is referred to as muktzeh [lest] financial loss [be caused].
[Included in this category are] a large saw, the knife-like point of a plow, a butcher's knife, a leather-worker's knife, a carpenter's plane, a perfume-maker's mortar,20All these utensils are used for professional purposes that are forbidden on the Sabbath. Since they are delicate instruments, their owners will not use them for other purposes, lest they become damaged. and the like.", + "All utensils that were set aside because of [an association with] a prohibited [activity] are forbidden to be carried. For example, it is forbidden [to move] a lamp that was kindled for the Sabbath,21For these same reasons, it is forbidden to use the oil in the lamp, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 12.
It must be emphasized that, because the articles mentioned in this halachah were involved with the performance of a forbidden activity on the Sabbath itself, the prohibitions governing it are more severe than those applying to an article used for a forbidden labor. It is forbidden to move the articles mentioned in this halachah, even when it is necessary to use the place where they are located or one desires to use them for a permitted purpose.
a candelabra upon which a lamp was placed, or a table on which money was lying.22As evident from Halachah 17, the present halachah refers to an instance when money was intentionally placed on the table. If it was forgotten there, more lenient rules apply.
[Moreover,] even if the candle is extinguished or if the money falls, [the prohibition remains intact]. Whenever an article is forbidden to be carried beyn hash'mashot [on Friday], it remains forbidden to be carried throughout the entire Sabbath23Rashi, Beitzah 26b, derives this concept from Exodus 16:5, \"On Friday, they will prepare what they have brought,\" which implies that the Sabbath preparations are completed on Friday, before the Sabbath's commencement. An article that is not prepared for use at that time may not be used throughout the Sabbath., even though the factor that caused it to become forbidden is no longer present.", + "In contrast, a utensil that is set aside because it is repulsive - e.g., a used kerosene lamp,24Kerosene produces an unpleasant odor. Therefore, even a metal lamp that uses it for fuel is considered repulsive. a chamber pot, or the like - may be carried on25This halachah grants permission to carry the repulsive article for other purposes. One is allowed to remove an article that contains filth from a room regardless, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 279:6, 308:34-35). the Sabbath26Although one would generally not think of using such a utensil because it is repulsive, since its use is not totally out of the question, it is not forbidden as muktzeh. According to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:35), however, this leniency does not apply to a chamber pot. It is considered as too repulsive to use for other purposes. if it is required.27Note the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, which states that it appears that such entities may be moved only when one desires to use them for a purpose and not when one merely desires to use the place in which they are being kept. The Mishnah Beruah 279:19, however, differs and also permits moving the article when one desires to use its place.", + "The doors of any utensil28Compare to Halachah 6. that may be carried on the Sabbath - e.g., the doors of a box, a chest, or a cabinet - may themselves be carried [on the Sabbath], regardless of whether they were removed on the Sabbath or before the Sabbath.29The Merkevet HaMishneh notes that in this clause the Rambam mentions \"before the Sabbath\" after \"on the Sabbath,\" because it is the greater inclusion. Since the doors were not fixed before the Sabbath, one might think that they are no longer considered part of a utensil, and hence it would be forbidden to carry them on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since they are fit to be attached to their original utensil, they may be moved.
In the following clause, the Rambam mentions \"on the Sabbath\" after \"before the Sabbath,\" because it is the greater inclusion, as explained in the following note.

Similarly, whenever a utensil that can be carried on the Sabbath breaks, whether before the Sabbath or on the Sabbath,30When an article breaks on the Sabbath and it is no longer fit to be used for its original purpose, there is a difficulty. There is a difference of opinion among the Sages whether an object that is nolad - i.e., \"comes into existence initially\" on the Sabbath - is permitted or not. Since it was on the Sabbath that it first became possible to use the broken pieces of the utensils for this new purpose, it is possible to consider them as nolad (Magen Avraham 308:14).
The prevailing view is that objects that are nolad are permitted to be moved on the Sabbath. They are, however, forbidden to be moved on a festival. Accordingly, if an article breaks on a festival, it would be forbidden to move its broken pieces even if they were fit to be used for a constructive (other than one resembling the article's original) purpose Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:24].
It must, however, be noted that the Magen Avraham's conception is not accepted by all authorities. Many maintain that since these pieces were always fit for use - either as part of the larger utensil or in their own right - they should not be considered nolad (Be'ur Halachah 308).
its broken pieces may be carried on the Sabbath, provided these pieces can be used for a purpose that resembles the purpose for which they could be used [originally].31Our translation follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, even though there appears to be a printing error. To explain: In the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:5), there is a difference of opinion between the Sages. The first opinion of the Mishnah states that the broken pieces of a utensil may be carried provided they can be used for any constructive purpose. Rabbi Yehudah differs and maintains that the broken pieces may be carried only when they can be used for a purpose that resembles the intent for which they had originally been used.
Although the wording of the standard printed text follows Rabbi Yehudah's opinion, the examples he gives and the continuation of the halachah follow the other view. Significantly, many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah state \"provided the pieces can be used for a constructive purpose.\"
Although the Baal Halachot Gedolot and other sages of the early generations follow Rabbi Yehudah's opinion, in the later generations almost all the authorities accept the other view.

What is implied? The broken pieces of a kneading trough can be used to cover the opening of a jug. Broken pieces of glass can be used to cover the opening of a flask. The same rules apply in other similar situations. If, by contrast, the broken pieces are unfit for any purposeful use, it is forbidden to carry them.32For they are no longer a utensil, and hence may not be carried, as stated in Halachah 6. Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:6), who mentions that if the broken pieces of the utensil present a danger, they may be moved.", + "All the covers of utensils may be carried on the Sabbath, provided they, themselves, are considered to be utensils.33With the latter clause, the Rambam excludes objects that were never used as the coverings of utensils before the Sabbath, nor were they prepared for to be used for this purpose. Furthermore, if it is not common practice to use an object for this purpose - e.g., a stone - it may not be moved on the Sabbath despite the fact that it was used as a covering several times during the week (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:36).
(See also Rashi (Shabbat 126b), who states that we may carry a cover only when it is fit to be used as a utensil in its own right. His opinion is not shared by other authorities.)

[The following rules apply regarding] utensils that are attached to the ground - e.g., a barrel imbedded in the earth:34According to the Maggid Mishneh, this refers to a utensil that is buried entirely within the ground and does not protrude at all. Since it is built in this manner, the Sages apply the laws governing pits and vats to it, lest people be unable to distinguish between them. If, however, a utensil that is attached to the ground projects from the ground, its cover does not require a handle, as will be explained (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:10). If its cover has a handle, it may be carried. If not, it may not be carried. Similarly, the coverings of cisterns and ditches should not be carried35This refers to covers that are not attached with a hinge, as is obvious from Chapter 10, Halachah 14. unless they have a handle.36By mentioning this law in this context, it would appear that the Rambam considers the rationale for the prohibition to be that without handles, the cover is not considered a utensil (Rav David Arameah).
Other authorities explain that when a cover lacks handles, its removal or placement resembles building. If, however, the cover has a handle, it is clearly distinguished as a separate entity that is intended to be handled (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:37; Mishnah Berurah 308:42). The Rambam touches on the latter prohibition, albeit in a slightly different manner, in Chapter 22, Halachah 25.
The covering of an oven [by contrast] may be carried, even though it does not have a handle.37In Talmudic times, an oven was a separate utensil whose base was attached to the ground, but which protruded from the ground entirely. Therefore, it could not be confused with a pit or a vat (Maggid Mishneh). As the structure of ovens has changed throughout the ages, there has also been a variation in the laws governing their covers.", + "[The following rules apply when] there are two entities, one permitted to be carried and one forbidden to be carried - one adjacent to the other, one on top of the other, or one within the other - and when one is moved the other will also be moved:38Based on Tosafot, Shabbat 43b, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:8) describes these laws with the term טלטול מן הצד, \"carrying in an indirect manner.\" If a person requires the article that is permitted [to be carried], he may move it, even though the forbidden article is drawn after it. If he requires to move the forbidden article, he should not move it by moving the permitted article.", + "What is implied? When a fig39An article that is permitted to be carried. is buried in straw40An article that is forbidden to be carried, because it is used for construction. More precisely, the term פגה refers to an unripe fig that is placed in the straw to ripen. or a cake is lying upon coals, one may pierce them with a spindle or a weaver's shuttle and remove them, even though the straw or the coals41The commentaries question whether or not this refers to an instance where the coals are burning. Were the coals to be burning, there is the possibility that by removing the cake, one will extinguish the upper coals and cause the lower coals to burn. The Maggid Mishneh quotes Rashi (Eruvin 77a) as explaining that the coals have already been extinguished.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the wording chosen by the Rambam differs slightly from that of the Talmud. The Talmud states \"a cake buried in coals,\" while the Rambam speaks of a cake \"lying on coals.\" Therefore, he maintains that the law stated by the Rambam applies even when the coals are burning.
Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham, Responsum 9), also shares that opinion, explaining that it is not absolutely necessary that the person will cause the coals to move, and this is not his intention. Therefore, there is no prohibition involved, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 5. (See also Hilchot Shegagot, Chapter 7.) Significantly, however, when Rav Yosef Karo mentions these laws in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:9), he cites the example of the fig and the straw, but omits mention of the cake and the coals entirely.
will be moved on the Sabbath when one removes them.
Similarly, if a turnip or a radish42The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:8) emphasizes that this refers to an instance where the vegetables were placed in the earth for storage purposes and they had not yet become rooted there. Were they to have taken root in the earth, it would be forbidden to remove them. is buried in [loose] earth and a portion of its leaves is protruding,43If, however, a portion of its leaves is not protruding, it is not permitted to pierce them with a spindle and remove them. By doing so, one would appear to be creating a pit in the earth.
This is the opinion of the Maggid Mishneh. The Magen Avraham 311:21, however, mentions the opinion of the Tosafot, Shabbat 50b, from which it appears that this leniency would be allowed.
one may pull out [the vegetables] on the Sabbath, even though the earth is dislodged. Conversely, however, if a loaf of bread or a child is [located] on a stone or beam, one may not carry the stone or beam because of the child or the loaf of bread.44This is an example of the second principle mentioned in the previous halachah, that one may not carry a forbidden object because of a permitted object lying upon it. Note Chapter 26, Halachah 21, which mentions that exceptions to this principle are made to save a corpse from the heat or from a fire. Similar rules apply in other analogous situations.", + "A person may pick up his son if [the son] yearns for [his father],45The bracketed additions were made on the basis of Shabbat 141b. despite the fact that the son is holding a stone.46Shabbat 141b explains that this refers to a situation where the son might become sick if his father does not pick him up. If there is no danger of the child's becoming sick, the father is forbidden to pick him up (Magen Avraham 309:1).This, however, is not [permitted] if [the son] is holding a dinar,47A coin of the Talmudic period. lest it fall and the father [pick it up and] carry it.48Shulchan Aruch HaRav 309:2 mentions that it is even forbidden to hold the child by the hand that is not holding the coin.
When a basket has a hole and a stone has been used to plug the hole,49The Magen Avraham 309:3 states that this refers to an instance where one firmly attached the stone in the hole, making it a permanent part of the basket. Otherwise, carrying the stone in the basket is forbidden.
Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 21:1), where the Rambam interprets this law and the one that follows as a single concept (as the Ra'avad does in his notes). According to that understanding, the leniency of using the stone as part of a container is permitted only when the basket contains fruit that will spoil if the container is overturned. Thus, the Rambam's decision here reflects a change of mind in favor of a more lenient ruling.
[the basket] may be carried, because the stone is considered as its wall.
[The following rules apply when] a basket is filled with fruit and a stone [is discovered] among the fruit:50The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:3) mentions the converse of this principle. When the fruits are firm and will not be spoiled if the basket is overturned and they are spilled to the earth, the basket should be overturned before it is carried. If the fruit is soft - e.g., grapes or berries - the basket may be carried as it is.51As mentioned above, the Ra'avad objects to this decision, based on his interpretation of Shabbat 142a. The Maggid Mishneh states that according to the text of the Talmud we have, the Ra'avad's interpretation must be accepted. It is, however, possible that the Rambam's text of the Talmud had a different version of this passage. Both the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:3) follow the Rambam's approach. If one spills out the fruit, it would be spoiled by the earth, and [our Sages] did not [apply] their decree in an instance where a loss would be caused.52The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions that if one needs to use the place where the basket with the stone is placed, one may move it without overturning it, even though it contains fruit that will not be spoiled. (See Halachot 17 and 20).", + "When a person forgets a stone on the opening of a jug, he may tilt the jug to the side [so that the stone] falls.53Shabbat 142b emphasizes that we are required to tilt the jug only when it is moved for the sake of its wine. If one moves it to use the place where it is located, there is no need to dislodge the stones. This ruling is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:5). If the jug with the stone upon it is standing among other jugs,54Were he to tilt the jug there, the falling stone might break other jugs. it should be lifted to another place, and then tilted to the side [so that the stone] falls. Similarly, if one forgets money on a pillow that one needs, one may shake the pillow [so that the money] falls.55Shulchan Aruch HaRav 309:6 and the Mishnah Berurah 309:14 emphasize that if one's intent is only that the money should not be stolen, it is forbidden to shake it from the pillow. If one needs [to use] the place where the pillow [is located], one may remove the pillow [although] the money is upon it.
When, by contrast, one56The Ramah (Orach Chayim 309:4) states that the following restrictions apply only when one places a forbidden article on an article of one's own, and not when one places a forbidden article on an article belonging to a colleague. For a person cannot cause an article belonging to a colleague to become forbidden. [intentionally] places money on a pillow57Note the Magen Avraham 309:6, which states that the word \"intentionally\" must be interpreted to mean \"for a useful purpose.\" If, however, a person put down an article on another object intentionally, but with no particular purpose in mind, it is considered as if he forgot it there. on Friday or places a stone on the opening of a jug, it is forbidden to carry them.58Since the article is forbidden beyn hash'mashot, the time of the commencement of the Sabbath, it remains forbidden for the entire Sabbath.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:4) also mentions the opinion of Tosafot, who maintain that a base for a forbidden object is created only when one's intent was that the forbidden object remain on the base for the entire Sabbath. If one intended to shake it off the base, or have it transferred by a gentile over the course of the Sabbath, it is not considered a base.
Although the Rambam's opinion is accepted by the later authorities, the more lenient view may be followed if there is a possibility that a loss will be caused - e.g., a lamp falls on a table (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 309:7).
[This applies even when later] the stone or the money is removed, for [the pillow or the jug] has become the base for a forbidden article.", + "[The following rule applies to] a stone that is placed in an earthenware59Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:6) and Hilchot Keilim 20:1. Rashi and others render the Hebrew קרויה as a \"gourd.\" bucket [as a weight]:60I.e., since the bucket is made of earthenware, it is not necessarily heavy enough to sink. Therefore, the stone is used as a weight. If it does not fall out when one draws water [with the bucket], it is considered part of the bucket and one is permitted to draw water with it. If not, one may not draw water with it.61In such an instance, the bucket itself becomes forbidden, because it serves as a base for a forbidden object (Mishnah Berurah 309:8). A garment that is [hanging] on a reed62This refers to a reed that was not altered to serve as a hanger. It is not considered a utensil and is therefore deemed muktzeh. may be slipped off the reed.63The intent is that one must hold the garment that is not muktzeh, and not the reed that is (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:16). The Mishnah Berurah 308:64 mentions that one must remove the garment without moving the reed. It is questionable, however, whether the Rambam would agree to that stringency, for this appears to resemble the other instances of טלטול מן הצד, \"carrying in an indirect manner,\" described above.", + "It is forbidden to carry produce that is forbidden to eat - e.g., produce that has not been tithed, even if the obligation to tithe is only Rabbinic,64I.e., produce other than grain, wine, or olive oil. produce separated as the first tithe, from which terumat [ma'aser] has not been separated,65After the tithes have been given to the Levites, they are required to separate a tenth of the produce that they have been given. This produce is given to the priests and is governed by same laws as terumah. (See Numbers 18:25-32.)terumah that has contracted ritual impurity,66Once terumah has contracted ritual impurity, the priests are forbidden to partake of it and it must be burnt. produce separated as the second tithe67The produce separated as the second tithe must be eaten in Jerusalem. When a person lives far from Jerusalem, produce that has been separated as the second tithe can be redeemed by exchanging it for money (Deuteronomy 14:24-27). or produce that has been consecrated68With the exception of the first fruits (bikkurim), produce is not offered in the Temple. If a person consecrates produce, his intent is that it be sold, and the proceeds given to the Temple. and has not been redeemed.
It is, by contrast, permitted to carry d'mai,69Produce purchased from an individual on whom we cannot depend to have separated tithes. for it is fit to be eaten by the poor, and produce separated as the second tithe or produce that has been consecrated and has been redeemed, but for which an additional fifth of its value has not been given.70When one redeems the second tithe or consecrated property, it is necessary to add a fifth of its value to the sum. (One pays 125%.) Nevertheless, as long as one has given the value of the produce, it is considered to have been redeemed, and the additional fifth is considered a debt. Note a parallel in Hilchot Eruvin 1:15.
It must, however, be noted that in Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 5:12, the Rambam writes that the sacred dimension of the second tithe is considered to have departed from the produce after it has been redeemed, even though one has not paid the additional fifth. Nevertheless, one should not partake of this produce, even on the Sabbath, unless one pays that fifth.
In contrast, in Hilchot Arachin 7:3, the Rambam writes that one is permitted to partake of consecrated produce after it has been redeemed, despite the fact that one has not paid the additional fifth.
", + "An Israelite is allowed to carry terumah, even though it is not appropriate for him. One may carry terumah that has contracted ritual impurity together with terumah that is pure, or together with ordinary produce, if both of them are contained in a single receptacle.71The presence of an article that is forbidden to be carried does not cause the entire container to become forbidden.
When does the above apply? When the pure terumah is below [the impure],72Our translation follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. The Kessef Mishneh mentions that the version of this halachah in the texts of the Mishneh Torah commonly available in his time read: \"When does the above apply? When the impure [terumah] was below....\" He, however, prefers the version found in our standard texts, because it parallels the text of Shabbat 141b. Significantly, Rav Kapach notes that both versions appear in ancient manuscripts.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that if the pure terumah is above, one should remove the pure terumah by hand, and then leave the remainder.
and the [terumah consists of] produce that would be soiled by the ground. Thus, if the container were overturned, it would be spoiled. If, by contrast, the produce is nuts, almonds, or the like, one must overturn the container, take the terumah and the ordinary produce, and leave the impure [terumah].
If one requires the place where the container is located, one may take all the produce at once, regardless of whether the pure [terumah] is located at the top or at the bottom.", + "[The following rules apply when] a person has in mind [to sit on] a row of stones73That were not cemented in place. Hence, there is a possibility that one will move them when one sits down.
The Magen Avraham 308:41 emphasizes that if one will not move the stones when sitting, there is no prohibition. Moreover, the Magen Avraham emphasizes that the prohibition against muktzeh pertains only to carrying objects with one's hands, and not to moving it with one's body. (See the following halachah.) Therefore, the intent in both clauses of this halachah is to carry the stones or the branches in order to sit on them.
before the commencement of the Sabbath: If he prepares them,74I.e., performed a deed preparing them. he is permitted to sit on them on the morrow; if not, that is forbidden.75Although the Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:21) desires to equate the row of stones with the date branches, the Magen Avraham (loc. cit.) justifies the Rambam's ruling.
When a person gathers the branches of a date palm [to use as kindling] wood, but changes his mind on Friday and decides to use them to sit on [in place of mats], he is allowed to carry them.76In contrast to the previous law, thought is sufficient to change the status of the date branches. This leniency is granted because date branches are often used to sit on. It was the person's thought to use the branches for kindling that caused them to be forbidden. Hence, his thought itself is sufficient to remove that prohibition.
By contrast, a row of stones is generally used for construction and not as a seat. Therefore, one must perform a deed that indicates one's desire to use the row to sit upon. Consequently, in the present era, when it is no longer customary to sit on date branches, in this instance as well one must perform a deed to indicate one's intent (Magen Avraham 306:40).
Similarly, if he actually sat upon them77The person did not intend to use them as a mat in the future when he sat upon them. Nevertheless, since date branches are commonly used for that purpose, that is sufficient to cause them to be considered as a useful object (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:51). before the commencement of the Sabbath, it is permitted to carry them.", + "One may not move straw that is on a bed with one's hands;78In the Talmudic era, straw was generally used for the purpose of kindling. Therefore, it is classified as muktzeh. The Magen Avraham 308:53 notes that in his era, straw was used most commonly for animal fodder. Therefore it should not be classified as muktzeh.one may, however, move it with one's body.79For the prohibition against moving muktzeh applies only when one moves it with one's hands. [Moreover,] if it is [useful as] animal fodder, one is permitted to carry it [by hand]. Similarly, if a pillow or a sheet is placed upon it, it is considered as if one had sat on it before the commencement of the Sabbath,80I.e., placing the pillow or sheet on it is a clear indication that one intends to use it as a mattress. Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:15 and the Mishneh Berurah 311:31, which state that if one puts straw on a bed with the intention of sleeping on it, one may spread it out by hand. and one may move it by hand.
[The following rules apply when] a person has brought a container [filled]81The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:35), which states that unless the person sets aside a corner of the house for the earth, it is considered part of the floor of the house. This implies that the person emptied out the container, for otherwise the earth would remain a distinct entity. with earth into his home: If he sets aside a corner for it on Friday,82This act indicates that the person plans to use the earth on the Sabbath. Therefore it is considered a designated article (מוכן). (See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:18.) he may carry it on the Sabbath, and use it for all his needs.83In the ages prior to household plumbing, earth was necessary to cover urine, feces, and other wastes.", + "It is forbidden to negate the possibility of using a utensil, since this is comparable to destroying [it]. What is implied? A person should not place a receptacle below a lamp on the Sabbath to receive any oil that drips. For the oil in the lamp is forbidden to be carried, and when it falls into the receptacle it will cause the receptacle that had been permitted to become forbidden.84This law has already been explained in Chapter 5, Halachah 13. Were one to place the receptacle there before the commencement of the Sabbath, it would be permitted. The same applies in all analogous situations.
For this reason, a receptacle may not be placed below a chicken to receive the eggs it lays.85According to most authorities, nolad, an article that first comes into existence on the Sabbath, is not forbidden. Nevertheless, an egg laid on the Sabbath is forbidden to be moved. This is a decree enacted as a safeguard, lest one move an egg laid on a festival, as explained in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 1:1). One may, however, cover [the eggs] with an [overturned] utensil.86One must, however, be careful not to move the forbidden article when covering it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 310:6; note the gloss of the Ra'avad to this halachah). Similarly, one may use an overturned utensil to cover any article that is forbidden to be carried, for by doing so one has not negated its use.87Although there is an opinion in Shabbat 43a that states that one may carry an article only for the sake of an object that may itself be carried, this opinion is not accepted as halachah (Maggid Mishneh). (Note, however, the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Chapter 26, Halachah 22.) Should one desire to take [the overturned article], one may.", + "One may place a receptacle under dripping water88I.e., water dripping from a leaking roof or the like. to collect it.89There is no prohibition against carrying rainwater. Thus, in placing the receptacle there one does not nullify the possibility of using the receptacle later (Mishnah Berurah 338:30). If the receptacle becomes full, one may pour out the water and return [the receptacle to its place] without hesitation.90This pattern may be repeated any number of times.
[The above applies] only when the dripping water is fit to use for bathing.91Water with which one bathes need not be as clean as water that one drinks. Nevertheless, one will not bathe with water that is soiled. Although the Tur (Orach Chayim 338) differs with the Rambam and does not require the water to be clear, the Rambam's view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 338:8) and the later authorities. If the water is not fit [for washing], one should not place a receptacle there.92The reason for the prohibition against placing a receptacle to collect the water is that one is invalidating the utensil for future use. The commentaries question this decision, noting that ultimately, when the receptacle becomes full, one is permitted to move it because it is repulsive. They explain that this restriction was instituted because, at the outset, it is forbidden to cause an article to become repulsive (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 339:9, Be'ur Halachah 339). [Nevertheless, after the fact,] should one have placed a receptacle there, one may carry it together with the repulsive water it contains.93These leniencies are granted only within a person's permanent dwelling, as reflected in the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:34. [The reason for the restriction against placing the receptacle there is] that we do not create a repulsive situation94Literally, \"a chamber pot.\" at the outset.95Leniency is granted if there is a possibility of loss involved (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 308:37).", + "Should a barrel containing [wine or oil] that is tevel,96Produce from Eretz Yisrael from which the agricultural requirements (terumah and the tithes) have not been separated. Until these requirements are separated, the produce is not fit to eat and it is considered as muktzeh as explained in Halachah 19. be broken [on the Sabbath], one may bring a receptacle and place it under [the barrel]. [By doing so, one is not considered to have nullified the possibility of using the receptacle,] since were one to transgress and separate [the terumah and tithes as required], the produce would be permitted for use.97See Chapter 23, Halachah 15..
A receptacle may be placed below a candle to collect the sparks that fall, for [the sparks] have no substance. In such an instance, it is permissible to move the receptacle.98See Chapter 5, Halachah 13.
When a beam breaks, we should not support it with a bench or a bed post99The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:7) emphasizes that one may use these utensils only to prevent the beam from falling further. It is forbidden to raise the beam to its original position, because that would be considered as if one were building. unless there is ample space [between the beams] and one can remove [the bench or the bed post] whenever one desires,100Unless there is ample space, we fear that the pressure will be so great that it will be impossible to remove them later. Therefore, one will have nullified all future possibilities of using them (Shabbat 43a). so that one will not nullify a utensil from the possibility of being used.
One may spread a mat over stones or over a beehive on the Sabbath in the summer, [as protection] from the sun, and in the rainy season, [as protection] from the rain, provided that one has no intention of snaring [the bees].101Based on Chapter 1, Halachah 6, one must add that the person must place down the mat in a manner that will not inevitably cause the bees to be snared (פסיק רישא). Were that to be the case, the person who places down the mat would be liable for snaring. [By doing so, one is not considered to have nullified the possibility of using the receptacle] because one may remove [the mat] whenever one desires.
On the Sabbath one may overturn a basket onto which chicks102Which are muktzeh like all animals and fowl. may climb and descend, since103Although one is forbidden to carry the basket while the chicks are in it, one is not considered to have invalidated the possibility of using the receptacle, because one may move it after the chicks descend. one is permitted to carry [the basket] after they descend.104If, however, the chicks are in the basket throughout beyn hash'mashot on Friday, the basket becomes muktzeh (Mishnah Berurah 308:148). Similar rules apply in all analogous situations.", + "[The following rules apply when] an animal falls into a cistern or into a water conduit [from which it cannot ascend on its own]: If one can supply it with its needs while it is there, one should do so until Saturday night. If not, one may bring cushions and blankets and place them beneath it. If this [enables the animal] to ascend, there is no difficulty. Although one is nullifying the possibility of using a utensil - for one is throwing it into a cistern [filled with] water105Rashi and the Rashba (Shabbat 128b) explain the problem differently from the Rambam: that while the animal is standing on the cushions, it is impossible to move them. This interpretation is difficult, because one may move them after the animal departs,. According to the Rambam's interpretation, by contrast, there is no difficulty, because once the cushions are wet, they cannot be used. The Rambam's interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:19). - [our Sages did] not institute a decree [in this instance], because of the suffering [the] animal endures.
[Regardless of the circumstances,] it is forbidden to lift the animal up by hand.106Although the prohibition against carrying an animal by hand is also Rabbinic in origin, it is more severe. Therefore, our Sages did not nullify it despite the suffering caused to the animal.
There are authorities who are more lenient and maintain that even the latter prohibition is waived because of the animal's suffering. The later authorities rule that one may rely on this decision in a situation where a great loss will be incurred. Moreover, they add that all agree that one may instruct a gentile to lift the animal from the cistern. This is preferable to placing the cushions and blankets there (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:26; Mishnah Berurah 305:70).
Similarly, one may not lift up an animal, beast, or fowl in a courtyard.107Needless to say, this is forbidden in the public domain, because it is forbidden to carry an animal there (Shabbat, loc. cit). One may, however, push them until they enter.
One may support108I.e., hold them by the necks or shoulders and direct them (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 308:40). calves and ponies as they walk. One may not, however, hold a chicken that fled [as one directs] it [to return to its coop]. [This prohibition was instituted] because [the chicken tries] to free itself from [the person's] hand, and [in the process, causes] its wings to be torn off.109This is the Rambam's interpretation of Shabbat (loc. cit.). Rashi and the Ra'avad offer a different rationale for the prohibition against lifting a chicken: that the chicken will lift up its legs from the ground, causing one to carry it. This interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). One may, however, push it until it enters [its coop]." + ], + [ + "All the utensils used for weaving, including the cords and the reeds, may be carried [according to the rules governing] other utensils that are used for forbidden tasks.1I.e., the object may be carried to perform a permitted task or because the place in which it is lying is needed (Chapter 25, Halachah 3). An exception is made regarding the upper weaver's beam and the lower weaver's beam. They may not be carried, because they are [usually] fixed [within the loom].2The Maggid Mishneh writes that, for this reason, it is as though they are not considered to be utensils.
Similarly, the pillars [of the loam] may not be moved, lest one fill the hole [in the earth created when they are removed]. It is permitted to move the other utensils of a weaver.3See Chapter 10, Halachah 3, and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 15:2, which mention the use of a weaver's rope.", + "Brooms made of date branches and the like, which are used to sweep the ground, are considered utensils that are used for a permitted purpose, since sweeping is permitted on the Sabbath.4See Chapter 21, Halachah 3, which states that one may sweep a floor on the Sabbath only if it is paved. Since sweeping is permitted in that instance, however, it is considered a permitted activity.
Nevertheless, according to the Ramah (Orach Chayim 337:2), who forbids sweeping with these brooms even on a paved floor, a broom would be considered a utensil used for a forbidden purpose. The notes on that halachah mention the views of the later authorities.

Bricks that remain after a building [was completed] are considered utensils that are used for a permitted purpose, for they are fit to recline upon,5Rashi, Shabbat 124b, states \"to sit upon.\", as is obvious from the fact that they are filed and adjusted for this purpose.6For this reason, a more lenient ruling is given than with regard to the row of stones mentioned in Chapter 25, Halachah 21, where one must indicate one's desire to use them on the Sabbath. (See Mishnah Berurah 306:73.) If, however, one collects them, [it is evident] that they have been set aside [for building], and it is forbidden to carry them.7Since they are not considered to be utensils. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 6.)", + "A small shard may be carried, even in the public domain.8Although there is no utensil to cover there, since it is fit to cover a utensil one may take it to use for another purpose (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306:7). Needless to say, one may carry it only less than four cubits.[This leniency is granted] because it is fit to be used in a courtyard to cover the opening of a small utensil.9As the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize, this leniency applies only to the broken pieces of a utensil. Since it was originally considered a utensil, it remains in this category as long as it can serve a useful purpose. In contrast, a stone is not considered a utensil, even though it is fit to cover another utensil, unless it is designated for this purpose. [When] the stopper of a barrel has been cut off, both it and its broken pieces are permitted to be carried. If one threw it into a garbage dump10Although it is useful, since its owner discarded it before the commencement of the Sabbath, there was no intent of using it at the time the Sabbath commenced. Therefore, it becomes forbidden. (See Ramah, Orach Chayim 308:7.) before the commencement of the Sabbath,11If, however, it is discarded on the Sabbath itself, its use is permitted, since at the time of the commencement of the Sabbath it was still deemed to be a useful article (Maggid Mishneh). carrying it is forbidden.
When a utensil has been broken [but not shattered into pieces], one should not remove a shard from it to use to cover [another utensil] or to use as a support.", + "It is permitted to bring three rounded12Our translation is taken from the dictionary of Rabbi Tanchum of Jerusalem. The Maggid Mishneh renders the term מקורזלות as \"sharp.\" stones into a lavatory to clean oneself.13Although stones are not considered to be utensils and therefore may not ordinarily be carried, an exception is made in order to allow a person to take care of his basic hygienic needs.
Because of the advances in civilization, the situations described in this and the following halachah are no longer common practice. Nevertheless, the motivating principle behind these laws - that our Sages allowed certain leniencies for the sake of human dignity and hygiene - is pertinent at all times.
In this context, it is worthy to note the difference of opinion mentioned by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 312:1): According to one opinion, it is permitted to carry these stones only in one's own courtyard; i.e., only the prohibition against carrying stones is lifted. A second opinion, however, maintains that the prohibition against bringing an article from a carmelit into the private domain is also lifted in this instance. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 312:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 312:8 favor the latter view.
Of what size may they be? A fistful.14I.e., the size of all three together may not exceed a fistful (Maggid Mishneh).A clod of earth, by contrast, which is likely to crumble, is forbidden to be taken to clean oneself.15Rashi (Shabbat 81a) relates that since the earth is likely to crumble - and then it will no longer be useful for this purpose - the prohibition against carrying it was never lifted.
It is permitted to take these stones up to a roof [so that one will be able] to clean oneself with them.16Rashi (loc. cit.) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 312:1) explain that carrying the stones might entail extraordinary difficulty, which is normally forbidden on the Sabbath. An exception is made in this instance, however, for the reasons mentioned above. When rain descends upon them and they sink in the mud, they may be taken if there is a distinct mark [showing their location].17There is no concern that one might be performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of grinding, nor of the forbidden labor of demolishing.
[When] a stone has filth on it, one can be certain that it is used to clean oneself. Therefore, carrying it is permitted it even though it is large.18As a corollary to this principle, the Mishnah Berurah 312:6 mentions that it is permitted to carry toilet paper. Although paper is generally considered to be muktzeh, since the purpose for which this paper is used is clearly designated, it is not placed in this category. The Mishnah Berurah, however, emphasizes that tearing the paper on the Sabbath is forbidden.", + "Should a person have a choice of [using] a stone or an earthenware shard [to clean himself], one should use the stone.19Since a shard is sharp and might tear one's membranes (Rashi, Shabbat 82a).If, however, the shard comes from the handle of a utensil, one should use the shard.20Because in this instance the shard is smooth and will not tear one's membranes. Since the shard comes from a useful article, it is not muktzeh, as the stones are.
[The following rules apply when] a person has a choice of [using] a stone or grass: If the grass is soft, one should use it.21Since the grass is useful as animal fodder, it is not considered muktzeh. Therefore, using it is preferable to using the stone. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 312:6), which states that one may use grasses that are still attached to the ground, provided one does not uproot them. If not, one should use the stone.22If the grasses are firm, there is a possibility that their sharp edges will perforate one's membranes (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:5).", + "The remnants of mats that have become tattered are considered utensils that may be used for a permitted purpose, for they are fit to be used to cover filth.23The Ramban states that if they were discarded before the commencement of the Sabbath, they are considered to be muktzeh. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:12). In contrast, the remnants of clothes24The Maggid Mishneh cites the Ra'avad who states that this refers to the remnants of a tallit used for prayer, which are inappropriate to be used to clean filth. The Rambam, however, interprets this as referring to the remnants of all garments. Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:13) quotes both views, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:41 favors the Rambam's opinion, explaining that even though smaller pieces of cloth are fit to be used to clean filth, this does not cause them to be considered to be a כלי, \"useful article,\" unless they are explicitly designated for this purpose. Therefore, they are placed in the category of muktzeh like stones. that are less than three [thumbbreadths] by three [thumbbreadths],25The minimum size of a piece of cloth that is susceptible to ritual impurity (Hilchot Keilim 22:20). and have become tattered may not be carried, for they are not fit - neither for the poor nor for the rich.26Hilchot Keilim (op. cit.) mentions that a cloth three thumbbreadths by three thumbbreadths is fit only for the poor. A rich person, by contrast, will not consider a cloth valuable until it is a minimum of three handbreadths by three handbreadths. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:41 and the Mishnah Berurah 308:52 also apply these concepts with regard to our present halachah.
The broken pieces of an oven are permitted to be carried; they are considered to be like all other utensils that are permitted to be carried.27See Chapter 25, Halachah 12. When, however, one leg of a range has slipped from its place, it may not be carried, lest one affix [it in its place].28And thus perform a forbidden labor. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:16) applies this concept to other articles - e.g., a bench that has one leg broken off.", + "A ladder leading to a loft is forbidden to be carried [on the Sabbath], since it is not considered to be a utensil.29Hence, moving it at all is forbidden. (See Hilchot Eruvin 3:7, from which one can derive the following: A ladder leading to a loft is usually left there permanently. Therefore, it is a heavy structure that is not considered to be a כלי, a utensil, but rather a permanent part of the building's structure.) [A ladder leading] to a dovecote [by contrast, is not considered muktzeh30Since it is usually moved from dovecote to dovecote, it is light and is therefore considered to be a כלי. Accordingly, if there were no room for suspicion that one would snare doves, one would be allowed to move it.
The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 5:4, which states that the only reason the Sages permitted moving such a ladder on a holiday was to allow for festive joy (i.e., to permit one to bring doves to slaughter). Therefore, on the Sabbath, when slaughtering is forbidden, there is no reason to allow one to move such a ladder. A household ladder, by contrast, may be moved (Mishnah Berurah 308:78).
and] is permitted to be tilted. One should not, however, carry it from one dovecote to another, lest one follow one's ordinary course of conduct and come to snare [the doves].
[The following rule governs the use of] a rod that is used to harvest olives:31The Rambam describes the construction and use of such a rod in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:3). When it is categorized as a utensil,32Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:1), which states that for a reed to be \"categorized as a utensil,\" it is not sufficient merely to think about using it for that purpose; one must actually adapt the article to fit the purpose for which it is intended to be used. it is considered to be a utensil that is used for a forbidden purpose. [The following rule governs the use of] a reed that is adjusted by a homeowner to open and lock [his door]:33I.e., it is used as a door stop. Thus, it resembles slightly the bolt mentioned in the following halachah. When it is categorized as a utensil,34The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:1) mentions two perspectives on this matter. Rashi states that one must prepare the reed for use as a utensil that can be employed for other purposes. Otherwise, using it as a door stop will be considered to be building. Rabbenu Tam explains that as long as the reed is prepared for use as a door stop, it is sufficient.
Although in this halachah, the Rambam's perspective appears to follow that of Rashi, in his gloss to Chapter 23, Halachah 13, the Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam follows the position of Rabbenu Tam. The later authorities agree that one may rely on Rabbenu Tam's view (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:2; Mishnah Berurah 313:7).
it is considered to be a utensil that is used for a permitted purpose.", + "[The following rules apply to] a door35Rashi and others explain that the difficulty with the doors mentioned in this halachah is that since they do not meet all the criteria of ordinary doors, closing an opening with them resembles building. The Rambam, by contrast, appears to maintain that the difficulty is whether doors of this nature are considered to be כלים, useful articles, or not. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:3) follows Rashi's view. that once had a hinge - though at present it does not have a hinge36If the board used as a door lacks any sign of a hinge, it is not considered a כלי, a useful article, and carrying it is forbidden. In this instance, since it has the mark of a hinge, it was obviously used as a door in the past. Therefore, if it meets either of the other conditions mentioned by the Rambam, it may be moved on the Sabbath. - which is prepared to close a yard,37Our translation is based on Rashi (Eruvin 101a) and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). More precisely, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 10:8), the Rambam defines the Hebrew term מוקצה as \"a distinct place that is not used for any purpose, nor is it required by its owner - e.g., a barn or stable.\"
The Shulchan Aruch emphasizes that the ruling concerning moving the partition used as a door is dependent on the fact that this enclosure is used infrequently. If an entrance that is frequently used were closed with such a partition, it would be considered as having been set aside for this purpose. However, since this is not the case, there is reason for the restrictions mentioned.
but which drags on the ground when it is opened and closed: If the door is attached to and hanging on the wall, it may be used to close the space and may be locked.38According to the Rambam, the fact that they were attached to the wall before the Sabbath indicates that they were intended to be used as a door. According to Rashi, it is sufficient to indicate that one is not building on the Sabbath. If not, it may not be used to close the space. If the door is [suspended] above the ground, it may be used to close the space.39The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam's wording appears to indicate that two criteria must be met: The partition used as a door must have at least the remnant of a hinge, and it must either be attached to the wall or be suspended above the ground. He objects to this conception, explaining that based on Eruvin 101a, it would appear that if a partition is suspended above the ground, it is considered to be a door even if it never had a hinge.
The Maggid Mishneh states, however, that it is possible that the Rambam also shares this conception. (Merkevet HaMishneh postulates that he surely does. Otherwise, the Rambam's words would be redundant, since it is impossible for a door to be suspended above the ground unless it hangs from the wall or is attached by a hinge.) The Maggid Mishneh's view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:3).
The same rules apply to a [partition made from] brambles or a mat that drags on the floor.", + "[The following rules apply to] a door that is made from a single piece of wood and which is placed in [a doorway] to close it and removed [to open it]. If [the doorway] does not have a base at the bottom that resembles a doorstep that would indicate that [the door] is a utensil that is used for [opening and] closing, [the door] may not be used to close [the doorway].40As in the previous halachah, Rashi and others explain that the reason the prohibition was instituted is that this door does not resemble an ordinary door. Hence, one appears to be building when closing it. The Rambam, by contrast, explains that the prohibition stems from the fact that the door is not prepared to serve as a כלי, a useful article. Therefore, moving it is forbidden, as explained in the previous chapter. If [the doorway] has a doorstep, one may use [the door].41Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:4), which states that even if the entrance has a doorstep, since it is uncommon to use a door made of a single piece of wood, such a door may not be used on the Sabbath. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch continues, this prohibition applies even when the door has a hinge.
The Magen Avraham 313:8 and other later authorities, however, maintain that one may rely on the Rambam's opinion if a door is used frequently as an entrance and an exit. This is surely true in the present age, when it is very common for doors to be made from a single piece of wood.

Similarly, a bolt that has a bulb at its end that indicates that it is a utensil used to bolt a door, and is not merely an ordinary beam, may be used to bolt a door on the Sabbath.42Eruvin 10:10 relates that there was a synagogue in Tiberias that had such a bolt. Its congregants refrained from using it on the Sabbath until Rabban Gamliel and the elders ruled that using it was permitted.
In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit:1) is more stringent and requires the bolt to be tied to the door even when it has a bulb at the end. (See the following halachah and notes.)
", + "[The following rules apply to] a bolt that does not have a bulb at its end: If it is tied to the door and suspended from it, we may use it to bolt the door on the Sabbath.43For the fact that it is tied to the door clearly indicates that it has been set aside for a purpose. [This ruling] also applies when it is carried together with the rope attaching it to the door.44This refers to an instance where the bolt is attached to a rope that is, in turn, attached to the door. If the bolt is removed by detaching the rope from the door and carrying the bolt and the rope together, the presence of the rope serves as an indication that the bolt has been set aside to be used for a significant purpose. Therefore, there is no prohibition involved. If, as in the following clause, the bolt is detached from the rope, there is nothing to indicate that it is a useful article. Hence, it is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).
The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's interpretation of the Hebrew ניטל באגדו. Instead, he offers a different explanation: that the rope with which the beam is attached to the door with a knot that is strong enough to hold the beam when it is removed. This is the interpretation that Rav Yosef Karo follows in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:1).

If, by contrast, the rope attaching it is fixed permanently to the door and the bolt is removed like a beam, placed in a corner, and then reattached when one desires, its use as a bolt is forbidden [on the Sabbath].45It was permitted to use such a bolt in the Temple, because none of the Rabbinic prohibitions in the category of sh'vut were in effect there. Outside of the Temple, using such a bolt was prohibited for the reasons mentioned by the Rambam (or according to others, because this resembles building, Eruvin 102a). This is forbidden because [the bolt] is not considered to be a utensil, nor is there any indication [that it is being used as a utensil], for it is not attached to the door, nor is it connected to a rope.46Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil and others question the distinction between this halachah and Chapter 22, Halachah 30, which mentions a piece of wood that is used to close a window. The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, leniency was granted only when the piece of wood is prepared for that purpose. In the present halachah, by contrast, nothing has been done to indicate that the bolt is set aside for purposeful use.
It must be emphasized that the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) takes a different perspective and maintains that the restrictions were instituted lest it appear that one is building when using such a door. According to this perspective, unless the conditions mentioned above are met, it is forbidden to use this bolt, even if it was prepared for this purpose before the Sabbath.
", + "A candelabrum that is made of several separate parts may not be moved on the Sabbath.47This applies even when one has not lit this candelabrum at the commencement of the particular Sabbath in question. Had the candelabrum been lit at that time, carrying it would have been forbidden, as reflected by Chapter 25, Halachah 23. [This restriction applies] regardless of whether it is large or small. [Why was this prohibition instituted? As a safeguard] lest [it fall apart and] one reconstruct it on the Sabbath.48See Chapter 22, Halachah 26.
[The following rules apply when] a candelabrum has grooves and thus appears to resemble one that is made from several parts: If it is large and can be carried only with two hands, carrying it is forbidden because of its weight.49The Kessef Mishneh questions the phrase \"because of its weight,\" for seemingly Shabbat 46a considers that as another rationale for stringency, not at all dependent on the fact that the candelabrum has grooves. Indeed, these rationales offered by two separate sages seem to be mutually exclusive. He and other commentators attempt to resolve this difficulty. Rav Kapach notes that many authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah omit this problematic phrase. If it is smaller than that, carrying it is permitted.50In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 279:7), Rav Yosef Karo follows the reasoning he mentions in his Kessef Mishneh and forbids the use of all candelabra with grooves, whether large or small.", + "We may remove a shoe from a shoemaker's block on the Sabbath.51A new shoe will most likely be firmly fixed on the shoemaker's block, and removing it would necessitate moving the block. This is, nevertheless, permitted, because the shoemaker's block is considered to be a utensil that is used for a forbidden intent. Accordingly, it may be moved when one desires to use the space it takes up - in this instance, the space within the shoe where one puts one's foot [Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:14)]. We may release a clothes press belonging to an ordinary person on the Sabbath. We may not, however, set the press in place.52Rashi (Shabbat 141a) explains that putting clothes in a press is forbidden, because it appears to be an activity performed for the sake of the weekdays that follow, and not for sake of the Sabbath itself. A press belonging to a launderer should not be touched at all; it is set aside not to be used, because of the financial loss [that might be incurred through its improper use].53Rashi (loc. cit.) offers a different rationale for this prohibition: that setting up a professional press resembles building and opening it resembles the labor of demolishing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:4) quotes Rashi's view.
Similarly, unprocessed rolls of wool may not be carried,54Shabbat 49a,b mentions the use of such wool for the purpose of insulating food to keep it warm. because [their owner] objects [to their use for purposes other than spinning fabric].55Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 259:1), which follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Shabbat 49a), who permits picking up such rolls if they are used as insulation, unless they are explicitly set aside for sale. Although these rolls are generally used for spinning wool, since they are not very valuable, the fact that they are employed for the purpose of insulation is sufficient for them to be considered to have been set aside for that purpose (Mishnah Berurah 259:6). Therefore, if they have been set aside for a particular purpose,56Note the Magen Avraham 259:2, which states that they must be set aside to be used for this purpose - e.g., insulation - forever. It is not sufficient that one decide to use them for this purpose on merely one Sabbath. it is permitted to use them. Unprocessed hides - regardless of whether they belong to a private person or to a [leather] craftsman - may be carried,57These are likely to be used as mats to sit on (Shabbat, loc. cit.). because [their owner] does not object to their [use].58The Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:25) mentions an opinion that states that this leniency applies only to cow hides, but not to sheep hides. The later authorities, however, do not accept this view (Mishnah Berurah 308:107).", + "All filth - e.g., feces, vomit, excrement, and the like - that is located in a courtyard where [people] are dwelling may be removed to a dung heap or to a latrine.59It would appear that the Rambam's intent is that although these repulsive entities should be forbidden to be removed since they are not כלים, it is permitted to remove them because of the discomfort their presence causes. Such entities are referred to as a chamber pot.60I.e., this term is used as an idiom to describe all repulsive entities. If it is located in another courtyard, it should be covered by a utensil so that a child will not become soiled by it.
One may step on spittle that is lying on the ground without taking any notice of it.61Note Chapter 11, Halachah 4, for a more specific definition of the Hebrew wording used. One may carry a warming-pan because of its ash. [This leniency is granted] despite the fact that it contains chips of wood,62The Ra'avad accepts the Rambam's ruling only when the warming-pan has coals that had turned to ash before the commencement of the Sabbath. The Ra'avad offers a different explanation of the leniency, stating that it is granted because the warming-pan is the base for a permitted article (the ash that existed before the commencement of the Sabbath) and a forbidden article (the remainder of the ash and the chips of wood). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 310:8) quotes the Ra'avad's interpretation. because it is equivalent to a chamber pot.
At the outset, we may not bring about the creation of a repulsive entity63Our translation is based on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:36). on the Sabbath. If, however, [such an entity] comes about as a natural process, or one transgresses and creates it, it may be removed.", + "It is permitted to partake of oil that flows from beneath the beam of an olive press on the Sabbath64Although the oil had not been separated before the commencement of the Sabbath, one is allowed to partake of it on the Sabbath. As mentioned previously, the Rambam follows the view of Rabbi Shimon (Shabbat 19b) who permits the use of nolad (objects that come into existence on the Sabbath). and from dates and almonds that are prepared to be sold.65In contrast to utensils that are forbidden in this instance, as mentioned in Chapter 25, Halachah 9. One may even begin to take grain from a storehouse66See, however, the following halachah. or from a grain pile on the Sabbath, for food never becomes muktzeh on the Sabbath at all. On the contrary, all [types of food] are [always] prepared for use.67As examples of this principle, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 310:2) states that one may pick up seeds from the ground which fell before the Sabbath that have not become rooted or eggs that were laid before the Sabbath from beneath a chicken. (See also Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:18.)
[There is, however, one] exception: figs and raisins that have been set aside to dry. Since they pass through an intermediate stage when they become repulsive and are unfit to eat,68I.e., fresh grapes and figs and dried grapes and figs are desirable foods. In the process by which these fruits dry out, they pass through a stage when they become repulsive. they are considered muktzeh and are forbidden [to be carried] on the Sabbath.69The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) states that there are two drawbacks to such fruit: a) it is unfit to be eaten; b) the owners intentionally set it aside, not to be used until it became dried. Therefore, the restriction is placed upon it.
A barrel [of wine] or a watermelon that was opened may be carried and stored away, even though it is no longer fit to eat.70See Hilchot Rotzeach 11:9, which explains that partaking of such foods is forbidden, because it is possible that a poisonous snake deposited venom there. Similarly, an amulet that has not proven its efficacy may be moved, although one is forbidden to go out [into the public domain] wearing it.71See Chapter 19, Halachah 14.
The oil that remains in a lamp or in a bowl that was kindled on a particular Sabbath may not be used on that Sabbath. It is muktzeh because of the forbidden [labor with which it was associated beyn hash'mashot].72See Chapter 5, Halachah 12 and Chapter 25, Halachah 10.", + "Although taking [produce] from a storehouse of grain or of barrels of wine is permitted, it is forbidden to begin73From the use of the word \"begin,\" the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 331) derives the following ruling: If one begins emptying the storehouse before the commencement of the Sabbath, one may complete the removal of its contents on the Sabbath, even if one's purpose is not directly associated with a mitzvah.
The Turei Zahav 331:1 objects to this leniency, however, for this appears to be unnecessary work that should not be permitted on the Sabbath.
to empty [the storehouse]74In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:1, based on Shabbat 127a), the Rambam explains the reason that this restriction was instituted. It is very likely that there are grooves or cavities in the floor of a storeroom, and a person would be tempted to level the floor if he were allowed to empty the entire room. The Turei Zahav 333:1 explains that the prohibition was instituted to prevent a person from exerting himself excessively.
Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 331:1 quotes both rationales, indicating that they are not mutually exclusive.
unless this is being done for a purpose associated with a mitzvah - e.g., emptying it to host guests or to establish a hall of study.
[In the latter situations,] how should the storehouse be emptied? Every person should take [out] four or five75In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that this number is not intended as a limitation. Indeed, every person may take out as many containers as he needs at one time.
It must be emphasized that this interpretation is dependent on a version of Shabbat 126b-127a that is not accepted by many other authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 333:1).
containers until it has been completely [cleared].76I.e., a single individual is not allowed to clear out the entire storehouse. Instead, each individual - or a substitute for him - must clear out the area he needs. Although one person may remove as many containers as he can carry at one time, he may not, however, return to take more (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.). See also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 333:3). We may not sweep the floor of the storehouse, as has been explained.77See Chapter 21, Halachah 2.
[Even when one is forbidden to empty the storehouse,] one may enter and leave and create a path with one's feet by entering and leaving.", + "Any substance that is fit to be used as food for an animal, beast, or fowl that is commonly found may be carried on the Sabbath. What is implied? One may carry dry turmos beans78See the notes on Chapter 3, Halachah 12, for a more specific definition of the type of bean referred to. because they are food for goats. Fresh [turmos beans,] by contrast, may not [be carried].79Because they are very bitter, they are not eaten at all (Maggid Mishneh). [One may carry] chatzav80A shrub whose roots penetrate deeply into the ground. because it is food for deer, mustard seed because it is food for doves,81The Maggid Mishneh objects to the mention of mustard seed. Although it is used as food for doves, it is also commonly used to prepare food for humans. There is a general principle that whenever a substance is considered to be food both for animals and for humans, it is considered to be set aside for use for humans and not for animals. The Kessef Mishneh, however, justifies the Rambam's ruling.and bones because they are food for dogs.
Similarly, we may carry all the shells and seeds [of produce] that are fit to serve as animal fodder. Concerning those that are not fit to be eaten: One should eat the food and throw [the shells or seeds] behind one's back;82A person should throw the shells - and similarly, any other waste left after eating - over his shoulder so that he will not create a repulsive situation on the table before him. For, as mentioned above (Halachah 13), at the outset creating a repulsive situation is forbidden (Maggid Mishneh). Significantly, this point is not emphasized by the later authorities. carrying them is forbidden.
One may carry meat that has spoiled, for it is fit to be eaten by beasts.83Or dogs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:31). One may carry raw meat - whether salted or unsalted84According to most authorities, although meat must be salted to remove the blood before cooking, there is no prohibition against eating uncooked unsalted meat. (See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 67:2.) Nevertheless, according to the Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:12), it is necessary to salt raw meat before one eats it. From the juxtaposition of these two rulings, Rav Kapach derives that, according to the Rambam, it is permitted to salt meat on the Sabbath to remove its blood.- because it is fit to be eaten by humans. This ruling applies to [raw] fish that has been salted. By contrast, carrying unsalted [raw] fish is forbidden.85For it is unfit for both human and animal consumption.", + "We may not carry broken pieces of glass even though they are edible by ostriches,86Rav Kapach explains that the intent is not that the broken glass is actually considered to be food by the ostriches. Instead, the intent is that ostriches have strong digestive organs, which will not be torn by the glass. As such, the glass will assist them in the process of digestion, because it will help shred the other food that they have consumed. nor bundles of twigs from a vine even though they are edible by elephants, nor luf,87A wild vegetable of the onion family (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 18:1). even though it is edible by ravens. [These restrictions were instituted] because these and similar [species] are not commonly found among most people.88Nevertheless, a person who owns a species of animal that is rarely found may carry whatever food is necessary for it, even though it is not usually consumed by other animals (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:29).", + "[The following rules apply to] bundles of straw, bundles of wood, and bundles of twigs: If they were prepared89Preparation is necessary, because we assume that these substances would ordinarily be used for kindling (Maggid Mishneh). Note the Magen Avraham 308:53, which states that straw is usually employed at present as a mattress or for animal fodder. Hence, it is permitted to be carried even though it was not prepared before the Sabbath. to be used as animal fodder, one may carry them. If not, one may not carry them.
If one brought in bundles of wild hyssop, madder, hyssop, or thyme90At times these substances are used for kindling, at times for animal fodder, and at times for other purposes that serve humans. to be used as kindling wood, one may not use them on the Sabbath.91Since these substances are less likely to be used for kindling, everything depends on the person's intent when he brought them home. Note the Magen Avraham 321:1, which states that if one brings them home without any specific intent, they are considered to be animal fodder. (See also Chapter 21, Halachah 19.) If one brought them in for use as animal fodder, one may use them. Similar rules apply to mint, rue, and other herbs.", + "We may not rake food that was placed before an ox that is being fattened for slaughter. [This applies regardless of whether the food has been placed] in a feeding trough that is a [separate] utensil92This is forbidden, lest one follow the same practice in an earthen feeding trough. or in an earthen feeding trough. [Similarly,] one may not shift [the food] to the side so that [it does not become mixed with] feces. [These restrictions are] decrees, [instituted] lest one level grooves [in the floor].93Note the Mishneh Berurah 324:41, which gives another reason for the prohibition against shifting food to the side: Some of the straw has surely become repulsive and is no longer fit to be carried.
One may take food that had been placed before a donkey and place it before an ox.94For an ox will not hesitate to eat food from before a donkey. One may not, by contrast, take food that had been placed before an ox and place it before a donkey. [This restriction was instituted] because the food that is before an ox becomes soiled by its spittle95Because oxen chew their cud. and is not fit to be eaten by another animal.96The Mishnah Berurah 324:37 emphasizes that the intent is that an animal of another species will not eat food that is soiled with the spittle of an ox. One ox will, however, eat food that is soiled with the spittle of another ox.
Leaves that produce a foul and repulsive odor and are not eaten by animals may not be carried. For similar reasons, carrying the hook on which fish are hung is forbidden.97The Maggid Mishneh explains that, in contrast to a meat hook, a fish hook is not a proper utensil and will be discarded after use. Hence, it may not be carried on the Sabbath. Rav Kapach objects to this interpretation, noting that if this explanation were correct, it would have been more appropriate to state this halachah in Chapter 25, which differentiates between entities that are considered utensils and those that are not.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 310:1) states that it is permitted to carry a fish hook, because it is not considered too repulsive to move.
By contrast, the hook on which meat is hung is permitted to be carried. The same applies in all similar situations.", + "Although carrying a corpse on the Sabbath is forbidden, one may anoint it and wash it, provided one does not move any of its limbs.98All the leniencies mentioned in this halachah are intended to inhibit the process of the corpse's decomposition. We may slip out a pillow from underneath it99Moving the pillow, and not the corpse, by hand. Although the corpse will also be moved, this is of no consequence. so that it will be lying on the ground100If a corpse is covered by blankets or sheets, it is possible that they will serve as insulator and keep heat from diffusing, thus causing the corpse to decompose more quickly. to enable it to remain without decomposing.
We may bring a utensil that will cool [a corpse] or a metal utensil and place it on the belly [of the corpse] so that [the corpse] will not swell. We may stop up [the corpse's] orifices so that air will not enter them. We may tie its jaw - not so that it will close101For this would involve moving a limb (Rashi, Shabbat 151b). - but so that it will not [open] further. We may not close [a corpse's] eyes on the Sabbath.102Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:13 and the Mishnah Berurah 311:22 relate that, based on the Zohar, it has become customary to close a corpse's eyes and straighten its limbs on the Sabbath, for the failure to do so will lead to danger.", + "When a corpse is lying in the sun, we may place a loaf of bread103Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:4), which mentions an opinion that allows a corpse to be carried if it is dressed in the clothes it wore while it was alive. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:10 accepts this ruling; the Mishnah Berurah 311:16, by contrast, does not. or a baby on it and carry it [into the shade]. Similarly, if a fire breaks out in a courtyard where a corpse is lying, we may place a loaf of bread or a baby on it104Thus, it is as if the corpse were merely a medium to enable one to carry the bread or the baby. and carry it [out from the fire].105This refers to carrying a corpse within a private domain. (See also Halachah 23 and notes.)
Indeed, even if a loaf of bread or a baby are not available, one may save a corpse from a fire. [This leniency is granted] lest one extinguish the fire out of apprehension that the corpse not be consumed [by the flames].
[The leniency of carrying an entity with] a loaf of bread or a baby upon it is granted only in the case of a corpse, because a person is distraught over the corpse [of his loved ones].106If a baby or a loaf of bread is not available, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:1) allows one to move a corpse by shifting it from one bed to another. The Ramah (loc. cit.:2) offers another alternative - to have a gentile carry the corpse.", + "[The following procedure should be adhered to when] a corpse is lying in the sun and there is no place to carry it, or [the people] do not desire to move it from its place: Two people should come and sit, one on either side [of the corpse]. If it is [too] warm for them [to sit on the ground], they may both bring couches and sit on them. If it is [too] warm for them [to sit in the sun], they may both bring mats and spread them over the couches.107Spreading the mats constitutes the construction of a temporary tent. This is permitted only because of the discomfort suffered by a living person, and not for the sake of preserving the corpse. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake all the stages in this process, so that it will not be obvious that this is being done for the sake of the corpse (Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:11; Mishnah Berurah 311:19).
[Afterwards,] they both may [depart], overturn their couches, and remove them [leaving the mats suspended over the corpse]. In this manner, the covering is created on its own accord, [as it were], for the two mats are next to each other and their two ends are located on the ground on either side of the corpse.", + "When a corpse has decomposed108Or will shortly reach that state (Ramah, Orach Chayim 311:2). in a house [to the extent that it produces a foul odor] and thus is being disgraced in the eyes of the living, and their honor is being compromised because of it, carrying it109The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not mention carrying the corpse with a baby or a loaf of bread on it, as in Halachah 21. The commentaries differ on whether this is necessary. The Rashba maintains that it is desirable to place another article on the corpse, so that one will be carrying the corpse for the sake of a permitted article.
The Ramban, by contrast, explains that since one is carrying the corpse into a carmelit and violating a Rabbinic prohibition associated with a forbidden labor, it is preferable to minimize the violation of that prohibition by not carrying another article. Although the prohibition against carrying an entity (the corpse) that is muktzeh will be violated in a more serious way, it is preferable to violate that prohibition (which is associated with a sh'vut) than the prohibition against carrying into a carmelit, which has its source in the forbidden labor of transferring articles.
Although the Rashba's view is accepted by the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:2; Mishnah Berurah 311:9), one may rely on the Ramban's view if there is not another useful article available, and carry the corpse out without anything else.
into a carmelit is permitted.110The corpse may be carried into a carmelit, but not into a public domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:5; Mishnah Berurah 311:10).
The Tur allows carrying a corpse even into the public domain; since one does not intend to use the corpse, carrying it is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, and the prohibition against performing such an activity is waived in this instance. The Rambam would surely not accept this premise, for he maintains that one is liable according to the Torah for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Even the later Ashkenazic authorities who accept the basic principle of the Tur do not accept this leniency.

[This leniency was granted because] the honor of the creatures is great enough to supersede [the observance of] a negative commandment of the Torah, namely: \"Do not swerve right or left from the words they tell you\" [Deuteronomy 17:11].111See Hilchot Mamrim 1:2, which interprets this as a commandment prohibiting us from transgressing a directive instituted by the Rabbis. All the Rabbinic commandments have their source in this mitzvah from the Torah. See also Hilchot Kilayim 10:29.
If [the people in the home] have an alternative place to go, they may not remove the corpse. Instead, the corpse should be left in its place and they should depart.112The commentaries emphasize that this ruling indicates that according to the Rambam, the main source for leniency is the regard for the honor of the living, that they are forced to remain in a house permeated by the odor of a decaying corpse.
[It is possible to explain that according to the view of the Ramah cited in Note 106, the honor of the corpse is also considered, and removing it is allowed even if the people in the home have an alternative place to spend the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 311:7)].
" + ], + [ + "A person who goes beyond [his] city's Sabbath limit should be punished by lashes, as [Exodus 16:29] states: \"No man should leave his place on the seventh day.\"1Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 321) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 24) include this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Having covered all the prohibitions associated with the performance of labor on the Sabbath, in this and the next chapter the Rambam focuses on another Biblical prohibition associated with the Sabbath - the prohibition against departing from one's location. With regard to this prohibition, it is also significant to consult Hilchot Eruvin, Chapters 6-8, which mention extending the Sabbath limits mentioned here through a convention of Rabbinic origin known as eruv t'chumim.
[The term] \"place\" refers to the city's Sabbath limits.
The Torah did not [explicitly] state the measure of this limit. The Sages, however, transmitted the tradition that this measure was twelve mil,2A mil is approximately one kilometer.
There are those who interpret the Rambam's ruling here as a change in his position from Sefer HaMitzvot, which can be interpreted as stating that the limit of two thousand cubits has its source in the Torah itself. In a responsa, however, the Rambam explicitly states that his statements in Sefer HaMitzvot were intended to be general in nature, to be clarified in the Mishneh Torah.
It must also be noted that there are many authorities (among them the Ramban and the Rashba) who maintain that the Sabbath limits are a Rabbinic prohibition. (According to this view, the allusion to Exodus 16:29 is merely an asmachta.) Significantly, there is an early reference in the Rambam's works (Commentary to the Mishneh, Sotah 5:3) which supports this view.
The fundamental basis for these positions can be explained as follows: The measure of twelve mil is mentioned in the Jerusalem Talmud (Eruvin 1:10), but not in the Babylonian Talmud. The Babylonian Talmud (Eruvin 17a) cites a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and other Sages. Rabbi Akiva maintains that the Torah established a Sabbath limit of two thousand cubits, but the other Sages differ. According to the Rambam, the ruling of the Jerusalem Talmud is accepted. According to the other view, this represents a difference of opinion between the majority opinion in the Babylonian Talmud (which appears to state that the Torah did not establish Sabbath limits) and the Jerusalem Talmud. Generally, when there is a difference between the majority opinion in the Babylonian Talmud, and the Jerusalem Talmud, the majority opinion of the Babylonian Talmud is accepted.
The Rabbinic origin of the prohibition of two thousand cubits is universally accepted. It would appear that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 404:1) accepts the position that the entire concept of Sabbath limits is a Rabbinic institution. The Ramah, however, requires that consideration be taken of the Rambam's view.
Note also the Tzafenat Paneach, which emphasizes that all authorities agree that the observance of limits on travel on the holidays is Rabbinic in origin.
the length of the Jews' encampment [in the desert]. Thus, Moses our teacher was instructing them, \"Do not go out beyond the camp.\"
Our Sages ruled3According to the Rambam, as a safeguard to the prohibition of the Torah. According to the other view, as an independent prohibition. that a person should go only two thousand cubits beyond the city. [Going] beyond two thousand cubits is forbidden. [The rationale for the choice of this figure is that] two thousand cubits represents the pasture land [given to] a city.4See Numbers 35:5.", + "[From the above,] it follows that a person may walk throughout the expanse of [any] city, even if it is as large as Nineveh, whether or not it is surrounded by a wall.5Nineveh is used as a classic example of a metropolis because of the description of the city's size in the Book of Jonah 3:3, 4:11). Significantly, the Talmud (Eruvin 61b) gives Antioch as the example, and not Nineveh.
The entire city is considered to be the person's \"place,\" in the wording used in Exodus (loc. cit.). Hence, as long as he stays within the city's confines, or goes less than two thousand cubits beyond them, he is not considered to have \"left his place.\"
With the expression, \"whether or not, it is surrounded by a wall,\" the Rambam touches on a Halachic point of particular relevance in the diaspora where it is not common for a city to have an eruv. There is a question if the term \"city\" used throughout this chapter refers to all cities, or only to those surrounded by a wall.
The rationale behind the latter thesis is that only when a city is surrounded by a wall is it a private domain, and fit to be described as a person's \"place.\" When the city lacks a wall, the person's place is his individual domain. See Rashi, Eruvin 61b, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 396:1.
The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to these halachot, and more specifically, in his gloss to Hilchot Eruvin 7:4), explains that the Rambam does not subscribe to this restriction, and considers even a city without a wall as \"one's place\" even if it is forbidden to carry within it.

Similarly, it is permitted for a person to walk two thousand cubits in all directions outside the city. [When calculating these two thousand cubits, the entire area] is considered to be square, like a tablet,6There is a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah (Eruvin 4:8) whether the city is considered to be the center of a circle with a radius of two thousand cubits, or the center of a square whose sides are twice that length. The Rambam follows the latter opinion, thus expanding the permitted area to include the corners of the square.
The determination of the limits of the city's boundaries from which these two thousand cubits are measured is discussed at the beginning of the following chapter.
so that [the area in between] its furthest corners will also be included.7The Maggid Mishneh states that although the corners of the square are included, one is allowed to walk 2800 cubits (the approximate distance to the corner of the square) only when one is, in fact, pointed in the direction of that diagonal. One may not arbitrarily rotate the area encompassed by the square so that one will always be walking along its diagonal.
If a person goes beyond two thousand cubits up to a distance of twelve mil, he should be given \"stripes for rebelliousness\"8This is the punishment given for the violation of a Rabbinic prohibition.. If he goes even one cubit beyond twelve mil, he should be punished by lashing [as prescribed] by the Torah.", + "[There is a question whether] a person [is liable] if he goes beyond the Sabbath limit, [travelling] at a height of more than ten handbreadths above the ground9Since a public domain and a carmelit extend only to a height of ten handbreadths, the Sages questioned whether or not this same concept applied with regard to the Sabbath limits. - e.g., he jumps from one pillar to another - when none of the pillars has a surface area of four handbreadths by four handbreadths.10A surface less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths is not comfortable to use. Therefore, it is a matter of question (Rashi, Eruvin 43a). For there remains an unresolved question [among the Sages] whether or not the Sabbath limits apply ten handbreadths above the ground.11The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh cite one of the Rambam's responsa, which states that this entire question applies on dry land only. On the sea or on a river, all authorities agree that if the sea or river is more than ten handbreadths deep, the Sabbath limits do not apply.
The rationale for this leniency is that the laws concerning the Sabbath limits are also derived from the encampment of the Jews in the desert, and there the Sabbath limits were measured only on the land, and more particularly, in a public domain. When a domain is classified within the category of carmelit, e.g., seas and rivers, the establishment of the Sabbath limits is merely Rabbinic in origin. Therefore, since the case at hand - whether the Sabbath limits apply above ten handbreadths - is a point in question, we follow the principle: When in doubt regarding a point of Rabbinic law, the more lenient view should be followed. (See Chapter 30, Halachah 13 and notes, for a further discussion of this issue.)
.
[The matter is one of question only in an instance similar to the example given.] If, by contrast, a person walks on a surface that is four [handbreadths] by four [handbreadths], it is as if he is walking on the ground [even though the surface is ten handbreadths above the ground].12Eruvin 43a uses the expression, \"It is like thick ground.\" The Sabbath limits apply in such an instance.", + "A person who spends the Sabbath in a barn in the desert,13The intent is a private domain that is located outside a city and that was enclosed for the purpose of dwelling, or that is less than 5000 square cubits (Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh). (See Chapter 16, Halachah 12, and Hilchot Eruvin 7:4.)
Halachah 2 emphasizes that a person's \"place\" can refer to the entire city in which he lives. Similarly, in this instance, since this private domain is a distinct entity, it is considered to be the person's \"place,\" and the calculation of a person's Sabbath limits begins from the end of its borders.
in a corral, in a cave, or in a similar type of private domain may walk through its entire space and [may continue] to the limits of a square extending two thousand cubits in every direction [from that domain].
Similarly, a person who spends the Sabbath in an [open] valley14I.e., a carmelit that is not enclosed (Chapter 14, Halachah 4). Needless to say, the same laws would apply in a public domain (Maggid Mishneh).
In this instance, the four square cubits surrounding the place where he is standing at the commencement of the Sabbath is considered his \"place,\" and the two thousand cubits are calculated accordingly (Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh).
may walk to the limits of a square extending two thousand cubits in every direction from the place [at which he is located at the commencement of the Sabbath]. [This applies] even when he was sleeping at the time of the commencement of the Sabbath and thus did not consciously acquire the place as his Sabbath base.15This point is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages (Eruvin 4:5). There are opinions that maintain that a person must consciously acquire his place on the Sabbath. Otherwise, he is allowed to move within a square of four cubits alone. Eruvin 46a substantiates the opinion that the Rambam quotes as halachah.
A person who is walking in an open valley and does not know how far his Sabbath limit extends may take two thousand ordinary steps. This is [his] Sabbath limit.", + "When a person walks the two thousand cubits that he is entitled to walk and his limit ends in a barn, in a corral, in a cave, or in a city, he is allowed to proceed only to the end of his limit. We do not say that since his limit ends within a private domain, he is entitled to walk throughout that domain.16The Hagahot Maimoniot quotes sources that allow a person to proceed throughout a domain - but no further - even though his Sabbath limits end within that domain. This view is also cited by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 408:1).
When does the above apply? When his limit ends in the midst of the city or in the midst of the cave. If, however, that private domain is included within his two thousand cubits,17These concepts also apply in regard to a city. If it is included within the two thousand cubits of a person's Sabbath limits, it is only considered as four cubits. In this context, the commentaries clarify that when the urban area of a city is included within a person's two thousand cubits, but the city possesses some pasture land that extends beyond the two thousand cubits, the pasture land is not significant, and the city is still counted as four cubits (Ra'avad, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh). that entire domain is considered to be only four cubits, and the remainder [of the two thousand cubits] is calculated accordingly.", + "What is implied? If there were one thousand cubits from the place a person established as his base for the Sabbath, or from the town [in which he spent the Sabbath],18In this instance, we have based our translation on Rav Kapach's Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah, because the precise meaning of the wording employed in the standard printed text is extremely difficult to comprehend. to a city or a cave that is a thousand cubits long or less, he may walk through the entire city or cave that he encounters and [continue] beyond it for 996 cubits.", + "If, however, [in the instance mentioned above,] the city or the cave that begins within his Sabbath limits extends one thousand and one cubits, the person may walk only one thousand cubits - i.e., he may proceed to the end of the two thousand cubits [granted] him, [but no further].", + "A person whose Sabbath limits end in the midst of a town may, nevertheless, move an article to any place within the town by throwing it.19Needless to say, this ruling applies when the town is surrounded by an eruv. Eruvin 42b states that it is necessary to state this law, lest one think that this would be forbidden lest a person be drawn after the article he threw.
When a person spends the Sabbath in an open valley, and gentiles surround him with an enclosure on the Sabbath, he may still walk only two thousand cubits - even when this measure is included within the enclosure - in any direction.20As stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 22, an enclosure that is erected on the Sabbath is significant - and therefore, the person is allowed to carry within it. Nevertheless, the erection of such an enclosure does not have any effect on the extent of a person's Sabbath limits, because these are established at the commencement of the Sabbath. He may, nevertheless, move an article to any place within the enclosure by throwing it, provided it was enclosed for the sake of habitation.21See Chapter 16, Halachah 1.", + "[The following rule applies when] a person is in the midst of a journey - whether on sea or on dry land - and [intends] to enter a city: If he comes within two thousand cubits of the city before the commencement of the Sabbath, even though he did not arrive at the city until [after] the Sabbath [had commenced], he is permitted to enter,22This refers to a classic instance recorded in the Mishnah, Eruvin 4:2. Once, when several Rabbis were traveling together with Rabban Gamliel on a ship, they had not reached port before the commencement of the Sabbath. After the ship docked, the Sages asked Rabban Gamliel if they might disembark or not. He assured them that they might, because at the commencement of the Sabbath, he had looked to see that they were within two thousand cubits of the city. to walk throughout the entire city,23Regardless of its size, even if it is more than 2000 cubits. It is considered as if the person had already entered the city before the commencement of the Sabbath. and [continue] for two thousand cubits outside of it in all directions.", + "[The following rule applies when] a person [is in the midst of a journey and intends to enter] a city, but falls asleep on the way, and does not awake until [after] the Sabbath [has commenced]: If when he awakes, he finds himself within the city's [Sabbath] limits, he is permitted to enter, to walk throughout the entire city, and [continue] for two thousand cubits outside of it in all directions.24This also refers to a classic instance that occurred concerning Rabbi Tarfon. Eruvin 45a states that he was on his way to a city when night fell on Friday. Unsure of whether or not he was within the city limits, he did not proceed any further and spent the night in the fields. In the morning, the shepherds found him and told him, \"Rabbi, the city is right in front of you. Why don't you enter?\" He indeed did so, and lectured in the house of study throughout the entire day.
The Ra'avad questions why the Rambam quotes the story of Rabbi Tarfon, which is a baraita, rather than the Mishnah, Eruvin 4:4. The Mishnah states that a person who was journeying toward a city, but sat down to rest at nightfall, may enter the city on the Sabbath, if he has already passed within its Sabbath limits. Although the person was unsure whether or not he entered the Sabbath limits, since he was actually within those limits and desired to be in the city on the Sabbath, he is given the privileges of the city's inhabitants.
If, however, the person did not have a desire to be within the nearby city, or specifically stated \"This is my place for the Sabbath,\" he may walk no more than 2000 cubits from that specific place, despite the fact that he is within the city limits. Since he consciously segregated himself from the inhabitants of the city, he is not granted their privileges (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Orach Chayim 400:1).

[This is permitted] because his intent was to journey to this city. Therefore, he is considered to have established his \"place\" for the Sabbath together with the inhabitants of this city, since he entered into their limits.", + "A person who goes25This refers to a person who left the city's Sabbath limits either intentionally, for purposes not directly associated with a mitzvah, unintentionally, or because of forces beyond his control, as mentioned in the following halachah. even a single cubit beyond [a city's] Sabbath limits should not reenter them. [The rationale is that] the four cubits that a person is granted in which to walk begin from the place where the person is standing. Therefore, since the person went a cubit or more beyond his Sabbath limit, he must remain in his place. He may not walk except in the four cubits that begin from the place in which he is standing, and continue in a forward direction.26A key to the understanding of this halachah and the questions it has raised among the commentaries is the principle of הבלעת תחומים, the overlapping of boundaries. What this means is that when a person has a Sabbath limit already established, but leaves - either intentionally or because of forces beyond his control - he is given a new Sabbath limit in which he may walk. If the boundaries of that new limit overlap into his previous Sabbath limit, he may return there and walk freely within that limit.
To apply these principles to the case at hand: When a person leaves his Sabbath limits voluntarily, the place at which he stops is considered to be his base for the remainder of the Sabbath. He is granted only four cubits in which to walk. Moreover, as indicated in the notes on Chapter 12, Halachah 15, the Rambam maintains that this does not mean that the person may walk four cubits in all directions, but that he may walk four cubits in one of the four directions. Once he walks four cubits to one side, however, he may not walk four cubits in the other direction.
In the case of a person who willfully departs from the Sabbath limits, he is considered to have chosen the four cubits in front of him. Therefore, it is only within these four cubits that he may walk; he may not turn back in the direction of his original place at all.
This is the explanation given by the Maggid Mishneh for the Rambam's ruling. The Maggid Mishneh questions, however, the restriction imposed by the Rambam: Why must we say that the person is restricted to the four cubits in front of him? The person has the choice of four cubits in any direction. If he chooses the four cubits behind him, he will be able to reenter his previous Sabbath limits, and, based on the principle of הבלעת תחומים mentioned above, he would then be able to conduct himself as any other member of the city. Why prevent him from utilizing this option?
This objection - first mentioned by the Ra'avad - is echoed by Rav Yosef Karo in the Kessef Mishneh. In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 405:1), however, Rav Karo quotes the Rambam's decision. Based on the above principles, the Magen Avraham 405:1 allows a person to return to his previous Sabbath limits if he leaves the city's Sabbath limits unintentionally or because of forces beyond his control, provided the four cubits in which he is allowed to walk overlap his previous Sabbath limits. If, however, he intentionally leaves the city's Sabbath limits, no leniency is allowed, as the Rambam states.

Similarly, a person who is even one cubit outside a city's Sabbath limits when darkness falls should not enter the city.27Since the person is outside the city's Sabbath limits, he is more than two thousand cubits away. Thus, he cannot enter the city unless he transgresses and goes beyond his own Sabbath limits. Instead, he may proceed only two thousand cubits from the place where he was standing when the Sabbath commenced. If a person's Sabbath limit ends in the midst of the city, he may proceed [no further] than the end of his Sabbath limit, as has been explained.28In Halachot 5 and 7. The Maggid Mishneh raises an obvious question: Since the person is located more than two thousand cubits outside the city, how is it possible for his Sabbath limits to end within the city? [Significantly, when quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:3) omits this clause.]
The Maggid Mishneh answers that this refers to a situation in which a person was traveling to a city when night fell on Friday, and consciously decided to be considered as an individual, rather than as a member of the city. (See the notes on Halachah 10.)
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam is speaking of a second location, a town other than the one that the person originally desired to enter. The Or Sameach offers a unique explanation, stating that this refers to a situation where the person was more than two thousand cubits outside the city, and thus beyond its Sabbath limits. Nevertheless, there was a large cave included within his two thousand cubits. Since that cave is considered to be only four cubits, it is possible that his own Sabbath limits will extend into the city.

If one of a person's feet is inside [a city's] Sabbath limits and his other foot is outside the Sabbath limits [when the Sabbath commences], he may enter.29He may conduct himself as a member of the city with regard to its Sabbath limits. Although the Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:2) follow the Rambam.", + "[The following rules apply to] a person who left the Sabbath limits unintentionally - e.g., gentiles took him outside [the limits], he was possessed by an undesirable temperament,30More literally, this phrase would be rendered as \"an evil spirit.\" Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 4:1, the source for this halachah), which interprets this phrase as referring to \"any malfunction in a person's intellectual functioning, whatever the cause may be.\" or he inadvertently went beyond [the limit]: He may walk no more than four cubits.
If he returned [within his previous Sabbath limits] voluntarily, he may walk no more than four cubits. If [the forces that caused him to depart] returned him, it is as if he had never departed.31And he may walk within its limits at will. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 405:8), which follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher and allows a person to walk through his city at will, even if he returned voluntarily. The rationale is that since this was his original Sabbath limit, it is as though he had never departed.
If [these forces] left him in a private domain - e.g., the gentiles placed him in a barn, a corral, a cave, or another city - he may walk throughout that domain.32In this instance, we apply the principle that an entire domain can be considered to be four cubits. This ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion in the Mishnah cited above, and there are Geonim who follow the more stringent ruling and restrict the person to four cubits in this situation as well. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 405:6) and the other later authorities follow the Rambam's decision. Similarly, if he inadvertently left his Sabbath limits [and entered] a domain of this nature, and became conscious of his actions while in this domain, he may walk throughout that domain.33For Eruvin 43b equates acting without awareness of the prohibition involved to being taken away forcefully by gentiles.", + "When a person voluntarily left the Sabbath limits, he may walk only within four cubits, even when he was returned to his [original] Sabbath limits involuntarily34Needless to say, according to the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch mentioned previously in Note 31, one would be allowed to walk freely in such circumstances. - e.g., he was taken back by gentiles or because of an undesirable temperament.
Similarly, if he voluntarily left the Sabbath limits, he may walk only within four cubits even when he is within a private domain - e.g., a barn or a corral.35The Maggid Mishneh relates that the Rashba differs with this decision, maintaining that, in this instance, we should also apply the principle that an entire domain can be considered to be four cubits. It is, however, the Rambam's view that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 405:6).
A person who sets out on the Mediterranean Sea may walk throughout the ship and carry throughout the ship, even though he is outside the Sabbath limits that he originally established as his Sabbath base.36This ruling also reflects a classic incident related by the Mishnah (Eruvin 4:1): Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Yehoshua were on a ship that left the port of Plandarsin on the Sabbath. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar walked throughout the ship despite the fact that it had traveled beyond their original Sabbath limits. (This follows the ruling in Halachah 12, that if gentiles take a person outside his Sabbath limits, but place him in an enclosed area, he may walk throughout the entire area. The gentiles took the Sages outside their Sabbath limits, but since the ship was enclosed, they were allowed to walk throughout its confines.)
The Mishnah continues, stating that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehoshua remained within the four cubits in which they were standing. Nevertheless, the Mishnah explains that this was merely a stringency they accepted upon themselves and not a binding obligation.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7) accepts the more lenient view and allows one to proceed throughout a ship's confines. It must be emphasized, however, that this leniency applies only when there are barriers around a ship's deck. When the barriers surrounding a ship's deck are removed, one may proceed throughout the ship only when it is moving. If it is anchored, the passengers may move only four cubits.
", + "Whenever a person leaves his Sabbath limits unintentionally, and is surrounded by an enclosure on the Sabbath,37As stated in Halachah 8, and in Chapter 16, Halachah 22, an enclosure that is erected on the Sabbath is significant. Therefore, this situation is considered analogous to that of a person who leaves his Sabbath limits unintentionally and enters an enclosed domain. he may walk throughout [the area of] that enclosure, provided it does not exceed two thousand cubits.38The Rambam does not grant the person any greater leniency than if he had been located in that place when the Sabbath began, and afterwards gentiles surrounded it with an enclosure. (See Halachah 8.)
The Ra'avad and the Rashba differ and explain that greater leniency should be granted in this instance. Halachah 8 is speaking about establishing a person's place at the beginning of the Sabbath. Hence, if the enclosure is not erected at that time, it is not significant. This halachah is speaking about a person who is removed from his Sabbath limits against his will. Since we follow the principle that any enclosure is considered to be merely four cubits - whatever the size of that enclosure - he should be granted permission to walk throughout its limits, and 1996 cubits beyond it.

When this enclosure that is created without his knowledge overlaps part of the Sabbath limit that he left [an additional leniency is granted]. Since he is allowed to walk throughout that enclosure, he may reenter his Sabbath limits. Once he enters, [he may proceed freely,] as if he had never left.39In this instance as well, the Rambam is referring to a well known Talmudic incident. Eruvin 43b relates that Rav Nechemiah, one of Rav Nachman's students, had taken a Sabbath stroll, and while lost in thought had strayed beyond the Sabbath limits.
\"Your student, Nechemiah, is beset by disturbance,\" Rav Chisda told Rav Nachman.
\"Make a human partition around him [see Chapter 16, Halachah 23] and let him enter,\" Rav Nachman replied.
", + "[The following rules apply when] any of the individuals whose movement is restricted to four cubits must relieve himself: He may leave [these four cubits], move away [an appropriate distance], relieve himself,40Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 406:1), which questions if this leniency applies when the person must urinate, or if it applies only when he must defecate. and then return to his place.41Here we see how important the consideration of human dignity is. Even the prohibitions of our Sages - which the Torah obligates us to fulfill - are waived because of it (Rashi, Eruvin 41b).
This would appear to indicate that, according to the Rambam - who rules that the Sabbath limit of twelve mil has its source in the Torah - a person who travels more than twelve mil beyond his Sabbath limits may not move beyond four cubits, even to relieve himself (Minchat Chinuch, Mitzvah 24).

If when moving away to relieve himself, the person enters a portion of the Sabbath limits that he originally left: since he has entered, [his] entry [is accepted as fact], and it is as though he had never departed.42The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that one may intentionally move toward one's Sabbath limits in search of a private place to relieve oneself. Nevertheless, if such a place presents itself before one is able to return to his Sabbath limits, he must avail himself of it. He may then move far enough away so as not to be bothered by the odor, but then he must confine himself to a square of four cubits. [This leniency applies] provided he originally left unintentionally. If he left intentionally, he may walk only [within] four cubits, even if he reentered [his original limits].43As mentioned in Halachah 13, even if he was returned to his Sabbath limits by gentiles, the restrictions against his walking freely are not lifted.", + "[The following rules apply to] all individuals who are sanctioned by the court [to leave their Sabbath limits] - e.g., witnesses who are going to testify regarding their sighting of the moon,44See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 3:2-4, which describes how witnesses who saw the new moon should proceed to Jerusalem to give testimony, even if it is necessary to violate the Sabbath laws. - and all others who are allowed to depart because of a mitzvah:45Rosh HaShanah 2:6 explains that this refers to individuals who leave their Sabbath limits in an attempt to save lives - e.g., a midwife or a person who goes to rescue people from drowning, from an attack, or from an avalanche, as mentioned in the following halachah. When they reach their destination, they may proceed two thousand cubits in all directions.46Rosh HaShanah (ibid.) explains that originally such people were considered to be individuals who leave their Sabbath limits voluntarily, and therefore could proceed no more than four cubits. Rabban Gamliel was the one who granted this leniency. Should they become located in a city, they [are governed by] the same [rules as] the inhabitants of that city, and may proceed two thousand cubits beyond the city in all directions.", + "[The following rules apply when] a person was sanctioned to depart [from his Sabbath limits], but in the midst of his journey, he was informed that the mitzvah that he had intended to perform had already been completed: He may proceed two thousand cubits in all directions. If a portion of the Sabbath limit from which he departed overlaps these two thousand cubits, he may return to his [original] place, and it is as though he had never departed.
All those who depart [from the Sabbath limits] to rescue Jewish lives from gentiles, from a [flooding] river, or from an avalanche, are granted two thousand cubits [in which to walk] from the place where they rescue them. [When Jews are rescued from gentiles, but] the gentiles' position is strong, and the rescuers fear spending [the remainder of] the Sabbath in the place where they rescue them, they may return to their [original] place, [carrying] their weapons.47See Chapter 2, Halachah 23, where these concepts have been explained." + ], + [ + "Whenever there is a home that is outside a city, but seventy and two thirds cubits - i.e., the length of one of the sides of [a square] 5000 square cubits in area1See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Eruvin 5:2) which notes the difference between the figures mentioned here and the precise mathematical terms. See also Tosafot Yom Tov, Eruvin 5:2. - or less from the city, it is considered to be part of the city and joined to it. When two thousand cubits are measured in all directions from the city, this house [is considered to be on the extremity of the border2See Halachot 6 and 7, which state that a square should be made to include the furthermost extremities of the city, and the Sabbath limits should be measured from there. and] the measurement [begins] from there.3The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam appears to be saying that the Sabbath limits are measured from the edge of the city. He notes that there are opinions (see Eruvin 5:2) that grant a city a karpef (a seventy and two-thirds cubit extension) even if it is not close to another city. According to those views, the Sabbath limits are calculated seventy and two thirds cubits from the city's boundaries. The Rambam (Commentary on the Mishnah) rejects that view.
The Rambam's opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 398:5). The other view is accepted by the Tur and quoted by the Ramah.
", + "If one house is within seventy cubits of a city, another house is within seventy cubits of the first, and a third within seventy cubits of the second [and so on], they are all considered to be one city, although the chain extends for a distance of several days walk. When [the Sabbath limits] are measured, they are measured from the last house, provided this house is a dwelling4The intent is a permanent dwelling. A temporary structure, or a building that does not have facilities for lodging is not sufficient, as explained in the following halachot. four cubits by four cubits5The Magen Avraham 398:6 emphasizes that this does not include all structures with a total area of sixteen square cubits. Each side of the building must be at least four cubits. (See a parallel in Hilchot Mezuzah 6:2.) or more [in area].", + "[The following are considered to be dwellings in the context mentioned above:] a synagogue that has a dwelling for its attendants, a temple of a false deity that has a dwelling for its priests, a storeroom that has a dwelling, a bridge or a grave that has a dwelling,6Rav David Arameah explains that it was common for a bridge to have a dwelling for a toll collector, and a grave to have a dwelling for a watchman. a structure four cubits by four cubits that has three walls but no roof, watchtowers,7Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ma'aser 3:7)., a house built [on an island]8The bracketed additions are based on Rashi's commentary (Eruvin 55b). at sea,9Such a house is useful in unloading cargo from ships (Magen Avraham 398:7). a structure with two walls and a roof,10The Ra'avad notes that the question of whether such a structure is acceptable is left unresolved by Eruvin, loc. cit. Accordingly, he rules stringently. The Rambam's position is, however, followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 398:6). a cave with a building at its entrance that is used as a dwelling. All of these are included as part of the city, provided they are located within seventy and a fraction cubits of it.
From this house on the extremity [of the city], we consider it as if a line is extended along the length of the entire city, and we measure two thousand cubits outward from that line.", + "The following [structures] are not added [as the furthest extremities of a city's boundaries]: a structure with two walls and no roof - despite the fact that people dwell within it - a bridge, a grave, a synagogue, a temple to false deities, and a storehouse that do not have dwellings; a cistern, a trench, a cave,11The commentaries on Eruvin 55b state that the latter three are excluded even if there are people who inhabit them. a dovecote, and a house on a ship.12Because it is not anchored permanently and may depart, it is considered to be a temporary dwelling (Magen Avraham 398:10). All of these are not added [to a city's boundaries].", + "[The following rule applies when] two towns are located next to each other: If the distance between them is 141 1/3 cubits [or less], so that [the distance between them] is seventy and a fraction [as measured] from one town and seventy and a fraction [as measured] from the other town, they are considered to be a single city. Accordingly, [the inhabitants of] each town can walk throughout the other town and two thousand cubits outside of it.
[The following rules apply when] three villages are located in a triangle: If there are two thousand cubits or less between the village in the middle and both of the villages on the extremities, and there are 282 2/3 cubits [or less] between the villages on the extremities, so that if the middle village were placed on the line between them, there would be 141 1/3 cubits [or less] between it and both13See the Chatam Sofer (Orach Chayim, Responsa 94), which emphasizes that each of the exterior villages can be no more than 141 1/3 cubits from the imaginary line leading to the middle village. It is not sufficient that there be a total sum of less than 282 2/3 cubits between the two villages. of them,14This phrase and the phrase that precedes it create a difficulty. From the phrase, \"there are 282 2/3 cubits [or less] between the villages on the extremities,\" one would assume that this rule does not apply when the two villages on the extremities are separated by a greater distance. Nevertheless, the phrase \"if the middle village were placed on the line between them, there would be 141 1/3 cubits [or less] between it and both of them,\" appears to imply that even were the distance between the two villages on the extremities to exceed 282 2/3 cubits, as long as the villages on the extremities are not more than 141 1/3 cubits from the place the middle city would take up, it is acceptable.
From the diagram that the Rambam drew to accompany his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 5:3), the former interpretation would appear appropriate. (Similarly, the Ra'avad interprets the Rambam's intent in this manner and, therefore, objects.) Nevertheless, both the Maggid Mishneh and the Radbaz state that the width of the city should be added to the sum of 282 2/3 cubits. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 398:8) quotes the Rambam's wording verbatim. The Ramah, however, clarifies the ruling according to the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh.
they are all considered to be a single city. When [a Sabbath limit] is measured, it is measured two thousand cubits in all directions from [the single unit created from] these three [villages].
When the wall15This refers to a wall on which there are no dwellings (Maggid Mishneh). of a city was erected, and the city was settled afterwards, we measure [the Sabbath limit] from [the end of] the settled area [and not from the wall]. If it was settled and then surrounded [by a wall], we measure from the wall.16Rashi (Eruvin 26a) explains that when a wall is erected after an area has been settled, the wall causes the entire village to be considered as if it were four cubits in length. Therefore, we measure from the wall. When, by contrast, the wall was erected before the houses were built, the wall is not halachically significant. Accordingly, the Sabbath limits are measured from the houses. Based on the Rambam's statement's in Halachah 2, it is questionable if he would accept this interpretation.", + "When a city is rectangular or square, since it has four angles that are equal, we leave it as it is, and measure two thousand cubits in each direction on all four sides.
17Eruvin 55a and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 398:1) state that even if the sides of such a city are not positioned directly north and south, nothing is added to its size, because it is rectangular or square in shape.
If it is circular, we construct an [imaginary] square around it, considering it as the center of that square. We measure two thousand cubits from the sides of that square in all directions. Thus, [the inhabitants] gain [the area] at the corners.", + "Similarly, if a city is triangular in shape, or if it has many different sides, we construct a square around it, and afterwards measure two thousand cubits from each side of that square.
When we construct a square around a city, we construct this square according to the compass directions,18This applies even when the total area of the square is increased by constructing it in this fashion. making each of its sides face one of the four directions and extend in a straight line vertically or horizontally.", + "When a city is [shaped like a trapezoid,] one side being shorter than the other, we consider both sides to be of the length of the longer side.
[The following rules apply when a city] is L-shaped or crescent-shaped: If there are less than four thousand cubits between the two points on the extremities,19I.e., if the Sabbath limits of the houses on the extremities overlap, the houses are considered to be part of a single entity. we measure [the Sabbath limit] from [the imaginary line that connects these points].20This applies regardless of the distance from the vertex of the crescent to the imaginary line connecting its extremities. Even if it is more than two thousand cubits, the entire area is considered to be a single unit (Kessef Mishneh). When there are more than four thousand cubits between the two points on the extremities, we measure [the Sabbath limit] from [the vertex of] the crescent.21This applies to the house at the vertex. The Rashba considers each of the sides of the crescent to be a separate city. Sefer Ha'Itim considers every house to be an entirely separate entity. The Magen Avraham 398:2 states that the entire crescent is considered to be a single entity. According to this conception, the only difference between this instance and the previous clause is that one may not walk more than two thousand cubits away from the houses in the open area between them.
Based on the rulings of Rabbenu Asher and the Tur, the Ramah mentions two leniencies: a) Even when the two extremities of the crescent are more than four thousand cubits away from each other, the entire area of the crescent until the points on the either side which are four thousand cubits removed, is, nevertheless, considered to be a single entity.
b) If the space from the vertex of the crescent to the imaginary line connecting the two extremities is less than two thousand cubits, the entire area is considered to be a single entity even though there are more than four thousand cubits between each side.
", + "[The following rules apply to] a city located at the edge of a river:22Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi - and subsequently the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 398:9) - interpret this as referring to a river that usually dries up and is filled with water only during the rainy season. If there is a dock four cubits wide at the river bank, so that one can stand on it and use the river, the river is considered to be part of the city. Thus, [the Sabbath limit of] two thousand cubits is measured from the other bank of the river, because the dock causes the river to be considered part of the city.
If there is no dock, the measurement begins from the edge of the houses,23The city itself, however, is considered to be a collective entity (Maggid Mishneh). Note Rashi (Eruvin 61a), who follows a different perspective entirely, stating that, because there is no dock, the city is not considered as a permanent location, and every home is judged to be an individual entity. and [the width of] the river is included in the two thousand cubits.", + "[The following laws apply to] the dwellers of huts:24More specifically, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Ma'asrot 3:7), the Rambam defines the Hebrew צריפין as referring to \"V-shaped lean-tos made from reeds and wood.\" [The Sabbath limits] should be measured from the entrance to their homes.25These huts are not considered to be permanent dwellings. Hence, their aggregate is not considered to be a unit. Note, however, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 398:10), who states that if a group of such dwellings is surrounded by a wall ten handbreadths high or a trench ten handbreadths deep, they are considered to be a single unit. If [in that area] there are three courtyards with two houses26This refers to permanent structures built of wood and/or stone. in each, [the entire area] is established [as a unit].27The three courtyards, each containing two houses, are sufficient to be classified as a city (Eruvin 59a). Since we are classifying the permanent houses as a city, that status is conferred upon the area as a whole, including also the huts. A square is constructed around it, and two thousand cubits are measured [from its borders], as all other cities.", + "[The two thousand cubits of the Sabbath limits] should be measured only by using a rope of fifty cubits,28Eruvin 58a interprets Exodus 27:18, \"its width fifty by fifty,\" as an indication that the width of fifty cubits should be measured with a rope of that size. but not a shorter29For when the rope is shorter, the measurers may pull it tightly and extend its length (Rashi, Eruvin 58a). or a longer one.30For when the rope is longer, it may sag and cause the measure to be shortened (Rashi, Eruvin 58a). The rope should be made of flax, so that it will not stretch beyond [that length].
When [the measurers] reach a crevice that is fifty cubits [or less] wide, so that [its width] can be spanned [by the length of] the measuring rope, this should be done,31I.e., rather than measure the length of the incline, the entire valley should be measured as a unit of fifty cubits or less. provided [the crevice] is less than four thousand cubits deep.32The Maggid Mishneh states that this represents the Rambam's interpretation of the statements of Abbimi (Eruvin 58b). Rabbenu Asher offers a different interpretation of that passage, which is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 399:4).", + "When does the above apply? When a plumb line descends directly [into the crevice], for then [the slopes of the crevice] cannot be used.33For the incline is too steep. If, however, the plumb line does not descend directly,34And thus the slopes of the incline can be used for various purposes. one should not span [the crevice with the measuring rope], unless the crevice is two thousand cubits or less in depth.", + "With regard to a valley with a gradual descent, one should ascend and descend, measuring by approximation.35Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 5:4). See Halachah 16 for an explanation of the process followed. If the valley is more than fifty cubits wide and thus cannot be spanned [by the measuring rope], [the measurers] should go to a place where they can span the gap,36Provided it is within the Sabbath limits. He should not, however, go beyond the Sabbath limits, lest an observer notice his measurements and mistakenly think that the place is within the Sabbath limits (Eruvin 58b and Halachah 16 above). measure the span [there], see the parallels to [the place they are] measuring, and return to their task.", + "When [the measurers] reach a wall, we do not say that they must pierce the wall [to continue measuring].37Tosafot, Eruvin 58a, states that the intent is not actually to pierce the wall, but that one would be required to erect poles extending above the wall and measure from them. Instead, it is sufficient to approximate its thickness and continue.38The Rambam is referring to a wall whose sides are not straight, and hence the determination of its exact thickness is difficult.
If the wall can be used [by the public],39I.e., its incline is gentle enough to allow the public to ascend it without difficulty. it must be measured in an exact manner.40The Rambam's ruling follows the version of Eruvin 58a that appears in the texts of several early geonim. The standard printed text of the Talmud differs. In his gloss, the Ra'avad refers to the version of the standard text. Similarly, if a plumb line will descend directly parallel [to the wall],41And thus its thickness can be measured easily at either side. It must be measured exactly. The leniency granted in the first clause applies to a wall that ascends gradually, but not gradually enough to make it easily accessible for public use. its thickness should be measured exactly.", + "[The following rules apply when the measurers] reach a mountain: If the slope of the mountain ascends ten handbreadths within a length of five cubits, [the measurers should] measure the span [above the mountain],42By erecting a pole equivalent to the height of the mountain on either side (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 399:4). and return to their [ordinary] measurement.
If its height rises acutely, its slope ascending ten handbreadths within a length of four cubits, [all that is necessary is] to approximate [its length], and then one may proceed further.
If a mountain is so wide that [the measuring rope] cannot span it - i.e. it is more than fifty cubits wide - it should be measured by approximation, small portions at a time. This is the meaning of the expression,43Eruvin 5:4. \"In the mountains, they measured by approximation.\"", + "What is implied [by the directive to] measure mountains or valleys that cannot be spanned by approximation? Two people hold a rope four cubits long. The person above should hold the upper end at the level of his feet, while the person below should hold the lower end at the level of his heart.44In this way, the rope will be held horizontally, on more or less an even plane. The person standing above then descends to the level of the person standing below, who, in turn, descends further to the extent of the rope. [The entire process should be repeated and] continued until the entire area has been measured.
When [the measurers] go to span a mountain or a valley,45Which cannot be measured in the normal manner, as mentioned in Halachot 13 and 15. See also Halachah 19. they should not depart from the Sabbath limits, lest passersby see them and say, \"The Sabbath limits passed by here.\"", + "We rely only on the measurement by an expert46In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 5:5), the Rambam defines this as a person who knows engineering and is proficient in the measurement of land. who is proficient in the measuring of land. If the Sabbath limits [of a city] had been established and an expert came and measured [them again], increasing them in some places and decreasing them in others, we accept his ruling regarding the limits that he increased.47The Rambam's wording appears to imply that one accepts the opinion of the expert only with regard to the Sabbath limits that he increased, but not with regard to those that he decreased. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh note that although the Rambam is quoting the wording of the Mishnah (Eruvin, loc. cit.), the Talmud (Eruvin 59a) explains that the ruling of the expert must be accepted even with regard to those places where he decreased the Sabbath limit. The Kessef Mishneh notes that even in his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam follows this interpretation.
Note, however, Merkevet HaMishneh, which explains the Rambam's ruling here according to its simple interpretation. When the original measurement of a city's Sabbath limits was made by ordinary people, the expert's advice must be adhered to entirely, whether it is more stringent or more lenient. When, however, the original limits were also established by experts, the situation resembles the latter clause of the halachah, and the second expert's opinion is followed only when it is more lenient.

Similarly, if two experts came and measured the Sabbath limits, one giving a larger measure and the other giving a smaller measure, we accept the ruling of the one who gives the larger measure,48Because, as stated in Halachah 19, the more lenient opinion is accepted, since the Sabbath limit of two thousand cubits is a Rabbinic institution. provided that the inconsistency is not greater than the difference between the diagonal [and the border of] a city.49We do not say that the difference between the two figures could only be a minute measure because of imprecision. Instead, we allow the possibility of a major error, as explained in the following halachah.", + "What is implied? We can say that the reason the latter increased the measure was the following: The first erred and measured the two thousand [cubits] from the corner of the city diagonally.50Instead of measuring 2000 cubits on the diagonal, the person should have measured approximately 2800, as explained in Chapter 27, Halachah 2, and notes. Measuring only 2000 cubits on the diagonal causes the entire measure to become reduced. Therefore, he reduced its measurement, and the distance between the border of the Sabbath limits and the city will be less than two thousand [cubits]. [By contrast,] the second person [who measured] measured the two thousand [cubits] from the edge of the city [and therefore produced a larger figure]. We do not, however, consider the possibility of the first person's making any greater mistake.
Accordingly, if the latter measure is less than 580 cubits51I.e., if the diagonal of a square is 2000, the side will be approximately 1420. The figure stated by the Rambam is not exact, as the commentaries mention in detail. more than the original measure, it is accepted. A larger increase, however, is not accepted.", + "Even when a servant or a maidservant52There are two difficulties regarding the statements of a servant or maidservant. First, they are not acceptable witnesses. Also, as a whole, such individuals are known to be less than careful with regard to ritual observance. says, \"The Sabbath limits reach here,\"53I.e., the servant's statements were intended to increase the Sabbath limit of a city by saying that the limit originally established was greater than the one observed at present. their statements are accepted. An adult's statement is accepted if he says, \"We would proceed until this place when I was a child.\" His testimony is relied on in this instance, 54Generally, a person's testimony is accepted only when he qualifies as a witness at the time he saw an event take place and at the time he gives his testimony. Since a child is not an acceptable witness, testimony of this nature would ordinarily be rejected. In this instance, however, it is accepted. (See Hilchot Edut 14:3 for other examples of instances in which similar testimony is accepted.)since our Sages stated that the lenient approach should be accepted in these rulings, and not the more stringent one, because the measure of two thousand cubits is a Rabbinic institution." + ], + [ + "It is a positive commandment from the Torah1Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 155) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 31) count this as one of the Torah's 613 mitzvot. to sanctify the Sabbath day with a verbal statement,2Sefer HaMitzvot states: \"With this mitzvah, we are commanded to make statements... that acknowledge the greatness and glory of this day, and how it is distinguished from the days that precede it and those that follow it.\"
Although the Sabbath is by nature a holy day, this mitzvah requires that we consciously - and verbally - acknowledge this holiness. As the Rambam mentions in Halachah 6, our Sages required that this acknowledgement be recited over a cup of wine. Nevertheless, according to the Torah itself, it is sufficient to make these statements in the prayer service.
as [implied by Exodus 20:8]: \"Remember the Sabbath day to sanctify it\" - i.e., remember it with [words of] praise [that reflect its] holiness.3As the Rambam states in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 12:3, this mitzvah is incumbent on women as well as on men. This concept is derived as follows: In the first mention of the Ten Commandments (Exodus, Chapter 20), we are commanded to \"remember\" (zachor) the Sabbath. In Moses' review of that event (Deuteronomy, Chapter 5), however, he uses the expression, shamor, \"observe.\"
Sh'vuot 20b teaches that these two terms were related by God \"in a single breath\" - i.e., they are two complementary expressions of respect for the Sabbath. Accordingly, all the individuals obligated to keep the mitzvah of \"Observe\" must also keep the mitzvah of \"Remember.\" Since women are obligated to keep the mitzvah of \"Observe\" - i.e., to adhere to the prohibitions against forbidden labor - they are also obligated to \"Remember\" the Sabbath (Berachot 20b).

This remembrance must be made at the Sabbath's entrance and at its departure: at the [day's] entrance with the kiddush that sanctifies the day, and at its departure with havdalah.4As the Rambam clearly states in Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), his intent is that the mitzvah of remembering the Sabbath encompasses both kiddush and havdalah. The Maggid Mishneh cites opinions that maintain that the mitzvah to \"remember the Sabbath\" applies only at the commencement of the Sabbath, but not at its conclusion. According to this view, the obligation to recite havdalah is Rabbinic in origin, without any connection to the Biblical commands, \"Remember\" and \"Observe.\"
Among the practical distinction between these two approaches is the conception of a woman's obligation to recite havdalah. According to the Rambam, there is no difference between a woman's obligation and that of a man. The other view, by contrast, allows for the conception that women are not obligated to recite the havdalah prayer.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 296:8) cites both opinions (but appears to favor the Rambam's view). The Ramah suggests that a woman should fulfill her obligation by listening to a man's recitation of this prayer. When this is not possible, a woman should recite the havdalah herself. A man who has fulfilled his obligation should not, however, recite the prayer for the sake of a woman (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 296:19; Mishnah Berurah 296:35-36).
", + "This is the text of the kiddush, sanctifying the day:
Blessed are You, God, our Lord, King of the universe, who has sanctified us with His commandments and has desired us. He has given us5Although the Sabbath is part of the internal rhythm of creation, it was given to the Jewish people alone as a heritage to observe and make part of their lives. the holy Sabbath with love and with favor as an inheritance and a commemoration of the work of creation.6For in the narrative of creation, God rested on the Sabbath day.
It is the first of the convocations of holiness,7In the Bible, the term \"convocation of holiness\" refers to the festivals. The Sabbath is the first and foremost of these holy days. Therefore, in Leviticus, Chapter 23, when the festivals are mentioned, the Sabbath is mentioned first. a commemoration of the exodus from Egypt.8In the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, Chapter 31, the Rambam explains the connection between the exodus from Egypt and the Sabbath. In Egypt, the Jews were slaves and unable to control when they could cease work and rest. By ceasing work every week, they recall God's kindness in delivering them.
The Ramban (in his Commentary on the Torah, Deuteronomy 5:15 offers a different explanation. The exodus from Egypt expresses God's infinite power. If a person doubts the narrative of creation, he can resolve those questions by considering the historical evidence of the miracles of the exodus.
For You have chosen us and sanctified us from among all the nations. With love and favor You have granted us Your holy Sabbath as an inheritance.9Herein, there is a unique homiletic point. God's choice of the Jewish people is expressed, not in granting them dominion over other nations or bestowing inordinate resources of wealth and prosperity upon them, but rather in granting them the Sabbath and its atmosphere of holiness and peace.
Rav Zerachiah HaLevi notes that the three times God's desire and favor are mentioned this passage refer to the three dimensions of the Jews' connection with the Sabbath: the Sabbath of creation, the Sabbath of the exodus, and \"the age that is all Sabbath and rest for life everlasting\" - i.e., the era of the Redemption.
Blessed are You, God, who sanctifies the Sabbath.
", + "This is the text of the havdalah prayer:
Blessed are You God, our Lord, King of the universe, who distinguishes between the holy and the mundane, between light and darkness, between Israel and the nations, and between the seventh day and the six days of activity.10All four of the distinctions mentioned are reflected in the transition from the Sabbath to the weekdays. For, as we progress from day to night on the eve between the Sabbath and the days of activity that follow, the Jews - and not the people of the world at large - pass from an atmosphere of restful holiness to involvement with the mundane details of their existence. Blessed are You, God, who distinguishes between the holy and the mundane.
", + "The essence [of the mitzvah] of sanctifying the Sabbath [is to do so] at night.11For this marks the transition from the weekdays to the Sabbath. More particularly, the most select way of performing the mitzvah is to recite the kiddush shortly after nightfall (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:16). If a person does not recite kiddush at night - whether consciously or inadvertently - he may recite kiddush12Note that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 271:8) describes the recitation of the blessing at this time as compensation for the mitzvah of sanctifying the Sabbath at night.
When reciting kiddush during the day, one should recite the entire blessing usually recited on Friday night. The passage Vayechulu should not, however, be recited (Ramah, Orach Chayim, loc. cit.).
throughout the entire [Sabbath] day.13Until sunset. Between sunset and the appearance of three stars on Saturday night, the blessing should be recited without mentioning God's name (Mishnah Berurah 271:39).
A person who does not recite havdalah at night may recite [this blessing] on the following day,14In Talmudic times, this situation was wont to occur because wine was scarce. People would often be unable to obtain wine on Saturday night, but would be able to secure it the following day.
At present, the most common example of the delay of the recitation of the havdalah occurs when the fast of Tish'ah B'Av is observed on a Sunday. In that instance, havdalah is not recited until Sunday night.
and [indeed] may recite [this blessing] until [nightfall] on Tuesday15The first three days of the week are still associated with the previous Sabbath. Therefore, the recitation of havdalah is still appropriate (Pesachim 106a).
There are authorities who differ, maintaining that one may not recite havdalah after sunset on Sunday. Also, the Halachot Gedolot states that a person who has eaten before reciting havdalah may no longer recite this prayer from Sunday onward. Although the later authorities do not accept these views, they do urge that the recitation of havdalah not be delayed any later than necessary.
[if he does not fulfill his obligation beforehand].
[Although the havdalah blessing may be recited at a later time,] one should recite the blessing on a flame only on Saturday night.16The blessing over a flame was incorporated into the havdalah ceremony to commemorate the discovery of fire by Adam directly after the conclusion of the first Sabbath. Thus, reciting this is appropriate only on Saturday night. Similarly, when havdalah is recited from Sunday onward, the blessing over the spices is also omitted (See Halachah 29, and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 299:5).", + "A person is forbidden17Whenever the performance of a mitzvah is associated with a specific time, our Sages forbade partaking of a meal from the time when the obligation to perform the mitzvah begins until one actually performs it. With regard to kiddush and havdalah, however, they were more stringent and forbade even tasting food until one performs the mitzvah. They enforced this stringency because the most favorable manner of performing both these mitzvot is to do so at the beginning of the evening (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:9). to eat or to drink wine from the commencement of the Sabbath onward18I.e., from sunset onwards. The procedure to be followed by a person who begins a meal before sunset and continues eating is described in Halachah 12. The restrictions mentioned in this halachah also apply to a person who accepts the Sabbath before its actual commencement (Mishnah Berurah 271:11). until he recites kiddush. Similarly, after the conclusion of the day, a person is forbidden to begin to eat, drink, perform labor,19Needless to say, the performance of labor is not mentioned with regard to kiddush, for performing labor on the Sabbath is forbidden regardless. or taste anything until he recites havdalah. Drinking water is, however, permitted.20The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this leniency applies both before kiddush and before havdalah. However, based on the rulings of the Rashba, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 271:4, 299:1) states that drinking water before reciting kiddush is forbidden. One may, however, drink water before havdalah.
Should a person forget or transgress and eat or drink before reciting kiddush or havdalah, he may nevertheless recite kiddush or havdalah afterwards.21The performance of one undesirable act is not reason to perform another. As soon as one becomes conscious of the obligation to recite kiddush or havdalah, he should cease eating and fulfill the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 271:4).", + "It is a mitzvah [instituted by] our Sages to recite kiddush over [a cup of] wine22The Magen Avraham 271:1 explains that the Rabbinic obligation to recite kiddush over wine does not replace the Biblical commandment entirely. Accordingly, the recitation of the Sabbath prayers in the Shemoneh Esreh of the evening service represents the fulfillment of one's obligation to sanctify the Sabbath.
Although one is also required to recite kiddush before one's meal to fulfill the obligation instituted by our Sages, there is room for certain leniency, because one has already fulfilled one's obligation according to the Torah. For example, a person who is certain that he has recited the evening service, but is in doubt whether or not he has recited kiddush, should not recite the latter prayer. Note, however, Sefer HaKovetz, which interprets these concepts in a different manner.
and to recite havdalah over [a cup of] wine.
Although one recites havdalah in one's [evening] prayers, one is required to recite [this blessing] over a cup [of wine].23In Hilchot Tefillah 2:12, the Rambam mentions the inclusion of havdalah in our evening prayers by the addition of the passage Attah Chonantanu to the fourth blessing of the Shemoneh Esreh.
When the Men of the Great Assembly ordained the prayers and blessings for the Jewish people, the Jewish people were needy and could not afford wine. Therefore, these Sages ordained the recitation of havdalah in prayer. Afterwards, when the fortunes of the people improved, the Sages ordained that they should recite this blessing over a cup of wine, like kiddush.
Subsequently, our people's prosperity suffered and the Sages reinstituted the blessing into the prayer service. Nevertheless, in order to prevent the matter from being totally dependent on socio-economic factors, they established the following guidelines: A person should recite the havdalah prayers in the Shemoneh Esreh of the evening service. Afterwards, he should try to obtain wine in order to fulfill the mitzvah as the Sages prescribed. If, however, this is not possible, his recitation of the prayer in the evening service is sufficient to fulfill his obligation.
[Nevertheless,] once a person has said \"[Blessed is He24Here, the Rambam is not necessarily referring to a person who recited the passage Attah Chonantanu in the evening prayers. To be permitted to perform labor, it is sufficient to recite the phrase, \"Blessed be He who distinguishes between the holy and the mundane,\" without reciting God's name or mentioning His sovereignty. Indeed, this is a frequent practice for women, who do not always recite the evening service.] who distinguishes between the holy and the mundane,\" he is permitted to perform labor25But not to eat or to drink. even though he has not recited havdalah over a cup [of wine].
One should recite the blessing over the wine first, and then recite the kiddush.26For we follow the principle תדיר ושאינו תדיר, תדיר קודם Whenever a person has a choice of reciting two blessings, one frequently recited and one less frequently recited, he first recites the one that is more frequently recited. One should not wash one's hands27This refers to the ritual washing before partaking of bread. The order suggested by the Rambam is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 271:12). Significantly, the Ramah states that it is preferable to wash one's hands and recite the blessing before reciting kiddush. (See Halachah 10 and notes.) He writes that this is the common practice in the Ashkenazic community. (Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:23 and the Mishnah Berurah 271:62 differ and suggest adhering to the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.) until after the recitation of kiddush.", + "What is the procedure he should follow: He should take a cup that contains a revi'it28A revi'it is 86.6 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish. or more, wash it thoroughly inside, and rinse its outside.29These are the requirements Berachot 51a mentions with regard to a cup of blessing. In contrast to Rashi, the Rambam considers the term \"cup of blessing\" as referring primarily to the cup over which kiddush is recited. He does, however, also apply these principles to the cup over which grace is recited. (See Hilchot Berachot 7:15.)
Based on this distinction, the cup must also be whole, without a crack or chip; it should be filled to the brim; and no one should have drunk from the wine in the cup beforehand (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:18).
He should fill it with wine, hold it in his right hand, lifting it above the ground more than a handbreadth,30The Rambam is speaking about Arab countries, where people would eat while sitting on mats on the ground. When eating at a table, one is obligated to lift the cup a handbreadth above the table. without supporting it with his left hand.
One recites the blessing [borey pri] hagefen and then the kiddush. It is, however, common custom among the Jewish people first to recite the passage Vayechulu,31This recitation of this passage acknowledges God's creation of the world. Accordingly, Shabbat 119b states, \"Whoever recites the passage Vayechulu on Friday night is considered to be God's partner in creation.\"
The Rokeach mentions that we should recite Vayechulu three times on Friday night - and this, indeed, is our practice: once in the Shemoneh Esreh of the evening service, once communally after the Shemoneh Esreh, and once in Kiddush.
then the blessing [borey pri] hagefen and then the kiddush
One should drink [at least] a cheekful of wine32A cheekful is slightly more than half of a revi'it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 271:13). This, however, refers to a cheekful of an ordinary person. More particularly, the measure of a \"cheekful\" depends on the size of an individual person's mouth - i.e., were a person to swish the wine in his mouth to one side, that cheek would look full (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:24; Mishnah Berurah 271:68). and give all those joining in the meal to drink.33These people are not required to partake of a revi'it. Indeed, they may fulfill their obligation for kiddush by reciting Amen, without partaking of the wine at all (Magen Avraham 271:30). Nevertheless, it is preferable that everyone be given from the cup of kiddush or have cups of wine before them (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 271:14). Afterwards, one washes one's hands, recites the blessing hamotzi, and [begins] eating.", + "[The mitzvah of] kiddush [may be fulfilled] only in the place of one's meal.34Tosafot (Pesachim 101a) derive this law from the exegesis of Isaiah 58:13: \"And you shall call the Sabbath, 'a delight.' It explains that \"calling the Sabbath\" - reciting kiddush - must be in the place of \"a delight,\" one's Sabbath meal. What is implied? A person should not recite the kiddush in one house35We have translated the word בית as \"house\" according to its literal meaning. The Maggid Mishneh, however, suggests that in this context, the term should be rendered as \"room\" - i.e., one may move from one corner to another in the same room, but not from one room to another in the same house. (See also Hilchot Berachot 4:5 and commentaries, where this term is used in a similar context.)
The Maggid Mishneh mentions, however, that there are authorities who interpret בית as \"house.\" According to their view, if two rooms are in the same house, one may recite kiddush in one and eat the Sabbath meal in the other, provided one has this intention when reciting kiddush. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 273:1) rules according to this interpretation.
and eat his meal in another.36Even if the person had the intent of eating his meal in the second place when he recited kiddush and does so without any unnecessary interruption, he does not fulfill his obligation and must recite kiddush again. One may, however, recite kiddush in one corner and eat one's meal in another.
[One might ask:] Why is kiddush recited in the synagogue? Because of the guests who eat and drink there.37I.e., the kiddush is not part of the prayer service, but was instituted merely for the sake of these individuals. Nevertheless, in one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that after the custom of reciting kiddush in the synagogue was established, it should be continued even if there are no guests present in the synagogue. [At present, this custom is not usually followed in the Sephardic community, and there are many communities in the Ashkenazic community that have also discontinued it.]", + "A person who desires to partake of bread more than of wine, and similarly, a person who has no wine, should wash his hands, recite the blessing hamotzi, and then recite kiddush. Afterwards, he should break bread and eat.
Havdalah, by contrast, may not be recited over bread, but only over wine.38Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi explains the difference between the two blessings: Kiddush was instituted as the beginning of the Sabbath meal. Hence, it is also appropriate that it be recited over bread. Havdalah, by contrast, has no connection with a meal. Therefore, bread may not be used.", + "A person who had intended to recite kiddush over wine on Friday night, but forgot, and before he recited kiddush washed his hands [with the intention of partaking of bread], should recite kiddush over bread. He should not recite kiddush over wine after washing his hands [to partake of] a meal.39In this ruling, the Rambam follows the interpretation of Pesachim 106b suggested by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and other Rishonim. There are, however, other interpretations of this passage, which lead to the ruling of the Ramah (cited in Note 27) that one should always wash one's hands before reciting kiddush.
(Although the Ramah's view is not accepted by the later authorities, the Mishnah Berurah 271:62 states that it is of sufficient weight to be relied on in the case described by the Rambam here: a person who desired to recite kiddush over wine, but washed his hands previously. Rather than recite the kiddush over bread, the person may recite kiddush over wine.)

It is a mitzvah to recite a blessing over wine on the Sabbath day before partaking of the second [Sabbath] meal.40Pesachim 106a relates that this practice is derived from Exodus 20:8: \"Remember the Sabbath day\"; a remembrance must be made on the day itself. (See also Chapter 30, Halachah 9.) This is called \"the great kiddush.\"41The Maggid Mishneh explains that this term is used as a euphemism, as one calls the blind sagi nahor, \"of great light.\" One recites only the blessing borey pri hagefen, partakes of the wine,42The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling and rejects the concept of reciting kiddush on the Sabbath day. In his rebuttal of the Ra'avad's words, the Maggid Mishneh states that it is impossible to recite kiddush on the Sabbath day on bread. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 289:2, however, uses the Ra'avad's ruling to reach a third position, that although kiddush is required during the day as well as at night, one may recite the kiddush on bread. washes one's hands, and begins the meal.
[On the Sabbath day as well,] a person is forbidden to taste any food before he recites kiddush.43The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 289:1) permits one to drink water before prayer, because \"the obligation to recite kiddush is not incumbent on one at that time.\" This leniency has been extended by the later authorities to drinking coffee, and by some to partaking of pastry. This kiddush may also be recited only in the place where one eats one's meal.", + "A person may recite kiddush over a cup [of wine] on Friday before sunset, even though the Sabbath has not commenced.44From this time onward, the person must observe all the Sabbath laws. Note the Magen Avraham 267:1, which states that a person may only recite kiddush from plag haminchah onward - i.e., no more than one and a quarter \"seasonal\" hours (שעות זמנוית) before sunset. Similarly, he may recite havdalah over a cup [of wine] before sunset, even though it is still Sabbath.45The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 293:3) prescribes this leniency only for a person who is אנוס, \"pressured by forces beyond his control.\" Needless to say, even after reciting havdalah, the person must observe all the Sabbath laws. The blessing over fire should not be recited until sunset. For the mitzvah of remembering the Sabbath involves making [a statement to this effect] at the entrance and the departure of the Sabbath, or slightly before these times.", + "A person who is in the midst of eating [a meal] on Friday when the Sabbath commences should spread a cloth46I.e., as soon as the sun sets, one must cease eating and cover the table for kiddush. (See also Chapter 30, Halachah 4, which states that one should not plan to eat a meal on Friday afternoon, so that one will enter the Sabbath with an appetite.) over the table,47The bread should always be covered during kiddush. In this instance, covering it serves a further purpose, making it appear as if it had been placed on the table in honor of the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:10). recite kiddush,48The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 271:4) state that if one had been drinking wine previously, one should recite kiddush over a cup of wine without reciting the blessing borey pri hagefen. complete his meal,49From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that he does not require the recitation of the blessing hamotzi when one resumes eating. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher differ and require the recitation of this blessing, because at the time the person recited kiddush it was forbidden for him to partake of bread.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions both opinions. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:11 and the Mishnah Berurah 271:18 suggest following the Rambam's view. For whenever there is an unresolved question of whether or not a blessing should be recited, the practice is not to recite it.
and recite grace.50When one partakes of a portion of food the size of an olive after nightfall, one is obligated to mention the Sabbath in the grace, for this is considered to be one of the Sabbath meals (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:13; Mishnah Berurah 271:30).
A person who is in the midst of eating [a meal]51This refers to a meal including bread that he began before sunset. If one did not begin eating before sunset, eating or drinking is forbidden. (See Halachah 5.) Moreover, if one is eating or drinking, but is not in the midst of a meal including bread, one is obligated to cease eating at sunset. There are, however, certain opinions that allow one to begin eating after sunset or to continue partaking of foods outside a meal until a half hour before the appearance of the stars (Mishnah Berurah 299:1). on the Sabbath when the Sabbath departs should complete his meal,52I.e., one is allowed to continue eating after nightfall. Although the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol requires one to interrupt one's meal and recite havdalah directly after the appearance of three stars, this opinion is not accepted by the later authorities (Ramah, Orach Chayim 299:1). wash his hands,53For mayim acharonim, the washing that precedes grace. recite grace over a cup of wine,54For it is preferable - although not obligatory - to recite grace over a cup of wine. (See Hilchot Berachot 7:15.) and afterwards recite havdalah over [this cup].55The Ra'avad and others raise questions concerning the Rambam's decision. For Pesachim 102b states, as the Rambam himself quotes in the following halachah, \"we do not observe mitzvot in bundles\" - i.e., one cup of wine should not be used to fulfill two separate mitzvot.
The Maggid Mishneh offers a possible resolution for the Rambam's ruling: The above principle applies only when the two mitzvot are connected with two different times - e.g., kiddush and grace, as mentioned in the subsequent halachah. For grace is associated with the preceding meal, and kiddush with the Sabbath day that will follow. In contrast, in the present halachah, both havdalah and grace are associated with the previous time - the Sabbath - and the previous meal. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh himself agrees with the Ra'avad that the Rambam's ruling should be followed only in a situation where one does not have another cup of wine available. This opinion is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 299:4) and accepted by the later authorities.
[Rav Kapach offers another justification for the Rambam's ruling, based on the final phrase of the following halachah, which states that both kiddush and grace are \"mitzvot of the Torah.\" Havdalah, Rav Kapach explains, is Rabbinic in origin and therefore can be combined with grace and recited over a single cup. Although this resolution appears closest to the Rambam's wording in these two halachot, it is difficult to reconcile with the Rambam's statements at the beginning of the chapter and in Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 155) that the mitzvah of reciting havdalah has its source in the Torah itself.]
If he is sitting and drinking,56For drinking - even drinking wine - is not considered significant enough to override the obligation to recite havdalah. he should interrupt his drinking,57He must stop drinking at sunset (or half an hour before the appearance of the stars), but preferably should not recite havdalah until after the appearance of three stars.recite havdalah, and begin drinking again.", + "A person who is eating and completes his meal at the commencement of the Sabbath should recite grace first and then recite kiddush on a second cup of wine.58The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 271:6) also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, and states that reciting grace in such a situation generates several doubts: whether or not to mention the Sabbath in grace, whether or not to partake of the cup over which grace was recited, and whether or not a second meal is required so that kiddush will be \"in the place of a meal.\"
Therefore, it is preferable to recite kiddush in the midst of the meal, as mentioned in the previous halachah, to eat a small amount on the Sabbath, and then to recite grace. The Ramah suggests following this view.
He should not recite grace and kiddush on the same cup [of wine], because two mitzvot should not be performed with the same cup [of wine].59See the notes on the previous halachah. For both the mitzvah of kiddush and the mitzvah of grace are mitzvot that emanate from the Torah itself.", + "Kiddush may be recited only on wine that is fit to be offered as a libation on the altar.60See Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 5:1, 6:9. (See also Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 11:9-10, which mentions these concepts with regard to the prohibition against using wine employed by gentiles for their libations.) Therefore, if one mixed even a drop of honey61Needless to say, this also applies to sugar. or yeast62These are forbidden to be offered on the altar in any form, as derived from Leviticus 2:11, which states, \"You shall present no leavening agent and no sweetener....\" the size of a mustard seed in a large barrel [of wine], kiddush may not be recited upon it.
This is the ruling that we follow universally in the west. There is, however, an opinion that allows kiddush to be recited on such wine.63The western lands the Rambam refers to are Morocco and Muslim Spain.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Pesachim 10:1) states that one may use sweetened wines for kiddush. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 272:8) mentions both opinions. The Ramah states that it is customary to follow the more lenient view. This issue is very significant, for almost all commercially produced wines have sugar added to them.
[This view] explains that the term \"wine that is fit to be offered as a libation on the altar\" excludes only wine with an unpleasant fragrance,64This applies even if the wine's taste is unaffected (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:1). wine that was left uncovered,65In Talmudic times, wine that was left uncovered was forbidden, out of fear that poisonous snakes might have deposited venom in it. (See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 11:6-8,10.) At present, this circumstance is extremely rare, and it is customary to partake of wine even after it has been left uncovered. Nevertheless, such wine is unacceptable for kiddush, because using it for a mitzvah is not considered respectful (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 272:1; Mishnah Berurah 272:3).or wine that was cooked.66In this instance as well, there are many authorities who differ with the Rambam and permit the use of such wine, based on the Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.). Here, also, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 272:8) mentions both opinions, and the Ramah states that it is customary to follow the more lenient view. This issue is also very relevant today, for many wines and grape juices undergo pasteurization before being sold. Kiddush may not be recited on any of these wines.", + "Wine that tastes like vinegar may not be used for kiddush although its fragrance is that of wine.67Indeed, as the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 204:4) states, it is not proper to recite the blessing borey pri hagefen over this beverage. Similarly, we may not recite kiddush over [the beverage produced from] pouring water over the dregs of wine, although it tastes like wine.
When does the above apply? When the ratio between the water poured over the dregs and the beverage produced is less than three parts to four parts. If, however, the ratio is more than three parts to four parts, [the beverage produced is considered to be] diluted wine, and kiddush may be recited over it.68The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 204:5) emphasizes that this law depends on the strength of the wine. Our wines are not as strong as those of the Talmudic period, and hence the ratio of one to four is not sufficient to require the blessing borey pri hagefen. This law is also relevant with regard to commercially produced wines, which are often heavily diluted before being sold.", + "When a person drinks from a vessel containing wine, even if he drinks only a small amount from a vessel that contains many revi'iot [of wine],69The Ra'avad states that this restriction applies only when one drinks from a cup of wine and not from a larger container. The Rambam's view is, however, accepted by the later authorities. (See Pesachim 106a, which mentions opinions that follow both views.) he has blemished the wine and invalidated it. We may not recite kiddush over the remainder,70The Mishnah Berurah 271:43 questions whether a person who only has wine from which others have drunk should recite kiddush over it, or whether he should recite kiddush over bread instead. because it is regarded like the remnants left over in a cup.71I.e., wine into which bread has been dipped. Beitzah 21b states that such wine is unfit for human consumption and should be given only to chickens. Even if wine has not been spoiled to this extent, after a person has drunk from a cup, reciting kiddush over it is forbidden.", + "Although the fragrance of wine resembles vinegar, if its flavor resembles wine, kiddush may be recited over it.72After stating this law, however, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 272:3) states that it is preferable to use wine that is choice in all respects for the mitzvah. Similarly, [kiddush may be recited over] diluted wine.73Indeed, as stated in Hilchot Berachot 7:15, wine should be diluted before using it for a \"cup of blessing.\" (See, however, the notes on Halachah 15 regarding the extent of the dilution.)
We may recite kiddush over raisin wine, provided it is made from raisins that [are not entirely dried out] - i.e., if one presses them, they will release a concentrated syrup.
Similarly, a person may recite kiddush over wine fresh from the wine press, [i.e., grape juice].74Although grape juice was acceptable as a wine libation only after the fact (בדיעבד, Hilchot Issurei Mizbe'ach 6:9), it is acceptable for kiddush. Nevertheless, using wine that has fermented is a more favorable way of performing the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 272:2; Mishnah Berurah 272:5). Indeed, a person may squeeze a cluster of grapes and recite kiddush over the juice immediately thereafter.75Needless to say, the grapes must be squeezed before the commencement of the Sabbath.
Although the majority of a country uses beer instead of wine, [the beer] is not acceptable for kiddush.76For if there is no wine available, kiddush may - and should - be recited over bread. It may, nevertheless, be used for havdalah,77Since havdalah may not be recited over bread, these beverages should be used as an alternative.
This is the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's ruling, based on Pesachim 107a. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 272:9), however, mentions other views: that one may recite kiddush over beer in places where wine is not easily available, and that of Rabbenu Asher, which states that, at night, one should recite kiddush on bread if wine is not available. During the day, however, it is preferable to recite kiddush over other beverages. The Ramah states that Rabbenu Asher's view should be followed.
If wine is easily available, however, kiddush should not be recited on these other beverages. With regard to havdalah, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 296:2) states that it is preferable to recite havdalah over a cup of wine from which a person has drunk, rather than to use another beverage. Although this ruling is not accepted by the later authorities, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 296:8 states that a person who possesses wine at home should not recite havdalah over other beverages.
for in that country it serves as a substitute for wine.78It must be emphasized that the term חמר מדינה, \"a beverage used as a substitute for wine in one's country,\" must be widely used in that country. If it is not, it is not acceptable. (See Mishnah Berurah 296:9.)
Water (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.), milk and oil (Mishnah Berurah 272:25), and apple cider and borscht (Mishnah Berurah 296:10) are also not considered acceptable. From these exclusions, we can appreciate the types of beverages that are acceptable.
", + "Just as we recite kiddush on Friday night and havdalah on Saturday night, so too, we recite kiddush on the night of a holiday's commencement and havdalah on the night following a holiday and on the night following Yom Kippur, for they are all \"Sabbaths of God.\"79From the Rambam's description of the holidays as \"Sabbaths of God,\" he appears to be implying that the mitzvah of reciting kiddush on these days is included in the mitzvah to \"remember the Sabbath,\" which is the source for the mitzvah of reciting kiddush on the Sabbath. A similar intent appears in the comments of the Mechilta on that verse.
The Magen Avraham 271:1 cites the Maggid Mishneh as differing with this interpretation and stating that the obligation to recite kiddush on holidays is Rabbinic in origin.

We recite havdalah on the night leading from a holiday to chol hamo'ed,80For chol hamo'ed has a lesser level of holiness, since the prohibitions against performing the forbidden labors do not apply. There are, however, restrictions against work, as stated in Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov, Chapter 7. and on the night leading from the Sabbath to a holiday,81For the Sabbath represents a higher level of holiness, since even the labors associated with the preparation of food are prohibited. but not on the night leading from a holiday to the Sabbath.82Since the holiday represents a lower level of holiness, it is not appropriate to say havdalah, but only kiddush. (See the conclusion of Chapter 5, where the two final points are mentioned.)", + "[The following is] the text of the kiddush recited on festivals:
Blessed are You, God our Lord, King of the universe, who has chosen us83God's choice of the Jewish people is mentioned at the outset in the kiddush for festivals, but not at the beginning of the kiddush for the Sabbath. Our Rabbis explain that God's choice of the Jewish people is associated with the exodus and the giving of the Torah. Since the uniqueness of the Sabbath was established before these events, it takes primacy. The festivals, by contrast, were established to commemorate those events that are directly associated with God's choice of the Jewish people.
Significantly, the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah mention a slightly different text for this blessing. Instead of beginning \"who has chosen us,\" it begins \"who has sanctified us.\"
from all the nations, and raised us above people of all tongues. He chose us and made us great; he showed us favor and glorified us.
And God our Lord gave us with love festivals for rejoicing, holidays and [unique] seasons for gladness, [including] this festive day of holy convocation, this festival of
- Matzot, Shavuot, [or] Sukkot -
the season of - our freedom, the giving of our Torah, [or] our happiness -
in love, as a commemoration of the exodus from Egypt.
For You have chosen us and sanctified us from all the nations and given us as an inheritance Your holy seasons for rejoicing and gladness. Blessed are You, God, who sanctifies Israel and the seasons.84See Hilchot Tefillah 2:5. The sanctity of the Jewish people is mentioned before the sanctity of the festivals, because God sanctifies the Jews and it is they - through their keeping the calendar through the sanctification of the months - who sanctify the festivals (Beitzah 17a).
When [a holiday] occurs on the Sabbath, one should mention the Sabbath [in the midst of the passage], and conclude in the same manner as one concludes in prayer, \"[Blessed...] who sanctifies the Sabbath,85The sanctification of the Sabbath is mentioned first, because the Sabbath is sanctified by God directly, independent of the spiritual service of the Jewish people (ibid.). Israel and the seasons.\"", + "On Rosh HaShanah, one should say:
...And God our Lord gave us with love this day of holy convocation for remembrance,86Leviticus 23:24 refers to Rosh HaShanah as \"a day of recalling the sounding of the shofar.\" Numbers 29:1 refers to it as \"a day of sounding the shofar.\" On this basis, our Rabbis understand \"recalling\" as a separate concept, and describe Rosh HaShanah as \"the Day of Remembrance,\" the day when we ask God to remember us for good. recalling the sounding [of the shofar],87In many communities, the text of this phrase is generally יום תרועה, \"a day of sounding [the shofar].\" Only on the Sabbath, when the shofar is not sounded, is the text employed by the Rambam used. a holy convocation in love, as a commemoration of the exodus from Egypt.
For You have chosen us and sanctified us from all the nations, and Your words are true and everlasting. Blessed are You God, the King of the entire earth,88As indicated by Rosh HaShanah 16a, our divine service on Rosh HaShanah centers on the acceptance of God as our King. Therefore, this concept is mentioned in the conclusion of this blessing. who sanctifies Israel and the Day of Remembrance.
When [Rosh HaShanah] occurs on the Sabbath, one should conclude \"[Blessed...] who sanctifies the Sabbath, Israel and the Day of Remembrance,\" as one concludes in prayer.", + "On the night of a holiday, one recites kiddush over wine as on the Sabbath.89This law appears to corroborate the thesis that the Rambam sees kiddush on the holidays as an obligation with a source in the Torah itself. Therefore, he clarifies that just as Halachah 6 states that the Sages instituted the obligation that kiddush be recited over wine on the Sabbath, they imposed a similar obligation on holidays. Should one lack wine or should one desire bread, one may recite kiddush over bread.90See Halachah 9. Similarly, on [the day of a] holiday, one should recite \"the great kiddush\" as one does on the Sabbath.91See Halachah 10.", + "What blessings should be recited on the night of a holiday that falls on a Sunday? At the outset, one recites the blessing [borey pri] hagefen. Afterwards, one should recite the kiddush for the holiday. Then one should recite the blessing over fire,92It is customary merely to look at the festive candles on the table. One need not hold them together and gaze at one's nails, as is the usual custom on Saturday night. and after that havdalah. One should conclude havdalah, \"...who distinguishes between the holy and the holy.\"93Merkevet HaMishneh notes that in Hilchot Tefillah 2:14, the Rambam states that in one's prayers during the evening service, one should add the phrase \"You distinguished between the holiness of the holidays and the holiness of the Sabbath.\" He does not, however, recommend making this addition in havdalah. It is, however, customary in most communities to make this addition. [In conclusion,] one recites the blessing Shehecheyanu.94See the following halachah.", + "On the night of every holiday95This also includes the second day of the holiday celebrated in the diaspora and the second day of Rosh HaShanah. and on the night of Yom Kippur, we recite the blessing Shehecheyanu.96As the Rambam states in Hilchot Berachot 11:9, the blessing Shehecheyanu is recited when performing any mitzvah that we are obligated to fulfill only at a specific time. This also applies to the mitzvah of observing the festivals. Needless to say, on Yom Kippur the blessing is recited in the synagogue, and not during kiddush. On Yom Kippur, women should recite this blessing while lighting candles and should not repeat it in the synagogue. We do not recite the blessing Shehecheyanu on the seventh day of Pesach, because it is not a holiday in its own right,97Shemini Atzeret is, by contrast, considered to be a festival in its own right (Sukkah 47a), and we recite the blessing Shehecheyanu on that day and on Simchat Torah. and we have already recited the blessing Shehecheyanu at the beginning of the Pesach festival.98See Sukkah 47b, which states that this wording implies that a person who failed to recite Shehecheyanu on the first day of the festival may compensate by reciting it later.", + "This is the order of havdalah on Saturday night: [First,] one recites the blessing over the wine;99Significantly, the Rambam does not mention the custom of reciting the passage containing select Biblical verses beginning Hiney E-l Yeshuati. afterwards, one recites the blessing over the spices,100See Halachah 29. and then over the flame.
Which blessing is recited over the flame? \"[Blessed... King of the universe,] who creates the lights of fire.\"101Berachot 52b explains that this wording is chosen because there are many colors of light in a flame. Afterwards, one recites havdalah.", + "We do not recite the blessing over the flame until we derive benefit from its light to the extent that one could differentiate between the coin of one country and that of another.102Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Berachot 8:6), from which it appears that one is actually required to derive benefit from the havdalah light. (In this context, see the Midrash Sachar Tov, commenting on Psalms 35:10, which mentions the custom of gazing at one's nails in the light of the havdalah candles.) The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 298:4), by contrast, states that one must stand close enough to the light to benefit from it, implying that there is no obligation actually to derive benefit from the light.
We may not recite the blessing over a flame belonging to gentiles,103The Mishnah (loc. cit.) also mentions spices belonging to gentiles. The Rambam omits mention of this subject here, relying on his discussion of the prohibition against using such spices in Hilchot Berachot 9:7-9. for it may be assumed that their gatherings are associated with the worship of false divinities.104Significantly, according to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, Berachot 52b appears to offer this rationale only with regard to spices belonging to gentiles. With regard to a gentile's flame, it offers another reasoning: because the gentile's flame has not rested on the Sabbath. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam also quotes Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view. In these halachot, however, he mentions this principle only in Halachah 27, appearing to indicate that the need for a candle to \"rest\" on the Sabbath applies only to candles lit by Jews. Since the gentiles are not bound by the Sabbath laws, this principle does not apply to them at all.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:5) quotes Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view and forbids using a candle that a gentile lit during the day. With regard to a candle lit by a gentile at night, see the following halachah.
We may not recite the blessing on a flame [kindled for] the worship of false divinities105In his explanation of these laws in his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states:
It is explicitly forbidden by the Torah to benefit from any entity associated with the worship of false divinities, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states, \"Nothing that has been condemned shall cling to your hand.\"
The prohibition against benefiting from entities associated with false divinities is detailed in Chapters 7 and 8 of Hilchot Avodat Kochavim.
or on a flame [kindled for the sake of] the deceased.106For this was kindled to give honor to the deceased and not to provide light for others to benefit from (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:12).", + "When a Jew lights a flame from a gentile's [flame], or a gentile from a Jew's [flame], we may recite a blessing upon it.107The Maggid Mishneh specifies that this does not refer to a flame lit at a gathering of gentiles. Shulchan Aruch Rav 298:9 and the Mishnah Berurah 298:20 explain that this decision was rendered even though one might think it proper to forbid using a light taken from a gentile at night, lest one use a light kindled by the gentile during the day. According to the Rambam, however, the meaning is that since a Jew is involved, there is no intention for the worship of false divinities. [If, however,] a gentile [lights a flame] from another gentile's [flame], we may not recite a blessing upon it.108According to the Rambam, it would appear that we suspect that the gentiles lit the flame for the sake of worshiping their divinities.
In contrast, the Magen Avraham 298:11 states that this is a decree, lest the gentile light from a flame kindled on the Sabbath directly after the Sabbath's conclusion. He continues postulating that, after the fact, a person who recites a blessing over such a flame is considered to have fulfilled his obligation.

[The following rules apply when a person] is walking outside a large city and sees light: If most of the city's inhabitants are gentiles, he may not recite this blessing. If most are Jewish, he may.
At the outset, one should not recite this blessing over the fire of a furnace, an oven, or a range.109This ruling reflects the Rambam's conception of Berachot 53a. Since these fires are not generally kindled for the purpose of producing light, one should not use them for the blessing. Nevertheless, since it is customary to benefit also from their light, one fulfills his obligation.
Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 298:10) and most other authorities follow Rav Hai Gaon's interpretation of the passage, which explains that directly after these flames are kindled, one may not recite a blessing over them, since they are then intended for purposes other than producing light. When, however, those purposes have been accomplished and the flames continue burning, one may recite the blessing over them.
If coals [are glowing to the extent that] were one to put a sliver of wood between them, they would catch fire of their own accord, we may recite a blessing over them.110Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:9), which states that this law applies only when the fire was kindled for the purpose of producing light. Otherwise, a blessing should not be recited.
We may recite this blessing over the light of the House of Study if there is an important person there for whom the light is kindled. We may recite a blessing over the light of a synagogue if there is a chazan who lives there.111Candles are often lit in synagogues and houses of study as a token of respect for the place, and not to produce light. Therefore, it is not proper to recite a blessing over this light unless it was lit for the benefit of an individual, so that he will use it for his needs.
The most choice way of performing the mitzvah is to use a torch for the havdalah [light].112Because it produces a large quantity of light with different colors of flame (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 298:4; Mishnah Berurah 298:5). Note Rav Tanchum of Jerusalem, who interprets the Hebrew אבוקה as referring to a beeswax candle. Although his interpretation is not accepted, it is customary to use beeswax for this mitzvah (ibid.). There is no need to seek light [for havdalah] as one seeks to fulfill all the other mitzvot.113On the night following Yom Kippur, by contrast, we are obligated to search for a candle that burned throughout the day, over which to recite the blessing (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:1). Instead, [the law is that] if one has a light, one should recite the blessing over it.", + "We may recite the blessing over a fire that is kindled on the Sabbath for the sake of a sick person or for a woman after childbirth.114Although this fire was kindled on the Sabbath, since it was permitted to do so, it may be used for the mitzvah. If, however, it was kindled on the Sabbath in transgression of the law, it may not be used, for the light used for this blessing must have \"rested from sin\" on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).
On Saturday night, we may recite the blessing over light produced from wood or stone, for this was the manner in which fire was first created by man.115Bereshit Rabbah 12:6) relates that after the sun set following the first Sabbath, Adam became frightened. G‑d prepared two boards for him. He struck them together and brought forth fire. We may not, by contrast, recite a blessing over such a flame on the night following Yom Kippur. For on the night following Yom Kippur, we recite the blessing only on a light that has rested.116I.e., we do not recite the blessing over light that was kindled on that night, but on a candle that had burned throughout the holiday. It is, however, acceptable to use a candle that was lit from a candle that burned throughout the holiday (Shulchan Aruch and Ramah, Orach Chayim 624:5). When, however, a fire is kindled on Yom Kippur for the sake of a sick person or for a woman after childbirth, we may recite the blessing upon it, for it \"rested from sin.\"", + "When a holiday falls in the middle of the week,117I.e., from Sunday to Thursday. As mentioned in Halachah 18, when a holiday falls on Friday, havdalah is not said. one recites [the following passage] as havdalah:
[Blessed are You...] who distinguishes between the holy and the mundane, between darkness and light, between Israel and the gentiles, between the Sabbath and the six days of activity....
One uses the same text as one uses on Saturday night. [The fact that it is not the Sabbath does not present a difficulty, for] one is merely listing the types of distinctions [that God has created within our world].
[On the night following a holiday,] one need not recite the blessing over spices, nor the blessing over light.118There is a slight imprecision with the Rambam's wording, for it is not customary to recite the blessing for spices at this time, and we are forbidden to recite the blessing over light. Similarly, we are not required to recite the blessing over spices on the night following Yom Kippur.", + "Why is the blessing recited over spices on Saturday night? Because the soul is forlorn119See Beitzah 16a, which mentions that God grants us an extra soul on the Sabbath, but takes away this gift after the Sabbath's conclusion. This gift is granted on the Sabbath alone, and not on festivals. Hence the distinction mentioned in the previous halachah. by reason of the departure of the Sabbath. Therefore, we gladden120See Berachot 43b, which describes fragrance as an element that brings joy to the soul. it and settle it with a pleasant fragrance." + ], + [ + "There are four [dimensions] to the [observance of] the Sabbath: two originating in the Torah, and two originating in the words of our Sages, which are given exposition by the Prophets. [The two dimensions originating] in the Torah are the commandments \"Remember [the Sabbath day]\"1This involves the sanctification of the Sabbath, as explained in the previous chapter. and \"Observe [the Sabbath day].\"2This involves the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath, as reflected in the first 24 chapters of this text.
In the Guide for the Perplexed (Vol. II, Chapter 31), the Rambam explains that the commandment to remember the Sabbath commemorates the Sabbath of creation and the holiness that the Sabbath brings into the world. The commandment to observe the Sabbath reflects the connection to the exodus from Egypt and thus emphasizes the dimension connected with the cessation of labor.

[The two dimensions] given exposition by the Prophets are honor and pleasure3The explanation of these two dimensions is the subject of this final chapter of the Sabbath laws.
The Ramban (in his commentary on Leviticus 23:3 considers the honor of the Sabbath and the delight in it as required by the Torah itself. For the Torah (ibid.) describes the Sabbath as a \"holy convocation,\" and the Sifra explains that that term implies that the day must \"be sanctified, honored... and delighted in.\"
, as [Isaiah 58:13] states: \"And you shall call the Sabbath 'A delight, sanctified unto God and honored.'", + "What is meant by honor? This refers to our Sages' statement that it is a mitzvah4This is not an absolute obligation. One who fulfills it receives a reward, but one who does not is not punished (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 260:1; Mishnah Berurah 260:1). for a person to wash his face, his hands, and his feet5The Rambam's statements are based on Shabbat 25b. Note the Tur (Orach Chayim 260), which mentions that a person should wash his entire body. The Rambam's decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 260:1), while the Tur's ruling is quoted by the Ramah. in hot water on Friday in honor of the Sabbath. He should wrap himself in tzitzit and sit with proper respect, waiting to receive the Sabbath as one goes out to greet a king.
The Sages6Shabbat 119a describes Rabbi Chanina as following this practice. of the former generations would gather their students together on Friday, wrap themselves [in fine robes] and say, \"Come, let us go out and greet the Sabbath, the king.7Our text of Shabbat 119a reads \"Sabbath, the queen,\" and indeed, this analogy is employed extremely frequently. From the Maggid Mishneh's commentary, it appears that the Rambam's version of that passage reads, \"Sabbath, the king.\" According to the kabbalah, the feminine term is more appropriate, because the Sabbath is associated with the sefirah of Malchut, which reflects a feminine dimension.", + "Among the ways of honoring the Sabbath is wearing a clean garment.8See also the Sefer Chassidim (quoted in the Mishnah Berurah 262:6), which emphasizes that a person must also endeavor to keep his clothes clean. For example, he should not hold a child until he covers his clothes. One's Sabbath garments should not resemble one's weekday clothes. A person who does not have a different garment for the Sabbath should allow his robe to hang low,9As is the fashion of the wealthy. (See Hilchot De'ot 5:9.) so that his [Sabbath] clothing will not resemble the clothes he wears during the week.
Ezra ordained that the people launder their clothes on Thursday10But not on Friday, so that they will have time to engage in other Sabbath preparations (Magen Avraham 242:3). as an expression of honor for the Sabbath.", + "In respect for the Sabbath,11Two reasons are given: a) to enter Sabbath with an appetite (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 249:2), b) to allow oneself time for Sabbath preparations (Magen Avraham 249:4). it is forbidden to plan a meal or a winefest for Friday.12I.e., one should not arrange to hold a feast on Friday that one would not hold ordinarily during the week (Maggid Mishneh). This includes even feasts associated with a mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). One may, however, hold a feast associated with a mitzvah that should be performed on that day - e.g., a circumcision or the redemption of the first-born (Ramah, loc. cit.). These feasts should be held as early as possible, and by no means should begin later than 3:00 PM (or the equivalent time according to the principle of \"seasonal hours\"), as will be explained.
Although the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam regarding this prohibition, the explanation offered above is accepted by most authorities.

[According to the letter of the law,] one may eat or drink until nightfall. Nevertheless, as an expression of honor for the Sabbath, a person should refrain from planning a meal13This refers to an ordinary meal that one might partake of during the week. Although one is not required to refrain from eating, one should preferably not plan to eat a meal at this time (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). for [mid]afternoon on,14I.e., the prohibition begins nine \"seasonal\" hours after daybreak. Thus, on a day that begins at 6:00 AM and concludes at 6:00 PM, the time would be 3:00 PM. This time would be later in the summer and earlier in the winter. so that he will enter the Sabbath with an appetite.", + "A person should prepare his table on Friday, even if he is [to partake] only [of an amount of food] equivalent to the size of an olive.15I.e., even if the quantity of food the person eats is not great, he should prepare his table as if he is to partake of a distinguished meal. Similarly, a person should prepare his table on Saturday night,16This refers to the melaveh malkah meal that should be eaten at a table set in the same manner as at all the other Sabbath meals (Mishnah Berurah 300:1). even if he is [to partake] only [of an amount of food] equivalent to the size of an olive. [In this manner,] he shows his respect for the Sabbath when it enters and when it departs.
One should prepare one's house while it is still day as an expression of respect for the Sabbath.17Note the Nimukei Maharai, which emphasizes that כבוד (\"honor\") appears to refer to activities that are performed in preparation for the Sabbath, while ענג (\"delight\") to the appreciation of pleasure on the Sabbath itself. Note, however, the Ramah's gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 262:1). There the Ramah emphasizes that one should keep one's table attractively set throughout the entire Sabbath, implying that although honoring the Sabbath begins with preparing for it on Friday, the mitzvah continues throughout the day. There should be a lamp burning,18See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the mitzvah of lighting Sabbath lights. a table prepared [with food] to eat, and a couch bedecked with spreads.19In Talmudic times, people would recline on couches while eating, and this is the intent here. The word מטה also means \"bed,\" and the Mishnah Berurah 262:2 writes that it is appropriate that the beds of the house be made before the commencement of the Sabbath. All of these are expressions of honor for the Sabbath.20Shabbat 119b relates that a person returning home from the synagogue is accompanied by two angels, one with positive tendencies and the other with negative tendencies. When they enter the home and see it prepared for the Sabbath, even the angel with negative tendencies is forced to give his blessing that this setting be repeated in the week to come.", + "Even a very important person who is unaccustomed to buying items at the marketplace or to doing housework is required to perform tasks to prepare by himself for the Sabbath. This is an expression of his own personal honor.21I.e., rather than think that involving himself in such activities will be demeaning, he should appreciate that these deeds will enhance his honor. Even if it is possible to have others perform these tasks for one, it is preferable to carry out certain deeds oneself. For there is nothing more honorable than to give honor to the Sabbath. In this context, Rabbenu Chanan'el refers to Kiddushin 41a, \"It is more of a mitzvah [to perform a positive action] oneself, rather than [to charge] an agent [with its performance].\"
The Sages of the former generations22The examples quoted by the Rambam are taken from the description (Shabbat 119a) of the manner in which certain of the leading Sages of Babylonia would prepare for the Sabbath. [would involve themselves in such activities]: There was one who would chop wood to cook with, one who would salt meat, one would braid wicks, and one who would kindle the lamps. Others would go out and purchase food and beverages for the Sabbath, even though this was not their ordinary practice. The more one involves oneself in such activities, the more praiseworthy it is.", + "What is meant by [Sabbath] delight? This refers to our Sages' statement23As a source, the commentaries point to Shabbat 118b, which states: \"How should one delight in the Sabbath? With a dish of beets, large fish, and garlic heads.\" that a person must prepare a particularly sumptuous dish and a pleasantly flavored beverage for the Sabbath. All of this must be done within the context of a person's financial status.
The more one spends [both financially,] in expenses undertaken for the Sabbath and [in effort,] in the preparation of many good foods, the more praiseworthy it is.24One should not worry about the expense, for Beitzah 16a teaches that a person's income is fixed at the beginning of the year, with the exception of the money that he spends to honor the Sabbath and the festivals. A person need not be concerned with the cost of \"honoring the Sabbath,\" since he will be recompensed for the expense by an increase in his earnings If, however, this is not within one's [financial] capacity, even if one merely stews food or the like in honor of the Sabbath, this is considered to be Sabbath delight.
One is not obligated to strain oneself25See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 242:1), which states that one should earnestly endeavor to provide generously for the Sabbath and, if necessary, minimize one's expenditures during the week to do so. or to borrow from others26Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 242:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 242:3, which state that if possible - even if this entails pawning property - one should borrow to enhance one's Sabbath meals. One may rest assured that ultimately one will be able to repay these debts. Beitzah 15b states that God promises, \"Take a loan on My account. I will repay.\"
According to this view, the directive \"Make your Sabbaths as weekdays...\" applies only when a person has no property to pawn and will not be given a loan on any other terms.
in order to prepare more food for the Sabbath. The Sages of the former generations said,27Pesachim 113a; Shabbat, loc. cit. \"Make your Sabbaths as weekdays, but do not depend on others.\"", + "A person who is indulgent and wealthy and conducts all his days as Sabbaths must also partake of different foods on the Sabbath from those of which he partakes during the week. If [his fare] cannot be changed, he should [at least] change the time at which he eats [his meals]. [For example,] if he usually eats early, he should eat later.28He should not, however, delay his meals for a lengthy period of time, so that he will not experience discomfort on the Sabbath (Magen Avraham 288:12). If he usually eats late, he should eat earlier.", + "A person is obligated to eat three meals on the Sabbath:29In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe'ah 8:7), the Rambam cites Shabbat 117b, which states that this obligation stems from the fact that when describing the manna, Exodus 16:25 mentions the word היום, \"today,\" three times. In the verse, \"today\" refers to the Sabbath, and its threefold repetition indicates that three meals should be eaten on that day. one in the evening, one in the morning, and one in the afternoon.30The Maggid Mishneh explains that with these words, the Rambam is emphasizing that a person who does not eat his meals at these times does not fulfill the mitzvah of eating three Sabbath meals. Although the Halachot Gedolot maintains that the times when one partakes of these meals is not significant, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 291:1) rules according to the concept explained by the Maggid Mishneh. One should be extremely careful regarding these three meals, not to eat any less. Even a poor man who derives his livelihood from charity should eat three meals [on the Sabbath].31This directive is addressed, not only to the poor person himself, but to the administrators of the communal charity funds, as reflected in the Rambam's ruling, Hilchot Matnot Ani'im 7:8.
[Nevertheless,] a person who is sick from overeating, or one who fasts constantly is not obligated to partake of three meals.32Since the obligation to eat stems from the command to delight in the Sabbath, it is not applicable to these individuals, who will suffer discomfort from eating further. Note, however, the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.): \"A person who cannot eat at all is not obligated to cause himself discomfort.\"
All these three meals must be significant [sittings] at which wine is served;33Our translation is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh, which differs with the Tur (Orach Chayim 291) in the interpretation of the Rambam's words. The Tur maintains that the Rambam requires the recitation of kiddush before the third meal as well. Almost all the commentaries accept the Kessef Mishneh's view. at each,34The rationale for this ruling is that the obligation to eat three meals is derived from a verse describing the manna, and the manna was described as \"bread\" (Exodus 16:15 .
Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4) quotes the Rambam's ruling, the Ramah adds in his gloss that there are opinions that maintain that a single complete loaf is sufficient. The Shulchan Aruch continues (loc. cit.:5), mentioning other views that allow one to fulfill his obligation by eating foods other than bread. Although the Shulchan Aruch favors the Rambam's ruling, the later authorities agree that a person who is unable to eat a third meal of bread may fulfill his obligation by eating other foods (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 291:7).
one must break bread on two full loaves.35This obligation stems from the fact that the manna did not descend on the Sabbath, and a double portion of manna descended on the previous day. To commemorate this lechem mishneh (Exodus 16:22 , a double portion of bread is placed on the table on the Sabbath.The same applies regarding the holidays.36Most authorities interpret the Rambam's intent to be that one is obligated to break bread on two complete loaves on the holidays. [The rationale being that the manna did not descend on the holidays as well, and a double portion of manna descended on the previous day (Mechilta).] The Tur, by contrast, interprets the Rambam as requiring one to partake of three meals on the holidays as well.", + "Eating meat and drinking wine on the Sabbath is a form of pleasure for a person,37Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 242:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 242:1, which state that there is no obligation per se to partake of meat, fish, or wine on the Sabbath. The intent is to eat foods that give one pleasure. It has become customary to serve these foods because most people derive pleasure from them. provided this is within his [financial] capacity.38This reiterates the theme mentioned in Halachah 7, that one should not overextend oneself financially to provide for the Sabbath. The wording used by the Rambam here also allows us to appreciate the rationale for this ruling: Since the person will be putting himself under undue financial pressure, he will not derive pleasure from this indulgence.
On the Sabbaths and holidays, a significant meal at which wine will be served is forbidden to be scheduled for the time the house of study is in session.39This would prevent one from attending the house of study. (See Gittin 38b, which states that holding a meal at this time will lead to business misfortune.) Instead, the practice of the righteous of the former generations would be as follows: A person would recite the morning service and the additional service in the synagogue. Afterwards, he would return home and partake of the second [Sabbath] meal. He would then proceed to the house of study, to read [from the Written Law] and to study [the Oral Law] until the afternoon, at which time he would recite the afternoon service. He would then [partake of] the third [Sabbath] meal, a significant [sitting] at which wine is served, and continue eating and drinking until the Sabbath passed.", + "It is forbidden for a person to travel more than three parsa'ot from the beginning of the day on Friday. [This restriction was adopted] so that one will arrive home early in the day and prepare one's Sabbath meals. [One may not rely on] the members of one's household to prepare for him, [for they] do not know that one will arrive on this day.
Needless to say, [this restriction applies] when one is visiting others, since [by arriving unexpectedly,] one will embarrass them, for they will not have made the preparations appropriate for hosting guests.40In the present age, when travel and communication have advanced considerably, we need not hold rigidly to this halachah. The principle that it teaches, however - that one should not drop in suddenly on one's family and surely, on others - is definitely a significant ethical point.
Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 249:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 249:3, which state that at present, since people usually prepare generously for the Sabbath meals, there is no difficulty in coming unexpectedly if this cannot be avoided.
Another related point is also worth keeping in mind. Although long distance travel has been greatly facilitated in the present age, one should always plan to arrive several hours before the Sabbath, lest one be held back by forces beyond one's control.
", + "It is forbidden to fast,41Note the Radbaz (Vol. IV, Responsum 1266), who quotes the Rashba as stating that this prohibition has its source in the Torah itself. to cry out [to God], to offer supplication, or to entreat [His] mercy on the Sabbath.42In one of the Rambam's responsa, he explains that although prayer and supplication are revered media of divine service, on the Sabbath our service of God is channeled through a higher medium: rest and spiritual pleasure. As such, prayer and supplication are not appropriate. Even when [a community is beset] by a distressing circumstance that would ordinarily require the community to fast and sound the trumpets,43In Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1, the Rambam writes that one of the Torah's commandments is to cry out to God and sound the trumpets at a time of communal distress. He continues in Halachah 4, stating that our Sages required the community to fast on such occasions. In addition to drought, the Rambam mentions several other situations in Hilchot Ta'aniot, Chapter 3, which are described as times of communal distress.we do not fast or sound the trumpets on the Sabbath or holidays.
[There are, however, exceptions. They include] a city surrounded by gentiles or a [flooding] river, and a ship sinking at sea. We may sound the trumpets on the Sabbath to summon help for them, offer supplications on their behalf, and ask for mercy for them.44This is a restatement of a law mentioned previously in Chapter 2, Halachah 24. Chapter 2 involves questions concerning pikuach nefesh, the threat to life, and that is the reason why exceptions are made in these instances.", + "We do not lay siege to gentile cities less than three days before the Sabbath, so that the minds of the warriors will become settled and they will not be agitated and preoccupied on the Sabbath.45I.e., the siege must begin no later than Tuesday. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 248:1.) Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah 248:4, which cites other views that count the three days as beginning on Thursday. Thus, the siege may begin on Wednesday.
Although the army will still be in a state of war, and agitation will thus not have been eliminated entirely, since three days will have passed since the siege began, we can assume that much of the initial confusion and strain will have passed, and the situation will have settled into a routine.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 25, we may wage war against gentiles on the Sabbath. Generally, the commentaries mention two reasons why a siege should not be initiated less than three days before the Sabbath: the reason stated by the Rambam, and also that the three days before the Sabbath are considered to be days of preparation. Hence, at this time, one is forbidden to put oneself in a situation where it will inevitably be necessary to violate the Sabbath laws because of pikuach nefesh, a threat to life. When, however, the siege is begun earlier, the situation will have already become part of the soldiers' functional reality before the preparations for the Sabbath have begun, and they will be permitted to violate the Sabbath laws, if necessary.
By mentioning this law in this context, the Rambam emphasizes that the issue with which he is concerned is ensuring, to the fullest extent possible, the soldiers' peace of mind.

For this reason, we may not set sail on a ship less than three days before the Sabbath, so that one's mind will be settled before the Sabbath and one will not suffer excessive discomfort.46There are many people who get sea-sick on the first days of a journey. After three days have passed, however, they are likely to have grown accustomed to conditions aboard ship.
According to the Rambam, this prohibition applies only to ocean vessels, and not to river-boat traffic. There are, however, different rationales for the requirement to leave three days before the Sabbath. Among them:
a) By traveling on a ship, one goes beyond the Sabbath limits. Although there is an opinion that the Sabbath limits do not apply when one is ten handbreadths above the ground - as a ship usually is above the ocean or river bed - there is, nevertheless, no definitive ruling about the matter. (See Chapter 27, Halachah 3; see Maharik, Responsum 45.)
b) One may be forced to perform forbidden labor on the ship or, at the very least, have a gentile perform forbidden labors on one's behalf. (See Rivash, Responsum 152.)
With regard to both these matters, these follow the alternate view mentioned above: that within three days of the Sabbath, since the Sabbath preparations have begun, one is not allowed to put oneself into a situation where one will inevitably break the Sabbath laws. If, however, one has put oneself into such a situation before the commencement of the Sabbath preparations, the status is different.
In two of his responsa, the Rambam explains that the question of whether or not the Sabbath limits apply above ten handbreadths is relevant on dry land, but does not apply to water travel at all. Hence, it does not present a difficulty in the case at hand. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 248:2). Although the Ramah mentions objections, the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 248:3-4) follow the Rambam's view.
With regard to the performance of work, the Radbaz writes that, according to the Rambam, one may never put oneself into a situation in which one knows that one will inevitably be forced to perform forbidden labors on the Sabbath. (See Be'ur Halachah 248.) The Ramah (Orach Chayim 248:2) and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities definitely do not accept this position. Moreover. from the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4), it appears that the Sephardic community also agrees with the other view.
For the sake of a mitzvah, however, one may set out on a sea journey even on Friday. One should enter into an agreement that [the ship] interrupt [its journey] on the Sabbath. [If, however,] this agreement is not kept [it is not of consequence].47See Chapter 24, Halachah 6 and notes, where this law was originally stated and explained. It is repeated here to emphasize that because there is a mitzvah, the discomfort that will be caused by the journey is overlooked.
From Tyre to Sidon48Two cities in Lebanon that are not far removed from each other. and the like, one may set out on Friday, even if the journey concerns one's personal affairs.49For such a short journey is not likely to disturb one's ordinary functioning. In places where it is customary not to set out on a journey on Friday at all, one should refrain from travelling.", + "Sexual relations are considered a dimension of Sabbath pleasure.50This applies to all people, not merely Torah scholars. Therefore, Torah scholars who are healthy51And thus are not prevented from engaging in relations. set aside Friday night as the night when they fulfill their conjugal duties.52Ketubot 62b interprets Psalms 1:3, \"who gives its fruit in its season,\" as referring to a person who engages in sexual relations on Friday night and not on other occasions. This is the practice of Torah scholars, who generally engage in relations only once a week (Hilchot Ishut 14:1).
At the outset, it is permitted to engage in sexual relations with a virgin on the Sabbath. It is not [forbidden because] one is creating a wound,53For the hymenal blood is considered to be a distinct entity enclosed in the membrane, and thus this situation differs from others in which bleeding is caused (Rashi, Ketubot 7a).
Note the Magen Avraham 339:11, which mentions that witnesses should observe the yichud, the entry into a private chamber, of the bride and groom before the commencement of the Sabbath, so that all the contractual aspects of the marriage will have been completed at that time.
nor because of the pain the woman [feels].", + "[The observance of] the Sabbath and [the prohibition against] worshiping false deities are each equivalent to [the observance] of all the mitzvot of the Torah.54The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:9) derives the equivalence between the Sabbath and the entire Torah from Nechemiah 9:13-14: \"On Mount Sinai You descended.... And You gave them straight judgments... and good statutes and commandments. And You informed them of Your holy Sabbath.\" The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Sabbath's central importance stems from the fact that it is a sign of God's constant renewal of creation.
Kinat Eliyahu explains the equivalence between the Sabbath and all the other mitzvot as follows: The dynamic spiritual activity of the Sabbath, carried out against a backdrop of rest and material satisfaction, reflects the goal and purpose of the totality of our Torah observance. It is for this reason that our Sages called the Sabbath \"a microcosm of the world to come.\"
And the Sabbath is the eternal sign between the Holy One, blessed be He, and us.55The Rambam is borrowing the wording of Exodus 31:13,17.
For this reason, whoever transgresses the other mitzvot is considered to be one of the wicked of Israel, but a person who desecrates the Sabbath publicly is considered as an idolater. Both of them are considered to be equivalent to gentiles in all regards.56This ruling represents more than a moral condemnation. Not only is such a person not acceptable as a witness and ineligible to take an oath in court, but all the restrictions applied with regard to gentiles - e.g., the prohibitions against gentile wine, gentile milk, and gentile bread - are applied to him. Similarly, he may not be counted in a minyan, nor be given any honor in the synagogue. (See Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 72:2.)
Many halachic authorities of the recent era (see Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim I, Responsum 33, and other sources) explain that there is room for leniency with regard to certain of these restrictions at present. Nevertheless, the overall attitude must still be one of stringency.
It must, however, be emphasized that the offspring of such Jews have a full portion in their Jewish heritage. Instead of shunning them, we must make every effort to draw them close to their spiritual roots. (See Hilchot Mamrim 3:3.)
Therefore, our prophets praise [Sabbath observance], saying [Isaiah 56:2]: \"Happy is the man who does the following, and the mortal who holds fast to it, who keeps the Sabbath, without desecrating it....\"
It is explicitly stated in our prophetic tradition that whoever observes the Sabbath according to law and honors it and delights in it according to his ability will receive reward in this world in addition to the reward that is preserved for the world to come,57Which the Rambam considers to be the ultimate reward, as he writes in Hilchot Teshuvah, Chapter 8. as [Isaiah 58:14]58It is the observance of the Sabbath that is described in the preceding verse in Isaiah, \"And you shall call the Sabbath 'a delight...,' which makes one worthy of the rewards mentioned in this verse. states: \"'You will then delight in God. I will cause you to ride on the high places of the earth, and I will nourish you with the heritage of Jacob your ancestor'; thus has the mouth of God spoken.\"" + ] + ], + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007", + "https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH001020101/NLI" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "משנה תורה, הלכות שבת", + "categories": [ + "Halakhah", + "Mishneh Torah", + "Sefer Zemanim" + ], + "sectionNames": [ + "Chapter", + "Halakhah" + ] +} \ No newline at end of file