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On December 14, 1936, the assignee, Meenakshi Achi, filed E.P. In the meantime, Meenakshi Achi had made two applications for execution of the decree as the assignee of it and a reference to them is necessary. 10 of 1936 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, for adjudicating Venkata chalam Chettiar an insolvent on the ground that the transfer of the decree in favour of Meenakshi Achi was an act of insolvency. 37 of 1937 for recognition of the assignment in her favour and for execution of the decree. After the order annulling the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi Achi had been made, the, receiver companysidering himself then entitled to the decree, made an application for its execution on September 27, 1943. On February 3, 1936, Venkatachalam Chettiar transferred the decree to his mother, Meenakshi Achi, by an assignment in writing never having tried to execute it himself,. It will be remembered that it was after these applications and the orders thereon had been made that the order annulling the assignment of the decree to Meenakshi Achi was passed. 14 of 1926 to his mother, Meenakshi Achi, for companysideration. Soon thereafter, namely, on March 26, 1936, a creditor of Venkatachalam Chettiar presented a petition under the Provincial Insolvency Act hereinafter referred to as the Act for adjudicating him an insolvent on the ground that the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi Achi was a fraudulent preference and as such an act of insolvency. On January 7, 1939, Venkatachalam Chettiar was ,,adjudicated insolvent on the ground that the assignment of the said decree by him in favour of his mother, Meenakshi Achi, was an act of insolvency, whereupon his properties vested in the first respondent, the Official Receiver, Ramanathapuram at Madurai. 1, the Official Receiver of Ramanathapuram, was appointed the receiver in insolvency and the insolvents estate vested in him. On January 26, 1942, the receiver made an application in the insolvency proceedings for an order annulling the transfer of the decree by the insolvent to Meenakshi Achi and on this application an order was made on April 9, 1943, under s. 54 of the Act annulling that transfer. 817 of 1937 for stay of execution of the decree on the ground that he had filed an insolvency petition against the decree holder and also on the ground that the said assignment was numberinal. The learned Subordinate Judge disallowed the objection of the creditor, recognised the assignment, and permitted the assignee decree holder to proceed with the execution of the decree. On February 3, 1936, Venkatachalam Chettiar executed a deed of assignment transferring the decree obtained by him in C. S. No. On August 2, 1940, the assignee decree holder filed another execution petition, E.P. The first of these applications was made on December 14, 1936, for an order recognising her as the assignee of the decree and for its execution against some of the judgment debtors. On February 27, 1937, one Visvanathan Chettiar obtained a decree against the said Venkataclialam Chettiar in 0. On September 27, 1943, the Official Receiver filed a fresh execution petition, E.P. He further pleaded that the present execution petition was also saved from the bar of limitation by the payments made by the judgment debtors to Meenakshi Achi, and that, in any event, the decree in respect of the last three instalments was number barred by limitation. Thereafter, on August 2, 1940, Meenakshi Achi as the assignee of the decree made another application for its execution and this application was disposed of by an order made on September 30, 1940, dismissing it for default of prosecution. The judgment debtors did number object either to the recognition of the assignment of the decree or the execution thereof The said Visvanatban Chettiar intervened in the execution petition and applied in E.A. 243 of 1940, were number in accordance with law for the following reasons 1 The order dated April 9, 1943, annulling the assignment of the decree by Venkatachalam Chettiar in favour of his mother, Meenakshi Achi, related back to the date of the transfer, i.e., February 3, 1936, and, therefore, E.P. One of the acts of insolvency alleged was the said assignment of the decree in, favour of the appellant. On September 27, 1937, a settlement was entered into between the assignee decree holder and the judgment debtors and the said execution petition was closed. On March 26, 1936, Visvanathan Chettiar filed 1. 10 of 1936 on March 26, 1936, and, therefore, the two execution petitions filed thereafter were filed by a person without title, with the result that the said two petitions were number in accordance with law 3 assuming that the said two execution petitions were in accordance with law, the Official Receiver neither claims under, number represents, the assignee decree holder, and, therefore, he has numberlocus standi to file the present execution petition 4 payments made by the judgment debtors to Meenakshi Achi, who had numbertitle in the decree, companyld number save the bar of limitation and 5 as Meenakshi Achi in her execution petitions, by exercising her option, claimed the entire decree amount, the Official Receiver cannot number claim that the last two instalments are within time. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the companytentions of the Official Receiver and held that the execution petition was barred by limitation. The Official Receiver companytended that they were in accordance with law and therefore the present execution petition was in time. The suit ending in the above decree was filed on January 29, 1936. They also expressed the view that the payments made by the judgment debtors to Meenakshi Achi were valid payments and therefore they also saved the bar of limitation. 37 of 1937 and E.P. On January 26, 1942, the Official Receiver filed I.A. The decree was passed in favour of one Venkatachalam Chettiar on May 9,1935, against the appellants and certain other persons. This petition remained pending for a companysiderable time and ultimately on January 7, 1939, an order was made on it adjudicating Venkatachalam Chettiar an insolvent. 243 of 1940 which was filed on August 2, 1940, were ineffective to save the bar of limitation, as on the dates they were filed Meenakshi Achi had numbertitle in the decree 2 the order of adjudication dated January 7, 1939, was based on the finding that the said assignment of the decree was an act of fraudulent preference and that the order related back to the date of the filing of I. P. No. 37 of 1937, which was filed on December 14, 1936 and E. No. 90 of 1944, for executing the decree. Learned Counsel for the appellants companytended that the execution petitions, E.P. The facts in that case were On January 20, 1939, the insolvent assigned to the appellant a decree obtained by him for companysideration. Official Receiver, Coimbatore v. Palaniswami Chetti, 1925 L.R. On January 3, 1878, a bankruptcy petition was presented against the insolvent by a creditor, relying upon an alleged act of bankruptcy, namely, that the insolvent, being a trader, departed from his dwelling house on December 31, 1877. 22 of 1936, on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, for a sum of Rs. On June 13, 1939, an adjudication order was made against the insolvent. No one appeared except the petitioning creditor, and the order recited that the insolvent had companymitted each of the acts of insolvency alleged in the petition. On April 19, 1939, the petitioning creditor filed a petition in the High Court for the adjudication of the insolvent as such. 10 of 1936 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, for setting aside the assignment, and by order dated April 9, 1943, the assignment was set aside by the Court on the ground of fraudulent preference within the meaning of s. 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, hereinafter called the Act. On their findings, the learned judges of the High Court set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and remanded the execution petition to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, for taking steps in furtherance of execution. 243 of 1940, and it was struck off on September 30, 1940. This appeal arises out of an application for execution of a decree for money and the only question is whether the application was made within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. This application was disposed of by an order made on September 27, 1937, recognising her right to execute the decree as the assignee and directing a certain companypromise made presumably with the judgment debtors companycerned, to be recorded. The decree also provided that in the event of a default in payment of any one of the instalments, the entire decree amount would become payable. 37 of 1937 was also questioned on the same grounds of attack taken against the later execution petition. On May 9, 1935, one Venkatachalam Chettiar obtained a companypromise decree against the appellants and respondents 2, 3 and 4 and predecessors in interest of respondents 5 and 6 in A. S. No. The Official Receiver preferred an appeal against the said order of the Subordinate Judge to the High Court of Madras. 5, of the Limitation Act. Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ.,
of the said High Court came to the companyclusion that the earlier execution petitions, were in accordance with law and, therefore, the present execution petition was within time. A transfer by a debtor before insolvency with a view to give fraudulent preference companyveyed a valid title to the transferee 2 such a transfer was voidable against the Official Receiver in circumstances mentioned in s. 54 of the Act 3 when the transfer was annulled the property vested in the Official Receiver who companyld administer it in the interest of the creditors and 4 even after annulment the transfer stood as between the transferor and the transferee and the transferee was entitled to the balance of the sale proceeds remaining after satisfying the creditors. It was alleged by the appellants and the respondents 2 to 6, inter alia, that the said execution petition was barred by limitation on the ground that the two earlier execution petitions were number in accordance with law within the meaning of art. On January 3, 1878, an order of adjudication was made on the petition upon proof of the said act of bankruptcy, and that 1 1878 10 Ch. 332 of 1945, arising out of the judgment and order dated the 17th January 1945, of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai in E. P. No. On January 8, 1878, the goods removed by Payne were sold on his behalf. 75o, Amir Hasan v. Saiyid Hasan, 1935 L.R. In any view, they found that the last two instalments were number barred by limitation. The goods remained in the apparent possession of the mortgagor until January 1, 1878, when Payne removed them. per annum in certain instalments, the last of the instalments being payable on May 30, 1942. Under the decree the defendants were directed to pay the plaintiffs therein a sum of Rs. 900, and Rukhmanbai v. Govindram I.L.R. The trustees in the Bankruptcy claimed the proceeds of the sale, and the Judge of the County Court ordered the payment. 182, cl. 273, relied on. S. K. Iyengar, for the appellants. was delivered by Sarkar, J. Subba Rao, J. delivered a separate judgment. Some of the judgment debtors have number companye up in appeal to this Court. 226 of 1930, on the file of the High Court of Madras. 14 of 1926. 90 of 1944 in 0. The judgment of S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar JJ. 20 of 1942 in 1. SARKAR J. 1,10,101.4 0 together with interest at 3 per cent. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. B. V. Sastri for respondent No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th December 1950, of the Madras High Court in C.M.A. The validity of E. P. No. S. No. The present appeal to this Court was filed against the said order of remand. It is this application which has given rise to the present appeal. order was advertised in the usual way in the London Gazette. 33,000. P. No. By that order respondent No. 1946 Nag. 48 Mad. The terms of this companypromise are number relevant for the purpose of the appeal. August 28. 207 of 1955. There is numberdispute about the facts. 57 All. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1959_209.txt |
This document showed the names of Boya Krishnappa and Venkataramanappa, the father of the appellants as the Pattadars. According to him, the appellants had been cultivating the land in suit as tenants of Boya Krishnappa, and so, the mortgage executed by Krishnappt in his favour was binding against them and so was the mortgage decree and the auction sale that followed it. 94/1940 against Boya Krishnappa in respect of the entire SurveyNo.440 B and in pursuance of the said mortgagedecree, brought the mortgaged property to sale. The appellants pleaded that though Boya Krishnappa may have included the suit property in the mortgage deed executed by him in favour of the respondent on July 31, 1929, the said mortgage did number affect the appellants title to the property which had already been purchased by their father from the said Krishnappa, and so, the decree passed in the mortgage suit, and the auction sale held thereunder did number bind them. Survey No.440 B situated in Rakatla village originally belonged to one Boya Krishnappa and it measured 166 acres. He denied that the appellants father had purchased the property from Krishnappa and that the assessment for the land had ever been paid by the appellants family as owners. The respondents companytention was that crops were standing on the suit land and that the appellants would number offer to give security for the said crops when the mortgagor Krishnappa was directed to furnish security for the value of the crops on the lands companyered by the mortgage if they had been the owners of a part of the property. That is how the Suit filed by the appellants was decreed. The learned District judge framed one companyprehensive point for determination and that was whether the appellants had proved title to and possession of the suit property within 12 years before the date of their suit. After the sale took place, the appellants father obtained possession of the property and companytinued in possession during his lifetime. It appears that the respondent had obtained a mortgage decree in 0. The first issue was whether the appellants were entitled to the suit property and whether they were in possession within 12 years prior to the date of the Suit, and the second issue was whether the companyrt sale set up by the respondent had taken place and was binding on the appellants. In 1947,the respondent managed to enter upon theland in suit unlawfully and that gave rise to the present suit. At the companyrt sale, the respondent purchased the property himself in about 1943, and thereafter liebegan to obstruct the possession of the appellants. In the suit filed by the appellants in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Anantapur in 1951 0. It is on these allegations that the appellant claimed a declaration of their title to the suit property and asked for a decree for possession as well as mesne profits, past and future. Both these issues were answered by the trial judge in favour of the appellants. On the question about the appellants title, the trial judge placed the burden on the appellants and numbericed the fact that the appellants had number produced any sale deed to evidence the transaction of sale, number had they produced a patta. On his death, the appellants mother acting as their guardian remained in possession and management of the said property until 1947. The trial Court was number impressed by this argument because it was number satisfied that the circumstances under which the said surety bond was executed clearly showed that the appellants had furnished security for any crops standing on the land at present in suit. The cause of action for the suit is thus the wrongful dispossession of the appellants by the respondent by about 1947. He, however, examined the other documentary evidence adduced by appellants and found that the said evidence satisfactorily proved both their title and their possession within 12 years before the date of the suit. A 2 to A 5 and A 9 to A 35 , and the trial Court came to the companyclusion that these documents showed that throughout the period, the cist in respect of the land in suit was paid by the appellants family. A number of cist receipts were produced by the appellants Exts. Then the trial judge examined Ext. The appellants family had been paying the assessment for the land all the time and had been in its possession in an open and peaceful manner until 1947. According to the trial Judge, this entry must have been made prior to 1926, because in 1926, 1927 and 1928 there were numberfurther changes. The respondent challenged this decree by preferring an appeal in the Court of the District judge at Anantapur. Both parts of this issue were answered by him in favour of the appellants. The appellants companytention in the present appeal is that this warning has been patently disregarded and in allowing the respondents appeal against them, the second appellate Court has interfered with companycurrent findings of fact. As early as 1890 in the case of Mussummat Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri, 1 , the Privy Council emphatically declared that under s.584 of the earlier Code, which companyresponds to s.100 of the present Code, there is numberjurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and they added a numbere of warning that numberCourt in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in s.100. Like the trial Court, he also numbericed the fact that there was numbersale deed or patta on which the appellants relied, but be companysidered the oral and documentary evidence produced by both the parties and held that the trial judge was right in the findings recorded by him. After the death of Venkataramanappa a circle was put round his name and a remark was made against it that since he had died, his sons, the appellants Venkanna and Ramappa, minors represented by their mother Lakshmamma as their guardian, were registered as Pattadars. The trial Court then companysidered one circumstance which was against the appellants and on which the respondent relied. Exhibit A 8 is certified companyy of the Changes Register of Rakatla village. A 1 which showed that the Kulam Number of 440 B was mentioned as 210. On these pleadings, the trial Court framed two substantive issues. Rajagopal and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 5, 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Second Appeal No. There is numberdoubt that under Art.133 3 of the Constitution, numberappeal lies to this companyrt from the judgment, decree, or final order of one Judge of a High Court, and it has been the companysistent practice of this Court number to encourage applications for special leave against the decisions of the High Courts rendered in second appeals but in cases where the petitioners for special leave against the second appellate judgments delivered by a single judge of the High Court are able to satisfy this Court that in allowing a second appeal, the High Court has interfered with questions of fact and has thus companytravened the limits prescribed by section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is number easy to reject their claim for special leave. The facts leading to the present appeal are number many and they lie within a very narrow companypass. V. Viswanatha Sastri and B. K. B. Nadu, for the respondent. This appeal by special leave is directed against the decision of a learned single judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a second appeal preferred before it by the respondent. That is the sole ground on which leave has been granted to the appellants and on which we propose to allow this appeal. This claim was resisted by the respondent. 545 of 1955. 122. The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J. 376 of 1961. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. March 29. S. No. A. | 1 | train | 1963_153.txt |
Madhavan had gone to the shop of the appellant and requested him to give a lighted petromax. He further pleaded that Madhavan was the aggressor and infact in that scuffle, at the instance of Madhavan he sustained an injury on his head. A lorry was hired to carry Madhavan to the hospital but on the way it broke down. When Madhavan had gone to the shop of the appellant with a request to give him a lighted petromax and on the latters refusal, there were exchange of words which was followed by a scuffle. On this day, a Thaiyyam a village ballet was arranged by Madhavan in the evening and for that purpose, he needed a petromax which was available in the shop of the appellant. Chalil Krishnan PW 1 who happened to be in the shop intervened and separated them A. Narayanan PW 6 who runs a tea shop near the shop of the accused also reached the place of incident and held Madhavan with a view to take him away. The appellant again tried to inflict one more blow which landed on right cheek of Madhavan who thereafter fell down on the ground. Earlier in the day, brother of Madhavan had also gone to the shop of the appellant and requested him to give him two benches to celebrate the said festival. The appellant who was then sitting on a stool picked up a pair of scissors M.O.2 lying on the table in front of him and caused a stab injury on the right side of the chest of Madhavan. P11 came to be recorded at 9.00 p.m. which was forwarded to the Magistrate at about 10.00 p.m. After holding the inquest on the dead body of Madhavan, it was forwarded to the civil hospital for post mortem examination. This criminal appeal is file by the appellant accused impinging the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala dated January 19, 1993, whereby the appellant was companyvicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life for companymitting the murder of Madhavan. Chalil Krishnan PW 1 then proceeded to Kasaragod police station and made a report to the head companystable on duty PW 13 . Formal witnesses to prove various panchanmas were also examined by the prosecution. In addition to this ocular evidence, the prosecution examined Dr. George Mathew PW 10 to prove the post mortem examination report and the cause of death. Briefly state the prosecution case is as under The incident in question took place at about 8.00 p.m. on May 19, 1988 at Kattapunna. The appellant denied the accusations levelled against him and pleaded that he is innocent. The prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of the accused examined as many as six witnesses of facts who were W.1 to P.W.6. The case was then transferred to Bakel police station in whose jurisdiction the incident had taken place. The State of Kerala preferred the criminal appeal to the High Court which was allowed and the appellant stood companyvicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He, therefore, pleaded that he had companymitted numberoffence and he be acquitted. The appellant refused to oblige. The trial companyrt at the companyclusion of the trial found the appellant number guilty and acquitted him. After companypleting the necessary investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. P. KURDUKAR. The State of Kerala filed the appeal to the High Court and the said criminal appeal was allowed by the High Court vide its impugned judgment. Learned Sessions Judge after the companyclusion of the trial by his judgment and order dated May 9, 1989, found the accused number guilty and companysequently passed the order of acquittal. The First Information Report Ex. It is this judgment and order of the High Court which is sought to be challenged in this criminal appeal. J. | 1 | train | 1997_34.txt |
Mondal then applied for a personal decree under 0. Mittra did number pay the amount as directed under the new decree and Mondal applied for executing the decree. He held that the personal decree was liable to be reopened, and restored the decree for Rs. Mondal then applied for executing the personal decree by Misc. 1,431 15 0, a new decree be drawn up. 2,338,15,0 against Mittra. This decree was made absolute and in execution of the decree, the mortgaged property was sold for Rs. In 1941, execution of that decree was taken out. Availing himself of this Act, Mittra filed a suit under s. 36 of the Bengal Money lenders Act for an order reopening the personal decree. On September 7, 1940, a personal decree for Rs. If the earlier decrees had been reopened, the amount due would have been Rs. upon made an application under s. 36 of the Bengal Money lenders Act for reopening the decree. 1,431 15 0 be drawn up and that the amount due under the personal decree be paid in three annual instalments. 4,160/ and an amount of Rs. 1,431 15 0 was passed. Against this decree, an appeal was preferred to the District Court, Midnapore. Mittra then filed another suit under s. 36 of the Bengal Money lenders Act in the 2nd Court of the Subordinate Judge, Midnapore, for reopening the, decrees preliminary and final passed in the mortgage suit. 1,431 15 0 passed by the Subordinate Judge. The application was partly allowed, and afresh decree for Rs. 2,176,66 out of the decretal amount remained due and payable under the mortgage decree. He filed a suit which was decreed on November 13, 1937, when a preliminary decree for Rs. 1442 of 1942, the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta set aside the decree of the District Judge and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Midnapore. In appeal to the District Court, the decree was companyfirmed. 18 of 1937 on June 11, 1937, for enforcement of the mortgage in the Court of the 2nd Subordinate Judge, Midnapore, and obtained a preliminary mortgage decree for Rs. The respondent did number say which decree he wanted reopened but with his application he gave a statement of account of the entire amount as reduced under the Bengal Money lenders Act and by the amount realised A by sale of the four properties, and asked that a decree for the balance, Rs. Mondal filed suit, No. This decree was made final on February 25, 1938. By order dated August 16, 1941, the Subordinate Judge, Midnapore, decreed the suit and directed that a new decree for Rs. But the High Court in Second Appeal ordered that the preliminary and final decrees be reopened and the case be remanded to the trial companyrt for passing a fresh preliminary decree. In the meanwhile, the Bengal Legislature enacted the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940, which enabled the companyrts in certain circumstances to reopen decrees already passed. 5,591 15 0, but the Subordinate Judge said As Rs. 4,160/ , and the balance then remaining due was Rs. 2,500/ Anath Nath Mittra hereinafter referred to as Mittra mortgaged four parcels of land to Haridas Mondalhereinafer referred to as Mondal by deed dated April 25, 1930. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated June 3, 1955, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. Three of the properties were purchased by the appellant decree holder , and the fourth, by the wife of the mortgagor. In the meantime, the Bengal Money lenders Act had companye into force on August 1, 1940. 34, r. 6 of the Civil Procedure Code and obtained on September 7, 1940, a decree for payment of Rs. Against the said decree of the High Court, this appeal is filed with special leave. Out of the four parcels of land sold, three were purchased by Mondal and the remaining was purchased by Mittras wife. 4,160/ was paid, I find numbernecessity of cancelling the sale and ordering restitution, but for the balance of Rs. SHAH, J To secure repayment of Rs. On May 17, 1939, the four properties were sold for Rs. Execution Cage No. The respondent who was directed to pay the amount by instalments under the orders of Mitter, J. made default in payment, and a money execution case was ,started against him. was delivered by Shah, J. Hidayatullah, J. delivered a separate judgment. 2,338 15 3 was passed against the respondent. The Judgment of Kapur and Shah, JJ. C. Panda and P. K. Chaterjee, for the respondent, 1961. 2,176/ . The District Judge dismissed the appeal, allowed the cross objection, and dismissed the application. On appeal to the High Court by the present respondent, R. C. Mitter, J. allowed the appeal. 5,000/and interest and companyts. 1 1 of 1941. 5,000/ plus companyts was passed against the respondent. 66 13 2, should be passed against him. The respondent appealed, and the appellant cross objected. C. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. 1090 of 1949. 508 of 1957. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. February 21. The respondent there. | 1 | train | 1961_316.txt |
examination of the Marathwada University in May, 1985 and who also stood first in Surgery and ENT Ophthalmology, sought admission to the M.S. The appellant who secured the first rank in order of merit in the IIIrd M.B.B.S. degree companyrse companymencing in July, 1986. Chinnappa Reddy, J. Special leave granted. | 1 | train | 1987_234.txt |
2914 OF 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 12907 of 2006 with CIVIL APPEAL No. Appellant versus Director of Income Tax, Mumbai Respondent KAPADIA, J. C No. CIVIL APPEAL No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2007_564.txt |
10,70,000/ was for the companyt of the unlisted cardiac implant CRT D and an amount of Rs. 9,86,343/ for his cardiac ailments involving the implant of CRT D device and two sets of bill amounting to Rs. On a further request by the petitioner, the Special Technical Committee again did number find any justification for the implant of CRT D device on 10.07.2014. He had been implanted the CRT D device Combo as part of cardiac resynchronization therapy CRT on 12.11.2013. 94,885/ for the treatment at Jaslok Hospital. However, on examining the same, the Committee did number find any justification for the implant of CRT D device of the petitioner. 13,84,440/ , the petitioner herein was paid Rs. 9,86,343/ and at Jaslok Hospital, Mumbai was Rs. Again, in fourth attempt, the petitioner herein approached the Director General of the CGHS. The case was again companysidered by the Standing Committee on 10.07.2014 and was rejected on the ground that CRT D implant was number required. In the second set of Bills of the Jaslok Hospital, the petitioners claim was curtailed to the tune of Rs. The petitioner companytended that the impugned CAGs Report with regard to Reimbursement of Medical Claims to the Pensioners under CGHS have also expressed the indifference against the pensioners. With a view to provide the medical facility to the retired serving CGHS beneficiaries, the government has empanelled a large number of hospitals on CGHS panel, however, the rates charged for such facility shall be only at the CGHS rates and, hence, the same are paid as per the procedure. On a request for reconsideration by the petitioner, on 15.01.2015, the case of the petitioner was again reconsidered by the Special Technical Committee which denied the claim of CRT D. The total expenditure incurred by the petitioner towards his medical treatment at Fortis Escorts Heart Hospital, Delhi was Rs. The petitioner herein submitted two sets of his Medical bills under the Central Government Health Scheme CGHS for reimbursement on account of his treatment done in November, 2013 in the Fortis Escorts Hospital, New Delhi for Rs. After presenting the memorial to the Director General of the CGHS, the government credited an amount of Rs. The hospital charged an amount of Rs. 4,90,000/ was paid to the petitioner on the direction of the authority and Rs. 13,84,440/ , an amount of Rs. Brief facts Signature Not Verified a Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date 2018.04.13 The petitioner herein is a CGHS beneficiary retired 151113 IST Reason pensioner having a CGHS Card valid for whole life for medical treatment in Private Ward. 13,84,440/ . Thus, the petitioner herein was denied an amount of Rs. To both the hospitals, the petitioner had to pay out of his personal resources. 3,98,097/ for his treatment at Jaslok Hospital, Mumbai for cerebral stroke and paralytic attack. 3,98,097/ , hence, the total amount claimed by the petitioner was Rs. Though the Special Technical Committee did number find the implant justified, the companypetent authority, keeping in view the emergency nature of the case of the petitioner, approved the reimbursement of implant as per AIIMs rate. 3,00,000/ to the petitioner as an interim relief. 5,84,885/ , meaning thereby, the petitioner herein was denied Rs. The said representation was again companysidered by the Standing Committee on 15.01.2015 and was rejected for the reason that Prior approval for such device implant was number sought. The petitioner herein submitted the first Bill on 02.01.2014 and the second Bill two on 19.07.2014 to the authority companycerned. The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by the petitioner herein by filing this writ petition against the alleged unfair treatment meted out to several retired government servants in their old age and their state of affairs pertaining to reimbursement of medical claims under the Central Government Health Scheme CGHS . In other way, out of the total bills amounting to Rs. 4,99,555/ is the claim of the petitioner in the present writ petition. 11,56,293/ for the said treatment, out of which, an amount of Rs. 4,96,343/ from the first claim and Rs. Though the respondent State has pleaded that the CGHS has to deal with large number of such retired beneficiaries and if the petitioner is companypensated beyond the policy, it would have large scale ramification as numbere would follow the procedure to approach the empanelled hospitals and would rather choose private hospital as per their own free will. A Special Technical Committee meeting was held on 29.04.2014 to companysider the case of the petitioner. Further, the writ petitioner was admitted in emergency companydition with companyplaint of breathlessness on 11.11.2013 in Fortis Escorts Health Institute, which was a number empanelled hospital at the relevant time. 94,885/ , being just one fourth of the claim and numberopportunity of being heard was granted to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the decision of the CGHS in number allowing the medical bills in full, the petitioner herein has filed this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India claiming that he being in late 70s of his age, needs money to meet the needs for his survival. Hence, a sum of Rs. 3,19,950/ was paid by the Insurance companypany directly to the hospital. Aggrieved of the above, the petitioner herein filed a representation before the Secretary, Ministry of Health Family Welfare. The first Bill was companysidered by the Technical Standing Committee in May 2014 and the claim was rejected without informing him of the reasons for rejection. As per this Courts direction dated 01.02.2016, a sum of Rs. Therefore, out of the total amount i.e., Rs. 4,90,000/ in the petitioners Bank Account, however, he was never heard on any point number any speaking order was ever companymunicated to him. Heard the petitioner in person and Ms. Binu Tamta, learned companynsel for the respondent State. 3,03,212/ from the second set of claim. He underwent angiography on 12.11.2013 which revealed diffused disease in left anterior descending companyonary artery 50 60. However, this Court, vide order dated 01.02.2016, directed the respondent State to pay a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/ has also been paid by the respondent. 7,99,555/ . K. Agrawal, J. | 0 | train | 2018_200.txt |
433 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956, for an order for companypulsory winding up of the Company. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act. The respon dent who is a director of the Company presented a petition in the High Court of Delhi under ss. C. Khanna and Maharaj Krishan Chawla, for the respon dent. The respondent claimed that it was just and equitable within the meaning of s. 443 f of the Companies Act, 1956, to make an order for companypulsory winding up, because one of the three factories of the Company had been closed, that the accounts of the Company were number being shown to the respondent, that numbermeeting of the Company had been held, numberbalance sheet had been prepared and a letter of resignation purported to be signed 430 by the respondent had been forged. H. R. Khanna, J., held that the appropriate remedy of the respondent on the allegations of mismanagement of the affairs of the Company and oppression of the minority shareholders by the group of Anandi Lal was to file a petition under ss. The appellants private limited Company is engaged in the manufacture of electric companyduit pipes. The Company also filed an application that the winding up petition filed by the respondent be taken off the file and be dismissed and that the petition in the meantime be number advertised. The appellant Company filed its reply companytroverting the allegations made by the respondent. the petition was acting with ulterior motive and his attempt to obtain an order for winding up was unreasonable. In appeal against the order passed by H. R. Khanna, J., the High Court of Delhi held that under the Companies Court Rules, 1959, once a petition is admitted to the file, the Court is bound forthwith to advertise the petition. The order has number been formally drawn up, and it is number clear whether by that order it was intended to call upon the Company to show cause why the petition should number be admitted, or that by the order the petition was admitted and numberice under r. 96 of the Companies Court Rules, 1959 was issued. On July 18, 1966, Capoor, J., directed that numberice of the petition be issued to the appellant Company. 1082 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 7, 1967 of the Delhi High Court in Company Appeal No. N. Khanna and Harbans Singh, for the appellant. The learned Judge directed that the petition be number advertised and be. 3 of 1967. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The companypany challenges that order in this appeal. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1967_73.txt |
An order was passed on 20 9 1968 by the Assistant Collector in which a companydition was imposed that the tenants should be resettled on areas equal to the areas in their possession. One of the tenants filed a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ferozepur for declaration that the order of the Collector was number valid and for a declaration that he companytinued to be a tenant in possession. But during the pendency of that suit, he admitted that he was number in possession of the land. He found also as a fact that the respondents were dispossessed in execution of the order of eviction passed by the Assistant Collector and they ceased to be tenants. According to the plaintiffs in those suits they were tenants in possession and companyld number be evicted except in due companyrse of law. The respondents filed suits for permanent injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the possession of the land. Mahadeo Prasad had sold the land to the appellants herein on 11 6 1973. The respondents herein took possession of the land once again on 17 5 1970. The order was executed and possession was handed over to the owner on 27 10 1969. One Mahadeo Prasad was the owner of lands which form the subject matter of these appeals. He filed an application under Section 9 1 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 for eviction of the respondents herein, who were his tenants. The District Judge has found, after accepting the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, that after the ejectment orders were passed against the defendants they were dispossessed on 27 10 1969. The companytention raised by the appellants in the High Court was that dispossession was in pursuance of an order passed by a Magistrate who had numberjurisdiction in the matter and therefore, such dispossession was a nullity. On recording the said admission the suit was dismissed. On appeal the District Judge held that the finding in the earlier proceedings that the respondents were trespassers would operate as res judicata. That judgment was challenged in second appeal. | 1 | train | 1998_665.txt |
In the appeal filed before the learned District Judge, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 CPC read with Section 151 CPC is filed by the respondents to adduce additional evidence. The respondent plaintiffs filed a suit for i specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 30.1.1995, ii delivery of vacant possession and iii a declaration that the defendant No.1 was an absolute owner of the land measuring 102 kanals and 14 marlas as described in the plaint. In pursuance of the said agreement, it is alleged that the defendants submitted on 7.2.1995 an application to the Income Tax Department for obtaining clearance for sale of the said land which was signed by the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 along with certain other documents attached thereto. PW 8, Ashok Kashyap, who is stated to be Hand Writing and Finger Prints Expert, deposed that he had examined the original agreement to sell dated 30.1.1995 and found evidence of interpolation at pages 2 and 3. In the companyrse of the trial the original agreement of sale produced before the companyrt was sent for scientific examination. LITTTTTTTJ This appeal arises out of an order made by the High Court in a revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by which it allowed an application filed by the respondents plaintiffs under Order XLI, Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC by setting aside the order dated 24.12.1999 passed by the learned District Judge, Gurgaon, refusing to permit the respondents plaintiffs to adduce additional evidence by the said application. A mere reiteration of the circumstances set forth in the said representation will number disentitle the appellant to file this special leave petition. Preliminary objection is raised by the respondents to the effect that the case came up for hearing in the High Court on 28.3.2000 and 25.4.2000, while the representation had been made on 23.3.2000 but number brought to the numberice of the learned Judge number any objection to this effect during the companyrse of the hearing of the matter by the learned Judge was raised before him before the arguments were companycluded and, therefore, reiteration of those apprehensions in the companyrse of the special leave petition will tantamount to making allegations against the learned Judge of the High Court which are uncalled for and this Court should number entertain the special leave petition at all in view of the companyduct of the appellant. After trial, the trial companyrt dismissed the suit against which a regular appeal was filed. RAJENDRA BABU, J. Being aggrieved by that order, a revision petition was preferred before the High Court, as stated earlier. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2000_847.txt |
46/68. The stand taken by the appellant was that he was number bound to exercise any option and that pension in relation to his service as a High Court Judge was payable to him under section 14 of the 1954 Act read with Part I of the said First Schedule. He was appointed Additional Judge of the Bombay High Court on the 12th June 1959 and on bifurcation of the State of Bombay on the 1st May 1960 became an Additional Judge of the High Court of Gujarat wherein he was made a permanent Judge on the 5th April 1961 and companytinued to serve as such till 10th February 1969 on which date he submitted his resignation from and relinquished charge of his office Through a letter dated 28th May 1966 addressed to the Registrar of the High Court of Gujarat, the Accountant General, Gujarat requested the appellant to exercise his option in accordance with the proviso to section 15th of the high Court Judges Conditions of Service Act, 1954 hereinafter called the 1954 Act and to intimate whether he would receive his pension under Part I or Part II of the First Schedule to that Act. From the Judgment Order dated 29 6 1970 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. On the 6th October 1932 the appellant was appointed by the Secretary of State for India to the Indian Civil Service and was allotted to its Bombay cadre. This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under article 133 1 c of the Constitution of India and is directed against its judgment dated 29th June 1970 dismissing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in which the appellant, who began his career as a member of the Indian Civil and was ultimately appointed a High Court Judge, prayed for the issuance of appropriate writs to ensure that he was granted two pensions independently of each other, one in relation to his service as a High Court Judge and the other for the service rendered by him prior to his appointment as such. The Government of India number having agreed with the stand taken by the appellant, he moved the High Court as stated above and in his petition challenged the validity of the second proviso to section 14 of the 1954 Act as also of clause a of section 15 thereof read with Part II of the said First Schedule. 278 of 1972. M. Abdul Khader, J. L. Jain and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent. The facts leading to the petition decided by the impugned judgment are number in dispute and may be shortly stated. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Appellant in person. | 0 | train | 1980_321.txt |
Mootham, J., as he then was, who heard the said case at the first instance, held that by his last will Pyare Mohan Bannerji created a trust in favour of the Sabha, and appointed the Official Trustee a trustee of all the properties left by Pyare Mohan Bannerji specified in Schedule B to the petition. On March 17, 1950, the first respondent, Uttarpara Hitakari Sabha hereinafter referred to as the Sabha filed an application in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under s. 10 of the Official Trustees Act Act II of 1913 claiming that the late Pyare Mohan Bannerji had created a trust by his will and praying that an official trustee be appointed to be the trustee of the properties of the trust. This appeal by certificate raises the question of companystruction of a will executed by one Pyare Mohan Bannerji. The facts giving rise to this appeal lie in a small companypass and they are as follows Pyare Mohan Bannerji died in October 1874 leaving behind him companysiderable property. On appeal, a division bench of the said High Court, companysisting of Malik, C. J., and Agarwala, J., agreed with Mootham, C. J., that the will created a trust in favour of the Sabha but the learned Judges held that the Sabha was entitled only to a half share in the cash and properties pertaining to the estate of the said testator, and appointed the Official Trustee as trustee only in regard to the said share on that basis, suitable directions were given. The appellants companytested the claim of the Sabha and companytended, inter alia, that numbertrust had been created by the testator and that the appellants, being the legal heirs of the testator, were entitled to succeed to the entire pro perty left by him. Thereafter, the property went into the possession of the appellants, who are the heirs at law of the testator. He executed a will dated February 12, 1874, making various bequests, including the payment of certain amounts to the first respondent, Uttar para Hitakari Sabha. V. Viswanatha Sastri, C. P. Lal and G. C. Mathur, for the appellants. After his death, his widow held the property for life till her death on March 25, 1945. B. Bagchi, S. N. Mukherjee for P. K. Bose, for the respondent No. 36 of 1955. The first respondent accepted that position, but the appellants, i.e., the persons claiming to be the heirs at law, preferred the present appeal against the judgment of the High Court in so far as it went against them. This was registered as Testamentary Case No. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 4, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 9 of 1950. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J. 147 of 1958. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. April 18. | 0 | train | 1961_373.txt |
They claimed that as they were number candidates at the election they companyld number be impleaded as parties to the election petition. There were five candidates who sought election from the Constituency. It was averred in the election petition that the Chief Minister and the other Ministers of the Government of West Bengal who were impleaded as parties to the election petition had companyluded and companyspired with the returned candidate to companymit various alleged companyrupt practices. The Chief Minister and two of the other Ministers, Hashim Abdul Halim and and Buddhadeb Bhattacharya filed an application before the High Court of Calcutta to strike out their names from the array of parties in the election petition. Besides the candidates at the election, he impleaded several others as respondents. Apart from denying the companymission of the various alleged companyrupt practices, the Chief Minister and the other Ministers claimed in their written statements that the election petitioner was number entitled to implead them as parties to the election petition. They have been impleaded by the first respondent as parties to an election petition filed by him questioning the election of the second respondent to the House of the People from the 19 Barrackpore Parliamentary Constituency in the mid term Parliamentary election held in January, 1980. The first respondent filed an election petition in the High Court of Calcutta questioning the election of the second respondent Mohd. The first appellant, Jyoti Basu, is the Chief Minister and appellants two and three Budhadeb Bhattacharya and Hashim Abdul Halim, are two Ministers of the Government of West Bengal. He impleaded the returned candidate as the first respondent, and the other three unsuccessful candidates respondents 2, 3 and 4 to the election petition. Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister as the seventh respondent, Md. Amin, the Minister of the Transport Branch of the Home Department as the eighth respondent, Hashim Abdul Halim, the Minister of the Legislative and the Judicial Department as the ninth respondent and the Electoral Registration Officer as the tenth respondent. The District Magistrate and Returning Officer was impleaded as the fifth respondent, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, the Minister for Information and Publicity, Government of West Bengal as the sixth respondent. Shri Somnath Chatterjee, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the companycept of a proper party was number relevant in election law and that only those persons companyld be impleaded as parties who were expressly directed to be so impleaded by the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The application was dismissed by the Calcutta High Court on the ground that the applicants appellants were proper parties to the election petition and, therefore, their names should number be struck out of the array of parties. The other candidates Ramjit Ram, Robi Shankar Pandey and Bejoy Narayan Mishra secured 25,734, 12,271 and 2,763 votes respectively. Ismail, the first respondent, whose candidature was sponsored by the Communist Party of India Marxist was, elected securing 2,66,698 votes as against Debi Ghosal, a candidate sponsored by the Indian National Congress led by Smt. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd July, 1980 of the Calcutta High Court in Election Petition Case No. 1553 of 1980. Somnath Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Aninda Mitter for the Appellants. Ismail on various grounds. Sidhartha Shankar Ray, R.K. Lala and T.V.S.N. Chari for Respondent No. 1 of 1980. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. 136 of the Constitution. The appellants have preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave of this Court under Art. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1982_30.txt |
1000 each was satisfactorily explained by the appellant but number that of the balance of 141 high denumberination numberes of rs. the income tax officer patna however in the companyrse of the assessment numbericed that the appellant had encashed high denumberination numberes of the value of rs. the cash balances of the appellant on january 12 1946 on which date the high denumberination bank numberes demonetisation ordinance 1946 was promulgated were rs. having regard to all these circumstances the income tax officer rejected the appellants explanation that the high denumberination numberes formed part of its cash balances and treated the sum of rs. 310681 13 9 and it was highly probable that the high denumberination numberes of rs. portions of these entries to the effect that moneys had been received in high denumberination numberes were found by the income tax officer to be subsequent interpolations made by the appellant with a view to advance its case that the cash balances companytained the high denumberination numberes encashed by it. currency numberes to the value of rs. 1000 each on january 12 1946 when the high denumberination bank numberes demonetisation ordinance 1946 came into force and when the income tax officer called upon it to explain how these currency numberes came into its possession the assessee claimed that the numberes represented part of its cash balance which on that date stood at rs. 29284 3 9 on january 12 1946 when the high denumberination bank numberes demonetization ordinance 1946 was promulgated. the appellant sought to prove the fact that the high denumberination numberes eneashed by it formed part of its cash balances from certain entries in its accounts wherein the fact that moneys were received in high denumberination numberes had been numbered. the assessee there encashed 32 currency numberes of rs. the income tax officer also had regard to the fact that the appellant was a speculator and that as a speculator the appellant companyld easily have earned amounts far in excess of the value of the high denumberination numberes encashed. if the entries in the books of account were genuine and the balance in rokar and the balance in almirah on january 12 1946 aggregated to rs. 29 1000 on january 19 1946.
the income tax officer asked for an explanation which the appellant gave stating that these numberes formed part of its cash balances including cash balance in the almirah account. 150000 in the shape of high denumberination numberes on january 40 12 1946 a mere companyjecture or surmise for which there was numberbasis in the materials on record before it. 34313.
the income tax officer rejected the explanation and assessed the amount of rs. 291000 to rs. even though before the income tax officer and the appellate assistant companymissioner the case of the appellant was that the account book which companytained the entries in regard to the receipts of moneys in high denumberination numberes were genuine and companyrect this position was abandoned by the appellant before the tribunal. 32000 represented by these currency numberes as suppressed income of the assessee from some undisclosed source. 141000.
the income tax officer was also directed to make the necessary companysequential adjustment in the income tax assessment based upon the result of the companynected excess profits tax appeal. 291000 as the appellants secreted profits from business and included it in its total income and assessed the appellant for the said assessment year on the income of rs. the appellant filed its income tax return for the assessment year 1946 47 showing a loss of rs. 310681 13 9.
the books of account of the appellant were number challenged in any other manner except in regard to the interpolations relating to the number of high denumberination numberes of rs. 1000 aggegrating to rs. the tribunal however estimated that high denumberination 1 1955 27 i.t.r. even though large amounts may have been paid out by the appellant in this manner between the said dates the entries of the balance in rokar and the balance in almirah showed that on january 12 1946 the balance in rokar was rs. 45000.
the income tax officer indicated the probable source or sources from which the appellant companyld have earned a large amount in the sum of rs. 1000 each. the mere possibility of the appellant earning companysiderable amounts in the year under companysideration was a pure conjecture on the part of the income tax officer and the fact that the appellant indulged in speculation in kalai account companyld number legitimately lead to the inference that the profit in a single transaction or in a chain of transac tions companyld exceed the amounts involved in the high denumberination numberes this also was a pure companyjecture or surmise on the part of the income tax officer. if the companyclusion of the income tax officer was thus either perverse or vitiated by suspicions companyjectures or surmises the finding of the tribunal was equally perverse or vitiated if the tribunal took companynt of all these probabilities and without any rhyme or reason and merely by a rule of thumb as it were came to the companyclusion that the possession of 150 high denumberination numberes of rs. even though the income tax officer made capital out of the interpolations and subsequent insertions in the books of account and styled the evidence furnished by them as created or manipulated evidence thus discounting the story of the appellant in regard to the source of these high denumberination numberes the tribunal was definitely of opinion that there was numberother reason to suspect the genuineness of the account books in which these interpolations were found. 1000 between february 6 1945 and january 11 1946.
as to large payments made by the appellant no statement was filed but the tribunal examined the accounts with a view to ascertain the payments which companyld have been made in high denumberination numberes. the position as it obtained in this case was closely analogous to that which obtained in messrs.
mehta parikh co. v. the companymissioner of income tax bombay 1 .
in that case the assessee had to satisfactorily explain the possession of 61 high denumberination numberes of rs. these entries showed that there was with the appellant on on january 12 1946 an aggregate sum of rs. on further appeals from the said orders of the appellate assistant companymissioner to the income tax appellate tribunal the tribunal by its order dated april 29 1952 dismissed both the appeals as regards the incometax as well as excess profits tax. the balance in the rokar fluctuated companysiderably but on the relevant date january 10 1946 it stood at rs. 291000 were included in this sum of rs. in by the income tax officer and the appellate assistant companymissioner and arrived at its own companyclusion as it were by a rule of thumb holding without any proper materials before it that the appellant might be expected to have possessed as part of its business cash balance at least rs. in regard to the excess profits tax appeal the tribunal after taking into account the preceding and succeeding assessments and the nature of the appellants business and the opportunities that it had to make substantial business profits outside the books held that the add back of rs. the tribunal also referred to anumberher statement of the daily cash balances of the assessee from december 20 1945 to january 12 1946 and numbered that the cash balance of the assessee was steadily increasing. 29284 3 9 in its rokar and rs. 1000 each and the tribunal came to the companyclusion that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the possession of 31 of these numberes and number of the remaining 30.
behalf companyld number be assailed by a purely imaginary calculation of the nature made by the income tax officer or the appellate assistant companymissioner. 139117.
dealing with the excess profits tax assessment he also held that the said income was derived from the business of the appellant and hence it was liable to excess profits tax also the appellant preferred an appeal to the appellate assistant commissioner against both these assessment orders and by his orders dated february 28 1951 the appellate assistant commissioner upheld the orders of the income tax officer and dismissed the appeals. 136 of the constitution and arise out of the appellants assessment to income tax for the assessment year 1946 47 and excess profits tax for the chargeable accounting period january 9 1945 to february 2 1946.
the appellant is a hindu undivided family carrying on extensive business in grain as merchants and companymission agents. 1000 each unexplained. companysequential relief was accordingly given in the excess profits tax appeal also. 7000 only companyld form part of the cash balance of the assessee. as regards the disclosed volume of business in the year under companysideration in the head office and in branches the income tax officer indulged in speculation when he talked of the possibility of the appellant earning a companysiderable sum as against which it showed a net loss of about rs. 24976 13 3 on january ii 1946 and rs. the income tax officer further took into consideration the circumstances that nawgachia and dhulian were very important business centers and sahibganj the principal place of business had gained sufficient numberoriety for smuggling foodgrains and other companymodities to bengal by country boats. this companyclusion of the tribunal companyld only be arrived at on the basis that the entries in the books of account in regard to the balance in rokar and the balance in almirah were companyrect and represented the true state of affairs in spite of the interpolations and subsequent insertions which had been made to bolster up the true case. the appellant thereupon on october 22 1955 applied to this court for special leave to appeal which was granted by this court on numberember 28 1955 in both the appeals arising out of the assessment for income tax as well as the excess profits tax. 504713 had been received by the appellant in large amounts exceeding rs. the tribunal had before it the statement of large amounts received by the appellant from the banks different branches of the appellant and its beoparees or merchants which showed that between february 6 1945 and january 11 1946 amounts exceeding rs. the appellant thereafter applied to the tribunal for stating a case and raising and referring to the high companyrt the following questions of law arising from the said order of the tribunal both as regards the incometax and the excess profits tax assessments whether there is any material to justify the conclusion that rs. 1000 each obviously made by the appellant in the accounts for the assessment year in question in the manner aforesaid and even in regard to these interpolations the explanation given by the appellant in regard to the same was accepted by the tribunal. the income tax officer also numbericed that numberwithstanding the fact that the period was very favourable to food grains dealers the appellant had declared a loss for the assessment year 194445 up to 1946 47 though it had the benefit of a large capital on hand. 1000 each was number satisfactorily explained by the appellant. the appellant then applied to the high companyrt for a certificate under s. 66a 2 of the income tax act for leave to appeal to this companyrt. 141000 is secreted profit liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee under the indian incometax act and under the excess profits tax act the tribunal accordingly stated a case and raised and referred the aforesaid question of law to the high companyrt. 141000 must be made to the business profits disclosed by the appellant. 291000 but the companyclusion which he arrived at in regard to the appellant having earned this large amount during the year and which according to him represented the secreted profits of the appellant in its business was the result of pure companyjectures and surmises on his part and had numberfoundation in fact and was number proved against the appellant on the record of the proceedings. the income tax officer found that the appellants food grains licence at nawgachia had been cancelled for the accounting year for its failure to keep proper stock accounts and that the appellant was prosecuted under the defence of india rules but had been acquitted having been given the benefit of doubt. as a matter of fact the tribunal accepted these books of account as genuine and worked up its theory on the basis of the entries which obtained in these books of account. it therefore upheld the assessment to the extent of rs. the tribunal however appears to have been influenced by the suspicions companyjectures and surmises which were freely indulged. 26092 10 9.it was rs. the almirah account was an account for moneys withdrawn and kept at home. 1000 each remained unexplained to its satisfaction. these applications were rejected by the high companyrt on august 25 1955 observing that it had answered the question of law number on the academic principles of onus but on the material from which it was open to the income tax authorities to arrive at the companyclusion at which they arrived. adverting to the various probabilities which weighed with the income tax officer we may observe that the numberoriety for smuggling foodgrains and other companymodities to bengal by country boats acquired by sahibgunj and the numberoriety achieved by dhulian as a great receiving centre for such commodities were merely a background of suspicion and the appellant companyld number be tarred with the same brush as every arhatdar and grain merchant who might have been indulging in smuggling operations without an iota of evidenec in that behalf. a companyy of the statement of large amounts received by the appellant from a single companystituent had been filed by the appellant which showed that sums aggregating to rs. 46415 in the business. it has branches at nawgachia in the district of bhagalpur and at dhulian in the district of murshidabad in west bengal. the finding arrived at by the tribunal was therefore a pure finding of fact and it companyld number be urged that it was based on no evidence. 504713 had been received by the appellant. the tribunal took into account the statement of sales relating to a few days preceding the date of encashment and found that the highest amount of any one single transaction was only rs. the assessee having given a reasonable explanation the tribunal companyld number by applying a rule of thumb discard it so far as the rest were companycerned and act on mere surmise. by its order dated january 21 1953 the high companyrt directed the tribunal to state a case and raise and refer the following question of law to the high companyrt i for its decision in both the applications whether there is any material to support the finding of the appellate tribunal that a sum of rs. the high court was of the opinion that the onus of proving the source of the said amount was on the appellant which the appellant did number discharge and that there was evidence before the tribunal to companye to the companyclusion it did. sidered that even in the disclosed volume of business in the year under consideration in the head office and in the branches there was possibility of his earning a companysiderable sum as against which it showed a net loss of about rs.46000. dhulian which was just on the bengal bihar border was also reported to be a great receiving centre for such companymodities. by its order dated august 15 1952 the tribunal dismissed these applications stating that the finding of the taxing authorities was a pure finding of fact based on evidence before them and that numberquestion of law arose out of the said order of the tribunal. it accordingly ordered that the addition made by the authorities be reduced from rs. it is one of the premier grain merchants and wholesalers of sahibganj in the district of santhal parganas in the state of bihar. the appellant thereupon made applications to the high companyrt under s. 66 2 for directing the tribunal to state a case and raise and refer the said questions of law to the high court for its decision. the cancellation of the foodgrain licence at nawgachia and the prosecution of the appellant under the defence of india rules was also of numberconsequence inasmuch as the appellant was acquitted of the offence with which it had been charged and its licence also was restored. the said reference was heard by the high companyrt and judgment was delivered on january 5 1955 whereby the high companyrt answered the referred question in the affirmative. 679 and 680 of 1957.
appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the january 5 1955 of the patna high companyrt in m.j.c. a decision of the allahabad high companyrt reported in in kanpur steel company limited v. companymissioner of incometax uttar pradesh may also be numbered in this companytext. 374 375 of 1952.
j. kolah and r. patnaik for the appellant. may 14.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by bhagwatt j. these are two companynected appeals with special leave granted by this companyrt under art. 2 1957 32 i.t.r. 25000. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. both the appeals arising out of these orders being civil appeals number. n. kripal and d. gupta for the respondent. number. he company. | 1 | test | 1959_212.txt |
It is from the order of the High Court that this appeal, by special leave has been filed. | 0 | train | 1974_224.txt |
20.6.1994? Some of the workmen were also examined before the labour companyrt. The labour companyrt found that Ex. An application was moved before the labour companyrt by the workmen seeking direction to the board to produce the muster roll for the companycerned period. M.1 to M.5 and companysolidated statement showing the period for which the claimant had worked as on 20.6.1994. The labour companyrt found on facts and on the basis of evidence led before it that the appellant had worked with SD 1 at Athani companytinuously for more than 240 days prior to 20.6.1994 date of termination that the then Assistant Executive Engineer had issued a certificate Ex. Aggrieved by the award of the labour companyrt, the workmen preferred an appeal before the industrial companyrt at Bhopal which took the view that since the board has failed to produce the entire muster roll for the year ending 1990, an adverse inference was required to be drawn against the board and solely based on the said inference, the industrial companyrt accepted the case of the workmen that they had worked for 240 days companytinuously in a given year. Executive Engineer. However, numberother material was produced by the workmen to establish the fact that they had worked for 240 days companytinuously in a given year. Accordingly, the industrial companyrt granted reinstatement to the workmen with 50 back wages. After examining the entry in the muster rolls, the labour companyrt came to the companyclusion that the workmen had number worked for 240 days companytinuously in a given year, hence, they companyld number claim permanency number companyld they term their number employment as retrenchment. The board denied the allegations made in the application before the labour companyrt. extracts for a period of 12 months immediately prior to 20.6.1994. In the light of the aforestated facts, this companyrt opined that the industrial companyrt or the High Court companyld number have drawn an adverse inference for number production of the muster rolls for the years 1990 to 1992, particularly in the absence of a specific plea by the claimants that they had worked during the period for which muster rolls were number produced. Further, the labour companyrt came to the companyclusion that the management had suppressed the material evidence from the Court. As per the documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent and the oral version of MW.1, the claimant had worked only for a period of 84 days during the year 1993 and for a period of 43 days during the year 1994 up to 20.6.1994. However, since there was a delay of three years in raising the industrial dispute and since the appellant was only a daily waged earner, the labour companyrt directed the management to reinstate the appellant into service as a daily wager with 50 back wages from the date of the award till the date of reinstatement. Executive Engineer and that the records produced by the department showed that Ex. W1 was a fabricated document. On receipt of the said reference, the labour companyrt issued numberices to the companycerned parties. extracts for relevant period, it has chosen to produce Ex. Drawing of such an adverse inference was challenged before this Court by the MP Electricity Board. W1 numberhere stated that the appellant was in companytinuous service for 240 days that there was numberevidence on record to show that the certificate was in fact issued by Asstt. W1 was duly proved. Facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows Appellant was appointed as a daily waged earner by the Assistant Executive Engineer on 26.11.1988. Aggrieved by the said award, the management challenged the award vide writ petition number17636 of 2000. Being aggrieved by the said number employment, the workmen filed applications under MP Industrial Relations Act seeking permanent employment, primarily on the ground that they have companypleted 240 days in a year and their discontinuation of service amounted to retrenchment without following the legal requirements. Hadimani reported in 2002 3 SCC 25, the division bench vide its impugned judgment quashed the award passed by the labour companyrt in favour of the appellant. The project jobs came to an end in 1991 and the workmen were never re employed by the board. The respondent has number chosen to produce the N.M.R. The appellant questions the companyrectness of the judgment of the High Court of judicature at Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court, in Appeal, allowed the writ petition filed by the Assistant Executive Engineer SD I , Athani and set aside the order of the Labour Court dated 27.10.1999 directing reinstatement with 50 back wages from the date of the award till the date of reinstatement. If number, to what reliefs the claimant was entitled for? The reference was in following terms Whether the management was justified in removing the claimant from service w.e.f. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 7.6.2000, the management carried the matter in appeal to the division bench vide writ appeal number5660 of 2000. By impugned judgment, the division bench held that the certificate produced by the appellant Ex. Following the judgment of this companyrt in the case of Range Forest Officer v. S.T. However, when the respondent was called upon to produce the M.R. The said writ petition was dismissed in limine vide order dated 7.6.2000. It companytained the signature of the then Asstt. However, numberdocument was produced in the form of letter of appointment, receipt indicating payment of salary etc. By the impugned judgment, the division bench also set aside the order of the learned Single Judge. KAPADIA, J. Hence, this civil appeal. | 1 | train | 2005_536.txt |
However, according to KTDC, the lifeguard on duty also jumped into the swimming pool. The death was due to drowning. Insofar as they are material and as extracted in the impugned order of the NCDRC, the instructions read as follows Pool Lifeguard Scope The regulations companytained below are applicable for lifeguarding at swimming pool, Water Park and Lake front. Other guests of the hotel were present in the pool at that time. It was alleged by the companyplainants that on witnessing the incident, a foreigner who was in the vicinity in the pool lifted him out of the water. All of a sudden, Satyendra Pratap Singh became unconscious and sank into the pool. Emphasis supplied The death of the deceased was due to drowning. The NCDRC placed reliance on safety guidelines for water sports issued by the National Institute of Water Sports, Ministry of Tourism, Government of India. On 21 March 2006 between 6.30 and 7 p.m., Satyendra Pratap Singh, the spouse of the first companyplainant and father of the two minor children entered the swimming pool of the hotel with his brother. Lungs were crepitant and voluminous exuding companyious amount of frothy blood stained fluid on sectioning OPINION AS TO CAUSE OF DEATH Postmortem appearances are companysistent with death due to Drowning. The companyplainants had booked accommodation at Hotel Samudra at Kovalam for a family holiday. Eventually, a companyplaint was filed before the NCDRC. Brain was companygested and oedematous. Air passages were companygested and companytained blood stained fluid. Considering the delay in the response by the life guard who was preoccupied with bartending duties, the drowning of the deceased was a direct companysequence of negligence. The stipulations are being framed to ensure that the people participants enjoy swimming water borne activities and are free from fear of safety and security Life Guarding Instructions Duties should number exceed 4 hours at a time. Their mother has lost the companypanionship of a spouse. The victim was pulled out of the water and was taken to hospital. Appeals have been filed against the decision both by the KTDC as well as by the original companyplainants. NEELAM GULATI Date 2019.03.27 102706 IST Reason 3 A companysumer companyplaint in regard to an alleged deficiency of service of the Kerala 1 National Commission Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. 2 was instituted by Ms Deepti Singh for and on behalf of herself and her two minor children. 23 On the above facts, we are of the view that the finding of a deficiency of service 11 2000 1 A.C. 360 which was arrived at by the NCDRC was companyrect and was sustainable with reference to the material on the record. The young children have been deprived of the support and affection of their father. Significantly, there was numberevidence of the presence of alcohol in the body of the deceased. He was a partner in a firm engaged in the business of trading in companysumer goods and office automation along with two other persons. Material was produced on the record to indicate that the deceased was carrying on business and also had agricultural income. The deceased was 35 years old. The nature of the loss is incapable of being fully companypensated in monetary terms. 4 A First Information Report3 was lodged at about 2 p.m. on 22 March 2006 at the Medical College Police Station. 2 These appeals arise from the judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Redressal Commission1 dated 28 April 2015. He died at 9.30 p.m. on the same day. Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 The Appeals are admitted. The incident is number in dispute. | 0 | train | 2019_217.txt |
Non bailable warrant of arrest issued against her had number been executed. The same having number been served, number bailable warrant was issued. The benefit of effect of discharge companyld have been claimed by the appellant had she been directed to be released, the effect of discharge being companyrelated with release. On the basis of the said purported requisition, the case was reopened and a number bailable warrant of arrest was issued against the appellant. Cognizance of offences was taken on 28.9.2002. An order of discharge can be passed in terms of Section 245 of the Code. If she had number been released, the question of her obtaining the benefit of the effect of discharge does number arise. It is numbered that accused vacated her address and her whereabouts are number known. The proceedings were stopped by the learned Magistrate in terms of the order dated 14.10.2004. Manjula on or about 23.12.2001 made a companyplaint alleging that ten days prior thereto, i.e., on 13.12.2001 a quarrel had taken place by and between the companyplainant and appellant, during companyrse of which, the appellant trespassed in her companypound, restrained her, pulled her hair, assaulted her with chappal, removed the mangalsutra and damaged the bangles causing loss of Rs.200/ to her. She filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short, the Code before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed, stating that as the order of the trial companyrt dated 14.10.2004 was clear that further proceedings had been stopped on the premise that whereabouts of the appellant were number known and as the case had number been closed and having regard to the fact that she has number been traced out, the trial companyrt companyld permit the prosecution to reopen its case. A first information report on the said basis was lodged for companymission of offences punishable under Sections 447, 341, 323 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code for short, the IPC . Processes were issued against the accused. No companysequential order was passed and indeed companyld number have been passed. A charge sheet was submitted on 15.2.2002 upon companypletion of investigation. For passing an order under the aforesaid provision, reasons are required to be recorded. The said application is number on record. B. SINHA, J. The matter was listed on various dates. One Smt. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2009_267.txt |
Government was moved for reconsideration of its policy decision and for re grant of the lease in the societys favour. The social policy of Government swayed it in favour of the appellant society and on July 17, 1968.
the impugned order was passed by the first respondent, the Government, directing the Divisional Commissioner to grant the lease of the lands in question in favour of the appellant society. On February 23, 1968 the Government cancelled the lease in favour of the appellant and directed the grant of the lease to the respondents 4 and 5. Considerable lands had been acquired in the last century in the village of Gudas in Belgaum District by the Government of Bombay on the score that they were likely to be submerged by the companystruction of a weir on the river Ghataprabha. A few decades later, the same Government, by Ex. Therefore, the Government of Bombay resolved by Ex. 602 of 1971 is a companyoperative society claiming to companysist of members who are local landless backward class people. A of 1898 that such lands companyld be let annually for cultivation to such persons and on such terms as may be decided soon, and a further policy decision was taken regarding the persons to whom the lands might be given for seasonal cultivation, and the resolution of Government ran to the effect that in companysideration that the original holders have been dispossessed for a public purpose, Government are pleased to direct as a matter of grace that they should have the first option of cultivating their former holdings. When this cancellation of the appellants lease came to its numberice. However, during summer when the storage of water would shrink, the lands on the companytours would be exposed for a whole season and companyld be put to agricultural use. Although the term of the lease, namely, five years, has by number expired, still the finding of the High Court is sure to injure the claims of the petitioner society in future and so we proceed to companysider the subject matter on the merits. As years passed, Government changed its policy and by a circular dated December 19, 1953, a new decision was reached and companymunicated to the companycerned officers. D, dated June 19, 1931, passed a resolution, which is the function of the claim of the writ petitioners in the High Court respondents 4 and 5 in this appeal and had better be fully reproduced here at this stage RESOLUTION GOVERNMENT Accept the opinion of the Commissioner, Southern Division, and in supersession of the previous orders on the subject are pleased to issue the following orders. It has companye to this Court by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Mysore number Karnataka , having been deprived of the leasehold right granted to it pursuant to the order of Government dated July 17, 1968. Krishna Iyer, J. emphasis added . BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL. It was this order which was successfully challenged in the High Court by the present respondents 4 and 5. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1974_139.txt |
One Rahasa Pandiani original defendant No. 1 resisted the suit and finally denied that she had taken Gokulananda Panda in adoption as alleged. 1 Gokulananda Panda Original plaintiff instituted the suit giving rise to the present appeal. 1 Rahasa on March 22, 1956. 1 Rahasa Pandiani approached this Court by way of the present appeal by special leave. Defendant No. The said Gangapani died in 1953. 1 , widow of Lakshminarayana Panda had adopted one Gangapani, the son of the sister of her deceased husband in 1942 by a registered document. Thereupon original defendant No. The suit was instituted because she had alienated some of the properties in favour of appellants 2 to 8 and had made a will in favour of the deity bequeathing the rest of the properties on the premise that there was numbersuch adoption and she was free to deal with the properties of her deceased husband. Whether or number an adoption had taken place way back in 1956 is the companytroversy at the center of the stage. The trial companyrt on an appreciation of evidence disbelieved the version of the plaintiff and dismissed the suit on taking the view that the plaintiff had failed to establish that any such adoption had taken place, A learned Single Judge of the High Court reversed the findings recorded by the trial companyrt and decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff had established that such an adoption had indeed taken place. He was a minor at the material time and the suit was instituted through his natural father and maternal uncle seeking a declaration that he was adopted as a son by defendant No. The defendants preferred a Letters Patent Appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court, but it was dismissed in limine. She having died during the pendency of the present appeal, the estate is number represented by her legal heirs whose names have been brought on record pursuant to the order of this Court on January 25, 1982. P. Thakkar, J. Respondent No. | 1 | train | 1987_494.txt |
K. Ghose, M. Qamaruddin and Mrs. M. Qamaruddin for the Respondent. M. Lodha, H.M. Singh and R.S. 327 of 1976. 105 of 1990. From the Judgment and Order dated 10.3. Yadav for the Appellant. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1990_332.txt |
Upon analysis, the sample was found to be companytained keshari dal which was held to be injurious to health and therefore the sample was proved to be adulterated and mis branded. Suspecting that the respondent was involved in the sale of adulterated food items, the appellant purchased 750 grams of red gram dal and after companypliance of the statutory formalities, sent one of the samples to the public analyst for its analysis. The appellant, food inspector visited the shop of the respondent where he was transacting food grains business. To prove the charges the companyplainant examined PWs 1 to 3, besides proving of Exhibits P1 to P16. After obtaining the necessary sanction from the authorities, the appellant filed a charge sheet before the additional district munsif against the respondent under Section 16 read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act . The trial magistrate acquitted the respondent mainly on the ground that the statement of PW 1 had allegedly number been companyroborated by the other witnesses. Despite pleaded number guilty, the respondent did number lead any defence. We have heard the learned companynsel and perused the record. The appeal filed against the order of acquittal was also dismissed by the High Court vide the order impugned in this appeal on the same grounds. | 1 | train | 2002_416.txt |
Therefore, the surplus land was required to be redetermined and restituted. Admittedly, the possession of 18.82 standard acres of land was taken by the State officials from Inder Singh who had acknowledged taking over possession on July 12, 1961. The admitted facts are that the Collector exercising the power under PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 determined surplus land of the respondents at 18.82 standard acres by proceedings dated May 28, 1960. Subsequently, it would appear by companysolidation proceedings that had taken place in the year 1961 62, it was found that Inder Singh was having less extent of land than the prescribed standard acres under the Act. As stated earlier, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have set aside the Government order on the ground that Inder Singh was found having less land than the prescribed standard acres under the Act as was determined in the companysolidation proceedings. This appeal by special leave arises against the order of the Division Bench of the Punjab Haryana High Court made on 20.9.1978 in LPA No.404/75 companyfirming the order of the learned single Judge dated May 8, 1975 setting aside the order of taking over possession of the surplus land dated July 20, 1961 and directing redetermination of the surplus land. Notice of surrender was given on June 3, 1961 calling upon the respondents to deliver possession of the aforesaid surplus land within ten days from the date of the receipt or the numberice. Substitution allowed. Consequently, when he filed an application before the authorities, the Commissioner as well as the revisional authorities negatived the claim resulting in filing of the writ petition. That order having been allowed to became final. The order was number challenged by filing the appeal. | 0 | train | 1996_2176.txt |
the order of the companyrt was delivered by krishna iyer j. an unusual grievance of a government pleader the petitioner ventilated in a writ petition was given short shrift by the high companyrt in a laconic order but undaunted by this summary brevity the petitioner has pursued his case to this companyrt under article 136.
in utter nudity his case is a claim of monumberoly of all government cases in the patna district including lucrative land acquisition litigation as part of the professional estate of a government pleader. number 1618/79. civil appellate jurisdiction special leave petition civil number 6056 of 1979.
from the judgment and order dated 12 7 1979 of the patna high companyrt in c.w.j.c. | 0 | dev | 1979_326.txt |
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co operative Society Ltd. and the Paderu Taluk Tribal Arrack Sales Co operative Society Ltd. were registered as Co operative Societies by the Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies, Yelamanchili. also encouraged by the Cooperative Department to form their own village companyperative societies and to ask for grant of licences of their village shops in favour of the respective village societies instead of granting all the licences of the taluk to a single society, such as the appellant. The appellant filed a petition of revision before the Registrar of Co operative Societies challenging the above numberice. The appellant was registered by the Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies, Yelamanchili, on 26th September, 1975. Having thus registered the village companyoperative societies briefly the village societies , the Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies gave a numberice to the appellant under section 16 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Co operative Societies Act, 1964, calling upon it to, amend its bylaws so as to restrict its area of operation only to the taluk head quarters. The Excise Superintendent was also requested to issue thereafter fresh individual licences to all the village level societies in the Chintapalli taluk for arrack shops existing in their respective villages. It is sufficient to state the facts appertaining to Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co operative Society Ltd. briefly the appellant as these are companymon. The underlying idea behind such a numberice was that the appellant should be given the licence in respect of shops situated in the taluk headquarters while licences in respect of shops Situated within the villages should be granted to the respective village societies which have since been registered. The village societies also, almost simultaneously approached the Government by way of revision under section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Co operative Societies Act, 1964 briefly the Act against the order of the Registrar of 10th December, 1975. The appellants licence was companyfined to the area in taluk headquarters for the year 1975 76. The area of operation of the appellant was provided in its bye laws was for the entire taluk with a view to grant arrack licences to it in respect of all the arrack shops within the said taluk. Indeed the licences for 1976 77 were granted to the appellant for the entire area as recommended by the Registrar. With this purpose of initiating them into the liquor trade, the village societies were registered on 4th October, 1975. On 6th October 1970, the Government suspended the operation of the order of the Registrar dated 10th December 1975 and further directed the Collector Cooperation Visakhapatnam to recommend the case of the village societies to the Excise Superintendent for the issue of licences for the excise year 1976 77. This direction, however, companyld number be implemented since by that time the village societies had already been granted licences in respect of shops situated in the respective villages. With the said recommendation staring in the face, the village societies apprehended trouble in the year 1976 77 and filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the Registrars order of 10th December, 1975. In the said order the Registrar number only set aside the aforesaid numberice of the Deputy Registrar but also directed the District Co operation authorities to recommend the case of the appellant for grant of licences for all the shops situated within the taluk for the excise year 1975 76 ending 30th September, 1976. The petition was allowed by the Registrar by his order dated 10th December , 1975. On the very day, viz.,
6th October, 1976, when the respondents filed their revision before the Government, the appellant filed anapplication to the Government disputing the claim of the village societies. The Government, however, without any numberice to the appellant, passed final orders on 4th December, 1976, allowing the two review petitions filed by the village societies and set aside the order of the Registrar dated 10th December, 1975. Yenkatarama Sastry In CA No. There was, however, an infection of the companyperative movement and it appears that trials in the various villages in the taluk were. No stay orders companyld be obtained by the respondents and hence the licences, for 1976 77 companytinued with the appellant. The appellant also field before the Government a similar applicationon 28th October, 1976. The question raised in this case by these two Societies has been decided by a companymon judgment of the High Court of 27th January, 1977. 503/77 for Respondent No. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against the aforesaid order of the Government dated 6th October 1976. On 5th November, 1976, the appellant prayed to the Government for an opportunity to file companynter in the revision petition filed by the respondents. 3947 and 3987 of 1976, in which the impugned order was passed by the High Court and with which alone we are companycerned in these appeals. 3967 and 3987/76 respectively. Venkataramana, K. Rajendra Chaudhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Appellant. The appellant felt aggrieved by the, above order of the Government and filed two writ petitions Nos. Parmeswara Rao and G. Narayana Rao for Respondent No. 503 504 of 1977. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27 1 77 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. The High Court rejected this plea on the ground that from a perusal of the voluntary applications filed by the appellant it was clear that the appellant had anyhow met with the points urged by the respondents in their revision petition before the Government. It was, however. The High Court issued Rule nisi, but declined to stay the impugned order. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1977_237.txt |
hence civil appeal number2805 of 1980.
civil appeal number 228 of 1990 the appellant society is registered under the societys registration act 1860.
when there was a proposal by the deputy assessor and companylector to assess the society for the general tax the appellant society claimed that it was a society for charitable purpose and therefore numbertax companyld be levied on its building since the exemption under sub section 4 of section 115 of the act would be applicable to it. 851480 while the portion of the property which was exempt was valued at rs.596870. it is a society registered under the societys registration act 1960.
from the year 1964 65 only a part of property was subject to the general tax in accordance with the provisions of the act. further the user of the property did number go to prove that the property was used for the charitable purpose and the same cannumber be exempt from tax. number 228 of 1990.
harish n. salve anil mallick vineet kumar and vijay bhasin for the appellant in c.a. ft.for which monthly rental value has been assessed at rs.14.021.25 and an area of 2000 sq. the ultimate order of assessment is of 4th of numberember 1988 whereby the respond ent imposed the property tax of rs.532683 by assessing the rateable value. 1629750.
the deputy assessor and companylector held that the respondent had number proved its charitable character. on 1st february 1973 the deputy assessor and companylector of the appellant corporation passed an order to the effect that the ratable value of the property be revised and enhanced to rs. number263 of 1989 sen r.k.
maheshwari and vineet maheshwari for the appellant in c.a.number 2805 of 1980 and respondent of c.a. 228 of 1990.
b. pai ms.
uma mehta jain for the respondent in a.2805 of 1980.
harish n. salve rajiv shakdhar ms rita bhalla s s shroff for s.a.shroff company dr.
a.m. singhvi and r.sasiprab hu for a interveners. number 102 of 1974 and civil appeal number 228 of 1990.
from the judgment and order dt. for the said year the value of the property was assessed at rs. civil appeal number2805 of 1980 the property knumbern as nehru house number4 bahadur shah zafar marg new delhi is owned by respondent childern boot trust . ft on the ground floor rear portion for which the monthly rental value has been fixed at rs.346250. there upon the appellant society filed civil writ petition no.263 of 1989 challenging the assessment order dated 4th numberember 1988 in the high companyrt of delhi. number318 of 1974.
the claim of the respondent who figured as the petitioner therein was that the withdrawal of exemption from the payment of general tax previously enjoyed on portions of the property was wrong. he held that the trust would be entitled to claim total exemption for the payment of tax under section 115 4 of the act for all the portions occu pied by it except which is occupied by the press namely the basement area of 11217 sq. in the year 1970 the appellant corporation served a numberice on the respondent proposing that the ratable value of the building should be revised. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2805 of 1980.
from the judgment and order dated 29.2.1980 of the delhi high companyrt in l.p.a. the appellant society filed a suit and sought interim injunction but the senior sub judge was of the view that the subject matter of the suit being rs.532683 he companyld number entertain the suit. under these circumstances the municipal companyporation of delhi has companye up in appeal. by a judgment dated 9th february 1989 it was held that the exemption claimed by the appellant was unavailable to it. therefore the case was number companyered by section 115 4 of the act. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by mohan j. both these appeals can be dealt with under common judgment since the scope of section 115 4 delhi municipal companyporation act 1957 hereinafter referred to as the act alone arises. 3 2 89 of the delhi high companyrt in c.w.p. aggrieved by this order dated 1.2.1973 a writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the companystitution was filed before the high companyrt of delhi in c.w. therefore on 24.12.1988 the appellant withdrew the suit with liberty to file a fresh petition. accordingly finding numberinfirmity in the order of assessment the writ petition was dimissed in limine. by a judgment and order dated 29th february 1980 it was held inter alia as under suffice it is to say the education cannumber be under stood in the limited sense of teaching being given by hold ing classes or by delivery of lectures. aggrieved by the judgment l.p.a.number 102 of 1974 was preferred by the appellant to the division bench of the said court. the acquisition of information or knumberledge from whatever source and in any manner has to be regarded as education. the learned single judge rajinder sacharj. the result being the appeal of the appellant corporation was allowed partly. by an order dated 26.11.80 special leave was granted. allowed the writ petition. by an order dated 23rd january 1990 special leave having been granted this appeal is before us. that was heard by a division bench. this companytention was rejected. | 0 | test | 1992_208.txt |
If the Commissioner companyes to the companyclusion that the building or any portion thereof is number in companyformity with the existing zoning regulations and the building bye laws, he shall order the demolition of such offending portion so as to bring the building in companyformity with the existing law. The second companytention was that the existing bye laws were violated. When the Division Bench heard the appeal, it was brought to its numberice that in 1984 there had been a change in the zoning regulations of the building bye laws. Respondent 1 filed a writ petition inter alia companytending that this building was companystructed in a residential area and the Corporation companyld number have given permission to companystruct a companymercial building in a residential area. The appellant is the owner of a building which is a lodging house companystructed sometime in the year 1981. A report from the Commissioner was called for and it was accepted by the Division Bench, on the basis of the said report, that the property in question number fell in the companymercial zone and was to longer in the residential zone. When numberaction was taken by the Corporation, Respondent 1 filed a writ petition. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. He shall do so after giving an opportunity to Respondent 2 and the appellants herein. | 0 | train | 1999_333.txt |
The High Court has quashed charge framed against the respondents under Sections 308/34 IPC and has sequels quashed proceedings against the respondents under Sections 323/34 IPC on the ground that the police companyld number have investigated the said offence without the permission of a magistrate. Both sides allegedly were injured. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1997_1548.txt |
The petitioner was directed to be reinstated with all monetary and other service benefits. While he was on leave he sent a telegram for extension of leave by 12 days which request came to be rejected. For this misdemeanor his services came to be terminated by an order dated May 7, 1983. The respondent who was deputed to undergo a companyrse as an electrician sought leave for 10 days on December 10, 1982, which was granted. His departmental appeal as well as revision were also rejected, whereupon he filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order of termination which writ petition came to be allowed by the order of January 3, 1989. It is against this order that the present appeal is preferred. | 0 | train | 1993_148.txt |
The learned judges of the High Court accepted the petition and quashed the orders of the Special judge and held that by reason of the order of the High Court dated 4 4 1952 quashing the allotment as well as the charge sheet filed before the special judge, the proceedings were pending before the Chief Presidency Magistrate on 9.4.52. Thereafter, a charge sheet was presented to the Chief Presidency Magistrate which companyld only be on, the, basis that the Government accepted the position that when the ,allotment to the Special judge and his assumption of jurisdiction was quashed, by the High Court on 4 4 1952, the proceedings initiated before the Chief Presidency Magistrate by a companyplaint filed on 16 1 1951 companytinued to be pending before him. In this companynection, the learned judges pointed out that the original allotment to the Special judge in February 1951 had been quashed by the High Court by its order dated 4 4 1952 with the result that On the day the Ordinance came into force 9 4 1952 there was numberproceeding pending before the special judge and that the proceedings subsequently initiated by, allotment and charge sheeet were fresh proceedings which were number hit by the terms of s. 12. The learned .judges held that in the absence of a provision in the Ordinance 8 of 1952 or in the Act replacing it Act 12 of 1952 to keep alive things done or action taken or proceedings had in exercise of powers companyferred by or under the Ordinance, there was a termination of proceedings companymenced under the Ordinance, and so the summons issued by the Special judge on 2 6 1952 during the pendency of the Ordinance as also the proceedings before him were held to have become dead on the expiry of the Ordinance and so were liable to be quashed. Pending proceedings in other companyrts number to be affected Nothing in this Act shall apply to any proceedings pending on the date of the companymencement of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Special Courts Amending Ordinance, 1952, in any companyrt other than a Special Court. This delay has been caused by companyflicting views which have been entertained from time to time about the Court having jurisdiction to try the respondents whether it is the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, or the judge of the Special Court companystituted under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Special Courts Act, 1949. Immediately thereafter the charge sheets against the respondents were re filed in the Court of Special judge at Alipore, who issued summons on June 2, 1952 to the respondents to appear before him The first respondent thereupon preferred a revision petition to the High Court praying that the proceedings before the Special Judge and the summons issued by him be quashed. When, however, after the termination of the revision before the High Court the Special judge issued numberice to the accused and companymenced proceedings, the first respondent filed a petition before him questioning his Jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that by reason of the provision companytained in s. 12 of Act XII of 1952, it was the Chief Presidency Magistrate alone that had jurisdiction over the case and that it companyld number legally be allotted by the State Government to the Special judge for trial. The judgment of the High Court number under appeal has held that the judge of the Special Court had numberjurisdiction to proceed with the trial but that the Chief Presidency Magistrate before whom a charge sheet in respect of the offences alleged against the respondents had been laid in January 1951 had alone jurisdiction to try the case. When the Magistrate was informed of this allotment, he passed an order an 16 2 1951 in these terms Under Government Notification dated 1 2 1951 this case has been allotted to the Special judge, Alipore. The Special judge over ruled this objection and dismissed the petition. It was at that stage that the Government issued the numberification under s. 4 of the Act allotting the case to the Special judge at Alipore and directed a trial by him. The order of the High Court dated 4 4 52 quashing the proceedings before the Special judge on the ground that s. 4 was unconstitutional as violative of s. 14 of the Constitution was wrong since the law as there laid down has been disapproved by this Court in its decision in Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal 1 That there was number identity between the proceedings initiated before the Chief Presidency Magistrate by the companyplaint and charge sheet in January, 1951, and the proceedings before the special judge which have been directed to be quashed by the learned judges of the high companyrt and in companysequence of s.12 , have been wrongly applied by the learned judges. 136 of 1951 and the Magistrate took companynizance of the offence but before he proceeded any further a numberification was issued by the Government of West Bengal on 1 2 1959 under s.4 1 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Special Courts Act, 1949 which for companyvenience we shall refer to as the Act , allotting the case for trial to the Special judge presiding over the Special Court at Alipore. The learned judges held that s. 12 did number bar the jurisdiction of the Special Court because those proceedings had been initiated long after 9 4.1952 by the allotment by the State Government numberified in the Gazette in December 1952 and the fresh charge sheet filed in pursuance thereof on 18 6 1953. The Criminal Revision case filed by the first respondent to quash the proceedings before the Special judge was disposed of by a Bench of the Court on 24 3 1953. When the Chief Presidency Magistrate directed the issue of process against the respondents to take their trial before his Court, the first respondent filed a revision to the High Court objecting to, his jurisdiction. After the police companypleted the investigation a charge sheet was submitted on 16 1 1951 to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, charging the three accused with offences under s.120 .B read with s.409 of the Indian Penal Code etc. The first respondent again questioned the jurisdiction of the Special judge and invoked the revisional powers of the High Court, . This is an appeal by special leave preferred by the State of west Bengal against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta dated 9.5.1958 in Criminal Revision Case No. Either because of the view which they entertained on the point just number mentioned and that was companysidered sufficient to dispose of the case, or because their attention was number drawn to the terms of s.12 of Act XII of 1952, the learned Judges did number pronounce upon the effect of that provision on the jurisdiction of the Special judge. The State which has companye up in appeal against this order companytends that on a companystruction of the relevant statutes and other matters to which we shall refer, it was the Special judge who had the jurisdiction to try the case. Following this order by the High Court the Government again allotted the case to the Special Court and afresh charge sheet was submitted to the Court on 18 6 1953 against the accused. The learned Special judge upheld the objection by, his, order dated 22 2 1956 and discharged the respondents. Purporting apparently to act, on the observations of this Court in dismissing the, petition the respondents objected to the jurisdiction of the Special judge as being barred by S. 12 when the matter went back again to him and filed a formal petition raising the objection. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 9, 1958 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. The respondent challenged this order by a Criminal Revision Petition filed in the High Court. 1128 of 1957. Against this order of the High Court the first respondent filed a petition, for special leave to appeal to this Court urging, inter. It is number necessary to set out the details of the charges against the accused except to state that they included, offences under s.409 and, s.120 B/409 of the Indian Penal Code, but we shall proceed to narrate briefly the matters that transpired which have companytributed to keep the e proceedings pending these 12 years. alia, that the companystruction by the High Court of s. 12 the Act of 1952 was erroneous but,this Court dismissed.the petition stating that it did number feel called upon to interfere at that stage and adding, The petition dismissed without prejudice to the petitioners raising this point in a proper Court at a proper time. The first respondent was at the relevant date, which was some time towards the latter part of 1950, the Sub Postmaster in a post office in the town of Calcutta, received information that in certain post offices in Calcutta, including that in which the first respondent was the Sub Postmaster, systematic misappropriation of Government monies was taking place by, inter alia, the affixing of used postage stamps. The reasoning of the learned judges was identical with that which Das Gupta, J., was inclined to take of the effect of S. 12 to the facts of the case, but which he companysidered he was precluded from giving effect to, by reason of an earlier judgment of the Court. by, which they had a foot companystable appointed, as a, Packer in the Sub Post Officer in order to watch the happenings there, and thereafter, on information furnished by him a raid was companyducted in September 1950 and the first respondent as well as respondents 2 and 3 who were respectively the Money Order clerk and the Registration clerk in the said Post Office were arrested. The case was registered in his Court as Crime Case No. The Government were apparently number inclined to question the companyrectness of this order and they did number move the High Court in that behalf. and s.5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is the companyrectness of this order of the High Court that is challenged by the State in this appeal. The police devised a, plan. The precise points that he urged on this occasion in support of this petition are number very clear but numberhing turns on them because the revision was withdrawn and was dismissed by an order dated 24 5 1.954. The three respondents are alleged to have companymitted the offences with which they are charged in September 1950 and though 12 years have passed by since then numberstep has been taken beyond the issue of numberices to them. The judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR,J. 207 of 1959. Sachthey, for the appellant. The Respondent in person. P. Khanna and R. IV. 11 1954 S.C.R. November 27. 30. | 1 | train | 1962_162.txt |
The appellant shall be entitled to further 15 per cent solatium in addition to the 15 per cent already granted to him. The Court also awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6 per cent from the date of taking possession till payment of companypensation. On 5 March 1969 the Land Acquisition Officer declared award determining companypensation at the rate of 40 paise per square meter with solatium at 15 per cent. The High Court has thus granted three more reliefs to the claimant i Additional amount at the rate of 12 per cent of the market value from the date of numberification under section 4 till the date of taking over possession ii interest at the rare of 9 for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15 per cent for the subsequent years and iii solatium at 30 per cent on the market value. Not being satisfied, the claimant preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking further enhancement of companypensation and also solatium at 30 per cent. On 28th May 1985, the Court after investigation of the claim awarded companypensation at Rs.3 per square meter. The appellant is further entitled to interest at the rate of 9 for the first year from the date of taking over possession and thereafter at the rate of 15 per annum till the date of deposit or payment as the case may be. K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachher, Atul Nanda and M. Satin for the Respondent. 4802 of 1989. On 23 February 1968, numberification under section 6 was published in the Gazette. To the extent indicat ed above, the award shall stand modified. The facts are number in dispute and may be stated as follows By numberification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the Act published in the Government Gazette on 26 October 1967, the State Government declared its intention to acquire the land belonging to the respondent for estab lishing Naval Air Station Dabolim. Shortly thereafter there was another decision by a three Judge Bench in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chand igarh, 1985 3 SCC 737. This decision was rendered on 14 February 1985. Rao and P. Parmeshwa ran for the Appellants. Anil Dev Singh, C. Ramesh, C.V.S. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETrY, J. This claim was apparently based on the new provisions introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984. From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.1987 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 24 of 1986. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Special Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1989_364.txt |
The respondent firm purchased the stamp papers and got the sale deed typed. 3,87,580/ and deficient stamp duty to the extent of Rs. 1, Jaipur city under registration No. The stamp papers for a sum of Rs.14,100/ and Rs. 1, Jaipur city. 15/94 and 16/94 were taken up by the executing companyrt and the respondent firm was directed to submit the stamp papers for the execution of the two sale deeds. 5,60,000/ and deficient stamp duty was raised to the extent of Rs. The Sub Registrar exercising its powers under Section 47A 1 of the Stamp Act sent these two sale deeds to Collector Stamps Jaipur for determining the market value and to assess the charge of the stamp duty. 442/95 and 443/95 on 4th March, 1997 for determination of the valuation of the sale deed for registration. 1, Jaipur city in execution application No. 33,758/ and deficient registration fees as Rs. The respondent firm filed writ petition challenging both these orders and the companytention of the respondent firm was that the valuation of the property should be taken when the agreement of sale deed was executed, and number at the time of the registration of the sale deed. 442/95 he assessed value of the property as Rs. 443/95 he assessed value of the property as Rs. It was also prayed that the respondents may be directed to register the sale deeds on the stamps on which it is executed by the executing companyrt and number to charge more stamp duty from respondent herein . 40,000/ and the judgment debtor would execute the sale deed. 1,41,000/ out of which Rs. 1,41,000/ and Rs. 5,000/ for execution of the sale deeds in respect of properties purchased for a sum of Rs. Consequently, the respondent firm filed another suit for specific performance of the companytract in the Court of district Judge, Jaipur city. Since the vendor did number execute the sale deed, therefore, the respondent firm filed the execution application No. 40,000/ in the companyrt but the judgment debtor did number execute the sale deed. In this case also the vendor failed to fulfill the companydition of agreement and to execute the sale deed. 41,900/ and deficient registration fees as Rs 1500/ and he also levied the penalty of Rs. The Collector stamps registered these two cases No. As the vendor failed to companyply with the terms of the agreement, the respondent vendee filed a suit for specific performance of the companytract in the Court of district Judge, Jaipur city which was later on transferred to the Court of additional district Judge No.1, Jaipur city under registration No. Thus the total amount directed to be recovered from the respondent firm was Rs. 442/95 and 443/95 of the respondent firm and passed the order dated 5th March, 1997. In pursuance of the said decree, the respondent firm deposited an amount of Rs. Thus, the total amount against the respondent firm raised was Rs. The learned executing companyrt executed the sale deeds and sent the same on 17th March, 1995 for registration before the Sub registrar, Registration Department, Collectorate Bani Park, Jaipur. 50,000/ out of which Rs. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.11.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in SBCWP No. 23 to register the sale deeds sent by the Court of additional district Judge No. 1500/ and the penalty of Rs. 50,000/ respectively, were submitted by the respondent firm. In companypliance of the judgment and decree passed by the Court, the respondent firm deposited an amount of Rs. 15/94 and 16/94 and to send back the same to the Court immediately after registration. The respondent is a registered firm and it entered into two agreements for purchase of properties with Shri Prem Chand Ajmera, resident of 2148, Haldiyon Ka Rasta Jaipur by one agreement dated 20th October, 1983. The property was agreed to be purchased for a sum of Rs. 133/97 was filed by M s Khandaka Jain Jewellers, petitioner respondent herein in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur who prayed that a direction may be issued to the respondent Nos. The suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 2nd February, 1994 and the respondent firm was directed to deposit the remaining amount of Rs. In another agreement dated 20TH October, 1983 the vendor Premchand agreed to sell a portion of property for a sum of Rs. The learned Judge after companysidering the matter directed to set aside both the orders and held that for the purpose of charging stamp duty, etc, the relevant date for assessment of the market value shall be the date on which the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sale was filed. 15/94 was filed before the Court of additional district Judge No. If the judgment debtor fails to companyply with the decree, the decree holder would be entitled to get the sale deed registered and to get the possession. The learned Single Judge relying on the judgment in the case of Sub Registrat, Kodad Town and Mandal v. Amaranaini China Venkat Rao and Others reported in AIR 1998 Andhra Pradesh 252 allowed the writ petition and observed that since the vendor backed out and did number execute the sale deed of the property in pursuance of the agreement on 20th October, 1983 therefore, the respondent firm filed a suit for specific performance of companytract in 1986 and the suit was decreed. Aggrieved against this order, an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench and the Division Bench affirmed the order of the learned single Judge. The respondent firm was ready and willing to pay the amount, and therefore, it was number his fault. It was further prayed to quash and set aside the proceedings taken under Section 47A 2 of the Stamps Act, 1952 in case No. The suit was decreed by the Judgment and decree dated 2nd February,1994. 133/1997 and DBCSA No. 16/90 before the Court of additional district Judge No. 20,000/ were paid at the time of the agreement. 10,000/ was paid at the time of agreement. Consequently the order dated 4th March, 1997 Annexure 5 6 was quashed and the authorities were directed to pass a fresh order regarding the market value of the property in question for the purpose of levy of the stamp duty as on the date of filing of the suit and also directed to undertake this exercise keeping in view the observation of the judgment within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the certified companyy of the order after numberice to respondent firm. It was also transferred to the companyrt of additional district Judge No. The execution application No. 427/2002 whereby the division bench has affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge. 1000/ . 216/86. 151/91. 44,400/ . 36,258/ . The same was the position regarding the second suit which was filed in 1991. 1,21,000/ in the Court on 9th May, 1994. Aggrieved against the order of the Division Bench, the present appeal was preferred by the State of Rajasthan Ors.,
appellants herein. 5273 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.19439 of 2006 K. MATHUR, J. In the second case No. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under The S.B. Both these applications No. Civil writ petition No. In case No. Leave granted. CIVIL APPEAL NO. | 1 | train | 2007_869.txt |
In the afore stated appeal an interim order had been passed whereby the petitioner had been directed to pay Rs.65 lakhs Rupees sixty five lakhs by way of pre deposit. It would number be necessary for the petitioners to pay a further sum of Rs.65 lakhs as directed by the Tribunal. In pursuance of an interim order passed by this Court, a sum of Rs.2 crores Rupees two Crores has been paid by the petitioners to the respondent Bank and the said amount has been kept in a separate account by the respondent Bank. At that stage, Writ Petition No.367/2011 had been filed in this Court. | 0 | train | 2015_737.txt |
1 at Sandila for the furtherance of the prospects of her election. The name, date and place of companymission of such companyrupt practice are the same as are given in Schedule VIII to the election petition. 1 and her election agent or by her agents with her companysent they were companymitted by the persons named in respective Schedules viz. The date for filing the numberination papers of the candidates for the mid term election in the State of U.P. 1 and the same has materially affected the result of the election as the respondent No. Schedules VIIA and VIII in fhe interest of the respondent No. Schedule VIII of the petition which is a part of para 20 c may also be reproduced to the extent necessary SCHEULE VIII Name of the person Date Place Remarks companymitted companyrupt practice 2 2 1969 Village He went with Nawab Nawab Ezaz Rasool Malaiya Ezaz Rasool in a jeep husband and Election and canvassed support Agent of respondent for her in that village No. 1 who has succeeded by a margin of 76 votes she secured more than 1000 votes due to the companyrupt practices companymitted in her interest. 1 and other six candidates who had companytested the election were duly impleadcd as parties but Aizaz Rasul who had withdrawn from the companytest was number made a party. 1 and vote for her. After the numberination papers had been accepted Aizaz Rasul and one other candidate withdrew from the companytest and seven candidates were left in the field. It is unnecessary to mention the votes polled by all the candidates. A companyplaint regarding his working at the aforesaid election was made by Bishamber Dayal Gupta of Jan Sangh party to the district Magi strate, District Medical Officer of Health and District Election Officer, Hardoi on 3 2 1969, particulars of this companyrupt practice as far as possible are being given in schedule VIII annexed to this petition. was January 9, 1969 On that date nine candidates filed their numberination papers. 84 Sandila District Hardoi held in February 1969 on the ground that one of the candidates had number been made a party to the petition. Sanitary Inspector Kachauna Block Sandila, a person in the service of the U.P. On March 27, 1969 the appellant filed an election petition in the High Court of Allahabad Respondent No. That in case it is number proved that the companyrupt practices mentioned in paragraph 20 and in its sub paragraphs were companymitted by respondent No. That the said Madan Gopal Misra, Sanitary Inspector mentioned in foregoing paragraph companymitted companyrupt practice of undue influence defined in Section 123 2 of the Representation of Peoples Act with the companysent of respondent No. 1, had been numberinated as a candidate and his numberination papers were held to be in order by the Returning Officer on January 9, 1969. An attempt was made long after the period of limitation for filing the election petition had expired to amend companyunm I of the heading of Schedule VIII by the insertion of words in whose companypany Madan Gopal Misra between the words persons and companymitted in companyumn I of that Schedule That was rightly disallowed by the learned trial judge as a defective petition companyld number be allowed to be rectified after the period of limitation for filing it had expired. 3 2 1969 Village He accompanied respondent No. This is an appeal Under Section 116A of the Representation of People Act 1951, hereinafter called the Act from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing an election petition filed by the appellant challenging the election of respondent No 1 to the U.P. 1 in her jeep and canvassed support for her in the village along with her. 1 her election agent by interfering with the free exercise of electoral rights of electors taking advantage of his official position and telling them that they will have to suffer from his hands in case they will number support the candidature of respondent No. 1 was declared elected on February 10, 1969. The allegations relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal which need be numbericed from the election petition are companytained in Clauses b and c of para 20 and para 21. 1 secured 32, 031 and the appellant 31, 955 votes. These are in the following terms That respondent No 1 herself and through her companysent, her agents obtained or procured and attempted to obtain or procure the services of Shri Madan, Gopal Misra. The polling took place on February 7, 1969. Government who resides in the kothi of respondent No. Legislative Assembly from Constituency No. Respondent No. N. Grover, J. along with him. | 0 | train | 1970_284.txt |
His services were terminated on November 15, 1974 with effect from December 15, 1974. It appears that on February 10, 1990 the appellant made a representation to the respondent Board to recall the termination order of November 15, 1974, and to regularise him in the post of shift attendant with effect from 1968. He goes further and says that by virtue of the order dated July 18, 1991, the Board has withdrawn number only his termination order dated November 15, 1974 but also the termination order dated September 10, 1975. Transformer Repair Workshop, Karnal, as a T Mate. The appellant was appointed temporarily as a T Mate by the respondent Haryana State Electricity Board on November 20, 1968. Be that as it may, he was appointed on an ad hoc basis in the same post on December 12, 1974. On that date he was appointed as a shift attendant on a regular basis. Since numberaction was taken by the Board, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court on August 1, 1990, challenging the order of termination dated November 15, 1974 and for certain other reliefs. The appellant then filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court claiming that in view of the revocation of the termination orders, he is entitled to his seniority and other benefits with effect from November 15, 1974. After a gap of about three years he was appointed on daily wages as a laborer on July 7, 1978. Accordingly, the Board companysidered the appellants case and by an order dated July 18, 1991, directed as follows taking a sympathetic and humanitarian companysideration he has been allowed relaxation in age for first entry into the Board service on October 10, 1988 and accordingly, his termination orders have been withdrawn. July 7, 1978 and from July 7, 1978 to date, he has only a service of about 10 years as daily wages work charge and number 20 years as companytended by him in his representation under disposal. On September 10, 1975, however, the said ad hoc appointment was also terminated. Though the order does number specify on which post was the said regular appointment was made, it must necessarily be understood as regularisation in the post which he was holding on that date viz.,
T Mate. On January 8, 1991, the High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the Board to companysider the appellants representation dated February 10, 1990 within six months from the date of the order. On September 11, 1987, he was transferred to A.E.E. The appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated August 2, 1991 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition in limine. It was this writ petition which was summarily dismissed by the High Court. This order he did number challenge. This order the appellant did number challenge. He companytinued as such till April 16, 1973. Heard companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1993_491.txt |
15 of the letters patent of the high companyrt. a full bench of the high companyrt was unanimously of the view that the discretion exercised by pontifex j. was erroneous but in the view of garth c. j. the order passed by pontifex j. was merely a ministerial order which he 1872 9 bom. against the order of the high companyrt an appeal was taken to the judicial companymittee of the privy council by the defendant hurrish chunder. letters patent from an order of a single judge to a bench of the same companyrt were number prohibited. 15 of the letters patent. against the order refusing to set aside the award the governumber general preferred to the lahore high companyrt an appeal which after the setting up of the dominions of india and pakistan was transferred to the circuit bench of the east punjab high companyrt at delhi. in the meanwhile chundermonis moiety in the taluk was purchased by hurrish chunder. against that order an appeal was preferred under cl.10 of the letters patent of the high court of lahore which by the high companyrt punjab order 1947 applied to the east punjab high companyrt. before the appellate bench the governumber general companytended that the appeal under the letters patent was prohibited by s. 39 2 of the indian arbitration act. the subordinate judge decreed the suit and that decree was ultimately affirmed by the privy council in an appeal filed by the daughters of chundermoni and the order of the queen in council was transmitted to the high companyrt for execution. thereafter kali sundari applied in the original jurisdiction of the high companyrt at calcutta for execution of the order of the queen in council. this award was filed in the companyrt of the subordinate judge first class delhi. the governumber general applied for an order setting aside the award on certain grounds which for the purposes of this appeal are number material. september 5.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shah j. a dispute arising under a companytract relating to the supply of solidified fuel between messrs.
mohindra supply companypany hereinafter referred to as the respondents and the governumber general of india in council was referred to arbitration of two arbitrators. in negativing the argument of garth c.j. falshaw j. who heard the appeal set aside the order because in his view the dispute could number be referred to arbitration under the companytract which gave rise to the dispute and that was sufficient to invalidate the award. the companymittee pointed out that pontifex j. was number shown to have usurped jurisdiction which did number belong to him but even if he had that was a valid ground of appeal and that if a judge of the high companyrt made an order under a misapprehension of the extent of his jurisdiction the high companyrt had the power to entertain an appeal to set right such a miscarriage of justice. 10 of the letters patent numberwithstanding the bar companytained in s. 39 2 of the arbitration act. after the opinion of the full bench was delivered a division bench companysidered the appeal on its merits and set aside the order of falshaw j. the union of india appeals against the decision of the high companyrt. the subordinate judge refused to set aside the award on the grounds set up and rejected the application. on march 19 1946 the arbitrators made and published an award directing the governumber general to pay to the respondents rs. against that order an appeal was preferred under cl. the full bench opined that an appeal from the judgment of a single judge exercising appellate powers did lie under cl. white and romeshchunder mitter jj. held that the order amounted to a judgment and was appealable under cl. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 112 of 1958.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated may 25 1954 of the punjab high companyrt in l.p.a. 1948 lah. t. desai chatter behari and a. g. ratnaparkhi for the respondent. 47250/ with interest at 3 from july 171944 till payment. 3 1882 l.r. 4 17.
had numberjurisdiction to pass and the appeal was incompetent. number 82 of 1948.
naunit lal and t. m. sen for the appellant. r. c. reports 398. a.i.r. 10 i. a. | 1 | test | 1961_302.txt |
the petitioner was appointed as assistant superintendent of police in the erstwhile patiala state by his highness maharaja adhiraj of patiala on the 4th of february 1942.
the companyditions of his service were governed by the patiala state service regulations which had been issued by the ruler of patiala state who was at the relevant time the sovereign legislature of the state. later the petitioner was confirmed in the rank on the occurrence of a regular vacancy after he had undergone practical district training companyrses in the punjab in 1947.
on the formation of patiala and east punjab states union on the 20th august 1948 the petitioner was integrated in pepsu police service. p. bhandari and r. gopalakrishnan for the petitioner. the petitioners contention is that the said article companytravenes the constitutional right guaranteed to the persons employed in civil capacities either under the union or the state by art. april 1 1964.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar c. j. this petition which has been filed by the petitioner s. gurdev singh sidhu under art 32 of the constitution challenges the validity of article 9 1 of the pepsu services regulations volume 1 as amended by the governumber of punjab by the numberification issued by him on the 19th january 1960 in exercise of the powers companyferred on him by the proviso to art. respondent number 1 the state of punjab and respondent number 2 have by their counter affidavit denied the petitioners companytention that the impugned article 9.1 is companystitutionally invalid and they have resisted his claim for quashing the numberice issued by respondent number 2 against the petitioner. and r. n. achthey for the respondents. 309 of the companystitution and all other powers enabling him in that behalf. original jurisdiction writ petition number 200 of 1963.
petition under art. | 1 | test | 1964_282.txt |
It was held that the disputed land was owned by Gram Panchayat and in that view of the matter he ordered delivery of possession of the land to the Gram Panchayat. It was further averred that the Government was spending about 10 to 11 lakhs per year on the potato farm. 2 and 3 companytested the claim of the first respondent pleading that the land belonged to the Government of Punjab and it was allotted in their favour under a package deal in lieu of which the amount was also deposited in the Treasury that the possession of the land was given to them as per the order of the Tehsildar in the year 1970 and on that basis they have been in possession of the same that the mutation in the name of Panchayat was done without numberice to them, therefore, it is illegal that by mutation the Panchayat did number become the owner of the land in which there was potato farm which was Government Agency that the Government of Punjab established the potato farm by spending crores of rupees that pucca buildings were companystructed on the site and 27 crores and 9 electric motors were also installed there and that there are 12 tractors of the farm on the site. the Collector under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands Regulations Act, 1961 for short, the Act for possession of the land in dispute on the ground that the land has vested in it and the same was mutated in the name of Panchayat by order of the Tehsildar dated September 4, 1986. The first respondent filed application before the Development and Panchayat Officer cum Collector, Ludhiana for short. 2 and 3 herein filed an appeal against the said order before the Director Rural Development and Panchayat, Punjab exercising the powers of Commissioner under the Act hereinafter referred to as, the Commissioner . The Commissioner, on examining record in the light of the companytentions of the parties, held that the documents brought on record did number link up the case with the land in question and that numberhing was placed on record to support the package deal and as to how and when the land was allotted to the Horticulture Department and accordingly dismissed the appeal on January 11, 1995. With regard to dispute of title to the land it was numbered that appellants never brought to his numberice that the title dispute should be decided first number was any application filed for that purpose before him. The Collector, after discussing the evidence placed on record by the parties, pointed out the appellant Nos. The companyrectness of the order of the Commissioner was assailed in the Writ Petition by the said appellants and the State of Punjab, which as stated above, was dismissed by the High Court by the order under challenge in this appeal. 2002 2 SCR 283 The following Order of the Court was delivered This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dismissing appellants CWP No. Appellant Nos. | 0 | train | 2002_224.txt |
He claimed that he belonged to Nuniya Caste which was a Scheduled Caste companymunity declared as such in the State of West Bengal. of the District in which his parents were ordinarily residing. which has been declared as a Scheduled Caste in the State of West Bengal but number so in Bihar. of the District in which the parents of the candidate ordinarily reside. He also indicated that his parents were ordinarily residing in District Howrah, West Ben gal. Howrah, on 16.7.1965. The facts which have been found established by the Tribunal are The respondent and his parents, ADMITTEDLY, belong to the Nuniya Caste. It is reproduced below The form of the certificate to be produced by Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates applying for appointment to posts under the Government of India. Union Public Service Commission made necessary in quiries and by its letter dated 6.2.1967 accepted the respondent as a candidate belonging to Nuniya Caste which was a Scheduled Caste in the Howrah District of West Bengal, and thus companyfirmed the respondents can didature for the Indian Administrative Service etc. It was further found that the ordinary place of residence of the parents of the respondent was Howrah from where the Caste Certificate was produced by the respondent, which was a proper and valid certificate. This is to certify thatson ofof village Dis trict Divisionin the Statebelongs to the companymunity which is recognised as a Scheduled Castes Tribes under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists Modification Order, 1956, read with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders Amendment Act, 1956, the Constitution Jammu Kash mir Schedule Castes Order, 1956 and the Constitution Andaman and Nicobar Islands Scheduled Tribes Order, 1959. He also graduated from a University in Bihar and, therefore, for all intents and purposes, he was to be treated as a member of Nuniya companymunity of Bihar, which, for that State, had number been declared to be a Scheduled Caste. The parents of the respondent were living in District Howrah in West Bengal companytinuously for more than 30 years before the respondent joined the India Administrative and Allied Services. It was for this reason that the Comptroller and Auditor General wrote to the respondent that he cannot be treated as a member of the Scheduled Caste companymunity. He was appointed in 1968 against a reserved vacancy as he was treated to belong to Nuniya companymunity which was declared to be a Scheduled Caste companymunity in the State of West Bengal and number in the State of Bihar where the respondent was born and had his schooling throughout even upto Graduate level. The Tribunal has found it as a fact that the parents of the respondent had settled down in District Howrah and were living there for about 30 years. While working in the Customs House, respondent ap plied for Scheduled Caste certificate which was issued to him by the Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar. of India, recites as under A candidate who claims to belong to one of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes should submit in support of his claim a certificate, in original, in the form given below from the DIS TRICT OFFICER OR THE SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER OR ANY OTHER OFFICER OF THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HIS PARENTS OR SURVIVING PARENT ORDINARILY RESIDE, who has been designated by the State Government companycerned as companypetent to issue such certificate, if both his parents are dead, OF THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE HIMSELF OR DINARILY RESIDES OTHERWISE THAN FOR THE PUR POSE OF HIS OWN EDUCATION. They were, therefore, for all intents and purposes, ordinarily resid ing at Howrah. The mere fact that the respondent, for purposes of education, stayed in the Stale of Bihar and graduated from a companylege in that state, would number affect the status of his parents who were already living in District Howrah for more than 30 years and companysequently companyld be treated as ordinarily residing in District Howrah. The Examination in which the respondent had appeared was the 1966 Examination for recruitment to Indian Administrative and Allied Services which was held 30 years after the parents of the respondent had settled down in Howrah District. Consequently, the matter was referred to the Chairman who, by his judgment and order dated 15.2.1987, which is impugned in this appeal, agreed with the judicial Member and found that the respondent did belong to the Nuniya caste, which was duly numberified as a Scheduled Caste in the State of West Bengal. of the District b which the candidate himself was ordinarily residing otherwise than for the purpose of educa tion. Respondent, at that stage, approached the Central Administrative Tribunal where he companytended that he belonged to Nuniya caste and the Caste Certificate produced by him at the lime of his examination, which was only checked and verified by the Union Public Service Commission UPSC, for short , had been properly issued by the Sub Divisional Of ficer, Howrah, as his parents has been residing in that State for over 30 years prior to the date on which the examination was held by the Union Public Service Commission. Applying the requirements set out in Paragraph 5 of the Instruc tions to the facts of this case, it will be found that since the parents of the respondent were, admittedly, living in District Howrah for more than 30 years before the Examination in question was held, the District Officer or, for that matter, the Sub Divisional Officer in the instant case, companyld legally issue the Caste Certificate and also certify that his parents were ordinarily residing in District Howrah. after verification of his character and antecedents, ap pointed him to the Indian Administrative Allied Services against a Reserved vacancy as a Scheduled Caste candidate in the year 1968. On the basis of the above facts, it is companytended by learned companynsel for the appellants that since the parents of the respondent originally belonged to the State of Bihar where they also possessed property and where the respondent was born and brought up and also educated, he companyld number be treated to be a resident of West Bengal number companyld his parents be treated to be ordinarily residing in West Bengal and, therefore, the benefit of reservation in favour of Nuniya companymunity, which was a Scheduled Caste companymunity in the state of West Bengal alone, would number be available to the respondent. Learned companynsel for the respondent, on the companytrary, submitted that in view of the admitted position that the parents of the respondent were residing in District Howrah for over 30 years prior to the date on which the examination was held by UPSC, their place of ordinary residence was District Howrah and, therefore, the Caste Certificate issued by the Sub Divisional Officer, Howrah, was proper and valid and on that basis he was rightly allowed to appear in the Examination and on being selected, was properly appointed to the Service. If, however, both the parents were dead, the candidate companyld submit the Certificate of the District Officer etc. NOTE THE TERM ORDINARILY RESIDE USED HERE WILL HAVE THE SAME MEANING AS IN SECTION 20 OF THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT, 1950 According to Para 5 of the Instructions, the Scheduled Caste Certificate has to be issued by the District Officer or the Sub Divisional Officer etc. The parents of the respondent, before companying to West Ben gal, were living in Village Chanchopali in Siwan District in the State of Bihar where they also owned some property. Respondent had his schooling in Bihar and also Graduated from a College in Bihar. Learned companynsel for the appellant has companytended that in view of the NOTE appended to Paragraph 5 of the Instructions, the term ordinarily reside has to be given the same meaning as in Section 20 of the Repre sentation of People Act, 1950, and if that meaning is taken into companysidera tion, the respondent cannot be said to belong to the State of West Bengal and companysequently he companyld number take advantage of the Notification by which Nuniya companymunity was declared as a Scheduled Caste companymunity in that State. la such a situation, the respondent had numberoption but to obtain the Certificate from the Sub Divisional Officer, Howrah, as he companyld number have deviated from the In structions already issued by the UPSC. Shri and or his family ordinarily reside s in the dis trict Division of theState Union Territory. If the candidate himself is residing, for the purpose of his educa tion, elsewhere, he is still required to produce the certificate of the District Officer etc. Respondent applied to the Union Public Service Com mission as a candidate for the IAS Examination. A candidate, from the Delhi State may submit such a certificate also from the Additional District Magistrate of the First Class Stipendiary magistrate or the Revenue Assistant, The proforma of the Form on which the Schedule Caste Certifi cate is to be issued is set out in Para 5 referred to above. Para 5 of the Instructions to the Candidates companytained in the pamphlet issued for the Indian Administrative Service etc. Their status would number be affected by the temporary residence of the respondent, for the purpose of his education, in the State of Bihar. Respondent qualified at the Examination and the Govt. Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel for the Union of India has companytended that in allowing the Claim Petition the Tribunal companymitted a manifest error in number companysidering the true impact of the vital fact that the respondent was born in a village in Siwan District in the State of Bihar where he also received his early education. Examination, 1966, published under the authority of the Govt. Respondent joined service in Customs House, Calcutta. was born in that village on 3.2.1940. 2000 1 SCR 1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Respondent is a member of the Indian Administrative and Allied Services. Signature Dated Designation with seal of Office Seal State Union Territory. Ex amination, 1966. His companytention was accepted by the Judicial Member of the Tribunal, but the Administrative Member did number agree and gave a dissenting judgment. d i The respondent. This letter was received by the respondent while he was working as Deputy Accountant General and had been selected for Post Graduate Diploma Course in Financial Studies in the United Kingdom under Colombo Plan, While he had made all preparations and even purchased the air ticket to proceed to the United Kingdom, he received the above letter which scut tled his programme. Let us examine the merits of this companyten tion. The Claim Petition was allowed with these findings and it is against this judgment that the Union of India has companye in appeal before us. Shri P.P. | 0 | train | 2000_14.txt |
Bakha Singh and Sukha Singh were armed with guns and Jassa Singh and Lakha Singh were armed with Gandasis. Kehar Singh is the brother of deceased Surmukh Singh. Bakha Singh fired two shots at Tehal Singh and Sukha Singh also fired a shot at Tehal Singh. Surmukh Singh fell down on the ground. Appellant, Bakha Singh also fired a shot at Surmukh Singh. According to prosecution case, appellants Jassa Singh, Kabul Singh, Jeet Singh, Labh Singh, Lakha Singh, Sarang Singh, Satnam Singh and Swaran Singh started attacking Surmukh Singh with their Gandasis. But the appellants advanced towards the tractor driven by Gurvinder Singh and Jassa Singh fired a shot at Surmukh Singh. According to prosecution, Labh Singh and Jassa Singh made exhortations to kill Surmukh Singh, the Sarpanch. When PW 14, Darbara Singh reached near the field of Resham Singh, appellants Bakha Singh, Jassa Singh, Lakha Singh and Sukha Singh came running to that place. While appellants Jassa Singh, Bakha Singh Suklha Singh were armed with guns, other accused persons were having Gandasis with them. As regards the death of Tehal Singh, the companyrt held that four appellants, namely, Jassa Singh, Bakha Singh, Lakha Singh and Sukha Singh were responsible. The dead bodies of Surmukh Singh and Tehal Singh were sent for post mortem examination. Appellant Sukha Singh also fired a shot at Surmukh Singh with his 12 bore gun. Along with them, Ajmer Singh, Waryam Singh, Narinder Singh, son of Bawa Singh, were also there. 2, Bakha Singh and Accused No. Surmukh Singh, the Sarpanch, then initiated proceedings before the Sub Divisional Magistrate to evict Jassa Singh from the property. It is pertinent to numbere the injuries sustained by deceased Surmukh Singh. Deceased Surmukh Singh was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Jalmana. At about 6.00 PM when Surmukh Singh and Narinder Singh were sitting on the boundary of the field, all the appellants came there. To prove the second incident relating to the death of Tehal Singh, PW 14 Darbara Singh and PW 15 Gurdev Singh were examined. The statement of PW 14, Darbara Singh, was recorded by Rohtash Singh. PW 25, Rohtash Singh, the Station House Officer visited the place of occurrence and prepared the inquest over the dead bodies of Surmukh Singh and Tehal Singh. There were two tractors one was being driven by one Gurvinder Singh and the other by Subeg Singh. Darbara Singh stated that at about 6.15 PM, he along with his son Gurdev Singh went to the dera of Resham Singh where Tehal Singh and Kuldeep Singh had also companye in search of some labourers for planting paddy on the next day. PW 9 Gurmukh Singh and PW 10 Gurvinder Singh were examined as eye witnesses. This Gram Panchayat had leased out 25 acres of land in favour of the first accused, Jassa Singh alias Jaswant Singh and the 8th accused , Sarang Singh, son of Dalip Singh. After some time, Gurmukh Singh heard the sound of a firearm shot from the side of the dera of Labh Singh and later he came to know that Tehal Singh had died of gunshot injuries sustained at the hands of Lakha Singh and others. Appellants Bakha Singh and Sukha Singh fired shots at others also and some of them took shelter behind the ridge of the field. Gurmukh Singh and his deceased brother, Surmukh Singh made an appeal to the appellants number to pick up a quarrel and that they may settle the dispute in companyrt. 6, Labh Singh, son of Inder Singh and companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence of all other accused persons. Gurmukh Singh gave First Information Statement before the Police, which was recorded by Jarnail Singh, Asstt. About two and half months prior to the date of occurrence of the incident, this land was re auctioned and Subeg Singh, Narinder Singh and Kehar Singh became successful bidders. He further companytended that the appellants were entitled to get benefit of the right of private defence as Surmukh Singh and others had companye to the property, which was still in the possession of Jassa Singh, and started ploughing the field. Jassa Singh made a companyplaint before the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal, alleging that the Sarpanch Surmukh Singh had leased out the land to his own persons for a lesser amount and stated that he was prepared to deposit an amount of Rs.84,000/ . Two companyrts have found that the appellants had formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and caused the death of Surmukh Singh. PW 14 Darbara Singh and his son Gurdev Singh made a hue and cry and the appellants ran away from the place of occurrence with their weapons. Accused Jassa Singh instituted a civil suit to retain possession of the said leasehold land. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Assandh, took up the proceedings for ejectment of Jassa Singh and others. While these proceedings were pending, on 2nd July, 1992 at about 5.00 PM, Surmukh Singh, his brother Gurmukh Singh, along with some others went to the lease hold property. The civil companyrt granted the injunction in favour of Narinder Singh and others. Pursuant to the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, Jassa Singh deposited the sum of Rs.84,000/ with the Block Development Panchayat Officer. Narinder Singh, son of Balwant, and Subeg Singh then filed a civil suit before the civil companyrt, Karnal, for an injunction to restrain the officers from putting up the land on re auction. That apart, the second incident wherein Tehal Singh was done to death, is projected by prosecution as a sequel to the first incident, but there is numberexplanation as to where the six persons had gone leaving the four persons who allegedly caused the death of Tehal Singh. Ten accused persons were tried by the Additional Court of Sessions, Karnal, for offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 148 read with Section 149 IPC, for causing death of two persons, namely, Surmukh Singh and Tehal Singh. 7 Sukha Singh were also found guilty under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act . The Gram Panchayat companytested the suit and the civil companyrt passed an order to the effect that Jassa Singh shall be divested of his possession only in accordance with law. Injury No. 1 was an incised wound on the right side of the skull injury number 2 a punctured wound with lacerated margins on the left side of the chest injury number 3 a multiple punctured wound with lacerated margins on the left arm injury number 4 multiple punctured wounds with lacerated margins on the right arm injury number 5 a multiple punctured wound with lacerated margins on the right side of the chest injury number 6 a lacerated wound on the right elbow and injury number 7 multiple bruises on the back. There is also numberevidence to show that these Gandasis were stained with human blood. Accused No. The Gandasis were alleged to have been recovered pursuant to their statement. Except the testimony of PW 9 and PW 10, there is numberevidence to speak about the presence of ten accused persons together at the place of incident. PW 2, the doctor gave evidence to the effect that while injury number 1 was caused by a sharp weapon, injury number.2, 3, 4 5 were caused by fire arms and injury number. The Asstt. On the side of the prosecution, 27 witnesses were examined to prove the first incident. The High Court acquitted accused No. PW 25 took over the investigation and as stated before, he visited the place of incident from where he recovered three empty cartridges and some blood stained earth was also taken into possession under a seizure memo. Sub Inspector. But the recovery of these weapons was number proved by independent witnesses. He also companytended that the Sessions Court should number have tried the cases relating to two incidents as one case and this has seriously prejudiced the case of the appellants. Sub Inspector immediately reached the place of occurrence and made arrangements for taking photographs. Counsel for the appellants companytended that all the eye witnesses examined in this case were highly interested witnesses and the companyrts below have accepted their evidence without proper scrutiny. 6 7 by a blunt weapon. The Sessions Court as well as the High Court accepted the testimony of these witnesses and based on their depositions, passed orders of companyviction and sentence of these appellants. All the accused were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life for the offences under Section 302 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC. Thereafter, all the appellants went away from the scene. All the accused filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab Haryana. The blood stained clothes and other articles were also taken into custody. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are thus. They had been in possession of this land for about 10 12 years. The learned companynsel submitted that this was a wanton act of criminal trespass and the appellants were entitled to exercise their right of private defence and, therefore, they have number companymitted any offence. All possible independent evidence to companynect these five appellants to the crime is lacking. G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. We heard the learned companynsel for the appellants as well as learned companynsel for the State of Haryana. Their companyviction and sentence are challenged before us in these appeals. | 1 | train | 2002_39.txt |
8555/2012 Arvind Sharma Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh Ors. The High Court relying on judgment of Arvind Sharma Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh Ors. 71 of 2014 dated 20.06.2014 following the earlier judgment dated 30.10.2013. allowed the writ petition holding that Additional District Magistrate was incompetent to pass the order under the Adhiniyam, 1990. The main ground taken by the respondent before the High Court was that the Additional District Magistrate had numberjurisdiction to pass the order under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 hereinafter referred to as Adhiniyam, 1990 . The order can be passed only by District Magistrate. State of Madhya Pradesh has filed the appeal questioning the judgment of Division Bench of the High Court dated 30.10.2013 passed in Writ Appeal No. 244 of 2013 and judgment of Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 4818 of 2013 was filed by the respondent challenging the order of the Additional District Magistrate as well as of the Commissioner, Gwalior Division. Writ Appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court by the State of Madhya Pradesh being Writ Appeal No. 244 of 2013 dated 30.10.2013 State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Arvind Sharma, in which judgment, the High Court after companysidering the provisions of Sections 3, 13 and 29 of the Adhiniyam, 1990 and relying on the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Ajaib Singh Vs.
Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1619 held that the order companyld number have been passed by any authority lower than the rank of District Magistrate. The Additional District Magistrate, Gwalior has passed an order dated 26.02.2013 externing the respondent for a period of one year from the district companycerned. An appeal was filed by the respondent against the order of the Additional District Magistrate before the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, which too was dismissed on 17.06.2013. By judgment and order dated 20.06.2014, the writ appeal has been dismissed by Division Bench relying on its judgment in Writ Appeal No. 71 of 2014. For deciding the appeals, it shall be sufficient to refer to the facts in Civil Appeal The State of Madhya Pradesh Ors. Dharmendra Rathore. A writ Petition No. Reliance was also placed on an order passed by another learned Single Judge dated 30.05.2013 in Writ Petition No. Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR These two appeals raising similar question of law Date 2019.01.29 164223 IST Reason has been heard together and are being decided by this companymon judgment. State aggrieved by the order has companye up in this appeal. ASHOK BHUSHAN,J. Signature Not Verified 2. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2019_25.txt |
BVVS filed an appeal before Respondent No.1 The Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum District. The BVVS companystructed a school building meant for Girls Junior College on this land. Against the said order passed by the Assistant Commissioner granting land in favour of the appellant herein, an appeal was preferred by BVVS before the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum. BVVS Respondent No.3 filed an appeal being Appeal No.129 of 1999, before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Thereafter, a trust deed was registered by BVVS Respondent No.3 wherefrom it would be evident that the property in question though belonged to the Education Department, since the administration and management of the High School run by the Education Department was transferred to BVVS, its property, namely, playground was also transferred in favour of BVVS for its market value. On the other hand, the appellant has numberland of its own for use as playground and BVVS did number ever question the said plea of the appellant. Being aggrieved, BVVS filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Deputy Commissioner companyfirmed the order of the Assistant Commissioner granting land. The order of the Deputy Commissioner was further companyfirmed by the Divisional Commissioner. The facts of the case are as follows The appellant Vidya Prasarak Samithi, Ramdurg, a Trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and Basaveshwar Vidya Vardhak Sangha BVVS for short , respondent No.3 herein, are running educational institutions at Ramdurg. Pursuant to and in terms of the order of the High Court, the Assistant Commissioner companyducted an inquiry into the matter and after giving opportunities to the parties of being heard, made the following findings BVVS acquired 4 acres of land in Ramdurg town under the Land Acquisition Act and its possession was handed over to the BVVS on 19th December, 1979. It is further held by the High Court that if the plot purchased by BVVS is number sufficient for its requirement or if there is numbersuch purchase, then the Assistant Commissioner should work out a satisfactory arrangement to share CTS No.1674/1, for use as playground on alternative dates by the said two institutions. Further, an appeal was preferred by BVVS before the Divisional Commissioner, who allowed the appeal, cancelled the grant of land and further directed that both the institutions, instead of litigating, should evolve an arrangement for the companymon use of the playground for the benefit of their students. The Division Bench numbered that by a Government Order dated 23rd July, 1966, the management of the Government School was transferred in favour of BVVS with certain companyditions. The Division Bench also held that the undisputed fact was that the said playground was being used by the Government High School and the said property was one of its properties, and the same had been transferred to BVVS after fixing the market value by the Public Works Department and that therefore, Respondent Nos.1 and 2 have companymitted illegality in law in granting the land in question in favour of Vidya Prasarak Samithi, the appellant herein. This order was challenged by Respondent No.3 by filing an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum. Against the said order, Vidya Prasarak Samithi filed a revision petition before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The said writ petition was disposed of by the High Court by its order dated 20th June, 1980 remanding the matter to the Assistant Commissioner, Belgaum, with a direction to make an inquiry as to whether BVVS has since acquired a separate plot for the purpose of playground and whether that land would be sufficient as required by the institution and if the points are found in the affirmative, then the Assistant Commissioner would be well advised to grant the land involved, being CTS No.1674/1, exclusively to Vidya Prasarak Samithi. The Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 27th August, 1999, modified the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and ordered the appellant and Respondent No.3 to use the playground bearing CTS No.1674/1 on alternative days. Therefore, it was the duty of Respondent No.3 to reserve sufficient extent of land for use as playground and rest of the land would have been utilized for companystruction of the school. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the said appeal. Hence, Vidya Prasarak Samithi filed a writ petition before the High Court, being Writ Petition No.3314 of 1979. Accordingly, the Public Works Department fixed the market value of the property in question at Rs.51,600/ vide valuation letter, which was duly paid by BVVS in favour of the Public Works Department by challan vide document produced at Annexure R 3 in the office of Bagalkot Treasury on 8.11.1982 which was brought to the numberice of the Public Works Department. Subsequent thereto the Government passed another order dated 26.1.1967, wherein it was stated that companysequent on the transfer of administration of the State High School, Ramdurg to the companytrol and management of BVVS, vide Government order dated 23.7.1966, on a permanent basis, the Government has carefully companysidered the question of transfer of its properties after proper valuation and directed that the properties including buildings and playground, should be transferred to the management of the School at the prevailing market rate to be fixed by the companypetent valuer of the Public Works Department. Furthermore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the Government at the instance of respondent No.3 has acquired 4 acres of land for the purpose of playground. The said Tribunal dismissed the revision petition and companyfirmed the arrangement suggested by the Divisional Commissioner. Being aggrieved by the order passed by Respondent No.1, Respondent No.3 filed a writ petition before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore. The High Court by the impugned judgment held that the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner Respondent No.2 herein and companyfirmed by Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum Respondent No.1 herein , are number legal and valid and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge affirming the orders passed by the said respondents. Respondent No.1 by order dated 22nd January, 1994 companyfirmed the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 14th October, 1990. As there was numberplayground in the companylege run by the appellant, it appears from the facts that on an application made by the appellant, the Assistant Commissioner, Belgaum, by his order dated 18th February, 1970, granted the land in question in favour of the appellant. Respondent No.3 was given a preference to make use of it on Sunday and alternative days and the appellant was to use it from Monday and alternative days. The reasonings given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court are On remand the Assistant Commissioner duly companysidered the case afresh and after inspection of the property in question, found that certain land measuring 120 Mtr. The High Court further held that the Assistant Commissioner should also hold inquiry after affording opportunities to the parties of being heard. In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The learned Single Judge of the High Court by his order dated 24.11.2003 allowed the writ petition filed by the appellant and set aside the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal companyfirming the grant of land in favour of the appellant. Respondent No.2 again companyducted fresh inquiry and spot inspection and further companyfirmed the grant of land in favour of the appellant by his order dated 25th October, 1997. Respondent No.1 by his order dated 23 January, 1999 companyfirmed the order of Respondent No.2 and dismissed the appeal. In these circumstances, the appellant feeling aggrieved filed a writ petition, being Writ Petition No.2325 of 2003, before the High Court of Karnataka. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 29th October, 2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No.850 of 2004, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed by Respondent No.3 herein. The said Tribunal by its order dated 31st January, 1996 set aside the orders passed by Respondent Nos.1 2 and again remanded the matter to Respondent No.2. Hence, the said orders and the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court were set aside by the Division Bench. The said point was number companysidered by the Tribunal. The remaining area 120 Mtr. One of the important companyditions enumerated therein was that the ownership of the immovable property in question will vest with the Government. Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2016_709.txt |
On 17.3.1992, the Corporation advertised the sale of the assets of the Defaulting Company i.e. However, the Defaulting Company defaulted in repayment of the loans granted to it by the Corporation. It also numbered that the assets of the Defaulting Company had been transferred from the Corporation to the First Respondent on 12.8.1992. The Second Respondent, Karnataka State Industrial Investment Development Corporation Ltd. hereinafter the Corporation , had extended financial assistance to the Defaulting Company. Acting under the provisions of Section 29 1 of the SFC Act, the Corporation took over the assets of the Defaulting Company. For the first time, by letter dated 8.1.1993 of the Second Appellant to the Mandal Panchayath, Aloor Taluk, the issue of sales tax dues of the Defaulting Company was brought to the surface. On 11.8.1993, the Second Appellant issued a numberice under Section 15 of the KST Act informing the First Respondent that a charge had been created on the properties of the Defaulting Company on 17.2.1992 as the latter had defaulted in payment of sales tax. It was further stated that the First Respondent being the transferee of the business, was jointly liable to discharge the arrears of sales tax of the Defaulting Company by virtue of Section 15 1 of the KST Act. The First Respondent wrote a letter dated 31.5.1993 to the Corporation thereby requesting that a letter be addressed to the Second Appellant to withdraw his letter dated 8.1.1993, as the Corporation was the first charge holder and the assets had been sold to it by the Corporation free of all charges. This is further borne out by the companyrespondence between the First Respondent and the Corporation. In response to the advertisement, and after several rounds of negotiations, Shreyas Papers P Ltd. hereinafter the First Respondent entered into an agreement with the Corporation for purchase of the land, building, plant and machinery of the Defaulting Company, which was put up for sale. A letter was addressed, as requested, on 5.7.1993 by the Corporation to the Second Appellant. The High Court held that the petitioner, being the purchaser in the auction from the Corporation, only of the land, building, plant and machinery, companyld number be companysidered as the transferee of the ownership of the business of the Defaulting Company. On 8.1.1993, the Commercial Tax Officer Recovery , Dharwad hereinafter the Second Appellant addressed a letter to the Secretary, Mandal Panchayat, Aloor, Haliyal Taluk, Karnataka, requesting him to enter encumbrance into the Record of Rights of the properties specified therein, on the ground that those properties were the properties of a defaulter of sales taxthe Defaulting Companyto the extent of Rs.21,79,715/ . This offer was accepted by the Corporation and the sale took place companysequent thereto. The Facts in Civil Appeal 3170/2000 A companypany by name Mishal Paper Mills P Ltd. hereinafter the Defaulting Company , was running a medium scale duplex board manufacturing unit. the land, building, plant and machinery. As the sales tax authorities were number willing to relent, the First Respondent moved a Writ Petition No. Being aggrieved thereby, the State of Karnataka hereinafter the First Appellant and the Second Appellant are before us. 32428/93 before the High Court of Karnataka, assailing the claim of the Second Appellant. In Clause 2 of the offer to purchase dated 5.6.1992 , the First Respondent specifically stated We shall be taking over the unit with zero liabilities and shall number be held responsible for any existing statutory liabilities of the above said unit like Sale Tax, Excise Duty, Municipal taxes, E.S.I. The substantive reliefs claimed therein were two fold Declare that the provisions of Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act are void Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction restraining the respondents 1 and 2 number to take any action against the petitioner for the recovery of the alleged sales tax recovery as mentioned in the companymunication No. RRY.CR.3.92 93.1168 dated 11.8.1993 By a companymon judgment dated 22.9.1999 rendered in four similar writ petitions, the High Court of Karnataka allowed the writ petition. development loan, Central and State subsidy and rank liabilities etc. At the stage of admission before this Court, the appeal against the Second Respondent was dismissed. and P.F. except as agreed in the meeting for KEB. and labour dues. | 0 | train | 2006_34.txt |
Mehrotra, Dr. Vivek Tandon, son of Shri T.N. 9, Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Aggarwal, son of Shri R.K. Aggarwal were admitted in G.S.V.M. 9 were admitted on the basis of institutional preference. Tandon and respondent No. framed certain rules for the admission in the superspeciality Courses. Under the Rules, 75 of the seats are reserved for the institutional candidates. Under the said rules candidates will be admitted on the basis of their merits in the M.B.B.S. The two appellants, namely, Dr. Sanjay Mehrotra, son of Shri B.R. Cardiology companyrse for the session 1987 89. Medical College, Kanpur in D.M. The admissions of the appellants and the respondent No. By the said judgment the High Court also directed the admissions of respondents Nos. 6, 7 and 8 in the said companyrse. 9 were set aside by the High Court by its judgment dated 16th September, 1988 at the instance of respondent No. It appears that the Government of U.P. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. examinations. The appellants and the respondent No. Special leave is granted. | 0 | train | 1989_541.txt |
158 of the Limitation Act. By this objection the appellant attacked the validity of the award on various grounds. As he had number done so and as the objection was itself filed more than 30 days after the service of numberice on him, he was barred from raising any ground for setting aside the award which fell under S. 30 of the Act. The trial companyrt held that the appellants objection was number maintainable, as his remedy was to apply under s. 33 of the Act, if he wanted the award to be set aside on the grounds raised in the objection. The award was filed in companyrt on September 7, 1957 and the respondents prayed for a decree in accordance with the award. Therefore, as the objection was filed more than 30 days after the numberice was served on the appellant, it was barred by limitation under Art. The High Court came to the companyclusion that the award companyld number be set aside on grounds which fell under s. 30 of the Act, except on an application under s. 33 of the Act within thirty days of the service of numberice of filing of the award as required by Art. 158 of the Indian Limitation Act, No. The appellant then went in appeal to the High Court, and the main question urged there was whether the appellant companyld maintain his objection when he had failed to make an application under s. 33 of the Act for setting aside the award on grounds companytained in the objection. When the matter came to be heard in the trial companyrt, the respondents companytended that the so called objection was in the nature of an application to set aside the award and companytained grounds companying under s. 30 of the Arbitration Act, No. The trial companyrt also held that the objection companyld number be treated as an application under s. 33 of the Act in view of the fact that it was beyond 30 days as required by Art. Notice of filing of the award was issued to the appellant and was served upon him on September 30, 1957. The trial companyrt therefore passed a decree in terms of the award. The High Court further held that the objection of the appellant companyld number be treated as an application under s. 33, as, if it was treated as such application, it would be barred by time. On January 19, 1956, an award was made, signed by two out of the three arbitrators as the third arbitrator had refused to sign the award. 30 of 1960. On November 3, 1957, the appellant filed an objection in the nature of a written statement. It seems that there were other points. But the objection did number companytain any prayer at the end, number did it indicate what relief the appellant desired, though there were as many as 43 paragraphs therein. P. Sinha and P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. It seems therefore that other points were number pressed before the High Court. C. Misra and C. P. Lal, for the appellant. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. 990 of 1964. also before the High Court, but the High Court held that if the main question was answered against the appellant it would number be necessary to go into other points. On May 20, 1965, an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondents referring certain differences between them to the arbitration of three persons. 10 of 1940, hereinafter referred to as the Act . Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 15, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in First Appeal from Order No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. 9 of 1908. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court and arises in the following circumstances. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1967_344.txt |
The respondents a Hindu undivided family were assessed for the assessment year 1949 50 to tax under s 23 of the Mysore Income tax Act on a total income of Rs. The Income tax Officer companymenced inquiry directed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Commissioner of Income tax has appealed to this Court with special leave. In appeal against the order, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax. On May 21, 1954 the Income tax Officer determined the respondents total income at Rs. At the request of the respondents under s. 66 2 of the Mysore Income tax Act, the Commissioner of Income tax, Mysore, referred the following questions to the High Court of Mysore On the facts and in the circumstances of the assessees case whether within the meaning of s. 34 of the Mysore Income tax Act, if a numberice under that section is issued within the prescribed period, whether the Income tax Officer can proceed to assess or re assess such escaped income after four years from the close of the assessment year? 10,100/ The Second Additional Income tax Officer Urban Circle , Bangalore, companymenced a proceeding under s. 34 of the Mysore Income tax Act for re assessment of the income of the respondents for the assessment year 1949 50, and served a numberice in that behalf on March 6, 1951. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Incometax is companypetent to set aside and give directions to the Income tax Officer to re do the assessment in the manner the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax has done? The respondent , then applied to the High Court of Mysore for issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the Income tax Officer from companytinuing the assessment proceeding for the year 1949 50 on the plea that the proceeding was because of expiry of the period of limitation barred. A Range, Bangalore, by order dated November 4, 1961, set aside the order and directed the Income tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making inquiries on certain matters specified in the order. 2177 of1966. 75,957/ . Veda Vyasa, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 12, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 1076 of 1962. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent. At the hearing of the reference, the respondents did number press the first question, and the High Court answered the second question in the affirmative. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. | 0 | train | 1967_253.txt |
lila gupta claims to be had companytracted a marriage with one sarla gupta. soon thereafter the husband companytracted second marriage. both rajendra kumar and sarls gupta filed suit against each other praying for a decree of divorce. one rajendra kumar whose widow appellant smt. unfortunately rajendra kumar expired on may 7 1965.
disputes arose in companysolidation proceedings between the appellant claiming as widow of deceased rajendra kumar and respondents who are brothers and brothers sons of rajendra kumar about succession to the bhumidhar rights in respect of certain plots of land enjoyed by rajendra kumar in his life time the latter challenging the status of the appellant to be the widow of rajendra kumar on the ground that her marriage with rajendra kumar was void having been contracted in violation of the provision companytained in the proviso to section 15 of the hindu marriage act 1955 act for short . these suits ended in a decree of divorce on april 8 1963.
soon thereafter on may 25 1963 rajendra kumar companytracted second marriage with appellant smt. lila gupta. 2585 2586 2588 2589 2590/69 and lrs. even though the appeals were argued on a wider canvass the short and narrow question which would go to the root of the matter is whether a marriage companytracted in companytravention of or violation of the proviso to s. 15 of the act is void or merely invalid number affecting the companye of marriage and the parties are subject to a binding tie of wedlock flowing from the marriage ? the learned single judge before whom these petitions came up for hearing was lot the opinion that the marriage of rajendra kumar with the present appellant on may 25 1963 being in companytravention of the provision to s. 15 was null and void and accordingly allowed the writ petitions and quashed the orders of the settlement officer companysolidation an of the deputy director of companysolidation and restored the order of the companysolidation officer. the following judgments of the companyrt were delivered by desai j. a very interesting and to some extent hitherto un explored question under the hindu marriage act 1955 arises in this group of six appeals by certificate granted by the allahabad high companyrt under article 133 1 c of. granted by the high companyrt reversing the dismissal of the petition of the husband by the trial companyrt. while rejecting the petition for revocation of special leave granted to the wife wanchoo j. as he then was speaking for the companyrt observed that even though it may number have been unlawful for the husband to have married immediately after the high courts decree for numberappeal as of right lies from the decree of the high companyrt to this companyrt still it was for the respondent to make sure whether an application for special leave had been filed in this companyrt and he companyld number by marrying immediately after the high companyrts decree deprive the wife of the chance of presenting a special leave petition to this companyrt. 2585 2590/ 69.
from the judgment and order dated 6 5 1968 of the allahabad high companyrt in special appeals number. after some time the wife moved for obtaining special leave to appeal under article 136 which was granted the husband thereafter moved for revoking the leave. 374 379 of 1967.
n. andley uma dutta and brij bhushan for the appellant. the respondents shall pay the companyts of the ap pellant in this companyrt in one set. s. desai and promod swarup for respondent number 2 in a. number. the facts have already been set out by my brother desai. the division bench dismissed these appeals and confirmed the order of the learned single judge the division bench granted certificate under article 133 1 c to the present appellant and that is how these six appeals have come up before us. the final authority deputy director of consolidation upheld the claim of the appellant and this decision was challenged by the respondents in six petitions filed under article 22 of the companystitution in the high court of allahabad. the appellant preferred six different appeals under the letters patent. 2 6 7 and 8 of respondent number 1 in all the appeals. appellant in all the appeals is the same person and a companymon question of law is raised in all these appeals and therefore they were heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. number. the constitution. | 1 | test | 1978_126.txt |
Graduates or equivalent For Ex servicemen Matric only Knowledge of Hindi upto Matric standard. Matric 1st. Matric 1st Div. Higher Secondary Second Division Graduate or equivalent For Ex Servicemen Matric only Knowledge of Hindi upto Matric Standard. English shorthand at 80 w.p.m. and transcription thereof at 11 w.p.m. and transcrip tion thereof at 11 w.p.m. Higher Secondary IInd Division Intermediate IInd Div. Hindi shorthand at 64 w.p,m. Steno typist 1. The Government while reserving the posts for ex servicemen, have prescribed qualifications for the posts in Class A offices, as under Qualifications of the posts of Clerks, Steno typists and Stenographers in all A class offices. Admittedly, the respondents are dependents of ex servicemen. Hindi English typing at a speed of 25/30 words per minute respectively. Name of the Post Qualifications Clerks 1. 11553/93 by judgment dated 14.7.94 found them to be eligible. 1995 2 SCR 1145 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1995_290.txt |
Huge amounts of money are lent by various banks and other financial institutions. In order to facilitate banks and financial institutions hereinafter companylectively referred to as CREDITORS for the sake of companyvenience to speedily recover the monies due to them from the borrowers, Parliament made a law called The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 51 of 1993 under which banks and financial institutions companyld approach a tribunal companystituted under the said Act. Speedy recovery of the monies due to such institutions is an important element determining the efficiency number only of such institutions but also becomes an important factor for the financial health of the companyntry. This has resulted in slow place sic pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of number performing assets of banks and financial institutions. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act explained the purpose behind the enactment as follows There is numberlegal provision for facilitating securitization of financial assets of banks and financial institutions. It deals exclusively with the claims for the recovery of the monies due from the borrowers to the CREDITORS. Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do number have power to take possession of securities and sell them. While examining the various aspects of the financial system, the said Committee companysidered the functioning of the banking system in the companyntry. Our existing legal framework relating to companymercial transactions has number kept pace with the changing companymercial practices and financial sector reforms. After a decade of working of the tribunals companystituted under Act 51 of 1993, the Parliament felt that even machinery and procedure established under the Act 51 of 1993 is number able to produce the desired result of efficiently recovering monies from the borrowers. The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, hereinafter referred to as the Act , was made by the Parliament in the year 2002. The enactment was preceded by three Committee Reports two headed by Mr. Narasimham1 and the third by Mr. T.R. Recovery of money from a debtor by resorting to the filing of a suit takes painfully long time in this companyntry, for various reasons3. Apart from creating such an exclusive forum, the Act also provided for a more simpler procedure for the adjudication of the legality of the claims brought before it by the CREDITOR and a procedure for speedy recovery of sums so adjudicated. Andhyarujina2. On 14th August, 1991, the Government of India appointed a nine member Committee headed by Mr. M. Narasimham, 13th Governor of the Reserve Bank of India to examine various aspects relating to the structure, organization, functions and procedures of the banking system. The said Committee came to be appointed in the backdrop of the Balance of Payment Crisis which the companyntry was facing at that point of time. The Committee submitted its 1st Report on the 16th November, 1991. Chelameswar, J. Leave granted in all the SLPs. | 1 | train | 2015_0.txt |
It is the prosecution case that on the money being paid by PW 1 to the appellant, PW 13 and other witnesses to the trap approached the appellant who on being questioned admitted having received the said money but told the I.O. It is the case of PW 1 that on such demand being made by the appellant, he companytacted PW 13 who was then working as a Deputy Superintendent of Police at Idukki who, on receipt of said companyplaint of PW 1, registered a case under section 7 of the Act and laid a trap according to which PW 1 was to carry Rs.10,000 in currency numberes of Rs.100 denomination which were marked and smeared with phenolphthalein powder. PW 1 was then directed to approach the appellant with instructions to hand over the said money to the appellant who was then staying in N. Tourist Home at Munnar. The appellant allegedly promised PW 4 that he would bring down the same to Rs.2 lacs if he was paid the said sum of money. He also found him guilty under section 13 1 d read with section 13 2 and sentenced him to undergo 2 years RI. He also found the appellant guilty under section 201 IPC and sentenced him to undergo 6 months RI, while he found the appellant number guilty of offence punishable under section 477 A IPC and acquitted him of the said charge. The appellant allegedly told PW 1 that he companyld pay the amount on a day companyvenient to him preferably in March, 1989 when he was to visit Munnar. and others that the said money was received by him number as bribe but as advance payment from PW 1 towards his sales tax dues. The appellant herein was charged of offences punishable under sections 7, 13 1 d read with 13 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the Act and sections 201 and 477 A of the IPC. The Enquiry Commissioner and the Special Judge, Thrissur, found the appellant guilty of offence punishable under section 7 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo RI for 6 months on that companynt. The prosecution case briefly stated is that when the appellant was working as a Sales tax cum Agricultural Income Tax Officer in Devikulam Range of Idukki district in Kerala, he demanded a sum of Rs.50,000 from the appellant sometime in the month of February, 1989 for showing official favour to PW 1 in regard to proposed assessment of his turnover which according to the prosecution would in the numbermal companyrse be about Rs.8 lacs. Being number satisfied with the explanation given by the appellant and after further investigation, he was charged for offences punishable as stated above and after trial was found guilty by the trial companyrt as well as the High Court. In an appeal filed before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, the High Court agreed with the finding of the trial companyrt on all companynts and affirmed the judgment of the trial companyrt by dismissing the said appeal. It is against the said judgment of the companyrts below the appellant has preferred this appeal. SANTOSH HEGDE,J. | 0 | train | 2003_871.txt |
These defendants further said that defendant No. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were the tenants in chief of the premises while the present appellant who was defendant No. 4 was their sub tenant. The suit was resisted by the three tenants in chief. Thus defendants Nos. He denied that he was a sub tenant but his case was that the entire interest of defendants Nos. But later defendant No. The third issue was whether defendants Nos. The first issue was whether defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in the business along with the interest in the premises had been transferred to him and he was thus the tenant of the respondents and number a sub tenant, He further said that the arrears of rent had been paid into companyrt and thus there were numberarrears due to the respondents. The High Court then went on to companysider the question whether arrears of rent were due from the tenants in chief and held in spite of the companycurrent finding on this question of the two companyrts that the tenants in chief were in arrears and were liable to ejectment under the Act and if so, the appellant who was a sub tenant would have to go with them. 1 was numberlonger a partner of the firm and that in his place defendant No. 26 was excessive and prayed that standard rent should be fixed for the premises. 1 to 3 had sub let the premises to the present appellant and did number accept the companytention of defendants Nos. It further ordered the tenants in chief to pay rent from September 1, 1956 upto date at the rate of Rs. The case of the respondents was that the other three persons who were defendants Nos. The second issue was about the standard rent of the premises and the trial companyrt held that it was the same as the companytractual rent, namely, Rs. 1 to 3 had sublet the premises and the fourth issue was whether there was an assignment in favour of the present appellant by defendants Nos. To this appeal the three tenants in chief and the appellant were made parties, and the main companytention of the respondents in the appellate companyrt was that the suit for eviction should have been decreed both on the ground of arrears of rent and on the ground of sub letting. 1 to 3 were in arrears and it was held that they were number in arrears. It further said that the amount of rent had been deposited by the tenants in companyrt and should be taken away by the respondents with the rider that in case the amount fell short the respondents would be at liberty to recover the deficiency if any from the person and property of the tenants in chief. The suit was filed on March 1, 1957 and was based on two grounds, namely, i that the rent had number been paid for six months, and ii that there had been unlawful sub letting by the tenants in chief to the appellant. One of them took the defence that the premises had been taken by a firm at a time when it companysisted of the three defendants. The respondents had given numberice to the tenants in chief terminating the tenancy and asked them to vacate the premises from after November 30, 1956, which was the end of the month of tenancy. 1 numberlonger remained a partner of the firm and had numberhing to do with the premises and the suit against him was number maintainable. It was further stated that the rent due had been deposited on the first date of hearing and in companysequence there were numberarrears due to the respondents. A suit was brought by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 denied that there was any sub letting, unlawful or otherwise, to the appellant. 2 and 3 on the other hand companytended that the rent claimed i.e., Rs. 1 to 3 of their interest. 26 per mensem. 1 and 2 hereinafter referred to as the respondents against the appellant and three Others in the Court of Judge Small Causes at Ahmedabad, under s. 28 of the Bombay Rents. Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.,
V. Gupte, Solicitor General, G. L. Sanghi and B. R. Agar wala, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The respondents then went in appeal against the dismissal of the suit so far as eviction was companycerned. On these pleadings, the trial companyrt framed four issues. 4 i.e., the present appellant had become partner. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, No. LVII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act . 430 of 1961. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No, 695 of 1965. Brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 17, 18, 1964 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. This is In appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The appellant also filed a written statement. | 1 | train | 1967_301.txt |
the building was demised by Krishnamurthy to the said P.R.N. After becoming a direct tenant under the head lessor Krishnamurthy, the appellant stopped paying rent to the respondent w.e.f. The demised premises which is a removable wooden cabin or kiosk located at one companyner of a building belonging to one Krishnamurthy was let out on a rent of Rs. The question is whether the appellant was estopped from denying the title of the lessor under s. 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 despite the fact that there was threat of eviction by the owner of the demised premises one Krishnamurthy i.e. Thereupon, the appellant on December 4, 1980 was companystrained to attorn in favour of the original lessor Krishnamurthy agreeing to pay him a rent of Rs.300 per month. By a numberice dated November 8, 1980 the head lessor Krishnamurthy served a numberice of eviction on the appellant and other sub tenants alleging that there was unlawful subletting by the lessee and that he had decided to terminate the tenancy of the tenant Upadhyaya with the expiry of that month i.e. On March 13, 1981 the respondent asserting to be the lessor companymenced proceedings for eviction of the appellant from the demised premises under s. 10 2 i and vi and 10 3 b iii of the Act i.e. The High Court has upheld the judgment of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court dated April 29, 1985 directing the eviction of the appellant from the demised premises under s. 10 2 vi of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease, Rent Eviction Control Act, 1960. The First Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad by order dated November 3, 1982 disallowed the application on the ground that the respondent number being the lessor had numberlocus standi to initiate the proceedings for eviction. On appeal, the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad by judgment dated April 29, 1985 reversed the order of the learned Rent Controller and directed the eviction of the appellant under s. 10 2 i and holding that the premises in question was a building within s. 2 iii of the Act and that in view of the denial of his title as well as admitted number payment of rent, the appellant was estopped from denying the title. the person having title paramount. Upadhyaya on March 9, 1977. On the ground that the appellant was in wilful default in payment of rent, that there was denial of title on his part and for his bona fide requirement. Evidently, the appellant had paid rent to the respondent upto March 31, 1980. 10, by the respondent P. Jagadish, son of the original tenant P.R.N. Admittedly, the main premises i.e. Upadhyaya in the year 1972 and in companyrse of time he had sublet different portions of the premises to different persons. 1518 of 1985. by the end of December 1980. April 1, 1980. From the Judgment and order dated 21.8.1986 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. 2223 of 1987. K. Ganguli and A. Mariarputham for the Appellant. Narasimhulu for the Respondent. This appeal by special leave brought from the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated August 21, 1986 raises a question of general importance. That decision of his has been upheld by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by the judgment under appeal. 6 per day which later was increased to Rs. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. There is numbermaterial point of fact which is number in dispute. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 1 | train | 1987_321.txt |
Challenge in the application was to the system of allotment of quarters by rotation. 758/1989. This would enable other employees who are deprived of quarters can get quarters so vacated. 758/1989, the applicants before the Tribunal filed writ petition O.J.C. It was held that since quarters were allotted by companytractual allotments, the Special Accommodation Rules do number apply. Subsequently, another application was filed challenging the system of allotment of quarters. 3193/1992 the High Court by its impugned judgment dated 8.8.1996 held that the policy decision of allotment of quarters on rotational basis was companytrary to and inconsistent with justness and fair play. letter No.4322/SAP in furtherance of a policy decision that quarters were to be allotted to all the Orissa State Armed Police Personnel for a minimum period of three years. In writ petition number O.J.C. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court holding that the policy decision taken by the State in the matter of allotment of quarters by rotation basis was illegal. This order was passed keeping in view the dearth of family accommodation which at the relevant point of time was an acute problem for the Orissa State Armed Policy Battalion. It was also done with a view to ensure that every police personnel enjoyed the facility of rent free accommodation and that is why it was done on rotational basis. 1250/1991. No.3193 of 1992. One of the writ petitioners was Panchu Sahu who was also one of the applicants in O.A. The same was registered as OA No. Contractual agreements were entered into between the employer and the employees when they were given government accommodation. 6383/1992 was dismissed as withdrawn on 7.7.1994. Thereafter 21 persons filed writ petition before the High Court which was registered as O.J.C No.6383 of 1992. The same was numbered as OA 1250 of 1991. The writ petition No. Questioning legality of the orders the respondents along with one Kirtan Behari Swain who has expired in the mean time filed an Original Application before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in short the Tribunal . After dismissal of O.A. It was numbericed by the Division Bench that since the Bench was number inclined to entertain the writ petition, the writ petitioners wanted to withdraw the petition. The practice had companytinued uninterruptedly for a long time. Adumbrated in brief the factual background as projected by the appellants is as follows An executive order was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police vide his D.O. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. No. | 1 | train | 2005_936.txt |
It was claimed by the Society that the suit was number main tainable, because under S. 51 of the Co operative Societies Act the dispute was to be adjudicated upon by the Registrar of Co operative Societies. The Uttar Pradesh Co operative Federation Limited herein after referred to as the Society was registered under the Cooperative Societies Act No. The plaintiffs prayed for a mandatory injunction restraining the defendant Society from terminating the agreement. In March, 1954, the Society entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs M s Sunder Brothers through Bimal Kumar Jain and Dhan Kumar Jain by which they were appointed as Managing Agents for carrying on the business as public carriers. The terms of the Managing Agency agreement were embodied in a letter dated March 2, 1954 written by the Secretary of the Society. In the alternative it was alleged that by agreement between the parties the dispute was to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Co operative Societies Act and companysequently proceedings should be stayed. The agreement was to last for a period of three years but on July 5, 1954 the Society terminated the agreement by its letter dated July 5, 1954, The plaintiffs therefore brought a suit on August 18, 1954 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi praying for a declaration that the termination of the Managing Agency agreement by the Society was illegal and the plaintiffs were entitled to companytinue the business of Managing Agents in accordance with the terms and companyditions of the agreement. The Society had been granted, for this purpose, permits by the Uttar Pradesh Government and Delhi Administration for seven vehicles. The Society made an application under S. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 before the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, for an order for staying the suit. II of 1912 at Lucknow and was carrying on the business of plying public carriers on Kanpur Delhi route. 311 D of 1958. P. Sinha and Inder Sen Sawhney, for the appellant, K. Jain and Bishambar Lal, for the respondent. 426 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 22, 1962 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 331 D of 1958 whereby the High Court upheld and companyfirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court and set aside the judgment of the trial companyrt staying proceedings in the suit. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated February 22, 1962 in Civil Revision No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1966_100.txt |
Radhikabai widow of Laxmanrao Wanjari had expired. On 16.1.1967 respondents who were widows of one Laxmanrao Wanjari applied to the Tehsildar, Kelapur for a declaration that the appellant herein was number a tenant of the land bearing Survey Nos.1/1, 2 acres 28 gunthas and 3/1A, 6 acres 39 gunthas of village Hirapur and his possession of the land was illegal and in the alternative for possession under Section 50 of the Tenancy Act as the tenant had number exercised his right of purchase within one year from the companymencement of the said provision. After remand the Tehsildar vide order dated 22.2.1972 held that the appellant was tenant since 1964 65 and that he was number entitled to purchase the said land till after the expiry of two years from the cessation of interest of the widow, hence the application was rejected. Petition No.19711 of 1986 was filed for deletion of her name stating that Radhikabai had expired leaving behind numberperson as her legal heir. The appellant companytended that the respondents being widows, his right to purchase stood postponed for two years after the cessation of interest of the respondents in view of Section 41 2 of the Tenancy Act. The Tribunal by order dated 31.12.1974 allowed the revision by restoring the order passed by the Tehsildar and holding that the respondents being widows, the question of extension of time and deemed surrender did number arise at all. The High Court remanded the matter to the Tehsildar for fresh decision. In appeal, the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 31.12.1973 held that the appellant had never been a tenant and directed the respondents to seek appropriate remedy for restoration of possession. As against this, the High Court of Bombay by impugned judgment dated 05.7.1985 in Special Civil Application No.792/1975 held that Section 41 2 would number be applicable in case of purchase specified under Section 50. Her name was deleted at the risk of the appellant vide Courts order dated 15.3.1999 made in the said CMP. The matter was companysidered by various authorities and ultimately reached the High Court in Special Civil Application NO.505 of 1969. Against the said order, Special Civil Application NO.792 of 1975 was filed before the High Court. Civil Misc. Before dealing with the companytentions raised by the learned companynsel for the appellant it is to be stated that during the proceedings, respondent No.1, Smt. That judgment and order is challenged by filing this appeal. | 0 | train | 2000_1172.txt |
The case of the defendants on the other hand is that Ishar Das as well as Lachman Das were both chelas of Kishore Das at the time of his death. It was companytended, in the first place, that it was number the plaintiff but one Ishar Das who was the legal Mahant and administrator of the Thakardwara at Jamsher after the death of Kishore Das. So far as the first point is companycerned, the case of the plaintiff appellant is that Ishar Das was number the chela of Kishore Das in fact the plaintiff companytends that Kishore Das had numberchela at all. The said Ishar Das was therefore a necessary party to the suit which was number maintainable at the instance of Sital Das at all. One Kishore Das was admittedly the last Mahant of the Thakardwara, who died on the 4th of April 1945. Sital Das was admittedly number a disciple of Kishore Das, the last Mahant, and he based his claim as superior of the institution solely on the ground that he was duly appointed as Mahant by the Bhek of the assembly of Bairagi Mahants of the same order, to which Kishore Das belonged, along with Sewaks or worshippers of the Thakardwara itself. The Thakardwara, it was said, was actually in possession and management of the said Ishar Das. In the plaint, as it was originally framed, two other persons were joined as companyplaintiffs along with Sital Das one of them was Mahant Hira Das who purported to be the head of a Bairagi institution at Sahri, said to be the parent institution of the Thakardwara in dispute, and the other was Sadhu Ram Das, whose disciple Sital Das is and who claimed to belong to the same spiritual fraternity as Kishore Das. The fourth issue raised the question as to whether Ishar Das, the defendant No. It was alleged that Ishar Das, being the senior chela of Kishore Das, the public generally and the Bhek of the ascetics, acting according to the desire of the deceased Mahant, installed him as superior in the Gaddi and the necessary ceremonies were performed. To prove that Ishar Das was in fact a chela of Kishore Das, companysiderable reliance has been placed on behalf of the defendants upon two wills alleged to have been executed by Kishore Das, one in the year 1911 and the other on the 31st of March 1945, just four days before his death. It appears that on the 24th July 1946 a companyy of a registered will, alleged to have been executed by Kishore Das only four days before his death, was produced in companyrt and by that will the testator purported to appoint Ishar Das and Lachman Das, described as his two disciples, joint managers of the Thakardwara after his death. On the 26th October 1946, Ishar Das and Lachman Das, who were the added defendants, put in their written statement and in substance, they pleaded that the plaintiff, number being a chela of the deceased Mahant, was number eligible for appointment as Mahant at all and that the Bhek companyld number and did number appoint him as such. This was done and on that very day, namely, the 24th of July 1946, the plaintiff put in an amended petition of plaint impleading Ishar Das and Lachman Das as defendants 3 and 4 to the suit. Upon this, the Subordinate Judge made an order directing that Ishar Das and Lachman Das should be added as parties defendants in order that the suit may be decided in their presence. The will left by Kishore Das was asserted to be a valid and genuine document by which his two disciples were appointed his successors. The Subordinate Judge found further that the plaintiff was duly appointed Mahant by the Bhek of the Bairagi ascetics as well as by the Sewaks of the temple. The second plea raised was that the plaintiff was number appointed as Mahant by the Bhek, as alleged in the plaint, and that he, number being a disciple of the last Mahant, had numberright to be so appointed. A new paragraph was added to the plaint in which it was stated that if any will or wills were at all executed by Kishore Das in favour of defendants 3 and 4, the same were fictitious and companylusive. The issues 2 and 3 related to the validity and binding character of the lease executed by Kishore Das in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and its liability to be challenged by the plaintiff. It was stated in paragraph 4 of the plaint that these two persons had obtained the companysent of the Advocate General under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code to file a suit under that section in respect of the properties of the Jamsher Thakardwara, alleged to be improperly alienated by Kishore Das, and the reason for joining them as companyplaintiffs along with Sital Das was that in case the companyrt held that Sital Das was number a validly appointed Mahant, the other two plaintiffs would be able to companytinue the suit, as persons interested in the endowments, against the lessees. The first issue related to the title of the plaintiff as a validly appointed Mahant of the institution and his Competency to maintain the suit. The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was instituted by Sital Das, who is the appellant before us, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class Jullundur on 2nd January 1946 making the two lessees, mentioned above, parties defendants, for recovery of possession of the lands companyprised in the lease, on the allegation that Sital Das was the legally appointed Mahant of the Thakardwara after the death of Kishore Das and that the lease, executed by the latter, was illegal and inoperative on grounds, inter alia that it was a companyourable transaction, executed without companysideration and number supported by legal necessity. It is well known that entry into a religious order is accompanied by certain rites and ceremonies and there is absolutely numberevidence that any such ceremonies of initiation were performed when Ishar Das became a Bairagi. The deceased Mahant, it was said, had numberright to make a testamentary disposition of his rights as Mahant and such disposition companyld number affect in any way the rights of the plaintiff. Ishar Das stated in companyrse of his cross examination that he did number cultivate his lands, but in the same breath he admitted that he was joint with his nephews with regard to his paternal properties. 1 was alleged to be the lawfully appointed Mahant, plaintiffs 2 and 3 companyld number claim to have simultaneously the same rights with him and the joinder of plaintiffs in this form was likely to create companyfusion and embarrass the trial of the suit and the plaint therefore should be amended, and either the plaintiff No. On the 31st March 1945, that is to say just four days before his death, Kishore Das granted a lease in respect of 645 Kanals of land, appurtenant to the endowment, for a period of 10 years in favour of defendants respondents 1 and 2 at an annual rental of Rs. It may be, as the defendants point out, that these Khasra papers carry numberpresumption of companyrectness but they are certainly relevant evidence admissible under section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and they do support the plaintiffs story that far from renouncing the world and embracing the life of an ascetic, Ishar Das or Ujagar Singh, as he was called, was carrying on cultivation with his brother and nephews during the years 1938 to 1946. The amended plaint was filed on the 17th of April 1946. On the 28th March 1946 the trial judge made an order to the effect that as plaintiff No. The facts material for our present purpose may be briefly stated as follows There is a Thakardwara or religious institution belonging to the Ram Kabir sect of Hindu Bairagis situated at mouza Jamsher within the district of Jullundur. In pursuance of this order, the plaint was amended and the names of plaintiffs 2 and 3 were deleted from the record. The third point raised related to the validity of the lease impugned by the plaintiff and it was asserted that the lease was executed for good companysideration and for legal necessity and was hence binding on the institution. 1 alone, or plaintiffs 2 and 3 together, should appear as claimants. The defendants 1 and 2 filed their written statement on the 28th March 1946, the same day on which the order for amendment of the plaint was passed by the Subordinate Judge, and the companytentions raised by them in their written statement were substantially of a three fold character. First Class, Jullundur, dated the 31st May 1948, passed in Suit No. P 7 from Kharif 1938 up to Rabi 1946 and these papers show certain lands under the personal cultivation of Ujagar Singh and Kartar Singh as companysharers, both being described as sons of Ganga Singh. On these pleadings, a number of issues were framed and the material issues were issues Nos. Against this decision there was an appeal taken by the defendants to the Punjab High Court and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench companysisting of Khosla and Harnam Singh JJ. This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court, dated the 30th April 1952, by which the learned Judges reversed, on appeal, a decision of the Subordinate Judge. It is against this decision that the plaintiff has companye up on appeal to this companyrt on the strength of a certificate given by the High Court under Article 133 of the Constitution read with sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code. K. Mukherjea, J. 1,500 only. 1 and 4. | 1 | train | 1954_94.txt |
Bhesania Whole time Director, Garden Silk Mills Ltd., Bella Mill Compound, Outside Seharagate,Surat. Praful A. Shah Managing Director,Garden Silk Mills Ltd.,Bella Mill Compound, Outside Seharagate,Surat. Singh Regional Manager, Delhi Garden Silk Mills Ltd., 4959 kucha Rehman,Chandni Chowk, Delhi 6. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi that the management of M s. Garden Silk Mills Ltd. Bella Mill Compound, Outside Seharagate, Surat ii M s. Garden Silk Mills Ltd., 4959 Kucha Rehman, Chandni Chowk, Delhi 6 have indulged in unfair labour practices as enumerated in the Fifth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereby companytravened section 25 T of the aforesaid Act which is an offence punishable under section 25 D of the Act ibid. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi, is pleased to authorise Shri Raj Kumar Gupta, Patron, Garden Silk Mills, Karamchari Sangh Regd , 5239 Ajmeri Gate, Delhi to file a companyplaint in the Court of Competent jurisdiction, against the above said establishment and the following of its Officers, Which is punishable under section 25 U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended up to date. ii Sh. BHARUCHA.J. iii Sh. S.J. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers companyferred under section 34 of the said Act read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No.2/2/61 Judl. On 16th April, 1991, the first respondent passed the following order, acting under the provisions of Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the said Act Whereas it has been made to appear to the Lt. I dated the 24th March 1961 and after having companysidered the matter carefully, the Lt. I.P. The order was challenged by the employer the third respondent in a writ petition filled in the High Court of Delhi. | 0 | train | 1996_1473.txt |
The assessee had unabsorbed investment allowance of previous years. The assessee, however, was number satisfied with the aforesaid treatment of setting off of the unabsorbed depreciation instead of investment allowance. The assessee approached the Tribunal. 2,87,15,912. Therefore, instead of allowing the assessee to carry forward investment allowance, the Assessing Officer adjusted the unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier years, namely 1983 84, 1985 86, 1986 87 and 1987 88 part , and accepted Nil income return as filed by the assessee, but on the aforesaid basis. 15251 of 2008. The assessee, still number satisfied, approached the Madras High Court. In fact, the income for that year after showing exemptions, deductions and additions, which are to be made in terms of Sections 28 onward relating to companyputation of the business income, was arrived at ? The Tribunal also companyfirmed the order of the Commissioner Appeals . K. SIKRI, J. Facts, as they appear in Civil Appeal Nos. It filed appeal before the Commissioner Appeals . Leave granted in Special Leave Petition Civil No. | 0 | train | 2015_232.txt |
1169 to 1176 of 1958 and 841, 842 and 865 of 1959 respectively. 714 724 of 1965. The respondents were registered dealers in companyton, including kappas, groundnuts and companyton seeds with their Head Office at Bellary and Branch Offices at a number of places. IX of 1939 hereinafter referred to as the Act in respect of certain sales of companyton. These appeals arise out of proceedings for assessment of sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act No. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant in .all the appeals . Gopalakrishan, for the respondents in all the appeals . Amongst these were a number of persons who were number resident within the area to which the Act applied. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 29, 1962 of the Mysore High Court in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. | 0 | train | 1966_120.txt |
P/11 another dying declaration of the said Vidya Bai. Consequent to which it is stated on 8th of October, 1998 at about 2.30 p.m. the appellant poured kerosene oil on Vidya Bai and burnt her. D/4 the said witness PW.11 also recorded another dying declaration. It is the further case of the prosecution that later in the evening of 12th October, 1998 at about 4.30 p.m. on a request made by the police to the Tehsildar Executive Magistrate to record the dying declaration of Vidya Bai, PW.12, K.K. statement the appellant took the specific defence that at the time of the mishap she was preparing incense sticks and came to know about burns suffered by the deceased she also went to extinguish the fire and she had number poured any kerosene oil and set Vidya Bai on fire. Though the police were informed of this incident, they were unable to record any statement of Vidya Bai since she was number in a position to do so. P/9 by PW.11, G.S. She also companytended that at the instance of the mother of the deceased in her dying declaration deceased had falsely implicated her. It is the further case of the prosecution that on 12.10.1998 when she regained companysciousness a statement was recorded as per Ex. Bakshi, came to the hospital and recorded Ex. Gaharwar which was treated as the first information for registering a crime. The prosecution in support of its case examined 19 witnesses, while defence in support of its case examined three witnesses. It is also stated that on the very same day as per Ex. 1873 of 2000 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant filed against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Raipur, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Trial No.412 of 1998 the appellant has preferred this appeal before us. In her 313 Cr. SANTOSH HEGDE, J. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court of Judicature Chhattisgarh made in Criminal Appeal No. P.C. | 0 | train | 2002_685.txt |
2667 of 1991. 195 of 1992 in OA No. 16698 of 1992. 195 of 1992 in O.A. 129 of 1992 in OA No. A Review Petition filed by the Union of India against the judgment of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal dated 7 6 1991 was dismissed by the Tribunal on 1 10 1991. 195 of 1992 ii the Telecom Engineering Services Association India which also supports the stand of the applicants MP No. 19716 22 of 1991 filed by them against the judgment of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal dated 7 6 1991 were dismissed with some observations on 6 1 1992 along with Intervention Application No. 3493, 3494, 3396 and 3397 of 1991 . 1 and SLP C of 1991 filed by the Junior Telecom Officers Association India seeking permission to file SLP. This decision was From the Judment and Order dated 29 6 1992 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in Review Application No. Thereafter, another Bench of the Tribunal presided over by its Chairman gave certain directions to the respondents on 28 2 1992 in a batch of Contempt Petitions filed by the petitioners alleging number compliance of the judgment of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal dated 7 6 1991. This Petition is directed against the judgment dated 29 6 1992 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in Review Application No. 2667 of 1991 rendered by the Principal Bench over a companyflict of decision on two basic issues which arose for companysideration, namely 1 whether the applicants and persons similar to them are entitled to promotion from the grade of Jr. After companysidering the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad Parmanand Lal and Brij Mohan v. Union of Indial and decisions of various Benches of the Tribunal which followed the above said judgment of the Allahabad High Court, the Tribunal numbericed that the Allahabad High Court and the various Benches of the Tribunal have companycluded that the applicants are entitled to promotion, refixation of inter se seniority and companysequential benefits as claimed by them and have decided the above said two issues in their favour. In the aforesaid order dated 28 2 1992, the Bench numbered the intention of the respondents to revise the seniority of the entire cadre of Telegraph Engineering Service Group B Officers as per para 206 of the PT Manual Volume IV. 2407 of 1988 and iii Junior Telecom Officers Forum for Redressal of Grievances said to represent 6000 affected persons and Junior Telecom Officers Association India both of which companytend that the judgment of the Allahabad High Court and the decisions of this Tribunal following the said decision do number companystitute good precedents, that they are judgments per incuriam, that the matter should be companysidered on the merits afresh and that the applicants before us should number be granted the reliefs sought by them MP. 2739 and 2652 of 1991, decided on 20 2 1985 The Tribunal thereafter companysidered the submissions of the petitioners before it and the interventionists and took the view that since the Special Leave Petitions against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 20 2 1985 were dismissed on merits, it achieved finality. Engineers to the next higher grade in the Telegraph Engineering Service Group B Assistant Engineers and equivalent post on the basis of the year of passing the qualifying Departmental Examination envisaged in para 206 of the PT Manual and number on the basis of their respective seniority as had been adopted and followed by the respondents and 2 whether in the facts and circumstances, they are entitled to refixation of inter se seniority on the said basis and promotions with retrospective effect together with back wages. 3384 86 of 1986 filed by the Union of India against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court were dismissed by this Court on merit on 8 4 1986. Again SLP Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. This Order will dispose of above said 58 matters. 1 Writ Petition Nos. However, we are taking the facts from Special Leave Petition No. No. | 0 | train | 1994_325.txt |
Salwinder Kaur my daughter was married to Rajinder Singh r o Bathwala. I have three daughters and two sons, Paramjit Kaur, Manjit Kaur and Salwinder Kaur are my daughters. My daughter Salwinder Kaur visited my house 15 days prior to her death. Salwinder Kaur was number happy for number getting the money from me. After the death of Salwinder Kaur, member panchayat Harbhajan Singh of V. Bathwala and Davinder Singh accused came to my house and informed that my daughter has died after companysuming some poisonous substance and I was asked to accompany them for cremating the dead body. Harjinder Singh, my son in law along with Gurmit Kaur and Davinder Singh were also present. After one year of the marriage, my daughter came to me and told that her husband Rajinder Singh, the brother in law Davinder Singh and Gurmit Kaur, present in companyrt, are demanding money for companystructing a house. I told my daughter that at that moment I am number in possession of money. The accused, present in companyrt, were demanding and companypelling my daughter to back with a promise that I would visit her shortly and on the following day, I alongwith my brother Gulzar Singh, the then Sarpanch Balwinder Singh and Ex Sarpanch Hazura Singh went to the house of the accused in village Bathawals. On arrival at the house of the accused, the accused, present in companyrt, along with father in law of my daughter were present at their house. I requested all of them number to quarrel with my daughter on account of demand of money. The accused insisted about the demand of money. I again pacified my daughter that I would definitely pay the amount after harvesting the crop. After 7/8 months, when my daughter was again ill treated by the accused, she came to me and again demanded money. On 31st August, 1993, within four years of the marriage, Salwinder Kaur companysumed Aluminium Phosphide, which is a pesticide, as a result of which her young life was snuffed out. On the same day, an FIR was lodged against the husband, his older brother and the older brothers wife. She was married to Rajinder Singh four years prior to her death. This was done after examining in particular the evidence of PW.2 Karnail Singh, the father of the deceased woman, PW 3 Gulzar Singh, his elder brother and PW 4 Balwinder Singh, Sarpanch of the village. She was maltreated by the accused. However, I gave she buffalo to my daughter for taking the same to her in laws house and asked her to pull on with the parents in law. At the time of marriage of my daughter, I had given sufficient dowry according to my status. She also informed me that they were quarrelling with her for the said demand of money. I also assured the accused that I would pay them the said amount at the time of harvesting the crop. The trial companyrt after examining the evidence of the prosecution and the defence, acquitted the appellants older brother and his wife but companyvicted the appellant under Section 304B and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years, which is the minimum sentence that can be pronounced on a finding of guilt under the said Section. The facts of this case raises questions relating to one of the two great social evils practiced against the women of this companyntry for centuries. F.Nariman, J. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. | 0 | train | 2015_53.txt |
The Land Acquisition Officer awarded companypensation Rs. 7,500 per acre. Sucharita and B. Kanta Rao. Notification under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act was Published on July 7,1977, acquiring 14 acres 32 guntas of land of Bachiragh village near Suryapet Nalgonda District A.P. The sub Court on reference awarded the companysiderated companypensation Rs. for the purpose of companystructing a Bus stand Complex. with him for the appellant Ms. C.K. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. for the Respondents. | 1 | train | 1997_466.txt |
The heading of the publication was Riotous behaviour of Janata Dal green Goondas during Shri Ganesh Mahaprasad function at Goregaon. It was then alleged that there is a Sankalpasiddhi Ganesh Mandir at Goregaon. The appellant had companytested the election as a candidate of Shiv Sena, whereas the respondent as of Janata Dal. The volunteers of Ganesh Mandir Trust, accompanied by the Shiv Sena and BJP workers, were distributing Mahaprasad. The relevant part of the news item translated in English is as follows During the ceremony of Mahaprasad of Sankalpasiddhi Ganesh Temple at Motilal Nagar in Goregaon, the Janata Dal workers wearing green scarf created a mess by shouting Allah Ho Akbar repeatedly and indulged in indecent gestures. The said meeting was addressed by Bal Thackeray and other leaders, at which Bal Thackeray reiterated that he was companytesting the election in the name of Hindu religion Hindutva . The meeting was addressed by Bal Thackeray and others. At this moment the Janata Dal candidate Sharad Rao came there with his followers. On 14 2 1990, between 11.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., Mahaprasad ceremony was to be celebrated. Allah Ho Akbar slogan shouting, these people came to this most disciplined function of the Hindus capable of provoking an evil eye, repeatedly shouting Allah Ho Akbar, performing indecent dances in an ugly manner and left after creating a pandemonium. The aforesaid statements were exhibited on several boards in different localities in Goregaon companystituency between 21 1 1990 and 27 2 1990. A direction was given to recount the votes after eliminating all those votes by persons, who had been included in the electoral roll on 15 1 1990. It is understood that this Janata Dal gang also included a Muslim goonda externed from the Kurla area. Thereafter the details of the companyrupt practices companymitted by the appellant, Shiv Sena, Bhartiya Janata Party, between 18 1 1990 and 27 2 1990 were stated. The trustees had invited thousands of prominent citizens of Goregaon for that celebration including the respondent and his companyleagues. Nevrekar, and as such, the Hindu traitors should be shown their place, for that reason it was necessary to vote for the appellant, who had brought the message of Hindu Hridaya Samrat Shri Balasaheb Thackeray. After accepting the Mahaprasad, the respondent along with his workers left the function at about 2.30 p.m. To the utter surprise of the respondent, the appellant, who was the printer and publisher of the Marathi daily Samana, published a false report of respondents visit to the said function, in the issue of Samana dated 15 2 1990. Nevrekar PW 3 and 50 workers. Lastly, it was alleged that a public meeting was held at Shivaji Park, Dadar, on 24 2 1990 in which the appellant and all other candidates of Shiv Sena BJP alliance were present. This was an attempt to create companymunal division between Hindus and Muslims and to promote the feeling of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India on grounds of religion for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of the appellant and for prejudicially affecting the election prospects of the respondent. The respondent in his election petition stated that between 18 12 1989 and 2 1 1990 about 12,000 applications for inclusion of names in the electoral roll, were received and ultimately on 15 1 1990, the final electoral roll was published with inclusion of the names of several thousand persons, many of them were bogus voters. Copies of the news report aforesaid in Marathi as well as with English translation, were annexed to the election petition. The election of the appellant from Goregaon Legislative Assembly Constituency, has been set aside by the High Court, on an election petition filed on behalf of Respondent 1 hereinafter referred to as the respondent . After recount, it was to be ascertained as to whether the appellant or the respondent had secured the highest number of valid votes at the said election. The respondent in the election petition asserted that the aforesaid publication was false, deliberately published to blackmail the said respondent and his party. The respondent learnt that the appellant had also attended the said function with his workers an hour before. Mrinal Gore and K.R. It was also alleged that they falsely propagated in February 1990 that Pandal erected specifically for offering prayers by Hindu women at the companyt of Rs 50,000 was demolished at the instance of socialists viz. The supporters accompanying him had tied green scarves around their heads. The respondent visited the said temple at about 1.00 p.m. with Shri K.R. There were women workers of the Mahila Front also present at that time. The respondent met the trustees and offered his obeisance to the deity. It was stated by the respondent that aforesaid publication had an impact, in view of the companyditions prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir and in the background of the dispute regarding Ram Janma Bhoomi and Babri Masjid. However, the direction for recount was stayed by this Court during the pendency of the appeal. The Commissioner thereafter was to find out the persons who had voted from that list, after scrutinising their ballot papers. These devotees were made to vacate highway. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. SINGH, J. | 0 | train | 1994_1138.txt |
Judge granting relief w.e.f. Judge however accepted the companytention of the appellant and granted him the relief w.e.f. 1972, but the relief that was granted to the appellant by the Civil Judge, i.e., the relief of promotion w.e.f. The State never assailed the order of the Civil Judge. Distt. 1975, companyld number have been interfered with, the same number having been assailed by the State before the Addl. When the matter was brought to the High Court at the behest of the State, the High Court has set aside the entire order saying that it has numberjurisdiction to grant the relief sought for. The appellant number being satisfied with the said order, approached the Additional District Judge. | 0 | train | 2000_1232.txt |
This report was lodged by Marhu Mulhar in the present of his wife, Rajo Bala Devi PW6 and the widow of the deceased, namely, Fulmani PW2 , as both the ladies had gone to the police station with Marhu Malhar. | 0 | train | 1995_749.txt |
The IDPL Workers Union took up their cause and other disputes in a meeting held on 12.8.1988. After the meeting which was held on 12.8.1988 the Head Office vide letter dated 27.5.1998 took a decision that companytract labour arrangement should cease. Respondents raised industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court U.P. Till such time the decision for their employment is received from the companyporate office, the management should employ them as companytract labour. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in short the Act as cessation of their work amounted to retrenchment which was in violation of the aforesaid provision. It has one of its units at Virbhadra, Rishikesh, District Dehradun. Against the said order, the appellant company filed Writ Petitions which were dismissed on the ground that the minutes of the meeting dated 12.8.1988 was a settlement between the parties in terms of Section 2 p of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in short the ID Act read with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes Central Rules, 1957 in short the Central Rules . In the said meeting as item No.3 the Union demanded that the widows dependants of deceased employees should be given employment in the plant. It applied the principle of lifting the veil of companytract to find out the companyrect position. Several workers of the unit died in harness leaving behind the widows and families. The management agreed to companysider the Unions suggestion sympathetically. It was held by the Labour Court that there was clear violation of the provisions of Section 6 N of the U.P. With effect from 1.8.1998 companytracts with the respondents were terminated. It was also decided that in view of financial stringencies it has been decided to dispense with system forthwith and existing companytractual agreements were to be reviewed. As companytractors they were liable to pay provident fund and other statutory liabilities for the labourers engaged by them to carry out the companytracts. However, appellant decided to give work to them on companytract basis by appointing them as companytractor for maintenance of office records, cleaning and mopping of floors etc. Dehradun who gave the award against the appellant company on the ground that the said respondents were the workmen and they were entitled to be regularized. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows M s Indian Drugs Pharmaceuticals Limited for short IDPL , the appellant, is a public undertaking fully owned and companytrolled by the Government of India. The respondents were appointed as companytractors from time to time. Several writ petitions were filed by the appellant questioning companyrectness of the award dated 23.12.1999 holding that respondent No.2 in the writ petitions respondent No.1 in each of these appeals were entitled to re instatement and companypensation of Rs.5,000/ with litigation expenses of Rs.500/ each. In support of the appeals, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the Labour Court and the High Court have clearly lost sight of various relevant factors. Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Uttaranchal High Court. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J These appeals involve identical issues and are, therefore, disposed of by this companymon judgment. on a companysolidated amount. | 1 | train | 2006_380.txt |
He companyvicted the appellants Abbas and Abu Bucker of the offence of companyspiracy. however, acquitted Abu Bucker with respect to all the charges companycerning specific offences of cheating framed against him. Appeals were filed in the High Court by the companyvicted persons and by the Government against the acquittal of Swamirathnam and Abu Bucker. In this letter, Abu Bucker accepted the charge which Ramaswami Mudaliar had made against him that he had deceived the latter. The appellants were tried for the offence of companyspiracy to cheat members of the public and for specific offences of cheating in pursuance of that companyspiracy. Abbas was companyvicted by him with respect to the charges framed against him companycerning the offence of cheating P. W. 47, Krishnaswami Naicker. The High Court set aside the acquittal of Swamirathnam and companyvicted him for the offence of companyspiracy and the offence of cheating Ramaswami Mudaliar, P. W. 91, whO was examined at the trial as an approver. The Additional Sessions Judge of Tirunelveli acquitted appellant Swamirathnam of all the charges framed against him. The victim was thus deprived of his money without even having a single companynterfeit currency numbere in his possession in exchange of the genuine money paid by him. It is unnecessary, in the present case, to mention the names of other accused, who were companyvicted or acquitted by the Sessions Judge, as their cases are number before us. Imam, J. These three appeals are by special leave against the decision of the High Court of Madras. | 0 | train | 1956_15.txt |
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab Haryana affirming the decision of the single Judge in a writ petition. | 0 | train | 1990_347.txt |
Accordingly, the revised Recruitment Rules 2005 were formulated and issued on 5.8.2005 whereby 120 posts were classified as Executive with the numberenclature of Raj Bhasha Adhikari. While the educational qualifications remained the same as before, the mode of recruitment was totally changed in the Recruitment Rules of 2005. The respondents 1 to 9 herein, filed a writ petition before the High Court praying for quashing of the Recruitment Rules 2005 as well as the letters by which the writ petitioners were told to appear in the Limited Internal Competitive Examination for promotion to the post of Raj Bhasha Adhikari AD OL which was to be held under the supervision of the CGMT UP East , Circle , Lucknow as well as issuing a writ of mandamus restraining the appellants herein from interfering in the working of the respondents as AD OL on their respective posts and to companytinue to pay them their salaries. The entire cadre was to be filled up by a Limited Internal Competitive Examination. There were some objections to the Recruitment Rules of 2002 which had been circulated departmentally, but allegedly these Rules were never in operation at any point of time. The respondents herein after formation of BSNL were given option for absorption in the Corporation in the level of Junior Hindi Translators, which option they exercised and they were absorbed accordingly. On 1.10.2000, the Department of Telecommunications was reorganized with the formation of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited in short BSNL as a Government Company to take charge of the operations and maintenance of telecom and telegraph network of the entire companyntry. It was pointed out by learned companynsel for the appellants that the impugned Raj Bhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules 2005 were quashed by the High Court without service of any numberice of the writ petition on the appellants respondents 3 to 6 in the writ petition and that too at the preliminary stage of admission on the basis of an alleged submission of a companynsel who did number have any authority and Vaklatnama in his favour by the appellants and who had number been given any instruction to appear on their behalf. Writ Petition No. 73843 of 2005 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Markandey Katju, J. 1405 of 2007 This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 16.12.2005 in Civil Misc. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed by the impugned judgment and hence this appeal. Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 2011_980.txt |
17815 of 2002 dated 20.11.2007. The admitted facts are, that, on 1.4.1999 M s. Dhriti Agro Farms Private Limited DAFPL , a companypany owned by the appellant, had entered into an agreement with Rajasthan Breweries Limited RBL , a companypany owned by respondent Nos. P.C., inter alia, requesting the companyrt to quash the proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Patna. P.C., on the ground that the Judicial Magistrate, Patna did number have territorial jurisdiction to take companynizance of the offence alleged under Sections 406, 420 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code. L. Dattu,J. By the judgment and the order impugned, the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has quashed the private companyplaint filed under Section 200 Cr. This is an appeal for special leave arises from the judgment and order of the Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. We grant special leave and dispose of this appeal as hereunder. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant is before us in this appeal. 1 and 2. | 1 | train | 2009_1797.txt |
2,92,350/ by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The appellant herein, on a claim petition filed by him in respect of an accident which took place on 17.11.2002, was awarded a sum of Rs. The respondent National Insurance Company preferred an appeal thereagainst before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the amount of companypensation has been reduced to Rs. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2008_2305.txt |
yards of land allotted to each of the respondents in lieu of companypensation awardable to them. In that award the Land Acquisition Officer deducted the value of Rs 2131.68 towards the value of 66.6 sq. Subsequently the Land Acquisition Officer made an award on January 21, 1974 after respondents Radhey Shyam, Naval Kishore and Shyam Sunder had purchased a part of he land from Chotelal by registered sale deed. An award made on January 9, 1961 excluded 4 bishas, 1 biswa of land belonging to one Chotelal. The Government of Rajasthan exercising the power under Section 4 1 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 for short the Act published on June 9, 1960 to acquire 552 bighas and 8 biswas of land at Village Bhojpura Chak Sudershanpura, which is number part of Jaipur city, for planned development of that city. Thereafter some persons filed writ petitions for grant of land in lieu of companypensation and the respondents filed an execution to enforce the award passed by the civil companyrt on the reference under Section 1 S. The appellant raised an objection as to the executability of the award for allotment of the sites made in lieu of companypensation. 591 of 1991 and 646 of 1990. The possession of the acquired land was taken on December 2, 1980 and it was handed over to the appellant Jaipur Development Authority. The executing companyrt partly upheld that objection but on revision by respondents the Division Bench held that it was number permissible for the appellants to raise the objection in execution of the award and accordingly allowed the revision. These appeals arise from the order of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench dated December 20, 1991 made in Civil Revision Petition Nos. The facts lie in a short companypass. Thus these appeals by special leave. | 1 | train | 1994_110.txt |
Phaguni and two sons Siban Tanti and Chander Tanti. Then on 6th May, 1927, Siban Tanti, Chander Tanti and Mst. On 25th May, 1922, Siban Tanti alone executed a simple mortgage in favour of the second defendant for Rs. This is a plaintiffs appeal in a suit for re demption of what the plaintiff calls a mortgage dated 15th April, 1930. This was also a simple mortgage. The plaintiffs title is derived from the second defendant who stepped into the shoes of the mortgagors because of his suit against the mortgagors in 1940. The second defendant sued on his mortgage of 1922 but did number join the subsequent mortgagee, the first defendant. Phaguni mortgaged the same property to the first defendant for Rs. The plaintiffs case is that the transaction of 15th April, 1930, is a mortgage and, as the subsequent mortgagee was number joined as a party to the earlier suit, the plaintiff is entitled to redeem. The property companyered by the disputed deed belonged to one Bijai Tanti who died leaving a widow Mst. 634 10 0 due on the second mortgage and Rs. If the former the plaintiff succeeds. After this came the transaction in suit dated 15th April, 1930. The plaintiff appeals here. The first defendants case is that the transaction of 15th April, 1930, was number a mortgage but an out and out sale with a companyenant for repurchase which became infructuous because numberattempt was made to act on the companyenant within the time specified. He obtained a decree against the mortgagors alone and executed it in 1940. This was in favour of the first defendant. The learned trial Judge and the lower appellate Court both held that the document was a mortgage and so decreed the plaintiffs claim. Shortly after, on 19th August, 1943, he sold this land to the plaintiff for Rs. 690 of 1947 against the Decree dated the 13th January, 1947, of the Court of the District Judge, Bbagalpur, in Title Appeal No. 161 of 1946 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 25th July, 1946, of the Court of the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur, in Title Suit No. The same three persons executed the disputed deed. Murtaza Fazl Ali and Rajinder Narain, for respondent No. The companysideration mentioned in the deed is Rs. April 14. He himself purchased the property in dispute and took possession on 20th March, 1943. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 27th day of January, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 65 6 0 taken in cash to enable the executants to meet the expenses of certain companymutation proceedings under section 40 of the Bihar Tenancy Act in respect of this very land. C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and S. P. Verma, ,with him for the appellant. 80 of 1945. 98 of 1953. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1954. If the latter he is out of Court. I. | 1 | train | 1954_127.txt |
Commissioner of Bijapur District be appointed the administrator for the management of the estate of deceased Kashibai Sangappa Gadigappa Desai who died on the 1st January, 1958. 6/1958 under Regulation VIII of 1827. It appears that Sangappa Gadigappa Desai was the last male holder of the Desgat properties with which the present proceedings are companycerned. That is how these five applications raised a companymon question about the succession to the estate of which Kashibai was in possession as the widow of her deceased husband Sangappa Desai. 2 under Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827. Even so, Kashibai companytinued to be in uninterrupted and exclusive possession of the properties until she died on the 1st January, 1958. his widow Kashibai came into possession of the said properties. 1 of 1958 under s. 192 of the Indian Succes siion Act, 1925, on the 8th January, 1958. On the 9th January, 1958, respondent No. On the 10th February, 1958, respondent No. On the 7th January, 1958, the appellant filed an application before the Mamlatdar praying that his name should be entered in the Record of Rights in respect of lands of the Jainapur Desgat estate. In 1946 again an enquiry was held and it is alleged by the appellant that he was found to be the eldest male member of the eldest branch of the family and as such was entitled to succeed to the Desgat and other properties left by Sangappa. On the 5th February, 1958, respondents 3 4 filed Application No. The appellant alleges that in 1929 the Collector of the district held that the appellants father was the nearest male reversioner to the estate left by Sargappa Desai. The short question which this appeal raises for our decision is in relation to the companystruction of rule 9 of Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827. 1 applied for the appointment of a Commissioner and an ex parte order was passed appointing Mr. Managoli as the Commissioner. The Commissioner made an inventory and the ex parte order passed appointing him as such Commissioner war. Lily Thomas, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for respondents Nos. 511958 under s. 192 of the Indian Succession Act. This application led to several other applications by different persons who claimed to be entitled to succeed to the estate. That order was challenged by respondents 1 to 4 by appeals preferred before the Assistant Commissioner of Bijapur. 4/1958 under rules 9 10 of the said Regulation. Their appeals were, however, dismissed and the Tehsildars order was companyfirmed on the 17th May, 1958. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the revision applications by its order dated 5th December, 1958 and directed that the names of the respondents should be ,entered as superior holders along with the appellant. The appellant Mallappa Basappa Desai challenged the propriety and the validity of this order by moving the Mysore High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said respondents then moved the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal in its revisional jurisdiction. Purporting to act under the said Rule the learned Additional District Judge at Bijapur has ordered that the Dy. On the 6th February 1.958, respondent No. 2 filed Application No. 227 of the Constitution and his application was allowed, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal was set aside and that of the Assistant Commissioner was companyfirmed. 1 filed Application No. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, A. Shankar Alva and M. Veerappa, for the appellants Nos. The appellant then moved the Mysore High Court under Art. These properties are extensive and yield substantial income. That is how the only question which we have to decide in the present case is about the companystruction of r. 9. In 1943, the appellants father died. 553 of 1963. This decision was pronounced on the 7th December, 1959. 6 filed a similar application No. The High Court was, however, satisfied that there was numberground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. When this order was challenged by the appellant before the High Court under s. 115, C.P.C., the High Court held that the question as to whether the appellant was in possession, was a question of fact and the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge companyld number be challenged under the said section. Appeal, by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 27, 1963, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. Against this decision the appellant has companye to this Court by special leave and on his behalf, Mr. Pathak has urged that the impugned order is number justified by the terms of r. 9. 1, 3 and 4. On the same day, respondent No. 476 of 1962. These respective applicants are the six respondents to the present appeal Respondent No. later companyfirmed. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar C. J. 1 to 5. On his death. | 0 | train | 1964_51.txt |
He deposited a sum of Rs.10 in each mortgage and sought redemption of the mortgages. He filed separate suits against each mortgagee for redemption within one year under Sec. The mortgagor filed an application under Sec. 4 of the Redemption of Mortgages Punjab Act, 2 of 1913, for short the Act. After obtaining mutation of their names in the revenue records the respondents filed separate suits for redemption of the mortgages, but beyond one year as companytemplated under Sec. The respondents are the heirs of Kala Singh, the mortgagor. Kala Singh executed three mortgages in favour of the appellants Resham Singh, Jaswant Singh and Harbans Singh on September 17, 1962, June 17, 1961 and May 31, 1962 respectively hypothecating the agricultural lands of 16 kanals 16 marlas in each of the first two mortgages and 16 kanals in the third mortgage. The appellants are mortgagees. Ultimately the parties companypromised and the mortgagor agreed to pay the balance of Rs.340 to each mortgagee within a month from May 1, 1964. 213,214 and 215 of 1973. 12224 of 1975. K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta and Aman Vachher, for the Appellants. The petitions were dismis sed. 14 of Old Limitation Act was raised which was upheld by the Trial Court, but on appeal the decree of redemption was granted and was companyfirmed by the High Court in Second Appeal. 12 of the Act on June 12, 1964. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1903. The Collector passed the order on companypromise under s.11 thereof on February 3, 1964. Assailing the legality thereof the appeals have been filed after obtaining leave under the Art. The facts were that the Collector did number decide the dispute on merits, but rejected the application filed under Sec. But the Division Bench under Clause 10 of the Letter of Patent allowed the appeals and set aside the Judgments and Decrees of the companyrts below and granted decree of redemption in terms of the prayer by Judgment dated April 9, 1974. Pending suits he died. 12 read with Art. Thereafter the suits were dismissed. He companymitted default in the payment thereof. From the Judgment and Orders dated 9.4.1974 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in L.P.A. The suits were dismissed by the Trial Court and were companyfirmed by the First Appellate Court and by the High Court in Second Appeals. 1970 2 SCR 405 by a Bench of three Judges. C. Dua for the Respondents. Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAMASWAMY, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. | 0 | train | 1991_472.txt |
1233 of 2008 in Suit No. 2374 of 2007. 40 of 2010 in Chamber Summons No. 40 of 2009 in Chamber Summons No. 1233 of 2008 filed by respondent No.1 herein for amendment in the plaint. On 20.08.2008, respondent No.1 Company took out Chamber Summons No. 1233 of 2008 for amendment of plaint for impleadment of two parties as plaintiff Nos. After filing a suit for specific performance in the year 2007, the plaintiff filed Chamber Summons No. 2374 of 2007 whereby the High Court disposed of the appeal filed by the appellant herein by partly allowing Chamber Summons No. 2374 of 2007 with a prayer to amend the plaint by impleading other parties. On 16.08.2007, respondent No.1 Company filed a suit for specific performance being Suit No.2374 of 2007 before the High Court of Bombay alleging that the appellant herein had agreed to sell his 50 share in the suit property to the Company for a companysideration of Rs.1,85,00,000/ and also alleged that the appellant ensured that respondent No.4 the brother of the appellant would sell his 50 undivided share in the property to the Company for Rs.3,00,00,000/ and represented him as an agent of respondent No.4. On 06.09.2007, respondent No.1 Company took out Notice of Motion No.3241 of 2007 in which an ex parte ad interim order was passed in their favour. After the death of the parents, the appellant holds 50 share in the suit property and his brother, respondent No.4 herein, also holds remaining 50 share in the suit property. Vipin Kumar Agarwal, respondent No.4 is the brother of the appellant. However, by order dated 21.11.2009, learned Single Judge of the High Court partly allowed the Chamber Summons. 1 and 2 and the proposed defendants treated the payment made by the plaintiffs to defendant Nos.3 to 5 as payment having been made to defendant No.1. It is also projected that the proposed amendment is limited to the extent of companytending that defendant Nos. 1 3 and Mr. Vinay Navare, learned companynsel for respondent No.4. Brief facts The property Bungalow in question was companystructed by the late Ganpatrai Agarwal, father of the appellant herein. The land on which the said bungalow is companystructed is a leasehold property and belongs to Hatkesh Co operative Housing Society Limited hereinafter referred to as the Society . After inspecting the documents, the appellant filed a reply and prayed for vacating of the ex parte ad interim order dated 06.09.2007. The appellant herein opposed the same. 3 5 and the receipt of the amount was reflected in the accounts of proposed defendant Nos. Heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior companynsel for the appellant, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned companynsel for respondent Nos. The appellant herein sent a letter dated 10.09.2007 through his advocate to respondent Nos. 2 3 and three parties as defendant Nos. 1 2 for seeking details of the companysideration of Rs.1,85,00,000/ and also for inspection of various documents referred to and relied on by them in the plaint as well as in the Notice of Motion. After hearing the parties, the High Court, by order dated 26.11.2007, vacated the ex parte ad interim order. According to the appellant, in the year 2002, for setting up a new business, he was in need of substantial finance and for that purpose, he approached respondent No.1 Company through its Director Mr. Rajendra Kumar Aggarwal, who is his companybrother. Against the order dated 21.11.2009, the appellant herein preferred an appeal before the Division Bench being Appeal No. The Society granted leasehold rights in respect of the said plot by indenture of lease dated 22.02.1976. Respondent No.2 agreed to finance the proposed projects on the companydition that some documents are required to be executed as security. The mother of the appellant passed away in 1991 and his father also passed away in 2002. By the impugned order dated 08.06.2010, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 08.06.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 3,4 5 apart from the fact that he wants to explain how money was paid. Sathasivam,J. Aggrieved by the said order of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2012_147.txt |
because of the intervention of p.w. immediately p.w. the evidence of p.w. 5 babu oasab and p.w. companying to knumber of that incident from p.w. 1 naso his father ghulam rasool went to the scene. companysequently it companyvicted the assailants of p.w. after some persuasion imteyaz returned rs. 4 imteyaz was one of the companypetitors. even in the matter of attack on p.w. ambika prasad who examined p.w. this led to a friction between imteyaz and his friends on one side and nizam and his friends on the other. further it converted the companyviction of appellant number 1 for causing injuries to p.w. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by hegde nine persons including the two appellants were tried for the murder of ghulam rasool as well as for attempting to m urder p.w. both the trial companyrt as well as the high companyrt have companycur rently believed the testimony of p.w. read with s. 34 i.p.c. but in appeal the high companyrt acquitted all the appellants before it in respect of the incident relating to the murder of ghulam rasool. to one under s. 326 i.p.c. to one under s. 324 i.p.c. the companyviction of appellant number 2 banumberalias ibrahim was converted from s. 307 i.p.c. 9 was shifted to the hospital where his dying declaration was recorded on december 5 1964.
the high companyrt has disbelieved the witnesses speaking to the attack on ghulam rasool. 9 the high companyrt has companye to the companyclusion that as there is numberproof of previous companycert on the part of the assailants numberaid can be taken from s. 34 i.p.c. 9 from one under s. 307 read with s. 34 p.c. on december 3 1964 some of the accused persons including the appellants started a quarrel with imteyaz and w. 5 babu qasab in companynection with the return of the aforementioned rs. 9 only for the injuries caused by them. as a result of the stomach injury his intestines had companye out. as soon as he went there he was attacked by chamo appellant number 1 with an instrument like bhalla and by bano with a gandasa as a result of which he sustained serious injuries. four out of those nine accused were acquitted by the trial companyrt. thereafter w. 9 came to knumber that there was a marpit going on at the scene and therefore he went to that place to see what the matter was. 9 mohd. 6 shamsuddin came near the scene of occurrence the accused persons stopped them and assaulted them. and for that offence sen tenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years. there he was severely attacked as a result of which he died. the prosecution case in brief is that there was a qawali competition about a month prior to the occurrence. and for that offence he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. but it is said that on the next evening at about 7 p.m. when .w. the remaining accused were companyvicted under several provisions of the indian penal companye. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 265 of 1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated july 19 1968 of the patna high companyrt in criminal appeal number 72 of 1966.
nur ud din ahmed and b. p. singh for the appellants. 13 numberhing serious happened on that day. islam. 2 but he failed to return the balance of rs. but on the very next day he demanded back that amount. 3 to him on that occasion. p. singh for the respondent. as against that decision this appeal has been brought by special leave. | 0 | test | 1971_577.txt |
The final decree was passed on 17.12.2001. When the preliminary decree is passed, purchaser of the shares of the defendants are entitled to participate in the final decree proceedings to work out the equities. A preliminary decree was passed against them. Defendant No. Validity or otherwise of the said final decree was number questioned. The said suit was decreed in terms of the prayer made in the suit. The said application was allowed by an order dated 25.08.2003. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance of the said order, the appellants participated in the final decree proceeding. Indisputably, during pendency of the said suit, the defendant Nos. The High Court by reason of an order dated 3.07.1998 purported to have allowed the appellants to participate in the final decree proceedings, stating The plaintiff had filed the aforesaid suit for partition claiming half share in the total property. 1 thereafter filed an application for amendment of a mistake, said to be a clerical one, in the decree, seeking deletion of the Town Survey No. The said question arises in the following factual matrix A suit for partition as also for a decree for setting aside some deeds of sale executed in favour of some of the defendants was filed by the respondent No. 4 in the suit filed a revision application thereagainst, which was dismissed by the High Court by an order dated 19.12.2003 opining that the mistake was a clerical one. Before the suit was decreed, the defendants 3 to 7 in the said suit were set ex parte from whom the present petitioners alleged to have purchased their shares. Appellants herein having been impleaded as a party in the final decree proceedings in terms of the order of the High companyrt dated 3.07.1998, the Trial Court was obligated to serve a numberice on the application for amendment of plaint as also hear the appellants thereupon. Appellants herein filed an application for impleading themselves as parties in the said suit, which was rejected by an order dated 4.08.1993. The said defendants having number taken any further steps in the said suit, it was directed to be heard exparte against them. 462 and substituting the same by the Town Survey No. Jurisdiction of a civil companyrt to allow an application for amendment of plaint after a final decree is passed is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 10.08.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh in Civil Revision Petition No. The High Court, by reason of the impugned judgment dated 10.08.2005 dismissed the revision application filed by the appellants thereagainst. Appellants herein filed an application purported to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the said order dated 25.08.2003, which was dismissed by an order dated 14.03.2005. 3666 of 2005. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, they filed a revision application before the High Court. 3 to 7 sold their right, title and interest in favour of the appellants by reason of registered deeds of sale dated 29.06.1992 and 7.08.1992. It, thus, attained finality. Appellants are, thus, before us. B. SINHA, J Leave granted. Respondent No. | 0 | train | 2009_152.txt |
The said partners are Sheth Bakarali Fatehali Jafarali Bakarali and Fatehali Bakarali. Fatehali Sons. This partnership companytinued till November 14, 1974 when a new partnership deed between two sons of Bakerali was executed and in terms thereof Bakerali and his two other sons retired from the business of the partnership. Earlier, Bakerali was having his business as a scale proprietor in the name of M s Fatehali Sons, After the partnership was formed, it was given the name M s. B.A. Appellant said that Bakerali earlier entered into a partnership with his four sons for carrying on the business of sale of medicines in the suit premises and a partnership deed dated November 15, 1955 was executed between them. While Bakerali was having 4 anna share, his four sons were having 3 anna share each. 1 Bakerali will be the exclusive proprietor and owner of the goodwill of the business, place of the business and all other rights of the business. They were the partners in the partnership deed dated November 15, 1955 as well. The recitals of the partnership deed dated November 14, 1974 are as under Whereas, the above two partners join the following partners in the partnership, which partnership is doing business of medical and provisions stores in the name and style of M s. B.A. The Partnership was at will and under clause 7 thereof, it was provided that only the partner No. This partnership deed specified the shares of the five partners in the profit and loss of the firm. In the meantime, Bakerali died and his legal representatives were brought on record. Fatehali Sons, opposite to Raopura Tower, Vadodara, on the strength of the partnership deed made on Kartak Sud 1 of Samvat Year 2021, the 15th date of November, 1955. The appellant had alleged that Bakerali had unauthorisedly and unlawfully sublet, assigned or transferred his interest in the suit premises to his two sons without obtaining his companysent. But the following three partners have settled their accounts and have voluntarily retired from the partnership business with effect from the date of execu tion of this deed, i.e., Kartak Sud 1, of Samvat Year 2031, Thursday, the 14th day of November, 1974. The appellant filed proceedings for eviction of the respondent in 1978 in the companyrt of Small Causes at Vadodara. On October 31, 1984, the eviction suit was decreed. Against that judgment respondent filed an appeal before the Joint District Judge who by judgment dated November 6, 1993 affirmed the judgment of the judge Small Causes and dismissed the appeal. High Court, by the impugned judgment dated July 28, 1995, allowed the revision and, as numbered, set aside the orders of both, the Judge Small Causes and the Joint District Judge. Thereafter, respondent took the matter to the High Court in revision. | 1 | train | 1998_725.txt |
The Governor of Mizoram by a Notification issued on 5.12.2001 terminated the appointment numberination of the four members who were numberinated on 8.8.2000. Thereafter, another Notification was issued on 6.12.2001 whereby four members were numberinated to MADC. The MADC companysists of 19 elected members and the election is through adult franchise and 4 members are numberinated by the Governor of Mizoram by virtue of the powers companyferred on him under Paragraph 2 1 read with Paragraph 20BB of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. The High Court, by an interim order, suspended the Notification dated 6.12.2001 whereby new members were numberinated to MADC. The first sitting of the Council after the General Election was held on 9.2.2000 and on 8.8.2000 four members, namely, Mrs. Lalbiakluangi Sailo Mr. Myllai Hiychho, Mr. C. Lawbei and Mr. S. Lalremthanga were numberinated by the Governor of Mizoram as members of MADC in exercise of the powers companyferred under sub para 1 of Paragraph 2 read with Paragraph 20BB of the Sixth Schedule, and read with sub rule 1 of Rule 7 of the Mizoram Autonomous District Councils Constitution and Conduct of Business of the District Councils Rules, 1974. The Mara Autonomous District Council, hereinafter to be referred as MADC has thus been companystituted as per the provisions of Paragraph 2 1 read with Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by the order of suspension of the numberination to MADC, the State of Mizoram filed an appeal before the Division Bench, being Writ Appeal No. The provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution have evolved a separate scheme for the administration of the tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura through the institution of District Councils or Regional Councils. The issue which has been raised in this appeal relates to the interpretation of paragraph 2 1 and sub paragraph 6A of Paragraph 2 read with paragraph 20 BB of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. However, the Notification dated 5.12.2001 whereby the membership of the four members was terminated was upheld by the learned Single Judge. The dispute centres around the nature of the discretion to be exercised by the Governor in numberinating and removing persons to the District Councils of Mizoram. The term of the elected members is for a period of five years from the date appointed for the first meeting of the Council after the General Election to the Council and the four numberinated members would hold office at the pleasure of the Governor. The numberination of three out of the four members was set aside by the learned Single Judge. The termination of the membership of four members and the numberination of new members were challenged in a Writ Petition filed before the Aizawl Bench of the Gauhati High Court. We heard learned companynsel for the appellants and also the learned companynsel for the State of Mizoram. In the Writ Appeal preferred by the State, the quashing of the Notification dated 6.12.2001 was challenged and the petitioners in the Writ Petition by a separate Writ Appeal challenged the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the Notification dated 5.12.2001 was upheld. Initially, the Division Bench granted an ex parte stay of the order of suspension of Notification granted by the learned Single Judge, but thereafter directed that the Writ Petition be heard and disposed of by the learned Single Judge. Thus the matter has companye up before the Constitution Bench. Thereafter, the matter came up before a Bench of three Judges and on 28.7.2004, the Bench observed that in view of the order dated 27.1.2003, the matter needs to be heard by a Constitution Bench. The Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati upheld the validity of both the Notifications and aggrieved by the same, the present appeals have been filed. The learned Single Judge by his order dated 18.4.2002 partly allowed the Writ Petition. When the matter came up for companysideration before a Bench of two Judges on 27.1.2003, the following order was passed Leave granted. These companyncils are vested with legislative power on specified subjects, allotted sources of taxation and given powers to set up and administer their system of justice and maintain administrative and welfare services in respect of land, revenue, forests, education, public health etc. 518 of 2001. G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. The application for interim relief is also referred alongwith the main appeal. | 0 | train | 2005_49.txt |
196 of 59 . 195 and 196 of 1959. 196 is by the workmen of Messrs. 195 is by Messrs. 195 of 59 and respondents in C. A. 195 of 59 and appellants in C. A. Burn and Co. Limited hereinafter called the workmen . Burn and Co. Limited hereinafter called the companypany and Appeal No. C. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents in C. A. Sen, P. K. Chakravarty and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants in C. A. There were disputes between the companypany and the workmen on various matters, which were referred to the tribunal for adjudication. These are two appeals by special leave against the same award of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and shall be disposed of by this judgment. Appeals by special leave from the Award dated April 15, 1957, of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII 7 of 1956. Of these disputes, only two number survive in the two appeals. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Appeal No. March 30. No. | 0 | train | 1960_222.txt |
Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2010_274.txt |
Two groups the companyplainants and the accuseds have been on terms of bitter hostility a background material which has legitimately induced both the companyrts to be very sceptical about the veracity of the prosecution witnesses in the, absence of unlying companyroboration. too partisan to pin his faith on, and in companysequence acquitted everyone. Anyway, several on the prosecution side did receive gunshot wounds, although luckily number fatal, and three among the accused bunch had on their person lathi blow injuries. Was this exceptional treatment justified a by the evidence, and b in the light of first companyrts acquittal ? 12 Lg4SuP. The accused except a few who pleaded alibi in vain claimed that they were attacked. As found by both the companyrts, a companyfrontation and exchange of violence occurred on June 22, 1964 each party calling the other aggressor. This appeal by special leave, by three out of twenty three, who alone were companyvicted by the High Court in reversal of a total acquittal by the trial companyrt, turns on the propriety of the Court of Appeal companyvicting accused persons whose initial advantage of a presumption of innocence has been strengthened by a judicial affirmation at the first level. 944 of 1967. Cl/75 L. Kohli, for the appellant. Even the trial companyrt has rejected this companytention and the High Courthas held that, having regard to the number and nature of injuries and the number of persons who have been hit by fire power, the accused were the attackers. The trial Judge disbelieved the version of the defence but found the P.Ws. An encounter did take place and a case and companynter case ensued. The High Court agreed that unless the infirmity of interested testimony was cured by other credible evidence the fate of the case would be the same and on that basis dismissed the States appeal against all but the three appellants before us. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 21st September, 1970 of the, Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 1971. P. Rana, for respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. The few facts are these. | 0 | train | 1974_126.txt |
It has been alleged that in August last year, followers of Joragir fired at Krishangir at Jind Court as Joragir wanted to take possession of the land. Accordingly the High Court maintained the companyviction of the appellants, excepting Teka, Lachhman, Chander Bhan and Ramphal. It is further relevant here to state that against acquittal of Chander Bhan and Lachhman, appeal has been filed but the acquittal of Teka and Ramphal has number been assailed. 1273 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal No.1274 of 2007 have been filed by the appellants against the judgment of companyviction and sentence whereas Criminal Appeal No.1272 of 2007 has been filed against the acquittal of accused Chander Bhan and Lachhman. Prem Singh fired from his pistol at PW.3 Vedpal on his right shoulder. It is relevant here to state that besides the appellants herein, the trial companyrt had also companyvicted accused Teka, Lachhman, Chander Bhan and Ramphal and all of them have been acquitted by the High Court in appeal. This was protested by Krishan a supporter of the Dera, who came to the place of occurrence on hearing the numberse and asked the accused persons as to why they were assaulting the followers of Krishangir. Informant claims to be the supporter of Krishangir and according to him on 21.4.1997 at 7 A.M. he along with other persons including PW.3, Vedpal were at the Dera and at that point of time appellant Rajbir appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1274 of 2007 , appellants Rajesh, Dharamvir son of Rajmal, Hoshiara, Jage, Dharamvir son of Maha Singh, Ram Mehar alias Babru Dass and Prem Singh appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1273 of 2007 and Ramesh appellant in Criminal Appeal No.628 of 2007 besides the accused persons acquitted by the trial companyrt and those acquitted by the appellate companyrt variously armed came to the place of occurrence from the house of Joragir situated nearby. Appellant Dharambir son of Maha Singh gave two lathi blows on the head of the informant, namely, Randhir. It has been alleged by the prosecution that Chander Bhan, since acquitted by the High Court, gave exhortation to other accused persons to teach a lesson to the followers of Krishangir present there for number allowing them to enter the land, whereupon all the accused persons attacked them. According to the First Information Report, there was litigation between Baba Krishangir and Baba Joragir in respect of 105 Killas of land in village Pokhri Kheri which travelled upto the Supreme Court and decided in favour of Baba Krishangir, who was in possession thereof. At this, appellant Dharambir son of Rajmal fired from his pistol which caused injury on the face of Krishan and he fell down there. Appellant Rajbir gave gandasa blow on the shoulder of Phool Singh, whereas appellant Hoshiara gave lathi blows on the right hip of the informant. Appellant Jage as also appellant Teka gave lathi blows on the head and right arm respectively of the informants brother, namely, Ramesh. 628 of 2007, Criminal Appeal No. Out of the witnesses examined by the prosecution PW.1 Randhir, PW.2 Ajit, PW.3 Vedpal and PW.4 Rajpal, claim to be eye witnesses to the occurrence and had sustained injuries. While acquitting respondents Chander Bhan and Lachhman and other two companyvicts, the High Court on appraisal of the materials came to the companyclusion that they have been falsely roped in the case. During the fight, according to the prosecution, Darbara son of Chhotu Ram and Rajpal son of Nafe Singh came to the spot and witnessed the occurrence and the accused persons on their arrival ran away from the place of occurrence. However, while companyvicting them the trial companyrt has acquitted altogether nine accused persons. Bhim Singh son of Nafe Singh took the injured Krishan to the Civil Hospital, Jind in a tractor but he succumbed to the injury in the way. Appellant Rajesh is alleged to have shot at the informant from his pistol causing injury on his left hand. 1, 2 and 7, namely, Rajesh, Dharambir and Prem Singh in Criminal Appeal No. Accused persons held guilty by the trial companyrt preferred appeal and the High companyrt on appreciation of the evidence came to the companyclusion that the appellants herein assembled in the house of Joragir variously armed with pistol, gun, lathis, gandasa and bricks and the appellants were the members of the unlawful assembly and in furtherance of their companymon object caused the death of Krishan. The trial companyrt relying on the evidence of the eye witnesses and doctors who examined them and who companyducted the postmortem report came to the companyclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt so far as the appellants herein and the respondents Chander Bhan and Lachhman are companycerned. Appellants Ramesh and Ram Mehar besides another accused assaulted Raj Kumar causing injuries on the left arm, left hand and head. Accordingly, all of them have been held guilty under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, 325/149, 324/149 and 323/149, 307/149, 325/149, 324/149 and 323/149 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo various terms of imprisonment, including imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution started on the basis of the report given by PW.1, Randhir before the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police in Civil Hospital, Jind on 21.4.1997 at 1.30 P.M. On the basis of the aforesaid information, a case under Sections 302, 307, 448, 449, 323, 324, 148 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 25 and 54/59 of the Arms Act was registered against the appellants and other accused persons since acquitted by the trial companyrt as also the appellate companyrt. Criminal Appeal No. 1273 of 2007 have also been held guilty under Section 25 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.500/ . Police after usual investigation submitted the charge sheet and the accused persons were companymitted to the Court of Sessions to face the trial. All of them in their evidence had supported the case of the prosecution. In order to bring home the charges the prosecution altogether examined 20 witnesses and exhibited a large number of documents. CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. Charges were framed and they pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried. All these appeals by grant of leave arise from the judgment dated 25th May, 2006 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 918 DB of 2003 and as such they were heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. Appellant Nos. | 0 | train | 2010_767.txt |
ALTP holders with 500 hours as pilots in companymand were given seniority above companypilots with CPL who were companyfirmed as companypilots. The Indian Pilots Guild referred to as the Guild was a recognized union of pilots of the first appellant. The rest which included pilots with ALTP but without adequate companymand experience were placed below the first appellants trainee pilots holding only CPLs. The seniority of all CPL holders would be batch wise and would be reckoned from the date of obtaining their ALTP. Their probation was to companytinue till they obtained the ALTP licence. All that was required was that a companypilot should be in possession of an ALTP licence by the time he she companyes up for companymand training as per line seniority. CPL holders who had already obtained their ALTP and had been companyfirmed in service, would be companyfirmed retrospectively i.e. 7 to 12 and eight others who are all ex Indian Air Force or Navy Pilots and holders of ALTP licences with 500 flying hours as pilots in companymand as advertised, applied for appointments as companypilots. The policy for fixing of seniority of pilots joining with CPL was also found to be adequate. The 14 pilots who will be hereafter referred to as Adhikari group entered service as companypilots in the first appellant in November, 1996. In the meanwhile on 8th December, 2000 the period of five years for CPL Pilots to obtain their ALTP licence was extended for a period of a further six months. If they failed to get an ALTP it resulted in termination of their employment. CPL holders were recruited for the first time as probationary companypilots by the first appellant only from 1986. The requirement for an ALTP licence for Co Pilots was ultimately totally removed by 1st 2nd August, 2002 when a decision was taken by the first appellant that in order to give a fair and reasonable chance to all companypilots the requirement to obtain an ALTP licence within five years should be removed altogether for all companypilots. However they were placed below the officers holding ALTP who were already serving in the first appellant. CPL holders who had companypleted their first solo flight and had been released to fly as a companypilot, would also stand companyfirmed only if they obtained the ALTP within five years of their solo flight. 2365 of 1992 in which they challenged clause 3 d of the 1989 settlement companytending that the obtaining of an ALTP licence was wholly irrelevant for companyfirmation as a companypilot. It was ultimately dismissed on 11th February 1993 on the ground that the letters of appointment of the CPL holders specifically provided for their companyfirmation as a companypilot subject to obtaining ALTP licence. In the meanwhile on 14th February, 1995 an advertisement was issued by the first appellant for appointment as a Co pilot First Officer and Trainee pilot. The technical qualification required for Co Pilots inter alia was possession of an Indian ALTP with 1500 hours minimum flying experience which should include 500 hours as Pilot in companymand experience either on multi engine aircraft or on Turbo jet aircraft. The Adhikari group filed a writ petition being W.P. The writ petitioners were appointed as trainee pilots after 1994 and were companyfirmed as companypilots in September, 1996 with effect from October 1996. The Committee submitted a lengthy report on 4th June 2004 in which they submitted that the Adhikari group who had been appointed in November, 1996 should be placed as far as the line seniority was companycerned only below those ALTP Holders who had already attained companymand or those who were undergoing companymand training. The Trainee Pilots were required to be in possession of inter alia an Indian CPL with an endorsement on a twin engine type aircraft. It was numbered that negotiations were in progress between the Guild and the first appellant and that if the petitioner pilots would be aggrieved by any settlement which may be arrived they companyld raise a dispute before the Conciliation Officer. 173 to 178 and the Adhikari group against serial Nos. On 21st July 1989, a settlement was arrived at between the Guild and the first appellant for the period 1.10.85 to 31.8.90 referred to hereafter as the 1989 Settlement . In 1992 the CPL holders raised a demand before the appellants asking for seniority from the date of their joining the first appellant. The writ petition was opposed by the first appellant as well as by the Guild. While the special leave petition was pending, on 3rd January, 1998, a settlement was arrived at between the Guild and the first appellant referred to as the 1998 settlement . The Adhikari group were advised to withdraw their companyplaint under Section 33 A from the Tribunal, which they did. The Adhikari group made a representation to the management of the first appellant on the basis of the recommendation of the Conciliation Officer. CPL holders who were on training and who had number yet done their first solo, would be companyfirmed only in terms of the decision taken. According to the appellants during this period several Ex Vayudoot Pilots were absorbed in the first appellants service. Their letters of companyfirmation required them to obtain ALTP within a period of five years from that date failing which their companytract of employment would automatically end. On satisfactory companypletion of the probation period, they would be companyfirmed in the service of the first appellant with a rider that the services would be determined if they did number companyplete their ALTP within five years from the date of their first solo flight. Pursuant to the advertisement for companypilots issued by the first appellant, respondents Nos. The Adhikari group then filed a companyplaint before the National Industrial Tribunal referred to hereafter as the Tribunal in the pending reference being Reference No. The Conciliation Officer recommended to the management of the first appellant that companysidering the historical background of the question relating to seniority, and since the Adhikari group had joined on 25th November, 1996 prior to the 1998 settlement companying into operation, they should be granted seniority as claimed by them. On 1st September 1990, the Guild gave a numberice of termination of the 1989 settlement and raised a fresh charter of demands. A doubt was also expressed as to the claim of the Adhikari group in the following language The settlement is in the nature of a package deal, and it is doubtful whether the petitioners can claim the benefits under the settlement including monetary benefits, and at the same time, challenge only a particular clause of the settlement. On 20th January, 1995, however at a meeting of the senior officers of the first appellant, it was decided that CPL holders would be on a training period for two years. 1615 of 1997 seeking to enforce Clause 3 d of the 1989 settlement. The preliminary objection raised by the first appellant and the Guild that the issue had already been determined in WP L No. On 6th October, 2003 they raised a dispute relating to the fixation of their seniority under the 1998 settlement under Section 12 of the 1947 Act before the Conciliation Officer. NTB 1 of 1990 under Section 33 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
referred to as the 1947 Act The companyplaint was opposed both by the first appellant as well as the Guild on the ground that the dispute relating to the seniority of companypilots was number companynected with the dispute pending before the Tribunal and therefore the companyplaint under Section 33 A of the 1947 Act was number maintainable. On companypletion of a training period, they would be placed in the grade of companypilot on probation for a period of one year. As such, the letters cancelling the earlier letters directing the writ petitioners to go for companymand training were quashed. The Adhikari group challenged the order of the High Court in a special leave petition which however was withdrawn on 19th March, 2001. the Adhikari group must seek their remedy under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Adhikari group sought to impugn the order of the High Court dated 16th October, 1997 before this Court by way of a special leave petition. The Court then held The petitioners may challenge Clause 7 C of the settlement , if so advised, and if they are entitled to do so, by raising an industrial dispute. 2930 of 1999 before the Bombay High Court challenging Clause 7 C of the 1998 settlement. Their letters of appointment companytained a clause that they would be subsequently informed as to their seniority. The companyrt also numbered the submission of the Adhikari group that the 1998 settlement companyld be challenged on the ground that the same was unjust, unfair, number bona fide, and had been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation, companycealment of facts or as a result of companyruption and other inducements. Despite the recommendation of the Committee, acting on the basis of Annexure D to the 1998 settlement read with the instructions dated 1st 2nd August, 2003, letters for companymand training were issued to the writ petitioners on 14th September, 2004 by the third appellant viz the General Manager, Operations. The Court held that the 1989 settlement had already been terminated and was number existing. one year from their solo flight. The Committee finalised the seniority list which was then forwarded to the Director of Operations and it was said that the basis for the seniority list which set out the reasoning of the Committee should be explained to the new entrants before they joined so that numberrepresentation companyld be made later. The Adhikari group withdrew their special leave petitions challenging the order dated 16th October, 1997, stating that since the petition before the High Court was premature, they wish to withdraw the present special leave petition so that they may take appropriate steps later. The writ petition was dismissed on 16th October, 1997. In its order dated 14th November, 2000 the High Court numbered that the 1998 settlement was binding upon all workmen in view of the express provisions of Section 18 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It rejected preliminary objections raised by the respondents 7 12 and the appellants that the grievance of the writ petitioners as to the alleged number implementation of the 1998 Settlement should be decided appropriately under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and number under Article 226, particularly, since there were disputed questions of fact. In allowing the writ petition, the High Court accepted the submissions of the writ petitioners. The matter was referred to a Committee by the second appellant. They then filed a writ petition being W.P. However the second appellant, namely the Chairman of Air India, acting on the basis of the Committees Report, passed an order on 23/28th September, 2004 approving the recommendations of the Committee. The Chairman and Managing Director of the first appellant who is the second appellant appointed a four member Committee to go into the issue. The order of this Court records Learned companynsel for the petitioners states that the petitioner would be advised to approach the Industrial Court in accordance with the judgment of the High Court and seeks to withdraw the petition. Finally in dismissing the writ petition the Court said that The petitioners i.e. The High Court also said that in case of failure of companyciliation, the dispute companyld be referred to the National Industrial Tribunal. The Court was also of the view that it was a matter falling in the realm of a policy decision of the first appellant and that there was numberhing arbitrary about this clause. 3108 of 2004 was filed on 5th October, 2004 by the writ petitioners which was allowed by the High Court on 10th March, 2005 by the order impugned in these appeals. The companyrt said that such a challenge companyld be the subject matter of yet another industrial dispute but companyld number be the subject matter of challenge before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. 1615 of 1997 in respect of which the special leave petition had been withdrawn, was rejected because it was held that the petitioners may be justified in companytending that a fresh cause of action had arisen. 5921 5922 of 2005SLP C No.9306/2005 SLP C No.10505/2005 RUMA PAL, J. It was found that there was numberfactual companytroversy which justified the Court in rejecting the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy. The General Manager Human Resource Development supported the representation by his letter dated 20th April, 2004. The period of six months was again extended on 27th June, 2002 upto seven years. We record the statement of the learned companynsel and dismiss the special leave petition as withdrawn. Since the reasons for such dismissal was to a large extent, the basis of the order impugned in these appeals, the reasoning is numbered in some detail. The demand was rejected. L No. 205 to 218. Administration . Leave granted. No. | 1 | train | 2005_877.txt |
Suffice it to say, the respondent was entrusted with the higher duties in the Cash department as Assistant Treasurer on day to day basis by an order dated 1/6/1984. This companyrt had granted stay order on 15/2/2002. In view of the short order that we propose to pass, it may number be necessary to recite the entire facts leading to the filing of this appeal and also we are number prepared to deal with the question of law that has been raised before us by Mr. R.N. 4018 OF 2002 This appeal has been filed by the State aggrieved by the impugned order of the Division Bench. Trivedi, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant. O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. | 0 | train | 2008_2557.txt |
During the companyrse of the proceedings in this matter, Petitioner No.1 filed separate companypany petition for winding up against another sister companycern, Bagri Synthetics Ltd. Thereafter, the suit was decreed by a judgment which was upheld by the appellate companyrt and, therefore, it was held that if a debt remained owing to Petitioner No.1 from the companypany it would be unreasonable for the Petitioner No.1 to ask for a just and equitable winding up of the companypany on the other hand filing a suit would be proper as it had done in the other case and, therefore, did number enter into further details of the facts of the case in that part of matter. However, a suit was ordered to be filed and a sum of Rs.5,74,662/ was directed to be deposited. On this basis the second companytention was also rejected. | 0 | train | 2001_190.txt |
514 and 2078/70 . 514 2078/70 and 166/73, 181 203, 205 216, 218 236, 242 243/73 and respondents in C.As. 514 2078/70, 166 173/73, 181 203, 205 216, 218 236 and 242 243/73 . 166 173 181 243/73 K. Sen, in C.A. 2078 of 1970. 166/73 , H. B. Datar in C.A. 2534, 2529, 2532, 2530 31, 253536/70, 3560 3562/67, 7124 7129, 7131/69, 2476 78, 2480 2486/70, 2479170, 1211/70, 1081/70, 4690/69, 3846/70, 5634 35, 5638 39/69, 5632/69, 3040, 3039/70, 3147 48, 2772, 2775, 2777, 2773/70, 5426, 6770, 5503/69, 3033 36, 3037 38/70, 6087, 6089, 6086, 6088/89, 2062, 2820/70, 470, 1749, 2833 and 2834 of 1970 respectively. 181 to 243 of 1973. 514/70 and 166/73 and Girish Chandra, for respondent No. 514 of 1970 Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 22nd December, 1969 of the Mysore High Court in W.Ps. 893/70, 5367/69, 2031 2035/70 and 5734 of 1969 respectively. From the judgment and order dated the 15th October, 1970 of the Mysore High Court in W.Ps. 166 to 173 of 1973. 5361 of 1969. 5179 of 1969. Sen in C.A. 204, 217 and 237 241/73 . 3 in C.As. 2078 and M. Veerappa, for respondents number. From the Judgment and order dated the 25th May, 1970 of the Mysore High Court in W. P. No. M. K. Nair the intervener in C.A. 514170 . Srinivasan and J. Ramamurthy, for the appellants in As. Srinivasan and Vineet Kumar, for the appellants in As. 1 2 in C.As. These appeals arise out of the judgment of the High Court of Mysore dismissing a batch of writ petitions filed by a number of dealers in the State of Mysore number Karnataka questioning the levy of sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on certain interState sales. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. AND CIVIL APPEALs Nos. Civil Appeal No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. CIVIL APPEAL Nos. No. | 0 | train | 1974_271.txt |
On account of impracticability of partitioning a small pathway which is around 6 feet wide, the High Court granted liberty to the respondent C. Thankarajan to purchase the share of the appellant for a sum of Rs.50,000/ . NARENDRA PRASAD Date 2017.12.16 103444 IST Reason The main question of law raised in this appeal is whether the appellant, having number challenged the preliminary decree, may challenge the final decree. The issue pertains to partition. The appellant has approached this Court challenging the orders passed by the High Court dated 19.06.2014 in Mat. Aggrieved, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by the appellant is before this Court. KURIAN, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2017_536.txt |
After the death of his previous wife, the present husband remarried the present wife on 11.7.1981. According to the version of the wife the document of registered Chhor Chithhi was shown and given to the present husband before his accepting the second matrimony with the present wife. It is the case of the wife that in accordance with the prevalent custom in Maheshwari companymunity a Chhor Chithhi or a document of dissolution of marriage was executed between the wife and her previous husband on 15.5.1979 and it was later got registered. It also granted maintenance in the sum Rupees one thousand per month to the wife and Rupees two thousand per month to the child. The wife alleges that the husband started ill treating her due to number fulfulment of his demands by her father. The facts of this case tell the tragic tale of an Indian woman, who having gone through two marriages with a child born to her apprehends destitution as both marriages have broken down. The husband went in appeal to the High Court and the wife preferred a cross objection. A daughter, who is named Puja, was born from the second marriage on 14.7.1983. His first marriage was solemnized with late Smt. The husband is aggrieved by the part of the impugned judgment of the High Court whereby it maintained the amount of maintenance fixed per month for the wife under Section 25 of the Act. The wife is aggrieved by the impugned reversing judgment of the High Court declaring her marriage as null and void under Section 11 read with Section 5 i of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Act for short . She thereafter filed proceedings in the Family Court, Bombay for grant of a decree of judicial separation and maintenance of Rupees three thousand per month for herself and for her daughter. The Family Court, Bombay allowed the petition of the wife and granted in her favour, a decree of judicial separation. She had filed a Divorce Petition No.76/78 in Matrimonial Court at Amravati but it was number prosecuted and numberdecree of divorce was passed. The husband is an Income Tax Practitioner in the town of Ratlam in the State of Madhya Pradesh. These two cross appeals arise from matrimonial proceedings. Usha in the year 1963 and from her he has two sons and one daughter. Dharmadhikari J. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, both the parties are before this Court in these two cross appeals. She was driven out of the house in the year 1989. | 0 | train | 2004_736.txt |
The dispute was referred for adjudication by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Labour Court II , Lucknow. 1 , Lucknow Adjudication Case No. Prem Singh was represented before the Labour Court by the Matches Mazdoor Sangh, Bareilly. 247, with effect from 1 5 1966, legally and or justifiably ? 2375 of 1698. On April 13, 1966 the Company passed an order extending the period of his probation by two months with retrospective effect from March 1, 1966. The period of probation expired on March 1, 1966, but he companytinued to serve on his post. Nine days later on April 22, 1966, the Company passed this order the above watchman has been discharged with effect from 1 5 1966 for the reasons mentioned below 1 probation period number approved, services are numberlonger required by the Company. Appeal by special leave from the award dated April 19, 1968 of the Labour Court II Lucknow in Adjudication Case, No. The question referred to the Labour Court is Whether the employers have terminated the services of the workman Shri Prem Singh, son of Shri Bhartu, Watchman T. No. 184 of 1967 C. 11 Lucknow published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated August 10, 1968. The Labour Court has found that the discharge was neither mala fide number an act of victimisation for trade union activities. However, the Labour Court has set aside the order of discharge and has directed his reinstatement with companytinuity of service and back wages. 3 of 1967 L.C. The referring order was made on April, 9, 1968. K. Daphtary, P. C. Bharatri and O. S. Mathur, for the appellant. C. Aggarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondents. It was said that as his work was number found satisfactory, he was discharged. If number, to what relief is the workman companycerned entitled. This order gave rise to an industrial dispute. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1973_217.txt |
O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.415 OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.14033 of 2007 Leave granted. In a suit for specific performance of an agreement entered into between the appellants and the respondent filed by the respondent, the Trial Court framed a preliminary issue under Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure CPC which is to the following effect Whether this Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The said issue was answered in favour of the respondent. The High Court, by its order dated 15th July 2002, set aside the order of the Trial Court and remanded the matter for companysideration afresh. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Civil Revision Application before the High Court of Bombay. The said order of the High Court was challenged by the respondent in this Court. Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellants have filed this appeal. | 1 | train | 2008_81.txt |
the union government relaxed the rules both in regard to recruitment by interview and in regard to the quotas fixed by the rules for direct recruitment and recruitment by promotion to class i service. class i rules mention recruitment by companypetitive examination and by promotion. the recruitment to class i service during the years 1951 to 1958 was on the quotas fixed by rule 4 of the class i rules on the ratio of 10 per cent for departmental promotion and 90 per cent for direct recruitment. the promotion of the appellants was to temporary posts in class i service. but in fact the recruitment by interview was for 29 and by departmental examination. in the year 1959 the direct recruits who were companyfirmed in permanent posts were recruited by the union public service companymission by interview during the years 1951 to 1956.
in 1960 the direct recruits through interview who were companyfirmed had been selected through interview by the union public service companymission between the years 1953 and 1956.
in 1961 the direct recruits who were confirmed in permanent posts were those who had been selected by the union public service companymission through interview during the years 1956 to 1957.
in 1962 the direct recruits who were companyfirmed in permanent posts were those who had been selected by the union public service companymission through interview during the years 1956 to 1958.
in 1963 the direct recruits who were companyfirmed in permanent posts were those who had been selected by the union public service commission through interview between the years 1958 to 1961.
in 1964 the direct recruits who were companyfirmed in permanent posts were those recruited in 1962 by the union public service companymission through interview. the appointments to class i service by interview were made by the government in companysultation with the union public service companymission. it is because of the conditions of emergency that the quota for filling the temporary posts was half for departmental promotees and half for direct recruitment. during the years 1959 to 1963 inclusive the union government in companysultation with the union public service companymission relaxed the quota rule and increased the quota for departmental promotees from 10 per cent to 50 per cent and reduced the quota of direct recruitment from 90 per cent to 50 per cent. finally in 1969 the rules were amended and the quota for departmental promotion was 25 per cent and for direct recruitment at 75 per cent. in 1960 there were 14 permanent posts and 7 were allocated for direct recruits and 7 for departmental promotees. in 1965 the direct recruits who were companyfirmed in permanent posts were those recruited by the union public service companymission through interview in 1962 and 1963.
in 1965 13 direct recruits were confirmed and they included some of the respondents. in 1965 there were 15 permanent posts whereof 13 were allocated for direct recruits and two for departmental promotees. the recruitment against temporary posts indicated the following features between 1951 and 1956 the total recruitment against temporary posts was 84 whereof 75 were allocated for direct recruits and 9 for departmental promotees. in 1969 the class i service rules were amended. during the years 1957 and 1963 the number of vacancies for recruitment to temporary posts was 675 whereof 339 were allocated for direct recruits and 336 for departmental promotees. in the year 1959 126 permanent posts were available whereof 63 were allocated for direct recruits and the other 63 were for departmental promotees. the result is that the respondent who were appointed by interview fell within the class of direct recruits. to meet the emergency the union government in companysultation with the union public service companymission decided to recruit candidates by advertisement and selection by the union public service companymission. though rule 4 fixed the quotas on the ratio of 10 per cent for departmental promotion and 90 per cent for direct recruitment the union government in companysultation with the union public service companymission relaxed the rules and revised as an interim measure the existing quota of 10 per cent of departmental candidates for promotion to 50 per cent in the years 1959 to 1963 inclusive. between the years 1969 and 1971 there were 45 vacancies to temporary posts whereof 33 were allocated for direct recruits and 12 for departmental promotees. the recruitment against temporary posts during the years 1951 and 1971 shows that during the relevant years 1959 to 1963 the union government relaxed the quota and increased the quota of 10 per cent to 50 per cent for departmental promotion. be tween the years 1964 and 1968 the total recruitment was 264 whereof 238 were allocated for direct recruits and 26 for departmental promotees. in 1964 there were 9 permanent posts whereof 8 were allocated for direct recruits and one for departmental promotee. the selection was made by the union public service companymission. in fact recruitment was of 139 persons by competitive examination and of 98 by interview and 27 by departmental promotion. the companyfirmation against permanent posts was also in according ance with the quotas fixed by rule 4 for the years 1951 to 1958 namely 10 per cent for departmental promotion and 90 per cent for direct recruitment. all the respondents were appointed to the said class i service in the years 1962 1963 and 1964.
the appellants companytended first that the respondents who were directly appointed to class i service by interview were number within the purview of recruitment to class i service by competitive examination. the union government all throughout acted in companysultation with the union public service companymission. engineers were immediately required to fill the temporary posts in class i service. the respondents who were appointed by companypetitive examination and by interview were also appointed to temporary posts. the impor tant amendments were rule 4 and substitution of rule 21 in place of rules 21 22 and 23.
rule 4 dealt with the quotas fixed for direct recruitment and promotion to class i service. 4 to 21 107 to 122 and 124 to 126 were appointed to the said class i service after they had appeared at companypetitive examination while the rest were appointed by direct recruitment after having been interviewed by the union public service companymission. the second companytention of the appellants was that the respon dents were recruited to class i service by interview and competitive examination after the appellant had been promoted to class i service and were therefore number to be confirmed in permanent posts before the appellants. the military engineer service class i recruitment promotion and seniority rules which came into force on 1 april 1951 speak in rule 3 of recruitment to the class i service a by companypetitive examination in accordance with part 11 of the rules and b by promotion in accordance with part iii of the rules the appellants companytended that appointment to class i service by interview was number one of the methods recruitment companytemplated in the rules and therefore the respondents who were appointed by interview could number be said to be validly appointed in accordance with the rules. only 20 were recruited by competitive examination and 171 by interview and the remaining 484 were instances of departmental promotion. the government with the aid of selection and interview by the union public service commission directly recruited some respondents to class i service in the years 1962 1963 and 1964.
the candidates were selected after viva voce examination. interim measure the increase of the quota of departmental promotion of candidates from 10 to 50 per cent and followed that system up to the end of 1963 a question arose as to how the then existing permanent vacancies were to be filled and the union public service companymission advised that the same might be filled by companyfirmation of direct recruits namely those recruited on the basis of companypetitive examination and by advertisement and selection and promotees in the ratio of the advice of the union public service companymission was accepted and the departmental promotion companymittee acted on that basis. in 1961 on the results of the companypetitive examination numbercandidates were avail able for allotment to class i service against temporary posts. the two appellants were promoted in the years 1958 and 1959 respectively to the military engineer service class i hereinafter referred to as the class i service . it is apparent that during those years there was a relaxation in the observance of rules in the case of appellants and the other departmental promotees. during the years 1962 1963 and 1964 particularly and until the year 1969 the class i service rules were number statutory in character. at cannumber therefore be said that any injustice was done to the departmental promotees or that any advantage was gained by the persons who were recruited by interview. the only other companytention on behalf of the appellants was that they were promoted to class i service in the years 1958 and 1959 respectively and were thus senior to the respondents who were recruited to the service subsequently and therefore the appellants should be companyfirmed in class i service in priority to the respondents. the appellants were to be companyfirmed in permanent posts. on companypletion of 3 years companytinued service in the grade and after qualifying the necessary departmental test the respective officers were declared quasipermanent in the grade in terms of central civil service temporary service rules. i were recruited by companypetitive examination and 34 were promoted departmentally. from 1964 to 1968 the quota fixed by rule 4 was followed again. in this background the recruitment against temporary posts between the years 1951 and 1971 was indicated by a chart prepared by the government and accepted to be companyrect. they were also to be companyfirmed in permanent posts after having served the period of probation in accordance with the rules. on a temporary basis. in the year 1967 rule 20 of part ii of class i service rules was amended by introduction of sub rules h i i and k .
rule 20 referred to the period of probation in the case of recruitment by companypetitive examination sub rule i stated that 50 per cent of the permanent vacancies to be filled through the companypetitive ad hoc recruitment companyducted by the commission after 17 may 1963 shall be reserved for graduates engineers who are companymissioned in the armed forces on a temporary basis during the present emergency and later released subject to certain companyditions enumerated therein. the appointments by companypetitive examination proved fruitless. the substituted rule 21 stated that appointment by promotion was to be made by selection and promotion was number to be as a matter of right. the appellant number 1 joined the military engineer service as a temporary overseer on 1 may 1942.
he was promoted to the grade of superintendent grade i on 1 may 1949.
in the month of april 1957 he was selected to be promoted to the grade of temporary assistant executive engineer in class i service and he was promoted in fact in the month of april 1958.
respondents number. only on a satisfactory companypletion of probation the candidates were allowed to companytinue in service. in 1962 there was a state of emergency. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1499 of 1971.
appeal from the judgment and order dated august 23 1971 of the delhi high companyrt in civil writ petition number 517 of 1971.
c. chagla and r. gopalakrishnan for the appellants. 1 and 2.
k. sen and h. k. puri for respondents number. 15 39 to 48 51 103 and 123.
d. jain for respondent number 55 the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ray j. this in an appeal by certificate from the judgment dated 23 august 1971 of the high companyrt of delhi dismissing the writ petitions of the appellants. jagadish swarup solicitor general of india g. l. sanghi d. sharma and s. p. nayar for respondents number. | 0 | test | 1972_538.txt |
36,068/ . The assessment was companypleted by the Income tax Officer on such material as was available on the 23rd February, 1955 and the income was assessed at Rs. A scrutiny of the wealth statement and the Bank account and the extensive nature of the business carried on by the appellant led the Income tax Officer to entertain a belief that the income of the year 1951 52 had been under assessed. The appellant did number dispute the quantum of the assessment but only the jurisdiction of the Income tax Officer to initiate proceedings under s. 34 1 . The High Court answered the question against the appellant holding that the Income tax Officer had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against the appellant under s. 34 1 a of the Act for the assessment year 1951 52. 39,000/during the previous year which ended on the 30th June, 1950, though in respect of that previous year, the appellants income was assessed only at Rs. At the instance of the appellant, the Tribunal referred the following question of law for the opinion of the High Court Whether the Income tax Officer had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for the assessment year 1951 52 under the provisions of s. 34 1 a of the Indian Income tax Act of 1922. For the assessment year 1951 52 for which the previous year ended on 30th June, 1950 the appellant did number companyply with the numberice issued under s. 22 2 or section 22 4 of the Income tax Act. He accordingly issued a numberice under s. 34 1 and after examining the return made, he assessed the income of the appellant at Rs. Subsequently, while making assessment for the assessment year 1955 56, the appellant was asked to furnish a wealth statement which was actually filed on the 30th June, 1954. The appellant filed an appeal against the assessment order to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but the appeal was dismissed, the appellant preferred a further appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench. The books of accounts of the appellant were closed on the 30th of June every year. From the wealth statement it was found that the appellant had made investments for Rs. The appellant was carrying on business in jewellery, companyper wire and money lending. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants. 89,002/ by his order dated the 31st March, 1960. 562 of 1965. 3 of 1963. No return was filed by the appellant. V. Gupte, Solicitor General, N. D. Karkhanis Sachthey, for the respondent. The Tribunal by its order dated the 31st January, 1962 over ruled the objection and dismissed the appeal. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 24, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in I.T.R.C. This appeal is brought by special leave against the judgment of the High Court dated the 24th July, 1963. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami J. No. | 0 | train | 1966_41.txt |
The detention orders and the grounds of detention were served on the detenues on 18.05.2019. The detention orders along with grounds of detention were served on the detenues on 18.05.2019. The High Court quashed the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 on the ground that on 18.05.2019, the detention orders and the grounds of detention were served on the detenues but the relied upon documents and other material particulars were number served upon the detenues together with the grounds of detention. The orders of detention were issued on 17.05.2019. The companyies of the relied upon documents were served on the detenues on 21.05.2019 and 22.05.2019. In the detention orders dated 17.05.2019, though it was expressly mentioned that the documents mentioned in the list relied upon by the detaining authority are served upon the detenues along with the detention orders, the relied upon documents were served upon the detenues between 20.05.2019 and 22.05.2019. Since the documents were running into 2364 pages and there were fifteen detention orders passed against various detenues, the companypilation of documents was served on detenues on 21.05.2019 and 22.05.2019 respectively. The following points arise for companysideration in these appeals Whether the orders of detention were vitiated on the ground that relied upon documents were number served along with the orders of detention and grounds of detention? After extracting the relevant portion of the detention orders, the High Court held that though it was stated that the relied upon documents were served upon the detenues along with the detention orders, actually they were number served on the detenues together with the detention orders and the grounds of detention and while so, the appellants cannot have recourse to Section 3 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974. Nos.2843 and 2844 of 2019 in and by which the High Court has quashed the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 passed against the detenues. The detention orders dated 17.05.2019 was assailed by the detenues by filing writ petitions before the High Court. The relevant portion of the detention orders where the detaining authority has stated that the relied upon documents are being served upon the detenues along with the grounds of detention reads as under While passing the Detention Order under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, I have relied upon the documents mentioned in the enclosed list, which are also being served to you along with the Grounds of Detention. Section 3 3 of the COFEPOSA Act thus allows a leeway of five days at least for the grounds of detention and the documents relied upon in the grounds to be served on the detenues. In Virendra Singh, the order of detention was passed on 09.10.1980 and the grounds of detention and other documents and materials were supplied to the detenu on 01.11.1980 when he was arrested but without the documents and the materials which were later served on 05.11.1980. Section 3 3 of COFEPOSA Act states that the detenue should be companymunicated with the order of detention and the grounds as soon as may be after detaining him but ordinarily number later than five days According to the appellants, in the present case, the orders of detention and the grounds were served on the detenues on 18.05.2019. By the impugned order dated 25.06.2019, the High Court quashed the detention orders by holding that there was numberapplication of mind by the Detaining Authority in passing the detention orders. In his statement recorded on 29.03.2019, detenu Happy Dhakad is alleged to have accepted that 20.4 kgs of gold recovered from his premises was from the smuggled gold supplied to him by appellant Nisar Aliyar and the other 11.5 kgs of foreign marked gold was procured from other sources. By the term as soon as may be, the statute companysiders five days as a reasonable time in numbermal circumstances to companyvey the grounds of detention to the detenues. Detenu Happy Dhakad abetted smuggling by receiving smuggled gold from Nisar Aliyar and his group and disposing them off through jewellery outlets run by him and his relatives. Detenue Nisar Aliyar is stated to be the mastermind and kingpin of the syndicate who along with others smuggled gold from UAE to India. Whether the High Court was right in quashing the detention orders merely on the ground that the detaining authority has number expressly satisfied itself about the imminent possibility of the detenues being released on bail? The said detention order dated 01.07.2019 has numberrelevance to the present case. Nos.5459 and 5460 of 2019 have challenged the impugned judgment quashing the detention orders. underlining added Section 3 3 of the COFEPOSA Act stipulates the statutory period of five days to serve the grounds of detention and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded number later than fifteen days from the date of detention. The Detaining Authority Joint Secretary COFEPOSA , on being satisfied that the detenues have high propensity to indulge in the prejudicial activities, with a view to prevent them from smuggling and companycealing smuggled gold in future, passed the orders of detention dated 17.05.2019 under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 COFEPOSA . It is alleged that detenue Nisar Aliyar ensured that the sale proceeds of the smuggled gold were siphoned off to Dubai through hawala. Shoeb Zarodarwala, Abdul Ahad Zarodarwala and Shaikh Abdul Ahad were summoned and their statements were recorded and they are alleged to have made statement regarding receiving of smuggled gold from respondent detenu Nisar Pallathukadavil Aliyar. 5408 of 2018 Case of the appellants is that the respondent detenu Nisar Pallathukadavil Aliyar is a full time organised smuggler of large quantities of gold and is the mastermind of the smuggling syndicate and has been smuggling gold into India since 2016. Shri Happy Arvindkumar Dhakad have the right to represent against your detention to the Detaining Authority, to the Central Government as well as to the Advisory Board. The Supreme Court quashed the detention order and held as under Admittedly, the order of detention was passed on October 9, 1980 and the grounds were supplied to the detenu on November 1, 1980 when he was arrested but without the documents and materials which were supplied on November 5, 1980. It is alleged that Nisar Aliyar created a wide network of people to look after the operations at every stage and was smuggling gold into India since 2016 and is alleged to have smuggled more than 3300 kgs of gold having approximate value of Rs.1000 crores and is alleged to be a mastermind of the smuggling syndicate. As discussed earlier, the detention order shows the application of mind of the detaining authority based on the materials available on record, facts and circumstances of the case, nature of activities and the propensity of the detenues indulging in such activities. The present case relates to alleged smuggling of huge volume of gold of more than 3300 kgs of gold camouflaging it with brass metal scrap. Moreover, the order of detention suffers from another infirmity, namely, that the representation made by the detenu was disposed of by the detaining authority more than a month after the representation was sent to it. Accordingly, the representation was companysidered and the same was rejected by the Joint Secretary COFEPOSA who did number find any justification in modification of the detention orders. In this case as the documents and the materials forming the basis of the order of detention had number been supplied to the detenu along with the order of detention when the same was served on him, the order is rendered void as held by this Court in Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India 1980 4 SCC 531 and in Shalini Soni v. Union of India 1980 4 SCC 544. 1 2 For the purposes of clause 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution, the companymunication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily number later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, number later than fifteen days, from the date of detention. If you wish to avail this right, you should send your representation through the Jail Authorities where you are detained, in the manner indicated below underlining added Guideline No.21 of Dos of Dos and Donts in handling COFEPOSA matters, stipulates that the grounds of detention and relied upon documents must be invariably served together on the detenu including the companyies translated into the language known to and understood by the detenu, wherever necessary and these should be served as quickly as possible but within the statutory time limit of five days from the date of his detention. A total quantity of 110 kgs of gold was recovered from these premises. Being aggrieved by the stay, the detenues respondents have preferred appeals arising out of SLP Crl. Detenu Nisar Aliyar was arrested on 31.03.2019 for companymission of offences punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and his statement was recorded. However, since the documents were voluminous running about 2364 pages, the same was served on the detenues on 21.05.2019 and 22.05.2019 respectively which, of companyrse, was within the time period stipulated under Section 3 3 of the Act. 28.53 lakhs cash and unaccounted cash of Rs.28.53 lakhs and Rs.44.50 lakhs were seized respectively from the office and residence of detenu Happy Dhakad and he did number have any documents for his possession of gold. It was numbericed that there were two persons Abdul Ahad Zarodarwala and Shaikh Abdul Ahad, employee of Zarodarwala. Thirty one pieces of gold carrying a total weight of 20.4 kgs and 11.5 kgs of foreign marked gold bars totally valued at Rs.10.21 crores, Rs. While quashing the detention orders, the High Court has stayed the operation of its own order for a period of one week to enable the appellants to approach the Supreme Court. The High Court vide interim order dated 04.06.2019 directed the appellant to companysider the writ petitions as a representation of the detenues. Detenu Happy Dhakad was arrested on 29.03.2019 for the offence punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and was remanded to judicial custody. Search of the vehicles resulted in recovery of 75 kgs of gold in the form of five circular discs valued at Rs.24.5 crores. The detenu made a representation on November 13, 1980 which was disposed of on December 13, 1980. Follow up searches were companyducted in the offices and residential premises of the companynected persons resulted in further recovery of 110 kgs of gold and currency amounting to Rs.1.81 crores. The facts giving rise to these appeals are that pursuant to an investigation by the office of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence in the matter of smuggling of foreign origin gold by a syndicate of persons from UAE to India. M s. Al Ramz Metal Scrap Trading and M s. Blue Sea Metal FZE were floated and registered by the appellant in the name of one Kalpesh Nanda for exporting metal scrap to India which is alleged to companyer cargo to smuggle gold. Nos.5396 and 5408 of 2019 before this Court. The respondents were arrested for the offence punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act on 29.03.2019 and their statements were recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act. Crl. a Honda Activa Scooter and a Honda City car was held. It is number known whether the statutory time limit of five days was companyplied with or number. The appellants Union of India in appeals arising out of SLP Crl. On 28.03.2019 search and interception of two vehicles i.e. In the case of Sophia Gulam Mohd. Signature Not Verified These appeals arise out of the judgment dated Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2019.07.18 151256 IST Reason 25.06.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in W.P. BANUMATHI, J. It is stated that two companypanies, viz. All the appeals shall stand disposed of by this companymon judgment. Leave granted. You i.e. | 0 | train | 2019_407.txt |
1209 of 1957. Charan Singh, Maharaj Singh, Doonger Singh and Lajja Ram filed a petition before the High Court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. P. Goyal, for the appellants. Act V of 1954 hereinafter called the Act was appealable under S. 39 of the Arbitration Act X of 1940 Mr. J. P. Goyal, learned Counsel for the appellant urges that this decision of the Allahabad High Court is wrong. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of Dhavan, J., in Civil Revision No. The learned Judge, following Sarju Prasad v. Civil Judge, Farrukhabad 1 held that an order of the Court on an objection against an award made under S. 12 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act U.P. 76 of 1964. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. P. Rana, for the respondents. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the October 26, 1960 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. | 0 | train | 1966_253.txt |
17132/ for 1943 44 and rs. in the assessment for 1943 44 the appellant had claimed that rs. 417636 was received from the chistian shop. the sources of the assessees income for the purposes of income.tax assessment were his business his house property and the dividends earned by him. the appellant filed appeals before the appellate assistant commissioner against the said assessment orders for the assessment years 1943 44 and 1944 45 and on her behalf the income tax officers decision about the chargeability to tax of the aforesaid two amounts was challenged. october 3.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar j. these are appeals by special leave and they arise from the assessment proceedings taken against the appellants husband seth ganga sagar jatia in respect of his income for the assessment years 1943 44 and 1944 45.
the said seth ganga sagar died on september 22 1944 leaving behind him his widow the appellant shrimati indermani jatia. for the accounting year relevant to 1943 44 assessment the interest account in the said books showed credit entries of rs. similarly for the accounting period relevant to 1944 45 assessment rs. the income tax officer took the view that these two amounts represented the assessees taxable income in india and accordingly he levied tax on them. in this set of accounts income received by the assessee from all sources were incorporated. the appellant then filed appeals before the income tax appellate tribunal. 17132/ as interest received on capital invested in the shop at cliistian . 7512/ which had been spent in litigation was an admissible expenditure but this claim was disallowed by the income tax officer and his decision was companyfirmed by the appellate authority and by the tribunal. the central set of accounts of the assessees business were kept at khurja. after the death of her husband the appellant companytinued the assessment proceedings as his representative and administrator of his estate. this business was carried on by the appellant after his death at khurja and aligarh which are part of india and at chistian in the indian state of bahawalpur number a part of pakistan. the tribunal agreed with the view taken by the income tax authorities companyfirmed their companyclusion and dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellant. 47029/ had been credited in the said books. the appellant as well as her husband were residents and ordinarily residents in british india for the relevant years. the reference was heard by malik c. j. and v. bhargava j. on numberember 14 1950 and both the questions were answered against the appellant. 278 and 279 of 1956.
appeal from the judgment and order dated numberember 14 1950 of the allahabad high companyrt in incometax miscellaneous case number 12 of 1950.
v. viswanatha sastri and a. n. kirpal for the appellant. the application made by the appellant under s. 66a of the act for leave to appeal to the supreme companyrt was dismissed by the high companyrt on april 23 1954.
thereupon the appellant applied for and obtained special leave on december 10 1954.
that is how these appeals have companye to this companyrt. k. daphtary solicitor general of india rajagopala sastri r. h. dhebar and d. gupta for the respondent. the appellate authority however rejected the appellants companytention and companyfirmed the order under appeal. at the instance of the appellant the tribunal stated the case and referred the following two questions to the high companyrt at allahabad under s. 66 1 whether in the circumstances of the case the sum of rs. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. | 0 | dev | 1958_89.txt |
Over that issue Darshan Singh and his sons Jagmel Singh and Dayal Singh had assaulted him and other members of his family for which he instituted a police case against them. After the appellant had fled away, Inderjit Singh and his mother went to rescue Darshan Singh from the pond but found him dead. His specific defence was that his another brother Nirmal Singh had a dispute with Darshan Singh over a house jointly owned by them. Leaving his mother near the dead body, Inderjit Singh rushed to Chowkidar Bachan Singh P.W.3 and narrated the incident. Reaching there the appellant took out a pistol from the fold of his chaddar which was wrapped around his body and fired a shot aiming Darshan Singh. Niranjan Kaur P.W.2 At that time Darshan Singh was sitting on a chounta raised platform by the side of the village pond which is near the village gate. On March 27, 1984, the appellant was found moving around the house of Darshan Singh since numbern. Apprehending that the appellant might translate his threat into action, Inderhit Singh P.W.1 , another son of Darshan Singh, followed him accopained by his mother Smt. Inderjit Singh then approached Mukhtiar Singh of his village and accompained by him went to the police station and lodged a First Information Report. At or about 6.30 P.M. while drawing water from the nearby hand pump he started hurling abuses towards Darshan Singh in his absence and gave out that he would kill him. Shorn of details, the prosecution case is that the deceased Darshan Singh and the appellant used to live in adjacent houses in village Jangpur within the police station of Dakha in the District of Ludhiana. Dr. Subhash Bhatta W.3 who held post mortem examination upon the dead body of Darshan Singh found a central irregular wound of 1/2x 1/2 with inverted margin on the left temporal region 1/2 away from the left eye. About 2.1/2 years prior to his death a prosecution was launched against him and his son Jagmel Singh for causing injuries to the appellant. On the companytrary, the evidence of P.W.1 gets ample companyroboration from that of Bachan Singh P.W.5 to whom W.1 rushed after the death of his father and narrated the incident. According to P.W.3 there was numberburing and numberbalckening around the wound but some tattooing were present around the margin. Kapur Singh, the appellant herin, was placed on trial before the learned Additional Judge, Special Court, Ludhiana, to answer charges under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 on the allegation that on March 27, 1984 he companymitted the murder of his real brother Darshan Singh with a pistol. After hurling abuses the appellant went towards the village gate. Then the appellant dragged him to the nearby pond and threw him in its water. On companyclusion of the trial the learned Judge companyvicted him of both the charges and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/ , in default, to rigorous imprisonment for two years more for the former and to rigorous imprisonment for two years more for the former and to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.100/ , in default, to rigorous imprisonment for three months more for the latter, with a direction that the substantive sentences shall run companycurrently. K.MUKHERJEE.J. He also companytended that as he was the sole bread earner of the family and earning a total monthly remuneration of Rs.1600/ to 1700/ as an employee of the Punjab Roadways, he was made a target by the family members of the deceased. Both of them were subjected to detailed and searching cross examination but the defence companyld number succeed in eliciting any favourable answer or discrediting them. The other companyroboration of P.W.1s evidence is furnished by the fact that the FIR companytaining the details of the prosection case was lodged within two hours of the incident and reached the Special MAgistrate on that very night at 2 A.M. We next find that the evidence of the two eye witnesses fits in with the medical evidence. In support of its case the prosecution examined nine witnesses but numberwitness was examined by the appellant. Since then the relations between the two brothers became strained. The appellant pleaded number guilty to the charges levelled against him and companytended that he was falsely implicated. The above order of companyviction and sentence is under challange in this appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 14 of the Terrorist Affected Areas Special Courts Act, 1984. Thereafter he ran away. He sealed those articles and sent the same to the Ballistic Expert for his opinion. On companypletion of investigation he submitted charge sheet against the appellant and in due companyrse the case was companymitted for trial. He immediately fell down on the spot. | 0 | train | 1995_1111.txt |
The firm was assessed to Rs. The assessment against the firm was for Rs. 4344 of 1968. It was only the firm that was assessed for liability for tax for ail the three periods. It is a registered partnership firm. The firm was treated as unregistered dealer and was assessed to sales tax on the basis of the best judgment. The demand numberices were issued in the forms prescribed in the name of the firm by the Sales Tax officer. The firm failed to pay the tax and by the impugned order dated 29 4 1966 the Commissioner accorded sanction for criminal prosecution of the three respondents who were partners of the firm under section 46 1 c of the Act. In spite of repeated numberices the firm did number pay the assessment or the penalty that was imposed. 8,080 and a penalty. The firm was engaged in business of sale of bidis and during the relevant period used to purchase tendu leaves from the dealers. The three respondents are the three partners of a firm known as M S. Ramakrishna Ramnath. The firm failed to file any return and get itself registered under the State of Madhya Pradesh. By its judgment dated 16th March, 1971 the High Court allowed the petition and quashed the sanction for criminal prosecution given by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and the criminal proceedings. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 hereinafter to be referred as Act was sent to the firm demanding payment of the tax and penalty with a direction that the whole sum should be deposited in the Government treasury within 30 days from the receipt of the numberice of the demand and the treasury receipt in proof of payment of the sum should be produced before the Sales Tax officer. 8,000 and a penalty of Rs. 16,380 and imposing a penalty of Rs. 1966 and b the proceedings before the criminal companyrt started under section 46 1 c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, in Criminal Case No. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 2,000 was imposed. On 17th February, 1969 the respondents filed writ petition out of which the present appeal arises For quashing the order of sanction for criminal prosecution dated 29th April, 1966 given by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and of the proceedings before the criminal companyrt in Criminal Case No. 4344 of 1968 was registered and the respondents were asked to appear on 20th February, 1969. 85 of 1969, whereby the High Court allowed the petition filed by the respondents and quashed a the sanction for criminal prosecution of the respondents accorded by the companymissioner of Sales Tax by his memorandum dated 29th April. A challan was filed on 9th December, 1968 and a criminal Case No. The first was for the period 1 11 1956 to 23 10 1960 by an order dated 26th December, 1964, assessing the firm at Rs. This appeal is by Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore and three others by certificate of fitness granted by the high Court of Madhya Pradesh from the judgment and order dated 16th March, 1971 in Miscellaneous Petition No. The High Court companysidering the general and legal importance of the question, granted a certificate of fitness to the Commissioner of Sales Tax and the present appeal is thus before this Court. 85/69. The numberice of demand in Form 19 prescribed under M.P. Of Rs. There were three assessment orders. The second order related to the period 21 10 960 to 8 11 1961 and was dated 20th December, 1964. The third order was dated 20th December, 1964 and was for the period 9 11 1961 to 28 10 1962. From the Judgment and order dated 16 3 1971 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. The dealer received a numberice on 6th January, 1965, but failed to deposit the sum as directed. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for Respondents Nos. 5,000. 78 of 1972. Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM, J. K. Gambhir for the Appellant. | 0 | train | 1978_261.txt |
Subsets and Splits