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summarize the case details and judgement | cellaneous Petition No. 32937 of 1988.
345 IN Writ Petition No. 12 183 of 1985.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
K.K. Venugopal, Mrs. Jayashree Wad and Mrs. Aruna Mathur for the Petitioners.
K. Parasaran, Attorney General, A.K. Ganguli, P. Parmes waran and K. Swamy for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: ORDER In respect of the civil miscellaneous petition for clarification of this Court 's judgment dated 4th November, 1988, it is made clear that the assessable value of the processed fabric would be the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor plus the value of the job work done plus manufacturing profit and manufacturing expenses whatev er these may be, which will either be included in the price at the factory gate or deemed to be the price at the factory gate for the processed fabric.
The factory gate here means the "deemed" factory gate as if the processed fabric was sold by the processor.
In order to explain the position it is made clear by the following illustration: if the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor is Rs.20 and the value of the job work done is Rs.5 and the manufacturing profit and expenses for the processing be Rs.5, then in such a case the value would be Rs.30, being the value of the grey cloth plus the value of the job work done plus manufac turing profit and expenses.
That would be the correct as sessable value.
If the trader, who entrusts cotton or man made fabric to the processor for processing on job work basis, would give a declaration to the processor as to what would be the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, that would be taken by the Excise authorities as the assessable value of the processed fabric and excise duty would be charged to the processor on that basis provided that the declaration as to the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, would include only the price or deemed price at which the processed fabric would leave the processor 's factory plus his profit.
Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 346 enjoins that when goods owned by one person are manufactured by another the information is required relating to the price at which the said manufacturer is selling the said goods and the person so authorised agrees to discharge all the liabil ities under the said Act and the rules made thereunder.
The price at which he is selling the goods must be the value of the grey cloth or fabric plus the value of the job work done plus the manufacturing profit and the manufacturing expenses but not any other subsequent profit or expenses.
It is necessary to include the processor 's expenses, costs and charges plus profit, but it is not necessary to include the trader 's profits who gets the fabrics processed, because those would be post manufacturing profits. | On a civil miscellaneous petition for clarification of this Court 's judgment dated 4th November, 1988, the Court.
HELD: The assessable value of the processed fabric would be the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor plus the value of the job work done plus manufacturing profit and manufacturing expenses whatever these may be, which will either be included in the price at the factory gate or deemed to be the price at the factory gate for the processed fabric.
[345D E] The factory gate means the "deemed" factory gate as if the processed fabric was sold by the processor.
[345E] If the trader.
who entrusts cotton or man made fabric to the processor for processing on job work basis, would give a declaration to the processor as to what would be the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, that would be taken by the Excise authorities as the assessable value of the processed fabric and excise duty would be charged to the processor on that basis.
Such a declaration would include only the price or deemed price at which the processed fabric would leave the processor 's factory plus his profit.
It is necessary to include the processor 's expenses, costs and charges plus profit, but not the trader 's profits who gets the fabrics processed, because those would be post manufacturing profits.
[345G H; 346B C] |
summarize the case details and judgement | ivil Appeal No. 4031 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.4.1988 of the Patna High PG NO 867 PG NO 868 Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1923 of 1988.
R.K. Jain, R.P.Singh and Y.D.Chandrachud for the Appellant.
U.S. Prasad for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
Special leave granted.
The order dated 25th March, 1988 of the Collector is under challenge in this appeal.
The same reads as follows: "Shri Raghu Nath Thakur S/o Late Gorakh Thakur, Village Repura, P.S. Puksha, District Samastipur had bid for Rs.11,900 (Rupees eleven thousands only) per month Dak in an auction of Beni Country liquor shop held on 27.3.88 and he as given the shop of Beni Country liquor but after signing in Bandobasti Register he did not deposit dak amount.
The name of Shri Raghu Nath Thakur S/o Late Gorakh Nath Village Repura, P.S. Pusa, Distt.
Samastipur is therefore placed in the black list for future under the orders passed by the Collector, Samastipur.
" This order was passed pursuant to the order of the Collector.
The letter dated 25th March, 1988, states as follows: "The Collector of the district after perusal of the said office note passed order on 25.3.88 which is produced in verbatim below: Ist bidder chunki defaulter hai atah security prapt kar len tatha bhavishya ke liae Black list karen.
" Indisputably, no notice had been given to the appellant of the proposal of black listing the appellant.
It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before black listing any person.
In so far as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right.
But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the PG NO 869 principles of natural justice.
It has to be realised that black listing any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event.
Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order.
In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order in so far as it directs black listing of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law.
In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the black list in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside.
So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected.
This order will, however, not prevent the State Government or the appropriate authorities from taking any future steps for blacklisting the appellant if the Government is so entitled to do so in accordance with law, i.e. giving the appellant due notice and an opportunity of making representation.
After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor.
We, however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant.
The appeal is thus disposed of.
Appeal disposed of. | The appellant has bid in an auction of Beni Country Liquor Shop in the District of Samastipur and was given the shop being the highest bidder but he failed to deposit the bid money in time.
The Collector, Samastipur by an order cancelled the bid and black listed the appellant.
He then moved the High Court against the order of the Collector.
The High Court upheld the order of the Collector.
The appellant appealed to this Court by special leave.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.
It is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequences should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice.
Black listing any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequences for the future business of the person concerned in any event.
[868H; 869A] 2.
Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order.
[869B] In the instant case, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the black list in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside.
So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected.
[869B C] |
summarize the case details and judgement | Special Leave Petition No. 1900 of 1981 etc.
From the Judgment and order dated 3.2.1981 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 1924 of 1981.
P.P. Rao, Ambrish Kumar, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, M. Qamaruddin, Mrs. Qamaruddin, A.K. Srivastava, B.B. Tawakley, Mrs. Subhadra, S.N. Singh, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K. Gupta, Uma Dutt, C.P. Lal, M.K. Garg, and Lokesh Kumar for the Petitioners.
Anil Dev Singh, O.P. Rana, B.P. Maheshwari, Mrs. section Dikshit, P.K. Pillai, R. Ramachandran, A.K. Srivastava, S.C. Birla, section Wasim, A. Qadri, N.N. Sharma, Shakeel Ahmad and K.K. Gupta for the Respondents. | % In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 239(2)(E)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961, various Zila Parishads framed a bye law, providing that right to trade in carcass utilisation in the rural area of the respective Zila Parishads shall be put to public auction.
Such activities comprised of taking of the carcass of dead animals to a specified place, skinning of the carcass, storage of bones and skins, curing and dyeing of such skins and preparation of leather goods.
In a writ petition challenging the validity of the said bye law, a Single Judge of the High Court struck down the latter part of the bye law framed by one of the Zila Parishads, providing for farming out of the privilege of utilisation and disposal of carcass of dead animals, on the ground that it created a monopoly in favour of an individual or group of individuals.
A Division Bench reiterated that view in two writ petitions filed before it, and distinguished the decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra vs Mumbai Upnagar Gramodyog Sangh, ; taking a contrary view on the ground that the restrictions were reason able within the meaning of article 19(6), in the context of the thickly populated metropolitan city.
The correctness of the said decision of the Division Bench was open to question.
Another Division Bench referred the matter to a Full Bench, which expressly repelled the aforesaid view, and held that it was competent for the Zila Parishads to frame such bye laws in exercise of the powers conferred by section 239(2)(E)(a) of the Act.
539 Against the various judgments and orders of the High Court, special leave petitions and appeals by special leave challenging the constitutional validity of the aforesaid bye law, were filed in this Court.
In SLP(C) No. 1900 of 1981, this Court, in order to protect the interests of persons traditionally engaged in the work of skinning, tanning etc., directed the State Government to frame a Model Scheme for carcass utilisation in the Etawa district at the village panchayat level on an experimental basis, and passed certain incidental directions as to the price payable for skins, bones and horns.
As nothing further was done, in partial modification of its earlier orders, this Court directed the Zila Parishad, Etawa to issue licence to any person who applied for the same.
In the meantime, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a Circular dated June 7, 1986 stating that in future the licences for disposal of carcass of animals should be granted only to registered industrial cooperative societies formed by the persons engaged in this work.
Disposing of the Special Leave Petitions and civil appeals, ^ HELD: It is plain upon the reading of the Circular dated June 7, 1986 issued by the State Government that the contract system envisaged by the impugned bye law framed by the different Zila Parishads in the State has been virtually abandoned, and the State Government proposes to replace the system of auction by a system of licensing, giving preferential right to cooperative societies consisting of members of the traditional occupation, for the disposal of carcass of dead animals.
[544E F] In view of the subsequent policy decision taken by the State Government, the present controversy no longer survives.
It would be open to different Zila Parishads, in view of the directive of the State Government, to frame the appropriate Bye laws consistent with and for the implementations of the policy declared by the State Government.
The Zila Parishads, while considering the question, shall keep in view the directions issued by this Court on April 15, 1983, and also the order passed introducing the licence system in the Zila Parishad, Etawa on an experimental basis.[544F G] For a meaningful effectuation of the policy decision of the Government, which is taken in the larger interests of a sizeable segment of the weaker sections of the society, it is of utmost importance that the 540 work of formation of cooperative society of the members of the traditional occupation, who lack the will and the ability to organise themselves, should be taken up by the social welfare department of the State Government and every effort should be made to bring the members of the traditional occupation within the fold of these cooperative societies.
The social welfare department shall take effective steps to organise such cooperative societies.
[544H; 545A B] Wherever it is not possible to implement the policy decision and there is likely to be a loss of revenue or other compelling reason, it would be open to the Zila Parishads, as a purely transitory measure and with the prior concurrence of the State Government, to arrange for carcass utilisation by auction if the Bye laws permit such auction.
It is only where, for any compelling reason, the said policy decision cannot be implemented effectively in any area, that the concerned Zila Parishad could, with the prior sanction of the State Government, continue the present contract system subject to such variation as may be necessary till the cooperative societies are formed.
[545C D1] |
summarize the case details and judgement | ecial Leave Petition (C) No. 5628 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.1.1988 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 9 18 of 1987.
P.P. Rao and Shakeel Ahmed for the Petitioner.
S.C. Maheshwari, P.K. Chakravarti, Ms. Sandhya Goswami and V.K. Bhardwaj for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered We have heard this case arising out of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973.
We feel that this case is fully covered by the decision of Hon 'ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji & Hon 'ble Mr. Justice Ranganathan in Atma Ram Mittal vs Ishwar Singh Punia, 122 ; We respectfully agree with the princi ple enunciated in that decision.
The special leave petition is dismissed.
Learned counsel for the respondent Mr. S.C. Maheshwari states that the decree will not be executed till 30th April, 1990 subject to an undertaking on usual terms being filed in this Court within four weeks from today.
If the undertaking is not filed, the decree shall become executable forthwith.
G.N. Petition dis missed. | Applying the principle enunciated in Atma Ram Mittal vs Ishwar Singh Punia; , , this Court dismissed the special leave petition, and, HELD: 1.1 The exemption would apply for a period of ten years and will continue to be available until suit is dis posed of or adjudicated.
[121H] 1.2 If the petitioner fails to file an undertaking on usual terms, the decree shall become executable forthwith.
[122B] |
summarize the case details and judgement | r Petition (Civil) No. 344 of 1983.
Under article 139A of the Constitution of India for transfer of Writ Petition No. 475 of 1983 pending before the Rajasthan High Court.
D. Bhandari for the Petitioner (Not Present) B. D. Sharma for the Respondent.
The Order of the court was delivered by 200 CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
This petition is totally bereft of any statement of facts.
It has been drafted and filed in a most casual and careless manner.
All that is stated in the petition is that the Writ Petition pending in the Rajasthan High Court raises exactly the same questions as those raised in SLP (Civil) No. 7561/83 pending in this Court and the writ petition may, therefore, be transferred to this Court.
Nothing else is mentioned.
No facts relating to either case are mentioned.
Even the alleged common questions are not stated.
We can only say that it is most discourteous and disrespectful to the highest court in the country to file such indifferent petitions.
The advocate is not discharging his duty either to the court or to the client.
Transfer petition is dismissed.
H.S.K. Petition dismissed. | A petition for withdrawing a writ petition pending in the High Court to the Supreme Court under Article 139A (1) of the Constitution mentioned nothing else except that the writ petition pending in the High Court raised exactly the same questions as those raised in a special leave petition pending in the Supreme Court.
What the questions were and what the facts of the cases were was not disclosed.
Dismissing the petition, ^ HELD: It is most discourteous and disrespectful to the highest court in the country to file such indifferent petitions.
The advocate; is not discharging his duty either to the court or to the client.
[200 C] |
summarize the case details and judgement | Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11638 of 1986 From the Judgment and Order dated 12th September, 1986 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. No. 2845 of 1986.
B.K. Rawat, M.K. Dua, Aman Vachher and S.K. Mehta for the Petitioners.
1003 The following Order of Court was delivered ORDER Since this petition is filed against an interim order we do not propose to interfere with the order of the High Court.
The Petition is dismissed.
We, however, deprecate the practice of granting of temperory permits repeatedly to ply stage carriages for short periods even when it is made out that there is a grave need for increasing the number of regular services on the routes in question in public interest.
In many cases this practice has led to undesirable results.
In all such cases the proper action to be taken by the Regional Transport Authorities is to grant regular permits in accordance with law either by inviting applications for grant of permits or on the applications made by intending operators suo motu under section 57(2) of the .
We hope that the Regional Transport Authorities will take necessary steps in accordance with law in respect of all the routes to alleviate the suffering of the travelling public.
M.L.A. Petition dismissed. | In a petition for special leave against an interim order of the High Court, ^ HELD: (1) As the special leave petition is filed against an interim order of the High Court, this Court does not propose to interfere.
[1003B] (2.1) The practice of granting of temporary permits repeatedly to ply stage carriages for short periods even when it is made out that there is a grave need for increasing the number of regular services on the routes in question in the public interest is deprecated.
In many cases this practice has led to undesirable results.
[1003B C] (2.2) The proper action to be taken by the Regional Transport Authorities in such cases is to grant regular permits in accordance with law either by inviting applications for grant of permits or on the applications made by intending operators suo motu under section 57(2) of the .
[1003C D] |
summarize the case details and judgement | : Criminal Appeal Nos.
563 64 of 1986 From the Judgment and Order dated 30.9.85 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl.
M. (M) Nos.
1105 & 1106 of 1985.
M.R. Sharma and Dalveer Bhandari for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the court was delivered by MISRA, J.
Special leave granted.
We have carefully considered the various aspects of the case and we are of the view that having regard to the nature of the dispute and the fact that the offences, if any, are alleged to have been committed more than six years ago and the appellant was merely a trader at the 174 lowest rung of the hierarchy in the Foreign Exchange Divi sion of the Bank and not a highly placed officer and the trial is bound to occupy the time of the court of first instance for not less that two or three years in view of the complicated nature of the case and even then, it is extreme ly doubtful whether it will at all result in conviction, no useful purpose will be served by allowing the prosecutions to continue.
Hence, we allow the appeals and quash the charges against the appellant.
We may, however, make it clear that if the Bank has any legitimate claim against the appellant, it will be open to the Bank to pursue any civil remedies which may be available to it.
M.L.A. Appeals al lowed. | HELD: 1.
The fact that the offences, if any, are alleged to have been committed more than six years ago and the appellant was merely a trader at the lowest rung of the hierarchy in the Foreign Exchange Division of the Bank and not a highly placed officer and the trial is bound to occupy the time of the ' court of tint instance for not less than two or three years in view of the complicated nature of the case and even then, it is extremely doubtful whether it will at all result in conviction no useful purpose will he served by allowing the prosecutions to continue.
[H 174A] However, if the Bank has any legitimate claim against the appellant, it will he open to the Bank to pursue any civil remedies which may be available to it.
[174B] |
summarize the case details and judgement | : Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2088 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25 7 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1189/79.
N. Ali Khan and A. D. Mathur for the Petitioner The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.
Counsel for the petitioner states that the sentence imposed upon his client for the offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act must be reduced because the adulterant, namely, prohibited coal tar dye, is, in his submission, non injurious or an innocent mix.
Therefore, the imprisonment part of the sentence, it was urged, should be eliminated.
It is true that the High Court has observed that the "colour which was mixed with powdered chillies" is not mentioned in the Public Analyst 's report to be injurious to human life.
It does not follow that because it is not specifically mentioned to be injurious, it is non injurious.
Absence of evidence is not equal to evidence of absence.
For ought we know, the prohibition under the Act and the Rules has been imposed because it is harmful to human health.
It is true that the High Court has, under a mis conception, reduced the sentence, but we cannot be pressurised further into following the wrong path.
The special leave petition is dismissed.
V.D.K. Petition dismissed. | HELD: The prohibition under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules has been imposed because it is harmful to human health.
[312 G] Absence of evidence is not equal to evidence of absence.
Non mention in the Public Analyst 's report that the "colour which was mixed with powdered Chillies" was injurious to human life does not amount to the adulterant being non injurious.
When the High Court under this misconception has already reduced the sentence, this Court cannot under article 136 of the Constitution be pressurised further to follow the wrong path.
[312 F H] |
summarize the case details and judgement | tition (C) Nos.
13748 84 of 1984.
With Writ Petition (c) Nos.
1580626 of 1984.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. ) 48 N.N. Keshwani and R.N. Keshwani for the Petitioners.
O.P. Sharma, Girish Chandra, C.V. Subba Rao and Miss section Relan for the Respondents.
The following Order of Court was delivered: It is not disputed that the Air conditioned Coach In chargesAttendants are being paid overtime allowances for extra duty hours exceeding 96 hours in two weeks in the Western Railway, Central Railway and Eastern Railway.
There is no justification for denying overtime allowances on the same basis to the Air conditioned Coach Incharges Attendants in the Northern Railway.
We accordingly direct the Union of India and the Railway Administration to pay with effect from July 1, 1984 the overtime allowance to the Air conditioned Coach Incharges Attendants working in the Northern Railway on the same basis on which the Air conditioned Coach In charges Attendants in the other three Railways, referred to above, are paid.
All arrears of such allowances upto date shall be paid as early as possible and in any event not later than four months from today.
The benefit of this order shall be extended to all such employees including those who have retired and those who have not joined as petitioners herein.
The Writ Petitions are allowed.
No costs.
P.S.S. Petitions allowed. | The petitioners, Air Conditioned Coach Incharges At tendants in Northern Railway, contended in their writ peti tions that their counterparts in Western, Central and East ern Railways were being paid overtime allowance for extra duty hours exceeding 96 hours in two weeks, and sought a direction to the Union of India and Railway Administration to pay them the same allowance.
Allowing the writ petition, the Court, HELD: There was no justification for denying over time allowance to the petitioners working in the Northern Railway.
The Union of India and the Railway Administration to pay with effect from June 1, 1984 overtime allowance to the petitioners on the same basis on which their counter parts in the other three Railways are paid.
[48B C] The benefit of the order to be extended to all such employees including those who have retired and those who have not joined as petitioners.
[48D] All arrears of such allowances up to date to be paid within four months. |
summarize the case details and judgement | Civil Appeal No. 2291 of 1980.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 21st November, 1978 of the Kerala High Court in TRC No. 31 of 1978.
P.K. Pillai for the Appellant.
C. Agarwala for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
This appeal is filed against the judgment dated November 21, 1978 of the High Court of Kerala in The Jay Engineering Works Ltd. vs State of Kerala(1).
In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam vs M/s. Motor Industries Co., Ernakulam(2), we 362 have held that any claim for deduction in respect of goods returned by the purchasers under Rule 9 (b) (i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963 should be made in the assessment proceedings relating to the year in which the said goods were sold and not in the assessment proceedings relating to the assessment year in which they were actually returned.
following the above decision we set aside the judgment of the High Court in this case and direct that the assessment order for the year 1972 73 shall be accordingly modified.
As a consequence of this order, the Department is directed to modify the assessment order for the assessment year 1971 72 by allowing deduction under Rule 9 (b) (i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963 and to make refund of any excess tax paid during that year.
The appeal is accordingly allowed.
No costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed. | Allowing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD: Any claim for deduction in respect of goods returned by the purchasers under Rule 9(b) (i) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963 should be made in the assessment proceedings relating to the year in which the said goods were sold and not in the assessing proceedings relating to the assessment year in which they were returned.
[362 A B] Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam vs Messers Motor Industries Co., Ernakulam, ; followed. |
summarize the case details and judgement | : Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1481 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd January, 1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl.
Appeal No. 45 of 1983.
Harbans Lal and Balmokand Goyal for the Petitioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.
We are not inclined to grant special leave, but we make this short speaking order in order to keep the record straight that the dismissal of the special leave petition does not tentamount to affirmance of the order of the learned Judge of the High Court who for reasons utterly untenable interfered with teh 215 sentence imposed by the trial court and reduced it to sentence already undergone which in the facts and circumstances of the case was wholly impermissible.
In Meet Singh vs State of Punjab,(1) this Court pointed out that Sec.
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act prescribes a minimum sentence and discretion is conferred on the court to give less than the minimum for any special reasons to be recorded in writing.
This Court examined what constitute special reasons for the purpose of Sec.
5(2) and pointed out that the reasons which weighed with the learned Judge in reducing the sentence to the sentence undergone could not be special reasons.
Therefore, in our view, the learned Judge was entirely in error in showing a misplaced sympathy unsustainable in law.
With these observations we reject the special leave petition.
N.V.K. Petition dismissed. | Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 prescribes a minimum sentence and discretion is conferred on the Court to give less than the minimum for any 'special reasons ' to be recorded in writing.
[109B] What constitute 'special reasons ' for the purpose of Section 5 (2) was laid down in Meet Singh vs State of Punjab, ; [109B] In the instant case, the High Court for reasons utterly untenable interfered with the sentence imposed by the trial court and reduced it to the sentence already undergone.
It erred in showing a misplaced sympathy unsustainable in law.
[214H; 215A] ^ |
summarize the case details and judgement | Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1970.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 25 3 1969 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 1195 of 1970.
U.R. Lalit, P.H. Parekh and Miss Manik Tarkunde for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL J.
A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Rangam to the effect that the certificate granted by the court under sub clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution of India, as it then stood, does not conform to legal requirements in as much as (a) it does not specify the substantial question of law which the High Court states require determination; and (b) no reasons in support of the issuance of the certificate appear therein.
949 The preliminary objection is well founded in view of the decisions of this Court in Sohan Lal Naraindas vs Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit and in Sardar Bahadur section Indra Singh Trust vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal.
Faced with this situation Mr. Lalit wanted us to treat the appeal as one by special leave and prayed that such leave be granted now after condoning the delay.
That would have been certainly a reasonable course to follow if it was made out that a substantial question of law really requires determination.
We have gone through the impugned judgment and find that no such question is involved at all.
We, therefore, refuse special leave, revoke the certificate granted by the High Court and dismiss the appeal but with no order as to costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed. | If the certificate granted by the Court under sub clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution, as it then stood, did not conform to legal requirements in as much as it did not specify the substantial question of law which, according to High Court, required determination and no reasons in respect of issuance of the certificate appeared therein, the certificate could be revoked.
[948 H] Sohan Lal Naraindas vs Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit ; Sardar Bahadur section Indra Singh Trust vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal ; followed.
In such a situation if it could be made out that a substantial question of law really required determination, this Court could treat the appeal as one by special leave after condoning the delay.
In the instant case no such question is involved at all and, therefore, special leave cannot be granted.
[949 B C] |
summarize the case details and judgement | Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.
1731 and 927 of 1978.
From the Judgment and order dated 3 11 76 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in W.P. 116 of 1971 and from the Judgment and order dated 5 8 77 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Revision Application No. 29/77 respectively.
R. K. Garg, Madan Mohan and V. J. Francis for the Petitioner.
The order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.
For around 50 years, a man and a woman, as the facts in this case unfold, lived as husband and wife.
An adventurist challenge to the factum of marriage between the two, by the petitioner in this special leave petition, has been negatived by the High Court.
A strong presumption arises in favour of wed lock where the partners have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife.
Although the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin.
Law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy.
In this view, the contention of Shri Garg, for the petitioner, that long after the alleged marriage, evidence has not been produced to sustain its ceremonial process by examining the priest or other witnesses, deserves no consideration.
If man and woman who live as husband and wife in society are compelled to prove, half a century later, by eye witness evidence that they were validly married, few will succeed.
The contention deserves to be negatived and we do so without hesitation.
The special leave petitions are dismissed.
S.R. Petitions dismissed. | Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court ^ HELD: If man and woman who live as husband and wife in society are compelled to prove, after half a century of wedlock by eye witness evidence that they were validly married fifty years earlier, few will succeed.
` A strong presumption arises in favour of wed lock where the partners have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife.
Although the presumption IS rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seeks to deprive the relationship of its legal origin.
Law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy.
[1 F H] |
summarize the case details and judgement | N: Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.1986 of the Rajasthan High Court in Crl.
M.B.A. No. 1395/86 Gopal Subramaniam, A.M. Garg and R. Venkataramani for the Petitioner.
Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondents.
980 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J.
The widespread belief that dowry deaths are even now treated with some casualness at all levels seems to be well grounded.
The High Court has granted anticipatory bail in such a matter.
We are of the opinion that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction to release the accused on anticipatory bail in disregard of the magni tude and seriousness of the matter.
The matter regarding the unnatural death of the daughter in law at the house of her father in law was still under investigation and the appro priate course to adopt was to allow the concerned Magistrate to deal with the same on the basis of the material before the Court at the point of time of their arrest in case they were arrested.
It was neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail which order was very likely to occasion prejudice by its very nature and timing.
We therefore consider it essential to sound a seri ous note of caution for future.
The High Court is under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction to grant anticipato ry bail in a matter of this nature.
So far as the present matter is concerned, since it has become infructuous, we do not propose to pass any order.
Subject to these observa tions, the appeal is dismissed.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed. | While the matter regarding the unnatural death of the daughter in law at the house of her father in law was still under investigation the High Court grunted anticipatory bail to the accused in disregard of the magnitude and seriousness of the matter.
Subsequent to the filing of the appeal by special leave by the father of the deceased the investigation had been concluded by the police and challan filed, and the accused were released on bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
Dismissing the appeal as infructuous, the Court, HELD: The High Court was under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail in a matter of this nature.
[980D] The appropriate course to adopt was to allow the con cerned Magistrate to deal with the case on the basis of the material before him at the point of time of accused 's arrest in case they were arrested.
It was, therefore, neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted antic ipatory bail which order was very likely to occasion preju dice by its very nature and timing.
[980B D] |
summarize the case details and judgement | eview Petition Nos.
597 to 60 1 of 1987.
IN C.A. Nos, 3195/79, 4731 32/84, SLP No. 10108/80 and C.A.No. 793/84.
818 WITH C.A. Nos. 1313 & 388/81, SLPNo.
36/80, W.P. No. 192/77, SLP No. 404 1/81 and C.A. No. 2269/80.
A.K. Ganguli, K. Swamy and P. Parmeshwaran for the Petitioners.
F.S. Nariman, Anil B. Diwan, R.K. Lukose, K.R. Nambir, A.N. Haksar, D.N. Mishra and P.K. Ram for the Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties briefly, we are satisfied that the judgment and order dated 20 December, 1986 of which review is sought, should be recalled and the cases be heard again on the merits.
It appears to us prima facie that in respect of certain items an inconsistency is present in the impugned judgment when regard is had to the law laid down by this Court in Union of India vs Bombay Tyres International Ltd., ; Inasmuch as the cases are being re opened, we refrain from expressing any opinion at this stage on the merits of the points raised in the cases.
Objection was taken by the respondent manufacturers to the Review Petitions on the ground that the finality of the judgment should be maintained and should not be disturbed lightly.
In our opinion, the points raised by the petitioners are of substantial public importance, and therefore call for recon sideration.
Accordingly, we allow the Review Petitions, and recall the judgment and order dated 20 December, 1986 and restore the cases to their original number and direct that they be listed again for fresh consideration.
There is no order as to costs.
N.P. V Petitions allowed. | The petitioners revenue filed petitions for review of the judgment and order dated December 20, 1986 passed by this Court.
The respondent manufacturers objected to the same on the ground that finality of the judgment should be maintained and not disturbed lightly.
Allowing the Review petitions, this Court, HELD: Prima facie an inconsistency is present in the judgment in respect of certain items when regard is had to the law laid down by this Court in Union of India vs Bombay Tyres International Limited, ; Besides, the points raised by the petitioners are of substantial public importance and call for reconsideration [818D] Accordingly, the judgment and order dated December 20, 1986 are recalled and the cases directed to be listed again for fresh consideration.
[818D] Union of India vs Bombay Tyres International Limited, ; relied on. |
summarize the case details and judgement | Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2391 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.86 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 439/82.
S.B. Bhasme and A.S. Bhasme for the Petitioners.
A.K. Gupta for the Respondents.
The Judgment.
of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
The High Court of Bombay dismissed PG NO 641 PG NO 642 the challenge to the award in question.
The award is an unreasoned one.
The transactions between the parties started some time in 1974.
The petitioners participated in the reference in 1979, without demur.
In 1981, the award was made.
No objection was taken at that time that the award was bad being an unreasoned one.
The matter is pending for a long time.
It is not desirable, in the interest of justice, to keep this matter pending because some cases are pending here on the question of the validity of unreasoned award per se.
The parties participated in the arbitration.
There is no allegation of any violation of principles of natural justice.
One of the contentions in support of this application was that relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
The High Court has pointed out on reading the award that it does not indicate that all relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
On the facts of this case, from the records and on the face of the award there is no mistake of law apparent on the face of the award or gross mistake of facts resulting in the miscarriage of justice or of equity.
In the premises it would be unjust under Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere or keep the finding at bay.
The Special Leave Petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed.
P.S.S. Petition dismissed. | The petitioners participated in the arbitration without demur.
When the award was made in 1981 no objection was taken by them that it was bad being unreasoned one.
The High Court dismissed the challenge to the award.
In the special leave petition it was contended for them that relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
Dismissing the special leave petition, HELD: The High Court has pointed out that the award does not indicate that all relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
The parties participated in the arbitration.
There is no allegation of any violation of principles of natural justice.
There is no mistake of law apparent on the face of the award or gross mistake of facts resulting in miscarriage of justice or of equity.
It would, therefore, be unjust under article 136 of the Constitution to interfere or keep the finding at bay.
[642C D] |
summarize the case details and judgement | ition (Crl.) No. 2989 of 1983.
(Under article 32 of the Constitution) R.L. Panjwani, Manoj Saxena and R.D. Upadhaya for the petitioners.
The Order of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C.J, The question raised in this petition is whether the Government can ask the police not to enter a place of worship, even if criminals are reported to be hiding or harboured therein.
It is impossible and undesirable for any Court to issue a general writ of Mandamus to the effect that whenever a criminal is suspected to have taken shelter in a place of worship, the police must enter that place, regardless of the overall situation of law and order.
Speaking generally, Courts cannot enforce law and order by issuing general directions without reference to specific instances.
The Government has to assess, in the context of the prevailing conditions, the impact of the steps taken to enforce law and order.
And, it is the executive which has to take a policy decision as regards the steps to be taken in a given situation, after 903 taking into account the demands of the prevailing situation.
We do not commend or suggest that the police should be silent spectators to wanton destruction of life but we cannot, as men of some little experience of law and life, commend that the police must enter places of worship forcibly.
While enforcing law and order, the executive cannot be oblivious of the possibility that while solving one problem of law and order, others more acute than the one sought to be solved may arise.
That is always a valid and relevant consideration.
With these observations, we dismiss this petition filed by two public spirited organisations through their courageous convenor and secretary respectively.
M.L.C. Petition dismissed. | HELD: It is the executive which has to take a policy decision as regards the steps to be taken in a given situation, after taking into account the demands of the prevailing situation.
It is not that the police should be silent spectators to wanton destruction of life; but the Court cannot commend that the police must enter places of worship forcibly.
[902 H; 903 A] |
summarize the case details and judgement | : Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1620 of 1980.
From the Judgment and order dated 13 11 1979 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No 1310 of 1979.
Pramod Swarup for the Petitioner.
M. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.
The order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER J. We were not happy at the disposal by the High Court of a case under section 302 I.P.C. without a speaking order.
After all in so serious a crime as murder, where so severe a sentence as life imprisonment has been inflicted by the trial court and the appeal is as of right, the High Court must indicate in a reasoned judgment that it has applied its mind to the material questions of fact and law.
A judgment may be brief but not a blank, especially in a situation such as this.
For this reason we should have straightaway set aside the judgment of the High Court and sent it back for fresh hearing, but under Article 136 where justice is the paramount consideration we wanted to reduce the delay in the proceedings since there is a sentence of life imprisonment on the petitioner so we directed that the original record be sent for so that counsel on both sides may 1195 have the opportunity to peruse the entire case records and make submissions to us as if we were hearing the appeal in the regular course.
Counsel have had that facility and have made submissions after perusal of the materials.
After a brief hearing counsel for the petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the trial court 's judgment was vitiated by any flaw in appreciation of evidence or assessment of probabilities.
We, therefore, dismiss the Special Leave Petition after satisfying ourselves that natural justice has had its full play.
Dismissed.
P.B.R. Petition dismissed. | In so serious a crime as murder where so severe a sentence as life imprisonment has been inflicted by the trial court and the appeal is as of right, the High Court must indicate in a reasoned judgment that it has applied its mind to the material questions of fact and law.
A judgment may be brief but not a blank especially in a situation such as this.
[1194 F G] |
summarize the case details and judgement | Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2391 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.86 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 439/82.
S.B. Bhasme and A.S. Bhasme for the Petitioners.
A.K. Gupta for the Respondents.
The Judgment.
of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
The High Court of Bombay dismissed PG NO 641 PG NO 642 the challenge to the award in question.
The award is an unreasoned one.
The transactions between the parties started some time in 1974.
The petitioners participated in the reference in 1979, without demur.
In 1981, the award was made.
No objection was taken at that time that the award was bad being an unreasoned one.
The matter is pending for a long time.
It is not desirable, in the interest of justice, to keep this matter pending because some cases are pending here on the question of the validity of unreasoned award per se.
The parties participated in the arbitration.
There is no allegation of any violation of principles of natural justice.
One of the contentions in support of this application was that relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
The High Court has pointed out on reading the award that it does not indicate that all relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
On the facts of this case, from the records and on the face of the award there is no mistake of law apparent on the face of the award or gross mistake of facts resulting in the miscarriage of justice or of equity.
In the premises it would be unjust under Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere or keep the finding at bay.
The Special Leave Petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed.
P.S.S. Petition dismissed. | The petitioners participated in the arbitration without demur.
When the award was made in 1981 no objection was taken by them that it was bad being unreasoned one.
The High Court dismissed the challenge to the award.
In the special leave petition it was contended for them that relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
Dismissing the special leave petition, HELD: The High Court has pointed out that the award does not indicate that all relevant documents had not been taken into consideration.
The parties participated in the arbitration.
There is no allegation of any violation of principles of natural justice.
There is no mistake of law apparent on the face of the award or gross mistake of facts resulting in miscarriage of justice or of equity.
It would, therefore, be unjust under article 136 of the Constitution to interfere or keep the finding at bay.
[642C D] |
null | ition (Crl.) No. 2989 of 1983.
(Under article 32 of the Constitution) R.L. Panjwani, Manoj Saxena and R.D. Upadhaya for the petitioners.
The Order of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C.J, The question raised in this petition is whether the Government can ask the police not to enter a place of worship, even if criminals are reported to be hiding or harboured therein.
It is impossible and undesirable for any Court to issue a general writ of Mandamus to the effect that whenever a criminal is suspected to have taken shelter in a place of worship, the police must enter that place, regardless of the overall situation of law and order.
Speaking generally, Courts cannot enforce law and order by issuing general directions without reference to specific instances.
The Government has to assess, in the context of the prevailing conditions, the impact of the steps taken to enforce law and order.
And, it is the executive which has to take a policy decision as regards the steps to be taken in a given situation, after 903 taking into account the demands of the prevailing situation.
We do not commend or suggest that the police should be silent spectators to wanton destruction of life but we cannot, as men of some little experience of law and life, commend that the police must enter places of worship forcibly.
While enforcing law and order, the executive cannot be oblivious of the possibility that while solving one problem of law and order, others more acute than the one sought to be solved may arise.
That is always a valid and relevant consideration.
With these observations, we dismiss this petition filed by two public spirited organisations through their courageous convenor and secretary respectively.
M.L.C. Petition dismissed. | HELD: It is the executive which has to take a policy decision as regards the steps to be taken in a given situation, after taking into account the demands of the prevailing situation.
It is not that the police should be silent spectators to wanton destruction of life; but the Court cannot commend that the police must enter places of worship forcibly.
[902 H; 903 A] |