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On the other hand, to minimize interaction with one's ex-spouse, should a wife have lent money to her ex-husband, she should appoint an agent to demand its return. 22 SA and Rema, SA EH 119:8. Similarly, an ex-husband may support his ex-wife on the condition that he refrains from interaction with her and that he appoints an agent to implement support measures. 23 Rema, SA EH 119:8.

Consequently, it is unsurprising that there will be instances when the value of the ketubah will be paid to the wife after the get has been executed. As we know, accompanying a decision to obligate a get there is a judgment to obligate the husband to pay the value of the ketubah . 24 Teshuvot ha-Rashba 1:1192; Hiddushei ha-Ritva, Ketuvot 76a; Teshuvot ha-Rivash 127; Teshuvot Tashbetz 1:1; Rema SA EH 154:21; Teshuvot Maharalbah 33; Teshuvot Maharit 1:113; Teshuvot Maharbil 3:102; Bi'ur ha-Gra SA EH 154:69; Teshuvot Beit Meir 39. Though numerous legists argue that the value of the ketubah ought to be paid prior to executing the get , 25 Teshuvot ha-Rashba 1:1192, 1254; Teshuvot Tashbetz 1:1, 3:227; Rema, SA EH 154:21; Beit Shmuel SA EH 100:24, 119:6; Helkat Mehokeik SA EH 119:5; Pri Hadash SA EH 119:6; Teshuvot Yismah Lev EH 25 in the name of 26 authorities; Hazon Ish EH 69:13. there are decisors who allow the ketubah to remain a debt which can be paid by the husband after the get is executed. 26 Teshuvot ha-Rosh 42:1; Beit Yosef, Bedek ha-Bayit, Tur EH 119; Rema SA EH 119:6. Others argue that if the husband is giving the get voluntarily then the value of the ketubah must be paid prior to the divorce. However, if the beit din is obligating him to give a get then the value of the ketubah may be paid after the execution of the get . 27 Teshuvot ha-Tashbetz 4, Hut ha-Meshullash 1:4; Yad Aharon , ha-Gahot Beit Yosef 4; Helkat Mehokeik SA EH 119:5; Get Pashut 119:18; Pri Hadash, EH 119:6(8); Arukh ha-Shulhan EH 119:11–13; Teshuvot Yabia Omer 5, EH 1. Cf . Beit Shmuel SA EH 119:6. Finally, in a situation of a second marriage of spouses who despise each other, when there are no prospects for marital reconciliation and each one wants to be divorced, one may rely upon those authorities who argue that divorce ought to occur immediately and the value of the ketubah may be paid after the couple is halakhically divorced. 28 Beit Shmuel SA EH 119:6; Teshuvot ha-Ridvaz 3:566; Torot Emet 119:6; Teshuvot Lev Meivin EH 116; Teshuvot va-Yomeir Yitzhak EH 179. In sum, under certain circumstances a husband may pay the value of the ketubah after the execution of the get .

In contemporary times, a cursory review of some of the rabbinical court judgments handed down by the courts under the Israeli Chief Rabbinate will show that in fact divorce judgments are rendered without being contingent upon a prior resolution of the outstanding financial issues and parenting arrangements of the divorcing couples. Regardless of whether the claims are being dealt with in beit din or in civil court, the beit din issued decisions which recommend, obligate or coerce the giving of the get . 29 Collection of the Rabbinical Court Decisions of the Chief Rabbinate in Israel, ed. Z. Warhaftig, 97; PDR 1:129, 4:68, 9:94; File no. 61/82, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, 18 Sivan 5762 (unpublished decision); File no. 1-21-5035, Tel Aviv-Yaffo Regional Beit Din, January 21, 2005; File no. 1-21043387083, Tiberias Regional Beit Din, 28 Iyar 5764 (unpublished decision); File no. 1-21-022290027, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, 12 Ellul 5764 (unpublished decision); File no. 47126/9, Ashkelon Regional Beit Din, June 18, 2012; File no. 289160/5, Netanya Regional Beit Din, September 19, 2012; File no. 901912/1, Haifa Regional Beit Din, May 7, 2013; File no. 927170/1, Tel Aviv-Yaffo Regional Beit Din, July 11, 2014; File no. 965579/2, Netanya Regional Beit Din, July 23, 2015; File no. 514847/9, Haifa Regional Beit Din, December 28, 2015; File no. 1097040/10, Haifa Regional Beit Din, November 6, 2017; File no. 8293/5, Ashdod Regional Beit Din, February 18, 2018; File no. 1103694/2, Yerushalayim Regional Beit Din, January 6, 2019; File no. 905329/1, supra n. 10; File no. 220814/10, Petah Tikva Regional Beit Din, March 27, 2019; File no. 1201519/5, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, April 7, 2019; File no. 1150841/6. Haifa Regional Beit Din, July 3, 2019. For additional Israeli rabbinic court rulings, see this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 3, 61, n. 19. For understanding these different types of divorce judgments, see infra n. 36. In fact, on January 26, 2020, I was invited to listen to five divorce cases at the Yerushalayim Regional Beit Din. In the midst of one of the cases where the parties were exchanging arguments regarding an end of a marriage issue, the beit din allotted time to execute the get procedure ( seder haget ) for this couple. By the end of the session, the discussion of the end of marriage matter by the parties was finished and the get had been given to the wife.

Rather than advising divorcing couples that the arrangement of the get may await the resolution of all their monetary issues either in a beit din or in civil court ( halakhically sanctioned – heter ar'kaot ) and the issuance of a civil divorce, American rabbinical courts and rabbis ought to follow the approach that once it is clear that there is a halakhic basis to give a get , its execution ought to transpire, and that any financial matters and parenting arrangements will be addressed afterwards. 30 See the addendum. Various contemporary dayanim have aptly noted that parenting arrangements that entail a third party's interest, namely those of a child, and consequently may not serve as a reason to delay the execution of a get which focuses upon claims which directly relate to a divorcing spouse, such as the value of the ketubah and the division of marital assets. See S. Landesman, "Can a husband who is obligated to grant a divorce impose conditions?" (Hebrew), 2 Divrei Mishpat 145 , 151–152; S. Daichovsky, "A husband who makes the granting of a divorce contingent on cancellation of his previous obligations," (Hebrew), 26 Tehumin 149, 157 (2005); File no. 029612306-68-1, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, July 17, 2007, ha-Din veha-Dayan , gilyon 19, 4–5; File no. 863382/4, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, unpublished decision, November 9, 2013. For an extensive analysis of the propriety of a conditional divorce in the wake of a beit din obligating a get , see this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 3, 55–81. See also Iggerot Moshe YD 4:15. In recent years, Rabbi Feinstein's posture has been subscribed to by numerous Israeli rabbinical court decisions. For one of the most recent endorsements, see File no. 975408/1, Netanya Regional Beit Din, April 28, 2019.

In effect, the American Orthodox rabbinic network ought to adopt the protocols employed by Israel's Chief Rabbinate rabbinical court which has been described in the following fashion: 31 Rabbi Shimon Ya'acobi , supra n. 12, 160.

The common practice in the rabbinical courts in Israel is that before the giving of a get, the beit din which executes the get (the mesadeir ha-get – AYW) informs the husband that he should know that there is no connection between the financial matters which were resolved and concretized in an agreement which was signed and reviewed by the beit din . . . and the get . And the husband should be aware that if the wife breaches the entire agreement or portions of it, he still is giving the get voluntarily . . . unconditionally and he cannot say (due to the breach – AYW) I have not divorced her . . . Only after he understands and affirms his agreement, the beit din executes the get . The rabbinical courts make every effort to persuade the parties to resolve all the monetary issues and children (parenting arrangements – AYW) prior to the get . However, there are instances where it is impossible (to finalize these matters – AYW). . . . In such cases, the beit din agrees that each party shall retain its right to file a claim, and they warn the husband that he is giving the get unconditionally even if it emerges that he erred. Namely, a claim that he intended to submit against his wife was ultimately rejected in a proceeding which took place after the get, or a claim was advanced by the wife which he thought she would never succeed according to Halakhah (or secular law if the claim is occurring in a civil court – AYW), yet she won the suit. . . . This "etched in stone" (" nehe'retzet " – AYW) determination that all financial matters are to be completed prior to the get is a stringency that may potentially lead to a leniency. . . . Delaying the arrangement of the get by a beit din when the parties are agreeable in order to wait until the monetary claims and children are completed . . . will cause many stumbling-blocks of remaining a married woman (potential of incestuous relationships – AYW) and God forbid the proliferation of bastards. And this is when the beit din is the one that delays the get, while the husband stands and screams that he is willing to give a get unconditionally.

In the aforementioned case of the couple who was separated for eighteen years, 32 See supra chapter 4E. the husband was a secular Jew, who was only willing to give a get conditional upon the withdrawal of the plaintiff's financial claims in the civil court. The fact that he was separated from his wife since 1998 and a civil divorce was executed in 2006 did not propel him to date to give a get to his wife. Since he is irreligious, he had no interest in having the matter of the get adjudicated in a beit din setting. Regretfully, even some divorcing husbands who identify themselves as being members of the Torah-observant Jewish community have equally refused to accede to their wives' requests to address the matter of the get even after a civil divorce has been executed. As such, we need to execute the get prior to resolving the end of marriage issues lest we continue to experience get recalcitrance even after the execution of a civil divorce!

Invoking a Mishnah and a Talmud passage found in Tractate Ketuvot, 33 Ketuvot 108b-109a. post-Talmudic arbiters have endorsed this position, namely that end of marriage issues may be resolved after the giving of a get. As we know, halakhic engagement ( kiddushin ) entails a promise between a Jewish man and a Jewess to contract a marriage. One of the consequences of this engagement is the establishment of a personal status which remains until the death of either spouse or their divorce. As such, should the marriage fail to materialize, a divorce is mandated. 34 SA EH 26:3.

That being said, if one promises money to his son-in-law as a dowry and then he defaulted, the Rabbis argue that he may leave her in the state of engagement until the father-in-law redeems his pledge. However, Admon contends that the groom must marry her without the dowry or divorce her. In other words, according to Admon, the issue of the nonpayment of the dowry has no impact upon the giving of the get . And many authorities endorse Admon's view. 35 MT Ishut 23:16; Tur EH 52; SA EH 52:1; Teshuvot Divrei Ribot 191; Teshuvot Maharashdam EH 64. Cf. Bah, Tur EH 52; Rema, SA EH 52:1. In a different factual context, some arbiters reached the same conclusion. See Teshuvot ha-Rivash 317; Teshuvot Maharik , shoresh 72.

Based upon the foregoing, we have shown that there is a persuasive and strident halakhic tradition of resolving financial issues and parenting arrangements after a get has been given. As such, both the American Orthodox rabbinate as well as the American battei din ought to insist that a husband address the matter of the get even prior to the resolution of end of marriage issues. Following their Israeli counterpart, American rabbinical courts ought to be willing and ready to recommend the giving of a get, issue a judgment of " mitzvah to divorce," or obligate a get unconditionally to a divorcing couple who consent to their jurisdiction and will hopefully heed their rulings. 36 Whereas coercing a get ( kofin le-garesh ) by a beit din may entail imprisonment or flogging, rendering a decision of obligating a get ( hiyuv le-garesh ) involves verbal persuasion such as labeling the get recalcitrant husband as a sinner. See Sefer ha-Yashar, Teshuvot 24; Teshuvot Tashbetz 2:8; Rema SA EH 154:21. Cf. Piskei ha-Rosh Yevamot 6:11 who contends that the consequence of a failure to adhere to a ruling of obligating a get may result in a social ban ( niddui ). Notwithstanding the Rosh's posture, the level of sanctions differs when a beit din obligates a get rather than compels a get . Yet, there is a minority of authorities who argue that rendering a judgment to obligate the giving of a get, similar to coercing a get, runs afoul of the strictures of a coerced get (a get me'useh ). See Hazon Ish EH 99:2; Teshuvot Yabia Omer 2 EH 10; Shlomo Karelitz, Teshuvot Ateret Shlomo 1:32 (6) in the name of Rashba and Rivash; PDR 7:201, 204 (Rabbi Elyashiv in the name of Rosh); File no. 1083672/1, Haifa Regional Beit Din, January 25, 2018. See the addendum. Therefore, in certain instances a beit din may choose to advise the husband to fulfill the divine imperative to give a get or recommend the giving of it rather than obligate a get. In pursuance to the majority of decisors, the consequence of a coerced get is that on a Torah level, the get is null and void. See this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 3, 30, n. 11. Whereas in Israel, the battei din are empowered to coerce a get , in the United States the rabbinical courts are legally authorized to obligate/recommend a get or to counsel that there is a divine commandment to give a get . In contradistinction to the get compulsion and obligating orders, and in the wake of the concern for avoiding the specter of a coerced get , some American rabbinical courts may choose either to recommend a get or direct the husband that there is a divine commandment to give a get rather than obligate a get . See Teshuvot Yabia Omer 2, EH 10; File no. 1083672/1, Haifa Regional Beit Din, January 25, 2018. The divine commandment to give a get has been understood as a directive of rabbinic advice for the husband to give the get . See Rabbeinu Yonah, Shittah Mekubetzet, Ketuvot 64a; Tashbetz, op. cit. To state it differently, whereas, the consequence of failing to comply with the divorce decree of "a religious duty" to give a get labels a husband a sinner with certain ramifications such as his ineligibility to serve as a witness in a beit din , should a husband fail to heed a beit din decree of recommending a divorce he is not following the mandate of Torah scholars rather being classified as a sinner. In other words, whereas the issuance of a get compulsion order and the rendering of a judgment of obligating a get are predicated upon a husband's physical defects such as sterility or behavior that potentially may destroy the family unit such as engaging in illicit affairs, the handing down of a decision to be duty bound to give a get or recommend a divorce is related respectively, to the husband being a sinner or a spouse receiving counsel to heed the words the instruction of a Torah scholar. See Teshuvot Mishpatekha le-Ya'akov 6:4 (12). Alternatively, in a case of an agunah , some rabbinic courts may decide to hand down a judgment directing the husband that there is a divine commandment to be divorced ( mitzvah le-garesh ). See Teshuvot Terumat ha-Deshen, Pesakim u-Ketavim 58; Beit Yosef Tur EH 134 in the name of Tashbetz; Teshuvot Ma'amar Mordekhai 2, EH 11. Cf. Teshuvot ha-Rashbash 411 who contends that the issuance of a beit din directive that under certain conditions there is a commandment to be divorced is employed regarding a wife who is a sinner. Once a beit din obligates a get , the giving of the get must be performed unconditionally . In other words, a husband cannot argue that the giving of a get is contingent upon the resolution of certain end of marriage issues such as dividing marital assets and/or parenting arrangements. The execution of the get must be done immediately. See this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 3, 55–81. On one hand, a divorce judgment of obligating a get precludes a husband from advancing a condition(s) prior to giving a get since such an order is grounded in rabbinic legislation. On the other hand, should a beit din either render a decision that there is a divine commandment to be divorced ( mitzvah le-garesh – see Teshuvot ha-Rashbash 208, 383; Teshuvot Tashbetz, Hut ha-Meshullash , Tur 1, 6; Teshuvot Nofet Tzufim EH 129) or to recommend the giving of a get, such a ruling is not based upon rabbinic legislation. Consequently, a husband may advance a condition(s) prior to giving a get provided that the wife may easily fulfill the condition(s). See Teshuvot ha-Rashba 4:256; Bedek ha-Bayit on Beit Yosef, Tur EH 143 in the name of Rashba; Teshuvot ha-Rashbash 208; Tashbetz, Teshuvot Hut ha-Meshullah 1:6; Teshuvot Nofet Tzufim EH 129; Teshuvot Maharsham 5:60. Nonetheless, upon a beit din issuing a decision that there is a divine imperative to give a get or to recommend a get in order to pre-empt the possibility of the wife becoming an agunah , should the husband continue to refuse to give a get and/or advance preconditions (prior to giving the get ) which are irrational and impossible to fulfill, then the community can be directed to implement isolating measures (known as Harhakot de-Rabbeinu Tam) vis-à-vis the get recalcitrant husband . See written communications dated February 10, 2019 and December 21, 2019 (on file with author) from Rabbi Uriel Lavi, Presiding Dayan of Yerushalayim Regional Beit Din; Rabbi U. Lavi, "The Obligation of divorce in a plea of repulsion or only a duty to divorce," (Hebrew), Kenes ha-Dayanim, 5776, 311; Teshuvot Ateret Devorah 2:80. The foregoing is based upon the application of halakhic logic ( sevara ). As we know, there are lacunae (matters which are left unaddressed) in the Halakhic legal system. Consequently, the system mandates that under certain conditions we may employ halakhic logic in order to resolve these issues. See Bava Batra 130b; Teshuvot ha-Ri Megas 114; Teshuvot ha-Rambam 66; Sefer ha-Yashar, Teshuvot 8; Ramban, Commentary on the Torah, Vayikra 19:2, Devarim 6:18; Teshuvot ha-Rosh 20:27, 55:9, 78:3; Teshuvot ha-Rashba 2:9; Teshuvot Maharil 109; Sedei Hemed ha-Shalem , Kelalim, Ma'arekhet sameakh, 63. For additional decisors who have addressed this matter, see Rabbi E. Shochetman, "On analogy in decision making in Jewish Law and the Foundations of Law Act," (Hebrew) 13 Shenaton Ha-Mishpat Ha-Ivri 307, 315–350 (1988). For the authoritativeness of invoking halakhic logic in decision making in twentieth-century writings, see Rabbi Menahem Kasher, Mefaneah Tzefunot , Yerushalayim 5736, Rabbi E. Berkovits, Not in Heaven: The Nature and Function of Halakha , NY: 1983, chapter 1, and this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 1, 53–57. For a brief discussion of these isolating measures, see this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 3, 291–293. Based upon the foregoing, there are four different levels of divorce enforcement: recommending a get , being duty bound to give a get , obligating a get and coercing a get . On one hand, issuing a divorce judgment without identifying the ground(s) for the divorce ( ilat gerushin ), the divorce is valid. See Gittin 90a; Hiddushei Hatam Sofer, Gittin 90b. On the other hand, pursuant to numerous decisors, a prohibition has been transgressed. See Rashi Gittin 90b, s.v. im she'nuah ; Teshuvot ha-Rashba 1:18; Teshuvot ha-Ran 17; Teshuvot ha-Rivash 127; Teshuvot Rashbash 411; Bah, Tur EH 119; Beit Shmuel SA EH 119:2. Compare others who contend that invoking one of the above mentioned grounds entails a recommendation rather than an infraction of a prohibition. See Bahag, Gittin, Beit ha-Behirah, Gittin 90a; Arukh ha-Shulhan EH 119:5; Teshuvot Maharam Lublin 123. See further, Y. Sharabi, "Marital reconciliation: Intervention in the resolution of marital crises and their avoidance in Halakhah and Law," (Hebrew), Doctoral thesis submitted to Bar Ilan University, Kislev 5773, 207–209.

Should a beit din fail to summon the husband to a hearing regarding the matter of the get , American orthodox rabbis ought to function as arbiters of prohibitions and permissibility (" mo'reih hora'ah "), and rabbinic courts ought to function as arbiters of prohibitions and permissibility, addressing the wife's inquiry as to whether there are grounds to give a get. 37 In other words, one may resolve this question of whether a husband is obligated to give a get to his wife or for that matter voiding a marriage, as these are " halakhot of prohibitions and permissibility" (" issur ve-heter "), in the absence of the husband (i.e. either a husband who was summoned to a hearing but refuses to appear, or one who was not summoned to the hearing) while being in the presence of one individual Jew, one rabbi or three rabbis functioning as arbiters of these halakhot. See Ketzot ha-Hoshen, HM 3:1–2; Netivot ha-Mishpat , HM 3:1; Teshuvot Yehuda (Gordin), EH 51:2; Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, OH 51, EH 2:64; Pithei Teshuvah , SA EH Seder ha-Get 6, 8; PDR 6:265, 269; File 957-61, Beit Din Yerushalayim for Monetary Matters and Yuhasin, vol. 7, 515; File no. 448866/3, Tel-Aviv-Yaffo Regional Beit Din, July 11, 2013; File no. 1086123/1, Be'er Sheva Regional Beit Din, December 20. 2018. Whether the individual Jew must be knowledgeable in Halakhah is subject to controversy. See Yam shel Shlomo , Bava Kama 3:9; Teshuvot Ma'aseh Hiyah , 24; Ketzot ha-Hoshen HM 3:1; File no. 448866/3, op.cit. Should the arbiter determine that there is a ground(s) for the husband to give a get, and if upon notification of that determination to the husband he refuses to give one, the beit din ought to direct the community to religiously, socially and economically isolate him, measures known in rabbinic parlance as " harhakot of Rabbeinu Tam. " 38 Sefer ha-Yashar 24; Teshuvot Maharik , shoresh 133, 166; Rema SA EH 154:21. Whether there is a precondition for a beit din to issue a get compulsion order or a judgment of obligating a get rather than a ruling that there is a commandment to give a get prior to directing the community to isolate a get recalcitrant husband is subject to debate. See File no. 8455-64-1, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, September 17, 2008; File no. 862233/1, Tiberias Regional Beit Din, January 8, 2013. For the authority of a beit din to direct the community to isolate the get recalcitrant husband, see Rema SA EH 154:21; Levush 77:3, 134:4; Seder Eliyahu 13; Teshuvot Yabia Omer EH 7:23. Though this power does not entail excommunication ( niddui), the same empowerment is delegated to a beit din concerning excommunication. See Rema SA YD 334:6. For beit din authorization in other communal matters, see Rema SA HM 15:5, 358:5.

Furthermore, in the event that the beit din renders a judgment that he is obligated to give his wife a get and he refuses to give one, the husband remains obligated to support his wife. 39 Bava Metzia 12b; Teshuvot Maharit 1:113; Teshuvot Re'em 30; SA EH 160:4 ; PDR 7:290, 294, 10:94. On the other hand, some argue that the wife's entitlement to support is contingent upon the fact that a beit din issues a divorce judgment. See PDR 12:257. Even if the wife is earning a salary under these circumstances that a get has not been forthcoming from the husband, according to most authorities, the husband must continue to support her as a penalty for refusing to give her a get . See File no. 833000/12, Netanya Regional Beit Din, July 28, 2014. Cf. Ha'sagot ha-Ra'vad, Ketuvot 63a. As such, a wife may advance a claim for this maintenance in the beit din should her spouse fail to pay her. 40 File no. 819158/3, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, October 5, 2011; File no. 965171/1, Netanya Regional Beit Din, October 28, 2014. In effect, the imposition of this support duty is a means to pressure the husband to give a get , a claim which does not run afoul of the strictures of "a coerced get " (a get me'useh ). 41 We are dealing with "coercion by way of choice" ( kefiyah be-derekh bereirah). In other words, the husband must choose whether to give the get or to pay spousal support. Such a decision is an example of indirect coercion and therefore halakhically does not constitute coercion and consequently under such circumstances the subsequent execution of the get is valid. See Teshuvot ha-Rivash 1227; Teshuvot Tashbetz 1:1; Teshuvot Ranah 1:63; Rema, SA EH 154:21. See further, this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 1, 142–156.

This "etched in stone" ("nehe'retzet" – AYW) determination that all financial matters are to be completed prior to the get is a stringency that may potentially lead to a leniency . . . . Failure to follow such a procedure to address the enforcement of the get in beit din accompanied by mandating support due to get recalcitrance has and only will continue to exacerbate the suffering of women whose delivery of their divorces (gittin) are delayed, to pose "many stumbling-blocks of remaining a married woman (potential of incestuous relationships – AYW) and God forbid the proliferation of bastards" as well as potentially promote a husband's engagement in illicit affairs. 42 See supra n. 12 text accompanying n. 33.

On the other hand, those who invoke all or some of the techniques to void a marriage are well aware that "the conditions of the time" mandate such action. Distinguishing between the period of the Talmud and contemporary times, Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank observes: 43 Teshuvot Har Tzvi EH 2:181. See also Teshuvot Dvar Eliyahu 48; Teshuvot Iggerot Moshe EH 1:79.

During the time of the Talmud there were Jewish arbiters who were empowered to coerce him (a husband to give a get - AYW) and today where we are not authorized to coerce him, we may say that it is a transaction in error.

Moreover, in the wake of the absence to mete out get coercion, the empowerment to void a marriage under certain conditions is not based only upon "a marriage in error" ( kiddushei ta'ut ) but as Rabbi Frank argues is equally upon utilizing "the wife's clear expectation of the marriage" ( umdana de'mukha ). 44 Teshuvot Har Tzvi EH 1:133. See also, Teshuvot Shoeil u-Meishiv , Mahadura Kama, 198.

Finally, the fear "lest that the daughters of Yisrael may succumb to licentiousness" ( shema tetzena benot Yisrael le'tarbut ra'ah ) due to their husband's recalcitrance in giving a get has propelled authorities throughout the ages to find solutions for both the classical agunah whose husband has disappeared as well as the modern day agunah whose husband refuses to give a get. 45 Teshuvot ha-Mabit 1:149, 3:54; Teshuvot ha-Ridvaz 4:1331; Teshuvot Shevut Ya'akov 3:110; Teshuvot Re'em 37; Teshuvot Hayyim ve-Shalom 2:1; Rabbi Sternfeld, Teshuvot Sha'arei Tzion 3:14; Teshuvot Yabia Omer 9, EH 16(8). As recently noted, 46 For a woman's promiscuity, see Yevamot 25a, 65a; Ketuvot 63b; Nedarim 90b–91a; Tosafot, Nedarim 90b; Hiddushei ha-Rashba, Nedarim 90b; Hiddushei ha-Rashba, Gittin 32a; Mordekhai, Kiddushin 542 in the name of Maharam; Teshuvot Yakhin u-Boaz 1:179; Rema SA EH 17:2; Teshuvot Maharbil 3:102; Teshuvot Shevut Ya'akov 1:101; Teshuvot Ezrat Kohen EH 44; Teshuvot Iggerot Moshe EH 1:139, 4:83. Whether later generations are promiscuous compared to earlier generations dating back to the time of the Talmud is subject to debate. See Teshuvot Yabia Omer 4, EH 11. For contemporary studies noting the existence of promiscuity in the American orthodox Jewish community, see S. Grossman, "Resolving the debate over human pappiloma virus vaccination for cancer prevention in the religious world," 51 Tradition 50, 67–68 (2019). Clearly, there are get recalcitrant husbands who identify with the American Orthodox Jewish community who engage in illicit affairs and/or sire a child (children) from the relationship. Whereas, offspring sired by a wife from an illicit affair results in halakhic bastardy, a child sired from a husband from an act of licentiousness does not create a halakhic bastard. As such, halakhic opposition regarding voiding marriages may promote promiscuity among husbands and mamzerut as well as licentiousness amongst wives. a husband or wife engaging in illicit affair(s) is a prevalent phenomenon today in the world of orthodox Jewry. As such, the fear of promiscuity may emerge in a case of get recalcitrance ( igun ). And in the over 155 cases that I have dealt with during the span of over six years, unfortunately licentiousness does exist in all segments of the orthodox Jewish community and has transpired either when the couple is living together and/or when a couple is separated and no get has been forthcoming. Though in the past, this fear has driven arbiters in Israel to coerce a get under such conditions, 47 Teshuvot Yabia Omer 3, EH 18:13, 20:34; Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 4:21, 5:26; File no. 464539/2, Tel Aviv-Yaffo Regional Beit Din, February 18, 2017; File no. 846913/2, Haifa Regional Beit Din, June 12, 2017; File no. 1157365/1, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, July 30, 2019. today in the Diaspora such an option fails to exist and as we mentioned earlier we are instructed by our decisors that under such conditions we may void marriages.

Whereas others who refuse to void a marriage are being lenient regarding the prohibition of halakhic bastardy ( mamzerut ) since a husband's get recalcitrance may and has resulted in the wife engaging in an illicit affair(s) and/or the siring of offspring from this relationship, there are those rabbinic arbitrators ( dayanim ) or arbiters of prohibitions and permissibility (" morei hora'ah ") who are being stringent regarding this prohibition by invoking under certain conditions various techniques to free the wife without a get lest promiscuity and/or halakhic bastardy transpire. 48 For the pitfalls of staking out a position of unnecessary stringent rulings which may result in "the breach of the wall of religious observance", see Taz, SA YD 293:4; Rabbi A. Kook, Teshuvot Orah Mishpat, OH 112. See this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 3, 16–17. The common denominator between those who are endorsing under certain conditions to void a particular marriage and those who reject such an avenue to address the plight of the agunah is the concern to avoid bastardy in order to prevent a future marriage between bastards and individuals of legitimate birth . See Teshuvot Helkat Ya'akov, 2:16; Teshuvot Iggerot Moshe 3 EH 5. Addressing the debate regarding the scope of the prohibition to bake bread with milk, lest the dairy bread might be eaten together with meat, Rabbi Yosef Karo citing Sha'arei Durah states: "Both interpretations are halakhically valid, since both are logically sound" ( Beit Yosef, Tur YD 97). Analogously, despite the fact that the halakhic propriety of voiding a marriage is open to controversy; nevertheless both positions are logically persuasive, namely the concern for avoiding mamzerut .

Page 12, n. 4. What is the difference between voiding a kiddushin ( halakhic betrothal-loosely translated as marriage) and annulling a kiddushin ?

The four scenarios in six discussions in the Talmud Bavli serve as the Talmudic precedents for empowering our rabbis (" kol ha'me'kaadesh adata de'rabbanan me'kadesh ") to annul a kiddushin . 1 Ketuvot 3a, Yevamot 90b and 110a, Gittin 33a and 73a, Bava Batra 48b. One type of annulment addresses a husband who instructed a get ought to be delivered to his wife and either granted it to her contingent upon the fulfillment of a certain condition or forwarded it to her via an agent and subsequently changed his mind and attempted to annul the get . Under such circumstances, Halakhah allows for the retroactive annulment of the kiddushin (" afk'inhu rabbanan le-kiddushin minei ").A second type of annulment transpires after the kiddushin and/or the marriage ( nissuin )where a get was drafted and delivered either to an agent of the wife or to the wife herself but was subsequently invalidated. In both instances, the annulment is contingent upon the wife receiving a get (a get kol de'hu ) even if the giving of it is against the husband's will. 2 Rashi, Ketuvot 3a, s.v. kol hamekadesh ; Rashi, Gittin 33a, s.v. adatei de'rabbanan mekadesh ; Tosafot Ri ha-Lavan, Ketuvot 3a, s.v. kol ha-mekadesh ; Hiddushei ha-Rashba, Ketuvot 3a; Teshuvot ha-Rashba 1:1162; Hiddushei ha-Ramban , Ketuvot 3a; Shitah Mekubetzet, Ketuvot 3a in the name of Ritva; Beit ha-Behirah, Ketuvot 3a; Ri Megas, Beit ha-Behirah , op.cit.; Hiddushei ha-Ra'ah, Ketuvot 3a; Pnei Yehoshua , Ketuvot 3a; Yam shel Shlomo Ketuvot 3:5.

However, the two Talmudic cases recorded in Yevamot 110a and Bava Batra 48b dealing with annulling a kiddushin due to a prospective husband acting inappropriately during the time of the kiddushin does not require the giving of a get . Lest one argue that we are empowered to annul a marriage without a get based upon the above Talmudic precedent in other situations such as the modern-day agunah where a husband refuses to give a get , our authorities rule that annulment is limited to the cases memorialized in the Talmud. 3 Hiddushei ha-Rashba, Ketuvot 3a, s.v. kol de'mekadesh;Teshuvot ha-Rashba 1:1185; Teshuvot ha-Radakh, page 19,s.v. ve'ain lomar ; Teshuvot Hakham Tzvi 124; Teshuvot Zekhor Simha 177; Teshuvot Melamed le-Hoeil 3:22.

On the other hand, there are various techniques recognized under certain conditions by our authorities for voiding a kiddushin . For example, if a husband intentionally or unintentionally fails to disclose to his prospective wife before the marriage a major defect( mum gadol ) such as being mentally dysfunctional, gay, a criminal, impotent, or sterile. In other words, it is "a marriage in error" ( kiddushei ta'ut ) and if the marriage is voided the wife is free to remarry without a get . In sum, whereas invoking marital annulment mandates the giving of a get , voiding a marriage has no such requirement. Whereas, marital annulment is premised upon a bona fide halakhic kiddushin , voiding a kiddushin is predicated upon the conclusion that there never was a halakhic kiddushin . 4 As we have noted elsewhere, there are authorities who utilize the term of annulling a marriage when in actuality the marriage is being voided. As such, in their minds there is one type of annulment which nullifies a priori the act of kiddushin and there is a second type of annulment which is predicated upon the notion that the kiddushin actually was established and ex post facto arbiters are empowered to annul it. See Rabbi S. Cohen, " Get Coercion in Contemporary Times," (Hebrew) 11 Tehumin 195, 199 (5750).

Page 13, n. 4. On the one hand argues Rabbi Avraham Sherman that given that the Torah scholars of the Jewish community are capable of identifying who are "the Torah giants of their generation" therefore we are dutibound to comply with their rulings in particular in the realm of marriage, divorce and conversion. 5 See Rabbi A. Sherman, "The authority of the scholars of the generation in matters of personal status and conversions," (Hebrew) 30 Tehumin 163 (2070). See also Rabbi A. Sherman, "The authority of the scholars of the generation in matters of personal status and conversions," (Hebrew) 30 Tehumin 163 (2070); Teshuvot Ein Yitzhak , Introduction by Rabbi Y. Abramski, Machon Yerushalayim ed.

Consequently, as we noted some contemporary authorities rely upon this position to invoke the argument that voiding a marriage is within the jurisdiction of Torah giants of the generation only.

However, as we have observed, there is well-grounded tradition ( mesorah ) that opine that voiding a marriage resides in the hands of credentialed halakhic decisors. 6 See also, Rambam, Introduction to Mishneh Torah , Mishneh Torah, Mamrim 2:1; Tur HM 25; Rabbi Refael Shlomo Daichovsky, Lev Shomeia le-Shlomo 2:37

Similarly, Rabbi Dovid Babad, a renowned 19th century authority communicates to us the following tradition that he received:

"I heard from ha-Gaon Rav Barish Rappaport . . . that he had a tradition from his Rav, ha-Gaon Noda Bashearim, ha-Av Beit Din of Lublin, that upon receiving a question to address, he would first weigh in his mind the truthfulness of the matter according to what human reason dictates and if in his estimation human reason the matter is true, then he will delve into Halakhah to arrive at a decision." 7 Teshuvot Havatzelet Hasharon 2:28

By invoking this tradition which addresses the mission of the credentialed arbiter in rendering a ruling in every realm of Halakhah , twentieth century Torah giants, Rabbis Ya'akov Breisch and Yitzhak Weiss convey to us that resolution of all cases including classical agunah questions where the husband is missing is within the purview of a rabbinic authority rather than only to be addressed by a Torah giant. 8 Teshuvot Helkat Ya'akov, EH 56 and Teshuvot Minhat Yitzhak 9:130. Moreover, a credentialed decisor may overrule a Torah giant provided that he submitted proofs to support his position. 9 Piskei ha-Rosh, Sanhedrin 4:6; Teshuvot Rid 72; Teshuvot ha-Rashba 2:322; Teshuvot Terumat ha-Deshen , Pesakim u-Ketavim 238; Rema, SA YD 242:3; Teshuvot ha-Mabit 116 ; Pri Hadash OH 496:11; Noda be-Yehudah , Mahadura Kama YD 55; Teshuvot Ya'avetz 1:5; Arukh ha-Shulhan YD 242:23,36; Hazon Ish , Kil'ayim 1, letter; Teshuvot Iggerot Moshe OH 109, YD 3:88; Teshuvot Mishneh Halakhot 8:137; Teshuvot Yabia Omer 1, Introduction, section 12. In short, with the absence of a Sanhedrin, there is no central authority which obligates the entire Jewish community. A Torah giant's ruling is obligatory only upon those who have accepted his authority. See Rabbi S. Daichovsky, " Da'at Torah in Halakhah ," (Hebrew), 30 Tehumin 174,182(5770). In the absence of accepting his authority, decisions are rendered by credentialed arbiters who are accepted by members of the community. See further this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 1, 15–64. Cf. others who construe a Torah giant as a mentor for the community. See Tosafot Berakhot 31b, s.v. moreh ; Teshuvot Terumat ha-Deshen 1:138. Lest one claim that the system is reduced to the arbiter's whims, there are guidelines for overruling a contemporary decisor or a predecessor which guarantee the integrity of the decision making process. See Rashbam, Bava Batra 131a, s.v. ve'al tigmeru ; Teshuvot of Rabbi Avraham, son of Rambam 97; Beit ha-Behira , Bava Batra 130b; Teshuvot ha-Rashba 2:322 and the abovementioned sources. For example, one of the guidelines is to follow under certain conditions the view of the wiser decisor. See Avodah Zarah 7a; Teshuvot ha-Rosh 94:5; Teshuvot ha-Rashba 1:253; Rema, SA HM 25:2; Shakh, SA YD 242:8; Teshuvot Hikrei Lev, OH 496:96. (Cf. Rid , op. cit.; Kesef Mishneh, MT , Mamrim 1:5 in the name of Rambam.) Consequently, some authorities contend that in light of the opinions of Torah giants of earlier generations, an arbiter must refrain from rendering an autonomous judgment. See Teshuvot Maharik , shoresh 159; Rabbi Y. Karo, Introduction to Beit Yosef ; Get Pashut , Kelal 5; Urim ve-Tumim HM 25.

Clearly, when dealing with an issue such as the propriety of introducing the solution of a conditional marriage ( tenai be-nissu'in ) as one of the avenues of establishing marital procedures for the Jewish community, 10 See this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 4, 21-48. there exists a practice (a nohag ) to enlist the consensus of Torah giants of the generation in order to validate these procedures. 11 Rabbi Shalom Schwadron and Rabbi Hayyim Ozer Grodzinsky, Ein Tenai be-Nissu'in , Vilna, 1930, 22, 37, 56.

However, when dealing with private matters of conversion and marriage and divorce, every beit din and/or rabbinic authorities are empowered to resolve these issues.

Page 17, n. 17 . Voiding a marriage may under certain conditions be executed in a situation of a dire need upon the reliance of a singular view entailing the Biblical matter of the prohibition of a married woman (an eishit ish ). 12 Teshuvot Yabia Omer 8, OH 34(6), 10 YD 43(3-4). See further this writer's Rabbinic Authority , vol. 3, 245–256.

Given that the application of following the majority rule is limited to resolving issues within the confines of a halakhic -judicial proceeding (a moshav beit din ) where give and take transpires face to face between the dayan and the minority may express his view, throughout the ages we usually are dealing with an intergenerational and/or international dispute where we do not have the ability to decide which opinion carries greater or lesser weight. 13 Get Pashut, Kelalim , Kelal 1,5; Teshuvot Maharlbah 147; Beit Yosef HM 13(end) in the name of Rashba, Teshuvot She'elat Ya'avetz 1:157; Hazon Ish, Kil'ayim 1; Teshuvot Havatzelet ha-Sharon OH 2.

That being said some arbiters contend that even if normative Halakhah is reflective of the majority issue regarding a particular issue, nevertheless one may invoke a double halakhic doubt even with the minority view in variance with the majority opinion. 14 Teshuvot Zivhei Tzedek YD 110:155; Teshuvot Beit Dovid YD 6; Teshuvot Devar Moshe 3, YD 2; Teshuvot Shemesh u- Tzedakah YD 50; Teshuvot Hesed le-Avraham, OH 13.

Page 55, n. 12. Upon a pending divorce where a beit din obligates a get and a wife refuses to accede to her husband's demands, it may be viewed by the Israeli rabbinical courts as "chaining herself" ( me'agenet et atzma ) to the marriage . Said conclusion is contingent upon the beit din understanding that these demands are rational such as a husband requesting custody be given to him rather than to his parentally unfit wife or recovering monies stolen from him by his spouse. In other words, the beit din panel may attempt to persuade the wife to remit stolen assets or other benefits which are reasonable demands in order that he may be willing to give a get . Under such conditions, should a wife refuse to comply with such demands, a husband's get recalcitrance is halakhically legitimate. 15 PDR 21:176,181; File no. 1-64-5082, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, May 29, 2002; File no. 7479-21-1, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, November 18, 2007; File no. 7041-21-1, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, March 11, 2008; File no. 272088/6, Netanya Regional Beit Din, January 1, 2011.

Page 61, n. 31. On the other hand, we should note that there are many authorities who will invoke as a supporting argument for leniency ( senif le'hakeil ) Rambam's controversial posture memorialized in Mishneh Torah, Ishut 14:8 that upon a wife advancing a plea of repulsion rather than attempting to torment him, a get may be compelled in a situation of "an hour of emergency" and get recalcitrance. 16 Teshuvot ha-Rosh 35:2; Teshuvot Tashbetz 2:8, 4:35(end); PDR 1:18, 3:3, 8:126, 9:171; Teshuvot Yabia Omer 3, EH 20(34).

Page 80,n. 23. Lest one contend that one should validate the witnesses and thus the act of kiddushin based upon the adoption of the stringent view, Rabbi Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor opines otherwise. In Rabbi Spektor's mind, in a case of invalid witnesses one ought to follow the lenient opinion which he characterizes as "the letter of Halakhah "( ikar hadin ) and concludes that the kiddushin be voided rather than act strictly based upon a stringency. 17 Teshuvot Ein Yitzhak 2, EH 64(2).

Page 83, n. 37. For precedent for those decisors who argue that "we are witnesses" may be employed as a means to validate testimony for the establishing the act of kiddushin , see Mordekhai, Kiddushin 531; Beit Shmuel, SA EH 42:12.Cf. additional antecedents for those arbiters who reject the mechanism of "we are witnesses" as an avenue to validate testimony, see Teshuvot ha-Rashba 1:1193; Rema, SA EH 42:4; Tumim, HM 90:14.

Page 98, n. 7. Pursuant to Israeli law, all marriages are to be conducted by rabbis who are recognized by the Chief Rabbinate. Accordingly, private marriages are a contravention of Halakhah and may be subject to an annulment ( hafka'at kiddushin ) or voiding of the marriage ( bittul kiddushin ). 18 B.M. Lewin, Otzar ha-Geonim, Ketuvot , Teshuvot Section, 18–19 in the name of Rabbi Hai; Teshuvot Maharashdam EH 21,30; Teshuvot Prei ha-Aretz 3, EH 2 (26c); Teshuvot Sedeh ha-Aretz 3, EH 3; Teshuvot Heikhal Yitzhak EH 1:5; Teshuvot Yabia Omer 4, EH 5(10);File no. 1093889/1, Yerushalayim Regional Beit Din, March 14,2017. For additional sources, see Otzar ha-Poskim Kiddushin 49:3(6). Cf. Teshuvot Admat Kodesh, EH 39.

Page 128, line 21. As we have demonstrated in the wake of the controversy between Rosh and Rashba, the propriety of utilizing a borrowed ring generates a halakhic doubt regarding the validity of the act of kiddushin . As such one may combine this doubt with the other doubt(s) which we presented concerning the act of kiddushin and rule leniently. 19 Teshuvot Yabia Omer 6, EH 6(7) in the name of various decisors. Cf. other authorities who mandate the existence of at least three doubts prior to ruling leniently. 20 Teshuvot Avnei Nezer EH 119(64); Seder Eliyahu Rabbah ,Sha'ar 1 (end); Teshuvot Kapei Aharon EH 5; Teshuvot Hayyim ve-Shalom 1:22 (in a case of get recalcitrance).

Page 181, n. 74. Construing the voiding of a marriage based upon an "error in the marriage" ( kiddushei ta'ut ) to be grounded in "the meeting of the minds" ( gemirat da'at ) which is consummated by the act of kiddushin or based upon the violation of a condition ( tenai ) is subject to debate amongst other decisors. 21 Mekor Hayyim , Biurim 448:9.Cf. Teshuvot Avnei Nezer 255; Teshuvot Birkat Retzeh 14; Teshuvot Beit Yitzhak HM 64.

Page 315, n. 30. Clearly, if the proceeding dealing with end of marriage issues will not be lengthy, the get ought to be executed after the completion of the proceeding. 22 File no. 1125604/8, Beit Din ha-Rabbani ha-Gadol, February 11, 2020.

Page 230, n. 74. Cf. other arbiters who argue that if epilepsy is viewed as a major defect (a mum gadol ), then the wife never accepted her husband's epilepsy. 23 Sefer ha-Mikneh , Kuntres Aharon 39:5; Teshuvot Yabia Omer 2, EH 9.

Page 318, n. 36. . . . January 25, 2018. There are some rabbinical courts who refrain from obligating a get due to the decisors who contend that should there emerge a halakhic error in obligating a husband to give a get in the particular circumstances, a coerced get (a get me'useh ) is generated. In other words, his willingness to give a get was predicated upon his perception that Halakhah mandated that a get ought to be given. As such, he willingly gave a get to his wife. In the wake of the emergence of the error, it became clear that Halakhah did not mandate a get ought to be given. As such the giving of it is halakhically construed as being coerced. And there are others who argue "a get in error" ( a get mut'eh ) has been produced. In other words, had the husband known that there was no basis to execute a get ; he never would have given it. Consequently, the divorce via the get is null and void. 24 Hazon Ish , op. cit.; Teshuvot Oneg Yom Tov EH 168(244b-245a).

For one of the most systematic and comprehensive treatments of the halakhic concept of "a get in error", see Ateret Devorah 1:86. For a recent practical application of this concept, see File no. 1066559/12, Yerushalayim Regional Beit Din, March 27, 2020.

"There was a little town, and few people within it, [and a great king came against it and went round it and built against it great siege-works]" (Ecclesiastes 9:14) [The term for] town [is suggestive of] the term "I would waken the morning" (Psalms 57:9). [This association is] explained [as follows]: The Holy One seeks us to return to [unto God]. [This may be explained with] a parable of a king who exiled his son while one of [his ministers] - a wise man - [felt great] sorrow [over the matter]. And as a result, [the king's] mercy was awakened for all his sons, due to the strength of this wise man. So too, the righteous awaken the Holy One's mercy upon all [of the People of] Israel. And this is [the inner meaning of] "I would waken the morning". [Similarly], a divine voice announces each day "turn back, rebellious sons" (Jeremiah 3:14; Eikhah Rabbah, Petichta 25; Avot 6:2). And this is the proclamation that comes to every single one [inspiring their spiritual] awakening.

And I will make a covenant of peace with them; it shall be an everlasting covenant with them: It explains how it is that they should live [forever] naturally; that it is understood according to the verse that the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Pinchas (Numbers 25:12), "behold, I give him My covenant of peace." For the matter of natural death is from the inferior quality of [man's] makeup. As he is not perfect in his composition, so that [his] components do not equally fit his makeup. So he acquires one of the circumstances [that compromise his health] that exist in the world and the days of old age and senescence come upon him, such that the body encounters deterioration. Yet the whole entire Torah is built upon guarding the body from [these] circumstances. And you should know that 'one who keeps the commandment does not know a bad thing.' And this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Pinchas, "behold, I give him My covenant of peace." For it is peace among the components [of his body]. And that is why we say that Pinchas is Eliyahu and that Eliyahu lives and survives forever. So that is what it informs us here, "And I will make a covenant of peace with them." And it is easy to understand.

And if this nation thinks of this thing as honor, beauty, and submission to its service, on basis of reason or imagination, also the Israeli man who is stuck in that essence or in that image. His desire to honor his God, whose name be blessed forever, may be elevated, thinking it is decreed to tell the Israeli to subdue his heart with music that reminds him of the laws of kings and their wars, or matters of desire and the like. Can a Cushite change his skin (i.e. can one change its own nature)? This is indeed one of the things naturally unavoidable, and if we force it upon the people against their will, saying it's forbidden (which it's not), the holy Israelis suffer and listen to the voice of their teachers. What will we answer on the day when we are spoken of with disgrace and ridicule by the nations who come to our house of prayer? Those who have neither seen nor heard the tunes of those drinking alcohol at the time of favor and in a sacred place. Doesn't the Scripture state that 'My house shall be called a house of prayer for all people'? Meaning that we must honor it with all kinds of honor, both real and imaginary, so that all nations will always say 'How good are your tents, O Jacob; your dwelling places, O Israel', and for this reason, it is called a house of prayer for all nations. And this is what we learned from RASHB"S to honor the synagogue even with imaginary honor because of the mockery of the nations, and it is as clear as the sun. And similarly, I saw in the response of Maimonides (Rambam) translated from Arabic, brought in the RADBAZ, concerning the enactment Maimonides made in Egypt to recite a certain prayer loudly without repetition, against the enactment of the Talmud. And he gave several reasons for this enactment, and at the end of his words he wrote that in this way the matter is correct and straight and prevents the inconvenience of elongation and desecration of God's name that spread among the gentiles because they saw the Jews spitting and coughing and talking during their prayers since they witness this continuously and testify about it. This is more correct and appropriate in my opinion due to the reasons I mentioned. And similarly, Rabbi Avraham Hanagid, his son, testified about him, his response was brought there in the RADBAZ and at the beginning of the book Maaseh Rokeach at length, see his words. You see how great the ridicule of the gentiles is, that because of it Maimonides stood and annulled the enactment of the sages of the Talmud. How much more so we in our case should be very concerned about the mockery of the gentiles coming into our synagogues. In our enactments, besides that we don't oppose any enactment of the sages of the Talmud and not words of tradition and light and heavy words of the scribes, but on the contrary, we beautify and adorn our God's house with both real and imaginary honor, for which reason I am pushed away from our case from what RADBAZ there wrote in that response to push away that enactment he wrote. And about what the rabbi wrote that there's desecration of God's name, nowadays this reason is gone, for we are worse in the eyes of the gentiles in sins, for they consider our prayers heresy and our Torah they say we exchanged it and added and subtracted and many like this with them. And since we are as nothing in their eyes, let us do what we are obligated from the law since we haven't elevated anything, and certainly when the first reason (meaning the elongation of mercies and the laying down on which they were coughing and talking and coughing and spitting) is nullified, this will also be nullified (meaning by the shortening of mercies they won't come to talk in the synagogue and there won't be mockery of the gentiles) this is the opinion of the RADBAZ and everyone straight in his eyes will see how far the case of the RADBAZ from our case. The first, what we already wrote, that in our case that we are worried about the ridicule of the gentiles, not because of this we nullify anything from the enactment of the sages of the Talmud, but on the contrary, we beautify our synagogues with intelligent things as said. Not so in the case of the RADBAZ. And already, he is saying emphatically that we're disregarded by them. We should do what's required by the law. It turns out that if we are required by the law, then we shouldn't worry about the non-Jews' ridicule because we're not regarded by them anyway. But that's not the case, and the truth is that we should care. Furthermore, from the words of the Radbaz himself, you learn that if we are regarded in the eyes of the non-Jews under whose wings we seek shelter, it would be right to abolish certain practices because of their ridicule. And as he wrote, we should do what's required by law because they have no upper hand over us. Understand from this that if they did, we wouldn't do what's required. It's clear from his words. In the matter that the Radbaz discussed about the ridicule from Muslims – truly, in their eyes, our faith and teachings are considered worthless and are derided and seen as heresy. As the Rambam elaborated at the end of the "Iggeret Teiman", he describes how God, due to our sins, placed us among the nation of Ishmael (Muslims) who have a strong negative opinion about us and always try to harm and reject us, just as it was decreed by God. They're our definitive enemies. No other nation has harmed us as much as they have. Even King David, upon seeing in a holy spirit all the future troubles of Israel, began to cry out against the evil of the sons of Ishmael and lamented about his dwelling among them. The Rambam was also aware of these sentiments (that they claim we removed Muhamad's name from the torah, Cf. the Rambam there) and still, he wrote and instituted what he did. In any case, the Radbaz spoke only of the Muslims, who didn't understand the roots of religions and didn't recognize our values. In our times of dominion and greatness, they were mere desert dwellers compared to wild animals. This is not the case with Christians who, besides being great scholars constantly seeking the truth, have found no fault in us adhering to our Torah. Furthermore, they truly recognize the value of our holy Torah and the wisdom of our Talmudic scholars. We and they are like two sprouts from one bulb. The great Christian scholars would never mock our Torah and our prayer customs, God forbid. If there's any ridicule, it's due to our poor behaviour, particularly in our synagogues and similar places. And how many great scholars wrote in praise of our service and our customs. Even to this day, many notable intellectuals in our generation strive to speak well of us and praise our deeds. However, some of them never spoke against our rituals and prayers per se. Their criticisms stem from what they see in our scriptures - aspects that set us apart from non-Jews and seemingly promote hatred against them. They thus mistakenly believe that due to our faith, we are inherently disruptive to the social aspects of the state (Social contract). Among the ancient nations that idol-worshipped, they would engage in harmful practices and spill the blood of their sons and daughters. However, some non-Jews today seek peace, believe in a Creator, and in His providence. And why should I length on such known matters? A notable distinction between Muslims and Christians is that the latter have never viewed our prayers as heresy. On the contrary, they admire our rituals and our monotheism. The Rabbi Radvaz points out the necessity of refining our practices, particularly in our synagogues, so they don't mock our esteemed teachings with "ugly vessels", given that they know the value of the Torah, the commandment, and the prayer, and they are translated into their languages in their countries, as known. We have returned to the words of Rabbi B"H of blessed memory, and we say that had Rabbi B"H been meticulous and differentiated between the subjects, between the music that has an inherent taste and is similar to a statue that is a decree without reason, he would not have written what he wrote. Especially if the response of the Rashba"sh, who is considered one of the early authorities, had been revealed in his time, he would have retracted it without a doubt. And so wrote the genius Rama"z, that had he seen the response of the Rashba"sh, he would have retracted his words and agreed with him. And I testify before Heaven and Earth that when I was in the great city of scholars and scribes, Semirna (Izmir), may God protect it, I saw great and famous scholars. They were great poets in the style of music, led by the wondrous Rabbi Avraham Hacohen Ariash of blessed memory. And for the musical style of the High Holidays, which required great humility, they called it a "Chizun (=Cantorship)." They would go to Christian churches, behind the curtain, after the mass during their holidays to learn from them that humbling voice that breaks the heart. They would arrange from those tunes arrangements for Kaddish and Kedusha. Such a widespread practice is a great support for everything previously stated, and that is enough on this matter. Furthermore, soon after, I found in the Gaonic Responsa, and it says: "And you asked, singing in a tune - meaning there a type of song that is not in the Holy Tongue, whether from an instrument or from a mouth, where did we get that it's forbidden? And a cantor who sings in the language of Ishmael, as it is written: 'Do not rejoice, Israel, do not exult like the nations.' And even at a feast it is forbidden, according to the language of the responsa of the great sages. It is enough to clarify that they did not forbid the cantor except for a language that is not the Holy Tongue. But regarding the melody itself with holy words, they did not care. The explanation is undoubtedly that if you say that even the melodies of the nations are forbidden, then one can argue and say: 'From where do we, the Israelites, have the melodies and sounds of David's songs that are heard in our holy cities? Isn't there a full verse that says, "How can we sing the Lord's song in a foreign land?" And consequently, we have forgotten as is the truth (and some say that we only have left the tune of "Blessed is the Lord, my rock", specifically for two reasons: one that this melody increasing its tempo and sound like the war marches, and this is the second [point], and it's astonishing – that all of Israel, wherever they are – the Asians, the Africans, the Europeans – all are unified in the melody of this psalm. It's a wonder because they are not unified in the melody of any other prayers or services. For in Muslim lands, all the prayer melodies are like the melodies of the Muslims, and in Edomite lands, they are like the melodies of Edom. But in this psalm's melody, all are unified. And I, who have traveled to almost every part of the diaspora, and especially the major countries, have examined this and found it to be true. The testimonies prove that this melody remains our inheritance from our ancestors.) And in every place of exile, the Jews learned the melodies of those lands. In Israel and throughout Arabia, the melodies of prayers, Kaddishes, and Kedushahs are all in the Arab melody. In Turkey, they are in the Turkish melodies, and in Edom, they are in the melodies of Edom. Who can deny this obvious fact? Do we say that all of Israel erred in their observation? Certainly not! We are particular only about the language being in Hebrew, but regarding the melody, what can we do since we no longer have a memory of our sacred melodies? On this matter, the Gaon rightly pointed out that it's not in the Hebrew language and did not say it's not in the sacred melody because that's how it has come to us. Likewise, in another source, it is noted and said that even if a cantor sings in the language of the Muslims, even in a real feast, I will say that all my life I was distressed when I saw many pious individuals who would not lend their ear and wouldn't allow singing in Israel, even on outings, in the Muslim language. If not for the poet who would compose a song to the same scale in that new or Arab melody. And I, because of the desire of the great pious rabbi, the great Rabbi Gagin, endeavored to establish new liturgical poems to the scale of Arab songs, and the language almost trips over itself. Apparently, I was puzzled, and many times I argued with them about it. The Rambam explains in his commentary on Pirkei Avot that when speech is divided into seven parts, he wrote: "Know that songs, regardless of the language they are composed in, require examination of their content to determine if they align with the speech we have divided. And indeed, I have clarified this even though it's clear because I saw elderly pious men from our Torah scholars when they were at a wine feast or at a wedding or otherwise, and someone wanted to sing an Arab song, even if the content of that song was praising bravery or generosity, and it was from the beloved part, or in the praises of wine, they would distance it as far as possible and it was not allowed for them to hear it," and so on. This is complete folly for the speech is not prohibited, nor is it more loved or hated due to the action done with it, but rather due to its content. So if that content is uplifting, one is obligated to say it in any language. And if the intention of that song is to belittle, in any language, it is forbidden to say it. According to this, the Rambam's view on songs is that any language is equal to him as Hebrew, as long as the content is beautiful. And from the words of the aforementioned Gaon, it seems that we are also particular about the holiness of the language. We found a strong basis to agree with those pious individuals I mentioned, but the truth is, as we have carefully examined, there's no disagreement in their opinion, the Gaon with the Rambam. In truth, the Gaon also was particular about songs due to their content and not their language. And what he said about the language of the Muslims, which is Arabic, means that usually, the majority of Muslim songs are lustful. Therefore, if Muslim songs were all lustful, we would go after the majority and also prohibit those that are not composed in Hebrew. Because it is known the nature of poets when they hear a melody with an instrument, and as the player plays, the spirit moves them to utter the words of the songs together with the harp, even without intention, because it is a permanent nature in poets. And on this, they prohibited unless a song in Hebrew has already been composed for it. Hence, a person should draw an inference from Muslim songs, the majority of which are lustful; therefore, their melodies were permitted to be sung in the Hebrew language, in prayers, and in holy words. Because the subjects are either beautiful or holy, and we do not care that perhaps at that moment when singing that tune in Hebrew words, one might remember the Arab ones which are frivolous or lustful matters. The custom in all of Israel and Arabia, in all synagogues, and the sages did not protest against them, are the songs of Edom, the majority of which are about wars and tales of bravery. So it's even more so allowed to sing in those tunes, in that language, during feasts. And in the synagogue in the Holy Language, during worship and prayer, all the more so the melodies of the Christian churches, which are truly humble melodies that bring forth love for God and His unity. And we do not know the Latin language in which they sing in that humble tone, and that's how we won't even know the matters of the trinity (that these songs may originally was about) which are forbidden to us. Certainly, not only are they permissible for us, but on the contrary, they are an obligation for us for all the reasons mentioned above, and it is clear.

And the letters were sent by couriers ( ratzim , literally runners), etc.: : It appears that the runners, meaning to say the five senses ( chushim ), are running - each one to acquire sensations. And that is why it is called a chush , from the usage, "hasten ( chusha ) to my aid" (Psalms 38:23). So he said that every one should do what it wants, the opposite of that which is stated (Isaiah 33:15), "shuts their eyes against looking at evil, etc." And he said that is the reason "to kill, to destroy, etc." And he said, "on a single day, on the thirteenth day of the month... Adar." I have already explained what it is (Mechir Yayin on Esther 3:7) - he means to say in the month of Adar, which is an expression of the powerful one ( adir ) of the Torah. And he thus said that this is all a reason to deny providence and all the rest of the Torah, which is the thirteen attributes or the thirteen principles [of faith]. For this is his saying, "to annihilate... on the thirteen(th)." He means to say that the killing and the destruction is this, to deny these thirteen. Instead one should believe that everything follows the power of the twelve constellations, and to believe that this is the greatness ( adar ) and praise of man. And this is [the meaning of] his saying, "the month of Adar, and to plunder their possessions." He means to say, to make his goal to plunder money, to rob and to loot.

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