diff --git "a/txt/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/merged.txt" "b/txt/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/merged.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/txt/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/merged.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,442 @@ +English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin +ביאור אנגלי על משנה ערכין +merged +https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Arakhin +This file contains merged sections from the following text versions: +-Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp +-http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/ + +English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin + +Introduction + +Our tractate is called Arakhin, the plural of “erekh” which means “value.” The tractate deals mostly with Leviticus 27, whose topic is evaluating people, animals and land whose value were donated to the Temple. For instance, a person who says, “My value (erekh) is upon me” means to say that he wishes to donate to the Temple his value. The value of a person is fixed according to Leviticus, and it will depend on a person’s gender and age. In addition, a person can dedicate to the Temple the value of an animal or a piece of property, topics that are also covered in Leviticus 27. Sometimes these values are fixed and sometimes they are individually assessed. As background to this tractate, it would be highly advisable to read this chapter of the Torah. I have included it below for your convenience. There are also laws in our tractate concerning the sale of ancestral property, a topic dealt with in Leviticus 25. While these laws are no longer practical, since we don’t have a Temple, they can teach us a lot about how people would have donated money to the Temple, as well as how the value of people and land was assessed. I think that you will find it to be a very interesting tractate, although as you know, I always say that. Good luck! + + + + + +Chapter 1 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +Introduction +In order to understand our mishnah we must understand the distinction between an “evaluation” and vowing someone’s monetary worth. When a person makes a statement such as “My value is upon me,” he must dedicate to the Temple the sum that the Torah determines to be his/her value. He can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s value is upon me.” +However, if he states, “My monetary worth is upon me,” then an actual evaluation of his value must be made. This is done by assessing how much he would be worth as a slave if he was sold in the market. Again, one can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.” +In other words there are two types of evaluation. For the first, where he uses the word “erekh,” or value, we use the Torah’s fixed sum. For the second, where he uses the word “monetary worth” we evaluate his actual worth. +All [persons] are fit to evaluate or to be made the subjects of evaluation, are fit to vow [another's worth] or have their worth vowed: priests, Levites and [ordinary] Israelites, women and slaves. Generally, all people can evaluate and be evaluated meaning they can either say, “My value is upon me” or have that said about them by another. In this case, the money they or others will owe to the Temple depends upon the value prescribed by the Torah (Leviticus 27). Similarly, all people can vow to give their or another’s person’s monetary worth to the Temple. This is when they say, “My monetary worth is upon me” or have that said by another person. As we shall see, this is just the general rule. There are indeed exceptions, people who cannot evaluate or be evaluated, vow or be vowed. +The tumtum and the hermaphrodite are fit to vow [another's worth], or to have their worth vowed, and are fit to evaluate, but they are not fit to be made the subjects of evaluation, for the subject of evaluation must be definitely either male or female. A tumtum is a person’s who has neither male nor female genitalia and a hermaphrodite has both male and female genitalia. The gender of these two people is in doubt. Both can vow another’s monetary worth or have their worth vowed by another, because vowing one’s monetary worth has nothing to do with establishing a certain gender. They can also evaluate another person by saying “So and so’s value is upon me” because they are considered to be intelligent. The one thing they can’t do is have their value dedicated by themselves or by others because in order to be evaluated one must have a certain gender. This is because the Torah determines the value of a human being partly based on the person’s gender. One without a gender cannot have his/her value determined. +A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are fit to have their worth vowed or be made the subject of evaluation, but they are not fit to make either a vow [of another's worth] or to evaluate, because they have no intelligence. A deaf-mute, imbecile and minor are not considered to be of intelligence and therefore they cannot dedicate anything to the Temple, neither through an evaluation nor a vow. However, they are of value, both according to the Torah’s assessment and as slaves sold in the market, therefore their value or monetary worth can be dedicated. +A person less than one month old may have his worth vowed but not his valuation. The Torah assigns value only to children who have reached thirty days. This is probably because life was so fragile for the first thirty days and so many children would have died (see Leviticus 27:6). Therefore, a child below thirty day’s value cannot be dedicated. But their monetary worth can be vowed because they could be sold on the slave market, even though their value might not be high due to their fragility. + +Mishnah 2 + +Introduction +In today’s mishnah Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah debate whether a non-Jew can dedicate his value or have his value dedicated to the Temple. +A non-Jew: Rabbi Meir says: he can be evaluated but he cannot evaluate. According to Rabbi Meir a non-Jew can be evaluated by others. This means that if a Jew says, “The value of so-and-so [a non-Jew] is upon me,” the Jew will be liable to pay the fixed value of the non-Jew to the Temple. However, he can’t evaluate himself or others. +Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Rabbi Judah holds the opposite. A non-Jew can evaluate himself or others, but he cannot be evaluated. It seems that these two rabbis debate the applicability of Leviticus 27:2, “Speak to the Israelite people and say to them….” The verse can be read as saying that the laws in the chapter refer only to Jews. However, which aspect of the chapter is not clear evaluating others or being evaluated? That is what they debate. +Both agree that he can vow another's worth and have his worth vowed by others. Both Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir agree that the non-Jew can vow his own worth or someone else’s worth to the Temple by stating, “The monetary worth of so-and-so is upon me.” Since this type of dedication is not the topic of Leviticus 27, the non-Jew is not excluded. As an aside, it is clear from many historical sources, both rabbinic and non-rabbinic, that non-Jews did donate money to the Temple in Jerusalem. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction +In today’s mishnah three sages debate whether a person who is about to die can have his worth or value dedicated to the Temple. +One at the point of death or about to be put to death cannot have his worth vowed, nor be evaluated. A person about to die, either naturally or by being executed, has no worth. Therefore, another person cannot dedicate the dying person’s monetary worth or his value to the Temple. The first opinion in the mishnah makes no distinction between the amount set by the Torah (value) and the amount estimated by his value in the marketplace (his worth). +Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia says: he can be evaluated because his value is fixed, but his worth cannot be vowed because his worth is not fixed. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia does make a distinction between the two. A person’s “value” is set by the Torah and it doesn’t matter whether he is about to die or is alive. Therefore, if someone says, “So and so’s value is upon me,” he is liable to make that payment. However, his monetary worth cannot be vowed through a statement such as, “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.” This is because there is no fixed “worth” to a human being, and since this human being is about to die, his life has no worth. +Rabbi Yose says: he may vow, evaluate, and consecrate [to the sanctuary], and if he caused damage, he is obliged to make restitution. Rabbi Yose adds that when it comes to the dying person vowing to give someone’s worth or value to the Temple or consecrating an object to the Temple, he has the same ability as everyone else does. Since he will be dead before he pays off these debts, the money will have to be taken out of his estate. Similarly, if he damages another’s property, his inheritors will have to pay out the restitution. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +Since yesterday’s mishnah dealt with the status of someone who was about to be executed, our mishnah continues to provide some information in this subject. It has nothing to do with evaluations. +If a woman is about to be executed, they do not wait for her until she gives birth. The rabbis considered delaying execution to be cruel to the executed person. The ideal was to sentence the person and execute them immediately so that they would not have to wait around a long time contemplating their death. We should remember that in order to sentence someone to death, the proof had to be overwhelmingly certain. In rabbinic law, a conviction would almost never be overturned, and therefore, it would be cruel to delay carrying out the sentence. Our mishnah teaches that this is so even for a pregnant woman. While this may seem cruel, it is in essence stating that the woman takes precedence over her fetus, which is not yet considered to be a full “life.” +But if she had already sat on the birthstool, they wair for her until she gives birth. However, if she has already begun to have contractions, and is sitting on the birthstool to give birth, they must wait until she gives birth to execute her. It seems that at this point the fetus is close enough to being an actual human being, that it would not be legal to execute it with the mother. +If a woman has been put to death one may use her hair. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from a dead body. However, if a person has been executed, it is permitted to derive benefit from the hair because the rabbis don’t consider hair to be alive, such that it has the status of a dead body. +If an animal has been put to death it is forbidden to make any use of it. When it comes to an animal executed for committing a crime (murder or sex with a human being) the law works differently. Once an animal has been sentenced to die it is immediately forbidden to derive benefit from any part of its body, even from its hair. When it dies, it continues to be forbidden to derive benefit from the entire body, and this prohibition continues to apply to its hair. In other words, when it comes to human beings, death makes the body prohibited, and therefore the prohibition does not apply to hair, which is not prohibited. When it comes to animals, sentencing makes the body prohibited and therefore it applies to the entire body, including the hair. + +Chapter 2 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +Introduction +Our mishnah begins by discussing upper and lower limits for evaluations. Afterwards, the remainder of the mishnah and the remainder of the chapter continues to discuss various issues unconnected to evaluations, but whose halakhot have the same literary format as the first sentence of the mishnah. +There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. Leviticus 27:8 states, “But if one cannot afford the equivalent, he shall be presented before the priest, and the priest shall assess him; the priest shall assess him according to what the vower can afford.” Thus if a poor person vows to pay the value of an adult male (whose value is 50 shekel/sela) and he can’t afford to pay the whole amount, he can pay less. Our mishnah teaches that this payment cannot be less than a sela. The maximum amount is 50 selas, as is stated explicitly in Leviticus 27:3. +How so? If one paid a sela and became rich, he need not give any [more]. But if he gave less than a sela and became rich, he must pay fifty selas. The mishnah now explains what happens if after the poor person gave a sela he then becomes rich. If he gave a sela, then he has fulfilled his obligation and even if he becomes rich, he need not give the full amount of fifty selas. But if he gave less than a sela, and then he became rich, he must give the full amount, because by giving less than a sela, he did not fulfill his obligation. +If he had five selas in his possession: Rabbi Meir says: he need not give more than one; The sages say he must give them all. The sages now debate what happens if a person has more than a sela, but does not have the full amount that he vowed. Let’s say he vowed to give the value of an adult male (50 selas) and all he has in 5 selas. According to Rabbi Meir, since he can’t give the full amount, he needs to pay only a sela, the lowest amount. The other rabbis hold that he must give whatever he can, even if he can’t pay the full amount. +There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. This is a repeat of section one. It is repeated here because the mishnah now begins a long list of halakhot taught with the literary format of “there is not in X less than A nor more than B.” +If a woman makes a mistake in her reckoning there is no re-opening for her [of the niddah count] earlier than seven, nor later than after seventeen days. This somewhat complicated halakhah has to do with counting a woman’s menstrual cycle, in order to know the difference between menstrual blood (which causes a woman to be impure for 7 days, even if she continued to bleed all the way through the seventh day) and non-menstrual blood (which causes a woman to be impure for one day, unless she sees blood for three straight days, in which case she is impure for 7 full days after she stops seeing blood). The rabbis instituted an 18 day cycle to calculate when blood was menstrual and when it is non-menstrual. When a woman first sees blood she considers it to be menstrual blood and she is impure for seven days, from the time she saw the first blood. After these seven days, any blood seen over the next 11 days is considered to be zivah (non-menstrual blood). After these eleven days are over, she returns to counting seven days, during which any blood is considered to be menstrual blood. Our mishnah deals with a situation where a woman made a mistake in counting these days (i.e. she didn’t know whether she was in the seven days or in the eleven) and she saw blood. She doesn’t know whether the blood she saw is to be considered menstrual, in which case she is impure for seven days, or zivah, in which case she is impure for only one day, or a full seven days if she sees zivah for three straight days. Our mishnah teaches that the beginning of her days of menstrual blood cannot be less then seven days after she doesn’t see any more blood, nor more than seventeen days, all counted from the time she first saw blood. How this works out is a bit complicated, but I shall try to explain very briefly. Let’s say she saw blood for one day, if these were “days of niddah” she could begin to count her next days of niddah after seventeen days, which is the maximum amount. This would mirror the normal situation. However, if she sees blood for several straight days, it may be possible that she only has to wait seven more days after not seeing blood to begin counting her menstrual blood days. Let’s say she sees blood for three straight days, she can then begin counting her menstrual days after seven days without seeing blood, because it doesn’t matter if the blood she saw was menstrual or not, seven days are sufficient to begin counting again. I realize that this is all very complicated, and indeed entire books exist dedicated to these complicated calculations. We will learn much more about this subject when we learn Tractate Niddah. +No signs of leprosy are shut up for less than one week and none more than two weeks. This calculation deals with isolating a person or house that might have shown signs of “negaim” which we should understand as some sort of skin affliction or house fungus. The minimum time of such an isolation is seven days, which is how long the isolation is for a person (see Leviticus 13:21, 26). The maximum time is three weeks, which is only for a house. We shall learn more about this in Tractate Negaim (I bet you can’t wait!). + +Mishnah 2 + +There are never less than four full months in the year, nor did it seem right to have more than eight. Every month in the Jewish calendar has 29 or 30 days, depending on when witnesses come to testify that they saw the new moon. The rabbis realized that there had to be about six “missing” months and six “full” months a year, in order to keep the schedule correct (an actual lunar cycle is between 29 and 30 days long). Therefore, they instituted a minimum of four full months and a maximum of eight to keep the calculations as close to correct as possible. Today, the Jewish calendar is fixed, and generally, there are six full and six missing months. +Two loaves were eaten, never earlier than the second day, nor later than the third day. The “two loaves” refers to the two loaves eaten on Shavuot. Generally, they were eaten the day after they were baked. They would be baked on erev Shavuot, and eaten on Shavuot. This is “the second day.” However, if Shabbat fell before Shavuot, they would be baked on Thursday and eaten on Sunday, the third day. For more information see Menahot 11:9. +The shewbread was eaten never earlier than the ninth day, nor later than the eleventh day. The showbread was the bread baked in the Temple on a weekly basis. Generally, it would have been baked on Friday and eaten the following Shabbat, on the ninth day. However, if there were holidays on Thursday and Friday, it might have been eaten on only the eleventh day. For more info see Menahot 11:9. +An infant may never be circumcised earlier than the eighth nor later than the twelfth day. Normally, a boy is circumcised on the eighth day. However, if he is born at dusk, at a time when it might be already the next day, he would have to be circumcised on the ninth day (which might be the eighth day). If he is born at dusk on erev Shabbat, he is circumcised on the following Sunday, the tenth day, because he can only be circumcised on Shabbat if it is certain that it is the eighth day. If he is born on erev Rosh Hashanah, when it falls on Thursday-Friday, he will be circumcised on the twelfth day, which is the following Sunday, because he couldn’t be circumcised on Thursday, Friday or Saturday . Unless the baby is unhealthy, the circumcision cannot be delayed any longer. + +Mishnah 3 + +There are never less than twenty-one blasts in the Temple and never more than forty-eight. There was a minimum of 21 daily trumpet blasts in the Temple and a maximum of 48. The explanation of this section can be found in Sukkah 5:5. The maximum number of blasts was sounded on erev Shabbat during Sukkot. +There are never less than two harps, nor more than six. The harps were played to accompany the singing of the Levites. +There are never less than two flutes, nor more than twelve. The flutes were played on special occasions, namely holidays, as the rest of the mishnah explains. +On twelve days in the year the flute was played before the altar: At the slaughtering of the first pesah, At the killing of the second pesah, On the first festival day of Pesah, On the festival day of Atzeret (, And on the eight days of Sukkot. The flute was played on the first day of each holiday, and also on any day that a pesah sacrifice was slaughtered (the fourteenth of Nissan, and the fourteenth of Iyyar). During Sukkot it was played every day. +And they did not play on a pipe [abuv] of bronze but on a pipe of reed, because its tune is sweeter. The flute that they played was a pipe made of reed, for its sound is sweeter (according to rabbinic tastes) than the bronze pipe. +Nor was anything but a single pipe used for closing a tune, because it makes a pleasant finale. At the conclusion of the song, they would end with a single pipe (flute) which is more pleasant than completing with two (or more) at the same time. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s, which discussed the blowing of the flutes on holiday occasions. +They were slaves of the priests, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, it was slaves owned by priests who would play the flute. +Rabbi Yose said: they were of families from Bet Hapegarim, Bet-Zipparya and from Emmaus, places from which priests would marry [women]. Rabbi Yose seems to think that it would not have been appropriate for slaves to fulfill such a function. Rather, people from important families, families whose daughters were able to marry priests (see Kiddushin 4:5), would play the flute. These three locations are in the region of Judea. In face, Emmaus is on my regular bike-riding route (near Latrun). Next time I’m out, I’ll try to listen for some flutists! +Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonos said: they were Levites. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says that just as Levites would sing, so too they were the ones to play the flute. + +Mishnah 5 + +There were never less than six inspected lambs in the chamber of lambs, enough for Shabbat and the [two] festival days of Rosh Hashanah, and their number could be increased infinitely. Every day there were at least two lambs that were used as the daily tamid offering, one in the morning and one at night. These lambs needed to be examined four days before being used, a halakhah found in the Torah in connection with the passover sacrifice offered in Egypt (see Exodus 12:3, 6). There was a special chamber where these lambs were kept (see Tamid 3:3). Generally, there were eight lambs in the chamber, enough for four days. Every morning they would take out two for that day, and then in the evening they would examine two new lambs to make sure that they were unblemished. There always had to be at least six checked lambs in the chamber, in case Rosh Hashanah fell immediately before or after Shabbat. If this happened they would need six lambs for the tamid, two for each day. There is no upper limit as to how many lambs they could put into the chamber. Of course, space, noise and stench might have become an issue at a certain point, but theoretically, they could keep adding as many as they wanted. +There were never less than two trumpets and their number could be increased infinitely. There always had to be at least two trumpets in the Temple. These trumpets were used on various occasions. See for instance Number 10:2, 10. They could have a much greater number. Indeed in II Chronicles 2:5, 12, we hear about 120 priests blowing on trumpets in the Temple. +There were never less than nine lyres, and their number could be increased infinitely. But there was only one cymbal. In the Temple they would use at least nine lyres, and they could use many more, but only one set of cymbals. + +Mishnah 6 + +There were never less than twelve levites standing on the platform and their number could be increased into infinity. There always needed to be twelve Levites standing on the platform in the Temple singing. This would mean one for every lyre (nine), one for every harp (two) and one for the cymbals. This number is also referred to in I Chronicles 25:9. +No minor could enter the court of the sanctuary to take part in the service except when the Levites stood up to sing. Minor Levites would go into the courtyard while the Levites were singing in order to aid them. However, they could only go in while the Levites were singing. +Nor did they join in the singing with harp and lyre, but with the mouth alone, to add flavor to the music. The minors only sang. They did not play the harp and lyre. +Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: they did not count in the required number, nor did they stand on the platform. Rather they would stand on the ground, so that their heads were between the feet of the levites. And they were called the youth of the Levites. There are two versions of this section. The version I have quoted here is one that Albeck seems to prefer. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob is referring to the youth mentioned in sections 1-2. The other version, found in the Rambam’s commentary reads, “trouble-makers of the Levites.” The Rambam explains that this refers to the musicians, those playing the instruments, for they would drown out the beautiful voices of the Levites. + +Chapter 3 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of the rapist and the seducer and the defamer is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. How so? Whether one has evaluated the fairest in Israel, or the ugliest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. But if he said: “Behold, his monetary worth is upon me,” he pays only as much as he is worth.
Like the second chapter, the third chapter also begins with a discussion of evaluations and through associative thinking goes on to discuss other laws that have a similar phenomenon. In this case, the phenomenon is that sometimes the law is lenient and sometimes it is strict.
Sections 2-4 will be explained in mishnayot 2-5, so I will not explain them here.
Section five: This section demonstrates how sometimes the laws of evaluation are strict and sometimes they are lenient. If a person vows the evaluation of a very good looking person, one who might be worth more than 50 selas, he still owes only 50 selas, because the Torah determines the person’s value as such. This is a leniency. But if the person is ugly and is really worth less than 50 selas, the vower still pays 50 selas. This is a stringency. We should note that this is true as long as the person’s whose worth is being donated is a male between the ages of 20 and 50. For older and younger males and for females, the evaluation is different. Nevertheless, the principle would be the same for all.
As we explained in the introduction, if the vower uses the word “monetary worth” instead of “value” then he owes the actual worth, be it higher for the good looking person, or lower for the ugly person. + +Mishnah 2 + +Introduction +Leviticus 27:16 states, “If anyone consecrates to the Lord any land that he holds, its assessment shall be in accordance with its seed requirement: fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed.” Verse 22 of the same chapter deals with a case where a person dedicated land that he purchased. +Our mishnah deals with both of these laws. The same topic will be discussed again later in tractate Arakhin. +“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. Similar to a case where a person dedicated the value of another human being, when one dedicates a field of possession, meaning one that is part of his ancestral inheritance, he must pay a fixed amount in order to redeem the field. That amount is set by the Torah as being fifty shekels of silver for every part of a field that can grow enough to sow a “homer” of barley. This is a standard amount set by what an average field can produce. It is not based on what the field actually dedicated produces. There are two regions mentioned in this section. The first is the sandy plains of a region called “Mahoz.” I do not know where this region is, but since there are many sandy regions in Israel, and “Mahoz” is a generic term meaning “the district” it probably could be in a variety of different places. Savaste is in Samaria. According to Albeck, Herod expanded this area and planted there gardens and orchards, and he was the one who called it by this name. +But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. If he dedicated a field that he bought and not one that he inherited, when he redeems the field he owes whatever the field is actually worth. +Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth. Rabbi Eliezer reads these verses differently and holds that in both cases, the person must redeem the field for fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. The only difference between the two is that when one redeems a dedicated field of possession he must add an extra fifth (see Leviticus 27:19), whereas when one dedicates a field which he bought, he need not add the extra fifth. Chapter seven will deal more with this subject. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah deals with the warned ox, the “muad.” This is an ox that has gored three times. The owner of a “warned ox” that kills a person is liable to pay the value of the person (see Exodus 21:30). However, if the ox kills a slave, he pays 30 shekels no matter the value of the slave (vs. 32). +“The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether it killed the fine looking slave or an ugly slave, he must pay thirty selas. If a warned ox kills a slave, the owner of the ox pays thirty selas (equivalent to the Torah’s shekels) to the slave’s owner, no matter how valuable the slave was. Sometimes this can create a stringency (if the slave was worth less) and sometimes a leniency (if the slave was worth more). +If it killed a free man he must pay what he is worth. As stated in the introduction, if the ox kills a free person, he must pay the value of the person, no matter the how great or small the value is. The fixed amount is only for the slave. +If it wounded, whether this one or the other, he must pay the full damage. The distinction between the slave and the free person is only in case the ox kills one of them. If the ox wounds them, its owner is liable to pay the actual worth in both cases. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +Our mishnah deals with the rapist or seducer, topics discussed in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 and Exodus 22:15-16. As was the case with the warned ox, any time the Torah sets a fixed amount as a fine, the result can be lenient or strict. +“The law of the rapist and seducer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether he raped or seduced a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. Whether one rapes or seduces a girl from a good family, for instance a priestly family, or from a humble/poor family, he pays the father fifty selas as compensation. This fine is fixed no matter how much the girl is actually worth. It is interesting to note that unlike the case of evaluations or killing the slave, where the mishnah referred to the looks of the one evaluated or killed, here the mishnah refers to the family of the girl. This probably reveals quite a bit about marriage choices in mishnaic times. A girl’s worth was largely dependent upon her familial status and far less upon her individual personal characteristics. A girl from a good family was worth more in the eyes of the society than one from a lesser family. While this is not at all surprising, it is still interesting to note such concrete evidence of this social phenomenon. +But compensation for shaming and for blemish is in accord with the [circumstances] of him who shames and of the one who suffers the shame. Deuteronomy and Exodus refer only to a fine paid to the father by a man who rapes or seduces his daughter. The rabbis made an innovation that rape is to be treated also as a case of personal injury to the girl, and not just a loss to the father. A rapist is liable to pay not only a fine, but also compensation for shaming her and her family and for any blemish that occurred. In truth he is also liable to pay for her suffering and any loss of work. These amounts, unlike the fine, are not set by the Torah. When it comes to shaming, the payment depends upon the social status of the shamer and the person who was shamed. This halakhah is true in all cases of personal injury. For more information see Ketubot 3:7. + +Mishnah 5 + +Introduction +The final mishnah of this chapter refers to the “defamer,” one who falsely claims that a girl he married was not a virgin (see Deuteronomy 22: 13-22). +The law of the defamer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.
How so? Whether he defamed a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay one hundred selas. The Torah sets a one hundred shekel fine for the defamer, no matter whether he defamed a girl from a good family or from a lesser family. Again, any time the Torah sets an amount, this will create a potential stringency and a potential leniency as well, depending on the actual circumstances. +Thus it turns out that he who speaks with his mouth suffers more than he that commits an act. Here the mishnah notes the paradox that a man who rapes or seduces a girl pays a fine of fifty shekels, whereas one who defames her pays double the amount. This is generalized into a value statement one who speaks against someone with his mouth can, at least at times, do more harm than one who acts out physically. +For thus we have also found that the judgment against our fathers in the wilderness was sealed only because of their evil tongue, as it is written: “Yet you have tested me these ten times, and you have not listened to My voice” (Numbers 14:22). The mishnah now midrashically connects this idea with the Israelites’ experience in the desert. After complaining to God about the report of the spies (see Numbers 14:1-3), God says that they have tested Him “ten times.” These ten times surely included not only the Israelites’ typical grumbling, but physical acts as well (for instance, worshipping the golden calf). Nevertheless, the terrible punishment that none of the adults who left Egypt would reach Canaan (save Caleb and Joshua) was not meted out until this instance. Furthermore, the following verse states, “All those who have vexed Me shall not see it (the land of Canaan).” This implies that the punishment was for verbally vexing God. + +Chapter 4 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower.
And the age is according to the subject of the vow.
The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation.
And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.
The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. How so? If a poor man evaluated a rich man, he pays only the valuation of a poor man. But if a rich man evaluated a poor man, he must pay the valuation of a rich man.
Our chapter provides several central rules as to how the amount paid for evaluations is determined. We should note that the literary structure of this chapter is the same as that of the previous chapter the first mishnah gives brief headlines that are further explicated in the rest of the chapter. Therefore, I will again leave the explanation of these headlines for subsequent mishnayot.
Section five: Leviticus 27:8 states, “But if one cannot afford the evaluation, he shall be presented before the priest and the priest shall assess him; the priest shall assess him according to what the vower can afford.” Our mishnah teaches that this is an assessment of the means of the person who made the vow, and not the person whose value was vowed. So if a poor person vows to give the value of a rich person he only pays the amount that a poor person could afford to pay. This estimate has nothing to do with the fact that the person being evaluated was rich. Conversely, if a rich person vows the value of a poor person, he must pay the full amount because he is rich. It does not matter at all that the person whose value he vowed is poor. + +Mishnah 2 + +Introduction +Our mishnah draws a distinction between one who makes a vow of evaluation and one who undertakes to bring someone else’s sacrifices. Whereas in the case of the former, the priest estimates the ability of the vower to pay his vow, in the case of sacrifices the priest estimates the financial ability of the person who was originally obligated to bring the sacrifice, and not the one who took on his obligation. +But it is not so with sacrifices. The law with regard to one who vows to bring someone else’s sacrifice is different from the law regarding someone who vows to give someone else’s worth. The mishnah will now explain. +If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. The sacrifices that a metzora, one afflicted with skin disease, brings at the end of his affliction depend upon his financial means. If he is rich he brings the full array of sacrifices (see Leviticus 13) but if he is poor, he can bring fewer sacrifices. In this case, one person vowed to bring the sacrifices of another person who was becoming pure from being a metzora. The vower must bring whatever the metzora was obligated to bring. If the metzora was poor, the vower brings a poor person’s sacrifice, even if the vower himself was rich. Conversely, if the metzora was rich and the vower poor, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich person. In both cases, the obligation goes according to the metzora and not the one making the vow. +Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi says that he can find a situation involving evaluations where we go according to the one being evaluated. First of all, he notes that if a poor man vows the value of a rich man we of course have to go according to the poor man’s means, because the rich man didn’t do anything at all. It would make no sense to do otherwise. But if a rich man vowed his own value, and the poor man said that he wanted to vow what the rich man had already vowed, he must pay the same amount that the rich main vowed. Thus Rabbi has found a case where we go according to the one being evaluated, and not the vower. +If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If the person who made the vow was rich at the moment he vowed and then he became poor before he paid his debt, we estimate his financial ability as if he were rich, because his liability cannot go down over time. If he made the vow when he was poor and then became rich before he paid his vow, he again pays according to the means of a rich man. This is because at the time he pays his debt he is already of means, and why should he be allowed to pay any less. Rabbi Judah goes even further. Even if he was poor, then became rich and then became poor again (perhaps he jumped onto the dot-com bubble?) he pays according to the means of a rich person. Again we see that once the obligation is set, it can never be reduced, even though it can be increased. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction +In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that when a person vows another person’s value, whether he was rich at the time of the vow or at the time that he comes to pay his debt, he pays as a rich man. Our mishnah contrasts this with the laws of bringing a sacrifice. +But it is not so with sacrifices. When it comes to sacrifices, whether he was rich and became poor, or poor and became rich, he always brings the sacrifices according to his financial means at the time he is actually bringing them. +Even if his father was dying [when a man vowed] and left him ten thousand, or if he had a ship on the sea and it brought to him ten thousand, the sanctuary has no claim at all on them. This section relates a halakhah common to both evaluations and sacrifices. If a person has money coming to him, whether through an inheritance or from a boat that is bringing him a large delivery, we ignore his future imminent income and determine his means according to his current financial situation. So if a person is about to become rich, but is still technically poor, he pays his evaluation debt or brings his sacrifices as a poor man. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah, the final mishnah of chapter four, explains the sections of mishnah one that have not yet been explained. +“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The amount owed is reckoned according to the person whose value was vowed, and not according to the age of the vower. +The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. Similarly, the gender is determined by the one whose value is being vowed and not the gender of the vower. +“And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The value of a person is determined partly by age (and partly by gender). When we determine his age we determine it according to his/her age at the time the vow was made, and not at the time that the vow is paid off. +The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. The rest of the mishnah states that the day that someone reaches a certain age, thirty days, five years, twenty years or sixty years, is not yet counted with the older age. Thus a kid who just turns thirty days does not yet have any value (value begins at thirty days). A kid who just turned five, still counts as a kid between the age of thirty days and five years. +For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. The mishnah proves that the day of the birthday counts with the lower age by quoting the verse concerning the sixty year old. Since the Torah says that he is above sixty years, the implication is that one who is exactly sixty years still pays the higher amount of a person from 20-60. +Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? The mishnah now critiques its own midrash. Treating a sixty year old as still belonging to the younger category creates a stringency his value is 50 and not 15. But treating a 5 year old or a 20 year in the younger category creates a leniency since the younger ages have lower values. The mishnah says that just because we treat a sixty year old as being in the younger category does not mean that we would necessarily treat 5 and 20 year olds as being in the younger category. +Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. The mishnah now brings another midrash to defend the halakhah that we always treat a person on the day of the birthday as if he still belongs to the previous age category. This is done with a technique called a “gezerah shavah”. What this technique consists of is taking a law from one situation and applying it to another because the Torah uses the same word in both situations. In our case the word is “years” and it is used in connection to one who turns 60 and one who turns 5 and 20. Since it is used in both connections, the same halakhah applies to both. +Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year. Rabbi Elazar extends the halakhah even further. A person doesn’t enter the new category until he is one month and one day into that category. For instance, one who is 60 doesn’t go down in value to 15 shekels until he is 60, one month and one day. + +Chapter 5 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicates his weight to the Temple. +One who said: “I vow my weight,” he must pay his weight, in silver [if he had said in] silver, or in gold [if he had said in] gold. If one vows his weight to the Temple, he must fulfill this vow by paying his weight, either in gold or in silver, depending on how he made his vow. +It happened with the mother of Yirmatia, who said, “I vow my daughter's weight.” She went up to Jerusalem and weighed her and then paid her weight in gold. Now this is one of the best stories I’ve ever read in the Mishnah. I can just picture poor Yirmatia being absolutely mortified that her mother had the audacity to vow her weight to the Temple. And then, the poor girl has to get on the scale in front of all of those priests! I wonder if this was all a ruse by the mother to get her daughter on a diet. +[If a man said: “I vow] the weight of my hand,” Rabbi Judah says: let him fill a barrel with water and put it [his hand] in up to the elbow. Then let him weigh the flesh, bones and sinews of a donkey and put it into the barrel until it is filled up again. Rabbi Yose said: “But how is it possible to account exactly one kind of flesh against another kind of flesh, and one kind of bones against another kind of bones? Rather: one estimates what the hand is likely to weigh. This mishnah address the Archimedean problem of how to weigh one’s hand. Rabbi Judah employs a system of water displacement, and then comparison of the weight of one’s hand with the weight of a donkey’s bones, sinews and flesh. Rabbi Yose criticizes him for assuming that donkey flesh weighs the same as human flesh. It seems, according to Rabbi Yose, that live human flesh cannot be weighed. The best one can do is just estimate how much the hand weighs. It is unclear how exactly one would do this. + +Mishnah 2 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah continues to deal with cases where a person dedicates the value or worth of a body part. +[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In yesterday’s mishnah the vower dedicated the weight of his hand. In this section, he dedicates the “worth of his hand.” This is evaluated the same way that worth is always estimated by examining how much a person would be worth on the slave market. In this case, they first estimate his worth when complete (with his hand), and then how much he would be worth without his hand. +In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. Later in this mishnah we will learn that if one says, “The value of my hand is upon me,” he is not liable to pay anything. Therefore, in this aspect, vows of “worth” are more stringent than vows of “value” for when one vows the worth of his hand, he must pay its worth. +There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. As is typical of the mishnah, once we note that vows of worth are in one way more stringent than vows of value, the mishnah now notes that sometimes the opposite is true. +How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. If one vows his value and then dies, the heirs must pay his value. This is because his value is set by the Torah and is not dependent upon an evaluation. However, if he vows his worth and then dies before they can estimate his worth, his heir need not pay anything because a dead person has no worth. Note that the obligation to pay is only incurred when the estimate is made, and since he has no worth when the estimate is made, the heirs owe nothing. +[If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value. If one vows the value of his foot or hand he is not liable to pay anything because the foot and the hand are not synonymous with his life. Since one can only vow the “value” of his life, in this case he has not vowed anything. In contrast, if one vows the value of his head, he has dedicated his full value because one can’t live without a head. He will now have to pay his full value, dependent upon his gender and age. The general rule that ends this mishnah explains just that if one vows the value of an organ that one can’t live without, he is liable to pay his entire value. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction +This mishnah deals with someone who dedicates half of his worth or value. +[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. In this case, he pays half of his value, which is what he intended when he made his vow. +[But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. Here he phrased his vow slightly differently. Saying “the value of one half of me is upon me,” is like saying “the value of my head is upon me” because no one can live without half of his body. Therefore, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, he must pay his full value. +[If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. Similar to section one, in this case he pays only half of his worth. +[If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. Although one can estimate how much a slave missing a hand would be worth, there is no way to estimate how much a slave missing half his body would be worth, because he would be worth nothing. Therefore, the worth of half of his body is synonymous with the worth of his whole body and he must pay his entire worth. +This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth. This is a similar rule to that which we saw in mishnah two concerning vows of value. If someone vows the worth of a body part that he can’t live without, he must pay his entire worth. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah deals with a person who vows another person’s worth or value. +If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. When the vower dies, the heirs of the vower incur the obligation to pay his vow. Even though the subject of the vow died they can pay his value, because the value is fixed and is not dependent upon an evaluation. +[If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. Here the vower dedicated someone else’s worth, which does require an evaluation. If the vower dies before he pays off his debt, the heirs must pay his debt. But if the subject of the vow dies, then the heirs do not owe anything because a dead person has no worth. This is basically the same halakhah that we learned in mishnah two. + +Mishnah 5 + +Introduction +Since yesterday’s mishnah dealt with cases where a person dedicated the value of another person and then that person dies, today’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicated an animal or a house and then the animal dies or the house falls down. +[If someone said:] “This ox shall be an olah [a whole burnt offering],” or “This house shall be an olah,” and the ox died or the house fell down, he is not obligated to pay. In this case, the person dedicated a specific ox or house to the Temple. If the ox dies or the house falls down he is exempt, because his only liability was to give to the Temple “this ox” or “this house.” +[But if he said:] “This ox is upon me as an olah” or “this house is upon me as an olah” and the ox died, or the house fell down, he is obligated to pay [their worth]. Here since he said the words, “upon me,” he is obligated to pay the value of the ox even if it dies or the house even if it falls down. “Upon me” means that he is responsible for making sure that the value of the object gets to the Temple + +Mishnah 6 + +With regard to those who made a vow of value: they take a pledge from them.
With regard to those obligated to bring a hatat or asham: they do not take a pledge.
With regard to those obligated to bring an olah or a shelamim: they do take a pledge.
And even though he is not atoned for unless he is willing [to pay his obligation], as it is said: “willingly” (Leviticus 1:3), they coerce him until he says: I agree.
The same is true in the case of divorce documents: they coerce him until he says: I agree.
This famous mishnah deals with how a court enforces a person to pay various obligations.
Section one: If someone makes a vow of value (or worth) and is late in paying his debt, the court can take a pledge (an object of value) from him in order to force him to pay his debt.
Section two: However, if someone has transgressed and is obligated to bring either a hatat (sin offering) or an asham (guilt offering) and he is late in bringing it, the court does not take a pledge from him. The general rule is that if the obligated item comes to atone for a sin, the court does not take a pledge.
Section three: If the person vowed to bring an olah (a burnt offering) or a shelamim (an offering of well-being) the court does take a pledge, because these are not sacrifices that atone for sin.
Section four: This and especially the next section are famous because they deal in general with the ability of the court to enforce obligations. The Torah states that an olah must be brought willingly. If so, how can the court force him to bring an olah or shelamim? The answer is that they force him to say that he agrees. Even though he clearly does not want to bring the sacrifice, the fact that he verbalizes his desire to do so is sufficient. Similarly, when it comes to divorce, the court can force him to write out a divorce document. As we know from other sources, a man can only divorce his wife willingly, but we know that under many circumstances the court forces him to divorce his wife (see for instance Ketubot 7:10; see also Gittin 9:8). Again, how can something be enforced and yet still be done willingly on the part of the person being coerced? The answer is that the court forces him to say that he agrees to the divorce. And as we learn in Gittin, this enforcing can be done even through physical coercion.
The Rambam, in his commentary on this mishnah, notes that although it seems that when the person says, “I agree” he doesn’t really mean it, we attribute to him that he does have the correct intention because he is doing what he should have done of his own free will. According to the Rambam, it is as if his evil urge not to perform the correct act overcame him, and by force the court makes him do what his good side really wanted to do in the first place. We should recognize that this is a dangerous principle and could be broadly applied to many categories. However, the Mishnah does not turn this into a blanket rule, but rather only mentions it in reference to these two categories sacrifices and divorce. + +Chapter 6 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +Introduction +Chapter six deals with the consequences of dedicating one’s property to the Temple. How is the money collected? How does his dedication effect his other obligations? These and other questions are addressed in this mishnah and in the subsequent ones. +[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. Occasionally the court needs to sell orphans’ property in order to pay back their father’s debts. When they do so, they proclaim that the property is for sale for thirty days in order to get the best offer. +And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. When a person dedicates a piece of land to the Temple, the Temple treasury proclaims that the land is for sale for sixty days. This gives them twice as long to get the best offer. +They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. The proclamation is made twice a day morning and night. +If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. The man’s prior commitment to pay his wife’s ketubah means that if he divorces her, she can collect her ketubah money from the property that he has already dedicated to the Temple. This is not under discussion and indeed is obvious. The problem is that we fear that the man might divorce his wife, allow her to collect her ketubah and then remarry her. This would end up cheating the Temple out of the property that he dedicated to it. To avoid this problem, Rabbi Eliezer says that when he divorces her, he must take a vow never to receive benefit from her again. In this way, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Joshua seems not to be concerned that a man will go through this ruse in order to cheat the Temple out of its due and therefore he does not obligate the man to take such a vow. +Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel brings up another similar situation where we make a husband divorcing his wife take a vow not to derive benefit from her. If a man had a guarantor sign on his ketubah and then he divorced his wife, if the man cannot afford to pay, the guarantor must pay in the husband’s place. In this situation, we fear that the husband will divorce his wife and allow her to collect from the guarantor. Then he will remarry, thereby cheating the guarantor. To protect the guarantor, we make the husband vow that he will not derive any more benefit from his wife. + +Mishnah 2 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah continues to deal with the case of a husband who dedicates his property to the Temple while still owing his wife her ketubah money. +A man who dedicates his possessions to the sanctuary while he is still liable for his wife's kethubah or in debt to a creditor, the wife cannot collect her ketubah from the consecrated property nor the creditor his debt. Rather he who redeems them must redeem for the purpose of paying the wife her ketubah or the creditor his debt. As I stated in the explanation to yesterday’s mishnah, when a man dedicates his property to the Temple and has a prior debt to his wife or a creditor the wife and creditor must certainly receive their due. However, they do not simply collect from sanctified property, because sanctified property cannot become non-sacred without being redeemed. Rather, what needs to happen is that the person who redeems the property must pay more than the value of the debt or ketubah. Then the money for the debt or ketubah goes to the creditor or to the woman and the property becomes non-sacred. The extra money will go to the Sanctuary. +If he had dedicated ninety maneh, worth of property, and he owed one hundred maneh, then he [the creditor] must add one dinar more and he redeems the property for the purpose of paying the ketubah to the wife or the debt to the creditor. In this case, there is a problem because if the person redeeming the property gives the ketubah to the wife or the debt to the creditor, nothing will be left over for the Sanctuary. In a sense, the person is not redeeming the property but rather just purchasing it from the woman or creditor. To avoid this, the redeemer must pay an extra dinar, over the amount owed to the woman or to the creditor. In this way, the Sanctuary will receive at least some money. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction +This mishnah relates to mishnah 5:6, where we learned that the court take pledges (objects of value) in order to force a person to pay his vows of value. +Today we learn that certain items are not taken by the collector. +Even though they said: they take pledges from those who owe vows of value, they allow him food for thirty days, clothing for twelve months, bed and bedding, shoes and tefillin. For himself, but not for his wife and children. When they take the pledge from the person who owes his vow to the Temple, they leave him with certain basic needs, food, clothing and tefillin. However, they don’t leave him with money to support his wife and family. Evidently, those who depend upon him will have to look elsewhere for support. Note that this does not mean that they take his wife’s property. It just means that they don’t leave him with money to buy food for her or his children. +If he was a craftsman, they leave him two tools of every kind. If he was a carpenter, they leave him two axes and two saws. If he is a craftsman, he is left with two kinds of each of his tools. This way he can continue to make a living to pay off his debt. An example is a carpenter, who is left with two axes and two saws. +Rabbi Eliezer says: if he was a farmer, they leave him his yoke [of oxen]. If a donkey driver, they leave him his donkey. Rabbi Eliezer adds that if he is a farmer they leave him with a pair of oxen to pull his plow. And if he is a donkey driver, they leave him his donkey. These are considered the tools of the donkey driver or farmer’s trade, just as an ax or saw is the tool of a carpenter’s trade. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s, which discussed what property the court seizes when taking a pledge from one who owes the Temple money for his vow. +If he had many [tools] of one kind, and few of another kind, they may not say to him to sell the many and buy some of the few, but one leaves him two of the kind of which he has many and all that he has from those of which he has few. If he only has one of a certain type of tool, but many of another, he doesn’t get the opportunity to sell some tools in order to buy a second tool of the kind of which he has only one. Rather, they just apply the rule as it is normally applied they leave him with two of every kind, and if only has one, too bad for him. +One who consecrates [all] his possessions to the Sanctuary, they count his tefillin in the evaluation. Tefillin count in assessing the value of one’s property. So if one dedicates the value of his property to the Temple, he must include in the assessment the value of his tefillin. [This brings back memories of the day my wife and I bought our first apartment. I remember taking out the mortgage and buying the house and then realizing that before that moment, the most valuable item I owned were my tefillin!] + +Mishnah 5 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah continues to deal with how the Temple assesses a person’s belongings if they have dedicated all of their property to the Temple. +Whether one consecrates his property or evaluates himself, it [the Sanctuary] has no claim to his wife's garment or his children's garment or to the dyed clothes which he had dyed for their use or to the new sandals which he has bought for their use. When a person dedicates all of his property to the Temple, the Temple can make claim only to property that is his they have no share in his family’s property. Even if he bought clothes for his wife or kids, they belong them and not to him. The mishnah goes even further. If the husband has clothes dyed in order to give them to his wife and kids, they already belong to them, even if they have not yet worn them. Similarly, if he buys new sandals for them, they do not belong to the husband, even if the wife and kids have not yet worn them. The mere intent that these items should belong to his family already takes them out of his property. +Although they said: “Slaves are sold with their garments to increase their value,” because when a garment for thirty denars is bought for him his value is increased by a maneh. And likewise with a cow, if it is kept waiting to the market-day it increases in value, and similarly a pearl, if brought to a big city increases in value. Nevertheless, the Sanctuary can only claim the value of anything in its own place and at its own time. The main point of this section is that when the Temple’s treasurer estimates the value of a person’s property, he estimates how much it is worth now, and not how much it might be worth in the future. There are three examples in which an owner could easily raise the value of his property. A slave dressed in fine clothing, worth 30 denars, will see his value in the market value go up 100 denar (a maneh) [this is similar to painting your house or fixing your car before you sell it the house increases in value more than the cost of the paintjob]. Similarly, a cow and a pearl that are given time to grow can have their market value greatly increase. In sum, slaves, animals and precious stones can have a large degree of variance in their value. Nevertheless, when the Temple collects from the person who dedicated his property, they assess its worth based on its current value. + +Chapter 7 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +Introduction +Chapter seven and the beginning of chapter eight deal with the laws concerning a person who dedicates his ancestral field to the Temple. These laws are found in Leviticus 27. +16 If anyone consecrates to the Lord any land that he holds, its assessment shall be in accordance with its seed requirement: fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed. 17 If he consecrates his land as of the jubilee year, its assessment stands. 18 But if he consecrates his land after the jubilee, the priest shall compute the price according to the years that are left until the jubilee year, and its assessment shall be so reduced; 19 and if he who consecrated the land wishes to redeem it, he must add one-fifth to the sum at which it was assessed, and it shall pass to him. 20 But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: 21 when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding. +We should note that from the Second Temple period and onward these laws would have been completely theoretical Jews no longer lived on land that they “held,” meaning land that was part of their ancestral possession. However, these laws are found in the Torah and therefore they are of interest to the rabbis. +One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. Vs. 18 states, “But if he consecrates his land after the jubilee, the priest shall compute the price according to the years that are left until the jubilee year, and its assessment shall be so reduced.” I have emboldened the word “years” because the halakhah in this mishnah is based on a midrash on that word. “Years” implies that there must be at least two years remaining before the Jubilee. If there are fewer, he cannot consecrate his land. If one has dedicated his land and then wishes to redeem it and it is still the first year of the Jubilee, he must pay the full amount, “fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed” (fifty shekels for every piece of land that requires a homer of barley to sow it). He doesn’t get to reduce the amount because of the months that have passed since the Jubilee. +One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. The mishnah now notes a general rule with regard to taking months into account. As we already learned, when a person redeems his land, he doesn’t take into account the months that have already passed. Rather he pays according to the full years that have passed since the Jubilee. However, the Sanctuary does benefit from the months that the land has already stayed in the hands of the dedicator. They benefit because he has to pay for them. [Note that this rule is somewhat repetitive]. +If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. This states the basic law as found in verse sixteen. Another version of the mishnah reads not “in the time of the Jubilee” but “during the year of the Jubilee.” The Hebrew of these two versions is nearly identical. This would then be an interpretation of verse 16 the verse applies to a person who dedicated his land during the year of the Jubilee. If after the Jubilee, the payment is reduced. +If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. Ravines and rocks don’t count in measuring the size of the field as long as they are ten handbreadths high or deep. This is because they are considered to be their own domain and not part of the field. However, if they are less than ten high or deep, they are assessed with the field. +If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. Who’s ready for some math? The full price of the field is 50 sela (shekels) for 49 years between one Jubilee and the next. A pondion is worth 1/48 of a sela, so the price per year is one sela and 48/49 of a pondion. The mishnah rounds up in favor of the Temple he pays a full pondion per year. +If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together. The payment made for redeeming the field must be done in full immediately, even though the field is only worth one sela and one pondion per year. + +Mishnah 2 + +It is all the same whether the owner or anyone else [redeems the field].
What is the difference between the owner and any other man? The owner must add one fifth, whereas any other man need not add one fifth.
The reckoning of the value of the field is basically the same whether the owner or another person redeems it. The only difference is that the owner adds another fifth to the value of the field. This is stated in Leviticus 27:19: “And if he who consecrated the land wishes to redeem it, he must add one-fifth to the sum at which it was assessed, and it shall pass to him.” The mishnah reads the words “and if he who consecrated the land” to mean that only if the owner consecrates it must he add another fifth. If others do, there is no added fifth. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah deals with the continuation of the verses about dedicating one’s “and of possession.” These verses read: 20“But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: 21 when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.” +As we can see, if the owner does not redeem the land, then the land becomes the property of the priests. +If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If the owner redeems it himself, it reverts to being his possession, and stays that way even after the Jubilee. +If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. Similarly, if his son redeems it, it goes back to the father, because the son is the eventual inheritor of the land. +If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. However, if other people, and even other relatives redeem the land, it is theirs only temporarily until the Jubilee at which point it becomes the property of the priests, as is stated in the final verse. +If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests. If one of the priests redeemed the land before the Jubilee, he is treated just like any other person. It is his until the Jubilee and then it becomes the possession of all the priests. He cannot claim that since he is a priest, at the Jubilee it should become his sole possession. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +The rabbis now debate what happens to the land if it is not redeemed before the Jubilee. This is explained in verses 20-21, “But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.” +If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. According to Rabbi Judah, while the priests do get the rights to the land, they must pay for the Temple for the land. It seems that he holds that when a person dedicates his field to the Temple, the Temple must receive compensation. It is not sufficient for the priests to take over. +Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. According to Rabbi Shimon, the priests do not need to pay for the land. It becomes “holy” by virtue of it becoming their possession. +Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it. Verses 20-21 state that “if the land is sold…it becomes the priest’s holding.” The implication is that if the land is never sold to another person, it does not become the property of the priest. This is Rabbi Eliezer’s position. The land can remain abandoned through several Jubilees and not become the possession of the priests until someone buys the land and then the next Jubilee year arrives. + +Mishnah 5 + +If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. A field that is not a “field of possession” reverts to its original owner during the Jubilee, as is stated in Leviticus 27:22-24. When a son buys a field from his father, it is questionable whether that field is considered a “field of possession” because it might eventually become his possession, or whether we treat this as a field that was purchased. If the father dies and then the son consecrates the field, it is considered a field of possession because even if the son had not bought the field, it would have become his (or at least partly his) before he consecrated it. +If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. However, if he consecrated it before his father died, there is a debate as to the status of the field. According to Rabbi Meir it is considered a field acquired by purchase. If he redeems it, he need not add an extra fifth, as is the rule with a field of possession. And if he doesn’t redeem it, during the Jubilee it reverts to its original owners. Rabbis Shimon and Judah disagree and derive through a midrash that any field that could become one’s through inheritance cannot be put into the category of a purchased field. Therefore, even if he dedicates the field purchased from his father before his father dies, it still retains the status of a “field of possession.” If he redeems it he will need to add an extra fifth, and if he doesn’t redeem it, it will become the possession of the priests during the Jubilee year. +A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. A field that is purchased does not really belong to the purchaser because the field will eventually revert to the original owner’s possession during the following Jubilee. Therefore, it never becomes the possession of the priests. The purchaser cannot truly consecrate it because it was never his. +Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee. There are special laws concerning a priest or Levite who dedicates his field. They may dedicate their field even within two years of the Jubilee (compare with mishnah one) and they can redeem their own field even after the Jubilee. This is different from an Israelite who can never redeem his field after the Jubilee. + +Chapter 8 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +Introduction +Our mishnah begins to deal with the laws of consecrating one’s inherited field at a time when the Jubilee was no longer observed. The mishnah describes a time when the Temple is still standing, meaning that the law of the Jubilee was not observed during the Second Temple period. +If one consecrated his field at a time when the [law of the] Jubilee was no longer observed, they say to him: “You open [the bidding]!” because the owner must pay an added fifth, whereas others do not pay an additional fifth. When the Jubilee was no longer observed, a consecrated field was redeemed through an auction. The first bidder was always the original owner and if he did not want to redeem the Temple officials would force him to make at least a minimum bid. The preference for redeeming the field goes to the owner because when he redeems the field he adds an extra fifth. In contrast, when the Jubilee year was still observed, they didn’t force the owner to redeem his field because an unredeemed field eventually would belong to the priests. +It happened that one consecrated his field because it was bad. They said to him: “You open the bidding.” He said: “I will acquire it for an issar.” Rabbi Yose said: he did say that, but rather “for an egg,” because consecrated objects may be redeemed by either money or money's equivalent. He [the Temple treasurer] said to him: It’s yours. It turns out he lost an issar and the field was his again. In this somewhat amusing story, an owner of a field consecrates a field because due to its poor quality. They then force him to at least put forth a bid. His bid is extremely low, an issar, which is 1/24 of a dinar. Rabbi Yose says that he offered an egg for the field, an object probably worth about an issar, if not more. In any case, with this tiny bid, he has acquired his field. He loses the issar to the Temple, but the field is restored to his possession. + +Mishnah 2 + +If one said: I will acquire it for ten selas, and another, [for] twenty, and another for thirty, and another for forty, and another for fifty, If he [that bid] fifty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] forty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] thirty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid twenty reneged they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid ten reneged they sell [the field] for what it is worth, and collect what remains from him who bid ten.
In this imaginative scenario there is initially a bidding war for the field, each person upping the previous bid by ten selas. Finally, the bid is won by the person who bid 50 selas. Then all of the bidders begin to renege. The mishnah delineates how the Temple deals with this situation. Note—the idea is that the Temple should collect the highest bid, but that all of those who bid should have to pay something. Basically the Temple takes a pledge from each person equivalent to the amount that he upped the previous bid ten selas. When they get to the last person, they simply sell the field and then take from him the difference between ten and the sale price. In this way, the Temple collects fifty selas, but no more than fifty selas. +If the owner bid twenty and any other man bid twenty, then the owner comes first, because he must add one fifth.
If the owner and another person put forth the same bid, the owner's bid is accepted because he must add an extra fifth. In this way the Temple maximizes its profits. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction
This mishnah deals with a case where the owner of the field is slightly outbid by another. The complicating factor is that the owner has to add an extra fifth, thereby increasing the profit gained by the Temple. Sometimes, a lower bid by the owner is actually better for the Temple than a higher bid by others.
The added fifth in rabbinic law is calculated by being a fifth of the final amount. Thus an added fifth of twenty is five, because 1/5 of 25 is five. If I remember my algebra the equation for this would be: x=(y+x)/5, where x is the added fifth and y is the original bid. This is called in rabbinic terminology, an outside fifth. +If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more.
In all of these cases the owner bid twenty. If the other person bid 21, then the owner's bid of 20 will end up more profitable for the Temple, because it is actually 25. He must pay 26 because we can't allow the principal that he pays to be less than that of the other bidder. So of the 26 he pays, 21 is considered principal and 5 is the extra fifth. Note that the owner is forced to pay the extra sela, even though his original bid would have caused him to pay only 25. The same is true in cases where others bid 22-25—the owners add the fifth to their bid, taking them to 25, and then they add the number that by which the other's bid was greater than theirs.
The final line of this section explains that the owners don’t have to pay an added fifth for the extra amount that they pay to surpass the other's bid. In other words, their principal, upon which they pay the added fifth, remains 20. This is because the other bid did not surpass their bid and the added fifth. +If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
In this case, the other bid was higher than the owner's bid and the added fifth taken together. In order to beat the other bid the owner will need to pay thirty-one selas and one denar. This consists of the original twenty five of their own bid (20 +5). Then they need to pay an extra six selas to add up to the twenty-six the other guy bid. For the extra sela which they were outbid they need to pay an added fifth, because in this case the extra amount bid was higher than his bid. This added fifth is one denar, because a sela is four denars. So it turns out that the owner pays 31 selas and one denar.
In this case the owner has the option to not pay the higher amount and allow the field to go to the other bidder. + +Mishnah 4 + +Introduction +The remainder of chapter eight deals with Leviticus 27:28: “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding, nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed; every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” From this verse we see that a person can devote part of his property to God. The word for “proscribed” is “herem.” According to the Torah, when a person “proscribes” any of his property to God it cannot be sold or redeemed. Rather it permanently becomes the property of the priests (see below in mishnah six). +A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. A person can proscribe some of a certain type of possession. For instance, he can proscribe some of his flock, herd or slaves. But he cannot proscribe all of them, and if he tries to do so, they are not considered to be sacred. This halakhah may come from a midrash on the words “of all that anyone owns” and not “all that anyone owns.” The implication is that one cannot proscribe all of his property and not even all of any one type of property. +Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah learns a moral lesson from the previous halakhah. One is not allowed to dedicate all of a certain type of property to the Temple, because that would be too great of a loss to his estate. The Torah prevents a person from acting so rashly when it comes to his own property even though the designee of this proscription is God what could be better than that! From here we can draw the lesson that people should be careful not to lose their property, a lesson that we might heartily agree with, even after two thousand years. Indeed, to this day, when a person gives a large percentage of his property to charity, he is praised, but if he gives all of it away, leaving himself with nothing to live on, he is probably considered foolish. + +Mishnah 5 + +If one proscribes his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or female slave, or the field which he acquired by purchase, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, for one can proscribe something that does not belong to him. One can proscribe only things that belong to him as permanent possessions. This is stated quite clearly in Leviticus 27:28, “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding.” Thus one cannot proscribe his children, his Hebrew slaves (whom he does not own) or land which he acquired through purchase. Such land will revert to its original owners when the Jubilee year comes, so it doesn’t really belong to its current owner. +Priests and Levites cannot proscribe [their belongings], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: the priests cannot proscribe, because things proscribed belong to them. But Levites can proscribe, because things proscribed do not belong to them. As we stated in the introduction, when someone proscribes (he uses the language, herem) his property, he is giving it to the priests. Therefore, if priests proscribe their property, nothing happens to it. According to Rabbi Judah, Levites too cannot proscribe their property. Rabbi Shimon holds that while priests cannot proscribe, Levites can, because the property they proscribe does not become theirs, but rather the priets. +Rabbi says: the words of Rabbi Judah seem acceptable in cases of immovable property as it is said: “For that is their perpetual possession,” (Leviticus 25:34) and the words of Rabbi Shimon seem acceptable in cases of movable property, since things proscribed do not fall to them. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] functions in this mishnah as a halakhic decisor in the debate between Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon concerning whether Levites can proscribe their property. Rabbi agrees that when it comes to immovable property, i.e. land, a Levite cannot proscribe his property. This is because states that the land that the Levites own is their “perpetual possession.” If they were allowed to proscribe their land, they could lose it. Therefore, they cannot proscribe any of their land. However, when it comes to movable property (animals, possessions, etc.) they can proscribe it, as Rabbi Shimon stated. This is because they don’t have the complication that priests have that the proscribed property would become theirs. + +Mishnah 6 + +Introduction +In today’s mishnah the sages and Rabbi Judah ben Batera disagree as to whether things that are proscribed without specification go to the priests or to a fund for Temple repairs. We should note that the first says, “every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” The meaning of “to the Lord” is disputed in our mishnah. +Things proscribed for [the use of] the priests cannot be redeemed but are to be given to the priests. That things proscribed cannot be redeemed is stated explicitly in the Torah, “nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed.” According to this opinion, the proscribed things become the property of the priests. The source of this can be found in section three below. +Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: things proscribed without specification fall to [the fund for] Temple repairs, as it was said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:25). Rabbi Judah ben Batera and the sages argue over whether things that are proscribed without specification, meaning the person did not state where he wanted the things to go, are given to the fund for Temple repair or to the priests. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, they are given to Temple repair. This is the meaning of “most holy to the Lord.” +But the sages say: things proscribed without specification go to the priests, as it is said: “As a field proscribed: its possession belongs to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why is it said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord”? This teaches that it applies to most holy and less holy things. The other sages point out that Leviticus 27:21 (and Numbers 18:14) clearly state that proscribed things belong to the priests. This then causes them to ask why the Torah says, “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord.” They interpret this verse as if it says, “Every proscribed thing, even a most holy thing, is holy to the Lord.” The next mishnah will discuss this halakhah. + +Mishnah 7 + +A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things.
If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him.
[If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer].
A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister.
Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
Today’s mishnah explains how one proscribes something that is already holy.
Section one: As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, a person can proscribe his most holy things (such as an olah a whole burnt offering) or his less holy things (such as a shelamim a wellbeing offering). Our mishnah describes what happens when he does after all, if something is already sanctified, how can he proscribe it either to the priests or for the upkeep of the Temple?
Section two: There are two ways of consecrating something: 1) as a vow; 2) as a freewill offering. Consecrating something as a vow means that he said, “I vow to bring an olah or a shelamim.” Then he sets aside an animal to be the olah or shelamim (a burnt offering and an offering of wellbeing). In this case, if something should happen to the animal he would have to bring another in its stead in order to fulfill his vow. He then proscribes this animal. In this case, since he was responsible for the animal, he can proscribe its entire value. This value must be given either to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section three: The other way of consecrating something is by saying, “This animal will be an olah or a shelamim.” In this case, if something should happen to the animal, he is not responsible to bring another in its stead. Thus the animal was not worth to him its full value (as it was in the previous case) because if it gets lost or dies, he need not bring another. We now have to evaluate how much it was worth to him. There are two ways of understanding how this is done. The first is that we evaluate how much a person would pay to offer an olah when he is not obligated to do so. A person might feel some pleasure from bringing a sacrifice and we could even give a monetary amount to this benefit. This is the amount that he would have to pay to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
The other interpretation of this section is that we find how much a priest who is not currently on his watch at the Temple would pay a person to wait until his watch to bring his olah so that he could have the benefit of offering it up. This amount of money is what the person who proscribed the animal would be obligated to give to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section four: A person can proscribe a first born animal, whether it is blemished (and edible to its owner) or unblemished (and must be given to the priest). The mishnah now explains how we evaluate how much the one who proscribed the first-born owes in a case where he was obligated to give it to a priest (an unblemished animal.) This animal cannot be given to a priest in return for money. But he could give it to his daughter’s son, if his daughter married a priest or to his nephew if his sister married a priest. We estimate how much a person would pay to give such a gift to his nephew or grandson and that is the amount he owes.
Rabbi Ishmael now provides a midrash to prove that one can dedicate a first born so that its value goes to the Temple or to the priests but one cannot dedicate a first-born for it to become a sacrifice. He points out that in reference to the first born one verse says, “you shall dedicate” and another verse says, “you shall not consecrate.” These two verses seemingly disagree with one another. He resolves them by having them refer to our situation you can dedicate the first born so that its value goes to the priests, but you cannot dedicate a first born so that it is put onto the altar as a different type of sacrifice. + +Chapter 9 + + + +Mishnah 1 + +Introduction +Our mishnah deals with the laws of selling one’s ancestral land to another person when the Jubilee was still observed. Concerning this law, Leviticus 25 states: +13In this year of Jubilee, each of you shall return to his holding. 14 When you sell property to your neighbor, or buy any from your neighbor, you shall not wrong one another. 15 In buying from your neighbor, you shall deduct only for the number of years since the Jubilee; and in selling to you, he shall charge you only for the remaining crop years: 16 the more such years, the higher the price you pay; the fewer such years, the lower the price; for what he is selling you is a number of harvests. 17 Do not wrong one another, but fear your God; for I the Lord am your God. +If one sold his field [of possession] at the time when the Jubilee was in force, he may not redeem it for two years, as it says: “According to the number of the years of the crops he shall sell to you” (Leviticus 25:15). When one sells his ancestral land he can redeem it until the following Jubilee (Leviticus 25:10). In essence, what he is actually selling is the right to use the land until the owner redeems it, or until the Jubilee comes. Since the Torah uses the word “years” when referring to selling or buying ancestral land, the rabbis deduce that no sale can be for less than two years. +If there was a year of blight or mildew, or a seventh year, it is not included in the count. If there was a year in which the purchaser could not plant, either because it was the seventh year or because of bad weather or blight, that year does not count towards the two. +If he only broke the ground [without planting] or left it fallow [for a year], that year is included in the count. However, if the purchaser decided of his own volition not to plant during a one of the first two years of his acquisition, that year counts towards the two year minimum. +Rabbi Elazar says: if he sold it to him before Rosh Hashanah year, and it was still full of fruit, he enjoys three crops in two years. Rabbi Elazar points out that sometimes a person can get a “three for two” deal. If he buys a piece of land right before Rosh Hashanah and it is full of produce, he can harvest that produce and then he still gets a full two years to work and harvest the land. He only pays for two years, so he is getting one harvest for free. It seems that when we reckon the years we don’t begin from the point of purchase but rather from Rosh Hashanah. + +Mishnah 2 + +Introduction +Today’s mishnah continues to deal with how one redeems one’s ancestral field. +If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). In this case, the person who wishes to redeem his field must reckon only with the person to whom he sold the field, and not with the person who bought from him. The way this is done is by first dividing the price of the field according to the number of years between the purchase and the next Jubilee. Let’s say he bought the field for 100 denars and there were ten years until the next Jubilee. When the owner comes to redeem his field he will pay ten denars for every year left. Then, the purchaser will have to restore the remainder of the money to the one who bought it from him, according to the value to which he sold it to him. So if the field was redeemed in the fifth year, the redeemer will give fifty to the first buyer, and the first buyer will have to give another 100 to the second buyer, who paid 20 denars a year for the field. +If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” ( the man in possession of the field. If the first buyer sold it to the second buyer for a lesser amount of money, the original owner need reckon the redemption price only with the second buyer. The mishnah’s midrash takes the word “the man” from the same verse as above, and isolates it, as if it means, “sometimes the original owner reckons with the first buyer and sometimes with the second buyer.” The halakhah ends up being lenient in both cases on the original owner, a person who grew so poor he had to sell his ancestral holdings. The lesson learned here is that the Torah wants the original owner to be able to acquire his ancestral land back, and therefore will make the law as lenient as possible to achieve such a goal. +One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. There are, however, certain restrictions when it comes to redeeming the ancestral land that he sold. One cannot sell some ancestral property in order to redeem other property, even if the property he wants to redeem is closer to his current residence, or the property he wants to redeem is of better quality than the property he wants to sell. One cannot borrow money in order to redeem his land. This may be a measure meant to prevent a poor person from going into even greater debt. Finally, one cannot redeem half of the property it’s either the whole thing or none. +But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things. These limitations do not apply to redeeming land dedicated to the Temple. In such a case, we allow him to borrow in order to redeem the land, or redeem it piece by piece. It seems that there is a desire to make it a bit easier for the Temple to receive the money for the dedicated land. The mishnah concludes by noting that in this respect, the laws concerning redeeming land from another person are more stringent than those governing redeeming land from the Temple. This is indeed an oddity, because usually the laws regarding holy things are more stringent. + +Mishnah 3 + +Introduction +Our mishnah and the remainder of the chapter deal with Leviticus 25:29-35, the verses that talk about a person selling a home within a walled city. The seller has one year to redeem his home, and if he does not redeem it, it becomes the property of the purchaser. +If one sold a house among the houses of a walled city, he may redeem it at once and at any time during twelve months. When it comes to redeeming a house sold in a walled city, the seller may redeem it immediately. There is no waiting period as there is for inherited fields. +This is a kind of interest, yet it is not interest. Selling a house in order to redeem it looks like interest, which is prohibited, but it is not interest. If Reuven sells his house to Shimon and it stays with Shimon for a period of months and then Reuven buys it back, it looks like Shimon has loaned Reuven the money in return for use of the house. If this was actually a case of lending money, the deal would have been prohibited. It is allowed because this is actually a sale and not a loan. +If the seller died, his son may redeem it. If the purchaser died, it may be redeemed from his son. If the seller dies, his son has the right to redeem the house. Similarly, if the purchaser dies, the seller may redeem it from his son. +One counts the year only from the time that he sold it, as it is said, “Before a full year has elapsed” (Leviticus 25:30). The year in which he has to redeem it is reckoned according to the date that the original owner sold the field. This is true even if his son is redeeming it, after he inherited the right to do so from his father. No matter the case, the field can be redeemed for only one year from the point of the original sale. +When it says a “a full” [year] the extra month is included. Rabbi says: he is allowed a year and its extra month. During a leap year, the seller has an extra month to redeem his field. Rabbi holds that a person is allowed a full lunar year, plus the extra eleven days separating a lunar year from a solar year. This is true regardless of whether the year was a leap year or not. One always gets a solar year in which to redeem the house. This is interesting because we are used to saying that the Jewish calendar is based on the moon. While this is true with regard to the months, it seems to be less true with regard to the year. When it comes to the year, we have a mix between a lunar calendar and a solar calendar. + +Mishnah 4 + +If the [last] day of the twelve months has arrived and it was not redeemed, it becomes his permanent [possession].
This applies whether he bought it or received it as a gift, as it is said: “beyond reclaim” (Leviticus 25:30).
In earlier times, he [the buyer] would hide on the last day of the twelve months, so that [the house] might become his permanent [possession].
Hillel enacted that he [the seller] could deposit his money in the chamber and break down the door and enter, and that the other [the buyer], whenever he wanted, might come and take his money.
Section one: If the last day of the twelve months passes and the owner doesn’t redeem his property, the house becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser. The house doesn’t go back to its original owner during the Jubilee year.
Section two: Leviticus 25:30 reads, “If it is not redeemed before a full year has elapsed, the house in the walled city shall pass to the purchaser beyond reclaim throughout the ages.” The words “beyond reclaim” and “throughout the ages” seem to be redundant. The rabbis use this redundancy as a source from which to conclude that the same laws that apply to selling the land also apply to giving it away. One who gives his house to another can redeem it, although all he must do is claim it in return.
Section three: Before Hillel, the seller would have to actually find the purchaser in order to redeem his house. It seems that they would quite frequently they would wait until the last possible day to redeem the house. This led to the purchaser hiding from the seller so the latter couldn’t reclaim possession of his house. In order to fix this problem, and to allow the sellers, who were assumedly poor and in desperate need of money, to reclaim their homes, Hillel allowed them to deposit their money in the chamber of the treasury in the Temple. Then he could go back to his house, break down the door and enter legally. The purchaser could come and collect his money from the Temple whenever he wanted.
We should note that there are other “takkanot” (rabbinic enactments) that are ascribed to Hillel in which we find Hillel shaping the halakhah to improve the lot of the poor. The most famous of them is the “prozbul” which allowed a creditor to collect his debt after the sabbatical year. There too Hillel acted to protect the poor, for if creditors could not be assured of their ability to collect their loans, they would never lend to the poor in the first place. + +Mishnah 5 + +Whatever is within the [city] wall is regarded as the houses in a walled city, with the exception of fields. Rabbi Meir says: even fields.
Anything inside the walled city is governed by the laws regarding houses in the walled city. The first opinion holds that fields are the exception. The implication would be that can be redeemed, if sold, up until the Jubilee year. Rabbi Meir says that even fields within the city must be redeemed within a year, or they become the permanent property of the buyer. + A house built into the wall: Rabbi Judah says: it is not considered a house within a walled city. Rabbi Shimon says: its outer wall is regarded as its [city] wall.
In thickly walled cities, houses were often built right into the walls. We see this in the Tanakh in connection with Jericho. According to Rabbi Judah these houses are not considered to be within the walled city. Rather they are like houses in a courtyard, a topic which mishnah seven will discuss.
Rabbi Shimon says that the outside wall of the house counts as the wall of the city and therefore these houses are considered part of the city. + +Mishnah 6 + +Introduction
Houses in cities that are not surrounded by walls are not treated in the same way as house in walled cities. These are called “houses in courtyards” and we will the halakhot which govern them tomorrow. Our mishnah discusses what cities count as being walled. +A city whose roofs [look as if] they form its wall,
If the city does not really have a wall, but its houses are so close together that they look like a wall, it still does not count as a walled city. +Or that was not encompassed by a wall in the days of Joshua ben Nun, is not considered like houses in a walled city.
In order for a city to count as a walled city it has to have had a wall around it in the time of Joshua. In other words, the status of walled or not walled is determined by the status of the city when the land was first conquered and then divided up to the original tribes. This is probably because these laws refer to ancestral inheritance, and ancestral inheritance begins at the time of Joshua. +[A house in any of] the following counts a house in a walled city: [those in a city] of no less than three courtyards, having two houses each, which have been encompassed by a wall in the days of Joshua ben Nun, such as the old acroplis of Tzippori, the fort of Gush-Halav, old Yodfat, Gamla, G'dod, Hadid, Ono, Jerusalem and other similar cities.
In order to count as a walled city the city must fulfill two main conditions:
1) Firstly, it must be large enough to be considered a city. The mishnah requires the city to have at least three courtyards, each with two houses.
2) Second, the city has to have been surrounded by walls at the time of Joshua. There are eight such cities listed here. Tzippori and Yodfat are in the Lower Galilee, and Gush-Halav and Gamla are in the Upper Galilee. G’dod (or in other versions, G’dor) is on the other side of the Jordan and Hadid and Ono are in Judea, near Lod. Jerusalem, I am assuming, is familiar to everyone. + +Mishnah 7 + +Introduction
Leviticus 25:31 reads, "But houses in courtyards that have no surrounding walls shall be classed as open country: they may be redeemed, and they shall be released through the Jubilee."
Our mishnah discusses how we treat houses in walled cities. +Houses in courtyards - we accord to them the advantages of houses in a walled city and the advantages given to fields:
When an owner sells a house found in a courtyard (and not in a walled city) he has a much easier time redeeming it. It has all of the advantages that a house in a walled city has over a field and all of the advantages that a field has over a house in a walled city. +They can be redeemed at once, and at any time within the twelve months like houses [in a walled city], and they return [to the owners] in the Jubilee or [at an earlier time] by [payment of a] reduced price like fields.
It has the advantages of a house in a walled city in that it can be redeemed immediately and throughout the twelve months that he has to buy it back. This is different from fields which can be redeemed only after they are with the purchaser for at least two years.
There are two advantages that these houses have for the seller over houses in walled cities. First, they revert to their owner at the Jubilee. Second, when the seller buys the house back, he reduces the money for the amount of time that the house was in the hands of the purchaser, as is the case with fields but not with houses in a walled city. +The following are considered houses in courtyards: [a city which has] two courtyards, each having two houses, even though they have been encompassed by a wall since the days of Joshua ben Nun, they count as houses in courtyards.
This section is the opposite of the last section of yesterday’s mishnah. If the house was in a place too small to be considered a city, or in a walled city that was not surrounded by walls then it counts as a house in a courtyard, and not a house in a walled city. + +Mishnah 8 + +Introduction +Houses owned by Levites in the cities that were allotted to them have rules that differ from those that apply to houses owned by Israelites. This is states in Leviticus 25:32-33: +32 As for the cities of the Levites, the houses in the cities they hold the Levites shall forever have the right of redemption. 33 Such property as may be redeemed from the Levites houses sold in a city they hold shall be released through the jubilee; for the houses in the cities of the Levites are their holding among the Israelites. +The second half of the mishnah deals with the status of the lands that surround the Levites cities. This issue is dealt with in Numbers 35: 1-5: +1 The Lord spoke to Moses in the steppes of Moab at the Jordan near Jericho, saying: 2 Instruct the Israelite people to assign, out of the holdings apportioned to them, towns for the Levites to dwell in; you shall also assign to the Levites pasture land around their towns. 3 The towns shall be theirs to dwell in, and the pasture shall be for the cattle they own and all their other beasts. 4 The town pasture that you are to assign to the Levites shall extend a thousand cubits outside the town wall all around. 5 You shall measure off two thousand cubits outside the town on the east side, two thousand on the south side, two thousand on the west side, and two thousand on the north side, with the town in the center. That shall be the pasture for their towns. +If an Israelite inherited from his mother's father who was a Levite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here. Also if a Levite inherited from his mother's father who was an Israelite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here, As it says, “As for the houses of the cities of the Levites” (Leviticus 25:32) [this order does not apply] unless he is a Levite and in the cities of the Levites, the words of Rabbi. We can see from Leviticus 25:32-33 that Levites always retain the right to redeem their houses, and if they don’t redeem them, they are released in the Jubilee year. According to Rabbi, the rules in these verses apply only to Levites that have sold ancestral Levitical lands. So if an Israelite inherits Levitical land from his Levite maternal grandfather, he is treated like an Israelite. Similarly, if a Levite inherits land from his Israelite maternal grandfather, the land is not considered to be the land of the Levites. +The sages say: these things apply to the cities of the Levites. According to the sages, these rules apply to all Levitical land, even if it is owned by an Israelite. They agree, however, that Israelite land inherited by a Levite is treated like Israelite land. The rules depend on the land, not on the person. +One may not turn a field into pasture land, nor pasture land into a field, nor pasture land into a city, nor a city into pasture land. In the passage from Numbers that I quoted above, there seems to be a significant discrepancy between verse four, which says “one thousand cubits” and verse five, which says, “two thousand cubits.” In Sotah 5:3, Rabbi Eliezer, the son of Rabbi Yose Hagalili says that one thousand cubits refers to pasture land, land which is not used for planting or for houses, and the two thousand cubits beyond that refers to fields for planting crops. Our mishnah teaches that when it comes to the cities of the Levites, one may not turn pasture land into a field or vice versa, and similarly one may not turn the pasture land into a city by enlarging the city. The status of these lands is given by the Torah and it does not change. +Rabbi Elazar said: When is this so? When it comes to the cities of the Levites, but when it comes to cities of Israelites one may turn a field into pasture land, pasture land into a field, pasture land into a city, but not a city into pasture land, in order that they should not destroy the cities of Israel. Rabbi Eliezer says that these rules work differently when it comes to Israelite cities. One may turn a field into pasture and pasture into a field (this is according to one reading of the mishnah other readings state that one may not turn pasture into field). One can also turn pasture land into a city. The one thing that cannot be done is to destroy parts of the city in order to turn them into pasture land. The mishnah prohibits this in order not to destroy the cities of Israel. +Priests and Levites may sell [a house] at any time and redeem it at any time, as it is said: “The Levites shall forever have the right of redemption” (Leviticus 25:32). Priests and Levites can sell and redeem their ancestral land, even within the first two years of their sale. They do not have the same restriction of two years that applies to Israelites (see mishnah one). They can also redeem their houses even after a year has passed (see also mishnah 7:5). Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Arakhin! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. The laws of Arakhin have basically not been in effect for thousands of years; some of them weren’t even applied when the Temple still stood. Nevertheless, there are some very interesting issues about the worth of human beings that can be found in the beginning of the tractate. As we learned, a person can be evaluated in two ways: 1) by an absolute value that is not determined at all by what s/he does, by how much money they make, by their abilities etc. This value is completely determined by the Torah. While we cannot quite say that everyone has the same value according to this system, because the Torah assigns different values based on age and gender, at least within an age group and gender group there is equality. 2) By how much a person could be sold on the slave market. This will depend on a person’s abilities, their looks, their health, etc. Every person will have a different worth, mostly based on their own accomplishments. I think that these two ways of evaluating people remain with us today. We have an ideal: that all human beings are created equal, but we realize that in reality, some people are worth more to the society than others, some people earn more money their others, and some people are more intelligent than others. While we strive for the ideal, we realize that the reality also has to be recognized. I hope you have enjoyed Arakhin. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Temurah. \ No newline at end of file