Prompt: 53.  On 23 December 2003 and 21 May 2004 the District Court delivered two similar judgments. It established that on 8 August 2000 in the house of the Musayev family in the village of Gekhi, Urus-Martan District, a member of an illegal armed group had been found and killed, as he had shown armed resistance. The applicants' sons,


Prompt: 51.  Movlatkhan Bokova further testified that she had washed Lidiya Khashiyeva's body before burial, and had seen numerous (about 20) stab and gunshot wounds on her body. Her left arm was broken and front teeth were missing. She further testified that


Prompt: 35.  By a letter dated 5 October 1999, the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court requested the Lice Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation in order to identify the officials who had failed to carry out an autopsy on


Prompt:
14.  On an unspecified date the applicant obtained the following certificate signed by investigator G. of the Grozny Prosecutor’s Office, which was neither on a letterhead nor dated:
“On 10 March 2000 officers of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD of Grozny and servicemen of the Federal Forces, during a “sweeping” operation [зачистка], apprehended [Mr T.] and


Prompt: 70.  On 14 May 2002 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow rejected her claim. The decision stated that as the criminal investigation into the killing had not yet been completed and the perpetrators had not been prosecuted, the applicant’s allegations that


Prompt: 37.  On 12 July 2005 the investigators questioned Ms L.Kh., a neighbour of S.-M. Tovsultanov, who stated that on 13 June 2004 she had been at home when at about 1 p.m. a Chechen woman had arrived at her house looking for the relatives of


Prompt:
56.  On 28 March 2001 a doctor from the Cochin Hospital practising in La Santé Prison issued the following certificate:
“I, the undersigned, ... state that the doctors from the medical service at Paris La Santé Prison are not qualified to judge whether the physical and mental condition of the prisoner


Prompt:
72.  The Resolution of the Committee of Ministers (CM/ResDH(2007)124), including the Appendix (extracts), adopted on 31 October 2007 at the 1007th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, is worded as follows:
“The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that the Committee supervises the execution of final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the Convention’ and ‘the Court’);
Having regard to the judgments transmitted by the Court to the Committee once they had become final;
Recalling that the violation of the Convention found by the Court in this case concerns a breach of the right to respect for private life of the applicant, Princess


Prompt: 17.  On 20 and 21 October 2005 the official newspapers and other mass media published two press releases with the headline “Special Statement of the Prosecutor General's Office, the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan”. These press releases officially informed the public about the arrest and indictment of a number of well-known current and former State officials and provided a summary of the evidence gathered in respect of their alleged plans for the “forcible capture of power” during the election period, “under the guise of an appeal for democratic changes in the political situation in the country”. The evidence mainly consisted of the testimony of one of the arrested persons concerning secret meetings between them and their sources of financing, as well as large amounts of cash and other valuables found in the homes of some of them. Additionally, some of the arrested persons were suspected of embezzlement of public funds and abuse of authority. Specifically, the press releases mentioned the names of the applicant, the former Parliament Speaker


Prompt: 37.  The questioning of Yakup Aktaş by the two gendarme officers who were subsequently prosecuted had come to an end on 23 November 1990, that is two days before Yakup Aktaş's death. Yakup Aktaş had shown no signs of illness or pain in the period between 18 and 23 November 1990, either during questioning or between sessions. Had he done so, the regiment's doctor would have been available.


Prompt: 11.  After a number of communications between the parties and the City Court in December 1995, on 10 January 1996 Mr Engelschiøn asked the City Court to adjourn the case pending the final outcome of separate compensation proceedings brought by the first applicant against Falkefjell Ltd. and Mr


Prompt: 24.  On 25 October 2004 the investigators questioned Ms Ya.Ya., who stated that in 2000 she had worked at the Leninskiy district military commander’s office and that on an unspecified date in August 2000 she had seen, on the premises, Mr


Prompt: 16.  Also on 17 March 2000 the investigator of the Urus-Martan FSB department issued two decisions certifying the intention of the authorities not to institute criminal proceedings against Islam Dubayev and


Prompt: 59.  On 1 April 2010 the Investigative Committee suspended the investigation. It was stated in the decision that between 28 June and 7 July 2009 Mr Apti Zaynalov had been anonymously treated in Achkhoy-Martan Hospital under the guard of armed men. The latter, having learned that Mr


Prompt: 73.  The head of the North-Caucasus Group of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of the Interior and the deputy head of the temporary group of the Russian Ministry of the Interior sent the investigators letters on 17 March and 6 September 2002, respectively. They stated that on 15 March 2001 special operations had been carried out in Duba-Yurt, but


Prompt: 30.  On 31 March 2003 the first applicant requested the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor’s office (“the Sunzhenskiy prosecutor’s office”) and the Chechnya prosecutor’s office to conduct an investigation into


Prompt: 91.  Before the Court the applicant referred to the so-called Susurluk incident and the domestic reports that have been produced in relation to this incident. These reports have been made available to the Court in a number of other cases brought against Turkey (cf. Yaşa v. Turkey judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1998-VI, Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, ECHR 1999‑IV,


Prompt: 50.  This report was drawn up and signed by eight doctors, each a specialist in different areas of medicine. They based their opinions on the reports referred to above and on the photographs of the body which had been taken during the autopsy (see paragraph 40 above). The doctors also had regard to two statements taken from


Prompt: 40.  The second applicant and Sh.D. were interviewed as witnesses on 25 June and 2 July 2001. They submitted, among other things, that at about 3.30 a.m. on 7 May 2000 a group of masked, camouflaged and armed men had burst into their house, shouting “Police! Lie down!” One of the intruders had not been wearing a mask. The intruders had ordered the men to produce their identity papers but had only taken


Prompt:
52.  In the course of the periodic review of the respondent State’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee during its March to April 2008 session, the latter “noted the investigation undertaken by the State Party and its denial of any involvement in the [applicant’s] rendition notwithstanding the highly detailed allegations as well as the concerns [raised by the Marty and Fava Inquiries]”. The United Nations Human Rights Committee made the following recommendation:
“14.  ... the State Party should consider undertaking a new and comprehensive investigation of the allegations made by Mr


Prompt:
12.  On 3 March 1998 Mr V. Mečiar, the Prime Minister, who at the time, under Article 105 § 1 of the Constitution, exercised several powers entrusted to the President of the Slovak Republic, delivered a decision on amnesty (rozhodnutie o amnestii), the relevant parts of which read:
“The Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, in the exercise of his powers under Article 105 § 1 and Article 102(i) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Slovak Republic, gives the following decision on amnesty as a contribution to reaching civic reconciliation and in the interest of eliminating possible sources of tension in society: ...
Article VI
I order that criminal proceedings should not be started and, if they have already been started, should be discontinued in respect of criminal offences committed in the context of the notification of the abduction of


the Special Adviser to the Chief of Mission

Prompt:
139.  The applicants submitted as evidence an affidavit made by Mr J.C. before a notary public in Dublin, Ireland, on 10 December 2001. The relevant parts of his affidavit read as follows:
“On the morning of Sunday 3.12.2000 at approximately 9.30 a.m., I received a telephone call whilst in my apartment within the UN compound in the UN Headquarters in Nicosia. The telephone call ... was from Mr M.İ. Mr M.İ. wanted to meet the Chief of Mission of UNFICYP. He did not tell me the reason ... I was unable to contact the Chief of Mission. Mr M.İ. then wished to speak to


Prompt: 7.  In their interviews published on 29 April 2004 in the two articles cited above, the applicants commented on the following issues: the difficulties they encountered in getting to İmralı island, where


Prompt: 115.  On 29 September 1995 Sergeant İlhan Yücel, the Bismil central gendarmerie commander, informed the Bismil gendarmerie district command that Harun Acar did not live in Ambar, that he was currently serving in an anti-terrorism unit and that his current address could be obtained from the Derik and Mazıdağı gendarmerie district commands. Sergeant Yücel appended to his letter an undated report, signed by the gendarmerie officers


Prompt: 22.  On 12 March 2002 the third applicant talked to another resident of Stariye Atagi, Mr R. D., who had been detained on 10 March 2002 and then released. The latter told the third applicant that he had been kept in the basement of the mill and had seen a note scratched on the ceiling to the effect that Mr


Prompt: 8.  On 12 January 2002 a prosecutor of the Urus-Martan district, Mr K., informed the applicant that Mr Alvi Bugayev was to be released on the same day. The applicant, Mr Alvi Bugayev’s wife and their children spent the entire day at the entrance to the VOVD awaiting his release. In the evening, Mr


Prompt: 32.  The Ivanovo prosecutor's office carried out an inquiry and established that none of the applicants, except Mr Kasimhujayev, had left Russia in May 2005. Mr Kasimhujayev had been in Andijan from 10 to 25 May 2005. Mr


Prompt:
54.  In an appeal of 14 February 2008 the applicant reiterated her arguments from her previous request for the custodial measure imposed on her to be lifted. On 22 February 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. It reiterated its previous conclusions as to the gravity of the offence and the particularly serious circumstances in which the offence was committed, and further held as follows:
“The acts of the defendants as described above show a high degree of ruthlessness, brutality and cruelty towards civilians, which resulted in the grave consequence of the killing of these persons. Therefore, this appellate court finds that such acts by the defendants went significantly beyond the usual acts and consequences of such offences and, in their intensity and nature, show that the offence was committed in particularly serious circumstances, such that detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the CCP remains necessary.
The arguments of the defendant


Prompt:
8.  On 6 October 2005 the Cizre public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Cizre Criminal Court against the applicant and four others. The applicant was charged with disseminating propaganda in favour of a criminal organisation and its goals, proscribed by Article 220 § 8 of the Criminal Code, on account of his speech on 5 September 2005. The public prosecutor submitted that the following passages in the speech constituted propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation:
“... We want peace in this country. Those who wish for war prevent us from having peace. As you know, Mr


Prompt: 50.  Two police officers were questioned as witnesses in October 2005. They stated that a special operation had been carried out in Starye Atagi in December 2002 by the task force unit and that they had heard about


Prompt: 38.  According to that statement, after having been told by her parents that pressure was being brought to bear on them, in September 2004 Ms Natsvlishvili, who was a student at the Central European University in Budapest at the time, decided to approach an acquaintance of hers who was working at the GPO, Ms T.B. Subsequently, Ms


Prompt:
36.  At the time of the incident, he was staying with his father, the applicant, in Basoğ hamlet. A clash broke out between the PKK and village guards. Two village guards were wounded. After that the guards set Ormandışı alight and came to their hamlet. When he saw them coming, he was scared and drove off on the tractor. He told three others in the fields and they got on their tractors too. As they crossed a stream, a helicopter opened fire on them. They got off their tractors and put their hands on their heads. The helicopter descended to a few metres above their heads, looked at them and then flew away. He got on his tractor and went on to Batikan village. Looking back from there, he could see that the house and fields had been burned. After a day and a night he returned. The house was a ruin, part of it burned and shot up. The tractor and trailer were burned, shot up and unusable. Harvested crops had been burned and a diesel tank, two barrels of diesel, a motor pump, and water pipes had been shot up and were unusable.
Statement by


Prompt: 32.  The Minister went on to hold that the first applicant had not attracted the particular attention of any groups or individuals in the period prior to the coming to power of the Taliban. The Minister underlined in this regard that, after the fall of the PDPA regime, the first applicant had easily obtained a job in the local police headquarters for the mujahideen governor of Herat,


Prompt: 47.  The military then ordered four of the applicants’ sons, including Sharpudi Visaitov, to go into the courtyard. They were not permitted to dress or to put on their shoes. After a while Sharpudi’s three brothers were released and returned to the house one by one. The servicemen left after about thirty minutes and took


Prompt: 44.  On 7 September 1993 the Denizli Assize Court requested the Forensic Medicine Institute in Istanbul to examine whether or not the 66 empty cartridges found at the scene of the crime and the bullets removed from the applicant Reşit Acar and from the body of Sabri Acar had been fired from the weapons of the village guards. The court further requested that


Prompt: 97.  It further appears from the judgment of the Military Court that Major Ersan Topaloğlu was also questioned during the trial. His testimony was not made available to the Commission or to the Court, but according to the summary contained in the judgment, Major Topaloğlu stated that he had been informed by


Prompt: 28.  On 12 December 2001 the prosecutor’s office of the Achkhoy‑Martanovskiy District (“the district prosecutor’s office”) set aside the decision of 14 November 2001 and launched a criminal investigation into the disappearance of


Prompt: 9.  G.A. ran after Nikolaos Leonidis. As he approached him, Nikolaos Leonidis put his hand inside his jacket. Suspecting that the latter might take out a weapon, G.A pulled out his own service revolver, a 357 magnum Smith and Wesson, which had no safety catch and was loaded. Holding the revolver in his right hand, with his finger on the trigger, he ordered


Prompt: 20.  Mustafa Sayğı’s brother Mehmet Sayğı told prosecutor M.A. that he had no doubts whatsoever that the items discovered during the excavation belonged to his brother. He said that he recognised the motorbike and the axe which had been given to


Prompt:
175.  On 20 June 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the North Caucasus military command informed the applicants of the following:
“During the investigation of criminal case no. 14/00/0020-01D ..., it has been established that Mr


Prompt: 46.  Akhmadi I. testified that that when the minibus was driving along Melnichnaya Street, nearing the crossroads with Ordzhonikidze Street, he saw a fireball flying towards the vehicle from the sky. At that moment


Prompt: 59.  On 11 February 2007 Mr A.E. was questioned. He submitted that at the beginning of August 2000 he had been detained by officers of the Urus‑Martan VOVD because he had had no identity documents. He had been held for three days in cell no. 4 with his acquaintances Mr G. and


Prompt: 11.  The public prosecutor accused the applicant of being one of the leaders of the PKK in Europe and of having been involved in the training of PKK members in Romania. According to the indictment, the applicant had been in contact with Mr


Prompt:
171.  In its 2011 Annual Report on “the State of the World’s Human Rights” Amnesty International stated, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“ ... Reports of torture or other ill-treatment remained widespread, despite government promises to adopt a zero tolerance policy toward its practice. Impunity for such human rights violations persisted ...
In January, Kazakhstan assumed chairmanship of the OSCE, making counter-terror and security measures in Europe and Central Asia the OSCE’s priority. Human rights commitments did not figure prominently in the chairmanship’s agenda.
In May, parliament approved a constitutional amendment that made President


Prompt: 40.  The Government to a large extent contested the applicants’ account of the facts. They relied on a report of 19 June 2004 addressed by the head of the Rīga Department of the State Border Guard Service to


Prompt: 9.  At the material time Kurbika Zinabdiyeva was assisting her mother, who worked as a house painter. Aminat Dugayeva, then fifteen years old, was attending the 9th grade of secondary school. Kurbika Zinabdiyeva lived with the first applicant at 12 Shkolnaya Street, the village of Ulus-Kert.


Prompt: 25.  On 25 October 2005, the applicants signed a statement written by the teachers of Aspropyrgos School expressing their wish to have their children transferred to the building separate from the primary school. The applicants allege that they had signed the statement in question under pressure from


Prompt: 37.  The trial court observed that the police officers had fired a total of eighteen bullets and that Mr Bektaş had been shot in the head, whereas the police officers should have aimed at other parts of his body, such as his legs and feet, in order to avoid the risk to his life. The trial court concluded that


Prompt: 6.  On 21 March 1999 the applicant was questioned by two police officers in the absence of a lawyer. In the verbatim records, signed by the applicant, the latter admitted, inter alia, to taking part in three separate acts of arson together with Mr M.K. and Mr F.D. in order to protest against the arrest of


Prompt: 74.  After making his statement he had been intimidated, in the presence of his wife, by a police officer who had visited him at the school where he taught. The police officer had made threats such as: “You eat from the State’s plate. I will not allow you to dirty that plate. You will suffer the same fate as


Prompt: 35.  In a statement taken by the Kulp Prosecutor on 13 June 1996, Halit Akdeniz stated that a large number of soldiers had come to the village in February 1994 and gathered the villagers outside the village. They then set fire to the houses in the village. He, his son İrfan, the applicant’s son Mehdi, and the other three persons had been singled out by the soldiers and ill-treated in the village. They had then been taken to the Sivrice gendarme station where they had stayed that evening. The following morning they had been taken to the Kulp Commando Brigade where they had been detained for four days during which they were blindfolded, beaten up and questioned. At the end of the four days they had been brought to the Kulp Central gendarme Station where the applicant’s son Mehdi had been separated from the rest of them and he had not been seen again. They had continued to be detained for another 15 days and at the end of their detention all but


Prompt: 38.  On the same date, 18 March 2004, the investigators questioned police officer Mr V.T., who stated that he had taken part in the special operation against Timur Khambulatov; the latter had been brought from his house to the Naurskiy OVD by FSB officers in a UAZ car and that after that, in the OVD, after the FSB officers had left, he had noticed that


Prompt: 23.  On 7 November 2001 the second applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer about the circumstances of the Crimea attack (Episode 7) and participated in a reconstruction. He described his and Mr


Prompt: 13.  Meanwhile the fourth applicant, who had been told by her neighbours that the servicemen were raiding her son's house, arrived at the yard and joined the second applicant in attempts to prevent the abduction of


Prompt: 44.  On 12 December 2000 the interim head of the Chechnya department of the FSB informed the first applicant that on 14 March 2000 Islam Dubayev had voluntarily surrendered to the Russian federal troops and had handed over his AK-74 machine gun with ammunition. Pursuant to Articles 208 and 222 of the Criminal Code and the Russian State Duma's decree of 13 December 1999 “On amnesty to persons who committed socially dangerous acts during the antiterrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus”,


Prompt: 73.  On 31 July 2006 the investigators questioned the applicant’s relative Mr A.E., who stated that on 6 February 2003 the applicant had told him that a group of unidentified men had abducted his son. On 12 February 2003 a resident of Urus-Martan had told him about the discovery of human remains in the orchard in Michurina district and that these remains had been identified as those of


Prompt: 16.  In or around September 1990 the police found firearms in the attic of William Stobie's flat. The latter was arrested. He was, according to the applicant, questioned about the Finucane murder from 13 to 20 September 1990. A journalist had allegedly interviewed


Prompt: 73.  On 4 July 2002 the applicants applied to various domestic authorities, including the Urus-Martan District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in the Chechen Republic (“the Urus‑Martan ROVD”) asking for assistance in the search for Mr


Prompt: 33.  On 30 October 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 387 of the Basmannyy District examined the charges. She examined three eyewitnesses called at the applicant’s request, but refused his request that the police officers who had arrested him be called and examined. The applicant’s request that a video recording of the relevant events be admitted as evidence was also refused, as was the request that a written report from an NGO which had observed the pickets be admitted in evidence. The three eyewitnesses examined at the applicant’s request testified that the applicant, after ending his picket, had walked down the street while speaking with a fellow activist, surrounded by journalists; he remained on the pavement, did not chant slogans, and carried no banners; several other participants in the picket remained standing with their banners, at a certain distance from each other; the police arrested the applicant without any warning or explanation. On the basis of written reports by two police officers


Prompt: 24.  Between 8 April 1987 and 18 July 2001 the court held numerous hearings. During this time, the court adjourned the onsite inspection twenty‑three times, either due to adverse weather conditions (6 times) or the plaintiffs’ failure to attend the onsite inspection (14 times). On at least three occasions the onsite inspection could not take place because another onsite inspection was being conducted. In the course of the proceedings, several hearings were adjourned pending the intervention of the heirs of some of the plaintiffs to the proceedings. During this time,


Prompt: 46.  On 27 March, 23 and 25 April and 7 June 2006 the investigators requested that the Grozny ROVD, the Oktyabrskiy ROVD, Grozny Search Bureau-2 and the Chechnya FSB take a number of steps to identify eyewitnesses to


Prompt: 27.  In a letter of 12 August 2001 the Chechen Department of the FSB informed the Grozny Prosecutor’s Office that on 12 May 2001 their two officers, T. and M., had detained Isa Kaplanov, Ruslan Sadulayev and


Prompt: 23.  On 3 November 2006, a few days after the Sofia City Court gave its judgment, there was a meeting in Sofia between the Macedonian and Bulgarian Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The news agencies reported that during the meeting Bulgaria’s then Foreign Minister, Mr


Prompt: 22.  On 16 March 2005 the Khasavyurt Town Prosecutor’s Office (“the town prosecutor’s office”) informed the applicant that they had investigated her complaint and found out that on 19 October 2004 A.I., M.I. and R.I., as well as


Prompt:
24.  On 11 May 2011 the Constitutional Court delivered its ruling in case no. 2010-55-0106 and held that the contested legal provisions complied with the Constitution and the Convention. The relevant part reads as follows:
“11. ...
It follows from the case materials that, on 27 December 2005, the KNAB opened an operational investigation. Interception of the Applicant’s telephone conversations was carried out from 29 to 31 December 2005, that is, for three days under section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 85 – 86). There is no dispute that the Applicant also participated in the telephone conversations which were intercepted.
... 13. The Applicant and the Ombudsman argue that the restriction of rights established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear. It is impossible to understand the meaning of ‘to prevent’. Nor can it be understood what preconditions need to be fulfilled in order to take operational measures under the special procedure where immediate action is required. Therefore, the restriction of rights established in the above-mentioned legal provision has not been provided for by a properly adopted law (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 7 – 8, and Vol. 3, pp. 46‑48).
... 13.2. The Applicant argues that the provisions of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be applied only when necessary to prevent serious or especially serious crimes. Consequently, the operational measures contained in this provision cannot be performed for the purpose of detecting (atklāt) a criminal offence.
...
The first sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides that ... operational activities may be carried out to react immediately to threats of criminal offences as referred to in this provision and [that] corresponding operational measures [may be taken] to prevent these offences. However, the fact that detection of criminal offences has not been mentioned expressis verbis in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, does not exclude the obligation to observe the purpose of operational activities. [The Constitutional Court] can agree with the arguments of Parliament and the KNAB, namely, that when carrying out activities mentioned in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, a criminal offence can be prevented and detected as well. When taking operational measures to prevent criminal offences, some [other] criminal offence may also be detected. For instance, in the case of the taking of a bribe, operational measures may prevent a criminal offence, as well as identifying the persons involved in giving such a bribe. Therefore, it can be concluded that the term ‘to prevent’ in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities includes not only prevention of crime, but also detection of other criminal offences. 13.3. ...
[The Constitutional Court] does not agree with the opinion by the Ombudsman that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear as it fails to establish preconditions which are necessary to allow immediate action to be taken in the form of operational measures under the special procedure. Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes two preconditions which allow ... operational measures.
First, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities enumerates specific circumstances ... Operational measures may be taken when required to prevent acts of terrorism, murder, banditry, riots, or other serious or especially serious offences. They are permissible also in circumstances of a real threat to the life, health or property of an individual. [The Constitutional Court considers that] this enumeration ... is exhaustive and sufficiently precise. Consequently, it excludes any possibility of operational measures under the special procedure in relation to the prevention of such criminal offences which are not indicated in the legal provision.
Second, operational measures ... may be taken ... only when an immediate action is required.
Interpreting this legal provision in conjunction with section 17(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, [the Constitutional Court] concludes that covert interception of non-public conversations is allowed only when [there is] reliable information (pamatotas ziņas) about persons’ involvement in a criminal offence, as well as a threat to important interests of the State, its security or defence. Consequently ... operational measures ... may be taken if [there is] reliable information regarding the involvement of an individual in a criminal offence.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for an exceptional procedure, namely, it allows ... immediate operational measures to be taken because any delay might significantly influence their results. Taking into account the seriousness of the offences referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, it is important to provide a timely and effective response to prevent all threats related to such crimes.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes the preconditions for its application [with sufficient precision]; consequently, the restriction on the fundamental rights has been established by law.
... 17. The Applicant indicates that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities does not provide an obligation ... to receive approval by a judge in cases where operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 26 – 27). 17.1. Sections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Law on Operational Activities establish two procedures for taking operational measures, namely, under the general and special procedures. Such classification is closely related to the nature of operational measures and their impact on the fundamental rights of persons. In the cases established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, operational measures must be taken under the special procedure as they significantly impinge on the fundamental rights of persons.
The Constitutional Court considers that the grammatical wording of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities [does not clearly indicate] whether it is necessary to obtain approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge in cases when operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours. 17.2. In order to determine the content of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, it must be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of the same section regulating operational measures to be taken under the special procedure.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains a reference to section 7(4) setting out the operational measures to be taken under the special procedure. These measures, including monitoring of correspondence and covert interception of non-public conversations, must be taken with the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge.
Although section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for exceptional circumstances where ... immediate action may be taken, it also establishes the obligation ... to obtain the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge for operational measures under section 7(4). Already when the draft of the Law on Operational Activities was being drawn up ... the need to receive a judge’s approval was emphasised in cases where operational measures would be taken under the special procedure (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 171 and 173).
The third sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities indicated that the operational measures had to be discontinued where no approval by a judge was obtained. According to the KNAB, this indication confirms that a judge’s approval must be sought only in cases where operational measures have not been terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 45). However, the Ministry of Justice and the Ombudsman indicate that such an interpretation ... would not comply with the essence of the Constitution (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 48 and 54 – 55).
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains no reference to the fact that no approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge is necessary for operational measures to be taken under section 7(4) in the event that it is planned to terminate them within ... 72 hours. Consequently, [the Constitutional Court] cannot agree with the opinion by the KNAB that a judge’s approval does not have to be obtained if operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours.
... 17.3. ... Consequently, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides that a prosecutor must always be informed of the operational measures taken; this provision also obliges ... [the seeking of] approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge.
The restriction established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be regarded as the most lenient measure for fulfilling the legitimate aim because monitoring by a prosecutor and subsequent judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of operational measures ensures effective protection of the rights of persons. 18. ...
It is not possible to agree with the Applicant’s statement to the effect that the infringement of his right is greater than the benefit gained by society. By means of a lawful restriction of a person’s right to respect for his or her private life, the State helps to combat crime and permits ... immediate reaction to threats of criminal offences that are particularly dangerous for society, serving to prevent them and identifying the persons involved. When intercepting non-public conversations in the cases established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, the protection of public safety is ensured.
Consequently, operational measures taken to prevent criminal offences referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be regarded as proportionate and compliant with Article 96 of the Constitution only if approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge has been obtained irrespective of the time when the operational measures are terminated. 19. The Applicant indicates that the [prosecutor’s office] cannot be regarded as an effective remedy in respect of his rights within the meaning of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 17 – 18).
The Constitutional Court has already established in its case-law that [an application to] the prosecutor’s office in Latvia may be regarded as an effective and available remedy, because the status and the role of the prosecutor in the supervision of law secures independent and impartial review of cases in compliance with Article 13 of the Convention (see Judgment of 11 October 2004 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2004-06-01. Para 19).
In the present case it is necessary to examine whether section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides a person with protection compliant with Article 13 of the Convention in cases where the right to the inviolability of private life and correspondence guaranteed in the Convention is infringed.
The Constitutional Court concludes that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes circumstances ... where operational measures may be taken immediately, as well as the procedure in accordance with which this has to be notified to a prosecutor and approval by a judge is to be obtained. However, this provision is not related to the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention. Consequently, the compliance of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities with Article 13 of the Convention must be assessed in conjunction with the first sentence of section 35(1) of that Law, the latter establishing a mechanism for monitoring operational measures and being contested by the Applicant as to its compliance with Article 92 of the Constitution. 20. The Applicant indicates that the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities fails to comply with Article 92 of the Constitution because it has no legitimate aim and it is not necessary in a democratic society. The provision fails to establish a procedure according to which the supervision and monitoring of performance of operational measures would be carried out. In the monitoring of operational measures, the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities confers on the prosecutor’s office a broad margin of appreciation (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 20 – 21). 21.1. ...
The Constitutional Court has already concluded in paragraph 17 above that [there is] an obligation to request, in any event, the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge in relation to operational measures. Consequently, the legislature has established such a regulatory framework for operational measures that requires not only monitoring by a prosecutor but also judicial supervision or at least subsequent judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of the measures taken and their compliance with the requirements of the law. 20.2. ...
The Constitutional Court has already indicated in its case-law that the prosecutor’s office, as a judicial institution, has a twofold nature. On the one hand it is a single, centralised three-level institutional system, under the management of the Prosecutor General, but – on the other – prosecutorial functions are carried out independently and solely by officials of the prosecutor’s office, that is, the individual prosecutors (see Judgment of 20 December 2006 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2006-12-01, Para 12.2).
... As to the taking of operational measures referred to in section 7(4) of the Law on Operational Activities, in cases established in section 7(5), ... a prosecutor, that is, the Prosecutor General or specialised prosecutors, must be notified within ... 24 hours (see


Prompt: 110.  In April 2002 the fifth applicant asked other relatives of missing persons who regularly gathered in front of the VOVD building if they knew K. from Gekhi, about whom she had been questioned in the VOVD. She met the brothers of K., who was also missing, and they told her that they in turn had been questioned about Mr


Prompt: 27.  The following morning the applicants complained about the abductions of the three men to a number of law-enforcement agencies and offices in the Achkhoy-Martan district. On 9 December 2001, after the curfew,


Prompt: 11.  The first and the fourth applicants were awakened by a group of servicemen who walked into their room, turned on the lights and ordered them to remain in bed and not to move. Two men searched the wardrobes in the room while the third stood at the doors on guard. The servicemen did not talk to the women. Once they had finished searching, two servicemen left and went to the adjacent room where


Prompt:
18.  On 20 September 2005 the daily newspaper Rezonansi published an interview with the Minister. He discussed allegations of corruption in the management of medical facilities in the penal system. The relevant excerpts of the interview read as follows:
“Journalist: You give two names –


Prompt:
12.  Early in the morning of 23 March 2012 the applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (Сунженский районный отдел внутренних дел (РОВД)) (hereinafter “the Sunzhenskiy ROVD”) and the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor. In his complaint the applicant stated the following:
“... Yesterday, on 22 March 2012, at about 9 p.m. my brother


Prompt:
13.  On 16 September 2005, while speaking live on a private television channel, Rustavi 2, about allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the Ministry and its Medical Department, the Minister, Mr K.K., stated:
“I am impelled to specify surnames and specific facts...


Prompt: 10.  The applicants, who are all French nationals, are Mr Pierre Lambert and his wife Mrs Viviane Lambert, who were born in 1929 and 1945 respectively and live in Reims, Mr David Philippon, who was born in 1971 and lives in Mourmelon, and Mrs


Prompt: 31.  On 22 August 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She submitted that Aslanbek Khamzayev had resided in the village of Gekhi. On 24 July 2002 he had gone to the Zavodskoy District to visit his relative, Ms Yu. On 25 July 2002 Ms Yu. had told the first applicant that earlier that day federal servicemen carrying out a “sweeping” security operation had checked


Prompt: 10.  On 20 March 2001, upon remittal to the Outer House, further directions were given for disclosure. On 14 September 2001, on the motion of the first defenders, the court appointed the case to the procedure roll for a debate (hearing) on pleas-in-law. After two dates for that debate were vacated, a two-day hearing was fixed for 20 and 21 June 2002. On 15 May 2002, the court allowed the applicant to lodge further supplementary arguments alleging a lack of candour in the defenders’ pleading but refused his motion for further disclosure. The case was heard on 21 June 2002. As a result of that hearing, the applicant’s action was dismissed on 4 September 2002 by the Outer House. In a written judgment,


Prompt: 16.  When he was taken out of the yard into the street, the first applicant saw a large number of servicemen, two khaki UAZ-452 vehicles (“Tabletka”) with no registration numbers, and a VAZ-2109 car. The first applicant was ordered to get into one of the UAZ vehicles, where he saw Mr


Prompt: 15.  On 8 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal in respect of all applicants except the applicants Ms Jagoda Jančić (application no. 62499/10), Mr Predrag Stamenković (application no. 63100/10) and Ms


Prompt:
59.  On 23 March 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated. The Constitutional Court failed to separately address his complaint concerning the divergent case-law.
(iii)  Mr


Prompt: 12.  They testified in writing that initially four of them had been placed in one APC, together with Ruslan Alikhadzhiyev, while M. was in the second APC. They were blindfolded, and a black bag was placed on


Prompt: 17.  On 26 March 2003 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20116 (“the unit prosecutor’s office”) informed the applicants that military personnel had not been implicated in Viskhadzhi Magamadov and


Prompt: 141.  About a month after the Orhans were detained, Ramazan Ayçiçek sent word to the applicant to contact him. The applicant was allowed to see him in Lice prison as he told the prison officers that Ramazan Ayçiçek was a close acquaintance and that he was asking about his brothers and his son.


Prompt: 112.  Unlike the prison staff, who had benefited from a final discontinuance decision (see paragraph 106 above), the members of the gendarmerie were placed under formal investigation after the close of the administrative proceedings before


Prompt: 64.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned as a witness Mr Ut., a serviceman of the district military commander's office. Mr Ut. stated that on 4 December 2000 he and other servicemen of the district military commander's office had been on duty on the roof of house no. 269 at Ugolnaya Street in Grozny. House no. 269 was located near the district military commander's office. On the night of 4 December 2000 everything had been calm and nothing had attracted Mr Ut.'s attention. He had not seen a NIVA vehicle arrive at house no. 269. At about 6 a.m. he had seen a group of civilians who were shouting something. He had had a permanent connection to the district military commander's office via military communication channels but on that morning he had not communicated with them. No one had mentioned a NIVA vehicle to him. He had learnt about the abduction of


Prompt: 52.  On 12 March 1996 the Lice gendarmerie commander replied to Lieutenant-Colonel Alpı's requests and enclosed copies of two pages of custody ledgers and copies of two pages of operation logbooks in which the day-to-day activities of the Lice gendarmerie were recorded. The Lice commander further stated in his letter that his soldiers had not conducted an operation in Türeli village on 18 May 1994 and that Servet and İkram İpek had not been detained. The letter further states that Major


Prompt: 53.  On 4 May 2006, representatives from the Public Defender's Office visited X in the prison Y. He reiterated word for word his deposition of 3 April 2006 (see paragraphs 47-50 above). The inmate added that when, on 1 October 2005, the expert had asked him to undress Mr


Prompt: 105.  The witness, a corporal in the gendarmerie, stated that he remembered having been on guard duty at the detention area of the interrogation centre on 20 November 1990. During his turn of duty he had let


Prompt:
26.  On 17 March 1995 the public prosecutor Selahattin Kemaloğlu took witness statements from Cavit Nacitarhan, Özer Akdemir, Salman Mazı, Murat Demir and Müjdat Yılmaz, who were all accused of being members of an illegal extreme left-wing organisation, the TDKP. The following depositions were taken.
(a)


Prompt: 60.  On 5 June 2000 the Parishioners' Assembly composed of 30 members, 21 of whom were present, decided that Mr S.G. could not remain a member as he had joined a new religious group. The Parishioners' Assembly discussed the judgment in which the Kyiv City Court had found that the Parishioners' Assembly contained 309 members. However, it reiterated its view that as from 24 December 1999 it had been composed of only 27 members. Two of the members of the Assembly (K.V. and T.L.) reported that their witness statements had been taken incorrectly. The Assembly also re-elected the Parish's governing bodies (Mr


Prompt: 14.  The applicant’s two relatives and Movsar Musitov spent a night in a cell, along with another person. On 13 May 2001 at about 11.30 a.m. Isa Kaplanov and Ruslan Sadulayev were taken away from the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD in a UAZ all-terrain vehicle.


Prompt:
74.  The Kyrgyzstan chapter of Amnesty International’s “2013 Annual Report”, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Torture and other ill-treatment remained pervasive throughout the country and law enforcement and judicial authorities failed to act on such allegations. The authorities continued to fail to impartially and effectively investigate the June 2010 violence and its aftermath and provide justice for the thousands of victims of serious crimes and human rights violations, including crimes against humanity. Ethnic Uzbeks continued to be targeted disproportionately for detention and prosecution in relation to the June 2010 violence.
...
The Osh City Prosecutor stated in April that out of 105 cases which had gone to trial in relation to the June 2010 violence, only two resulted in acquittals. Only one of those cases involved an ethnic Uzbek,


Prompt: 81.  The first applicant submitted that he believed that Mr Shchiborshch had wounded G. for the first time in the lobby while L. had been holding open the door to the flat. However, he did not actually see the wound being inflicted. He did not see Mr


Prompt: 25.  On 30 April 2002 the Sofia Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment, finding that O.V.’s conviction had been impermissibly based on assumptions. It acquitted him and disallowed the applicants’ civil claim, noting, in particular, that it had not been established that when he had attacked


Prompt: 34.  The Conseil d’État went on to find that its task was to satisfy itself, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that the statutory conditions governing any decision to withdraw treatment whose continuation would amount to unreasonable obstinacy had been met. To that end it needed to have the fullest information possible at its disposal, in particular concerning


Prompt: 55.  In December 2003, well before the applicant had been placed under investigation and arrested, and shortly after the Rose Revolution that led to the resignation of President Shevardnadze (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, §§ 11-13, ECHR 2008), Mr


Prompt:
8.  In issue no. 19/05 of Falter, an article was published on page 14 concerning the criminal proceedings against P., which read as follows:
“‘Sex with a nigger woman’
The courts: An asylum seeker lodges a criminal complaint alleging rape against a security officer. The case takes on a political dimension because it exposes conditions in the Traiskirchen centre. One year later only the victim is still before the courts. The chronicling of a judicial scandal. H.P., 48, is interviewed as the presumed perpetrator. When first questioned the trained bricklayer with the thick moustache states: ‘I didn’t have sex with the nigger woman.’ The next time his recall is more accurate: ‘It’s possible that I had intercourse with the nigger woman. I’d had twelve and a half litres of beer and one and a half litres of herb lemonade mixed with red wine.’ He claims it was entirely consensual. However, he doesn’t recognise Elaine in a photo. Police officer: ‘Could the woman have left the room if she’d wanted to?’ Answer: ‘No, only I had a key’. Again the question: ‘Did you pay the nigger woman for sexual intercourse?’ Answer: ‘No way!’ Third [interview] record: ‘I’d noticed the nigger woman about a week before we had sex. I fancied her from the beginning. I went into her room and gestured to her to come out.’ According to him, she followed him out of her own accord, undressed in front of him, took hold of his penis, inserted it and then got dressed again. Then she disappeared for good – without making any demands. ‘Maybe she thought she’d be given asylum sooner’ speculates the security officer. Something else occurs to him. He had offered to buy the woman a drink in the bakery a few days before. She had stroked his back and ‘cosied up’ to him.
Elaine B. denies this version of events. She says that she had other things on her mind at the time. She is not a whore. She felt repelled by this fat man with a moustache who smelled of alcohol, she was afraid of him. Also: if she had really been hoping to be granted asylum, why would she then have defamed the security officer?
Next to take the witness stand are the employees of the bakery. The first to be examined is saleswoman R.Z.: ‘She gave him a kiss. She was fairly young, I’d say between 20 and 25. The two of them were talking quietly. I couldn’t describe the woman.’ When confronted with


Prompt: 44.  On 26 and 30 June and 5 July 2002 the investigators requested the ROVD and other district departments of the interior in Chechnya to take operational search measures to identify and question witnesses to


Prompt: 23.  On 30 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 387 of the Basmannyy District examined the charges concerning the applicant’s administrative offence at Lubyanskiy Proyezd. The applicant was absent from the proceedings, but he was represented by his lawyer, who disputed the applicant’s participation in an irregular assembly and claimed that his client had not chanted any slogans. He asked


Prompt: 105.  On 15 November 2004 Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev’s brother was abducted by service personnel. During the night after his abduction a group of armed service personnel in masks broke into the applicants’ home and searched the premises. Having found that Mr


Prompt: 16.  In the afternoon of 8 August 2000 the applicant called Ms Margvelashvili and threatened her and her son with death if she did not tell him who had been behind the abduction of his father. Fearing for her life and the lives of those detained by the applicant, Ms


Prompt: 9.  Between 5 and 6 p.m. on the same day a light coloured UAZ vehicle (“таблетка”) arrived at the applicant’s house. About ten armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks emerged from the vehicle. The applicant’s neighbours R.Z., Z.D. and L.D., who witnessed the arrival of the vehicle, inferred that those men were servicemen. Two servicemen stayed by the UAZ vehicle and the others rushed inside the applicant’s house. Shortly thereafter the servicemen came outside, leading


Prompt:
36.  As to the telephone call of 13 October 2000, the High Court found:
“It is accepted by the Defendant both that DC Ridley took no further steps at this time in response to the threat to [Giles Van Colle] made by Mr Brougham, and that he should have done more by contacting or arresting Mr Brougham. His explanation for failing to arrest Mr Brougham, namely that he felt


Prompt: 44.  On 4 June 2009 the Inner House declared the applicant a vexatious litigant but excluded the Tods Murray litigation from the order. It referred to the applicant’s ill-founded allegations about lack of authenticity of documents which it said were a “serious abuse of process”. In coming to this conclusion it also took into account the finding that he had used a proof in the


Prompt: 74.  Judgment was given on 7 July 1998 and the appeal was partly upheld. In its judgment the Supreme Court considered that the fairness of the proceedings ought to be considered with, and as part of, the proceedings relating to the action itself. It concluded that the district court should not have considered the applicant’s allegations within the context of an interim application but within the framework of the trial taken as a whole. Only in the latter context would it be possible to determine whether or not the trial had been fair. The protection of rights aimed at securing a fair trial and not hampering it. The Supreme Court further rejected the contention that the Law of Suspension of Limitation of Actions which permitted the filing of an action without any time limitation was unconstitutional as decided in its judgment in the case of


Prompt:
6.  On 4 June 2007 the applicant did not appear at the preliminary hearing scheduled by the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskiy Town Court and the Town Court ordered the applicant’s detention instead of his undertaking not to leave the place of residence. The detention order contained no time-limits. The relevant part of the order read as follows:
“The preliminary hearing was scheduled by the court for 29 May 2007...
The accused


Prompt: 12.  On 13 September 2005 the then Minister of Justice, Mr K.K. (“the Minister”) commissioned an internal investigation concerning the activities of the Medical Department of the Ministry carried out between the period of 1 January 2005 and 13 September 2005.


Prompt: 10.  Meanwhile, the bus passengers saw from the windows that the servicemen at the intersection were checking the documents of the three men in the purple VAZ car. Ms Tamara S. and Ms Khamila D. recognised one of them as their acquaintance


Prompt: 37.  On 30 December 2009 the investigators issued a decision concerning the seizure of the detainees’ registration log of the Shatoy ROVD owing to “the information concerning the involvement of its employees in Mr


Prompt: 50.  Between August and October 2003 the first applicant tried on four occasions to talk to the head of the ROVD, but the latter was unavailable. At the beginning of October 2003 the first applicant talked to an officer of the ROVD who said that he was trying to find out whether


Prompt: 41.  On 14 August 2008 the applicant complained to the Karabulak District Court under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure about the failure of the investigating department to open a criminal case in connection with Mr


Prompt: 19.  At about noon on 23 October 2004 the head of the Gudermes ROVD, Arslan D., called A.I., M.I. and R.I. into his office and told them that they would be released. He returned their passports and the mobile phone to them. He also instructed them not to tell anyone about their detention. They were escorted outside of the building, where their relatives, including the applicant, had been waiting. From Arslan D. and from Said they understood that


Prompt:
28.  On the same date the Presidium of the Kyiv City Court allowed the Deputy Prosecutor General's application and quashed the decision. On the same date the GPS ordered the applicant's detention pending trial. As a result, the applicant was immediately arrested and transferred to the SIZO SBU. In particular, the Kyiv City Court held:
“... it can be seen from the witness statement by Mr


Prompt: 13.  In his report the prosecutor noted the presence of a large amount of dried blood on the floor which had come from Mustafa Döleksoy’s head. He observed that the corpse had swollen and the face had completely blackened. The doctor reported two fractures on both the left and right of the occipital region of the head and two cuts above the fractures. No indications of firearm injuries or stab wounds were noted on the body. A handful of hair found in the left hand of


Prompt: 46.  On 11 November 2005 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. She described in detail the circumstances of her son's apprehension and pointed out that her son had been abducted by representatives of the State. The applicant submitted that the investigation into


Prompt:
45.  On 10 February 2002 the investigators requested that the Shali FSB informed them whether they had detained the applicants’ relative. The text of the document included the following:
“... the investigation established that at about 3.35 p.m. on 9 January 2002 four vehicles, including two UAZ minivans, one of them with the registration number 635, had arrived at [the applicants’] address. Men of Slavic appearance in camouflage uniforms had put


Prompt: 131.  On 26 January 1996 Captain İrfan Odabaş, the Bismil gendarmerie district commander, informed the Bismil public prosecutor, in reply to his request of 16 October 1995, that no officers or NCOs called Ahmet were currently serving under his command. Captain Odabaş further informed the Bismil public prosecutor that the expert gendarmerie sergeant Ahmet Uyar had been ordered to report to the public prosecutor's office as he was present, that the expert sergeant


Prompt: 40.  On 8 September 2001 the criminal proceedings in case no. 24047 were adjourned as it was impossible to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrators. The proceedings were then resumed pursuant to a decision of the


Prompt: 39.  On 10 August 2004 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 informed a number of State authorities, including the Chechnya prosecutor's office, that the theory of the involvement of Russian military forces in the abduction of


Prompt: 80.  On 25 May 2008 the investigators forwarded requests for information to a number of law enforcement agencies. According to the response received from the Central Archives of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior, no special operations aimed at the detention of


Prompt: 35.  The relevant national and international materials concerning the problem of tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, and the World Health Organization Guidelines for the Management of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis are summarised by the Court in the case of Makharadze and


Prompt: 33.  After Lithuania regained its independence, on 13 June 2014 the applicant was charged with being an accessory to genocide, in accordance with Articles 24 § 6 and 99 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 58 below), for having taken part in the operation of 11-12 October 1956 during which


Prompt: 6.  On 4 April 1997 the weekly magazine Imperijal published two articles entitled “By exposing H.’s machinations I did not set up HDZ (Iznošenjem [H-ovih] makinacija nisam podvalio HDZ-u)” and “Dr I.V. fiercely attacked Dr.


Prompt:
36.  In its judgment of 29 October 2003, SIAC summarised the “open” case against the second applicant as follows:
“...
(1)  he has links with both the GIA and the GSPC [Algerian terrorist groups: see paragraph 26 above] and is a close associate of a number of Islamic extremists with links to al-Qaeda and/or Bin Laden.
(2)  he has been concerned in the preparation and/or instigation of acts of international terrorism by procuring high-tech equipment (including communications equipment) for the GSPC and/or Islamic extremists in Chechnya led by


Prompt: 15.  On 26 December 2009 the first applicant submitted a complaint to the local police department in St Petersburg about the disappearance of her husband and three of his relatives. She indicated that she had last seen her husband and the three other men at about 11.30 p.m. on 25 December 2009 at Kamskaya Street, driving away in his car. They had intended to drop two of the men at the Tekhnologicheskiy Institut metro station and then continue to her home address at Novikova Street. At about midnight


Prompt: 103.  Even assuming that the applicant had been a member of the DSP, he would not face any danger if returned to that country at present. As had emerged in the case of K.K., she had been able, as a lower-ranking DSP member, to continue as a soldier in the army of Mobutu’s successor


Prompt: 32.  The order of the Ministry of the Interior for the district, also dated 14 October 2002, contained similar provisions. Finally, on 15 October 2002 the head of the detachments of the Ministry of the Interior based in the district produced a report on the results of the operation. It listed thirteen men who had been detained in Nagornoye on that day on suspicion of being involved with illegal armed groups, and who had been questioned, fingerprinted and delivered to the ROVD.


Prompt: 28.  On 6 June 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic and the first applicant that, despite the suspension of the investigation in case no. 59186, investigative measures were being taken to find


Prompt: 19.  Upon receipt of the applicant's complaint, the prosecutor examined the custody records of police headquarters and concluded that Atilla Osmanoğlu had not been taken into custody. The prosecutor did not initiate an investigation, on the grounds that there were neither custody records showing that


Prompt: 6.  Mr Shahin Vrioni, the applicant in application no. 35720/04, is an Albanian national who was born in 1925 and lives in Albania. Mr Gherardo La Francesca, Mr Dario La Francesca and Mr Oliver Vrioni, the applicants in application no. 42832/06, are Albanian and Italian nationals who were born in 1946, 1950 and 1974 respectively and live in Italy. Mr


Prompt: 79.  On 9 December 1996 İlhan Ezer made another statement to the gendarmerie in which he declared that he knew Captain İzzet and NCO Ahmet very well and that they were definitely not the men who had abducted


Prompt:
25.  Dealing with the applicants’ submission that, in order for the United Kingdom to conform to its international obligations under the Convention, the House of Lords should find that there was (and in theory always had been) a tort of invasion of privacy under which the searches of the applicants were actionable and damages for emotional distress recoverable, Lord Hoffmann stated:
“32.  Nor is there anything in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which suggests that the adoption of some high level principle of privacy is necessary to comply with Article 8 of the Convention. The European Court is concerned only with whether English law provides an adequate remedy in a specific case in which it considers that there has been an invasion of privacy contrary to Article 8 § 1 and not justifiable under Article 8 § 2. So in Earl Spencer v United Kingdom 25 EHRR CD 105 it was satisfied that the action for breach of confidence provided an adequate remedy for the Spencers’ complaint and looked no further into the rest of the armoury of remedies available to the victims of other invasions of privacy. Likewise, in Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41 the court expressed some impatience, at paragraph 103, at being given a tour d’horizon of the remedies provided and to be provided by English law to deal with every imaginable kind of invasion of privacy. It was concerned with whether Mr Peck (who had been filmed in embarrassing circumstances by a CCTV camera) had an adequate remedy when the film was widely published by the media. It came to the conclusion that he did not. 33.  Counsel for the Wainwrights relied upon Peck’s case as demonstrating the need for a general tort of invasion of privacy. But in my opinion it shows no more than the need, in English law, for a system of control of the use of film from CCTV cameras which shows greater sensitivity to the feelings of people who happen to have been caught by the lens. For the reasons so cogently explained by Sir


Prompt: 26.  Between 2008 and 2012 Ms Natalya Kibalo visited her husband in Blagoveshchensk on eight occasions. On six of those occasions, between 2008 and 2010, her travel expenses were sponsored. She visited her husband once in 2011 and once in 2012 but could not afford to travel at all in 2013 or 2014. Miss


Prompt:
75.  On 30 June and 5 October 2005 the senior doctor at the OCTU at Fleury-Mérogis Prison issued two medical certificates in exactly the same terms:
“I, the undersigned, ... certify that Mr Ramirez Sanchez Ilich, who was born on 12 October 1949, has been in my care since his arrival at the prison.
The problems which Mr


Prompt: 165.   About two or three months after the abduction, the second applicant was informed by Mr A.Kh., an officer from Battalion Vostok, that his sons had been detained upon orders from the battalion’s commander Mr


Prompt: 27.  On 3 June 2003 the Nadterechny prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that there were no grounds to prosecute Mr K. and the servicemen of his unit because they had not been in the village of Psedakh at the time of the detention of Isa and


Prompt: 15.  As a prominent local HADEP politician, Hüseyin Koku was the subject of harassment and intimidation by the police, and, in particular, by the Governor of Elbistan, Mr Şükrü Görücü. Mr Görücü threatened to kill him and alleged that he was a traitor to the State and further alleged that HADEP was a terrorist party. Mr Görücü also told


Prompt: 136.  In a decision of 9 February 2001 the investigator in charge ordered a medical forensic examination with a view to establishing the cause of death of Apti Abubakarov, Aminat Abubakarova, Vakha Tseltsayev,


Prompt: 42.  A number of applicants (Michelle Périoche, Germain Guiton, Mario Guiton and Stella Huet, Laetitia Winterstein, Catherine Herbrecht, Sylviane Huygue-Bessin and Patrick Lefèvre, Gypsy Debarre and Paul Mouche,


Prompt: 40.  On the same date Ms H.A. was questioned. She submitted that on 10 March 2000 at 5.30 p.m. she had returned home and had learned that her husband, Mr T., had been apprehended by officers of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD dressed in camouflage uniform and masks. Mr


Prompt:
42.  Both applicants were entitled to a daily one-hour walk in a closed courtyard; no other prisoner could be present at the same time. From the courtyard the applicants could only see the sky and four very high walls. The applicants had no access to the gym or other such facilities.
They were allowed to have a shower once a week. In summertime there was no warm water. During the winter of 2004-2005 there was no cold water at all in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, so that


Prompt: 11.  According to Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov, after the arrest the men took him and Mr Aslan Ireziyev to the Avtury collective farm. There they were handed over to other men, put in a UAZ car and driven away, passing through several roadblocks. At a certain point the men stopped and placed him and Mr


Prompt: 40.  On 3 August 2007 a supervising prosecutor ordered the investigation to be resumed. The relevant decision stated that the investigating authorities had not taken the measures necessary for establishing the whereabouts of those missing and had not taken steps which could have been carried out in the absence of those responsible. In particular, the investigating authorities had not checked the information provided by the first applicant which claimed that servicemen of regiment no. 531 of the Russian Ministry of the Interior and a certain Mr


Prompt: 24.  On 25 August 2003 the investigating authorities questioned Ms Z. Sh., who submitted that she was the Ilyasovs’ neighbour. She stated that shortly after 6 a.m. on 15 November 2002 two APCs had driven down Lenina Street and stopped at the Ilyasovs’ house. After a while she had heard screaming coming from their yard. Later she had learned that Mr


Prompt:
198.  He denied having said to Major Şeker that if Yakup's death was the result of natural causes this would have been God's will. He had not dared or considered reading the record of his statement when Major Şeker had given it to him to sign.
iii.  Public Prosecutor


Prompt:
27.  Mr Lechi Temirkhanov was born in 1980. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from his uncle’s house at 1 Moskovskaya Street.
(h)  Abduction of Mr Apti Dedishov, Mr Abu Dedishov and Mr


Prompt: 18.  The first applicant, his relatives and neighbours started to take the bodies inside the yards. A group of soldiers were still standing at the intersection of Voronezhskaya Street and Khoperskaya Street, and one of them fired a single shot which wounded


Prompt: 38.  On 18 September 2002 the first applicant managed for the first time to meet investigator L. He showed her a plan of her neighbours’ house at 28 Krasnoarmeyskaya Street and asked in which room her husband had been detained. The first applicant realised that the investigator had information that


Prompt: 49.  On 15 September 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic notified the first applicant that the investigation had been resumed on 12 September 2003 and that investigative measures were being taken to find


Prompt: 11.  Magomed Umarov slept in an extension to the house located in the same courtyard. He rushed out into the courtyard, screaming “Why are you beating him?” According to the applicant, the men seized him, beat him and threw him into the Ural truck in which they had arrived. The vehicle had no registration plates. The men then left.


Prompt: 198.  On 26 August 2003 the investigators ordered the police to carry out operative search measures, such as identifying eyewitnesses and the perpetrators of the crime. They also sent information requests concerning


Prompt: 54.  An examination of the bodies of Khamid Khashiyev and Rizvan Taymeskhanov was conducted by an investigator from the Malgobek Town Prosecutor's Office in the municipal morgue on 10 February 2000. The bodies were frozen, and the examination was conducted without removing the clothes. On 14 February 2000 two forensic reports were prepared by a forensic expert, based on the investigator's descriptions and without examining the bodies. The report stated that Khashiyev's body had eight gunshot wounds and that his death had been caused by a gunshot wound to the head.


Prompt:
29.  On 1 August 2008 an investigating judge of the Split County Court ordered all the suspects to be detained on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (1), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely the danger of the suspects absconding, the danger of the suspects reoffending and the gravity of the charges. The relevant part of the decision, referring to the grounds for detention, reads:
“In view of the manner in which the criminal offence was committed, the type and quantity of the illegal substances in which the suspects were trafficking, the large number of illegal transactions and the persistence and determination involved in committing the criminal offences, as well as the fact that the suspects are mostly unemployed with no means of support and that the suspects ... and


Prompt:
5.  The applicants are:
1) Mr Isa Khutsayev, born in 1956,
2) Ms Birlant Khutsayeva, born in 1961,
3) Ms Maryam Khutsayeva, born in 1989,
4) Mr Aslan Khutsayev, born in 1988,
5) Mr Ibragim Khutsayev, born in 1993,
6) Ms


Prompt: 53.  M.A. stated that while at the detention centre, he had been beaten twice, in July 2014, when the staff had found him to be in possession of the Koran, and on 25 August, when one of the Syrian detainees had escaped. He had been beaten so that he would disclose details about the escape. After the beatings he had stayed in bed for three days and could not eat. He stated that he had not been allowed to make complaints or send letters, and had been denied access to his representatives and relatives. He had not been allowed to attend the court hearing on 28 November 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) even though he had asked to. He also confirmed that he had wanted to meet with his representatives, including Ms


Prompt: 10.  The first eight applicants are relatives of Leoma Akhiatovich Meshayev, who was born in 1952. The first applicant is his wife, the second applicant is his brother, the fourth, fifth, sixth and the seventh applicants are his children. The third and eighth applicants are his niece and nephew.


Prompt: 12.  On an unspecified date all fourteen officers of the Oryol Region anti-narcotics unit, including the six charged with drug-related offences, filed a civil defamation action. Without mentioning specific parts of the article, the officers asserted that the publication had damaged their honour, dignity and professional reputation and claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The statements designated the editor’s office of the Orlovskiy Meridian newspaper and “the author of the article


Prompt: 5.  The applicants were arrested and taken into custody on 19 and 20 February 1999 respectively on suspicion of their involvement in the throwing of Molotov cocktails at various public buildings. On 23 February 1999 the Suruç Magistrates' Court ordered their remand in custody. The applicants were aged sixteen (


Prompt: 44.  On 17 September 2002 the deputy head of the ROVD drew up a report concerning Lema Khakiyev’s disappearance. The report was based on the third applicant’s testimonies. The document stated that he had been abducted by armed men in masks and camouflage uniforms and that, despite the inquiry, his whereabouts remained unknown. In view of the foregoing, the deputy head of the ROVD ordered the discontinuation of the search for


Prompt: 18.  On 29 January 2003 the investigator of the district prosecutor's office adjourned the criminal proceedings given the failure to identify the persons against whom the charges must be brought (Article 208, part 1, item 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The investigator's decision instructed the Nadterechny district department of the Ministry of the Interior (ROVD) to search for


Prompt: 9.  On 3 July 1987 the Istanbul 3rd Civil Court (Asliye Hukuk) decided that the total of the above-mentioned immovable and movable property of Mrs Elisavet Pistika would be transferred by way of inheritance to Ms


Prompt: 109.  The applicant, Mr Muledal to some extent, and more particularly the applicant, Mr Lindahl, and also to a certain degree the applicant, Mr Sigurdur P. Hafsteinsson, provided detailed accounts of their individual experiences of test dives which had caused them pain, suffering and injuries. This related, inter alia, to Mr Lindahl’s participation in the Deep Ex I dive in 1980 (300 metres) and the Deep Ex II dive in 1981 (504 metres); Mr


Prompt: 6.  The first and second applicants, Mr Oleg Volodymyrovych Kats and Mrs Tetiana Yakivna Kats, born in 1946, are the father and mother of the late Ms Olga Olegivna Biliak (hereinafter Olga Biliak), who was born in 1971 and died in 2004. The third applicant, Mr


Prompt: 25.  The Government submitted that on 14 July 2006, on the road between Grozny and Shatoy, near the bridge close to the village of Yarysh‑Mardy, three unidentified individuals wearing camouflage uniforms and carrying automatic weapons had stopped a vehicle in which


Prompt: 7.  In the petition the lawyer representing the applicants stated that the applicant Hazım İncin had recently returned to Turkey from Iraq and wanted to lodge an official complaint concerning the killing of his father. In their petition the two applicants also gave the prosecutor the names of a number of people who they alleged had witnessed the incident in question. They asked the prosecutor to carry out an investigation, to identify and question all the eyewitnesses, to exhume the body of


Prompt:
28.  The documents listed below pertain to the applicant's complaints about the destruction of his house by the Malazgirt gendarmerie forces.
(i) Petition by the applicant dated 23 September 1994 to the Karşıyaka public prosecutor's office for submission to the Malazgirt public prosecutor's office;
(ii) Letter from the applicant to


Prompt: 56.  According to the applicants, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (“the ICRC”) in Cyprus visited Pavlides Garage in the Turkish-occupied sector of Nicosia and on 28 August 1974 recorded the names of twenty Greek Cypriots held there, including the nine persons from Yialousa (they cited document EZY284D)[5].


Prompt: 134.  On 18 May 2002 the investigation again questioned the seventh applicant and her husband. As appears from their transcripts enclosed with the Government's submissions, they both changed their initial statements, without clarifying the reason for the change. In particular, they admitted to having stayed in Grozny with their relatives on the night of 12 May 2002. In the morning, upon their return to Katyr-Yurt, the seventh applicant and her husband had learnt that Ali had been taken away by unknown armed men in masks and camouflage uniforms. They had had no news of him thereafter. They had immediately contacted the ROVD and the district military commander's office, which had denied having detained


Prompt: 138.   The witness entered Mr Adalı's house three or four hours after the incident, along with Refik Öztümen, a close relative of the deceased and the local muhtar. The door was open and the TV was on. They looked for a document, an item or anything that could have been the cause of the incident. They did not remove any object. Mr Adalı's office was in disorder and there were a large number of books which were piled up or arranged in boxes.


Prompt:
53.  On 7 April 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the criminal proceedings concerning the death of Visadi Shokkarov had been terminated on 18 February 2003 for lack of corpus delicti. The letter also stated that
“...


Prompt: 59.  On 24 December 2002 and 12 February 2003 the first and second applicants lodged civil actions within the aforementioned criminal proceedings. They claimed 50,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) and UAH 200,000 respectively for non-pecuniary damage inflicted by the deaths of Sergiy and


Prompt: 70.  Musa G., a resident of Alkhan-Kala, was questioned in June 2004 and October 2005. He stated that on 2 February 2000 he had tried to leave the village with his family in a PAZ bus. He was stopped by a group of armed men who ordered him to remove his belongings and to take the bus to the Alkhan-Kala hospital. At the hospital two other PAZ buses, also driven by villagers, were waiting. The armed men took wounded individuals out of the hospital and loaded them onto the three buses; the drivers were initially instructed to travel to Urus-Martan. However, they were not permitted to pass through a military roadblock at the exit of the village and returned to Alkhan-Kala. They were then instructed to go to Tolstoy-Yurt, where, as the witness understood it, the wounded were removed from the buses by servicemen from the Ministry of Justice. The witness identified


Prompt: 16.  According to the applicant, at some point after the events one of the servicemen who had been on duty at the ROVD on the night of the abduction told her that on the night of 3 January 2003 the minivan with


Prompt: 6.  In the early morning of 27 December 2001 a group of approximately twenty federal servicemen who had arrived in two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) and UAZ vehicles surrounded the house where the applicant lived with her son (Mr


Prompt:
65.  The documents submitted by the Government included:
(a)  four reports of 29 March 2004 on inspection of crime scenes at the houses at 73 Nuradilova Street from which Apti Murtazov had been taken, at 15 Rodnikovaya Street from which


Prompt: 51.  On 9 February and 31 March 2003 the investigators questioned the second applicant and granted her victim status on the latter date. She stated that since 2001 her husband had been working in the investigations department of the Shatoy ROVD. At about 4.30 a.m. on 9 February 2003 the family was sleeping in their house at 179 Kluchevaya Street. She was woken by a noise in the yard and saw about ten or twelve armed men in multicoloured military uniform, high boots and black masks. All these men were armed with typical submachine guns. They ordered her to stay in bed. The men acted in silence; only one of them was swearing and speaking unaccented Russian. The intruders threw her husband on to the floor and tied his hands behind his back with adhesive tape. After that they asked the applicant whether there was a balaclava mask in the house. When she replied in the negative, they took a pillowcase, put it over her husband's head and wrapped adhesive tape around it. After that they took


Prompt: 9.  On 28 November 2008 the applicant lodged a request for judicial review in which he alleged that the facts had been wrongly established and that his rights enshrined in Article 29 of the Slovenian Constitution had been violated. He disputed the allegation that his bar had been open and that he had had customers at the time in question. He emphasised, among other things, that the police had not approached him on the date the offence had allegedly been committed and that he and the witnesses had not subsequently had an opportunity to be heard by the


Prompt: 233.  Mr Erten told the Public Prosecutor, and subsequently the Investigating Judge, that he had been tortured and that the statements had been signed under duress. He told the Judge that he had resisted pressure from


Prompt: 221.  On 7 August 1998 Detective Chief Superintendent Van Duijvenvoorde interviewed the applicants. They told him that they were not aware that Moravia Ramsahai had had a pistol and could not imagine this to be the case.


Prompt: 92.  During the hearing before Kartal High Criminal Court on 19 March 1998 Ayhan Güneş admitted that he had strangled Kasım Açık with a piece of rope. He contended that Kasım Açık had suffered from psychological problems, that he had been very anti-social and that not been liked by any of the other inmates. On the day he was killed, Kasım Açık had provoked


Prompt: 37.  On 30 November 2000 the investigators granted both applicants victim status in the criminal case and questioned the second applicant, who stated that she had found out about the events from her neighbours and that she had been prevented by them from approaching the scene of the incident. From the eyewitnesses she had learnt that her son and


Prompt: 8.  At about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 the family of M.M. was at home. When Adam Khurayev went outside, to the toilet located in the courtyard, a group of over fifteen armed masked men in camouflage uniforms broke into the house. The intruders neither introduced themselves nor produced any documents. The applicant's relatives thought that they were Russian servicemen. They dispersed into different rooms, pointed their guns at the family members and ordered everyone to stay in their rooms. M.M.'s daughter, Ms L.M., rushed to the window and heard the intruders order someone in Russian: “Lie on the ground!” She thought that the order must have been given to


Prompt:
59.  Several documents refer to a certain Yuriy Zh., whose family had resided at 130 Neftyanaya Street. From the witnesses' testimonies it appears that Yuriy Zh. left Grozny at the end of 1980s, while his parents (or aunt and uncle) lived at the said address. They had been killed in 1997 by Chechen fighters and their house had been occupied. The witnesses referred to “rumours” that Yuriy Zh. was among the soldiers involved in the killings and that he was motivated by revenge. The house at 130 Neftyanaya was destroyed during the fighting. Several requests for information about Yuriy Zh. were sent by the investigators to the military authorities and to the civil authorities of the neighbouring regions, but the answers to these requests were either negative or were not provided by the Government.
i)  Testimony by


Prompt: 56.  On 11 March 2003 the investigation questioned Major I., who at the relevant time had headed the criminal police of the VOVD. Major I. stated that a group of FSB officers had brought a detainee to the premises of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD and questioned him there. He was not aware of the details of the case and had not given any orders to detain or to question


Prompt: 74.  On 23 August 1999, according to the applicants, Police Captain R., claiming to be acting on the orders of his superior officer, Lieutenant-Colonel B.D., placed seals on the door of the church of Cucioaia (Ghiliceni) and forbade V.R., a priest of the applicant Church, who regularly officiated there, to enter and continue to conduct divine service. After a complaint by the people of the village, the applicant


Prompt:
40.  The petitioners complained that Ihsan Simpil, Esref Simpil and Mehmet Zaman Simpil had fired at villagers from Ormandışı. It was stated that the aggressors were from Boyunlu village who hated and had a grudge against the Ormandışı village due to the latter’s lodging of legal proceedings against the Boyunlu villagers’ illegal entry onto Ormandışı village lands.
Statement by


Prompt:
40.  The dissenting judge, Mr Justice Rieber-Mohn, stated:
“(56) ... I concur that in its news coverage of 8 June 2000 Tønsbergs Blad published a defamatory statement – an accusation of a factual character – for which there was no factual basis. I also agree with the first voting judge that the core of the accusation is that Mr Rygh found himself on a list that the Tjøme Municipality had drawn up, which contained the names of individuals whom the Municipality considered to have breached the residence requirements. This would, however – assuming it was correct – not have been a final declaration that there had been a breach of the residence requirements. For this reason, among others, I agree with the minority of the High Court and the City Court that the accusation lies in the lower stratum of what can be covered by Article 247 of the Penal Code. I also have the impression that the High Court's majority by and large agree with this.
(57)  When an untrue defamatory statement is made, the point of departure is also clear under the European Court of Human Rights' case-law concerning Article 10 of the European Convention: the accusation is not protected by freedom of expression. But exceptions to this may be contemplated. If the accusation is to enjoy protection under freedom of expression, it must at the least be demanded that the news coverage in which it is contained is of public interest and additionally that the necessary care was taken by the newspaper. I consider that these criteria were met in this case.
(58)  There can be no doubt that the general subject with which the newspaper was concerned, and with which the news coverage of 8 June 2000 really dealt, namely compliance with the rules on residence requirements, was and is of great public interest. The question is whether it is in the public interest to publicise a possible breach of the residence requirements on the part of Mr Rygh. I would first mention that in modern journalism it is a common and recognised method of popular education to illustrate general and usually difficult questions by means of the roles and fates of individuals, when they are considered especially relevant. When individuals are unwillingly brought forward, and are subjected to accusations of crime and so forth, a mass medium must have good reasons for this, for example if the person concerned has sought out the light of publicity in this area, or is a prominent person in society who must accept that special demands are made of his integrity and sense of responsibility to society. At the time in question Mr Rygh belonged to the top management of one of the country's biggest industrial conglomerates, and his name was not unfamiliar in the news. In my opinion individuals who have sought prominent positions in society, which require a special degree of trust from the public, must to some extent accept that the media will follow them with the eyes of Argus, not just in their professional activities but also when, in the more private sphere, they challenge laws and other regulations that are particularly meant to safeguard the interests of society. It is therefore possible to conceive of violations of the law by these individuals that in the circumstances will be of public interest, even if the breach carries no criminal responsibility or the penalties are minor. In this case the newspaper thought that Mr Rygh had broken the rules on residence requirements, which in public opinion was and is of major social importance, even if such a contravention is not a criminal offence. I have difficulty seeing that it was not a matter of public interest if such a very prominent person as Mr Rygh had not complied with the residence requirements with regard to his property in the Tjøme Municipality.
(59)  The question then becomes whether the newspaper has acted with the requisite care. It must be noted that the journalist used an anonymous source when he wrote that Mr Rygh was on the Municipality's list of those who were considered to have breached the residence requirements. It is undisputed that for a long while Tønsbergs Blad had been working on this topic, and that the journalist – who lived at Tjøme – had been in contact with several representatives of the Municipality. It must also be noted that the journalist, on application to the Municipality, received confirmation that there existed a list that the Municipality had drawn up, but the mistake was that this was a list of individuals who, according to external tip-offs, had breached the obligation, and not a list of individuals whom the Municipality had already found to have breached it. The newspaper thus confused the tip-off list, which contained Mr Rygh's name, with the list that the Municipality was indeed to refer to


Prompt: 10.  The servicemen immediately grabbed the third applicant and Mayrudin Khantiyev and took them into one room. The third applicant asked one of the intruders what they were looking for. She did not receive any response to her question and was ordered to stay quiet. She heard the servicemen tying up her husband with adhesive tape; he could not say anything as apparently his mouth was covered with the tape. Having tied up


Prompt: 46.  To escape the fury of the villagers, Chief of Police Moga took Rapa Lupian Lăcătuş to the cemetery, after trying in vain to enter several courtyards in the village, which were all locked. The court noted that “the policeman [Moga], realising his presence was useless, abandoned his prisoner to the infuriated crowd”. According to the autopsy report,


Prompt: 70.  The applicants submitted a statement by Christopher Mark Milroy, registered medical practitioner, Professor of Forensic Pathology at the University of Sheffield and Consultant Pathologist to the British Home Office. The statement was prepared on the basis of the applicants' submissions concerning the circumstances of their relatives' deaths and of eight colour photographs taken by the first applicant when the bodies of


Prompt: 30.  In the aftermath of the incident the Roma residents of Hădăreni lodged a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutors' Office. The complainants identified a number of individuals responsible for what had occurred on 20 September 1993. Among those identified were several police officers: Chief of Police Ioan Moga, his assistant Sergeant


Prompt: 11.  On the same evening the applicant was contacted by Mr Berkadze (an accomplice to the kidnappers), who offered his services to locate the applicant’s father. On the following morning Mr Berkadze called Ms


Prompt: 22.  When the residents of the village were informed by Mr I. that Mr Khasayn Minkailov was seriously injured, they immediately went to look for him. They again broke up into small groups and entered the forest. Two of Mr


Prompt:
23.  In a judgment of 11 May 2002 the Burgas District Court found the applicant guilty of having, in the printed press, disseminated injurious statements of fact about, and imputed offences to Ms T.K., Ms A.M., Mr R.E. and Mr G.D., officials carrying out their duties, contrary to Article 148 §§ 1 (2) and (3) and 2 taken in conjunction with Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code. It applied Article 78a of the Code (see paragraph 39 below) and replaced the applicant’s criminal liability with four administrative fines of BGN 700 each. It also ordered the applicant to pay each of the complainants BGN 1,000 for non‑pecuniary damage, dismissing the remainder of their claims, and awarded them BGN 312 in costs (BGN 12 for court fees and BGN 300 for lawyers’ fees). Lastly, it ordered the applicant to pay BGN 160 in court fees. The court described its findings of fact and held as follows:
“In the course of the trial [the applicant] gave explanations. It should however be noted that in addition to being evidence the statements of the accused are also a means of defence. [The applicant] says that she conducted a journalistic inquiry which is governed by the unwritten rules of conscience and a moral duty to warn society. She had conversations with parents who claimed that some [pupils] had arranged for [their admission] by paying the commission. [For example, a pupil] had boasted that her father had paid [USD] 300 for her admission. At that point


Prompt: 14.  Azattin Narin, who is another of the sons of the deceased, stated that he had been in Istanbul at the time of the events. He had also heard that two expert sergeants, N.T. and L.B., had caused the death of his father.


Prompt:
17.  On 26 January 1999 the Łódź Court of Appeal found that the applicant had sullied the good name of the plaintiffs. It amended the judgment in so far as the text of the apology to be published was concerned and increased the sum to be paid by the applicant to all plaintiffs by way of costs and expenses to PLN 3,316. It upheld the remainder of the judgment. The applicant was to publish the following apology:
“We apologise to Mr Kern, his wife Mrs


Prompt: 17.  Before the High Court, the submissions of the applicant’s counsel concentrated, as the trial judge found, on the issues of assault and confiscation of documents. He did however raise the argument, in the context of the lawfulness of the arrest, that


Prompt:
18.  On 28 February 2002 the interdistrict prosecutor’s office granted the first applicant victim status. The decision read as follows:
“On [the date is illegible] 2000 military servicemen took Aslandek Khamidov away from his home and drove him away in an unknown direction.


Prompt: 9.  The Khumaidovs were inside the house at the time. The servicemen did not produce identity papers or any documents justifying their actions. They searched the house and apprehended the applicant’s husband and father-in-law without any explanations. Although Magomed and


Prompt: 67.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned Ms V., a neighbour of the abducted, as a witness. She stated that on 4 December 2000 she had heard from the street a woman's cry for help. Ms V. had learnt from other neighbours that


Prompt: 45.  In October 2003 the applicant requested that the authorities establish whether Mr Artur Ibragimov was being held in detention facilities in the Rostov Region. On 5 November 2003 the Rostov Region Department for the Execution of Punishments stated that Mr


Prompt: 23.  The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants. At the same time they pointed out that the abduction had been perpetrated by unidentified armed persons, whose outfits and firearms had been common among ordinary criminals, that the body of Mr


Prompt: 71.  On 20 February 1998, the International Law and Foreign Relations Department of the Ministry of Justice informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, according to a letter of 10 February 1998 from the Edirne public prosecutor,


Prompt: 10.  Later that day the investigator asked an expert to express an opinion on the extent of the injuries suffered by Mr Valeri Zashev and Ms T.L. and the manner in which they had been inflicted. He also asked a clinic in Pleven to clarify the exact cause of Mr


Prompt: 38.  The applicant did not appear at the hearing on 22 July 2013. The Outer House granted a further one-week adjournment in order to allow the applicant a “final opportunity to appear”. The clerk of court and


Prompt: 23.  The applicant and his younger son also went to Grozny central market and enquired of those who had been there on 26 November 2000 about Aslanbek Kukayev. In particular, they questioned servicemen from the mobile detachment, showing


Prompt: 80.  On 20 February 2001 a body bearing signs of violence was found in a mass grave in Zdorovye, an abandoned holiday village in the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny, along with the bodies of about fifty other people, including that of