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3,200 | 1994_94-562 | Werner A. Powers argued the cause for respondents.With him on the brief was Charles C. Keeble, Jr. *JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case asks whether the discretionary standard set forth in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U. S. 491 (1942), or the "exceptional circumstances" test developed in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983), governs a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings, and under what standard of review a court of appeals should evaluate the district court's decision to do so.IIn early 1992, a dispute between respondents (the Hill Group) and other parties over the ownership and operation of oil and gas properties in Winkler County, Texas, appeared likely to culminate in litigation. The Hill Group asked petitioners (London Underwriters) 1 to provide them with coverage under several commercial liability insurance policies. London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group in a letter dated July 31, 1992. In September 1992, after a 3-week trial, a Winkler County jury entered a verdict in excess of $100 million against the Hill Group on various state law claims.The Hill Group gave London Underwriters notice of the verdict in late November 1992. On December 9, 1992, Lon-* Laura A. Foggan, Daniel E. Troy, and Thomas W Brunner filed a brief for the Insurance Environmental Litigation Association as amicus curiae urging reversal.Edward F. LeBreton III filed a brief for the Maritime Law Association as amicus curiae.1 For the sake of clarity, we adopt the Court of Appeals' manner of referencing the parties.280don Underwriters filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, basing jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship under 28 U. S. C. § 1332. London Underwriters sought a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V), that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability for the Winkler County judgment. After negotiations with the Hill Group's counsel, London Underwriters voluntarily dismissed the action on January 22, 1993. London Underwriters did so, however, upon the express condition that the Hill Group give London Underwriters two weeks' notice if they decided to bring suit on the policy.On February 23, 1993, the Hill Group notified London Underwriters of their intention to file such a suit in Travis County, Texas. London Underwriters refiled their declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of Texas on February 24, 1993. As promised, the Hill Group initiated an action against London Underwriters on March 26, 1993, in state court in Travis County. The Hill Group's codefendants in the Winkler County litigation joined in this suit and asserted claims against certain Texas insurers, thus rendering the parties nondiverse and the suit nonremovable.On the same day that the Hill Group filed their Travis County action, they moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay London Underwriters' federal declaratory judgment action. After receiving submissions from the parties on the issue, the District Court entered a stay on June 30, 1993. The District Court observed that the state lawsuit pending in Travis County encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the declaratory judgment action and determined that a stay was warranted in order to avoid piecemeallitigation and to bar London Underwriters' attempts at forum shopping. London Underwriters filed a timely appeal. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, supra, at 10 (a district court's order staying federal proceedings in favor of pending281state litigation is a "final decisio[n]" appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 41 F.3d 934 (1994). Noting that under Circuit precedent, "[a] district court has broad discretion to grant (or decline to grant) declaratory judgment," id., at 935, citing Torch, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 194 (CA5 1991), the Court of Appeals did not require application of the test articulated in Colorado River, supra, and Moses H. Cone, supra, under which district courts must point to "exceptional circumstances" to justify staying or dismissing federal proceedings. Citing the interests in avoiding duplicative proceedings and forum shopping, the Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion, and found none. 41 F. 3d, at 935.We granted certiorari, 513 U. S. 1013 (1994), to resolve Circuit conflicts concerning the standard governing a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action in favor of parallel state litigation, compare, e. g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Missouri Elec. Works, 23 F.3d 1372, 1374, n. 3 (CA8 1994) (pursuant to Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, a district court may not stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action absent "exceptional circumstances"); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust, 806 F.2d 411, 413 (CA2 1986) (same), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778, n. 12 (CA5 1993) (the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone is inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235,237-238 (CA4 1992) (same), and the applicable standard for an appellate court's review of a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action, compare, e. g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 21 F.3d 259, 263, n. 5 (CA8 1994) (reviewing for abuse of discretion); Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 802 (CA2 1990) (same), with Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998282F. 2d 931, 936 (CA Fed. 1993) (reviewing de novo); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Holbrook, 867 F.2d 1330, 1333 (CAll 1989) (same). We now affirm.IIOver 50 years ago, in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U. S. 491 (1942), this Court addressed circumstances virtually identical to those present in the case before us today. An insurer, anticipating a coercive suit, sought a declaration in federal court of nonliability on an insurance policy. The District Court dismissed the action in favor of pending state garnishment proceedings, to which the insurer had been added as a defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding an abuse of discretion, and ordered the District Court to proceed to the merits. Reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding to the District Court, this Court held that, "[a]lthough the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, it was under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction." Id., at 494. The Court explained that "[o]rdinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties." Id., at 495. The question for a district court presented with a suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court found, is "whether the questions in controversy between the parties to the federal suit, and which are not foreclosed under the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the proceeding pending in the state court." Ibid.Brillhart makes clear that district courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites. Although Brillhart did not set out an exclusive list of factors governing the district court's exercise of this discretion, it did provide some useful guidance in that regard.283The Court indicated, for example, that in deciding whether to enter a stay, a district court should examine "the scope of the pending state court proceeding and the nature of defenses open there." Ibid. This inquiry, in turn, entails consideration of "whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc." Ibid. Other cases, the Court noted, might shed light on additional factors governing a district court's decision to stay or to dismiss a declaratory judgment action at the outset. See ibid. But Brillhart indicated that, at least where another suit involving the same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pending in state court, a district court might be indulging in "[g]ratuitous interference," ibid., if it permitted the federal declaratory action to proceed.Brillhart, without more, clearly supports the District Court's decision in this case. (That the court here stayed, rather than dismissed, the action is of little moment in this regard, because the state court's decision will bind the parties under principles of res judicata.) Nonetheless, London Underwriters argue, and several Courts of Appeals have agreed, that intervening case law has supplanted Brillhart's notions of broad discretion with a test under which district courts may stay or dismiss actions properly within their jurisdiction only in "exceptional circumstances." In London Underwriters' view, recent cases have established that a district court must point to a compelling reason-which, they say, is lacking here-in order to stay a declaratory judgment action in favor of pending state proceedings. To evaluate this argument, it is necessary to examine three cases handed down several decades after Brillhart.In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), the Government brought an action in Federal District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 seek-284ing a declaration of its water rights, the appointment of a water master, and an order enjoining all uses and diversions of water by other parties. See Pet. for Cert. in Co lorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, O. T. 1974, No. 74-940, pp. 39a-40a. The District Court dismissed the action in deference to ongoing state proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed, 504 F.2d 115 (CAlO 1974), on the ground that the District Court had jurisdiction over the Government's suit and that abstention was inappropriate. This Court reversed again. Without discussing Brillhart, the Court began with the premise that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress. Colorado River, supra, at 813, 817-818, citing Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). The Court determined, however, that a district court could nonetheless abstain from the assumption of jurisdiction over a suit in "exceptional" circumstances, and it found such exceptional circumstances on the facts of the case. 424 U. S., at 818-820. Specifically, the Court deemed dispositive a clear federal policy against piecemeal adjudication of water rights; the existence of an elaborate state scheme for resolution of such claims; the absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss; the extensive nature of the suit; the 300-mile distance between the District Court and the situs of the water district at issue; and the prior participation of the Federal Government in related state proceedings.Two years after Colorado River we decided Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978), in which a plurality of the Court stated that, while "'the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,'" id., at 662, quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 282 (1910), a district court is "'under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction,'" 437 U. S., at 662, quoting Brillhart, 316285u. S., at 494. Will concerned an action seeking damages for an alleged violation of federal securities laws brought in federal court during the pendency of related state proceedings. Although the case arose outside the declaratory judgment context, the plurality invoked Brillhart as the appropriate authority. Colorado River, according to the plurality, "in no way undermine[d] the conclusion of Brillhart that the decision whether to defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court is, in the last analysis, a matter committed to the district court's discretion." Will, supra, at 664. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, criticized the plurality for not recognizing that Colorado River had undercut the "sweeping language" of Brillhart. 437 U. S., at 667. Four Justices in dissent urged that the Colorado River "exceptional circumstances" test supplied the governing standard.The plurality's suggestion in Will that Brillhart might have application beyond the context of declaratory judgments was rejected by the Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983). In Moses H. Cone, the Court established that the Colorado River "exceptional circumstances" test, rather than the more permissive Brillhart analysis, governs a district court's decision to stay a suit to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act in favor of pending state litigation. Noting that the combination of Justice Blackmun and the four dissenting Justices in Will had made five to require application of Colorado River, the Court rejected the argument that Will had worked any substantive changes in the law. "'Abdication of the obligation to decide cases,'" the Court reasoned, "'can be justified ... only in the exceptional circumstance where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.'" 460 U. S., at 14, quoting Colorado River, supra, at 813. As it had in Colorado River, the Court articulated nonexclusive factors relevant to the existence of such exceptional circumstances, including the assumption by either court of jurisdic-286tion over a res, the relative convenience of the fora, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fora, whether and to what extent federal law provides the rules of decision on the merits, and the adequacy of state proceedings. Evaluating each of these factors, the Court concluded that the District Court's stay of federal proceedings was, under the circumstances, inappropriate.Relying on these post-Brillhart developments, London Underwriters contend that the Brillhart regime, under which district courts have substantial latitude in deciding whether to stay or to dismiss a declaratory judgment suit in light of pending state proceedings (and need not point to "exceptional circumstances" to justify their actions), is an outmoded relic of another era. We disagree. Neither Colorado River, which upheld the dismissal of federal proceedings, nor Moses H. Cone, which did not, dealt with actions brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). Distinct features of the Declaratory Judgment Act, we believe, justify a standard vesting district courts with greater discretion in declaratory judgment actions than that permitted under the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone. No subsequent case, in our view, has called into question the application of the Brillhart standard to the Brillhart facts.Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants. On its face, the statute provides that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration," 28 U. S. C. § 2201(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). See generally E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 312-314 (2d ed. 1941); Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for Declaratory Judgments, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 677 (1942). The statute's textual commitment to discretion, and the breadth287of leeway we have always understood it to suggest, distinguish the declaratory judgment context from other areas of the law in which concepts of discretion surface. See generally Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543 (1985); cf. O. Fiss & D. Rendleman, Injunctions 106-108 (2d ed. 1984) (describing courts' nonstatutory discretion, through application of open-ended substantive standards like "irreparable injury," in the injunction context). We have repeatedly characterized the Declaratory Judgment Act as "an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant." Public Servo Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 241 (1952); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 72 (1985); Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U. S. 83, 95, n. 17 (1993). When all is said and done, we have concluded, "the propriety of declaratory relief in a particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power." Wycoff, supra, at 243.Acknowledging, as they must, the unique breadth of this discretion to decline to enter a declaratory judgment, London Underwriters nonetheless contend that, after Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, district courts lack discretion to decline to hear a declaratory judgment suit at the outset. See Brief for Petitioners 22 ("District courts must hear declaratory judgment cases absent exceptional circumstances; district courts may decline to enter the requested relief following a full trial on the merits, if no beneficial purpose is thereby served or if equity otherwise counsels"). We are not persuaded by this distinction. London Underwriters' argument depends on the untenable proposition that a district court, knowing at the commencement of litigation that it will exercise its broad statutory discretion to decline declaratory relief, must nonetheless go through the futile exercise of hearing a case on the merits first. Nothing in the language of the Declaratory Judgment Act recommends Lon-288don Underwriters' reading, and we are unwilling to impute to Congress an intention to require such a wasteful expenditure of judicial resources. If a district court, in the sound exercise of its judgment, determines after a complaint is filed that a declaratory judgment will serve no useful purpose, it cannot be incumbent upon that court to proceed to the merits before staying or dismissing the action.We agree, for all practical purposes, with Professor Borchard, who observed half a century ago that "[t]here is ... nothing automatic or obligatory about the assumption of 'jurisdiction' by a federal court" to hear a declaratory judgment action. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, at 313. By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial arrow in the district court's quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants. Consistent with the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a close.2 In the declaratory judgment context, the normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.IIIAs Judge Friendly observed, the Declaratory Judgment Act "does not speak," on its face, to the question whether discretion to entertain declaratory judgment actions is vested in district courts alone or in the entire judicial system. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 Emory L.2We note that where the basis for declining to proceed is the pendency of a state proceeding, a stay will often be the preferable course, because it assures that the federal action can proceed without risk of a time bar if the state case, for any reason, fails to resolve the matter in controversy. See, e. g., P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1451, n. 9 (3d ed. 1988).289J. 747, 778 (1982). The Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's decision to stay London Underwriters' action for abuse of discretion, and found none. London Underwriters urge us to follow those other Courts of Appeals that review decisions to grant (or to refrain from granting) declaratory relief de novo. See, e. g., Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F. 2d, at 936; Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Holbrook, 867 F. 2d, at 1333. We decline this invitation. We believe it more consistent with the statute to vest district courts with discretion in the first instance, because facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp. Cf. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 948 (1995) ("[T]he reviewing attitude that a court of appeals takes toward a district court decision should depend upon 'the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts''') (citation omitted); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114 (1985) ("[T]he fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question"). While it may be true that sound administration of the Declaratory Judgment Act calls for the exercise of "judicial discretion, hardened by experience into rule," Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, at 293, proper application of the abuse of discretion standard on appellate review can, we think, provide appropriate guidance to district courts. In this regard, we reject London Underwriters' suggestion, Brief for Petitioners 14, that review for abuse of discretion "is tantamount to no review" at all.IVIn sum, we conclude that Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U. S. 491 (1942), governs this declaratory judgment action and that district courts' decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory judgment actions, which are necessarily bound up with their decisions about the propri-290ety of granting declaratory relief, should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. We do not attempt at this time to delineate the outer boundaries of that discretion in other cases, for example, cases raising issues of federal law or cases in which there are no parallel state proceedings. Like the Court of Appeals, we conclude only that the District Court acted within its bounds in staying this action for declaratory relief where parallel proceedings, presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues, were underway in state court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit isAffirmed | OCTOBER TERM, 1994SyllabusWILTON ET AL. v. SEVEN FALLS CO. ET AL.CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUITNo. 94-562. Argued March 27, 1995-Decided June 12, 1995Petitioner underwriters refused to defend or indemnify respondents under several commercial liability insurance policies in litigation between respondents and other parties over the ownership and operation of certain Texas oil and gas properties. After a verdict was entered against respondents and they notified petitioners that they intended to file a state court suit on the policies, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that their policies did not cover respondents' liability. Respondents filed their state court suit and moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay petitioners' action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the court did not require application of the test articulated in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, under which district courts must point to "exceptional circumstances" to justify staying or dismissing federal proceedings. The court reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion, and found none.Held:1. The discretionary standard of Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U. S. 491, governs a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings. Pp. 282-288.(a) In addressing circumstances virtually identical to those present here, the Court in Brillhart made clear that district courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Act), even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdiction. While Brillhart did not set out an exclusive list of factors governing the exercise of this discretion, it did provide some guidance, indicating that, at least where another suit involving the same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pending in state court, a district court might be indulging in gratuitous interference if it permitted the federal declaratory action to proceed. Pp. 282-283.278Syllabus(b) The Act's distinct features justify a standard vesting district courts with greater discretion in declaratory judgment actions than that permitted under the "exceptional circumstances" test set forth in Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, neither of which dealt with declaratory judgments. On its face, the Act makes a textual commitment to discretion by specifying that a court "may" declare litigants' rights, 28 U. S. C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added), and it has repeatedly been characterized as an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant. Pp. 283-287.(c) Petitioners' argument that, despite the unique breadth of this discretion, district courts lack discretion to decline to hear a declaratory judgment suit at the outset depends on the untenable proposition that a court, knowing at the litigation's commencement that it will exercise its discretion to decline declaratory relief, must nonetheless go through the futile exercise of hearing a case on the merits first. Nothing in the Act recommends this reading, and the Court is unwilling to impute to Congress an intention to require such a wasteful expenditure of judicial resources. Pp. 287-288.2. District courts' decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory judgment actions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo. It is more consistent with the Act to vest district courts with discretion in the first instance, because facts bearing on the declaratory judgment remedy's usefulness, and the case's fitness for resolution, are particularly within their grasp. Proper application of the abuse of discretion standard on appeal can provide appropriate guidance to district courts. Pp. 288-289.3. The District Court acted within its bounds in staying the declaratory relief action in this case, since parallel proceedings, presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues, were underway in state court. pp. 289-290.41 F.3d 934, affirmed.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BREYER, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Michael A. Orlando argued the cause for petitioners.With him on the briefs were Patrick C. Appel and Paul LeRoy Crist.279Full Text of Opinion |
3,201 | 1974_73-1531 | MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.This case concerns the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), permitting defendants in state cases to remove the proceedings to the federal district courts under certain conditions, in the light of Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 101(a), 82 Stat. 73, 18 U.S.C. § 245.IDuring March 1972, petitioners, six Negro citizens of Vicksburg, Miss., along with other citizens of Vicksburg, made various demands upon certain merchants and city officials generally relating to the number of Negroes employed or serving in various positions in both local government and business enterprises. In late March, petitioners began picketing some business establishments in Vicksburg and urging, by word of mouth and through leaflets, that the citizens of Vicksburg boycott those establishments until such time as petitioners' demands were realized. [Footnote 1] On May 2, 13, 14, and 21 of that year, petitioners, along with 43 other Negroes, were arrested [Footnote 2] on the basis of warrants charging, in general terms, their complicity in a conspiracy unlawfully to bring about a boycott of merchants and businesses. [Footnote 3] At least some Page 421 U. S. 216 of these arrests took place at a time when some of those arrested were engaged in picketing in protest of the racial discrimination allegedly practiced by certain merchants of Vicksburg. Following the arrests, which were made by Vicksburg police officers, those arrested were transported to the city jail, where they each remained after processing until the posting of bail. There is no indication in the record in this case that the arrests and subsequent detentions of petitioners or the other 43 persons so arrested and detained involved the application of any force by the arresting officers beyond the verbal directions issued by those officers and the coercive custody normally incident to arrest, processing, and detention.On May 25, 1972, those arrested filed a petition in the Federal District Court in compliance with the procedures established by 28 U.S.C. § 1446 seeking transfer of the trial of charges against them to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443, which reads, in pertinent part, [Footnote 4] as follows:"Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court, may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: "Page 421 U. S. 217"(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof. . . ."In their removal petition, it was alleged, inter alia, that those arrested were being prosecuted under several state conspiracy statutes [Footnote 5] which were, "on their face and as applied, repugnant to the Constitution . . . ," and that:"The charges against petitioners, their arrest, and subsequent prosecution on those charges have no basis, in fact, and have been effectuated solely and exclusively for the purpose and effect of depriving petitioners of their Federally protected rights, including by force or threat of force, punishing, injuring, intimidating, and interferring [sic], or attempting to punish, injure, intimidate, . . . and interfere with petitioners, and the class of persons participating in the . . . boycott and demonstrations, for the exercise of their rights peacefully to protest discrimination and to conduct and publicize a boycott which seeks to remedy the denial of equal civil rights . . . which activities are protected by 18 U.S.C. [§] 245."On December 29, 1972, after an evidentiary hearing was held by the District Court in which testimony was Page 421 U. S. 218 presented both by petitioners and the Vicksburg chief of police, who was one of the named respondents to the removal petition, the District Court remanded the prosecutions to the state courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, [Footnote 6] reasoning that § 245, as a criminal statute, "confers no rights whatsoever . . . ," 488 F.2d 284, 287 (CA5 1974), and that, under this Court's decisions in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780 (1966), and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808 (1966), a federal statute must "provide" for the equal rights of citizens before it can be invoked as a basis for removal of prosecutions under § 1443(1). Rehearing and rehearing en banc, Fed.Rule App.Proc. 35, were denied, five Circuit Judges dissenting in an opinion. [Footnote 7] 491 F.2d 94 (CA5 1974). We granted certiorari, 419 U.S. 893 (1974), and, for reasons stated below, affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Page 421 U. S. 219IIOur most recent cases construing § 1443(1) are the companion cases of Georgia v. Rachel, supra, and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra. Those cases established that a removal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) must satisfy a two-pronged test. First, it must appear that the right allegedly denied the removal petitioner arises under a federal law "providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality." Georgia v. Rachel, supra at 384 U. S. 792. Claims that prosecution and conviction will violate rights under constitutional or statutory provisions of general applicability or under statutes not protecting against racial discrimination, will not suffice. That a removal petitioner will be denied due process of law because the criminal law under which he is being prosecuted is allegedly vague or that the prosecution is assertedly a sham, corrupt, or without evidentiary basis does not, standing alone, satisfy the requirements of § 1443(1). City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra at 384 U. S. 825.Second, it must appear, in accordance with the provisions of § 1443(1), that the removal petitioner is "denied or cannot enforce" the specified federal rights "in the courts of [the] State." This provision normally requires that the "denial be manifest in a formal expression of state law," Georgia v. Rachel, supra at 384 U. S. 803, such as a state legislative or constitutional provision, "rather than a denial first made manifest at the trial of the case.'" Id. at 384 U. S. 799. Except in the unusual case where"an equivalent basis could be shown for an equally firm prediction that the defendant would be 'denied or cannot enforce' the specified federal rights in the state court,"id. at 384 U. S. 804, it was to be expected that the protection of federal constitutional or statutory rights could be Page 421 U. S. 220 effected in the pending state proceedings, civil or criminal. Under § 1443(1),"the vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in he rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court."City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra at 384 U. S. 828.In Rachel, the allegations of the petition for removal were held to satisfy both branches of the rule. The federal right claimed arose under §§ 201(a) and 203(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a) and 2000a-2(c). Section 201(a) forbids refusals of service in, or exclusions from, public accommodations on account of race or color; and § 203(c) prohibits any "attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201. . . ." The removal petition fairly alleged that the prosecutions sought to be removed from state court were brought and would be tried "solely as the result of peaceful attempts to obtain service at places of public accommodation." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 793. [Footnote 8] We concluded that, if the allegations in the removal petition were true, the defendants by being prosecuted under a state criminal trespass law would be denied or could not enforce their rights in the courts of Georgia, since the "burden of having to defend the prosecutions is itself the denial of a right explicitly conferred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at 384 U. S. 805. In Peacock, on the contrary, the state court defendants Page 421 U. S. 221 petitioning for removal were being prosecuted for obstructing public streets, assault and battery, and various other local crimes. [Footnote 9] The federal rights allegedly being denied were said to arise under the Constitution as well as under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 and 1981, the former section guaranteeing the right to vote without discrimination on the grounds of race or color and forbidding interference therewith, and the latter guaranteeing all persons equal access to specified rights enjoyed by white persons. [Footnote 10] The Court assumed that the claimed statutory Page 421 U. S. 222 rights were within those rights contemplated by § 1443(1), but went on to hold that there had been no showing that petitioners would be denied or could not enforce their rights in the state courts. The removal petitions alleged"(1) that the defendants were arrested by state officers and charged with various offenses under state law because they were Negroes or because they were engaged in helping Negroes assert their rights under federal equal civil rights laws, and that they are completely innocent of the charges against them, or (2) that the defendants will be unable to obtain a fair trial in the state court."384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 826. The Court held, however, that it was not enough to support removal to allege that"federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court."Id. at 384 U. S. 827. Petitioners could point to no federal law conferring on them the right to engage in the specific conduct with which they were charged, and there was no "federal statutory right that no State should even attempt to prosecute them for their conduct." Id. at 384 U. S. 826.IIIWith our prior cases in mind, it is apparent, without further discussion, that removal under § 1443(1) was not warranted here based solely on petitioners' allegations that the statutes underlying the charges against them were unconstitutional, that there was no basis in fact for those charges, or that their arrest and prosecution otherwise denied them their constitutional rights. We are also convinced for the following reasons that Page 421 U. S. 223 § 245, [Footnote 11] on which petitioners principally rely, does not furnish adequate basis for removal under § 1443(1) of these state prosecutions to the federal court.Whether or not § 24, a federal criminal statute, provides for "specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality . . . ," Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 792, it Page 421 U. S. 224 evinces no intention to interfere in any manner with state criminal prosecutions of those who seek to have their cases removed to the federal courts. On the contrary, § 245(a)(1) itself expressly provides:"Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to prevent any State . . . from exercising jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this section. . . . [Footnote 12]"The Mississippi courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction over conspiracy and boycott cases brought under state law; and § 245(a)(1) appears to disavow any intent to interrupt such state prosecutions, a conclusion that is also implicit in the operative provisions of that section. Section 245(b) makes it a crime for any persons, by "force or threat of force," to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any individual engaged in specified activities. The provision, on its face, focuses on the use of force, and its legislative history confirms that its central purpose was to prevent and punish violent interferences with the exercise of specified rights, and that it was not aimed at interrupting or frustrating the otherwise orderly processes of state law.Section 245, which was Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, was the antidote prescribed by Congress to deter and punish those who would forcibly suppress the free exercise of civil rights enumerated in that statute. The bill which eventually became Title I, H.R. 2516, was substantially identical to H.R. 14765, passed by the Page 421 U. S. 225 House as Title V of the Civil Rights Act of 1966. [Footnote 13] Title I was enacted against a background of racial violence described in the Report of the bill that was adopted by the House:"The brutal crimes committed in recent years against Negroes exercising Federal rights and against white persons who have encouraged or aided Negroes seeking equality need no recital. Violence and threats of violence have been resorted to in order to punish or discourage Negroes from voting, from using places of public accommodation and public facilities, from attending desegregated schools, and from engaging in other activities protected by Federal law. Frequently the victim of the crime has recently engaged or is then engaging in the exercise of a Federal right. In other cases, the victim is a civil rights worker -- white or Negro -- who has encouraged others to assert these rights or engaged in peaceful assembly opposing their denial. In still other cases, Negroes not known to have had anything to do with civil rights activities have been killed or assaulted to discourage other Negroes from asserting their rights."H.R.Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1967). [Footnote 14] Page 421 U. S. 226The Senate Report likewise explained Title I as a measure "to meet the problem of violent interference, for racial or other discriminatory reasons, with a person's free exercise of civil rights." S.Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1967). This concern with racially motivated acts of violence pervaded the report, see id. at 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. In the debate on the floor of the Senate, frequent references to the bill's being directed at crimes of racial violence were made, [Footnote 15] the following being particularly relevant here:"This new law would provide that, when a law enforcement officer totally abandons his duty in order to violently intimidate individuals seeking Page 421 U. S. 227 lawfully to exercise certain enumerated Federal rights, he will be punished like any other citizen.""* * * *" "So long as it appears that an officer reasonably believed he was doing his duty, that is, that the arrest took place because of a perceived violation of a then-valid law, no case of knowing interference with civil rights could be made against him."114 Cong.Rec. 2268 (1968).Viewed in this context, it seems quite evident that a state prosecution, proceeding as it does in a court of law, cannot be characterized as an application of "force or threat of force" within the meaning of § 245. That section furnishes federal protection against violence in certain circumstances. But whatever "rights" it may confer, none of them is denied by a state criminal prosecution for conspiracy or boycott. Here, as in Peacock, there is no "federal statutory right that no State should even attempt to prosecute them for their conduct." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 826. [Footnote 16]IVWe think further observations are in order. We stated in City of Greenwood v. Peacock:"[I]f changes are to be made in the long-settled interpretation of the provisions of this century-old removal statute, it is for Congress, and not for this Court, to make them. Fully aware of the established meaning the removal statute had been given by a consistent series of decisions in this Court, Congress, Page 421 U. S. 228 in 1964, declined to act on proposals to amend the law. All that Congress did was to make remand orders appealable, and thus invite a contemporary judicial consideration of the meaning of the unchanged provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1443."Id. at 384 U. S. 834-835. When we decided that case, there had been introduced in the Congress no fewer than 12 bills which, if enacted, would have enlarged in one way or another the right of removal in civil rights cases. Id. at 384 U. S. 833 n. 33. None of those bills was reported from the cognizant committee of Congress; none has been reported in the intervening years; and the parties have informed us of no comparable bill under active consideration in the present Congress. The absence of any evidence or legislative history indicating that Congress intended to accomplish in § 245 what it has failed or refused to do directly through amendment to § 1443 necessitates our considered rejection of the right of removal in this case. Also, as we noted in Peacock, there are varied avenues of relief open to these defendants for vindication of any of their federal rights that may have been or will be violated, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 828-830; and, indeed, it appears from the record in this case that at least one such avenue was pursued early on by them and continues to be pursued. [Footnote 17]Affirmed | U.S. Supreme CourtJohnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975)Johnson v. MississippiNo. 73-1531Argued February 26, 1975Decided May 12, 1975421 U.S. 213SyllabusPetitioners, six Negroes, who had been picketing and urging boycott of certain business establishments in Vicksburg, Miss., because of their alleged racial discrimination in employment, were arrested with others and charged with unlawfully conspiring to bring about a boycott. Those arrested then sought removal of the prosecutions from state to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1443(1), which provides for removal of state proceedings"[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens,"alleging that the conspiracy statutes underlying the charges were unconstitutional, that the charges were groundless, and made solely to deprive those arrested of their federally protected rights, and, more particularly, that their activities were protected by 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). Section 245(b)(5), inter alia, makes it a crime by "force or threat of force" to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person because he has been "participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly" opposing racial discrimination in employment, but § 245(a)(1) provides that § 245 shall not be construed as indicating Congress' intent to prevent any State from exercising jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of § 245. The District Court denied removal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that § 245 "confers no rights whatsoever," and that a federal statute must "provide" for the equal rights of citizens before it can be invoked as a basis for removal of prosecutions under § 1443(1).Held: Removal under § 1443(1) was not warranted based solely on petitioners' allegations that the statutes underlying the charges were unconstitutional, that there was no basis in fact for those charges, or that their arrest and prosecution otherwise denied them their constitutional rights. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780; City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808. Nor does § 245 furnish adequate basis for removal under § 1443(1). Pp. 421 U. S. 222-227.(a) The Mississippi courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction over conspiracy and boycott cases brought under state law, and § 245(a)(1) Page 421 U. S. 214 appears to disavow any intent to interrupt such state prosecutions, a conclusion that is also implicit in § 245's operative provisions, since § 245(b), on its face, focuses on the use of force, and its legislative history confirms that its central purpose was to prevent and punish violent interferences with the exercise of specified rights, and that it was not aimed at interrupting or frustrating the otherwise orderly processes of state law. Pp. 421 U. S. 223-227.(b) Thus, viewed in the context of § 245's being directed at crimes of racial violence, a state prosecution, proceeding as it does in a court of law, cannot be characterized as an application of "force or threat of force" within the meaning of § 245, and, whatever "rights" that section may confer, none of them is denied by a state criminal prosecution for conspiracy or boycott, there being no "federal statutory right that no State should even attempt to prosecute [petitioners] for their conduct," Peacock, supra, at 384 U. S. 826. P. 421 U. S. 227.(c) The absence of any evidence or legislative history indicating that Congress intended to accomplish in 18 U.S.C. § 245 what it has failed or refused to do directly through amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 also necessitates rejection of the right of removal in this case, in addition to which there are other avenues of relief open to petitioners for vindication of their federal rights that may have been or will be violated. Pp. 421 U. S. 227-228.488 F.2d 284, affirmed.WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 421 U. S. 229. DOUGLAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Page 421 U. S. 215 |
3,202 | 1995_95-5661 | JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue here is whether a Government motion attesting to the defendant's substantial assistance in a criminal investigation and requesting that the district court depart below the minimum of the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines also permits the district court to depart below any statutory minimum sentence. We hold that it does not.IPetitioner and several others entered into an agreement to buy cocaine from confidential informants of the United States Customs Service. As a result, petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, see § 406, 84 Stat. 1265, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 846, a crime that carries a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, see § 841(b)(1)(A). Plea negotiations ensued, and petitioner ultimately signed a cooperating plea agreement. The agreement provided, in pertinent part, that in return for petitioner's cooperation with the Government's investigation and his guilty plea, the Government would "move the sentencing court, pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, to depart from the otherwise applicable guideline range." App. 9. The agreement noted that the offense to which petitioner would plead guilty "carries a statutory mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment." Id., at 6. The agreement did not require the Government to authorize the District Court to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum, nor did it specifically state that the Government would oppose departure below the statutory minimum.Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charged conspiracy. The probation officer determined that the Guideline sentencing range applicable to petitioner's crime was 135 to 168 months' imprisonment. In a letter to the court, the Government described the assistance rendered by petitioner and moved the123court to impose "a sentence lower than what the [c]ourt ha[d] determined to be the otherwise applicable [sic] under the sentencing guidelines." Id., at 13-14. The letter specifically noted that "[t]his motion is made pursuant to Section 5K1.1." Id., at 13. The Government did not request a sentence below the statutory minimum, although, again, it did not state that the Government opposed such a departure. The District Court granted the Government's motion and departed downward from the sentencing range set by the Guidelines. However, because the Government had not also moved the District Court to depart below the statutory minimum pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3553(e), the court ruled that it had no authority to so depart; it thus imposed the 10-year minimum sentence required by statute.On appeal, petitioner contended that the District Court had erred in concluding that it had no authority to depart below the statutory minimum. A § 5K1.1 motion, he argued, not only allows the court to depart downward from the sentencing level set by the Guidelines but also permits the court to depart below a lower statutory minimum. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1, p. s. (Nov. 1995) (USSG). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed the 10-year sentence. 55 F.3d 130 (1995). A petition for rehearing was denied, with six judges dissenting.As we noted in Wade v. United States, 504 U. S. 181, 185 (1992), the Courts of Appeals disagree as to whether a Government motion attesting to the defendant's substantial assistance and requesting that the district court depart below the minimum of the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines also permits the district court to depart below any statutory minimum.11 Compare 55 F.3d 130 (CA3 1995) and United States v. RodriguezMorales, 958 F.2d 1441 (CA8), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 940 (1992), with United States v. Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490 (CA2 1991), United States v. Beckett, 996 F.2d 70 (CA5 1993), United States v. Wills, 35 F.3d 1192 (CA7 1994), and United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711 (CA9 1991).124We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 516 U. S. 963 (1995). We now hold that such a motion does not authorize a departure below a lower statutory minimum.IIThe question presented involves two subsections of federal statutes and a policy statement of the Guidelines. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3553(e) provides:"Limited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum.-Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code."Title 28 U. S. C. § 994(n), in turn, states:"The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense."Finally, the text of § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines provides:"Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)"Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.125"(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: [List of five factors for the court's consideration, including] the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered."Petitioner argues that § 5K1.1 creates what he calls a "unitary" motion system, in which a motion attesting to the substantial assistance of the defendant and requesting a departure below the Guidelines range also permits a district court to depart below the statutory minimum.2 The Government views § 5K1.1 as establishing a binary motion system, which permits the Government to authorize a departure below the Guidelines range while withholding from the court the authority to depart below a lower statutory minimum. The parties argue, naturally, that their respective interpretations of the system actually adopted by the Sentencing Commission were permissible ones under § 3553(e) and § 994(n).3We believe that § 3553(e) requires a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to "impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum2 Petitioner also argues for the first time in his reply brief that the plea agreement into which he entered was at least ambiguous with respect to whether it required the Government to move the District Court to depart below the statutory minimum-and thus that the agreement itself permitted the court to depart below the 10-year minimum. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 7-8. We do not view this issue as included within the question upon which we granted certiorari, see Pet. for Cert. 3 ("Did the sentencing court have the discretion to depart below the applicable statutory minimum once the United States moved for departure under USSG § 5K1, without the requirement of a second government departure application under 18 U. S. C. 3553(e)?"), and petitioner appears to concede that it is not, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. We therefore decline to address the argument.3 Although it is plain that under § 994(n), the Commission was at least authorized to create a system in which no Government motion of any kind need be filed before the district court may depart below the Guidelines minimum, neither party argues that the Commission has created such a system.126sentence" before the court may impose such a sentence. Petitioner and his amici repeatedly characterize the motion required by § 3553(e) as a "motion that substantial assistance has occurred," Brief for Petitioner 12, a "motion acknowledging the defendant's 'substantial assistance,'" id., at 8, and the like. But the term "motion" generally means "[a]n application made to a court or judge for purpose of obtaining a rule or order directing some act to be done in favor of the applicant." Black's Law Dictionary 1013 (6th ed. 1990).4 Papers simply "acknowledging" substantial assistance are not sufficient if they do not indicate desire for, or consent to, a sentence below the statutory minimum.5Of course, the Government did more than simply "acknowledge" substantial assistance here: It moved the court to impose a sentence below the Guideline range. But we agree with the Government that nothing in § 3553(e) suggests that a district court has power to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect a defendant's cooperation when the Government has not authorized such a sentence, but has instead moved for a departure only from the applicable Guidelines range. Nor does anything in § 3553(e) or § 994(n) suggest that the Commission itself may dispense with § 3553(e)'s motion requirement or, alternatively, "deem"4 See also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1254 (2d ed. 1987) (defining "motion" in the legal sense as "an application made to a court or judge for an order, ruling, or the like"); Wade v. United States, 504 U. S. 181, 187 (1992) ("[Substantial assistance] is a necessary condition for [a departure, but] it is not a sufficient one. The Government's decision not to move may have been based not on a failure to acknowledge or appreciate [the defendant's] help, but simply on its rational assessment of the cost and benefit that would flow from moving").5We do not mean to imply, of course, that specific language (such as that quoted in text) or, on the other hand, an express reference to § 3553(e) is necessarily required before a court may depart below the statutory minimum. Cf. Brief for Petitioner 5-6, 18, 32, 34 (characterizing the opposing argument in this fashion). But the Government must in some way indicate its desire or consent that the court depart below the statutory minimum before the court may do so.127a motion requesting or authorizing different action-such as a departure below the Guidelines minimum-to be a motion authorizing the district court to depart below the statutory minimum.Moreover, we do not read § 5K1.1 as attempting to exercise this nonexistent authority. Section 5K1.1 says: "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance ... the court may depart from the guidelines," while its Application Note 1 says: "Under circumstances set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(e) and 28 U. S. C. § 994(n) ... substantial assistance ... may justify a sentence below a statutorily required minimum sentence," § 5K1.1, comment., n. 1. One of the circumstances set forth in § 3553(e) is, as we have explained previously, that the Government has authorized the court to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum.Petitioner and his amici argue that § 3553(e) requires a sentence below the statutory minimum to be imposed in "accordance" with the Guidelines; that § 994(n) specifically directs the Commission to draft a provision covering substantial assistance cases, including cases in which a sentence below a statutory minimum is warranted; and that if § 5K1.1 is not read as creating a unitary motion system, then the Commission has improperly failed to meet its obligation, because no other provision of the Guidelines implements § 3553(e) and § 994(n). They also argue (1) that the reference to § 3553(e) in § 5K1.1's Application Note 1 indicates that § 5K1.1 is a "conduit" established by the Commission for "implementation" of § 3553(e); (2) that Application Note 2's use of the broad term "sentencing reduction," rather than "departure from the guidelines range," supports petitioner's view that § 5K1.1 authorizes departures below a statutory minimum; 6 (3) that Application Note 3 makes sense only on6 Application Note 2 provides in relevant part: "The sentencing reduction for assistance to authorities shall be considered independently of any reduction for acceptance of responsibility." USSG § 5K1.1, comment., n. 2.128the assumption that the district court retains "full discretionary power" over the extent of the sentencing reduction (i. e., the authority to choose any sentence once the Government makes any motion confirming the defendant's substantial assistance); 7 (4) that the reference to § 5K1.1 alone (rather than to § 3553(e)) in USSG § 2D1.1's Application Note 7 further supports petitioner's claim that § 5K1.1 is a conduit for implementation of § 3553(e); 8 and (5) that if the factors described in § 5K1.1(a) limiting the district court's discretion do not apply to sentences imposed after the Government moves to depart below the statutory minimum, then the district court's discretion will be wholly unlimited in those circumstances.In the Government's view, § 3553(e) already gives the district court authority to depart below the statutory minimum on motion to do so by the prosecutor. The Government urges us to read the last sentence of § 3553(e), and the inclusion of the phrase "including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence" in § 994(n), as merely requiring the Commission to constrain the district court's discretion in choosing a sentence after the Government moves to depart below the statutory minimum. The Government contends that the first paragraph of § 5K1.1 does not authorize departures below the statutory minimum, but that § 5K1.1(a) does apply to sentences imposed after the7 Application Note 3 provides: "Substantial weight should be given to the government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain." USSG § 5K1.1, comment., n. 3.8 Application Note 7 provides in pertinent part: "Where a mandatory (statutory) minimum sentence applies, this mandatory minimum sentence may be 'waived' and a lower sentence imposed (including a sentence below the applicable guideline range), as provided in 28 U. S. C. § 994(n), by reason of a defendant's 'substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.' See § 5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance to Authorities)." USSG §2D1.1, comment., n. 7. Section 2D1.1 is a Guideline addressed to a variety of drug offenses.129Government moves to depart below the statutory minimum (as well as to sentences imposed after the Government moves to depart below the Guidelines range); § 5K1.1(a) thus implements the requirements of § 3553(e) and § 994(n) that relate to sentences below the statutory minimum, by requiring the district court to consider the factors listed in §§ 5K1.1(a)(1)-(5) in determining the appropriate extent of a departure below the statutory minimum. According to the Government, the difficulties and gaps referred to by petitioner vanish once § 5K1.1(a) is so construed.We agree with the Government that the relevant parts of the statutes merely charge the Commission with constraining the district court's discretion in choosing a specific sentence after the Government moves for a departure below the statutory minimum.9 Congress did not charge the Commission with "implementing" § 3553(e)'s Government motion requirement, beyond adopting provisions constraining the district court's discretion regarding the particular sentence selected.Although the various relevant Guidelines provisions invoked by the parties could certainly be clearer, we also believe that the Government's interpretation of the current provisions is the better one. Section 5K1.1(a) may guide the district court when it selects a sentence below the statutory minimum, as well as when it selects a sentence below the Guidelines range.10 The Commission has not, however, im-9 Notably, §3553(e) states that the "sentence" shall be imposed in accordance with the Guidelines and policy statements, not that the "departure" shall occur, or shall be authorized, in accordance with the Guidelines and policy statements.10 Section § 5K1.1(a) may apply of its own force to sentences below the statutory minimum, see ibid. (providing that the district court shall determine "[t]he appropriate reduction" by applying a nonexhaustive list of factors), and both the reference to § 3553(e) in § 5KU's Application Note 1 and the reference to §5K1.1 in §2D1.1's Application Note 7 may reflect that fact. Or perhaps the phrase "[t]he appropriate reduction" in § 5K1.1(a) encompasses only departures below the Guidelines range, but130properly attempted to dispense with or modify the requirement for a departure below the statutory minimum spelled out in § 3553(e)-that of a Government motion requesting or authorizing a departure below the statutory minimum.The Government has made no such motion here. Hence, the District Court correctly concluded that it lacked the authority to sentence petitioner to less than 10 years' imprisonment.IIIWhat is at stake in the long run is whether the Government can make a motion authorizing the district court to depart below the Guidelines range but withholding from the district court the power to depart below the statutory minimum. Although the Government contends correctly that the Commission does not have authority to "deem" a Government motion that does not authorize a departure below the statutory minimum to be one that does authorize such a departure, the Government apparently reads § 994(n) to permit the Commission to construct a unitary motion system by adjusting the requirements for a departure below the Guidelines minimum-that is, by providing that the district court may depart below the Guidelines range only when the Government is willing to authorize the court to depart below the statutory minimum, if the court finds that to be appropriate. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-31.We need not decide whether the Commission could create this second type of unitary motion system, for two reasons. First, even if the Commission had done so, that would not help petitioner, since the Government has not authorized a departure below the statutory minimum here. Second, we agree with the Government that the Commission has not adopted this type of unitary motion system. Neither thethe Application Notes are meant to suggest that the court should also consider the § 5K1.1(a) factors in the analogous circumstance of a departure below the statutory minimum.131text of § 5Kl.1 nor its commentary expressly limits the authority of the court to depart below the Guidelines minimum to situations in which the Government has moved to depart below the statutory minimum. The text of § 5Kl.1 says:"Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance ... , the court may depart from the guidelines." We do not read this sentence to say: "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance ... and authorizing the court to depart below the statutory minimum, if any, the court may depart from the guidelines." Rather, we read it as permitting the district court to depart below the Guidelines range when the Government states that the defendant has provided substantial assistance and requests or authorizes the district court to depart below the Guidelines range. As we have noted, supra, at 127-130, the Application Notes to § 5Kl.1 and § 2Dl.1 do not compel any other reading.The judgment is affirmed.It is so ordered | OCTOBER TERM, 1995SyllabusMELENDEZ v. UNITED STATESCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUITNo.95-5661. Argued February 27, 1996-Decided June 17, 1996After agreeing with others to buy cocaine, petitioner was charged with a conspiracy violative of 21 U. S. C. § 846, which carries a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. He ultimately signed a plea agreement providing, inter alia, that in return for his cooperation with the Government's investigation and his guilty plea, the Government would move the sentencing court, pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, to depart downward from the otherwise applicable Guideline sentencing range, which turned out to be 135 to 168 months' imprisonment. Although the agreement noted the applicability of the 1O-year statutory minimum sentence, neither it nor the ensuing § 5K1.1 motion mentioned departure below that minimum. Pursuant to the motion, the District Court departed downward from the Guideline range in sentencing petitioner. It also ruled, however, that it had no authority to depart below the statutory minimum because the Government had not made a motion, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3553(e), that it do so. It thus sentenced petitioner to 10 years, and the Third Circuit affirmed.Held: A Government motion attesting to the defendant's substantial assistance in a criminal investigation and requesting that the district court depart below the minimum of the applicable Guideline sentencing range does not also authorize the court to depart below a lower statutory minimum sentence. Pp. 124-131.(a) Guideline § 5K1.1 does not create a "unitary" motion system.Title 18 U. S. C. § 3553(e) requires a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to "impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence" before the court may impose such a sentence. Nothing in §3553(e) suggests that a district court has the power to impose such a sentence when the Government has not authorized it, but has instead moved for a departure only from the applicable Guidelines range. Nor does anything in §3553(e) or 28 U. S. C. § 994(n) suggest that the Commission itself may dispense with § 3553(e)'s motion requirement or, alternatively, "deem" a motion requesting or authorizing different action-such as a departure below the Guidelines minimum-to be a motion authorizing departure below the statutory minimum. Section 5K1.1 cannot be read as attempting to exercise this nonexistent authority. That section states that "[u]pon motion of the121government ... the court may depart from the guidelines," while its Application Note 1 declares that "[u]nder circumstances set forth in ... § 3553(e) and ... § 994(n) ... substantial assistance ... may justify a sentence below a statutorily required minimum sentence." One of the circumstances set forth in §3553(e) is that the Government has authorized the court to impose such a sentence. The Government is correct that the relevant statutory provisions merely charge the Commission with constraining the district court's discretion in choosing a specific sentence once the Government has moved for a departure below the statutory minimum, not with "implementing" §3553(e)'s motion requirement, and that § 5K1.1 does not improperly attempt to dispense with or modify that requirement. Pp. 124-130.(b) For two reasons, the Court need not decide whether the Government is correct in reading § 994(n) to permit the Commission to construct a unitary motion system by providing that the district court may depart below the Guidelines range only when the Government is willing to authorize the court to depart below the statutory minimum, if the court finds that to be appropriate. First, even if the Commission had done so, that would not help petitioner, since the Government has not authorized a departure below the statutory minimum here. Second, the Commission has not adopted this type of unitary system. Pp. 130-131.55 F.3d 130, affirmed.THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, and in which O'CONNOR and BREYER, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 131. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 132. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 132.Patrick A. Mullin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David Zlotnick and Peter Go ldberger.Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben. ** Alan I. Horowitz, James R. Lovelace, and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal.Chester M. Keller filed a brief for the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in New Jersey as amicus curiae.122Full Text of Opinion |
3,203 | 1976_75-746 | MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue in these cases is whether, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, Congress may create a new cause of action in the Government for civil penalties enforceable in an administrative agency where there is no jury trial.IAfter extensive investigation, Congress concluded, in 1970, that work-related deaths and injuries had become a "drastic" national problem. [Footnote 1] Finding the existing state statutory remedies Page 430 U. S. 445 as well as state common law actions for negligence and wrongful death to be inadequate to protect the employee population from death and injury due to unsafe working conditions, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA or Act), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. The Act created a new statutory duty to avoid maintaining unsafe or unhealthy working conditions, and empowers the Secretary of Labor to promulgate health and safety standards. [Footnote 2] Two new remedies were provided -- permitting the Federal Government, proceeding before an administrative agency, (1) to obtain abatement orders requiring employers to correct unsafe working conditions and (2) to impose civil penalties on any employer maintaining any unsafe working condition. Each remedy exists whether or not an employee is actually injured or killed as a result of the condition, and existing state statutory and common law remedies for actual injury and death remain unaffected.Under the Act, inspectors, representing the Secretary of Page 430 U. S. 446 Labor, are authorized to conduct reasonable safety and health inspections. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a). If a violation is discovered, the inspector, on behalf of the Secretary, issues a citation to the employer fixing a reasonable time for its abatement and, in his discretion, proposing a civil penalty. §§ 658, 659. Such proposed penalties may range from nothing for de minimis and nonserious violations to not more than $1,000 for serious violations, to a maximum of $10,000 for willful or repeated violations, §§ 658(a), 659(a), 666(a)-(c) and (j).If the employer wishes to contest the penalty or the abatement order, he may do so by notifying the Secretary of Labor within 15 days, in which event the abatement order is automatically stayed. §§ 659(a), (b), 666(d). An evidentiary hearing is then held before an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission consists of three members, appointed for six-year terms, each of whom is qualified "by reason of training, education or experience" to adjudicate contested citations and assess penalties. §§ 651(3), 659(c), 661, 666(i). At this hearing, the burden is on the Secretary to establish the elements of the alleged violation and the propriety of his proposed abatement order and proposed penalty, and the judge is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate any or all of these items, giving due consideration in his penalty assessment to "the size of the business of the employer . . the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations." § 666(i). The judge's decision becomes the Commission's final and appealable order unless, within 30 days, a Commissioner directs that it be reviewed by the full Commission. [Footnote 3] §§ 659(c), 661(i); see 29 CFR §§ 2200.90, 2200.91 (1976).If review is granted, the Commission's subsequent order directing abatement and the payment of any assessed penalty Page 430 U. S. 447 becomes final unless the employer timely petitions for judicial review in the appropriate court of appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). The Secretary similarly may seek review of Commission orders, § 660(b), but, in either case,"[t]he findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive."§ 660(a). If the employer fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary may commence a collection action in a federal district court in which neither the fact of the violation nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be retried. § 666(k). Thus, the penalty may be collected without the employer's ever being entitled to a jury determination of the facts constituting the violation.IIPetitioners were separately cited by the Secretary and ordered immediately to abate pertinent hazards after inspections of their respective worksites conducted in 1972 revealed conditions that assertedly violated a mandatory occupational safety standard promulgated by the Secretary under § 5(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). In each case, an employee's death had resulted. Petitioner Irey was cited for a willful violation of 29 CFR § 1926.652(b) and Table P-1 (1976) -- a safety standard promulgated by the Secretary under the Act requiring the sides of trenches in "unstable or soft material" to be "shored, . . . sloped, or otherwise supported by means of sufficient strength to protect the employees working within them." The Secretary proposed a penalty of $7,500 for this violation, and ordered the hazard abated immediately.Petitioner Atlas was cited for a serious violation of 29 CFR §§ 1926.500(b)(1) and (f)(5)(ii) (1976), which require that roof opening covers, be "so installed as to prevent accidental displacement." The Secretary proposed a penalty of $600 for this violation, and ordered the hazard abated immediately.Petitioners timely contested these citations, and were afforded hearings before Administrative Law Judges of the Page 430 U. S. 448 Commission. The judges, and later the Commission, affirmed the findings of violations and accompanying abatement requirements and assessed petitioner Irey a reduced civil penalty of $5,000 and petitioner Atlas the civil penalty of $600 which the Secretary had proposed. Petitioners respectively thereupon sought judicial review in the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, challenging both the Commission's factual findings that violations had occurred and the constitutionality of the Act's enforcement procedure.A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Commission's orders in the Irey case over petitioner's and a dissenter's contention that the failure to afford the employer a jury trial on the question whether he had violated OSHA was in violation of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides for jury trial in most civil suits at common law. 519 F.2d 1200. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, over four dissents, adhered to the original panel's decision. Id. at 1215. It concluded that this Court's rulings to date"leave no doubt that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable, at least in the context of a case such as this one, and that Congress is free to provide an administrative enforcement scheme without the intervention of a jury at any stage."Id. at 1218.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also affirmed the Commission's order in the Atlas case over a similar claim that the enforcement scheme violated the Seventh Amendment. 518 F.2d 990. It stated:"Where adjudicative responsibility rests only in the administering agency, 'jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication, and would substantially interfere with the [agency's] role in the statutory scheme.' [Footnote 4]"Id. at 1011. Page 430 U. S. 449 We granted the petitions for writ of certiorari limited to the important question whether the Seventh Amendment prevents Congress from assigning to an administrative agency, under these circumstances, the task of adjudicating violations of OSHA. [Footnote 5] 424 U.S. 964.IIIThe Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . ." The phrase "Suits at common law" has been construed to refer to cases tried prior to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment in courts of law in which jury trial was customary, as distinguished from courts of equity or admiralty, in which jury trial was not. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830). Petitioners claim that a suit in a federal court by the Government for civil penalties for violation of a statute is a suit for a money judgment, which is classically a suit at common law, Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146, 138 U. S. 151 (1891); and that the defendant therefore has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury determination of all issues of fact in such a case, see Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 213 U. S. 115 (1909) (dictum); United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, 232 U. S. 47 (1914) (dictum). [Footnote 6] Page 430 U. S. 450 Petitioners taken claim that to permit Congress to assign the function of adjudicating the Government's rights to civil penalties for violation of the statute to a different forum -- an administrative agency in which no jury is available -- would be to permit Congress to deprive a defendant of his Seventh Amendment jury right. We disagree. At least in cases in which "public rights" are being litigated -- e.g., cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact -- the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible. [Footnote 7]Congress has often created new statutory obligations, provided for civil penalties for their violation, and committed exclusively to an administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation has in fact occurred. These statutory schemes have been sustained by this Court, albeit often without express reference to the Seventh Amendment. Thus, taxes may constitutionally be assessed and collected together with penalties, with the relevant facts in some instances being adjudicated only by an administrative agency. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 283 U. S. 599-600 (1931); Murray's Page 430 U. S. 451 Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 284 (1856). [Footnote 8] Neither of these cases expressly discussed the question whether the taxation scheme violated the Seventh Amendment. However, in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938), the Court said, in rejecting a claim under the Sixth Amendment that the assessment and adjudication of tax penalties could not be made without a jury, that "the determination of the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency, instead of a jury," id. at 303 U. S. 402. Similarly, Congress has entrusted to an administrative agency the tax of adjudicating violations of the customs and immigration laws and assessing penalties based thereon. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 287 U. S. 335 (1932) ("[D]ue process of law does not require that the courts, rather than administrative officers, be charged . . . with determining the facts upon which the imposition of [fines] depends"); Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909). [Footnote 9] See also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 279 U. S. 451, 279 U. S. 458 (1929).In Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921), the Court sustained Congress' power to pass a statute, applicable to the District of Columbia, temporarily suspending landlords' legal remedy of ejectment and relegating them to an administrative factfinding Page 430 U. S. 452 forum charged with determining fair rents at which tenants could hold over despite the expiration of their leases. In that case, the Court squarely rejected a challenge to the statute based on the Seventh Amendment, stating:"The statute is objected to on the further ground that landlords and tenants are deprived by it of a trial by jury on the right to possession of the land. If the power of the Commission established by the statute to regulate the relation is established, as we think it is, by what we have said, this objection amounts to little. To regulate the relation and to decide the facts affecting it are hardly separable."Id. at 158. (Emphasis added.)In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932), apparently referring to the above-cited line of authority, the Court stated:"[T]he distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments. . . . [T]he Congress, in exercising the powers confided to it, may establish 'legislative' courts . . . to serve as special tribunals 'to examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others, which, from their nature, do not require judicial determination, and yet are susceptible of it.' But 'the mode of determining matters of this class is completely within congressional control. Congress may reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals.' . . . Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans."Id. at 285 U. S. 50-51. (Emphasis added.) Page 430 U. S. 453In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937), the Court squarely addressed the Seventh Amendment issue involved when Congress commits the factfinding function under a new statute to an administrative tribunal. Under the National Labor Relations Act, Congress had committed to the National Labor Relations Board, in a proceeding brought by its litigating arm, the task of deciding whether an unfair labor practice had been committed and of ordering backpay where appropriate. The Court stated:"The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding. Reinstatement of the employee and payment for time lost are requirements [administratively] imposed for violation of the statute, and are remedies appropriate to its enforcement. The contention under the Seventh Amendment is without merit."Id. at 301 U. S. 48-49. (Emphasis added.) [Footnote 10] Page 430 U. S. 454This passage from Jones & Laughlin has recently been explained in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189 (1974), in which the Court held the Seventh Amendment applicable to private damages suits in federal courts brought under the housing discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Court rejected the argument that Jones & Laughlin held the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to any action based on a statutorily created right even if the action was brought before a tribunal which customarily utilizes a jury as its factfinding arm. Instead, we concluded that Jones & Laughlin upheld"congressional power to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized court of equity [Footnote 11] free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment."415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 194-195. (Emphasis added.)Finally, in Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363 (1974), [Footnote 12] in discussing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921), and Jones & Laughlin, we stated:"Block v. Hirsh merely stands for the principle that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication. . . . We may assume that the Seventh Amendment would not be a bar to a congressional effort to Page 430 U. S. 455 entrust landlord-tenant disputes, including those over the right to possession, to an administrative agency. Congress has not seen fit to do so, however, but rather has provided that actions under § 16-1501 be brought as ordinary civil actions in the District of Columbia's court of general jurisdiction. Where it has done so, and where the action involves rights and remedies recognized at common law, it must preserve to parties their right to a jury trial."416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 383. (Emphasis added.)In sum, the cases discussed above stand clearly for the proposition that, when Congress creates new statutory "public rights," it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be "preserved" in "suits at common law." [Footnote 13] Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from committing some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the relevant field. This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law, instead of an administrative agency. Petitioners would nevertheless have us disregard the interpretation of Jones & Laughlin which we recently espoused in Curtis v. Loether and Pernell v. Southall Realty, reading it instead as a holding solely that the entire proceeding before the NLRB was really equitable in nature; and they would have us entirely disregard Block v. Page 430 U. S. 456 Hirsh, supra. They would have us disregard the dictum in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932), that the adjudication of congressionally created public rights may be assigned to administrative agencies, as well as the similar holdings in Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Eltin, 287 U. S. 329 (1932); Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 (1856); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); and Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938).None of the grounds tendered for so reinterpreting the Seventh Amendment is convincing. It is suggested that, in some of the cases, Elting, Oceanic, Murray's Lessee, Phillips, and Helvering, the Seventh Amendment was not expressly put in issue. But these cases are clear enough that, in the context involved, there was no requirement that the courts be involved at all in the factfinding process in the first instance. It is difficult to believe that these holdings or dicta did not subsume the proposition that a jury trial was not required. Furthermore, there are the remaining cases where the Court expressly held or observed that the Seventh Amendment did not bar administrative factfindings. Jones & Laughlin, Block, Pernell, and Curtis.Second, it is argued with some force that cases such as Murray's Lessee, Eltin, Oceanic, Phillips, and Helvering all deal with the exercise of sovereign powers that are inherently in the exclusive domain of the Federal Government and critical to its very existence -- the power over immigration, the importation of goods, and taxation -- and that the theory of those cases is inapplicable where the Government exercises other powers that petitioners apparently regard as less fundamental, less exclusive, and less vital to the existence of the Nation, such as the power to regulate commerce among the several States, the latter being the power Congress sought to exercise in enacting the statute at issue here. The difficulty with this argument is that the Court in these cases, and in Page 430 U. S. 457 others, did not appear to confine its holdings in this manner. In Murray's Lessee, the Court referred to"matters, involving public rights [that] congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper."18 How. at 59 U. S. 284. In Oceanic, which sustained the administrative imposition of a fine for the wrongful importation of aliens, the Court said that its ruling was in accordance with "settled judicial construction" that, "not only as to tariff, but as to internal revenue, taxation and other subjects," Congress could"impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power."214 U.S. at 214 U. S. 339. (Emphasis added.) Crowell spoke broadly of the distinction between cases of private right and those which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority "in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments," see supra at 430 U. S. 452, and gave "familiar illustrations" of the permissible use of administrative agencies in connection with the exercise of such congressional powers as "interstate and foreign commerce." 285 U.S. at 285 U. S. 51. Helvering v. Mitchell, supra at 303 U. S. 402-403, relying on Oceanic and similar cases, stated simply that "the determination of the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency, instead of a jury." It is also apparent that Jones & Laughlin, Pernell, and Curtis are not amenable to the limitations suggested by petitioners.Third is the assertion that the right to jury trial was never intended to depend on the identity of the forum to which Congress has chosen to submit a dispute; otherwise, it is said, Congress could utterly destroy the right to a jury trial by always providing for administrative, rather than judicial, resolution of the vast range of cases that now arise in the courts. Page 430 U. S. 458 The argument is well put, but it overstates the holdings of our prior cases, and is, in any event, unpersuasive. Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving "public rights," e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated.More to the point, it is apparent from the history of jury trial in civil matters that factfinding, which is the essential function of the jury in civil cases, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S. 149, 413 U. S. 157 (1973) was never the exclusive province of the jury under either the English or American legal systems at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment; and the question whether a fact would be found by a jury turned to a considerable degree on the nature of the forum in which a litigant found himself. Critical factfinding was performed without juries in suits in equity, and there were no juries in admiralty, Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830); nor were there juries in the military justice system. The jury was the factfinding mode in most suits in the common law courts, but it was not exclusively so: condemnation was a suit at common law, but constitutionally could be tried without a jury, Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 91 U. S. 375-376 (1876); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 167 U. S. 593 (1897); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 397 U. S. 18 (1970). "[M]any civil as well as criminal proceedings at common law were without a jury." Kohl v. United States, supra at 91 U. S. 376. The question whether a particular case was to be tried in a court of equity -- without a jury -- or a court of law -- with a jury -- did not depend on whether the suit involved factfinding or on the nature of the facts to be found. Factfinding could be a critical matter either at law or in equity. Rather, as a general rule, the decision turned on whether courts of law supplied a cause of action and an Page 430 U. S. 459 adequate remedy to the litigant. [Footnote 14] If it did, then the case would be tried in a court of law before a jury. Otherwise, the case would be tried to a court of equity sitting without a jury. Thus, suits for damages for breach of contract, for example, were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury; but specific performance was a remedy unavailable in a court of law, and, where such relief was sought, the case would be tried in a court of equity with the facts as to making and breach to be ascertained by the court.The Seventh Amendment was declaratory of the existing law, for it required only that jury trial in suits at common law was to be "preserved." It thus did not purport to require a jury trial where none was required before. Moreover, it did not seek to change the factfinding mode in equity or admiralty, or to freeze equity jurisdiction as it existed in 1789, preventing it from developing new remedies where those available in courts of law were inadequate. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U. S. 531 (1970), is instructive in this respect. We there held that a jury trial is required in stockholder derivative suits where, if the corporation itself had sued, a jury trial would have been available to the corporation. It is apparent, however, that, prior to the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merging the law and equity functions of the federal courts, the very suit involved in Bernhard would have been in a court of equity sitting without a jury, not because the underlying issue was any different at all from the issue the corporation would have presented had it sued, but because the stockholder plaintiff who was denied standing in a court of law to sue on the issue was enabled in proper circumstances, starting in the early part Page 430 U. S. 460 of the 19th century, to sue in equity on behalf of the company.The point is that the Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases. It took the existing legal order as it found it, and there is little or no basis for concluding that the Amendment should now be interpreted to provide an impenetrable barrier to administrative factfinding under otherwise valid federal regulatory statutes. We cannot conclude that the Amendment rendered Congress powerless when it concluded that remedies available in courts of law were inadequate to cope with a problem within Congress' power to regulate -- to create new public rights and remedies by statute and commit their enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court of law -- such as an administrative agency -- in which facts are not found by juries. Indeed, as the Oceanic opinion said, the "settled judicial construction" was to the contrary "from the beginning." 214 U.S. at 214 U. S. 339. That case indicated, as had Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103 (1909), that the Government could commit the enforcement of statutes and the imposition and collection of fines to the judiciary, in which event, jury trial would be required, see also United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37 (1914), but that the United States could also validly opt for administrative enforcement, without judicial trials. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 303 U. S. 402-403, and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 551. [Footnote 15]Thus, history and our cases support the proposition that the Page 430 U. S. 461 right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue to be resolved, but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved. [Footnote 16] Congress found the common law and other existing remedies for work injuries resulting from unsafe working conditions to be inadequate to protect the Nation's working men and women. It created a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law, and placed their enforcement in a tribunal supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved. The Seventh Amendment is no bar to the creation of new rights or to their enforcement outside the regular courts of law.The judgments below are affirmed.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtAtlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977)Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health CommissionNo. 75-746Argued November 29, 1976Decided March 23, 1977*430 U.S. 442SyllabusUpon finding that the existing state statutory remedies and common law actions for negligence and wrongful death were inadequate to protect employees from death and injury due to unsafe working conditions, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), under which a new statutory duty was imposed on employers to avoid maintaining unsafe working conditions. Two new remedies were provided by permitting the Federal Government, proceeding before an administrative agency, (1) to obtain abatement orders requiring employers to correct unsafe working conditions, and (2) to impose civil penalties on any employer maintaining any unsafe working condition. If an employer contests a penalty or abatement order, an evidentiary hearing is then held before an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission), who is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate the proposed abatement order and penalty. The judge's decision becomes the Commission's final, appealable order, subject to review by the full Commission. If such review is granted, the Commission's subsequent order directing abatement and payment of a penalty becomes final unless the employer petitions for judicial review in the appropriate court of appeals, but the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. If the employer fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary of Labor may commence a collection action in a federal district court in which neither the fact of the violation nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be retried. In the instant cases separate abatement orders were issued and penalties proposed against petitioners for violations of safety standards promulgated under OSHA. After hearings were held before Administrative Law Judges when petitioners each contested the orders Page 430 U. S. 443 and penalties, and the judges and later the Commission had affirmed the findings of violations and the abatement orders and had assessed penalties, petitioners sought judicial review in the Courts of Appeals, challenging both the Commission's factual findings that violations had occurred and the constitutionality of OSHA's enforcement procedures. Each Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's orders over each petitioner's contention that the failure to afford the employer a jury trial on the question whether it had violated OSHA contravened the Seventh Amendment, which provides that, "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."Held: The Seventh Amendment does not prevent Congress from assigning to an administrative agency the task of adjudicating violations of OSHA. When Congress creates new statutory "public rights," it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be "preserved" in "suits at common law." That Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases, but took the existing legal order as it found it, and hence there is little or no basis for now interpreting it as providing an impenetrable barrier to administrative factfinding under otherwise valid federal regulatory statutes. The Amendment did not render Congress powerless -- when it concluded that remedies available in courts of law were inadequate to cope with a problem within its power to regulate -- so to create such new public rights and remedies by statute and commit their enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court of law (such as an administrative agency) in which facts are not found by juries. Pp. 430 U. S. 449-461.No. 75-746, 518 F.2d 990, and No. 75-748, 519 F.2d 1200, affirmed.WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases. Page 430 U. S. 444 |
3,204 | 1973_72-1603 | MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which the CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join.This case presents the issue of the legality, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, of a warrantless seizure of an automobile and the examination of its exterior at a police impoundment area after the car had been removed from a public parking lot.Evidence obtained upon this examination was introduced at the respondent's state court trial for first-degree murder. He was convicted. The Federal District Court, on a habeas corpus application, ruled that the examination was a search violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 354 F. Supp. 26 (SD Ohio 1972). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 476 F.2d 467 (1973). We granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973), and now conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, there was no violation of the protection afforded by the Amendments.IIn 1968, respondent Arthur Ben Lewis, Jr., was tried and convicted by a jury in an Ohio state court for the first-degree murder of Paul Radcliffe. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. Lewis, 22 Ohio St.2d 125, 258 N.E.2d 445 (1970). This Court denied review. Lewis v. Ohio, 400 U.S. 959 (1970). Page 417 U. S. 586On respondent's federal habeas application, the District Court, from the record and after an evidentiary hearing, adduced the following facts:On the afternoon of July 19, 1967, Radcliffe's body was found near his car on the banks of the Olentangy River in Delaware County, Ohio. The car had gone over the embankment and had come to rest in brush. Radcliffe had died from shotgun wounds. Casts were made of tire tracks at the scene, and foreign paint scrapings were removed from the right rear fender of Radcliffe's automobile.Within five days of Radcliffe's death, the investigation began to focus upon respondent Lewis. It was learned that Lewis knew Radcliffe. Lewis had been negotiating the sale of a business and had executed a contract of sale. The purchaser, Jack Smith, employed Radcliffe,. an accountant, to examine Lewis' books. Police went to Lewis' place of business to question him, and there observed the model and color of his car in the thought that it might have been used to push the Radcliffe vehicle over the embankment. Not until several months later, however, in late September, was Lewis again questioned. On October 9, he was asked to appear the next morning at the Office of the Division of Criminal Activities in Columbus for further interrogation.On October 10, at 8 am., a warrant for respondent's arrest was obtained. [Footnote 1] The District Court found that at Page 417 U. S. 587 this time, in addition to probable cause for the arrest, the police also had probable cause to believe that Lewis' car was used in the commission of the crime. An automobile similar to his had been observed leaving the scene; the color of his vehicle was similar to the color of the paint scrapings from the victim's car; in a telephone call to Mrs. Smith, made by a person who said he was Radcliffe but proved not to be, [Footnote 2] the caller made statements that, if true, would benefit only Lewis; he had had body repair work done on the grille, hood, right front fender, and other parts of his car on the day following the crime; and the victim's desk calendar for the day of his death showed the notation, "Call Ben Lewis." [Footnote 3]Respondent Lewis complied with the request to appear. He drove his car to the Activities Office, placed it in a public commercial parking lot a half block away, and arrived shortly after 10 a.m. Although the police were in possession of the arrest warrant for the entire period that Lewis was present, he was not served with that warrant or arrested until late that, afternoon, at approximately 5 p.m. Two hours earlier, Lewis had been permitted to call his lawyer, and two attorneys were present on his behalf in the office at the time of the formal arrest. Upon the arrest, Lewis' car keys and the parking lot claim check were released to the police. A tow truck Page 417 U. S. 588 was dispatched to remove the car from the parking lot to the police impoundment lot.The impounded car was examined the next day by a technician from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation. The tread of its right rear tire was found to match the cast of a tire impression made at the scene of the crime. [Footnote 4] The technician testified that, in his opinion, the foreign paint on the fender of Radcliffe's car was not different from the paint samples taken from respondent's vehicle, that is, there was no difference in color, texture, or order of layering of the paint.The District Court concluded that the seizure and examination of Lewis' car were violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the evidence obtained therefrom should have been excluded at the state court trial. The court, accordingly, issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring the State to "initiate action for a new trial of" respondent within 90 days or, in the alternative, to release him. 354 F. Supp. at 44. The Court of Appeals, in affirming, held that the scraping of paint from the exterior of Lewis' car was, in fact, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; that there was no consent to that search; that it was not incident to Lewis' arrest; and that the seizure of the car could not be justified on the ground that the vehicle was an instrumentality of the crime in plain view.IIThis case is factually different from prior car search cases decided by this Court. The evidence with which we are concerned is not the product of a "search" that implicates Page 417 U. S. 589 traditional considerations of the owner's privacy interest. It consisted of paint scrapings from the exterior and an observation of the tread of a tire on an operative wheel. The issue, therefore, is whether the examination of an automobile's exterior upon probable cause invades a right to privacy which the interposition of a warrant requirement is meant to protect. This is an issue this Court has not previously addressed.The common law notion that a warrant to search and seize is dependent upon the assertion of a superior government interest in property, see, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765), and the proposition that a warrant is valid"only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it,"Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 255 U. S. 309 (1921), were explicitly rejected as controlling Fourth Amendment considerations in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 302-306 (1967). Rather than property rights, the primary object of the Fourth Amendment was determined to be the protection of privacy. Id. at 387 U. S. 305-306. And it had been said earlier:"The decisions of this Court have time and again underscored the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy."Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 357 U. S. 498 (1958). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 769-770 (1966); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 350 (1967); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 410 U. S. 14-15 (1973).At least since Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), the Court has recognized a distinction between the warrantless search and seizure of automobiles or other movable vehicles, on the one hand, and the search of a home or office, on the other. Generally, less stringent Page 417 U. S. 590 warrant requirements have been applied to vehicles. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 399 U. S. 49 (1970), the Court chronicled the development of car searches and seizures. [Footnote 5] An underlying factor in the Carroll-Chambers line of decisions has been the exigent circumstances that exist in connection with movable vehicles."[T]he circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to search is fleeting, since a car is readily movable."Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 50-51. This is strikingly true where the automobile's owner is alerted to police intentions and, as a consequence, the motivation to remove evidence from official grasp is heightened.There is still another distinguishing factor."The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's person or of a building."Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 413 U. S. 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. See People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 388-389, Page 417 U. S. 591 190 N.W. 289, 292 (122). "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 351; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 14. This is not to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion. But insofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.In the present case, nothing from the interior of the car and no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect, were searched or seized and introduced in evidence. [Footnote 6] With the "search" limited to the examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle left in the public parking lot, we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed. [Footnote 7] Stated Page 417 U. S. 592 simply, the invasion of privacy, "if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical." Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 416 U. S. 865 (1974). Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Footnote 8]Here, it has been established and is conceded that the police had probable cause to search Lewis' car. An automobile similar in color and model to his car had been seen leaving the scene of the crime. This similarity was corroborated by comparison of the paint scrapings taken from the victim's car with the color and paint of Lewis' automobile. Lewis had had repair work done on his car immediately following the death of the victim. And he had a nexus with Radcliffe on the day of death. All this provided reason to believe that the car was used in the commission of the crime for which Lewis was arrested. Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 386 U. S. 61 (1967).IIIConcluding, as we have, that the examination of the exterior of the vehicle upon probable cause was reasonable, Page 417 U. S. 593 we have yet to determine whether the prior impoundment of the automobile rendered that examination a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We do not think that, because the police impounded the car prior to the examination, which they could have made on the spot, there is a constitutional barrier to the use of the evidence obtained thereby. Under the circumstances of this case, the seizure itself was not unreasonable.Respondent asserts that this case is indistinguishable from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). We do not agree. The present case differs from Coolidge both in the scope of the search [Footnote 9] and in the circumstances of the seizure. Since the Coolidge car was parked on the defendant's driveway, the seizure of that automobile required an entry upon private property. Here, as in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), the automobile was seized from a public place where access was not meaningfully restricted. This is, in fact, the ground upon which the Coolidge plurality opinion distinguished Chambers, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 463 n. 20. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 413 U. S. 446-447 (1973).In considering whether the lack of a warrant to seize a vehicle invalidates the otherwise legal examination of the car, Chambers is highly pertinent. In Chambers, four men in an automobile were arrested shortly after an armed robbery. The Court concluded that there was probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search the vehicle. The car was taken from the highway to Page 417 U. S. 594 the police station where, some time later, a search producing incriminating evidence, was conducted. We stated:"For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between, on the one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate, and, on the other hand, carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."". . . The probable cause factor still obtained at the station house, and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event, there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained."399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 52.The fact that the car in Chambers was seized after being stopped on a highway, whereas Lewis' car was seized from a public parking lot, has little, if any, legal significance. [Footnote 10] The same arguments and considerations of exigency, immobilization on the spot, and posting a Page 417 U. S. 595 guard obtain. In fact, because the interrogation session ended with awareness that Lewis had been arrested and that his car constituted incriminating evidence, the incentive and potential for the car's removal substantially increased. There was testimony at the federal hearing that Lewis asked one of his attorneys to see that his wife and family got the car, and that the attorney relinquished the keys to the police in order to avoid a physical confrontation. 354 F. Supp. at 33. In Chambers, all occupants of the car were in custody and there were no means of relating this fact or the location of the car (if it had not been impounded) to a friend or confederate. Chambers also stated that a search of the car on the spot was impractical because it was dark and the search could not be carefully executed. 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 52 n. 10. Here too, the seizure facilitated the type of close examination necessary. [Footnote 11]Respondent contends that here, unlike Chambers, probable cause to search the car existed for some time prior to arrest and that, therefore, there were no exigent circumstances. Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the time of arrest. Cf. Chambers, id., at 399 U. S. 50-51. The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained Page 417 U. S. 596 a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation's necessitating prompt police action. [Footnote 12] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtCardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)Cardwell v. LewisNo. 72-1603Argued March 18, 1974Decided June 17, 1974.417 U.S. 583SyllabusOn July 24, 1967, law enforcement officers interviewed respondent in connection with a murder that had occurred five days before and viewed his automobile, which was thought to have been used in the commission of the crime. On October 10, in response to a previous request, respondent appeared at 10 a.m. for questioning at the office of the investigating authorities, having left his car at a nearby public commercial parking lot. Though the police had secured a warrant for respondent's arrest at 8 a.m., respondent was not arrested until late in the afternoon, after which his car was towed to a police impoundment lot, where a warrantless examination the next day of the outside of the car revealed that a tire matched the cast of a tire impression made at the crime scene and that paint samples taken from respondent's car were not different from foreign paint on the fender of the victim's car. Respondent was tried and convicted of the murder, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, the District Court concluded that the seizure and examination of respondent's car violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and that the evidence obtained therefrom should have been excluded at the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the scraping of paint from the car's exterior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; that the search, which was not incident to respondent's arrest, was unconsented; and that the car's seizure could not be justified on the ground that the car was an instrumentality of the crime in plain view.Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 417 U. S. 585-596.476 F.2d 467, reversed.MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concluded that:1. The examination of the exterior of respondent's automobile upon probable cause was reasonable, and invaded no right of privacy that the requirement of a search warrant is meant to protect. Pp. 417 U. S. 588-592. Page 417 U. S. 584(a) The primary object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 305-306. P. 417 U. S. 589.(b) Generally, less stringent warrant requirements are applied to vehicles than to homes or offices, Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, and the search of a vehicle is less intrusive and implicates a lesser expectation of privacy. Pp. 417 U. S. 589-591.(c) The "search" in this case, concededly made on the basis of probable cause, infringed no expectation of privacy. Pp. 417 U. S. 591-592.2. Under the circumstances of this case, the seizure by impounding the car was not unreasonable. Pp. 417 U. S. 592-596.(a) The vehicle was seized from a public place, where access was not meaningfully restricted. Chambers v. Maroney, supra, followed; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, distinguished. Pp. 417 U. S. 593-595.(b) Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of a vehicle are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the time of arrest. Cf. Chambers, supra, at 399 U. S. 50-51. Pp. 417 U. S. 595-596.MR. JUSTICE POWELL, being of the view that the inquiry of a federal court on habeas corpus review of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim should be confined solely to the question whether the defendant had an opportunity in the state courts to raise that claim and have it adjudicated fairly, would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, since respondent does not contend that he was denied that opportunity. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 412 U. S. 250 (POWELL, J., concurring). P. 417 U. S. 596.BLACKMUN, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 417 U. S. 596. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 417 U. S. 596. Page 417 U. S. 585 |
3,205 | 1981_80-415 | JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion for the Court.In March 1975, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. (Rock Island) petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as added, 47 Stat. 1474, and amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205. Under the protection of § 77, the Rock Island continued to operate for approximately four and one-half years, until it ceased all operations in September, 1979, as a result of a labor strike that had depleted its cash reserves. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 11125 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) directed the Kansas City Terminal Railway Co. to provide rail service over the Rock Island lines. On January 25, 1980, the reorganization court concluded that reorganization was not possible. It then directed the Trustee of the Rock Island estate to prepare a plan for liquidation, and to continue planning for the cessation of rail operations upon the March, 1980, Page 455 U. S. 460 expiration of the ICC's directed service order. App. 239a-240a. Since the entry of the January 25, 1980, order, the Trustee has been liquidating the assets of the Rock Island estate.On March 4, 1980, various railroads and labor organizations representing Rock Island employees reached an agreement as to Rock Island employees hired by carriers acquiring the Rock Island's trackage. The agreement covered such matters as hiring preferences, monetary protection, and seniority, but it did not cover those Rock Island employees who are not employed by acquiring carriers.On April 14, 1980, the Rock Island Trustee petitioned the reorganization court to confirm the Rock Island's abandonment of all rail lines and operations. The reorganization court referred the petition to the ICC for its recommendation. On May 23, the ICC concluded that the Rock Island's abandonment and dissolution as an operating railroad was necessary.On June 2, the reorganization court ordered the total abandonment of the Rock Island system and the discontinuance of its service. The court found that to order the Rock Island to continue its operations indefinitely at a loss for the public's benefit would violate the"Fifth Amendment rights of those who have a security interest in the enterprise. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 396 (1920)."Id. at 270a. The reorganization court also concluded that"no claim or arrangement of any kind or nature for employee labor protection payable out of the assets of the Debtor's estate is allowed or required by this Court"pursuant to § 17(a) of the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act (MRRA), Pub.L. 96-101, 93 Stat. 744, 45 U.S.C. § 915(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). [Footnote 1] App. 271a. The court reasoned that § 17(a) of the Page 455 U. S. 461 MRRA does not apply to a total, systemwide abandonment of a railroad. App. 263a-264a.Congress responded to the crisis resulting from this demise of the Rock Island by enacting the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA), Pub.L. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399, 45 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The President signed the Act into law on May 30, 1980, three days before the reorganization court's abandonment order. At issue in these cases are RITA's employee protections provisions. Sections 106 [Footnote 2] and 110 [Footnote 3] require Page 455 U. S. 462 the Rock Island Trustee to provide economic benefits of up to $75 million to those Rock Island employees who are not hired by other carriers. [Footnote 4] 45 U.S.C. §§ 1005, 1008 (1976 ed., Page 455 U. S. 463 Supp. IV). Benefits must be paid from the estate's assets. The employee benefit obligations must be considered administrative expenses of the Rock Island estate for purposes of determining the priority of the employees' claims to the assets of the estate upon liquidation.On June 5, 1980, appellees filed a complaint in the reorganization court seeking to declare RITA unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement. On June 9, the reorganization court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of §§ 106 and 110 of RITA. Although it suggested that RITA might have other constitutional infirmities, the court concluded that RITA's employee protection provisions constituted an uncompensated taking of private property for a public purpose in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court reasoned:"[T]he Rock Island is a bankrupt corporation with no more operations, nothing left but assets and creditors and liquidation. Whatever obligations it may have to labor, it must arrive out of a contract that it had with labor, and any appropriate claims of labor under existing bankruptcy law is under the Railroad Retirement Act or any other statute which operates to fix the rights of labor. . . . But, these are all based upon existing law, existing rights, existing contracts, and that Congress believes it can legislate a $75 million labor protection burden on the assets of the Rock Island comes to me as a startling concept."App. 153a. Since it determined that the Rock Island is no longer subject to the obligations of an operating railroad, the court concluded that the Rock Island creditors' and bondholders' interests in the estate's remaining assets may not be taken to serve the public's interest in providing economic protection for displaced employees. Id. at 154a. Appellant appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (No. 80-415).Congress responded to the reorganization court's injunction by enacting § 701 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Page 455 U. S. 464 Pub.L. 96-448, 94 Stat.1959. With certain modifications, [Footnote 5] § 701 of the Staggers Act reenacted RITA §§ 106 and 110. The Staggers Act also added § 124 to RITA, 45 U.S.C. § 1018 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), which sought to avoid any implication that it had deprived appellees of any Tucker Act remedy otherwise available for the Trustee and creditors to pursue their takings claim against the United States. [Footnote 6] The Staggers Act was signed into law on October 14, 1980.Six days previously, appellant and the United States had moved the reorganization court to vacate its June 9 injunction on the basis that the passage of the Staggers Act rendered the injunction moot. In addition, it was argued that no irreparable injury could be shown, because the Staggers Act amendments provided that a remedy under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, would be available if the labor protection provisions were found to constitute a taking. On October 15, the reorganization court denied the motion to vacate and issued a new order enjoining implementation of the labor protection provisions of the "Rock Island Act, as amended and reenacted by the Staggers Rail Act." App. to Juris. Statement in No. 80-1239, p. 6a. Pursuant to § 124(a)(1) of RITA, as added by the Staggers Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1018(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), [Footnote 7] appellant and the United States appealed this order to the Court of Appeals for Page 455 U. S. 465 the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion by an equally divided vote. In re Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 645 F.2d 74 (1980) (en banc).This Court noted probable jurisdiction in No. 80-1239, and postponed the question of jurisdiction in No. 80-415 until our hearing the case on the merits. 451 U.S. 936 (1981). In No. 80-415, we order the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to vacate its injunction of June 9, 1980. [Footnote 8] We affirm in No. 80-1239 because we conclude that RITA, as amended by the Staggers Act, is repugnant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the Bankruptcy Clause, of the Constitution. We therefore find it unnecessary to determine whether the employee protections provisions of RITA violate any other provision of the Constitution. [Footnote 9]Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power to "establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." It is necessary first to determine whether the labor protection provisions of amended RITA are an exercise of Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause, as contended by appellees, or under the Commerce Clause, as contended by appellant and the United States. Distinguishing a congressional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause from an exercise under the Bankruptcy Clause is admittedly not an easy task, for the two Clauses are closely related. As James Madison observed,"[t]he power of establishing Page 455 U. S. 466 uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question."The Federalist No. 42, p. 285 (N.Y. Heritage Press 1945). See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 17 U. S. 195 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The bankrupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of commerce").Although we have noted that "[t]he subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition," we have previously defined "bankruptcy" as the "subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their relief." Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 304 U. S. 513-514 (1938). See Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 294 U. S. 673 (1936). Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause "contemplate[s] an adjustment of a failing debtor's obligations." Ibid. This power "extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors." Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 186 U. S. 186 (1902). It"includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves the power to impair the obligation of contracts, and this the States were forbidden to do."Id. at 186 U. S. 188.An examination of the employee protection provisions of RITA, we think, demonstrates that RITA is an exercise of Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause. Section 106 authorizes the ICC to impose upon the Rock Island estate "a fair and equitable" employee protection arrangement. After such an employee protection arrangement is imposed, "the bankruptcy court shall immediately authorize and direct the Rock Island trustee to . . . immediately implement such arrangement." § 106(c), 45 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1976 ed., Page 455 U. S. 467 Supp. IV). Section 106(e)(2) provides that employee protection benefits shall be paid from Rock Island's assets and employee claims shall be treated as administrative expenses of the Rock Island estate. 45 U.S.C. § 1005(e)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Section 108(a) provides that any employee who elects to receive benefits under § 106 "shall be deemed to waive any employee protection benefits otherwise available to such employee" under the Bankruptcy Act, subtitle IV of Title 49 of the United States Code, or any applicable contract or agreement. 45 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Claims for "otherwise available" benefits are not accorded priority as an administrative expense of the estate. § 1007(c). Under § 110, the United States guarantees the Rock Island's employee protections obligations. 45 U.S.C. § 1008(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As with the employee protection obligation itself, the guarantee is treated as an administrative expense of the Rock Island estate. § 1008(b).In sum, RITA imposes upon a bankrupt railroad the duty to pay large sums of money to its displaced employees, and then establishes a mechanism through which these "obligations" are to be satisfied. The Act provides that the claims of these employees are to be accorded priority over the claims of Rock Island's commercial creditors, bondholders, and shareholders. It follows that the subject matter of RITA is the relationship between a bankrupt railroad and its creditors. See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra, at 304 U. S. 513-514. The Act goes as far as to alter the relationship among the claimants to the Rock Island estate's remaining assets. In enacting RITA, Congress did nothing less than to prescribe the manner in which the property of the Rock Island estate is to be distributed among its creditors.The events surrounding the passage of RITA, as well as its legislative history, indicate that Congress was exercising its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. In RITA, Congress was responding to the crisis resulting from the demise of the Page 455 U. S. 468 Rock Island as an operating entity. The Act was passed almost five years after the Rock Island had initiated reorganization proceedings under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, and approximately 10 months after a strike had rendered the Rock Island unable to pay its operating expenses. In addition to providing for the continuation of the Rock Island under a directed service order until its lines could be acquired by other carriers, Congress sought to provide displaced employees with economic protection. Congress wanted to make liquidation of a railroad costly for the estate. As the House Conference Report explains,"it is the intention of Congress that employee protection be imposed in bankruptcy proceedings involving major rail carriers, for to do otherwise would be to promote liquidations, to the detriment of the employees and the public interest."H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 96-1430, pp. 138-139 (1980). Moreover, Congress was attempting to eliminate the confusion that existed at the time as to whether the labor protection provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11347 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), applied to railroads that were in liquidation proceedings and arguably had no remaining common carrier responsibilities. See 126 Cong.Rec. 4870 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Kassebaum). In RITA, Congress intended that a labor protection arrangement be included as a part of the liquidation of the Rock Island estate.We do not understand either appellant or the United States to argue that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause. Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon Congress' power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the United States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not required by the Commerce Clause. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 452 U. S. 332 (1981); Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U. S. 604, 338 U. S. 616 (1950) (distinguishing the Commerce Clause from Art. I, § 8, cl. 4). Thus, if we Page 455 U. S. 469 were to hold that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws. It is therefore necessary for us to determine the nature of the uniformity required by the Bankruptcy Clause.Pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress has power to enact bankruptcy laws that are uniform throughout the United States. Prior to today, this Court has never invalidated a bankruptcy law for lack of uniformity. The uniformity requirement is not a straitjacket that forbids Congress to distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it prohibit Congress from recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial transactions in a uniform manner. A bankruptcy law may be uniform and yet "may recognize the laws of the State in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to different results in different States." Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 606, 245 U. S. 613 (1918). Thus, uniformity does not require the elimination of any differences among the States in their laws governing commercial transactions. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 329 U. S. 172 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. at 186 U. S. 189-190, this Court held that Congress can give effect to the allowance of exemptions prescribed by state law without violating the uniformity requirement. The uniformity requirement, moreover, permits Congress to treat "railroad bankruptcies as a distinctive and special problem," and"does not deny Congress power to take into account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems."Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 419 U. S. 159 (1974) (3R Act Cases). In the 3R Act Cases, we upheld Congress' response to the existing rail transportation crisis in the Northeast. Since no railroad reorganization proceeding was then pending outside of the region defined by Page 455 U. S. 470 the Regional Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973 (3R Act), 87 Stat. 985, 45 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., the Act, in fact, operated uniformly upon all railroads then in bankruptcy proceedings. But a quite different sort of "uniformity" question is presented in these cases. By its terms, RITA applies to only one regional bankrupt railroad. [Footnote 10] Only Rock Island's creditors are affected by RITA's employee protection provisions, and only employees of the Rock Island may take benefit of the arrangement. Unlike the situation in the 3R Act Cases, there are other railroads that are currently in reorganization proceedings, [Footnote 11] but these railroads are not affected by the employee protection provisions of RITA. The conclusion is thus inevitable that RITA is not a response either to the particular problems of major railroad bankruptcies or to any geographically isolated problem: it is a response to the problems caused by the bankruptcy of one railroad. The employee protection provisions of RITA cover neither a defined class of debtors nor a particular type of problem, but a particular Page 455 U. S. 471 problem of one bankrupt railroad. Albeit on a rather grand scale, RITA is nothing more than a private bill such as those Congress frequently enacts under its authority to spend money. [Footnote 12]The language of the Bankruptcy Clause itself compels us to hold that such a bankruptcy law is not within the power of Congress to enact. A law can hardly be said to be uniform throughout the country if it applies only to one debtor and can be enforced only by the one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over that debtor. In re Sink, 27 F.2d 361, 362 (WD Va.1928), appeal dism'd per stipulation, 30 F.2d 1019 (CA4 1929). As the legislative history to the Staggers Act indicates, supra at 455 U. S. 468, Congress might deem it sound policy to impose labor protection obligations in all bankruptcy proceedings involving major railroads. By its specific terms, however, RITA applies to only one regional bankrupt railroad, and cannot be said to apply uniformly even to major railroads in bankruptcy proceedings throughout the United States. The employee protection provisions of RITA therefore cannot be said to "apply equally to all creditors and all debtors." 3R Act Cases, supra, at 419 U. S. 160.Although the debate in the Constitutional Convention regarding the Bankruptcy Clause was meager, we think it lends some support to our conclusion that the uniformity requirement of the Clause prohibits Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws that specifically apply to the affairs of only one named debtor.The subject of bankruptcy was first introduced on August 29, 1787, by Charles Pinckney during discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Pinckney proposed the following grant of authority to Congress:"To establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages Page 455 U. S. 472 arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange."2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 447 (1911). Two days later, John Rutledge recommended that the following be added to Congress' powers: "To establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." Id. at 483. The Bankruptcy Clause was adopted on September 3, 1787, with only Roger Sherman of Connecticut voting against. Id. at 489. [Footnote 13]Prior to the drafting of the Constitution, at least four States followed the practice of passing private Acts to relieve individual debtors. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am.J.Legal Hist. 215, 221-223 (1957). Given the sovereign status of the States, questions were raised as to whether one State had to recognize the relief given to a debtor by another State. See Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa.Sup.Ct. 1788); James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa.Ct.Common Pleas 1786). Uniformity among state debtor insolvency laws was an impossibility, and the practice of passing private bankruptcy laws was subject to abuse if the legislators were less than honest. Thus, it is not surprising that the Bankruptcy Clause was introduced during discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Framers sought to provide Congress with the power to enact uniform laws on the subject enforceable among the States. See Nadelmann, supra, at 224-227. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity requirement was drafted in order to prohibit Congress from enacting private bankruptcy laws. See H. Black, Constitutional Prohibitions 6 (1887) (States had discriminated against British creditors). The States' practice of enacting private bills had rendered uniformity impossible. [Footnote 14] Page 455 U. S. 473Our holding today does not impair Congress' ability under the Bankruptcy Clause to define classes of debtors and to structure relief accordingly. We have upheld bankruptcy laws that apply to a particular industry in a particular region. See 3R Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 (1974). The uniformity requirement, however, prohibits Congress from enacting a bankruptcy law that, by definition, applies only to one regional debtor. To survive scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors. A bankruptcy law, such as RITA, confined as it is to the affairs of one named debtor, can hardly be considered uniform. To hold otherwise would allow Congress to repeal the uniformity requirement from Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution.Since that result may be accomplished only by the process prescribed in that document for its amendment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 80-1239 is affirmed, and the judgment of the District Court in No. 8015 is vacated with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 340 U. S. 39 (1950).It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtRailway Labor Executives' Assn. v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982)Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. GibbonsNo. 8015Argued December 2, 1981Decided March 2, 1982*455 U.S. 457SyllabusIn 1975, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. (Rock Island) petitioned the District Court for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and thereafter continued operation under the protection of that Act until September, 1979, when it ceased operation as a result of a labor strike. The District Court concluded that reorganization was not possible, and directed appellee Trustee of Rock Island's estate (hereafter appellee) to liquidate the estate's assets. On June 2, 1980, the reorganization court ordered abandonment of the Rock Island system and concluded that no claim or arrangement "for employee labor protection payable out of the assets of the Debtor's estate is allowed or required by this Court." However, three days before the court's order, the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA) was signed into law. Under §§ 106 and 110 of the statute, appellee must pay benefits of up to $75 million to those Rock Island employees who are not hired by other carriers, and the United States guarantees Rock Island's employee protection obligations. The statute also requires that such obligations must be considered administrative expenses of the Rock Island estate for purposes of determining the priority of the employees' claims to the estate's assets. On June 5, 1980, a complaint was filed in the reorganization court challenging the constitutionality of RITA and seeking injunctive relief. On June 9, the court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of §§ 106 and 110, holding that those provisions constituted an uncompensated taking of private property (Rock Island's creditors' interests in the estate's assets) for a public purpose in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252, the District Court's order was appealed to this Court (No. 8015). Congress responded to the District Court's injunction by enacting § 701 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which reenacted §§ 106 and 110 of RITA and added a provision seeking to avoid any implication that appellee and creditors had been deprived of any Tucker Act remedy otherwise available to pursue their takings claim against the United Page 455 U. S. 458 States. Thereafter, the reorganization court denied a motion of appellant and the United States to vacate its June 9 injunction on the asserted ground that it was rendered moot by the passage of the Staggers Act, and issued a new order enjoining implementation of the labor protection provisions of RITA, as amended and reenacted by the Staggers Act. This order was appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 124(a)(1) of RITA, as added by the Staggers Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and an appeal was then taken to this Court (No. 80-1239).Held:1. The June 9 injunction was rendered moot by the enactment of the Staggers Act, and accordingly the judgment of the District Court is vacated and it is ordered to vacate the injunction. P. 455 U. S. 465.2. The Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed in No. 80-1239 because RITA, as amended by the Staggers Act, is repugnant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Pp. 455 U. S. 465-473.(a) The labor protection provisions of RITA are an exercise of Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause, rather than under the Commerce Clause. Although the subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition, "bankruptcy" has been defined as the "subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their relief." Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 304 U. S. 513-514. By its terms, the subject matter of RITA is the relationship between a bankrupt railroad and its creditors; Congress did nothing less than to prescribe the manner in which Rock Island's property is to be distributed among its creditors. The events surrounding RITA's passage, as well as its legislative history, also indicate that Congress was exercising its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. Pp. 455 U. S. 465-468.(b) The Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity requirement does not prohibit Congress from distinguishing among classes of debtors, or from treating railroad bankruptcies as a distinctive problem. Nor does it deny Congress power to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems. However, RITA is not a response either to the particular problems of major railroad bankruptcies or to any geographically isolated problem. By its terms, RITA applies to only one regional bankrupt railroad; only Rock Island's creditors are affected by RITA's employee protection provisions, and only Rock Island employees may take benefit of the arrangement. The language of the Bankruptcy Clause itself compels the conclusion that such a bankruptcy law is not within Congress' power to enact. Although meager, the debate in the Constitutional Convention regarding the Clause also supports the conclusion that the uniformity requirement prohibits Congress from enacting Page 455 U. S. 459 bankruptcy laws that specifically apply to the affair of only one named regional debtor. Pp. 455 U. S. 468-473.No. 80 115, vacated and remanded; No. 80-1239, 645 F.2d 74, affirmed.REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 455 U. S. 473. |
3,206 | 1976_74-1263 | MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.An Iowa trial jury found the respondent, Robert Williams, guilty of murder. The judgment of conviction was affirmed in the Iowa Supreme Court by a closely divided vote. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, a Federal District Page 430 U. S. 390 Court ruled that, under the United States Constitution, Williams is entitled to a new trial, and a divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed. The question before us is whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals were wrong.IOn the afternoon of December 24, 1968, a 10-year-old girl named Pamela Powers went with her family to the YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa, to watch a wrestling tournament in which her brother was participating. When she failed to return from a trip to the washroom, a search for her began. The search was unsuccessful.Robert Williams, who had recently escaped from a mental hospital, was a resident of the YMCA. Soon after the girl's disappearance, Williams was seen in the YMCA lobby carrying some clothing and a large bundle wrapped in a blanket. He obtained help from a 14-year-old boy in opening the street door of the YMCA and the door to his automobile parked outside. When Williams placed the bundle in the front seat of his car, the boy "saw two legs in it and they were skinny and white." Before anyone could see what was in the bundle, Williams drove away. His abandoned car was found the following day in Davenport, Iowa, roughly 160 miles east of Des Moines. A warrant was then issued in Des Moines for his arrest on a charge of abduction.On the morning of December 26, a Des Moines lawyer named Henry McKnight went to the Des Moines police station and informed the officers present that he had just received a long-distance call from Williams, and that he had advised Williams to turn himself in to the Davenport police. Williams did surrender that morning to the police in Davenport, and they booked him on the charge specified in the arrest warrant and gave him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. The Davenport police then telephoned Page 430 U. S. 391 their counterparts in Des Moines to inform them that Williams had surrendered. McKnight, the lawyer, was still at the Des Moines police headquarters, and Williams conversed with McKnight on the telephone. In the presence of the Des Moines chief of police and a police detective named Leaming, McKnight advised Williams that Des Moines police officers would be driving to Davenport to pick him up, that the officers would not interrogate him or mistreat him, and that Williams was not to talk to the officers about Pamela Powers until after consulting with McKnight upon his return to Des Moines. As a result of these conversations, it was agreed between McKnight and the Des Moines police officials that Detective Leaming and a fellow officer would drive to Davenport to pick up Williams, that they would bring him directly back to Des Moines, and that they would not question him during the trip.In the meantime, Williams was arraigned before a judge in Davenport on the outstanding arrest warrant. The judge advised him of his Miranda rights and committed him to jail. Before leaving the courtroom, Williams conferred with a lawyer named Kelly, who advised him not to make any statements until consulting with McKnight back in Des Moines.Detective Leaming and his fellow officer arrived in Davenport about noon to pick up Williams and return him to Des Moines. Soon after their arrival, they met with Williams and Kelly, who, they understood, was acting as Williams' lawyer. Detective Leaming repeated the Miranda warnings, and told Williams:"[W]e both know that you're being represented here by Mr. Kelly and you're being represented by Mr. McKnight in Des Moines, and . . . I want you to remember this because we'll be visiting between here and Des Moines."Williams then conferred again with Kelly alone, and, after this conference, Kelly reiterated to Detective Leaming that Page 430 U. S. 392 Williams was not to be questioned about the disappearance of Pamela Powers until after he had consulted with McKnight back in Des Moines. When Leaming expressed some reservations, Kelly firmly stated that the agreement with McKnight was to be carried out -- that there was to be no interrogation of Williams during the automobile journey to Des Moines. Kelly was denied permission to ride in the police car back to Des Moines with Williams and the two officers.The two detectives, with Williams in their charge, then set out on the 160-mile drive. At no time during the trip did Williams express a willingness to be interrogated in the absence of an attorney. Instead, he stated several times that "[w]hen I get to Des Moines and see Mr. McKnight, I am going to tell you the whole story." Detective Leaming knew that Williams was a former mental patient, and knew also that he was deeply religious.The detective and his prisoner soon embarked on a wide-ranging conversation covering a variety of topics, including the subject of religion. Then, not long after leaving Davenport and reaching the interstate highway, Detective Leaming delivered what has been referred to in the briefs and oral arguments as the "Christian burial speech." Addressing Williams as "Reverend," the detective said:"I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Page 430 U. S. 393 Des Moines, I felt that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in, rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm, and possibly not being able to find it at all."Williams asked Detective Leaming why he thought their route to Des Moines would be taking them past the girl's body, and Leaming responded that he knew the body was in the area of Mitchellville -- a town they would be passing on the way to Des Moines. [Footnote 1] Leaming then stated: "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as we're riding down the road."As the car approached Grinnell, a town approximately 100 miles west of Davenport, Williams asked whether the police had found the victim's shoes. When Detective Leaming replied that he was unsure, Williams directed the officers to a service station where he said he had left the shoes; a search for them proved unsuccessful. As they continued towards Des Moines, Williams asked whether the police had found the blanket, and directed the officers to a rest area where he said he had disposed of the blanket. Nothing was found. The car continued towards Des Moines, and as it approached Mitchellville, Williams said that he would show the officers where the body was. He then directed the police to the body of Pamela Powers.Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. Before trial, his counsel moved to suppress all evidence relating to or resulting from any statements Williams had made during the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. After Page 430 U. S. 394 an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. He found that"an agreement was made between defense counsel and the police officials to the effect that the Defendant was not to be questioned on the return trip to Des Moines,"and that the evidence in question had been elicited from Williams during "a critical stage in the proceedings requiring the presence of counsel on his request." The judge ruled, however, that Williams had "waived his right to have an attorney present during the giving of such information." [Footnote 2]The evidence in question was introduced over counsel's continuing objection at the subsequent trial. The jury found Williams guilty of murder, and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court, a bare majority of whose members agreed with the trial court that Williams had "waived his right to the presence of his counsel" on the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 402. The four dissenting justices expressed the view that,"when counsel and police have agreed defendant is not to be questioned until counsel is present and defendant has been advised not to talk and repeatedly has stated he will tell the whole story after he talks with counsel, the state should be required to make a stronger showing of intentional voluntary waiver than was made here."Id. at 408.Williams then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Counsel for the State and for Williams stipulated that "the case would be submitted on the record of facts and proceedings in the trial court, without taking of further testimony." The District Court made findings of fact as summarized above, and concluded as a matter of law that the evidence in question had been wrongly admitted at Page 430 U. S. 395 Williams' trial. This conclusion was based on three alternative and independent grounds: (1) that Williams had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel; (2) that he had been denied the constitutional protections defined by this Court's decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436; and (3) that, in any event, his self-incriminatory statements on the automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines had been involuntarily made. Further, the District Court ruled that there had been no waiver by Williams of the constitutional protections in question. 375 F. Supp. 170.The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed this judgment, 509 F.2d 227, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc. We granted certiorari to consider the constitutional issues presented. 423 U.S. 1031.ABefore turning to those issues, we must consider the petitioner's threshold claim that the District Court disregarded the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) in making its findings of fact in this case. That statute, which codifies most of the criteria set out in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, provides that, subject to enumerated exceptions, federal habeas corpus courts shall accept as correct the factual determinations made by the courts of the States. [Footnote 3] Page 430 U. S. 396We conclude that there was no disregard of § 2254(d) in this case. Although either of the parties might well have requested an evidentiary hearing in the federal habeas corpus proceedings, Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 372 U. S. 322, they both instead voluntarily agreed in advance that the federal court should decide the case on the record made in the courts of the State. In so proceeding, the District Court made no Page 430 U. S. 397 findings of fact in conflict with those of the Iowa courts. The District Court did make some additional findings of fact based upon its examination of the state court record, among them the findings that Kelly, the Davenport lawyer, had requested permission to ride in the police car from Davenport to Des Moines, and that Detective Leaming had refused this request. But the additional findings were conscientiously and carefully explained by the District Court, 375 F. Supp. at 175-176, and were reviewed and approved by the Court of Appeals, which expressly held that "the District Court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in its resolution of the disputed evidentiary facts, and that the facts as found by the District Court had substantial basis in the record," 509 F.2d at 231. The strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) require no more. [Footnote 4]BAs stated above, the District Court based its judgment in this case on three independent grounds. The Court of Appeals appears to have affirmed the judgment on two of those grounds. [Footnote 5] We have concluded that only one of them need be considered here.Specifically, there is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, a doctrine designed to secure the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 417 U. S. 438-439. It is equally unnecessary to evaluate the ruling of the District Court that Williams' self-incriminating statements were, indeed, involuntarily made. Cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315. For it is clear that the judgment before us must, in any event, be affirmed upon the ground that Williams was deprived Page 430 U. S. 398 of a different constitutional right -- the right to the assistance of counsel.This right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice. Its vital need at the pretrial stage has perhaps nowhere been more succinctly explained than in Mr. Justice Sutherland's memorable words for the Court 44 years ago in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 57:"[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation, and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself."There has occasionally been a difference of opinion within the Court as to the peripheral scope of this constitutional right. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1. But its basic contours, which are identical in state and federal contexts, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, are too well established to require extensive elaboration here. Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him -- "whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, supra at 406 U. S. 689. See Powell v. Alabama, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52; Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201; United Page 430 U. S. 399 States v. Wade, 388.U.S. 218; Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263; Coleman v. Alabama, supra.There can be no doubt in the present case that judicial proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the start of the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a Davenport courtroom, and he had been committed by the court to confinement in jail. The State does not contend otherwise.There can be no serious doubt, either, that Detective Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as -- and perhaps more effectively than -- if he had formally interrogated him. Detective Leaming was fully aware before departing for Des Moines that Williams was being represented in Davenport by Kelly and in Des Moines by McKnight. Yet he purposely sought during Williams' isolation from his lawyers to obtain as much incriminating information as possible. Indeed, Detective Leaming conceded as much when he testified at Williams' trial:"Q. In fact, Captain, whether he was a mental patient or not, you were trying to get all the information you could before he got to his lawyer, weren't you?""A. I was sure hoping to find out where that little girl was, yes, sir.""* * * *" "Q. Well, I'll put it this way: You was [sic] hoping to get all the information you could before Williams got back to McKnight, weren't you?""A. Yes, sir. [Footnote 6] "Page 430 U. S. 400The state courts clearly proceeded upon the hypothesis that detective Leaming's "Christian burial speech" had been tantamount to interrogation. Both courts recognized that Williams had been entitled to the assistance of counsel at the time he made the incriminating statements. [Footnote 7] Yet no such constitutional protection would have come into play if there had been no interrogation.The circumstances of this case are thus constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah v. United States, supra. The petitioner in that case was indicted for violating the federal narcotics law. He retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While he was free on bail a federal agent succeeded by surreptitious means in listening to incriminating statements made by him. Evidence of these statements was introduced against the petitioner at his trial, and he was convicted. This Court reversed the conviction, holding"that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee [the right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel."377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 206.That the incriminating statements were elicited surreptitiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant. See ibid.; McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356; United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 358 (CA7); Page 430 U. S. 401 United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632, 636 (CA3); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (CA1). Rather, the clear rule of Massiah is that, once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. [Footnote 8] It thus requires no wooden or technical application of the Massiah doctrine to conclude that Williams was entitled to the assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.IIIThe Iowa courts recognized that Williams had been denied the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. [Footnote 9] They held, however, that he had waived that right during the course of the automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines. The state trial court explained its determination of waiver as follows:"The time element involved on the trip, the general circumstances of it, and, more importantly, the absence on the Defendant's part of any assertion of his right or desire not to give information absent the presence of his attorney, are the main foundations for the Court's conclusion that he voluntarily waived such right. "Page 430 U. S. 402In its lengthy opinion affirming this determination, the Iowa Supreme Court applied "the "totality of circumstances" test for a showing of waiver of constitutionally protected rights in the absence of an express waiver," and concluded that"evidence of the time element involved on the trip, the general circumstances of it, and the absence of any request or expressed desire for the aid of counsel before or at the time of giving information were sufficient to sustain a conclusion that defendant did waive his constitutional rights as alleged."182 N.W.2d at 401, 402.In the federal habeas corpus proceeding, the District Court, believing that the issue of waiver was not one of fact, but of federal law, held that the Iowa courts had "applied the wrong constitutional standards" in ruling that Williams had waived the protections that were his under the Constitution. 375 F. Supp. at 182. The court held"that it is the government which bears a heavy burden . . . but that is the burden which explicitly was placed on [Williams] by the state courts."Ibid. (emphasis in original). After carefully reviewing the evidence, the District Court concluded:"[U]nder the proper standards for determining waiver, there simply is no evidence to support a waiver. . . . [T]here is no affirmative indication . . . that [Williams] did waive his rights. . . . [T]he state courts' emphasis on the absence of a demand for counsel was not only legally inappropriate, but factually unsupportable, as well, since Detective Leaming himself testified that [Williams], on several occasions during the trip, indicated that he would talk after he saw Mr. McKnight. Both these statements and Mr. Kelly's statement to Detective Leaming that [Williams] would talk only after seeing Mr. McKnight in Des Moines certainly were assertions of [Williams'] 'right or desire not to give information absent the presence of his attorney. . . .' Moreover, the statements were obtained only after Detective Page 430 U. S. 403 Leaming's use of psychology on a person whom he knew to be deeply religious and an escapee from a mental hospital -- with the specific intent to elicit incriminating statements. In the face of this evidence, the State has produced no affirmative evidence whatsoever to support its claim of waiver, and, a fortiori, it cannot be said that the State has met its 'heavy burden' of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver of . . . Sixth Amendment rights."Id. at 182-183 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).The Court of Appeals approved the reasoning of the District Court:"A review of the record here . . . discloses no facts to support the conclusion of the state court that [Williams] had waived his constitutional rights other than that [he] had made incriminating statements. . . . The District Court here properly concluded that an incorrect constitutional standard had been applied by the state court in determining the issue of waiver. . . .""* * * *" "[T]his court recently held that an accused can voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have counsel present at an interrogation after counsel has been appointed. . . . The prosecution, however, has the weighty obligation to show that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. We quite agree with Judge Hanson that the state here failed to so show."509 F.2d at 233.The District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in the view that the question of waiver was not a question of historical fact, but one which, in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, requires "application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. . . ." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, Page 430 U. S. 404 344 U. S. 507 (separate opinion). See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 309 n. 6, 318; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 384 U. S. 4.The District Court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in their understanding of the proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law -- that it was incumbent upon the State to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 304 U. S. 464. That standard has been reiterated in many cases. We have said that the right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 369 U. S. 513; cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 471, and that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, supra at 384 U. S. 4; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 315 U. S. 70. This strict standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 412 U. S. 238-240; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 237.We conclude, finally, that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that, judged by these standards, the record in this case falls far short of sustaining petitioner's burden. It is true that Williams had been informed of and appeared to understand his right to counsel. But waiver requires not merely comprehension, but relinquishment, and Williams' consistent reliance upon the advice of counsel in dealing with the authorities refutes any suggestion that he waived that right. He consulted McKnight by long-distance telephone before turning himself in. He spoke with McKnight by telephone again shortly after being booked. After he was arraigned, Williams sought out and obtained legal advice from Kelly. Williams again consulted with Kelly after Detective Leaming and his fellow officer arrived in Davenport. Throughout, Williams was advised not to make any statements before seeing McKnight in Des Moines, and was Page 430 U. S. 405 assured that the police had agreed not to question him. His statements while in the car that he would tell the whole story after seeing McKnight in Des Moines were the clearest expressions by Williams himself that he desired the presence of an attorney before any interrogation took place. But even before making these statements, Williams had effectively asserted his right to counsel by having secured attorneys at both ends of the automobile trip, both of whom, acting as his agents, had made clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur during the journey. Williams knew of that agreement and, particularly in view of his consistent reliance on counsel, there is no basis for concluding that he disavowed it. [Footnote 10]Despite Williams' express and implicit assertions of his right to counsel, Detective Leaming proceeded to elicit incriminating statements from Williams. Leaming did not preface this effort by telling Williams that he had a right to the presence of a lawyer, and made no effort at all to ascertain whether Williams wished to relinquish that right. The circumstances of record in this case thus provide no reasonable basis for finding that Williams waived his right to the assistance of counsel.The Court of Appeals did not hold, nor do we, that, under the circumstances of this case, Williams could not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under the Sixth and Page 430 U. S. 406 Fourteenth Amendments. [Footnote 11] It only held, as do we, that he did not.IVThe crime of which Williams was convicted was senseless and brutal, calling for swift and energetic action by the police to apprehend the perpetrator and gather evidence with which he could be convicted. No mission of law enforcement officials is more important. Yet "[d]isinterested zeal for the public good does not assure either wisdom or right in the methods it pursues." Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 332 U. S. 605 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). Although we do not lightly affirm the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in this case, so clear a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as here occurred cannot be condoned. The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great, especially when the crime is murder and the victim a small child. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. [Footnote 12]It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtBrewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)Brewer v. WilliamsNo. 74-1263Argued October 4, 1976Decided March 23, 1977430 U.S. 387SyllabusRespondent was arrested, arraigned, and committed to jail in Davenport, Iowa, for abducting a 10-year-old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. Both his Des Moines lawyer and his lawyer at the Davenport arraignment advised respondent not to make any statements until after consulting with the Des Moines lawyer upon being returned to Des Moines, and the police officers who were to accompany respondent on the automobile drive back to Des Moines agreed not to question him during the trip. During the trip, respondent expressed no willingness to be interrogated in the absence of an attorney, but instead stated several times that he would tell the whole story after seeing his Des Moines lawyer. However, one of the police officers, who knew that respondent was a former mental patient and was deeply religious, sought to obtain incriminating remarks from respondent by stating to him during the drive that he felt they should stop and locate the girl's body because her parents were entitled to a Christian burial for the girl, who was taken away from them on Christmas Eve. Respondent eventually made several incriminating statements in the course of the trip, and finally directed the police to the girl's body. Respondent was tried and convicted of murder, over his objections to the admission of evidence relating to or resulting from any statements he made during the automobile ride, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding, as did the trial court, that respondent had waived his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Respondent then petitioned for habeas corpus in Federal District Court, which held that the evidence in question had been wrongly admitted at respondent's trial on the ground, inter alia, that he had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and further ruled that he had not waived that right. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner warden claims that the District Court, in making its findings of fact, disregarded 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that, subject to certain exceptions, federal habeas corpus courts shall accept as correct the factual determinations made by state courts.Held:1. The District Court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) in its Page 430 U. S. 388 resolution of the disputed evidentiary facts where it appears that it made no findings of fact in conflict with those of the Iowa courts, and that its additional findings of fact based upon its examination of the state court record were conscientiously and carefully explained, and were approved by the Court of Appeals as being supported by the record. Pp. 395-397.2. Respondent was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Pp. 430 U. S. 397-401.(a) The right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to a lawyer's help at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him, and here there is no doubt that judicial proceedings had been initiated against respondent before the automobile trip started, since a warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been arraigned, and had been committed to jail. Pp. 430 U. S. 398-399.(b) An individual against whom adversary proceedings have commenced has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him, Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, and since here the police officer's "Christian burial speech" was tantamount to interrogation, respondent was entitled to the assistance of counsel at the time he made the incriminating statements. Pp. 430 U. S. 399-401.3. The circumstances of record provide, when viewed in light of respondent's assertions of his right to counsel, no reasonable basis for finding that respondent waived his right to the assistance of counsel, the record falling far short of sustaining the State's burden to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464. Pp. 430 U. S. 401-406.509 F.2d 227, affirmed.STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., post, p. 430 U. S. 406, POWELL, J., post, p. 430 U. S. 409, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 430 U. S. 414, filed concurring opinions. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 430 U. S. 415. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 430 U. S. 429. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 430 U. S. 438. Page 430 U. S. 389 |
3,207 | 1994_93-981 | quiring proof of such an act at trial, and it noted that the latter cases "stand on weak ground." Id., at 1420. Nevertheless, the court felt bound by precedent and attempted to reconcile the two lines of cases. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, although the Government must prove at trial that the defendant has committed an overt act in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy, the act need not be alleged in the indictment because" '[c]ourts do not require as detailed a statement of an offense's elements under a conspiracy count as under a substantive count.'" Id., at 1422, quoting United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (CA9 1981).Chief Judge Wallace wrote separately to point out that in no other circumstance could the Government refrain from alleging in the indictment an element it had to prove at trial. He followed the Circuit precedent but invited the Court of Appeals to consider the question en banc because the Ninth Circuit, "contrary to every other circuit, clings to a problematic gloss on 21 U. s. C. § 846, insisting, despite a complete lack of textual support in the statute, that in order to convict under this section the government must prove the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." 993 F. 2d, at 1422 (concurring opinion). For reasons unknown, the Court of Appeals did not grant en banc review. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1108 (1994), to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the 11 other Circuits that have addressed the question, all of which have held that § 846 does not require proof of an overt act. **See United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d 283, 285 (CA7), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 991 (1992); United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 639, 641 (CA4 1991); United States v. Figueroa, 900 F.2d 1211, 1218 (CA8), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 942 (1990); United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 155 (CA1 1989); United States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1432 (CA5 1989); United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012, 1017-1018 (CAll 1989); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (CAW 1988); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F. 2d 307, 308-309 (CADC 1987); United States v. Bey, 736 F.2d 891, 894 (CA3 1984); United States v. Dempsey, 733 F.2d 392, 396 (CA6),13IICongress passed the drug conspiracy statute as § 406 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. It provided: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." Id., at 1265. As amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4377, the statute currently provides:"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21 U. S. C. § 846. The language of neither version requires that an overt act be committed to further the conspiracy, and we have not inferred such a requirement from congressional silence in other conspiracy statutes. In Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913), Justice Holmes wrote, "[WJe can see no reason for reading into the Sherman Act more than we find there," id., at 378, and the Court held that an overt act is not required for antitrust conspiracy liability. The same reasoning prompted our conclusion in Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 (1945), that the Selective Service Act "does not require an overt act for the offense of conspiracy." Id., at 340.Nash and Singer follow the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 307-308 (1992). We have consistently held that the common law understand-cert. denied, 469 U. S. 983 (1984); United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 311 (CA2), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 986 (1978).14ing of conspiracy "does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability." Nash, supra, at 378; see also Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651, 659 (1951); Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464, 468 (1895) ("At common law it was neither necessary to aver nor prove an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy ... "). Respondent contends that these decisions were rendered in a period of unfettered expansion in the law of conspiracy, a period which allegedly ended when the Court declared that "we will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 404 (1957) (citations omitted). Grunewald, however, was a statute of limitations case, and whatever exasperation with conspiracy prosecutions the opinion may have expressed in dictum says little about the views of Congress when it enacted § 846.As to those views, we find it instructive that the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, contains an explicit requirement that a conspirator "do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy." In light of this additional element in the general conspiracy statute, Congress' silence in § 846 speaks volumes. After all, the general conspiracy statute preceded and presumably provided the framework for the more specific drug conspiracy statute. "Nash and Singer give Congress a formulary: by choosing a text modeled on § 371, it gets an overt-act requirement; by choosing a text modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, it dispenses with such a requirement." United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d 283, 284 (CA7 1992). Congress appears to have made the choice quite deliberately with respect to § 846; the same Congress that passed this provision also enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, §802(a) of which contains an explicit requirement that "one or more of [the conspirators] does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy," id., at 936, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1511(a).15Early opinions in the Ninth Circuit dealing with the drug conspiracy statute simply relied on our precedents interpreting the general conspiracy statute and ignored the textual variations between the two provisions. See United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 862 (CA9), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 972 (1977), citing United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671 (1975); United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 310 (CA9), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 834 (1974), citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 86-88 (1915). Two other Courts of Appeals were led down the same path, see United States v. King, 521 F.2d 61, 63 (CAlO 1975); United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484, 490 (CA8 1973), but both subsequently recognized the misstep and rejected their early interpretations, see United States v. Covos, 872 F.2d 805, 810 (CA8 1989); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (CAlO 1988).What the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize we now make explicit: In order to establish a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846, the Government need not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Felix, 503 U. S. 378 (1992), is not to the contrary. In that case, an indictment under § 846 alleged two overt acts which had formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction for attempting to manufacture drugs. The defendant argued that the Government had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S. 508 (1990), overruled, United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688 (1993), by using evidence underlying the prior conviction "to prove an essential element of an offense" charged in the second prosecution. We held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the conspiracy charge. JUSTICE STEVENS, writing separately, thought that our double jeopardy discussion was unnecessary partly because "there is no overt act requirement in the federal drug conspiracy statute," Felix, supra, at 392 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Shabani argues that, by not responding to this point, the Court im-16plicitly held that § 846 requires proof of overt acts; otherwise, the double jeopardy discussion would have been merely advisory. The procedural history of Felix, however, belies this contention. The disputed evidence was offered not to prove overt acts qua overt acts, but to prove the existence of a conspiracy. The lower court in Felix noted that it was "mindful that 21 U. S. C. § 846 does not require proof of an overt act .... " United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1529, n. 7 (CAlO 1991). Nevertheless, evidence of such acts raised double jeopardy concerns because it "tended to show the criminal agreement for the conspiracy," an indisputably essential element of the offense. Ibid. Indeed, JUSTICE STEVENS also argued that "the overt acts did not establish an agreement between Felix and his co-conspirators." Felix, 503 U. S., at 392. In light of the lower court opinion, it is apparent that we rejected this point-rather than JusTICE STEVENS' construction of § 846-before reaching the double jeopardy issue. In any event, Shabani's strained reading of Felix is of little consequence for precedential purposes, since "[q]uestions which 'merely lurk in the record' are not resolved, and no resolution of them may be inferred." Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 183 (1979), quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925).Shabani reminds us that the law does not punish criminal thoughts and contends that conspiracy without an overt act requirement violates this principle because the offense is predominantly mental in composition. The prohibition against criminal conspiracy, however, does not punish mere thought; the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus and has been so viewed since Regina v. Bass, 11 Mod. 55, 88 Eng. Rep. 881, 882 (K. B. 1705) ("[T]he very assembling together was an overt act"); see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) ("Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act") (citations omitted).17Finally, Shabani invokes the rule of lenity, arguing that the statute is unclear because it neither requires an overt act nor specifies that one is not necessary. The rule of lenity, however, applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute. See, e. g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 374 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239-241 (1993). That is not the case here. To require that Congress explicitly state its intention not to adopt petitioner's reading would make the rule applicable with the "mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction," id., at 239, a result supported by neither lenity nor logic.As the District Court correctly noted in this case, the plain language of the statute and settled interpretive principles reveal that proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals isReversed | OCTOBER TERM, 1994SyllabusUNITED STATES v. SHABANICERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITNo.93-981. Argued October 3, 1994-Decided November 1,1994Respondent Shabani was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846 after the District Court refused to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy is required for conviction under § 846. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under its precedent, the Government must prove at trial that a defendant has committed such an overt act.Held: In order to establish a violation of § 846, the Government need not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The statute's plain language does not require an overt act, and such a requirement has not been inferred from congressional silence in other conspiracy statutes, see, e. g., Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373. Thus, absent contrary indications, it is presumed that Congress intended to adopt the common law definition of conspiracy, which "does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability," id., at 378. Moreover, since the general conspiracy statute and the conspiracy provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 both require an overt act, it appears that Congress' choice in § 846 was quite deliberate. United States v. Felix, 503 U. S. 378, distinguished. While Shabani correctly asserts that the law does not punish criminal thoughts, in a criminal conspiracy the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus. The rule of lenity cannot be invoked here, since the statute is not ambiguous. Pp. 13-17.993 F.2d 1419, reversed.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, and Joseph Douglas Wilson.Dennis P. Riordan argued the cause for respondent.With him on the brief were Alan M. Caplan and Marc J. Zilversmit.11JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case asks us to consider whether 21 U. S. C. § 846, the drug conspiracy statute, requires the Government to prove that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. We conclude that it does not.IAccording to the grand jury indictment, Reshat Shabani participated in a narcotics distribution scheme in Anchorage, Alaska, with his girlfriend, her family, and other associates. Shabani was allegedly the supplier of drugs, which he arranged to be smuggled from California. In an undercover operation, federal agents purchased cocaine from distributors involved in the conspiracy.Shabani was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. He moved to dismiss the indictment because it did not allege the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which act, he argued, was an essential element of the offense. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Hon. H. Russel Holland, denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of evidence, Shabani again raised the issue and asked the court to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act was required for conviction. The District Court noted that Circuit precedent did not require the allegation of an overt act in the indictment but did require proof of such an act at trial in order to state a violation of § 846. Recognizing that such a result was "totally illogical," App. 29, and contrary to the language of the statute, Judge Holland rejected Shabani's proposed jury instruction, id., at 36. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court sentenced Shabani to 160 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 993 F.2d 1419 (1993). The court acknowledged an inconsistency between its cases holding that an indictment under § 846 need not allege an overt act and those re-12Full Text of Opinion |
3,208 | 1973_73-190 | MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented in this case is whether a partner in a small law firm may invoke his personal privilege against self-incrimination to justify his refusal to comply with a subpoena requiring production of the partnership's financial records. Page 417 U. S. 86Until 1969, petitioner Isadore Bellis was the senior partner in Bellis, Kolsby & Wolf, a law firm in Philadelphia. The firm was formed in 1955 or 1956. There were three partners in the firm, the three individuals listed in the firm name. In addition, the firm had six employees: two other attorneys who were associated with the firm, one part-time; three secretaries; and a receptionist. Petitioner's secretary doubled as the partnership's bookkeeper, under the direction of petitioner and the firm's independent accountant. The firm's financial records were therefore maintained in petitioner's office during his tenure at the firm.Bellis left the firm in late 1969 to join another law firm. The partnership was dissolved, although it is apparently still in the process of winding up its affairs. Kolsby and Wolf continued in practice together as a new partnership, at the same premises. Bellis moved to new offices, leaving the former partnership's financial records with Kolsby and Wolf, where they remained for more than three years. In February or March, 1973, however, shortly before issuance of the subpoena in this case, petitioner's secretary, acting at the direction of petitioner or his attorney, removed the records from the old premises and brought them to Bellis' new office.On May 1, 1973, Bellis was served with a subpoena directing him to appear and testify before a federal grand jury and to bring with him "all partnership records currently in your possession for the partnership of Bellis, Kolsby & Wolf for the years 1968 and 1969." App. 6. Petitioner appeared on May 9, but refused to produce the records, claiming, inter alia, his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. After a hearing before the District Court on May 9 and 10, the court held that petitioner's personal privilege did not extend to the partnership's financial books and records, and ordered Page 417 U. S. 87 their production by May 16. [Footnote 1] When petitioner reappeared before the grand jury on that date and again refused to produce the subpoenaed records, the District Court held him in civil contempt, and released him on his own recognizance pending an expedited appeal.On July 9 1973, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 483 F.2d 961 (CA3 1973). Relying on this Court's decision in United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (19,44), the Court of Appeals stated that "the privilege has always been regarded as personal in the sense that it applies only to an individual's words or personal papers," and thus held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to "records of an entity such as a partnership which has a recognizable juridical existence apart from its members." 483 F.2d at 962. After MR. JUSTICE WHITE had stayed the mandate of the Court of Appeals on August 1, we granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 907 (1973), to consider this interpretation of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the applicability of our White decision in the circumstances of this case. We affirm.It has long been established, of course, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), we held that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime" would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 116 U. S. 630; see also id. at 116 U. S. 633-635; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 221 U. S. 377 (1911). The privilege applies to the business records of Page 417 U. S. 88 the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more intimate information about the individual's private life. Boyd v. United States, supra; Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 (1973); Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (CA7), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459! 462 (CA5 1969). As the Court explained in United States v. White, supra, at 322 U. S. 698,"[t]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination . . . is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to force him to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him."See also Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 354 U. S. 125 (1957); Couch v. United States, supra, at 409 U. S. 330-331.On the other hand, an equally long line of cases has established that an individual cannot rely upon the privilege to avoid producing the records of a collective entity which are in his possession in a representative capacity, even if these records might incriminate him personally. This doctrine was first announced in a series of cases dealing with corporate records. In Wilson v. United States, supra, the Court held that an officer of a corporation could not claim his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to justify a refusal to produce the corporate books and records in response to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the corporation. A companion case, Dreier v. United States, 221 U. S. 394 (1911), held that the same result followed when the subpoena requiring production of the corporate books was directed to the individual corporate officer. In Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478 (1913), the Court held that no Fifth Amendment privilege could be claimed with respect to corporate records even though the corporation had previously been dissolved. And Page 417 U. S. 89 Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74 (1913), applied this principle to the records of a dissolved corporation where the records were in the possession of the individual who had been the corporation's sole shareholder.To some extent, these decisions were based upon the particular incidents of the corporate form, the Court observing that a corporation has limited powers granted to it by the State in its charter, and is subject to the retained "visitorial power" of the State to investigate its activities. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, supra, at 221 U. S. 382-385. But any thought that the principle formulated in these decisions was limited to corporate records was put to rest in United States v. White, supra. In White, we held that an officer of an unincorporated association, a labor union, could not claim his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to justify his refusal to produce the union's records pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. White announced the general rule that the privilege could not be employed by an individual to avoid production of the records of an organization, which he holds in a representative capacity as custodian on behalf of the group. 322 U.S. at 322 U. S. 699-700. Relying on White, we have since upheld compelled production of the records of a variety of organizations over individuals' claims of Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349, 339 U. S. 357-358 (1950) (Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee); Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 340 U. S. 371-372 (1951) (Communist Party of Denver); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372, 364 U. S. 380 (1960) (Civil Rights Congress). See also Curcio v. United States, supra, (local labor union).These decisions reflect the Court's consistent view that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be"limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through Page 417 U. S. 90 his own testimony or personal records."United States v. White, supra, at 322 U. S. 701. White is only one of the many cases to emphasize that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a purely personal one, most recent among them being the Court's decision last Term in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 327-328. Relying on this fundamental policy limiting the scope of the privilege, the Court in White held that"the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity."322 U.S. at 322 U. S. 699. Mr. Justice Murphy reasoned that"individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather, they assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its obligations."Ibid.Since no artificial organization may utilize the personal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the Court found that it follows that an individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of the organization may likewise not take advantage of his personal privilege. In view of the inescapable fact that an artificial entity can only act to produce its records through its individual officers or agents, recognition of the individual's claim of privilege with respect to the financial records of the organization would substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that the organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth Amendment privilege; and largely frustrate legitimate governmental regulation of such organizations. Mr. Justice Murphy put it well:"The scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations and their representatives demand that the constitutional Page 417 U. S. 91 power of the federal and state governments to regulate those activities be correspondingly effective. The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its representatives is usually to be found in the official records and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible. The framers of the constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure, who were interested primarily in protecting individual civil liberties, cannot be said to have intended the privilege to be available to protect economic or other interests of such organizations so as to nullify appropriate governmental regulations."Id. at 322 U. S. 700 (citations omitted). See also Wilson v. United States, supra, at 221 U. S. 384-385.The Court's decisions holding the privilege inapplicable to the records of a collective entity also reflect a second, though obviously interrelated, policy underlying the privilege, the protection of an individual's right to a "private enclave where he may lead a private life.'" Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 378 U. S. 55 (1964). We have recognized that the Fifth Amendment "respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought" -- an inner sanctum which necessarily includes an individual's papers and effects to the extent that the privilege bars their compulsory production and authentication -- and "proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." Couch v. United States, supra at 409 U. S. 327. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 381 U. S. 484 (1965). Protection of individual privacy was the major theme running through the Court's decision in Boyd, see, e.g., 116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 630, and it was on this basis that the Court in Wilson distinguished the corporate records involved in Page 417 U. S. 92 that case from the private papers at issue in Boyd. See 221 U.S. at 221 U. S. 377, 221 U. S. 380.But a substantial claim of privacy or confidentiality cannot often be maintained with respect to the financial records of an organized collective entity. Control of such records is generally strictly regulated by statute or by the rules and regulations of the organization, and access to the records is generally guaranteed to others in the organization. In such circumstances, the custodian of the organization's records lacks the control over their content and location and the right to keep them from the view of others which would be characteristic of a claim of privacy and confidentiality. Mr. Justice Murphy recognized the significance of this in White; he pointed out that organizational records "[u]sually, if not always, . . . are open to inspection by the members," that "this right may be enforced on appropriate occasions by available legal procedures," and that "[t]hey therefore embody no element of personal privacy." 322 U.S. at 322 U. S. 699-700. And here lies the modern-day relevance of the visitorial powers doctrine relied upon by the Court in Wilson and the other cases dealing with corporate records; the Court's holding that no privilege exists"where, by virtue of their character and the rules of law applicable to them, the books and papers are held subject to examination by the [state],"221 U.S. at 221 U. S. 382, can easily be understood as a recognition that corporate records do not contain the requisite element of privacy or confidentiality essential for the privilege to attach.The analysis of the Court in White, of course, only makes sense in the context of what the Court described as "organized, institutional activity." 322 U.S. at 322 U. S. 701. This analysis presupposes the existence of an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members. The group must be relatively Page 417 U. S. 93 well organized and structured, and not merely a loose, informal association of individuals. It must maintain a distinct set of organizational records, and recognize rights in its members of control and access to them. And the records subpoenaed must, in fact, be organizational records held in a representative capacity. In other words, it must be fair to say that the records demanded are the records of the organization, rather than those of the individual under White.The Court in White had little difficulty in concluding that the demand for production of the official records of a labor union, whether national or local, in the custody of an officer of the union, met these tests. See id. at 322 U. S. 701-703. The Court observed that a union's existence in fact, if not in law, was "as perpetual as that of any corporation," id. at 322 U. S. 701, that the union operated under formal constitutions, rules, and bylaws, and that it engaged in a broad scope of activities in which it was recognized as an independent entity. The Court also pointed out that the official union books and records were distinct from the personal books and records of its members, that the union restricted the permissible uses of these records, and that it recognized its members' rights to inspect them. Although the Court was aware that the individual members might legally hold title to the union records, the Court characterized this interest as a "nominal," rather than a significant, personal interest in them.We think it is similarly clear that partnerships may and frequently do represent organized institutional activity so as to preclude any claim of Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to the partnership's financial records. Some of the most powerful private institutions in the Nation are conducted in the partnership form. Wall Street law firms and stock brokerage firms provide significant examples. These are often large, impersonal, Page 417 U. S. 94 highly structured enterprises of essentially perpetual duration. The personal interest of any individual partner in the financial records of a firm of this scope is obviously highly attenuated. It is inconceivable that a brokerage house with offices from coast to coast handling millions of dollars of investment transactions annually should be entitled to immunize its records from SEC scrutiny solely because it operates as a partnership, rather than in the corporate form. Although none of the reported cases has involved a partnership of quite this magnitude, it is hardly surprising that all of the courts of appeals which have addressed the question have concluded that White's analysis requires rejection of any claim of privilege in the financial records of a large business enterprise conducted in the partnership form. In re Mal Brothers Contracting Co., 444 F.2d 615 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (CA2), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963); United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, 800 (CA7 1946). See also United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190, 205-210 (DC 1954). Even those lower courts which have held the privilege applicable in the context of a smaller partnership have frequently acknowledged that no absolute exclusion of the partnership form from the White rule generally applicable to unincorporated associations is warranted. See, e.g., United States v. Cogan, 257 F. Supp. 170, 17174 (SDNY 1966); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418, 421 (ND Cal.1948).In this case, however, we are required to explore the outer limits of the analysis of the Court in White. Petitioner argues that, in view of the modest size of the partnership involved here, it is unrealistic to consider the firm as an entity independent of its three partners; rather, he claims, the law firm embodies little more than the personal Page 417 U. S. 95 legal practice of the individual partners. Moreover, petitioner argues that he has a substantial and direct ownership interest in the partnership records, and does not hold them in a representative capacity. [Footnote 2]Despite the force of these arguments, we conclude that the lower courts properly applied the White rule in the circumstances of this case. While small, the partnership here did have an established institutional identity independent of its individual partners. This was not an informal association or a temporary arrangement for the undertaking of a few projects of short-lived duration. Rather, the partnership represented a formal institutional arrangement organized for the continuing conduct of the firm's legal practice. The partnership was in Page 417 U. S. 96 existence for nearly 15 years prior to its voluntary dissolution. [Footnote 3] Although it may not have had a formal constitution or bylaws to govern its internal affairs, state partnership law imposed on the firm a certain organizational structure in the absence of any contrary agreement by the partners; [Footnote 4] for example, it guaranteed to each of the partners the equal right to participate in the management and control of the firm, Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 59, § 51(e) (1964), and prescribed that majority rule governed the conduct of the firm's business, § 51(h). [Footnote 5] The firm maintained a bank account in the partnership name, had stationery using the firm name on its letterhead, Page 417 U. S. 97 and, in general, held itself out to third parties as an entity with an independent institutional identity. It employed six persons in addition to its partners, including two other attorneys who practiced law on behalf of the firm, rather than as individuals on their own behalf. It filed separate partnership returns for federal tax purposes, as required by § 6031 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6031. [Footnote 6] State law permitted the firm to be sued, Pa.Rule Civ.Proc. 2128, and to hold title to property, Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 59, § 13(3), in the partnership name, and generally regarded the partnership as a distinct entity for numerous other purposes. [Footnote 7]Equally important, we believe it is fair to say that petitioner is holding the subpoenaed partnership records in a representative capacity. [Footnote 8] The documents which Page 417 U. S. 98 petitioner has been ordered to produce are merely the financial books and records of the partnership. [Footnote 9] These reflect the receipts and disbursements of the entire firm, including income generated by and salaries paid to the employees of the firm, and the financial transactions of the other partners. Petitioner holds these records subject to the rights granted to the other partners by state partnership law. Petitioner has no direct ownership interest in the records; rather, under state law, they are partnership property, and petitioner's interest in partnership property is a derivative interest subject to significant limitations. See Ellis v. Ellis, 415 Pa. 412, 415-416, 203 A.2d 547, 549-550 (1964). Petitioner has no right to use this property for other than partnership purposes without the consent of the other partners. Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 59, § 72(2)(a). Petitioner is, of course, accountable to the partnership as Page 417 U. S. 99 a fiduciary, § 54(1), and his possession of the firm's financial records is especially subject to his fiduciary obligations to the other partners. Indeed, Pennsylvania law specifically provides that "every partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of [the partnership books]." § 52. [Footnote 10] To facilitate this right of access, petitioner was required to keep these financial books and records at the firm's principal place of business, at least during the active life of the partnership. Ibid. The other partners in the firm were -- and still are -- entitled to enforce these rights through legal action by demanding production of the records in a suit for a formal accounting. § 55. [Footnote 11]It should be noted also that petitioner was content to leave these records with the other members of the partnership at their principal place of business for more than three years after he left the firm. Moreover, the Government contends that the other partners in the firm had agreed to turn the records over to the grand jury before discovering that petitioner had removed them from their offices, and that they made an unavailing demand upon petitioner to return the records. Whether or not petitioner's present possession of these records is an unlawful infringement of the rights of the other partners, this provides additional support for our conclusion that it is the organizational character of the records and the representative aspect of petitioner's present possession of Page 417 U. S. 100 them which predominates over his belatedly discovered personal interest in them.Petitioner relies heavily on language in the Court's opinion in White which suggests that the "test" for determining the applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege in this area is whether the organization"has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only."322 U.S. at 322 U. S. 701. We must admit our agreement with the Solicitor General's observation that "it is difficult to know precisely what situations the formulation in White was intended to include within the protection of the privilege." Brief for United States 21. The Court in White, after stating its test, did not really apply it, nor has any of the subsequent decisions of this Court. On its face, the test is not particularly helpful in the broad range of cases, including this one, where the organization embodies neither "purely . . . personal interests" nor "group interests only", but rather some combination of the two.In any event, we do not believe that the Court's formulation in White can be reduced to a simple proposition based solely upon the size of the organization. It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be. Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74 (1913); Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 420 (CA9 1968); Hair Industry, Ltd. v. United States, 340 F.2d 510 (CA2 1965); cf. George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U. S. 286 (1968). Every State has now adopted laws permitting incorporation of professional associations, and increasing numbers of lawyers, doctors, and other professionals are choosing to conduct their business affairs Page 417 U. S. 101 in the corporate form, rather than the more traditional partnership. Whether corporation or partnership, many of these firms will be independent entities whose financial records are held by a member of the firm in a representative capacity. In these circumstances, the applicability of the privilege should not turn on an insubstantial difference in the form of the business enterprise. See In re rand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 358 F. Supp. 661, 668 (Md.1973).This might be a different case if it involved a small family partnership, see United States v. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105 (SDNY 1972); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. at 421, or, as the Solicitor General suggests, Brief for United States 22-23, if there were some other preexisting relationship of confidentiality among the partners. But in the circumstances of this case, petitioner's possession of the partnership's financial records in what can be fairly said to be a representative capacity compels our holding that his personal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is inapplicable.Affirmed | U.S. Supreme CourtBellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974)Bellis v. United StatesNo. 73-190Argued February 25, 1974Decided May 28, 1974417 U.S. 85SyllabusFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 322 U. S. 701. Pp. 417 U. S. 87-101.483 F.2d 961, affirmed.MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 417 U. S. 101. |
3,209 | 1977_76-1427 | MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE POWELL, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS joined.The question presented by this appeal is whether a Tennessee statute barring "Minister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination whatever" from serving as delegates to the State's limited constitutional convention deprived appellant McDaniel, an ordained minister, of the right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The First Amendment forbids all laws "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Page 435 U. S. 621IIn its first Constitution, in 1796, Tennessee disqualified ministers from serving as legislators. [Footnote 1] That disqualifying provision has continued unchanged since its adoption; it is now Art. 9, § 1, of the State Constitution. The state legislature applied this provision to candidates for delegate to the State's 1977 limited constitutional convention when it enacted ch. 848, § 4, of 1976 Tenn.Pub.Acts:"Any citizen of the state who can qualify for membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly may become a candidate for delegate to the convention. . . ."McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chattanooga, Tenn., filed as a candidate for delegate to the constitutional convention. An opposing candidate, appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified from serving as a delegate and for a judgment striking his name from the ballot. Chancellor Franks of the Chancery Court held that § 4 of ch. 848 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, and declared McDaniel eligible for the office of delegate. Accordingly, McDaniel's name remained on the ballot, and, in the ensuing election, he was elected by a vote almost equal to that of three opposing candidates.After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon "religious belief" and restricted"religious action . . . [only] in the lawmaking process of government -- where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause. . . ."547 S.W.2d 897, 903 (1977). Page 435 U. S. 622 The state interests in preventing the establishment of religion and in avoiding the divisiveness and tendency to channel political activity along religious lines, resulting from clergy participation in political affairs, were deemed by that court sufficiently weighty to justify the disqualification, notwithstanding the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause.We noted probable jurisdiction. [Footnote 2] 432 U.S. 905 (1977).IIAThe disqualification of ministers from legislative office was a practice carried from England by seven of the original States; [Footnote 3] later, six new States similarly excluded clergymen from some political offices. 1 A. Stokes, Church and State in the United States 622 (1950) (hereafter Stokes). In England, the practice of excluding clergy from the House of Commons was justified on a variety of grounds: to prevent dual officeholding, that is, membership by a minister in both Parliament and Convocation; to insure that the priest or deacon devoted himself to his "sacred calling," rather than to "such mundane activities as were appropriate to a member of the House of Commons"; and to prevent ministers, who, after 1533, were subject to the Crown's powers over the benefices of the clergy, from using membership in Commons to diminish its independence by increasing the influence of the King and the nobility. In re MacManaway, [1951] A.C. 161, 164, 170-171.The purpose of the several States in providing for disqualification was primarily to assure the success of a new political experiment, the separation of church and state. Stokes 622. Page 435 U. S. 623 Prior to 1776, most of the 13 Colonies had some form of an established, or government-sponsored, church. Id. at 364-446. Even after ratification of the First Amendment, which prohibited the Federal Government from following such a course, some States continued pro-establishment provisions. See id. at 408, 418-427, 444. Massachusetts, the last State to accept disestablishment, did so in 1833. Id. at 426-427.In light of this history and a widespread awareness during that period of undue and often dominant clerical influence in public and political affairs here, in England, and on the Continent, it is not surprising that strong views were held by some that one way to assure disestablishment was to keep clergymen out of public office. Indeed, some of the foremost political philosophers and statesmen of that period held such views regarding the clergy. Earlier, John Locke argued for confining the authority of the English clergy"within the bounds of the church, nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs, because the church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth"5 Works of John Locke 21 (C. Baldwin ed. 1824). Thomas Jefferson initially advocated such a position in his 1783 draft of a constitution for Virginia. [Footnote 4] James Madison, however, disagreed, and vigorously Page 435 U. S. 624 urged the position which, in our view, accurately reflects the spirit and purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Madison's response to Jefferson's position was:"Does not The exclusion of Ministers of the Gospel, as such, violate a fundamental principle of liberty by punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right? Does it [not] violate another article of the plan itself which exempts religion from the cognizance of Civil power? Does it not violate justice by at once taking away a right and prohibiting a compensation for it? Does it not, in fine, violate impartiality by shutting the door [against] the Ministers of one Religion and leaving it open for those of every other."5 Writings of James Madison 288 (G. Hunt ed.1904).Madison was not the only articulate opponent of clergy disqualification. When proposals were made earlier to prevent clergymen from holding public office, John Witherspoon, a Presbyterian minister, president of Princeton University, and the only clergyman to sign the Declaration of Independence, made a cogent protest and, with tongue in cheek, offered an amendment to a provision much like that challenged here:"'No clergyman, of any denomination, shall be capable of being elected a member of the Senate or House of Representatives, because (here insert the grounds of offensive disqualification, which I have not been able to discover) Provided always, and it is the true intent and meaning of this part of the constitution, that if at any time he shall be completely deprived of the clerical character by those by whom he was invested with it, as by deposition for cursing and swearing, drunkenness or uncleanliness, he shall then be fully restored to all the privileges of a free Page 435 U. S. 625 citizen; his offense [of being a clergyman] shall no more be remembered against him, but he may be chosen either to the Senate or House of Representatives, and shall be treated with all the respect due to his brethren, the other members of Assembly.'"Stokes 624-625.As the value of the disestablishment experiment was perceived, 11 of the 13 States disqualifying the clergy from some types of public office gradually abandoned that limitation. New York, for example, took that step in 1846, after delegates to the State's constitutional convention argued that the exclusion of clergymen from the legislature was an "odious distinction." 2 C. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 111-112 (1906). Only Maryland and Tennessee continued their clergy disqualification provisions into this century, and, in 1974, a District Court held Maryland's provision violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of the free exercise of religion. Kirkley v. Maryland, 381 F. Supp. 327. Today, Tennessee remains the only State excluding ministers from certain public offices.The essence of this aspect of our national history is that, in all but a few States, the selection or rejection of clergymen for public office soon came to be viewed as something safely left to the good sense and desires of the people.BThis brief review of the history of clergy disqualification provisions also amply demonstrates, however, that, at least during the early segment of our national life, those provisions enjoyed the support of responsible American statesmen, and were accepted as having a rational basis. Against this background, we do not lightly invalidate a statute enacted pursuant to a provision of a state constitution which has been sustained by its highest court. The challenged provision came to the Tennessee Supreme Court clothed with the presumption of validity to which that court was bound to give deference. Page 435 U. S. 626However, the right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, or, in other words, to be a minister of the type McDaniel was found to be. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). Tennessee also acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to seek and hold office as legislators or delegates to the state constitutional convention. Tenn.Const., Art. 2, §§ 9, 25, 26; Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 8-1801, 8-1803 (Supp. 1977). Yet, under the clergy disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously, because the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. Or, in James Madison's words, the State is "punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right." 5 Writings of James Madison, supra, at 288. In so doing, Tennessee has encroached upon McDaniel's right to the free exercise of religion."[T]o condition the availability of benefits [including access to the ballot] upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of [his] religious faith [by surrendering his religiously impelled ministry] effectively penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional liberties."Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 406 (1963).If the Tennessee disqualification provision were viewed as depriving the clergy of a civil right solely because of their religious beliefs, our inquiry would be at an end. The Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such. Id. at 374 U. S. 402; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra at 310 U. S. 304. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), the Court reviewed the Maryland constitutional requirement that all holders of "any office of profit or trust in this State" declare their belief in the existence of God. In striking down the Maryland requirement, the Court did not evaluate the interests assertedly justifying it, but rather held that it violated freedom of religious belief.In our view, however, Torcaso does not govern. By its Page 435 U. S. 627 terms, the Tennessee disqualification operates against McDaniel because of his status as a "minister" or "priest." The meaning of those words is, of course, a question of state law. [Footnote 5] And although the question has not been examined extensively in state law sources, such authority as is available indicates that ministerial status is defined in terms of conduct and activity, rather than in terms of belief. [Footnote 6] Because the Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily at status, acts, and conduct, it is unlike the requirement in Torcaso, which focused on belief. Hence, the Free Exercise Clause's absolute prohibition of infringements on the "freedom to believe" is inapposite here. [Footnote 7]This does not mean, of course, that the disqualification escapes judicial scrutiny, or that McDaniel's activity does not enjoy significant First Amendment protection. The Court Page 435 U. S. 628 recently declared, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 406 U. S. 215 (1972):"The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. [Footnote 8]"Tennessee asserts that its interest in preventing the establishment of a state religion is consistent with the Establishment Clause, and thus of the highest order. The constitutional history of the several States reveals that, generally, the interest in preventing establishment prompted the adoption of clergy disqualification provisions, see Stokes 622; Tennessee does not appear to be an exception to this pattern. Cf. post at 435 U. S. 636 n. 9 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). There is no occasion to inquire whether promoting such an interest is a permissible legislative goal, however, see post at 435 U. S. 636-642, for Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process have not lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed. The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on ministers is that, if elected to public office, they will necessarily exercise Page 435 U. S. 629 their powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its command of neutrality. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970). However widely that view may have been held in the 18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day, the American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts. [Footnote 9]We hold that § 4 of ch. 848 violates McDaniel's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.Reversed | U.S. Supreme CourtMcDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)McDaniel v. PatyNo. 76-1427Argued December 5, 1977Decided April 19, 1978435 U.S. 618SyllabusAppellee Paty, a candidate for delegate to a Tennessee constitutional convention, sued in the State Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that appellant, an opponent who was a Baptist minister, was disqualified from serving as delegate by a Tennessee statutory provision establishing the qualifications of constitutional convention delegates to be the same as those for membership in the State House of Representatives, thus invoking a Tennessee constitutional provision barring "[m]inister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination whatever." That court held that the statutory provision violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clergy disqualification imposed no burden on "religious belief," and restricted"religious action . . . [only] in the law making process of government -- where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause. . . ."Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. Pp. 435 U. S. 625-629; 435 U. S. 629-642; 435 U. S. 642-643; 435 U. S. 643-646.547 S.W.2d 897, reversed and remanded.THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by MR. JUSTICE POWELL, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded:1. The Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily not at religious belief, but at the status, acts, and conduct of the clergy. Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause's absolute prohibition against infringements on the "freedom to believe" is inapposite here. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (which invalidated a state requirement that an appointee to public office declare his belief in the existence of God), distinguished. Pp. 435 U. S. 626-627.2. Nevertheless, the challenged provision violates appellant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his religion on the surrender of his right to seek office. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 406. Though justification is asserted under the Establishment Clause for the statutory restriction on the ground that, if elected to public office members of the clergy will necessarily promote the interests of one sect or thwart those of another contrary to the anti-establishment principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of Page 435 U. S. 619 clergy participation in the political process have not lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed. Accordingly, there is no need to inquire whether the State's legislative goal is permissible. Pp. 435 U. S. 626; 435 U. S. 627-629.MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concluded:1. The Free Exercise Clause is violated by the challenged provision. Pp. 435 U. S. 630-635.(a) Freedom of belief protected by that Clause embraces freedom to profess or practice that belief, even including doing so for a livelihood. The Tennessee disqualification establishes as a condition of office the willingness to eschew certain protected religious practices. The provision therefore establishes a religious classification governing eligibility for office that is absolutely prohibited. Torcaso v. Watkins, supra. Pp. 435 U. S. 631-633.(b) The fact that the law does not directly prohibit religious exercise, but merely conditions eligibility for office on its abandonment, does not alter the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause. "Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine . . . ," Sherbert v. Verner, supra at 374 U. S. 404, and Tennessee's disqualification provision therefore imposed an unconstitutional penalty on appellant's free exercise. Moreover,"[t]he fact . . . that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution."Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, at 367 U. S. 495-496. Pp. 435 U. S. 633-634.2. The Tennessee disqualification also violates the Establishment Clause. Government generally may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges, or benefits. Specifically, government may not fence out from political participation people such as ministers whom it regards as overinvolved in religion. The disqualification provision employed by Tennessee here establishes a religious classification that has the primary effect of inhibiting religion. Pp. 435 U. S. 636-642.MR. JUSTICE STEWART concluded that Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, controls this case. Except for the fact that Tennessee bases its disqualification, not on a person's statement of belief, but on his decision to pursue a religious vocation as directed by his belief, the situation in Torcaso is indistinguishable from the one here. Pp. 435 U. S. 642-643.MR. JUSTICE WHITE concluded that the Tennessee disqualification, while not interfering with appellant's right to exercise his religion as he desires, denies him equal protection. Though that disqualification is based on the State's asserted interest in maintaining the required separation Page 435 U. S. 620 of church and state, it is not reasonably necessary for that objective, which all States except Tennessee have been able to realize without burdening ministers' rights to candidacy. In addition, the statute is both underinclusive and overinclusive. Pp. 435 U. S. 643-646.BURGER, C.J., announced the Court's judgment, and delivered an opinion, in which POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 435 U. S. 629. STEWART, J., post, p. 435 U. S. 642, and WHITE, J., post, p. 435 U. S. 643, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. BLACKMUN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. |
3,210 | 1973_72-1470 | MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.This case and Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., post, p. 416 U. S. 752, involve the application of the Anti-Injunction Page 416 U. S. 727 Act, § 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the Code), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), to the ruling letter program of the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) for organizations claiming tax-exempt status under Code § 501(c)(3), 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). The question presented is whether, prior to the assessment and collection of any tax, a court may enjoin the Service from revoking a ruling letter declaring that petitioner qualifies for tax-exempt status and from withdrawing advance assurance to donors that contributions to petitioner will constitute charitable deductions under Code § 170(c)(2), 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2). We hold that it may not.ISection 501(a) of the Code exempts from federal income taxes organizations described in § 501(c)(3). The latter provision encompasses:"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."Section 501(c)(3) organizations are also exempt from federal social security (FICA) taxes by virtue of Code § 3121(b)(8)(B), 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(8)(B), and from federal unemployment (FUTA) taxes by virtue of § 3306(c)(8), 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8). Donations Page 416 U. S. 728 to § 501(c)(3) organizations are tax deductible under § 170(c)(2). [Footnote 1]As a practical matter, an organization hoping to solicit tax-deductible contributions may not rely solely on technical compliance with the language of §§ 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2). The organization must also obtain a ruling letter from the Service, pursuant to Rev. Procs. 72-3 and 72, 1972-1 Cum.Bull. 698, 706, declaring that it qualifies under § 501(c)(3). Receipt of such a ruling letter leads, in the ordinary case, to inclusion in Page 416 U. S. 729 the Service's periodically updated Publication No. 78, "Cumulative List of Organizations described in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954" (the Cumulative List). In essence, the Cumulative List is the Service's official roster of tax-exempt organizations:"The listing of an organization in [the Cumulative List] signifies it has received a ruling or determination letter . . . stating that contributions by donors to the organization are deductible as provided in section 170 of the Code."Rev.Proc. 72-39, 1972-2 Cum.Bull. 818. An organization's inclusion in the Cumulative List assures potential donors in advance that contributions to the organization will qualify as charitable deductions under § 170(c)(2). The Service has announced that, with narrowly limited exceptions, a donor may rely on the Cumulative List for so long as the beneficiaries of his largesse maintain their listing, regardless of their actual tax status. [Footnote 2] For this reason, appearance on the Cumulative List is a prerequisite to successful fundraising Page 416 U. S. 730 for most charitable organizations. Many contributors simply will not make donations to an organization that does not appear on the Cumulative List. [Footnote 3]Because of the importance of inclusion in the Cumulative List, revocation of a § 501(c)(3) ruling letter and consequent removal from the Cumulative List is likely to result in serious damage to a charitable organization. [Footnote 4] Revocation not only threatens the flow of contributions, it also subjects the affected organization to FICA and FUTA taxes and, assuming that the organization has taxable income and does not qualify as tax exempt under another subsection of § 501, to federal income taxes. [Footnote 5] Upon the assessment and attempted collection of income taxes, the organization may litigate the legality of the Service's action by petitioning the Tax Court to review a notice of deficiency. See Code §§ 6212 and 6213, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212 and 6213. Or, following the collection of any federal tax and the denial of a refund by the Service, the organization may bring a Page 416 U. S. 731 refund suit in a federal district court or in the Court of Claims. See Code § 7422, 26 U.S.C. § 7422; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1) and 1491. Finally, a donor to the organization may bring a refund suit to challenge the denial of a charitable deduction under § 170(c)(2). Presumably such a "friendly donor" would be able to attack the legality of the Service's revocation of an organization's § 501(c)(3) status. But these post-revocation avenues of review take substantial time, during which the organization is certain to lose contributions from those donors whose gifts are contingent on entitlement to charitable deductions under § 170(c)(2). Accordingly, any organization threatened with revocation of a § 501(c)(3) ruling letter has a powerful incentive to bring a pre-enforcement suit to prevent the Service from taking action in the first instance.The pressures operating on organizations facing revocation of § 501(c)(3) status to seek injunctive relief against the Service pending judicial review of the proposed action conflict directly with a congressional prohibition of such pre-enforcement tax suits. In force continuously since its enactment in 1867, the Anti-Injunction Act, now Code § 7421(a), provides in pertinent part that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court. . . ." [Footnote 6] Because an injunction Page 416 U. S. 732 preventing the Service from withdrawing a § 501(c)(3) ruling letter would necessarily preclude the collection of FICA, FUTA, and possibly income taxes from the affected organization, as well as the denial of § 170(c)(2) charitable deductions to donors to the organization, a suit seeking such relief falls squarely within the literal scope of the Act. [Footnote 7] Page 416 U. S. 733The clash between the language of the Anti-Injunction Act and the desire of § 501(c)(3) organizations to block the Service from withdrawing a ruling letter has been resolved against the organizations in most cases. E.g., Page 416 U. S. 734 Crenshaw County Private School Foundaton v. Connally, 474 F.2d 1185 (CA5 1973), pet. for cert. pending in No. 7170; National Council on the Facts of Overpopulation v. Caplin, 224 F. Supp. 313 (DC 1963); Israelite House of David v. Holden, 14 F.2d 701 (WD Mich.1926). [Footnote 8] But see McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (DC 1972) (three-judge court). Cf. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).In the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed the majority view. Bob Jones University v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, petition for rehearing denied, 476 F.2d 259 (1973). In light of the contrary result reached by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 477 F.2d 1169 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., post, p. 416 U. S. 752, we granted Bob Jones University's petition for certiorari. 414 U.S. 817 (1973).IIPetitioner refers to itself as "the world's most unusual university." Founded in 1927 and now located in Greenville, South Carolina, the University is devoted to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist religious beliefs. All classes commence and close with prayer, Page 416 U. S. 735 and courses in religion are compulsory. Students and faculty are screened for adherence to certain religious precepts, and may be expelled or dismissed or lack of allegiance to them. One of these beliefs is that God intended segregation of the races, and that the Scriptures forbid interracial marriage. Accordingly, petitioner refuses to admit Negroes as students. On pain of expulsion, students are prohibited from interracial dating, and petitioner believes that it would be impossible to enforce this prohibition absent the exclusion of Negroes.In 1942, the Service issued petitioner a ruling letter under § 101(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the predecessor of § 501(c)(3). In 1970, however, the Service announced that it would no longer allow § 501(c)(3) status for private schools maintaining racially discriminatory admissions policies, and that it would no longer treat contributions to such schools as tax deductible. See Rev.Rul. 7147, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 230. The Service requested proof of a nondiscriminatory admissions policy from all such schools, and warned that tax-exempt ruling letters would be reviewed in light of the information provided. At the end of 1970, petitioner advised the Service that it did not admit Negroes, and in September, 1971, further stated that it had no intention of altering this policy. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue therefore instructed the District Director to commence administrative procedures leading to the revocation of petitioner's § 501(c)(3) ruling letter.Petitioner brought these administrative proceedings to a halt by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing the Service from revoking or threatening to revoke petitioner's tax-exempt status. Petitioner alleged irreparable injury in the form of substantial federal income tax liability and the loss of Page 416 U. S. 736 contributions. Petitioner asserted that the Service's threatened action was outside its lawful authority, and would violate petitioner's rights to the free exercise of religion, to free association, and to due process and equal protection of the laws.The District Court rejected a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and it preliminarily enjoined the Service from revoking or threatening to revoke petitioner's tax-exempt status and from withdrawing advance assurance of the deductibility of contributions made to petitioner. Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (1971). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, with one judge dissenting. 472 F.2d 903, reh. den., 476 F.2d 259 (1973). That court held that petitioner's suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act as interpreted by this Court in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962).IIIThe Anti-Injunction Act apparently has no recorded legislative history, [Footnote 9] but its language could scarcely be more explicit -- "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court. . . ." The Court has interpreted the principal purpose of this language to be the protection of the Government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interference, "and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund." Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Page 416 U. S. 737 Co., supra, at 370 U. S. 7. See also, e.g., State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 92 U. S. 613-614 (1876). Cf. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S. 85, 92 U. S. 88-89 (1876). The Court has also identified "a collateral objective of the Act -- protection of the collector from litigation pending a suit for refund." Williams Packing, supra, at 370 U. S. 7-8.In furtherance of these goals, the Court in its most recent reading gave the Act almost literal effect. In Williams Packing, an employer sought to enjoin the collection of FICA and FUTA taxes that the employer alleged were not owed and would destroy its business. The Court held unanimously that the suit was barred by the Act. Only upon proof of the presence of two factors could the literal terms of § 7421(a) be avoided: first, irreparable injury, the essential prerequisite for injunctive relief in any case; and second, certainty of success on the merits. Id. at 370 U. S. 6-7. An injunction could issue only "if it is clear that, under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail. . . ." Id. at 370 U. S. 7. And this determination would be made on the basis of the information available to the Government at the time of the suit."Only if it is then apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim may the suit for an injunction be maintained."Ibid.Perhaps in recognition of the stringent nature of the Williams Packing standard and its implications for this case, petitioner makes little effort to argue that it can meet that test. Rather, it asserts that the Anti-Injunction Act, properly construed, is not applicable, that Williams Packing is not the controlling reading of the Act, and that rejection of both these contentions would work a denial of due process of law. We find these arguments unpersuasive. Page 416 U. S. 738AFirst, petitioner contends that the Act is inapplicable because this is not a suit "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax. . . ." Under petitioner's theory, its suit is intended solely to compel the Service to refrain from withdrawing petitioner's § 501(c)(3) ruling letter and from depriving petitioner's donors of advance assurance of deductibility. Petitioner describes its goal as the maintenance of the flow of contributions, not the obstruction of revenue.Petitioner's complaint and supporting documents filed in the District Court belie any notion that this is not a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of federal taxes from petitioner. In support of its claim of irreparable injury, petitioner alleged in part that it would be subject to "substantial" federal income tax liability if the Service were allowed to carry out its threatened action. App. 6. Petitioner buttressed this contention with sworn affidavits alleging federal income tax liability of three-quarters of a million dollars for one year and in excess of half a million dollars for another and stressing the detrimental effect such tax liability would have on petitioner's capacity to operate its institution, to support its personnel, and to continue with its expansion plans. Id. at 10-11, 43-44. These allegations leave little doubt that a primary purpose of this lawsuit is to prevent the Service from assessing and collecting income taxes from petitioner.We recognize that petitioner's assertions that it will owe federal income taxes should its § 501(c)(3) status be revoked are open to debate, because they are based in part on a failure to take into account possible deductions for depreciation of plant and equipment. Even if it could be shown, however, that petitioner would owe no federal income taxes if its § 501(c)(3) status were Page 416 U. S. 739 revoked, this would still be a suit to restrain the assessment or collection of taxes, because petitioner would also be liable for FICA and FUTA taxes. Section 7421(a) speaks of "any tax"; it does not differentiate between federal income taxes or FICA or FUTA taxes. See, e.g., Williams Packing, supra. Moreover, petitioner seeks to restrain the collection of taxes from its donors -- to force the Service to continue to provide advance assurance to those donors that contributions to petitioner will be recognized as tax deductible, thereby reducing their tax liability. Although in this regard petitioner seeks to lower the taxes of those other than itself, the Act is nonetheless controlling. [Footnote 10] Thus, in any of its implications, this case falls within the literal scope and the purposes of the Act.Petitioner further contends that the Service's actions do not represent an effort to protect the revenues, but an attempt to regulate the admissions policies of private universities. Under this line of argument, the Anti-Injunction Page 416 U. S. 740 Act is said to be inapplicable because the case does not truly involve taxes. We disagree.The Service bases its present position with regard to the tax status of segregative private schools on its interpretation of the Code. [Footnote 11] There is no evidence that that position does not represent a good faith effort to enforce the technical requirements of the tax laws, and, without indicating a view as to whether the Service's interpretation is correct, we cannot say that its position has no legal basis or is unrelated to the protection of the revenues. The Act is therefore applicable. Petitioner's attribution of non-tax-related motives to the Service ignores the fact that petitioner has not shown that the Service's action is without an independent basis in the requirements of the Code. Moreover, petitioner's argument fails to give appropriate weight to Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16 (1922). In that case, the Court held that the Act blocked a pre-enforcement suit to enjoin collection of the federal Child Labor Tax, although the tax was challenged as a regulatory measure beyond the taxing power of Congress. Significantly, the Court announced Bailey v. George on the same day that it issued Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 Page 416 U. S. 741 (1922), a tax refund case in which the Court struck down the Child Labor Tax Law as unconstitutional on the grounds that the taxpayer attempted to raise prematurely in Bailey v. George. [Footnote 12]Petitioner also argues that § 7421(a) is not controlling because, when the Act was passed in 1867, Congress could not possibly have foreseen something as sophisticated as the comparatively recent ruling letter program [Footnote 13] and the special importance of that program for § 501(c)(3) organizations. This argument proves too much, however, since the same Congress also could not have foreseen, for example, FICA or FUTA taxes, to which the prohibitory command of § 7421(a) indisputably applies. See, e.g., Williams Packing, supra. Moreover, through the years, Congress has repeatedly reenacted the Anti-Injunction Act [Footnote 14] at times when it was obviously aware of Page 416 U. S. 742 the continuously increasing complexity of the federal tax system. [Footnote 15]BPetitioner next argues that Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., supra, does not constitute an all-encompassing reading of the Act. Petitioner contends, on the basis of prior precedents, that § 7421(a) is subject to judicially created exceptions other than the "under no circumstances" test announced in Williams Packing. But the Court's unanimous opinion in Williams Packing indicates that the case was meant to be the capstone to judicial construction of the Act. It spells an end to a cyclical pattern of allegiance to the plain meaning of the Act, followed by periods of uncertainty caused by a judicial departure from that meaning, and followed in turn by the Court's rediscovery of the Act's purpose.During the first half century of the Act's existence, the Court gave it literal force, without regard to the character of the tax, the nature of the pre-enforcement challenge to it, or the status of the plaintiff. See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. at 92 U. S. 613-614; Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189 (1883); Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. United States, 187 U. S. 447 (1903); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118 (1916); Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16 (1922). [Footnote 16] Occasionally, however, the Court noted in Page 416 U. S. 743 dictum that unspecified extraordinary and exceptional circumstances might justify an injunction despite the Act. E.g., Dodge v. Osborn, supra, at 240 U. S. 122; Bailey v. George, supra, at 259 U. S. 20. In 1922, the Court seized upon these dicta and permitted pre-enforcement injunctive suits against tax statutes that were viewed as penalties or as adjuncts to the criminal law. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922); Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U. S. 386 (1922). Shortly thereafter, however, the Court made clear that Hill, Lipke, and Regal Drug were of narrow scope, and had no application to pre-enforcement challenges to truly revenue-raising tax statutes. Graham v. Du Pont, 262 U. S. 234 (1923). [Footnote 17] Thus, the Court's first departure from a literal reading of the Act produced a prompt correction in course. Page 416 U. S. 744In the 1930's the Court decided Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498 (1932), and Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439 (1938), the cases relied on most heavily by petitioner. Standard Nut set forth a new definition of the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances test, which was followed in Regents. In Standard Nut, the Court stated that the Act is merely "declaratory of the principle" of cases prior to its passage that equity usually, but not always, disavows interference with tax collection; thus the Act was to be construed "as near as may be in harmony with [equity doctrine] and the reasons upon which it rests." 284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 509. Through this interpretation, the concept of extraordinary and exceptional circumstances was reduced to the traditional equitable requirements for issuance of an injunction.Standard Nut was such a significant deviation from precedent that it was referred to by a commentator at the time as "a tribute to the tenacity of the American taxpayer" and "little short of phenomenal." [Footnote 18] Read literally, the Court's opinion effectively repealed the Act, since the Act was viewed as requiring nothing more than equity doctrine had demanded before the Act's passage. The incongruity of this position has not escaped notice. [Footnote 19] It undoubtedly led directly to the Court's reexamination Page 416 U. S. 745 of the requirements of the Act in Williams Packing, the second time the Court has undertaken to rehabilitate the Act following debilitating departures from its explicit language. See Graham v. Du Pont, supra.Williams Packing switched the focus of the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances test from a showing of the degree of harm to the plaintiff absent an injunction to the requirement that it be established that the Service's action is plainly without a legal basis. The Court, in essence, read Standard Nut not as an instance of irreparable injury, but as a case where the Service had no chance of success on the merits. 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 7. And the Court explicitly held that the Act may not be evaded "merely because collection would cause an irreparable injury, such as the ruination of the taxpayer's enterprise." Id. at 370 U. S. 6. Yet petitioner's argument that we should find Williams Packing inapplicable turns, in the last analysis, on its claim that to do otherwise would subject it to great harm. The Court rejected that consideration in Williams Packing itself, and we reject it as a reason for finding that case not controlling. Under the language of the Act, the degree of harm is not a factor, and, as a matter of judicial construction, it does not provide a meaningful stopping point between Standard Nut and Williams Packing. Acceptance of petitioner's irreparable injury argument would simply Page 416 U. S. 746 revive the evisceration of the Act inherent in Standard Nut.CAssuming, arguendo, the applicability of § 7421(a) and Williams Packing, petitioner contends that forcing it to meet the standards of those authorities will deny it due process of law in light of the irreparable injury it will suffer pending resort to alternative procedures for review and of the alleged inadequacies of those remedies at law. The Court dismissed out of hand similar contentions nearly 60 years ago, [Footnote 20] and we find such arguments no more compelling now than then.This is not a case in which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial review. Were that true, our conclusion might well be different. If, as alleged in its complaint, petitioner will have taxable income upon the withdrawal of its § 501(c)(3) status, it may in accordance with prescribed procedures petition the Tax Court to review the assessment of income taxes. Alternatively, petitioner may pay income taxes, or, in their absence, an installment of FICA or FUTA taxes, exhaust the Service's internal refund procedures, and then bring suit for a refund. These review procedures offer petitioner a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality of the Service's revocation of tax-exempt status and withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility. See, e.g., Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, Page 416 U. S. 747 470 F.2d 849 (CA10 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (DC 1973). [Footnote 21]We do not say that these avenues of review are the best that can be devised. They present serious problems of delay, during which the flow of donations to an organization will be impaired, and in some cases perhaps even terminated. But, as the Service notes, some delay may be an inevitable consequence of the fact that disputes between the Service and a party challenging the Service's actions are not susceptible of instant resolution through litigation. And although the congressional restriction to post-enforcement review may place an organization claiming tax-exempt status in a precarious financial position, the problems presented do not rise to the level of constitutional infirmities, in light of the powerful governmental interests in protecting the administration of the tax system from premature judicial interference, e.g., Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. at 92 U. S. 88-89; State Page 416 U. S. 748 Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. at 92 U. S. 613-614, and of the opportunities for review that are available. [Footnote 22]IVSince we hold that Williams Packing, supra, governs this case, the remaining issue is whether petitioner has met the standards of that case. Without deciding the Page 416 U. S. 749 merits, we think that petitioner's First Amendment, due process, and equal protection contentions are sufficiently debatable to foreclose any notion that "under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail. . . ." 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 7. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that § 7421(a) deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief petitioner sought.In holding that § 7421(a) blocks the present suit, we are not unaware that Congress has imposed an especially harsh regime on § 501(c)(3) organizations threatened with loss of tax-exempt status and with withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility of contributions. A former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service has sharply criticized the system applicable to such organizations. [Footnote 23] The degree of bureaucratic control Page 416 U. S. 750 that, practically speaking, has been placed in the Service over those in petitioner's position is susceptible of abuse, regardless of how conscientiously the Service may attempt to carry out its responsibilities. Specific treatment of not-for-profit organizations to allow them to seek pre-enforcement review may well merit consideration. But this matter is for Congress, which is the appropriate body to weigh the relevant, policy-laden considerations, such as the harshness of the present law, the consequences of an unjustified revocation of § 501(c)(3) status, the number of organizations in any year threatened with such revocation, the comparability of those organizations to others which rely on the Service's ruling letter program, and the litigation burden on the Service and the effect on the assessment and collection of federal taxes if the law were to be changed.The judgment is affirmed.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtBob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)Bob Jones University v. SimonNo. 72-1470Argued January 7, 1974Decided May 15, 1974416 U.S. 725SyllabusPetitioner, a private university, was notified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), pursuant to a newly announced policy of denying tax-exempt status for private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies, that it was going to revoke a ruling letter declaring that petitioner qualified for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code). Petitioner sued for injunctive relief to prevent revocation, alleging irreparable injury in the form of income tax liability and loss of contributions and claiming that the revocation would violate petitioner's rights to free exercise of religion, to free association, and to due process and equal protection of the laws. The District Court granted relief despite § 7421(a) of the Code, which provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 7421(a), as construed in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1, foreclosed relief. Under that decision, a pre-enforcement injunction against tax assessment or collection may be granted only if (1) "it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail . . ." and (2) "if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists."Held:1. The suit is one "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax" within the meaning of § 7421(a). Pp. 416 U. S. 738-742.(a) Petitioner's allegation that revocation of the ruling letter would subject it to "substantial" income tax liability demonstrates that a primary purpose of the suit is to prevent the IRS from assessing and collecting income taxes; but even if no income tax liability resulted, the suit would still be one to restrain the assessment and collection of federal social security and unemployment taxes, as well as to restrain the collection of taxes from petitioner's donors. Pp. 416 U. S. 738-739. Page 416 U. S. 726(b) Petitioner has not shown that the contemplated revocation of its ruling letter is not based on the IRS' good faith effort to enforce the technical requirements of the Code. Pp. 416 U. S. 739-741.2. Petitioner's contention that § 7421(a) is subject to judicially created exceptions other than the Williams Packing test is without merit. That decision constitutes an all-encompassing reading of § 7421(a), and it rejected the contention, relied upon by petitioner, that irreparable injury alone is sufficient to lift the statutory bar. Pp. 416 U. S. 742-746.3. Denying injunctive relief to petitioner under the standards of William Packing, supra, will not, because of alleged irreparable injury pending resort to alternative remedies, deny petitioner due process of law, since this is not a case where an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial review. The review procedures that are available are constitutionally adequate, even though involving serious delay. Pp. 416 U. S. 746-748.4. Petitioner has not met the standards of Williams Packing, supra, since its contentions are sufficiently debatable to foreclose any notion that "under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail." Pp. 416 U. S. 748-750.472 F.2d 903 and 476 F.2d 259, affirmed.POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 416 U. S. 750. DOUGLAS, J., took no part in the decision of the case. |
3,211 | 1998_97-1235 | (b) Del Monte Dunes' § 1983 suit is an action at law for Seventh Amendment purposes. Pp.708-711.(1) That Amendment applies not only to common-law causes of action but also to statutory causes of action analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty. E. g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U. S. 340, 348. Pp.708-709.(2) A § 1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action at law within the Seventh Amendment's meaning. It is undisputed that when the Amendment was adopted there was no action equivalent to § 1983. It is settled law, however, that the Amendment's jury guarantee extends to statutory claims unknown to the common law, so long as the claims can be said to "soun[d] basically in tort," and seek legal relief. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 195-196. There can be no doubt that § 1983 claims sound in tort. See, e. g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477,483. Here Del Monte Dunes sought legal relief in the form of damages for the unconstitutional denial of just compensation. Damages for a constitutional violation are a legal remedy. See, e. g., Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U. S. 558, 570. Pp.709-711.(c) The particular liability issues were proper for determination by the jury. Pp. 718-722.(1) In making this determination, the Court looks to history to determine whether the particular issues, or analogous ones, were decided by judge or by jury in suits at common law at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted. Where history does not provide a clear answer, the Court looks to precedent and functional considerations. Markman, supra, at 384. P. 718.(2) There is no precise analogue for the specific test of liability submitted to the jury in this case, although some guidance is provided by the fact that, in suits sounding in tort for money damages, questions of liability were usually decided by the jury, rather than the judge. Pp. 718-719.(3) None of the Court's regulatory takings precedents has addressed the proper allocation of liability determinations between judge and jury in explicit terms. In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 191, the Court assumed the propriety of submitting to the jury the question whether a county planning commission had denied the plaintiff landowner all economically viable use of the property. However, because Williamson is not a direct holding, further guidance must be found in considerations of process and function. Pp. 719-720.690690 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.Syllabus(4) In actions at law otherwise within the purview of the Seventh Amendment, the issue whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is for the jury. The issue is predominantly factual, e. g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413, and in actions at law such issues are in most cases allocated to the jury, see, e. g., Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654,657. Pp. 720-721.(5) Although the question whether a land-use decision substantially advances legitimate public interests is probably best understood as a mixed question of fact and law, here, the narrow question submitted to the jury was whether, when viewed in light of the context and protracted history of the development application process, the city's decision to reject a particular development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications. This question was essentially fact-bound in nature, and thus was properly submitted to the jury. P.721.(d) This Seventh Amendment holding is limited in various respects:It does not address the jury's role in an ordinary inverse condemnation suit, or attempt a precise demarcation of the respective provinces of judge and jury in determining whether a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate governmental interests that would extend to other contexts. Del Monte Dunes' argument was not that the city had followed its zoning ordinances and policies but rather that it had not done so. As is often true in § 1983 actions, the disputed questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right in acting outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages. These were questions for the jury. Pp. 721-722.JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE THOMAS, concluded in Part IV-A-2 that the city's request to create an exception to the general Seventh Amendment rule governing § 1983 actions for claims alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause must be rejected. Pp. 711-718.1. This Court has declined in other contexts to classify § 1983 actions based on the nature of the underlying right asserted, and the city provides no persuasive justification for adopting a different rule for Seventh Amendment purposes. P.711.2. Even when analyzed not as a § 1983 action simpliciter, but as a § 1983 action seeking redress for an uncompensated taking, Del Monte Dunes' suit remains an action at law. Contrary to the city's submission, a formal condemnation proceeding-as to which the Court has said there is no constitutional jury right, e. g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 18-is not the controlling analogy here. That analogy is rendered691inapposite by fundamental differences between a condemnation proceeding and a § 1983 action to redress an uncompensated taking. Most important, when the government initiates condemnation proceedings, it concedes the landowner's right to receive just compensation and seeks a mere determination of the amount of compensation due. Liability simply is not an issue. This difference renders the analogy not only unhelpful but inapposite. See, e. g., Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 829 (No. 1,617) (CC NJ). Moreover, when the government condemns property for public use, it provides the landowner a forum for seeking just compensation as is required by the Constitution. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 316. If the condemnation proceedings do not, in fact, deny the landowner just compensation, the government's actions are neither unconstitutional nor unlawful. E. g., Williamson, supra, at 195. In this case, however, Del Monte Dunes was denied not only its property but also just compensation or even an adequate forum for seeking it. In these circumstances, the original understanding of the Takings Clause and historical practice support the conclusion that the cause of action sounds in tort and is most analogous to the various actions that lay at common law to recover damages for interference with property interests. In such common-law actions, there was a right to trial by jury. See, e. g., Feltner, supra, at 349. The city's argument, that because the Constitution allows the government to take property for public use, a taking for that purpose cannot be tortious or unlawful, is rejected. When the government repudiates its duty to provide just compensation, see, e. g., First English, supra, at 315, it violates the Constitution, and its actions are unlawful and tortious. Pp. 711-718.JUSTICE SCALIA concluded:1. The Seventh Amendment provides respondents with a right to a jury trial on their § 1983 claim. All § 1983 actions must be treated alike insofar as that right is concerned. Section 1983 establishes a unique, or at least distinctive, cause of action, in that the legal duty which is the basis for relief is ultimately defined not by the claim-creating statute itself, but by an extrinsic body of law to which the statute refers, namely, "federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3. The question before the Court then is not what common-law action is most analogous to some generic suit seeking compensation for a Fifth Amendment taking, but what common-law action is most analogous to a § 1983 claim. This Court has concluded that all § 1983 claims should be characterized in the same way, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 271-272, as tort actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries, id., at 276. Pp. 723-726.692692 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.Syllabus2. It is clear that a § 1983 cause of action for damages is a tort action for which jury trial would have been provided at common law. See,3. The trial court properly submitted the particular issues raised by respondents' § 1983 claim to the jury. The question whether they were deprived of all economically viable use of their property presents primarily a question of fact appropriate for jury consideration. As to the question whether petitioner's rejection of respondents' building plans substantially advanced a legitimate public purpose, the subquestion whether the government's asserted basis for its challenged action represents a legitimate state interest was properly removed from the jury's cognizance, but the subquestion whether that legitimate state interest is substantially furthered by the challenged government action is, at least in the highly particularized context of the present case, a jury question. Pp. 731-732.KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III, IV-A-1, IV-B, IV-C, and V, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-A-2, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 723. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which O'CONNOR, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 733.George A. Yuhas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard E. v: Harris.Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Malcolm L. Stewart, David C. Shilton, Timothy J. Dowling, and Nina Mendelson.Michael M. Berger argued the cause for respondents.With him on the brief was Frederik A. Jacobsen. **Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, Stefanie A. Brand, Deputy Attorney General, Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, Dan Schweitzer, and Gus F. Diaz, Acting Attorney General of Guam, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston693JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV -A-2.This case began with attempts by respondent Del Monte Dunes and its predecessor in interest to develop a parcel of land within the jurisdiction of the petitioner, theBryant of Arkansas, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. M odisett of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, John Knox Walkup of Tennessee, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, Christine Q Gregoire of Washington, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the City and County of San Francisco et al. by Louise H. Renne, Dennis Aftergut, Andrew W Schwartz, Pamela Albers, Gary T. Ragghianti, Zach Cowan, Ronald R. Ball, John L. Cook, Joel D. Kuperberg, Edward J. Foley, Philip D. Kohn, Lois E. Jeffrey, John Sanford Todd, William W Wynder, Steven F. Nord, Thomas B. Brown, George H. Eiser III, James R. Anderson, Monte L. Widders, Gary Gillig, Debra S. Margolis, Michael F. Dean, Stan Yamamoto, Hadden Roth, C. Alan Sumption, Daniel J. Wallace, John G. Barisone, Rene Auguste Chouteau, Victor J. Westman, Norman Y. Herring, Cameron L. Reeves, H. Peter Klein, Alan Seltzer, and Dwight L. Herr; for the American Planning Association by Robert H. Freilich and Terry D. Morgan; for the League for Coastal Protection et al. by John D. Echeverria; for the Municipal Art Society of New York, Inc., by Michael B. Gerrard, Michael S. Gruen, Dennis C. O'Donnell, John J. Kerr, Jr., Norman Marcus, and Otis Pratt Pearsall; and for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Timothy S. Bishop, Jeffrey W Sarles, John J. Rademacher, Nancy N. McDonough, and Carolyn S. Richardson; for the California Association of Realtors et al. by Roger J. Marzulla; for Defenders of Property Rights et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, Scott G. Bullock, and Richard A. Epstein; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by Gus Bauman, Mary V. DiCrescenzo, and Nick Cammarota; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by James S. Burling; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar.694694 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.city of Monterey. The city, in a series of repeated rejections, denied proposals to develop the property, each time imposing more rigorous demands on the developers. Del Monte Dunes brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. After protracted litigation, the case was submitted to the jury on Del Monte Dunes' theory that the city effected a regulatory taking or otherwise injured the property by unlawful acts, without paying compensation or providing an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the loss. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.The petitioner contends that the regulatory takings claim should not have been decided by the jury and that the Court of Appeals adopted an erroneous standard for regulatory takings liability. We need not decide all of the questions presented by the petitioner, nor need we examine each of the points given by the Court of Appeals in its decision to affirm. The controlling question is whether, given the city's apparent concession that the instructions were a correct statement of the law, the matter was properly submitted to the jury. We conclude that it was, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.I AThe property which Del Monte Dunes and its predecessor in interest (landowners) sought to develop was a 37.6-acre ocean-front parcel located in the city of Monterey, at or near the city's boundary to the north, where Highway 1 enters. With the exception of the ocean and a state park located to the northeast, the parcel was virtually surrounded by a railroad right-of-way and properties devoted to industrial, commercial, and multifamily residential uses. The parcel itself was zoned for multifamily residential use under the city's general zoning ordinance.695The parcel had not been untouched by its urban and industrial proximities. A sewer line housed in is-foot man-made dunes covered with jute matting and surrounded by snow fencing traversed the property. Trash, dumped in violation of the law, had accumulated on the premises. The parcel had been used for many years by an oil company as a terminal and tank farm where large quantities of oil were delivered, stored, and reshipped. When the company stopped using the site, it had removed its oil tanks but left behind tank pads, an industrial complex, pieces of pipe, broken concrete, and oil-soaked sand. The company had introduced nonnative ice plant to prevent erosion and to control soil conditions around the oil tanks. Ice plant secretes a substance that forces out other plants and is not compatible with the parcel's natural flora. By the time the landowners sought to develop the property, ice plant had spread to some 25 percent of the parcel, and, absent human intervention, would continue to advance, endangering and perhaps eliminating the parcel's remaining natural vegetation.The natural flora the ice plant encroached upon included buckwheat, the natural habitat of the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly. The butterfly lives for one week, travels a maximum of 200 feet, and must land on a mature, flowering buckwheat plant to survive. Searches for the butterfly from 1981 through 1985 yielded but a single larva, discovered in 1984. No other specimens had been found on the property, and the parcel was quite isolated from other possible habitats of the butterfly.BIn 1981 the landowners submitted an application to develop the property in conformance with the city's zoning and general plan requirements. Although the zoning requirements permitted the development of up to 29 housing units per acre, or more than 1,000 units for the entire parcel, the landowners' proposal was limited to 344 residential units. In 1982 the city's planning commission denied the application696696 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.but stated that a proposal for 264 units would receive favorable consideration. In keeping with the suggestion, the landowners submitted a revised proposal for 264 units. In late 1983, however, the planning commission again denied the application. The commission once more requested a reduction in the scale of the development, this time saying a plan for 224 units would be received with favor. The landowners returned to the drawing board and prepared a proposal for 224 units, which, its previous statements notwithstanding, the planning commission denied in 1984. The landowners appealed to the city council, which overruled the planning commission's denial and referred the project back to the commission, with instructions to consider a proposal for 190 units.The landowners once again reduced the scope of their development proposal to comply with the city's request, and submitted four specific, detailed site plans, each for a total of 190 units for the whole parcel. Even so, the planning commission rejected the landowners' proposal later in 1984. Once more the landowners appealed to the city council. The council again overruled the commission, finding the proposal conceptually satisfactory and in conformance with the city's previous decisions regarding, inter alia, density, number of units, location on the property, and access. The council then approved one of the site plans, subject to various specific conditions, and granted an 18-month conditional use permit for the proposed development.The landowners spent most of the next year revising their proposal and taking other steps to fulfill the city's conditions. Their final plan, submitted in 1985, devoted 17.9 of the 37.6 acres to public open space (including a public beach and areas for the restoration and preservation of the buckwheat habitat), 7.9 acres to open, landscaped areas, and 6.7 acres to public and private streets (including public parking and access to the beach). Only 5.1 acres were allocated to buildings and patios. The plan was designed, in accordance with697the city's demands, to provide the public with a beach, a buffer zone between the development and the adjoining state park, and view corridors so the buildings would not be visible to motorists on the nearby highway; the proposal also called for restoring and preserving as much of the sand dune structure and buckwheat habitat as possible consistent with development and the city's requirements.After detailed review of the proposed buildings, roads, and parking facilities, the city's architectural review committee approved the plan. Following hearings before the planning commission, the commission's professional staff found the final plan addressed and substantially satisfied the city's conditions. It proposed the planning commission make specific findings to this effect and recommended the plan be approved.In January 1986, less than two months before the landowners' conditional use permit was to expire, the planning commission rejected the recommendation of its staff and denied the development plan. The landowners appealed to the city council, also requesting a 12-month extension of their permit to allow them time to attempt to comply with any additional requirements the council might impose. The permit was extended until a hearing could be held before the city council in June 1986. After the hearing, the city council denied the final plan, not only declining to specify measures the landowners could take to satisfy the concerns raised by the council but also refusing to extend the conditional use permit to allow time to address those concerns. The council's decision, moreover, came at a time when a sewer moratorium issued by another agency would have prevented or at least delayed development based on a new plan.The council did not base its decision on the landowners' failure to meet any of the specific conditions earlier prescribed by the city. Rather, the council made general findings that the landowners had not provided adequate access for the development (even though the landowners had twice698698 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.changed the specific access plans to comply with the city's demands and maintained they could satisfy the city's new objections if granted an extension), that the plan's layout would damage the environment (even though the location of the development on the property was necessitated by the city's demands for a public beach, view corridors, and a buffer zone next to the state park), and that the plan would disrupt the habitat of the Smith's Blue Butterfly (even though the plan would remove the encroaching ice plant and preserve or restore buckwheat habitat on almost half of the property, and even though only one larva had ever been found on the property).CAfter five years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, 10 Tr. 1294-1295 (Feb. 9, 1994), Del Monte Dunes decided the city would not permit development of the property under any circumstances. Del Monte Dunes commenced suit against the city in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that denial of the final development proposal was a violation of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and an uncompensated, and so unconstitutional, regulatory taking.The District Court dismissed the claims as unripe under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), on the grounds that Del Monte Dunes had neither obtained a definitive decision as to the development the city would allow nor sought just compensation in state court. The Court of Appeals reversed. 920 F.2d 1496 (CA9 1990). After reviewing at some length the history of attempts to develop the property, the court found that to require additional proposals would implicate the concerns about repetitive and unfair procedures expressed in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo699County, 477 U. S. 340, 350, n. 7 (1986), and that the city's decision was sufficiently final to render Del Monte Dunes' claim ripe for review. 920 F. 2d, at 1501-1506. The court also found that because the State of California had not provided a compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory takings when the city issued its final denial, see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304 (1987), Del Monte Dunes was not required to pursue relief in state court as a precondition to federal relief. See 920 F. 2d, at 1506-1507.On remand, the District Court determined, over the city's objections, to submit Del Monte Dunes' takings and equal protection claims to a jury but to reserve the substantive due process claim for decision by the court. Del Monte Dunes argued to the jury that, although the city had a right to regulate its property, the combined effect of the city's various demands-that the development be invisible from the highway, that a buffer be provided between the development and the state park, and that the public be provided with a beach-was to force development into the "bowl" area of the parcel. As a result, Del Monte Dunes argued, the city's subsequent decision that the bowl contained sensitive buckwheat habitat which could not be disturbed blocked the development of any portion of the property. See 10 Tr. 1288-1294, 1299-1302, 1317 (Feb. 9,1994). While conceding the legitimacy of the city's stated regulatory purposes, Del Monte Dunes emphasized the tortuous and protracted history of attempts to develop the property, as well as the shifting and sometimes inconsistent positions taken by the city throughout the process, and argued that it had been treated in an unfair and irrational manner. Del Monte Dunes also submitted evidence designed to undermine the validity of the asserted factual premises for the city's denial of the final proposal and to suggest that the city had considered buying, or inducing the State to buy, the property for700700 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.public use as early as 1979, reserving some money for this purpose but delaying or abandoning its plans for financial reasons. See id., at 1303-1306. The State of California's purchase of the property during the pendency of the litigation may have bolstered the credibility of Del Monte Dunes' position.At the close of argument, the District Court instructed the jury it should find for Del Monte Dunes if it found either that Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of its property or that "the city's decision to reject the plaintiff's 190 unit development proposal did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose." App. 303. With respect to the first inquiry, the jury was instructed, in relevant part, as follows:"For the purpose of a taking claim, you will find that the plaintiff has been denied all economically viable use of its property, if, as the result of the city's regulatory decision there remains no permissible or beneficial use for that property. In proving whether the plaintiff has been denied all economically viable use of its property, it is not enough that the plaintiff show that after the challenged action by the city the property diminished in value or that it would suffer a serious economic loss as the result of the city's actions." Ibid.With respect to the second inquiry, the jury received the following instruction:"Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take actions which substantially advance legitimate public interest[s] and legitimate public interest[s] can include protecting the environment, preserving open space agriculture, protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and regulating the quality of the community by looking at development. So one of your jobs as jurors is to decide if the city's decision here substantially advanced any such legitimate public purpose.701"The regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially advanc[e] a legitimate public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship to that objective."Now, if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that there was no reasonable relationship between the city's denial of the ... proposal and legitimate public purpose, you should find in favor of the plaintiff. If you find that there existed a reasonable relationship between the city's decision and a legitimate public purpose, you should find in favor of the city. As long as the regulatory action by the city substantially advances their legitimate public purpose, ... its underlying motives and reasons are not to be inquired into." I d., at 304.The essence of these instructions was proposed by the city. See Tr. 11 (June 17, 1994).The jury delivered a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its takings claim, a separate verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its equal protection claim, and a damages award of $1.45 million. Tr. 2 (Feb. 17, 1994). After the jury's verdict, the District Court ruled for the city on the substantive due process claim, stating that its ruling was not inconsistent with the jury's verdict on the equal protection or the takings claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-39. The court later denied the city's motions for a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law.The Court of Appeals affirmed. 95 F.3d 1422 (CA9 1996).The court first ruled that the District Court did not err in allowing Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim to be tried to a jury, id., at 1428, because Del Monte Dunes had a right to a jury trial under § 1983, id., at 1426-1427, and whether Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of the property and whether the city's denial of the final proposal substantially advanced legitimate public interests were, on the facts of this case, questions suitable for the jury, id., at 1430. The court ruled that sufficient evidence had been presented to the jury from which it reason-702702 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.ably could have decided each of these questions in Del Monte Dunes' favor. Id., at 1430-1434. Because upholding the verdict on the regulatory takings claim was sufficient to support the award of damages, the court did not address the equal protection claim. Id., at 1426.The questions presented in the city's petition for certiorari were (1) whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the jury on Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim, (2) whether the Court of Appeals impermissibly based its decision on a standard that allowed the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of the city's land-use decision, and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming that the rough-proportionality standard of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994), applied to this case. We granted certiorari, 523 U. S. 1045 (1998), and now address these questions in reverse order.IIIn the course of holding a reasonable jury could have found the city's denial of the final proposal not substantially related to legitimate public interests, the Court of Appeals stated:"Even if the City had a legitimate interest in denying Del Monte's development application, its action must be 'roughly proportional' to furthering that interest .... That is, the City's denial must be related 'both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.'" 95 F. 3d, at 1430, quoting Dolan, supra, at 391.Although in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause, see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"), we have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use. See Dolan, supra, at 385; Nollan v. Cali-703fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 841 (1987). The rule applied in Dolan considers whether dedications demanded as conditions of development are proportional to the development's anticipated impacts. It was not designed to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the landowner's challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development. We believe, accordingly, that the rough-proportionality test of Dolan is inapposite to a case such as this one.The instructions given to the jury, however, did not mention proportionality, let alone require it to find for Del Monte Dunes unless the city's actions were roughly proportional to its asserted interests. The Court of Appeals' discussion of rough proportionality, we conclude, was unnecessary to its decision to sustain the jury's verdict. Although the court stated that "[s]ignificant evidence supports Del Monte's claim that the City's actions were disproportional to both the nature and extent of the impact of the proposed development," 95 F. 3d, at 1432, it did so only after holding that"Del Monte provided evidence sufficient to rebut each of these reasons [for denying the final proposal]. Taken together, Del Monte argued that the City's reasons for denying their application were invalid and that it unfairly intended to forestall any reasonable development of the Dunes. In light of the evidence proffered by Del Monte, the City has incorrectly argued that no rational juror could conclude that the City's denial of Del Monte's application lacked a sufficient nexus with its stated objectives." Id., at 1431-1432.Given this holding, it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to discuss rough proportionality. That it did so is irrelevant to our disposition of the case.IIIThe city challenges the Court of Appeals' holding that the jury could have found the city's denial of the final develop-704704 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.ment plan not reasonably related to legitimate public interests. Although somewhat obscure, the city's argument is not cast as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; rather, the city maintains that the Court of Appeals adopted a legal standard for regulatory takings liability that allows juries to second-guess public land-use policy.As the city itself proposed the essence of the instructions given to the jury, it cannot now contend that the instructions did not provide an accurate statement of the law. In any event, although this Court has provided neither a definitive statement of the elements of a claim for a temporary regulatory taking nor a thorough explanation of the nature or applicability of the requirement that a regulation substantially advance legitimate public interests outside the context of required dedications or exactions, cf., e. g., Nollan, supra, at 834-835, n. 3, we note that the trial court's instructions are consistent with our previous general discussions of regulatory takings liability. See Dolan, supra, at 385; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992); Nollan, supra, at 834; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 485 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 126 (1985); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). The city did not challenge below the applicability or continued viability of the general test for regulatory takings liability recited by these authorities and upon which the jury instructions appear to have been modeled. Given the posture of the case before us, we decline the suggestions of amici to revisit these precedents.To the extent the city contends the judgment sustained by the Court of Appeals was based upon a jury determination of the reasonableness of its general zoning laws or land-use policies, its argument can be squared with neither the instructions given to the jury nor the theory on which the case was tried. The instructions did not ask the jury whether the city's zoning ordinances or policies were unreasonable705but only whether "the city's decision to reject the plaintiff's 190 unit development proposal did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose," App. 303, that is, whether "there was no reasonable relationship between the city's denial of the ... proposal and legitimate public purpose," id., at 304. Furthermore, Del Monte Dunes' lawyers were explicit in conceding that "[t]his case is not about the right of a city, in this case the city of Monterey, to regulate land." 10 Tr. 1286 (Feb. 9, 1994). See also id., at 1287 (proposals were made "keeping in mind various regulations and requirements, heights, setbacks, and densities and all that. That's not what this case is about"); id., at 1287-1288 ("They have the right to set height limits. They have the right to talk about where they want access. That's not what this case is about. We all accept that in to day's society, cities and counties can tell a land owner what to do to some reasonable extent with their property"). Though not presented for review, Del Monte Dunes' equal protection argument that it had received treatment inconsistent with zoning decisions made in favor of owners of similar properties, and the jury's verdict for Del Monte Dunes on this claim, confirm the understanding of the jury and Del Monte Dunes that the complaint was not about general laws or ordinances but about a particular zoning decision.The instructions regarding the city's decision also did not allow the jury to consider the reasonableness, per se, of the customized, ad hoc conditions imposed on the property's development, and Del Monte Dunes did not suggest otherwise. On the contrary, Del Monte Dunes disclaimed this theory of the case in express terms: "Del Monte Dunes partnership did not file this lawsuit because they were complaining about giving the public the beach, keeping it [the development] out of the view shed, devoting and [giving] to the State all this habitat area. One-third [of the] property is going to be given away for the public use forever. That's not what we filed the lawsuit about." Id., at 1288; see also id., at 1288-706706 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.1289 (conceding that the city may "ask an owner to give away a third of the property without getting a dime in compensation for it and providing parking lots for the public and habitats for the butterfly, and boardwalks").Rather, the jury was instructed to consider whether the city's denial of the final proposal was reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. Even with regard to this issue, however, the jury was not given free rein to second-guess the city's land-use policies. Rather, the jury was instructed, in unmistakable terms, that the various purposes asserted by the city were legitimate public interests. See App. 304.The jury, furthermore, was not asked to evaluate the city's decision in isolation but rather in context, and, in particular, in light of the tortuous and protracted history of attempts to develop the property. See, e. g., 10 Tr. 1294-1295 (Feb. 9, 1994). Although Del Monte Dunes was allowed to introduce evidence challenging the asserted factual bases for the city's decision, it also highlighted the shifting nature of the city's demands and the inconsistency of its decision with the recommendation of its professional staff, as well as with its previous decisions. See, e. g., id., at 1300. Del Monte Dunes also introduced evidence of the city's longstanding interest in acquiring the property for public use. See, e. g., id., at 1303-1306.In short, the question submitted to the jury on this issue was confined to whether, in light of all the history and the context of the case, the city's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development proposal was reasonably related to the city's proffered justifications. This question was couched, moreover, in an instruction that had been proposed in essence by the city, and as to which the city made no objection.Thus, despite the protests of the city and its amici, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not adopt a rule of takings law allowing wholesale interference by judge or jury with municipal land-use policies, laws, or routine regulatory707decisions. To the extent the city argues that, as a matter of law, its land-use decisions are immune from judicial scrutiny under all circumstances, its position is contrary to settled regulatory takings principles. We reject this claim of error.IVWe next address whether it was proper for the District Court to submit the question of liability on Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim to the jury. (Before the District Court, the city agreed it was proper for the jury to assess damages. See Supplemental Memorandum of Petitioner Re:Court/Jury Trial Issues in No. C86-5042 (ND Cal.), p. 2, Record, Doc. No. 111.) As the Court of Appeals recognized, the answer depends on whether Del Monte Dunes had a statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial, and, if it did, the nature and extent of the right. Del Monte Dunes asserts the right to a jury trial is conferred by § 1983 and by the Seventh Amendment.Under our precedents, "[b]efore inquiring into the applicability of the Seventh Amendment, we must 'first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.'" Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U. S. 340, 345 (1998) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417, n. 3 (1987)); accord, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 192, n. 6 (1974).The character of § 1983 is vital to our Seventh Amendment analysis, but the statute does not itself confer the jury right. See Feltner, supra, at 345 ("[W]e cannot discern 'any congressional intent to grant ... the right to a jury trial'" (quoting Tull, supra, at 417, n. 3)). Section 1983 authorizes a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief through "an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Del Monte Dunes contends that the phrase "action at law" is a708708 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.term of art implying a right to a jury trial. We disagree, for this is not a necessary implication.In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 583 (1978), we found a statutory right to a jury trial in part because the statute authorized" legal ... relief." Our decision, however, did not rest solely on the statute's use of the phrase but relied as well on the statute's explicit incorporation of the procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which had been interpreted to guarantee trial by jury in private actions. Id., at 580. We decline, accordingly, to find a statutory jury right under § 1983 based solely on the authorization of "an action at law."As a consequence, we must reach the constitutional question. The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... " Consistent with the textual mandate that the jury right be preserved, our interpretation of the Amendment has been guided by historical analysis comprising two principal inquiries. "[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that was." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U. S. 370, 376 (1996). "If the action in question belongs in the law category, we then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791." Ibid.AWith respect to the first inquiry, we have recognized that "suits at common law" include "not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [also] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered." Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830). The Seventh Amendment thus applies not only709to common-law causes of action but also to statutory causes of action" 'analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty.'" Feltner, supra, at 348 (quoting Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 42 (1989)); accord, Curtis, supra, at 193.1Del Monte Dunes brought this suit pursuant to § 1983 to vindicate its constitutional rights. We hold that a § 1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. JUSTICE SCALIA'S opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment presents a comprehensive and convincing analysis of the historical and constitutional reasons for this conclusion. We agree with his analysis and conclusion.It is undisputed that when the Seventh Amendment was adopted there was no action equivalent to § 1983, framed in specific terms for vindicating constitutional rights. It is settled law, however, that the Seventh Amendment jury guarantee extends to statutory claims unknown to the common law, so long as the claims can be said to "soun[d] basically in tort," and seek legal relief. Curtis, supra, at 195-196.As JUSTICE SCALIA explains, see post, at 727-731, there can be no doubt that claims brought pursuant to § 1983 sound in tort. Just as common-law tort actions provide redress for interference with protected personal or property interests, § 1983 provides relief for invasions of rights protected under federal law. Recognizing the essential character of the statute, "'[w]e have repeatedly noted that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability,'" Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483 (1994) (quoting Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299, 305 (1986)), and have interpreted the statute in light of the "background of tort liability," Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187 (1961) (overruled on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436710710 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.u. S. 658 (1978)); accord, Heck, supra, at 483. Our settled understanding of § 1983 and the Seventh Amendment thus compel the conclusion that a suit for legal relief brought under the statute is an action at law.Here Del Monte Dunes sought legal relief. It was entitled to proceed in federal court under § 1983 because, at the time of the city's actions, the State of California did not provide a compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory takings. See First English, 482 U. S., at 308-311. The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. Had the city paid for the property or had an adequate postdeprivation remedy been available, Del Monte Dunes would have suffered no constitutional injury from the taking alone. See Williamson, 473 U. S., at 194-195. Because its statutory action did not accrue until it was denied just compensation, in a strict sense Del Monte Dunes sought not just compensation per se but rather damages for the unconstitutional denial of such compensation. Damages for a constitutional violation are a legal remedy. See, e. g., Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U. S. 558, 570 (1990) ("Generally, an action for money damages was 'the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law' ") (quoting Curtis, 415 U. S., at 196).Even when viewed as a simple suit for just compensation, we believe Del Monte Dunes' action sought essentially legal relief. "We have recognized the 'general rule' that monetary relief is legal." Feltner, 523 U. S., at 352 (quoting Teamsters v. Terry, supra, at 570). Just compensation, moreover, differs from equitable restitution and other monetary remedies available in equity, for in determining just compensation, "the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained." Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195 (1910). As its name suggests, then, just compensation is, like ordinary money damages, a compensatory remedy. The Court has recognized that compensation is a purpose "traditionally associated with legal711relief." Feltner, supra, at 352. Because Del Monte Dunes' statutory suit sounded in tort and sought legal relief, it was an action at law.2In an attempt to avoid the force of this conclusion, the city urges us to look not to the statutory basis of Del Monte Dunes' claim but rather to the underlying constitutional right asserted. At the very least, the city asks us to create an exception to the general Seventh Amendment rule governing § 1983 actions for claims alleging violations of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084 (CAll 1996) (finding, in tension with the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, that there is no right to a jury trial on a takings claim brought under § 1983). Because the jury's role in estimating just compensation in condemnation proceedings was inconsistent and unclear at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted, this Court has said "that there is no constitutional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings." United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 18 (1970); accord, Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 593 (1897). The city submits that the analogy to formal condemnation proceedings is controlling, so that there is no jury right here.As JUSTICE SCALIA notes, see post, at 724-726, we have declined in other contexts to classify § 1983 actions based on the nature of the underlying right asserted, and the city provides no persuasive justification for adopting a different rule for Seventh Amendment purposes. Even when analyzed not as a § 1983 action simpliciter, however, but as a § 1983 action seeking redress for an uncompensated taking, Del Monte Dunes' suit remains an action at law.Although condemnation proceedings spring from the same Fifth Amendment right to compensation which, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is applicable here, see First English, supra, at 315 (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933)), a condemnation action differs in im-712712 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.Opinion of KENNEDY, J.portant respects from a § 1983 action to redress an uncompensated taking. Most important, when the government initiates condemnation proceedings, it concedes the landowner's right to receive just compensation and seeks a mere determination of the amount of compensation due. Liability simply is not an issue. As a result, even if condemnation proceedings were an appropriate analogy, condemnation practice would provide little guidance on the specific question whether Del Monte Dunes was entitled to a jury determination of liability.This difference renders the analogy to condemnation proceedings not only unhelpful but also inapposite. When the government takes property without initiating condemnation proceedings, it "shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just compensation." United States v. Clarke, 445 U. S. 253, 257 (1980). Even when the government does not dispute its seizure of the property or its obligation to pay for it, the mere "shifting of the initiative from the condemning authority to the condemnee" can place the landowner "at a significant disadvantage." Id., at 258; cf. id., at 255 ("There are important legal and practical differences between an inverse condemnation suit and a condemnation proceeding"); 84 Stat. 1906, § 304, 42 U. S. C. § 4654 (recognizing, at least implicitly, the added burden by providing for recovery of attorney's fees in cases where the government seizes property without initiating condemnation proceedings but not in ordinary condemnation cases). Where, as here, the government not only denies liability but fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy (thus refusing to submit the question of liability to an impartial arbiter), the disadvantage to the owner becomes all the greater. At least in these circumstances, the analogy to ordinary condemnation procedures is simply untenable.Our conclusion is confirmed by precedent. Early authority finding no jury right in a condemnation proceeding did so713on the ground that condemnation did not involve the determination of legal rights because liability was undisputed:"We are therefore of opinion that the trial by jury is preserved inviolate in the sense of the constitution, when in all criminal cases, and in civil cases when a right is in controversy in a court of law, it is secured to each party. In cases of this description [condemnation proceedings], the right to take, and the right to compensation, are admitted; the only question is the amount, which may be submitted to any impartial tribunal the legislature may designate." Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 829 (No. 1,617) (CC NJ 1830) (Baldwin, Circuit Justice).(Although JUSTICE SOUTER'S opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part takes issue with this distinction, its arguments are unpersuasive. First, it correctly notes that when the government initiates formal condemnation procedures, a landowner may question whether the proposed taking is for public use. The landowner who raises this issue, however, seeks not to establish the government's liability for damages, but to prevent the government from taking his property at all. As the dissent recognizes, the relief desired by a landowner making this contention is analogous not to damages but to an injunction; it should be no surprise, then, that the landowner is not entitled to a jury trial on his entitlement to a remedy that sounds not in law but in equity. Second, the dissent refers to "the diversity of rationales underlying early state cases in which the right of a direct condemnee to a jury trial was considered and denied." Post, at 742. The dissent mentions only the rationale that because the government is immune from suit for damages, it can qualify any remedy it provides by dispensing with the right to a jury trial. The cases cited for this proposition-two state-court cases antedating the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and an off-point federal case-do not implicate714714 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.Opinion of KENNEDY, J.the Fifth Amendment. Even if the sovereign immunity rationale retains its vitality in cases where this Amendment is applicable, cf. First English, 482 U. S., at 316, n. 9, it is neither limited to nor coextensive with takings claims. Rather, it would apply to all constitutional suits against the Federal Government or the States, but not to constitutional suits such as this one against municipalities like the city of Monterey. Third, the dissent contends that the distinction we have drawn is absent from our condemnation cases. Even if this were true-and it is not obvious that it is-equally absent from those decisions is any analysis or principle that would extend beyond the narrow context of direct condemnation suits to actions such as this one. Rather, as apparent even from the passages quoted by the dissent, see post, at 736-739, and n. 1, these cases rely only on the Court's perception of historical English and colonial practice in direct condemnation cases. Nothing in these cases detracts from the authorities cited in this opinion that do support the distinction we draw between direct condemnation and a suit like this one. Finally, the existence of a different historical practice distinguishes direct condemnation from an ordinary tort case in which the defendant concedes liability. See post, at 742-743, n. 5.)Condemnation proceedings differ from the instant cause of action in another fundamental respect as well. When the government condemns property for public use, it provides the landowner a forum for seeking just compensation, as is required by the Constitution. See First English, supra, at 316. If the condemnation proceedings do not, in fact, deny the landowner just compensation, the government's actions are neither unconstitutional nor unlawful. See Williamson, 473 U. S., at 194 ("The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation"). Even when the government takes property without initiating condemnation proceedings, there is no constitutional violation "'unless or until the state fails to pro-715vide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss.'" Id., at 195 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 532, n. 12 (1984)). In this case, however, Del Monte Dunes was denied not only its property but also just compensation or even an adequate forum for seeking it. That is the gravamen of the § 1983 claim.In these circumstances, we conclude the cause of action sounds in tort and is most analogous to the various actions that lay at common law to recover damages for interference with property interests. Our conclusion is consistent with the original understanding of the Takings Clause and with historical practice.Early opinions, nearly contemporaneous with the adoption of the Bill of Rights, suggested that when the government took property but failed to provide a means for obtaining just compensation, an action to recover damages for the government's actions would sound in tort. See, e. g., Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38, 61 (S. C. 1796) (opinion of Waties, J.) ("But suppose they could sue, what would be the nature of the action? It could not be founded on contract, for there was none. It must then be on a tort; it must be an action of trespass, in which the jury would give a reparation in damages. Is not this acknowledging that the act of the legislature [in authorizing uncompensated takings] is a tortious act?" (emphases in original)); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 164, 166 (N. Y. 1816) (Kent, Ch.) (uncompensated governmental interference with property right would support a tort action at law for nuisance).Consistent with this understanding, and as a matter of historical practice, when the government has taken property without providing an adequate means for obtaining redress, suits to recover just compensation have been framed as common-law tort actions. See, e. g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546 (1914) (nuisance); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 (1872) (trespass on the case); Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243716716 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.Opinion of KENNEDY, J.(1833) (unspecified tort); Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103 (N. Y. 1822) (trespass). Tort actions of these descriptions lay at common law, 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 12 (1768) (trespass; trespass on the case); id., ch. 13 (trespass on the case for nuisance), and in these actions, as in other suits at common law, there was a right to trial by jury, see, e. g., Feltner, 523 U. S., at 349 ("Actions on the case, like other actions at law, were tried before juries").(JUSTICE SOUTER'S criticism of our reliance on these early authorities misses the point of our analysis. We do not contend that the landowners were always successful. As the dissent makes clear, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the concomitant incorporation of the Takings Clause against the States, a variety of obstacles-including various traditional immunities, the lack of a constitutional right, and the resulting possibility of legislative justification-stood in the way of the landowner who sought redress for an uncompensated taking. Rather, our point is that the suits were attempted and were understood to sound in tort. It is therefore ironic that the dissent invokes a law review article discussing such suits entitled "The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in NineteenthCentury State Just Compensation Law." Post, at 746-747 (citing Brauneis, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 57 (1999)). It is true, as the dissenting opinion observes, that claims for just compensation were sometimes brought in quasi contract rather than tort. See, e. g., United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 458465 (1903) (overruled on other grounds, United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592 (1941)) (comparing claims for just compensation brought in quasi contract with just-compensation claims brought in tort). The historical existence of quasi-contract suits for just compensation does nothing to undermine our Seventh Amendment analysis, however, since quasi contract was frequently available to the victim of a tort who elected to waive the tort and proceed717instead in quasi contract. See, e. g., W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 110, pp. 1118-1127 (1941). In any event, quasi contract was itself an action at law. See, e. g., 1 G. Palmer, Restitution §§ 1.2, 2.2-2.3 (1978); F. Woodward, Quasi Contracts § 6 (1913).)The city argues that because the Constitution allows the government to take property for public use, a taking for that purpose cannot be tortious or unlawful. We reject this conclusion. Although the government acts lawfully when, pursuant to proper authorization, it takes property and provides just compensation, the government's action is lawful solely because it assumes a duty, imposed by the Constitution, to provide just compensation. See First English, 482 U. S., at 315 (citing Jacobs, 290 U. S., at 16). When the government repudiates this duty, either by denying just compensation in fact or by refusing to provide procedures through which compensation may be sought, it violates the Constitution. In those circumstances the government's actions are not only unconstitutional but unlawful and tortious as well. See Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, supra, at 166, 168 ("[T]o render the exercise of the [eminent domain] power valid," the government must provide landowner "fair compensation"; "[u]ntil, then, some provision be made for affording him compensation, it would be unjust, and contrary to the first principles of government," to deprive plaintiff of his property rights; absent such a provision, the plaintiff "would be entitled to his action at law for the interruption of his right"); Beatty v. United States, 203 F.6d 0, 626 (CA4 1913) ("The taking of property by condemnation under the power of eminent domain is compulsory. The party is deprived of his property against his will. It is in effect a lawful trespass committed by the sovereign, and lawful only on the condition that the damages inflicted by the trespass are paid to the injured party. The analogy to a suit at common law for trespass is close and complete").718718 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.(The argument that an uncompensated taking is not tortious because the landowner seeks just compensation rather than additional damages for the deprivation of a remedy reveals the same misunderstanding. Simply put, there is no constitutional or tortious injury until the landowner is denied just compensation. That the damages to which the landowner is entitled for this injury are measured by the just compensation he has been denied is neither surprising nor significant.)BHaving decided Del Monte Dunes' § 1983 suit was an action at law, we must determine whether the particular issues of liability were proper for determination by the jury. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U. S. 370 (1996). In actions at law, issues that are proper for the jury must be submitted to it "to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dispute," as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. Id., at 377. We determine whether issues are proper for the jury, when possible, "by using the historical method, much as we do in characterizing the suits and actions within which [the issues] arise." Id., at 378. We look to history to determine whether the particular issues, or analogous ones, were decided by judge or by jury in suits at common law at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted. Where history does not provide a clear answer, we look to precedent and functional considerations. Id., at 384.1Just as no exact analogue of Del Monte Dunes' § 1983 suit can be identified at common law, so also can we find no precise analogue for the specific test of liability submitted to the jury in this case. We do know that in suits sounding in tort for money damages, questions of liability were decided by the jury, rather than the judge, in most cases. This allocation preserved the jury's role in resolving what was often719the heart of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant. Although these general observations provide some guidance on the proper allocation between judge and jury of the liability issues in this case, they do not establish a definitive answer.2We look next to our existing precedents. Although this Court has decided many regulatory takings cases, none of our decisions has addressed the proper allocation of liability determinations between judge and jury in explicit terms. This is not surprising. Most of our regulatory takings decisions have reviewed suits against the United States, see, e. g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981), suits decided by state courts, see, e. g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304 (1987), or suits seeking only injunctive relief, see, e. g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470 (1987). It is settled law that the Seventh Amendment does not apply in these contexts. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 160 (1981) (suits against the United States); Curtis, 415 U. S., at 192, n. 6 (suits brought in state court); Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447 (suits seeking only equitable relief).In Williamson, we did review a regulatory takings case in which the plaintiff landowner sued a county planning commission in federal court for money damages under § 1983. 473 U. S., at 182. Whether the commission had denied the plaintiff all economically viable use of the property had been submitted to the jury. Id., at 191-192, and n. 12. Although the Court did not consider the point, it assumed the propriety of this procedure. E. g., id., at 191 ("It is not clear whether the jury would have found that the respondent had720720 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.been denied all reasonable beneficial use of the property had any of the eight objections been met through the grant of a variance .... Accordingly, until the Commission determines that no variances will be granted, it is impossible for the jury to find, on this record, whether respondent 'will be unable to derive economic benefit' from the land").Williamson is not a direct holding, however, and we must look for further guidance. We turn next to considerations of process and function.3In actions at law predominantly factual issues are in most cases allocated to the jury. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654, 657 (1935). The allocation rests on a firm historical foundation, see, e. g., 1 E. Coke, Institutes 155b (1628) ("ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices; ad quaestionem juris non respondent juratores"), and serves "to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dispute," Markman, supra, at 377.Almost from the inception of our regulatory takings doctrine, we have held that whether a regulation of property goes so far that "there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act ... depends upon the particular facts." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922); accord, Keystone Bituminous Coal, supra, at 473-474. Consistent with this understanding, we have described determinations of liability in regulatory takings cases as "'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,'" Lucas, supra, at 1015 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978)), requiring "complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions," Yee, 503 U. S., at 523.In accordance with these pronouncements, we hold that the issue whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a predominantly factual question. As our implied acknowledgment of the procedure in Williamson, supra, suggests, in actions at law721otherwise within the purview of the Seventh Amendment, this question is for the jury.The jury's role in determining whether a land-use decision substantially advances legitimate public interests within the meaning of our regulatory takings doctrine presents a more difficult question. Although our cases make clear that this inquiry involves an essential factual component, see Yee, supra, at 523, it no doubt has a legal aspect as well, and is probably best understood as a mixed question of fact and law.In this case, the narrow question submitted to the jury was whether, when viewed in light of the context and protracted history of the development application process, the city's decision to reject a particular development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications. See Part III, supra. As the Court of Appeals recognized, this question was "essentially fact-bound [in] nature." 95 F. 3d, at 1430 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration by Court of Appeals). Under these circumstances, we hold that it was proper to submit this narrow, fact-bound question to the jury.CWe note the limitations of our Seventh Amendment holding. We do not address the jury's role in an ordinary inverse condemnation suit. The action here was brought under § 1983, a context in which the jury's role in vindicating constitutional rights has long been recognized by the federal courts. A federal court, moreover, cannot entertain a takings claim under § 1983 unless or until the complaining landowner has been denied an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Even the State of California, where this suit arose, now provides a facially adequate procedure for obtaining just compensation for temporary takings such as this one. Our decision is also circumscribed in its conceptual reach. The posture of the case does not present an appropriate occasion to define with precision the elements of a temporary regulatory takings claim; although the city objected to submitting722722 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.issues of liability to the jury at all, it approved the instructions that were submitted to the jury and therefore has no basis to challenge them.For these reasons, we do not attempt a precise demarcation of the respective provinces of judge and jury in determining whether a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate governmental interests. The city and its amici suggest that sustaining the judgment here will undermine the uniformity of the law and eviscerate state and local zoning authority by subjecting all land-use decisions to plenary, and potentially inconsistent, jury review. Our decision raises no such specter. Del Monte Dunes did not bring a broad challenge to the constitutionality of the city's general land-use ordinances or policies, and our holding does not extend to a challenge of that sort. In such a context, the determination whether the statutory purposes were legitimate, or whether the purposes, though legitimate, were furthered by the law or general policy, might well fall within the province of the judge. Nor was the gravamen of Del Monte Dunes' complaint even that the city's general regulations were unreasonable as applied to Del Monte Dunes' property; we do not address the proper trial allocation of the various questions that might arise in that context. Rather, to the extent Del Monte Dunes' challenge was premised on unreasonable governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the jury was that the city's denial of the final development permit was inconsistent not only with the city's general ordinances and policies but even with the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city. Del Monte Dunes' argument, in short, was not that the city had followed its zoning ordinances and policies but rather that it had not done so. As is often true in § 1983 actions, the disputed questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right in acting outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages. These were questions for the jury.723VFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.It is so ordered | OCTOBER TERM, 1998SyllabusCITY OF MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD., ET AL.CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITNo. 97-1235. Argued October 7, 1998-Decided May 24,1999After petitioner city imposed more rigorous demands each of the five times it rejected applications to develop a parcel of land owned by respondent Del Monte Dunes and its predecessor in interest, Del Monte Dunes brought this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court submitted the case to the jury on Del Monte Dunes' theory that the city effected a regulatory taking or otherwise injured the property by unlawful acts, without paying compensation or providing an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the loss. The court instructed the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if it found either that Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of its property or that the city's decision to reject the final development proposal did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit ruled, inter alia, that the District Court did not err in allowing Del Monte Dunes' takings claim to be tried to a jury, because Del Monte Dunes had a right to a jury trial under § 1983; that whether Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of the property and whether the city's denial of the final proposal substantially advanced legitimate public interests were, on the facts of this case, questions suitable for the jury; and that the jury reasonably could have decided each of these questions in Del Monte Dunes' favor.Held: The judgment is affirmed. 95 F.3d 1422, affirmed.JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-A-2, concluding that:1. The Ninth Circuit's discussion of the rough-proportionality standard of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 391, is irrelevant to this Court's disposition of the case. Although this Court believes the Dolan standard is inapposite to a case such as this one, the jury instructions did not mention proportionality, let alone require the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes unless the city's actions were roughly proportional to its asserted interests. The rough-proportionality discussion, furthermore, was unnecessary to sustain the jury's verdict, given the Ninth Circuit's holding that Del Monte Dunes had proffered evidence sufficient to rebut688688 MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.Syllabuseach of the city's reasons for denying the final development plan. pp. 702-703.2. In holding that the jury could have found the city's denial of the final development plan not reasonably related to legitimate public interests, the Ninth Circuit did not impermissibly adopt a rule allowing wholesale interference by judge or jury with municipal land-use policies, laws, or routine regulatory decisions. As the city itself proposed the essence of the jury instructions, it cannot now contend that these instructions did not provide an accurate statement of the law. In any event, the instructions are consistent with this Court's previous general discussions of regulatory takings liability. See, e. g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260. Given that the city did not challenge below the applicability or continued viability of these authorities, the Court declines the suggestions of amici to revisit them. To the extent the city contends the District Court's judgment was based upon a jury determination of the reasonableness of its general zoning laws or land-use policies, its argument can be squared with neither the jury instructions nor the theory on which the case was tried, which were confined to the question whether, in light of the case's history and context, the city's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development proposal was reasonably related to the city's proffered justifications. To the extent the city argues that, as a matter of law, its land-use decisions are immune from judicial scrutiny under all circumstances, its position is contrary to settled regulatory takings principles and is rejected. pp.703-707.3. The District Court properly submitted the question of liability on Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim to the jury. Pp. 707-711, 718-722.(a) The propriety of such submission depends on whether Del Monte Dunes had a statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial, and, if it did, the nature and extent of the right. Because § 1983 does not itself confer the jury right when it authorizes "an action at law" to redress deprivation of a federal right under color of state law, the constitutional question must be reached. The Court's interpretation of the Seventh Amendment-which provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved" -has been guided by historical analysis comprising two principal inquiries: (1) whether the cause of action either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that was, and (2) if so, whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U. S. 370,376. Pp. 707-708.689Full Text of Opinion |
3,212 | 1998_97-7597 | neither Knowles' consent nor probable cause to conduct the search. He relied on Iowa law dealing with such searches.Iowa Code Ann. § 321.485(1)(a) (West 1997) provides that Iowa peace officers having cause to believe that a person has violated any traffic or motor vehicle equipment law may arrest the person and immediately take the person before a magistrate. Iowa law also authorizes the far more usual practice of issuing a citation in lieu of arrest or in lieu of continued custody after an initial arrest.1 See Iowa Code Ann. § 805.1(1) (West Supp. 1997). Section 805.1(4) provides that the issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest "does not affect the officer's authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search." The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as providing authority to officers to conduct a fullblown search of an automobile and driver in those cases where police elect not to make a custodial arrest and instead issue a citation-that is, a search incident to citation. See State v. Meyer, 543 N. W. 2d 876, 879 (1996); State v. Becker, 458 N. W. 2d 604, 607 (1990).Based on this authority, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and found Knowles guilty. The Supreme Court of Iowa, sitting en bane, affirmed by a divided vote. 569 N. W. 2d 601 (1997). Relying on its earlier opinion in State v. Doran, 563 N. W. 2d 620 (1997), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search under a bright-line "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as the1 Iowa law permits the issuance of a citation in lieu of arrest for most offenses for which an accused person would be "eligible for bail." See Iowa Code Ann. §805.1(1) (West Supp. 1997). In addition to traffic and motor vehicle equipment violations, this would permit the issuance of a citation in lieu of arrest for such serious felonies as second-degree burglary, § 713.5 (West Supp. 1997), and first-degree theft, § 714.2(1) (West 1993), both bailable offenses under Iowa law. See §811.1 (West Supp. 1997) (listing all nonbailable offenses). The practice in Iowa of permitting citation in lieu of arrest is consistent with law reform efforts. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(h), p. 99, and n. 151 (3d ed. 1996).116arresting officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been a custodial arrest. We granted certiorari, 523 U. S. 1019 (1998), and we now reverse.The State contends that Knowles has challenged Iowa Code's § 805.1(4) only "on its face" and not "as applied," in which case, the argument continues, his challenge would run afoul of Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968). But in his motion to suppress, Knowles argued that "[b]ecause the officer had no probable cause and no search warrant, and the search cannot otherwise be justified under the Fourth Amendment, the search of the car was unconstitutional." App. 7. Knowles did not argue below, and does not argue here, that the statute could never be lawfully applied. The question we therefore address is whether the search at issue, authorized as it was by state law, nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment.2In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. 414 U. S., at 234. See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U. S. 800,802-803 (1974); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 762763 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964);2 Iowa also contends that Knowles' challenge is precluded because he failed to seek review of a separate decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of a city ordinance. That decision, Iowa argues, resulted from the same search at issue here, rejected the same Fourth Amendment challenge Knowles now makes, and, under principles of res judicata, bars his present challenge. Even if Knowles' failure to seek certiorari review of this decision could preclude his present challenge, Iowa waived this argument by failing to raise it in its brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. See this Court's Rule 15.2; Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 816 (1985) ("Nonjurisdictional defects of this sort should be brought to our attention no later than in respondent's brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari; if not, we consider it within our discretion to deem the defect waived").117Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914). But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.We have recognized that the first rationale-officer safety-is "'both legitimate and weighty,'" Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 412 (1997) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam)). The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' ... than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest ... a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they118may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry pat down" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest-the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.Iowa nevertheless argues that a "search incident to citation" is justified because a suspect who is subject to a routine traffic stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence related to his identity (e.g., a driver's license or vehicle registration), or destroy evidence of another, as yet undetected crime. As for the destruction of evidence relating to identity, if a police officer is not satisfied with the identification furnished by the driver, this may be a basis for arresting him rather than merely issuing a citation. As for destroying evidence of other crimes, the possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding offense seems remote.In Robinson, we held that the authority to conduct a full field search as incident to an arrest was a "bright-line rule," which was based on the concern for officer safety and destruction or loss of evidence, but which did not depend in every case upon the existence of either concern. Here we119are asked to extend that "bright-line rule" to a situation where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all. We decline to do so. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | OCTOBER TERM, 1998SyllabusKNOWLES v. IOWACERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWANo. 97-7597. Argued November 3, 1998-Decided December 8,1998An Iowa policeman stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding and issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, without either Knowles' consent or probable cause, found marijuana and a "pot pipe," and arrested Knowles. Before his trial on state drug charges, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that because he had not been arrested, the search could not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218. The trial court denied the motion and found Knowles guilty, based on state law giving officers authority to conduct a full-blown search of an automobile and driver where they issue a citation instead of making a custodial arrest. In affirming, the State Supreme Court applied its bright-line "search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as the officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been an arrest.Held: The search at issue, authorized as it was by state law, nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment. Neither of the two historical exceptions for the "search incident to arrest" exception, see Robinson, supra, at 234, is sufficient to justify the search in the present case. First, the threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. While concern for safety during a routine traffic stop may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. Second, the need to discover and preserve evidence does not exist in a traffic stop, for once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. Iowa's argument that a "search incident to citation" is justified because a suspect may try to hide evidence of his identity or of other crimes is unpersuasive. An officer may arrest a driver if he is not satisfied with the identification furnished, and the possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence of an unrelated offense seems remote. Pp. 116-119.569 N. W. 2d 601, reversed and remanded.114REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Paul Rosenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Maria Ruhtenberg.Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh, Solicitor General. *CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding, but issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The question presented is whether such a procedure authorizes the officer, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of the car. We answer this question "no."Knowles was stopped in Newton, Iowa, after having been clocked driving 43 miles per hour on a road where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. The police officer issued a citation to Knowles, although under Iowa law he might have arrested him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, and under the driver's seat he found a bag of marijuana and a "pot pipe." Knowles was then arrested and charged with violation of state laws dealing with controlled substances.Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence so obtained. He argued that the search could not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973), because he had not been placed under arrest. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officer conceded that he had* James J. Tomkovicz, Steven R. Shapiro, Susan N. Herman, and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.Stephen R. McSpadden filed a brief for the National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.115Full Text of Opinion |
3,213 | 1988_87-1815 | MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined,, post, p. 490 U. S. 465.JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.In this case, we consider whether Kentucky prison regulations give state inmates, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a liberty interest in receiving certain visitors. Page 490 U. S. 456IIn September, 1976, Kentucky inmates brought a federal class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging conditions of confinement in the Kentucky State Penitentiary at Eddyville. Other cases, one of them relating to the Kentucky State Reformatory at La Grange, were consolidated with the one concerning the penitentiary. The litigation was settled by a consent decree dated 28 May, 1980, and supplemented 22 July, 1980, containing provisions governing a broad range of prison conditions. App. 2-44, 45-55. See Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 27-50 (WD Ky.1981); see also Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432 (CA6 1984). Of sole relevance here, the consent decree provides:"The Bureau of Corrections encourages and agrees to maintain visitation at least at the current level, with minimal restrictions,' and to 'continue [its] open visiting policy."See 541 F. Supp. at 37.The Commonwealth in 1981 issued "Corrections Policies and Procedures" governing general prison visitation, including a nonexhaustive list of visitors who may be excluded. [Footnote 1] Four years later, the reformatory issued its own more detailed Page 490 U. S. 457 "Procedures Memorandum" on the subject of "Visiting Regulations." The memorandum begins with a Statement of Policy and Purpose:"Although administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits, it is the policy of the Kentucky State Reformatory to respect the right of inmates to have visits in the spirit of the Court decisions and the Consent Decree, while insuring the safety and security of the institution."App. 106. The memorandum then goes on to state that a visitor may be denied entry if his or her presence would constitute a "clear and probable danger to the safety and security of the institution or would interfere with the orderly operation of the institution." � K(1)(a), App. 133. A nonexhaustive list of nine specific reasons for excluding visitors is set forth. [Footnote 2] The memorandum also states that the Page 490 U. S. 458 decision whether to exclude a visitor rests with the duty officer, who is to be consulted by any staff member who "feels a visitor should not be allowed admittance." � K(3), App. 134.This particular litigation was prompted in large part by two incidents when applicants were denied the opportunity to visit an inmate at the reformatory. The mother of one inmate was denied visitation for six months because she brought to the reformatory a person who had been barred for smuggling contraband. Another inmate's mother and woman friend were denied visitation for a limited time when the inmate was found with contraband after a visit by the two women. In both instances, the visitation privileges were suspended without a hearing. The inmates were not prevented from receiving other visitors.The representatives of the Kendrick inmate class filed a motion with the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky (the court which had issued the consent decree), claiming that the suspension of visitation privileges without a hearing in these two instances violated the decree and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Page 490 U. S. 459 By a memorandum dated June 26, 1986, the District Court found that the prison policies did not violate the decree, App. 147, but concluded that the language of the decree was "mandatory in character," id. at 148, and that, under the standards articulated by this Court in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), respondents "possess a liberty interest in open visitation." The District Court directed petitioners to develop "minimal due process procedures," including "an informal, nonadversary review in which a prisoner receives notice of and reasons for" any decision to exclude a visitor, as well as an opportunity to respond. App. 148. A formal order was issued accordingly. Id. at 149.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and remanded the case. 833 F.2d 614 (1987). Relying not only on the consent decree but also on the regulations and stated policies, the court held that the relevant language was sufficiently mandatory to create a liberty interest. The Court of Appeals found that the relevant prison policies "placed substantive limitations on official discretion.'" Id. at 618-619, quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 461 U. S. 249 (1983). The court also found that the language of the consent decree, that "[d]efendants shall continue their open visiting policy" (emphasis supplied by Court of Appeals), see Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. at 37, coupled with a provision from the policy statement that "[a]n inmate is allowed three (3) separate visits . . . per week" (emphasis added by Court of Appeals), Reformatory Procedures � B(3), App. 108, satisfied the requirement of "mandatory language" articulated by our prior cases. See 833 F.2d at 618.Because this case appeared to raise important issues relevant to general prison administration, we granted certiorari. 487 U.S. 1217 (1988).IIThe Fourteenth Amendment reads in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without Page 490 U. S. 460 due process of law," and protects "the individual against arbitrary action of government," Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 418 U. S. 558 (1974). We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 408 U. S. 571 (1972); the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 472. The types of interests that constitute "liberty" and "property" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes are not unlimited; the interest must rise to more than "an abstract need or desire," Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 577, and must be based on more than "a unilateral hope," Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 452 U. S. 465 (1981). Rather, an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 466.Respondents do not argue -- nor can it seriously be contended, in light of our prior cases -- that an inmate's interest in unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause. We have rejected the notion that"any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause."(Emphasis in original.) Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 427 U. S. 224 (1976). This is not to say that a valid conviction extinguishes every direct due process protection;"consequences visited on the prisoner that are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime"may invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause even in the absence of a state-created right. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 445 U. S. 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital). However,"[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement Page 490 U. S. 461 to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight."Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236, 427 U. S. 242 (1976). The denial of prison access to a particular visitor "is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence," Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 468, and therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause.We have held, however, that state law may create enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting. We have found, for example, that certain regulations granted inmates a protected interest in parole, Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979), in good-time credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 418 U. S. 556-572, in freedom from involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 487-494, and in freedom from more restrictive forms of confinement within the prison, Hewitt v. Helms, supra. In contrast, we have found that certain state statutes and regulations did not create a protected liberty interest in transfer to another prison. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 225 (intrastate transfer); Olim v. Wakinekona, supra, (interstate transfer). The fact that certain state-created liberty interests have been found to be entitled to due process protection, while others have not, is not the result of this Court's judgment as to what interests are more significant than others; rather, our method of inquiry in these cases always has been to examine closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations. [Footnote 3] Page 490 U. S. 462Stated simply, "a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 249. A State may do this in a number of ways. Neither the drafting of regulations nor their interpretation can be reduced to an exact science. Our past decisions suggest, however, that the most common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by establishing "substantive predicates" to govern official decisionmaking, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 472, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.Most of our procedural due process cases in the prison context have turned on the presence or absence of language creating "substantive predicates" to guide discretion. For example, the failure of a Connecticut statute governing commutation of sentences to provide "particularized standards or criteria [to] guide the State's decisionmakers," Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 467 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), defeated an inmate's claim that the State had created a liberty interest. Id. at 452 U. S. 465 (majority opinion). See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 249-250 (interstate prison transfer left to "completely unfettered" discretion of administrator); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 228 (intrastate prison transfer at discretion of officials); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 243 (same). In other instances, we have found that prison regulations or statutes do provide decisionmaking criteria which serve to limit discretion. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 472 (administrative segregation not proper absent particular substantive predicates); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. at 3 482 U. S. 81 (parole granted unless certain standards met, even though the decision is "necessarily subjective . . . and predictive'"). Page 490 U. S. 463We have also articulated a requirement, implicit in our earlier decisions, that the regulations contain "explicitly mandatory language," i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that, if the regulations' substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow in order to create a liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 471-472. The regulations at issue in Hewitt mandated that certain procedures be followed, and "that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates." Id. at 459 U. S. 472. In Board of Pardons v. Allen, supra, the relevant statute "use[d] mandatory language (shall') to `creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted' when the designated findings are made," 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 377-378, quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 12. See also id. at 442 U. S. 11 (statute providing that board "shall order" release unless one of four specified conditions is found). In sum, the use of "explicitly mandatory language," in connection with the establishment of "specified substantive predicates" to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 472.IIIThe regulations and procedures at issue in this case do provide certain "substantive predicates" to guide the decisionmaker. See nn. 1 and | 1 and S. 454fn2|>2, supra. The state procedures provide that a visitor "may be excluded" when, inter alia, officials find reasonable grounds to believe that the"visitor's presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution's security or interfere with [its] orderly operation."See n 1, supra. Among the more specific reasons listed for denying visitation are the visitor's connection to the inmate's criminal behavior, the visitor's past disruptive behavior or refusal to submit to a search or show proper identification, and the visitor's being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Ibid. The reformatory procedures are nearly identical, and include a prohibition on a Page 490 U. S. 464 visit from a former reformatory inmate, without the prior approval of the warden. See n 2, supra. These regulations and procedures contain standards to be applied by a staff member in determining whether to refer a situation to the duty officer for resolution, and require the staff member to notify the duty officer if the staff member feels that a visitor should not be allowed admittance. Ibid. The same "substantive predicates" undoubtedly are intended to guide the duty officer's discretion in making the ultimate decision.The regulations at issue here, however, lack the requisite relevant mandatory language. They stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met. [Footnote 4] The Reformatory Procedures Memorandum begins with the caveat that "administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits," and goes on to note that "it is the policy" of the reformatory "to respect the right of inmates to have visits." App. 106. This language is not mandatory. Visitors may be excluded if they fall within one of the described categories, see n. 1, supra, but they need not be. Nor need visitors fall within one of the described categories in order to be excluded. The Page 490 U. S. 465 overall effect of the regulations is not such that an inmate can reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions. Or, to state it differently, the regulations are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably expect to enforce them against the prison officials. [Footnote 5]Because the regulations at issue here do not establish a liberty interest entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtKy. Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989)Kentucky Department of Corrections v. ThompsonNo. 87-1815Argued January 18, 1989Decided May 15, 1989490 U.S. 454SyllabusFollowing the District Court's issuance of a consent decree settling a class action brought by Kentucky penal inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Commonwealth promulgated "Corrections Policies and Procedures," which, inter alia, contain a nonexhaustive list of prison visitors who "may be excluded," including those who "would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution's security or interfere with [its] orderly operation." The Kentucky State Reformatory at La Grange subsequently issued its own "Procedures Memorandum," which, in addition to including language virtually identical to that of the state regulations, sets forth procedures under which a visitor "may" be refused admittance and have his or her visitation privileges suspended by reformatory officials. After the reformatory refused to admit several visitors and denied them future visits without providing them a hearing, the representatives of an inmate class filed a motion with the District Court, claiming, among other things, that the suspensions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court agreed, and directed that minimal due process procedures be developed. The Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded, concluding, inter alia, that the language of the relevant prison policies created a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.Held: The Kentucky regulations do not give state inmates a liberty interest in receiving visitors that is entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause. Pp. 490 U. S. 459-465.(a) In order to create a protected liberty interest in the prison context, state regulations must use "explicitly mandatory language," in connection with the establishment of "specific substantive predicates" to limit official discretion, and thereby require that a particular outcome be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 459 U. S. 472. Pp. 490 U. S. 459-463.(b) Although the regulations at issue do provide certain "substantive predicates" to guide prison decisionmakers in determining whether to allow visitation, the regulations lack the requisite relevant mandatory language, since visitors "may," but need not, be excluded whether they. fall within or without one of the listed categories of excludable visitors. Page 490 U. S. 455 Thus, the regulations are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions or reasonably expect to enforce the regulations against prison officials should that visit not be allowed. Pp. 490 U. S. 463-465.833 F.2d 614, reversed.BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 490 U. S. 465. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined,, post, p. 490 U. S. 465. |
3,214 | 1956_37 | MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.In this case, a Federal District Court convicted an attorney of criminal contempt on three specifications for disobeying subpoenas duces tecum, and imposed a general sentence of imprisonment for a year and a day. Since the Government has abandoned two of the specifications, the principal questions are whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on the third specification standing alone, and, if so, whether the case should be remanded for resentencing. For the reasons hereafter stated, we answer each in the affirmative.In 1953, in the District Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota, petitioner, Allen I. Nilva, Page 352 U. S. 387 was tried, with Elmo T. Christianson and Herman Paster, for conspiracy to violate the Federal Slot Machine Act, 64 Stat. 1134-1136, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1177. Christianson was the Attorney General of North Dakota. Paster was the owner of several distributing companies located in St. Paul, Minnesota. Petitioner was an attorney in St. Paul, a brother-in-law of Paster, and an officer in several of Paster's distributing companies. The indictment charged that these three conspired, with others, to accumulate slot machines late in 1950 and transport them into North Dakota, where they were to be distributed and operated under the protection of Christianson, who was to take office as Attorney General of that State on January 2, 1951.On the first trial, in 1953, a jury was unable to agree on the guilt of Christianson and Paster, but acquitted petitioner. In 1954, in preparation for a retrial of Christianson and Paster, the same court issued subpoenas duces tecum No. 78, returnable on March 22, and No. 160, returnable on March 29. Each was addressed to the Mayflower Distributing Company, a St. Paul slot machine distributing corporation wholly owned by Paster. Each called for the production of records, for certain periods in 1950 and 1951, relating to transactions in slot machines and other coin-operated devices. [Footnote 1] Each was served on Walter D. Johnson, secretary-treasurer of the company.On the date set for trial, Paster, instead of producing the subpoenaed records, moved to quash the subpoenas Page 352 U. S. 388 on the ground that the company was wholly owned by him and that the subpoenas required him to furnish evidence against himself. The motion was denied and, in response to the Government's request, the court ordered the subpoenaed records to be produced "forthwith." [Footnote 2] Three days later, on April 1, petitioner, who was an attorney of record for Paster, appeared in court and stated that he was the company's vice-president appearing for it in answer to the subpoenas. He said that,"in response to this subpoena, I personally, with the aid of people in the office force, searched all of our records in an attempt to comply with your subpoena and have brought all of the evidence I could to comply therewith."However, when the Government asked for the records of purchases and sales of slot machines called for by the subpoenas, he stated that he had been unable to locate them, and suggested that some of the company's records had been transferred to St. Louis in connection with a conspiracy case pending there on appeal. [Footnote 3]The trial court, being convinced, as it later stated, that petitioner was giving false and evasive testimony, issued Page 352 U. S. 389 an order reciting the failure of the officers of the company to produce the subpoenaed records and ordering all records of the company impounded by the United States Marshal. Many of the company's records in St. Paul were at once impounded, and accountants from the Federal Bureau of Investigation promptly examined them. Among them were records of the company's purchases and sales of slot machines in 1950 and 1951. At the conspiracy trial on April 12, an FBI agent named Peterson testified about those records from summaries he had compiled.On April 15, the trial court found it apparent that petitioner's testimony "was evasive or false, or both," and ordered him not to leave its jurisdiction without permission. No further action was taken at that time"because it was the Court's desire that the jury [in the conspiracy case] should not learn of the affair during the trial, so that the defendants therein would not be prejudiced by it in any way."On April 22, the jury found Christianson and Paster guilty of the conspiracy charged. [Footnote 4] On the following day, the court directed petitioner to appear on April 27 and show cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt for having obstructed the administration of justice. [Footnote 5] In three specifications, the court charged petitioner with --"1. Giving false and evasive testimony under oath on April 1, 1954, upon answering, as vice-president of the Mayflower Distributing Company, subpoenas duces tecum directed to [it] . . . "Page 352 U. S. 390"2. Disobedience to subpoena duces tecum No. 78, directed to the Mayflower Distributing Company . . . in that the following articles were not produced, as required thereby:""(a) Original ledger sheet reflecting the account of Stanley Baeder, November 1, 1950 through August 30, 1951;""* * * *" "3. Disobedience to subpoena duces tecum No. 160 directed to the Mayflower Distributing Company, and disobedience to the order of the Court, made on March 29, 1954, directing the Mayflower Distributing Company to produce records forthwith, in the case of United States of America v. Elmo T. Christianson and Herman Paster, Criminal No. 8158, in that the following articles were not produced, as required thereby:""(a) General ledger 1950;""(b) General ledger 1951;""(c) Journal 1950-1951;""(d) Check Register 1950-1951; . . . "Page 352 U. S. 391At 10 a.m. on April 27, petitioner appeared as directed. The court gave his counsel access to the impounded records and postponed the hearing until 3 p.m. At that time, the impounded books and records were present on the trial table, and petitioner took the stand in his own defense. He identified items (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the 22 listed in the third specification and introduced those records as his exhibits. Item (a) was the company's general ledger for 1950. It contained a record of sales of new slot machines during October, 1950-January, 1951; sales of used slot machines during July, 1950-January, 1951; and purchases of used slot machines during August, 1950-January, 1951. Petitioner admitted having previously examined the company's 1950 and 1951 general ledgers, but said that he had not found evidence of slot machine purchases and sales. He also admitted that he had not examined 19 of the 22 items listed in specification No. 3. At the close of the hearing, over petitioner's objection, a transcript of the testimony of FBI Agent Peterson, given at the conspiracy trial, was admitted in evidence in the contempt proceeding without opportunity for petitioner to confront him or cross-examine him in that proceeding.After finding petitioner guilty of criminal contempt on each of the three specifications, the court gave him a general sentence of imprisonment for a year and a day. On June 3, it released him on bail, but denied his motion to suspend his sentence and grant him probation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, 227 F.2d 74, and denied rehearing, 228 F.2d 134. We granted certiorari. 350 U.S. 1005.Although the District Court found petitioner guilty of contempt on each of the three specifications, the Government now concedes that the convictions on the first two are of doubtful validity, and does not undertake Page 352 U. S. 392 to sustain them. Consequently, we do not consider them here. [Footnote 6]This reduces the case to the charge that petitioner willfully disobeyed the court's order to produce certain corporate records required by subpoena No. 160. On that issue, it is settled that a criminal contempt is committed by one who, in response to a subpoena calling for corporation or association records, refuses to surrender them when they are in existence and within his control. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349; United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361; and see United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659.The Government rests its case on petitioner's failure to produce the records listed in the first four items set forth in specification No. 3, i.e., the general ledger for 1950, the general ledger for 1951, the journal for 1950-1951, and the check register for 1950-1951. These are impounded records which petitioner introduced in evidence as his exhibits. [Footnote 7] The first is the general ledger for 1950, shown by the list of petitioner's exhibits to include records of purchases and sales made during part of the Page 352 U. S. 393 period called for by subpoena No. 160. [Footnote 8] Petitioner admits having previously examined the first two items.Petitioner was a "nominal" vice-president of the corporation; he rendered it legal and administrative services of many kinds; he was a brother-in-law of its sole owner and president; he appeared in court as its official representative in answer to the subpoenas, and represented that he had brought with him all of the subpoenaed records that he and the office force could find.The subpoenas had been served on the secretary-treasurer of the corporation, who, in turn, had entrusted to petitioner the duty of satisfying them. When petitioner Page 352 U. S. 394 appeared in court in response to the subpoenas, he did not claim either want of actual possession of the required records or lack of opportunity or authority to produce them. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 339 U. S. 333; Wilson v. United States, supra, at 221 U. S. 376. Yet he failed to produce the vital corporate records which the Government promptly impounded. In our opinion, the evidence reasonably supports the conclusion that those records were in existence and were within petitioner's control. Page 352 U. S. 395-----------Exhibit No. 4 is described as the check register for Mayflower-St. Paul July 1, 1946, to January 31, 1955. Its contents are described as relating to purchases of used slot machines.Petitioner contends that his testimony that he attempted in good faith to comply with the subpoenas disproves the existence of any willful default and presents an "adequate excuse" for his failure to comply under Rule 17(g), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, his protestations of good faith were subject to appraisal by the court that heard them. It was the judge of his credibility and of the weight to be given to his testimony. Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87, 91. In our view, the trial court had a sufficient basis for concluding that petitioner intentionally, and without "adequate excuse," defied the court. [Footnote 9] We therefore agree that the record sustains petitioner's conviction for criminal contempt under specification No. 3.Petitioner claims that he was not allowed adequate time to prepare his defense. Under the circumstances of this case and in view of the wide discretion on such matters properly vested in the trial court, we think this claim is unfounded. [Footnote 10]Petitioner also contends that, as a matter of law, this contempt proceeding should have been heard by a judge other than the one who initiated the proceeding. Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not require disqualification of the trial judge except where Page 352 U. S. 396 "the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge. . . ." [Footnote 11] Concededly, the contempt here charged was not of that kind. And while there may be other cases, brought under Rule 42(b), in which it is the better practice to assign a judge who did not preside over the case in which the alleged contumacy occurred to hear the contempt proceeding, such an assignment is discretionary. In the absence of a showing of an abuse of that discretion, petitioner's conviction on specification No. 3 should be sustained.There remains a question as to petitioner's general sentence. It was imposed following his conviction on each of the three original specifications. Although the Government now undertakes to sustain but one of the convictions, it contends that petitioner's sentence should be left as it is because it was within the trial court's allowable discretion. We believe, however, that the court should be given an opportunity to reconsider petitioner's sentence in view of the fact that his conviction now rests solely on the third specification. [Footnote 12]Accordingly, petitioner's conviction for criminal contempt on specification No. 3 is affirmed, but his sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for reconsideration of his sentence.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtNilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957)Nilva v. United StatesNo. 37Argued November 8, 13, 1956Decided February 25, 1957352 U.S. 385SyllabusIn connection with a trial for conspiracy to violate the Federal Slot Machine Act, the court issued subpoenas duces tecum directing a corporation owned by one of the defendants to produce certain records of purchases and sales of slot machines. Petitioner, who was a vice-president of the corporation and an attorney of record for its owner, appeared on behalf of the corporation, produced certain records, and stated that they were all of the subpoenaed records that he could find. Under court order, all records of the corporation were impounded by a Federal Marshal, and among them were found records of purchases and sales of slot machines which petitioner had not produced. On the day after conviction of the defendants, the court ordered petitioner to appear four days later and show cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt for obstructing the administration of justice on three specifications. After a hearing, petitioner was found guilty of criminal contempt on all three specifications, and was given a general sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, the Government abandoned two of the specifications, but contended that the sentence should be sustained on the third.Held:1. The conviction of criminal contempt on the third specification is sustained. Pp. 392-396.(a) A criminal contempt is committed by one who, in response to a subpoena calling for corporate records, refuses to surrender them when they are in existence and within his control. P. 352 U. S. 392.(b) The evidence reasonably supports the conclusion that the records covered by the third specification were in existence and were within petitioner's control. Pp. 352 U. S. 392-394.(c) Although petitioner testified at his trial that he attempted in good faith to comply with the subpoenas, this testimony was subject to appraisal by the trial court, and the record contained sufficient basis to justify the court in concluding that petitioner's failure to comply with the subpoena was intentional, and without "adequate excuse" within the meaning of Rule 17(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. P. 352 U. S. 395.(d) In the circumstances of this case, and in view of the wide discretion on such matters vested in the trial court, petitioner's Page 352 U. S. 386 claim that he was not allowed adequate time to prepare his defense is unfounded. P. 352 U. S. 395.(e) Trial of petitioner before the trial judge who initiated the contempt proceeding was not improper, because Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure requires disqualification of the trial judge only when "the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge," the contempt here charged was not of that kind, and there is no showing in this case of an abuse of discretion in failing to assign another judge. Pp. 352 U. S. 395-396.2. Since petitioner's general sentence followed his conviction on three original specifications and the Government has abandoned two of them, the trial court should be given an opportunity to reconsider the sentence; and the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for that purpose. P. 352 U. S. 396.227 F.2d 74, 228 F.2d 1, judgment vacated and case remanded to the District Court. |
3,215 | 1972_72-694 | MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.These cases raise a challenge under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the constitutionality of a recently enacted New York law which provides financial assistance, in several ways, to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in that State. The cases involve an intertwining of societal and constitutional issues of the greatest importance. Page 413 U. S. 760James Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, [Footnote 1] admonished that a "prudent jealousy" for religious freedoms required that they never become "entangled . . . in precedents." [Footnote 2] His strongly held convictions, coupled with those of Thomas Jefferson and others among the Founders, are reflected in the first Clauses of the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights, which state that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." [Footnote 3] Yet, despite Madison's admonition and the "sweep of the absolute prohibitions" of the Clauses, [Footnote 4] this Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State. It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation, and as a consequence cases arising under these Clauses have presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court. Those cases have occasioned thorough and Page 413 U. S. 761 thoughtful scholarship by several of this Court's most respected former Justices, including Justices Black, Frankfurter, Harlan, Jackson, Rutledge, and Chief Justice Warren.As a result of these decisions and opinions, it may no longer be said that the Religion Clauses are free of "entangling" precedents. Neither, however, may it be said that Jefferson's metaphoric "wall of separation" between Church and State has become "as winding as the famous serpentine wall" he designed for the University of Virginia. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 333 U. S. 238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, the controlling constitutional standards have become firmly rooted and the broad contours of our inquiry are now well defined. Our task, therefore, is to assess New York's several forms of aid in the light of principles already delineated. [Footnote 5]IIn May, 1972, the Governor of New York signed into law several amendments to the State's Education and Tax Laws. The first five sections of these amendments established three distinct financial aid programs for nonpublic Page 413 U. S. 762 elementary and secondary schools. Almost immediately after the signing of these measures, a complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging each of the three forms of aid as violative of the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs were an unincorporated association, known as the Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (PERL), and several individuals who were residents and taxpayers in New York, some of whom had children attending public schools. Named as defendants were the State Commissioner of Education, the Comptroller, and the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance. Motions to intervene on behalf of defendants were granted to a group of parents with children enrolled in nonpublic schools, and to the Majority Leader and President pro tem of the New York State Senate. [Footnote 6] By consent of the parties, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2283, and the case was decided without an evidentiary hearing. Because the questions before the District Court were resolved on the basis of the pleadings, that court's decision turned on the constitutionality of each provision on its face.The first section of the challenged enactment, entitled "Health and Safety Grants for Nonpublic School Children," [Footnote 7] provides for direct money grants from the State to "qualifying" nonpublic schools to be used for the "maintenance and repair of . . . school facilities and equipment to ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils." [Footnote 8] A "qualifying" school is any nonpublic, Page 413 U. S. 763 nonprofit elementary or secondary school which"has been designated during the [immediately preceding] year as serving a high concentration of pupils from low income families for purposes of Title IV of the Federal Higher Education Act of nineteen hundred sixty-five (20 U.S.C.A. § 425). [Footnote 9]"Such schools are entitled to receive a grant of $30 per pupil per year, or $40 per pupil per year if the facilities are more than 25 years old. Each school is required to submit to the Commissioner of Education an audited statement of its expenditures for maintenance and repair during the preceding year, and its grant may not exceed the total of such expenses. The Commissioner is also required to ascertain the average per-pupil cost for equivalent maintenance and repair services in the public schools, and in no event may the grant to nonpublic qualifying schools exceed 50% of that figure."Maintenance and repair" is defined by the statute to include "the provision of heat, light, water, ventilation and sanitary facilities; cleaning, janitorial and custodial services; snow removal; necessary upkeep and renovation of buildings, grounds and equipment; fire and accident protection; and such other items as the commissioner may deem necessary to ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils." [Footnote 10] This section is prefaced by a series of legislative findings which shed light on the State's purpose in enacting the law. These findings conclude that the State "has a primary responsibility to ensure the health, welfare and safety of children attending . . . nonpublic schools"; that the "fiscal crisis in nonpublic education . . . has caused a diminution of proper maintenance and repair programs, threatening the health, welfare and safety of nonpublic school children" Page 413 U. S. 764 in low income urban areas; and that "a healthy and safe school environment" contributes "to the stability of urban neighborhoods." For these reasons, the statute declares that"the state has the right to make grants for maintenance and repair expenditures which are clearly secular, neutral and non-ideological in nature. [Footnote 11]"The remainder of the challenged legislation -- §§ 2 through 5 -- is a single package captioned the "Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity Program." It is composed, essentially, of two parts, a tuition grant program and a tax benefit program. Section 2 establishes a limited plan providing tuition reimbursements to parents of children attending elementary or secondary nonpublic schools. [Footnote 12] To qualify under this section a parent must have an annual taxable income of less than $5,000. The amount of reimbursement is limited to $50 for each grade school child and $100 for each high school child. Each parent is required, however, to submit to the Commissioner of Education a verified statement containing a receipted tuition bill, and the amount of state reimbursement may not exceed 50% of that figure. No restrictions are imposed on the use of the funds by the reimbursed parents.This section, like § 1, is prefaced by a series of legislative findings designed to explain the impetus for the State's action. Expressing a dedication to the "vitality of our pluralistic society," the findings state that a"healthy competitive and diverse alternative to public education is not only desirable but indeed vital to a state and nation that have continually reaffirmed the value of individual differences. [Footnote 13]"The findings further emphasize that the Page 413 U. S. 765 right to select among alternative educational systems "is diminished or even denied to children of lower-income families, whose parents, of all groups, have the least options in determining where their children are to be educated." [Footnote 14] Turning to the public schools, the findings state that any "precipitous decline in the number of nonpublic school pupils would cause a massive increase in public school enrollment and costs," an increase that would "aggravate an already serious fiscal crisis in public education" and would "seriously jeopardize quality education for all children." [Footnote 15] Based on these premises, the statute asserts the State's right to relieve the financial burden of parents who send their children to nonpublic schools through this tuition reimbursement program. Repeating the declaration contained in § 1, the findings conclude that "[s]uch assistance is clearly secular, neutral and nonideological." [Footnote 16]The remainder of the "Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity Program," contained in §§ 3, 4, and 5 of the challenged law, [Footnote 17] is designed to provide a form of tax relief to those who fail to qualify for tuition reimbursement. Under these sections, parents may subtract from their adjusted gross income for state income tax purposes a designated amount for each dependent for whom they have paid at least $50 in nonpublic school tuition. If the taxpayer's adjusted gross income is less than $9,000, he may subtract $1,000 for each of as many as three dependents. As the taxpayer's income rises, the amount he may subtract diminishes. Thus, if a taxpayer has adjusted gross income of $15,000, he may subtract only $400 per dependent, and if his adjusted gross income is Page 413 U. S. 766 $25,000 or more, no deduction is allowed. [Footnote 18] The amount of the deduction is not dependent upon how much the taxpayer actually paid for nonpublic school tuition, and is given in addition to any deductions to which the taxpayer may be entitled for other religious or charitable contributions. As indicated in the memorandum from the Majority Leader and President pro tem of the Senate, submitted to each New York legislator during consideration of the bill, the actual tax benefits under these provisions were carefully calculated in advance. [Footnote 19] Thus, comparable tax Page 413 U. S. 767 benefits pick up at approximately the point at which tuition reimbursement benefits leave off.While the scheme of the enactment indicates that the purposes underlying the promulgation of the tuition reimbursement program should be regarded as pertinent as well to these tax law sections, § 3 does contain an additional series of legislative findings. Those findings may be summarized as follows: (i) contributions to religious, charitable and educational institutions are already deductible from gross income; (ii) nonpublic educational institutions are accorded tax exempt status; (iii) such institutions provide education for children attending them and also serve to relieve the public school systems of the burden of providing for their education; and, therefore, (iv) the"legislature . . . finds and determines that similar modifications . . . should also be provided to parents for tuition paid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools on behalf of their dependents. [Footnote 20]"Although no record was developed in these cases, a number of pertinent generalizations may be made about the nonpublic schools which would benefit from these enactments. The District Court, relying on findings in a similar case recently decided by the same court, [Footnote 21] adopted a profile of these sectarian, nonpublic schools similar to the one suggested in the plaintiffs' complaint. Qualifying institutions, under all three segments of the enactment, could be ones that"(a) impose religious restrictions on admissions; (b) require attendance of pupils at religious activities; (c) require obedience by students to the doctrines and dogmas of a particular faith; (d) require pupils to attend instruction in the theology or doctrine Page 413 U. S. 768 of a particular faith; (e) are an integral part of the religious mission of the church sponsoring it; (f) have as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values; (g) impose religious restrictions on faculty appointments; and (h) impose religious restrictions on what or how the faculty may teach."350 F. Supp. 655, 663. Of course, the characteristics of individual schools may vary widely from that profile. Some 700,000 to 800,000 students, constituting almost 20% of the State's entire elementary and secondary school population, attend over 2,000 nonpublic schools, approximately 85% of which are church-affiliated. And while "all or practically all" of the 280 schools [Footnote 22] entitled to receive "maintenance and repair" grants "are related to the Roman Catholic Church and teach Catholic religious doctrine to some degree," id. at 661, institutions qualifying under the remainder of the statute include a substantial number of Jewish, Lutheran, Episcopal, Seventh Day Adventist, and other church-affiliated schools. [Footnote 23]Plaintiffs argued below that, because of the substantially religious character of the intended beneficiaries, each of the State's three enactments offended the Establishment Clause. The District Court, in an opinion carefully canvassing this Court's recent precedents, held Page 413 U. S. 769 unanimously that § 1 (maintenance and repair grants) and § 2 (tuition reimbursement grants) were invalid. As to the income tax provisions of §§ 3, 4, and 5, however, a majority of the District Court, over the dissent of Circuit Judge Hays, held that the Establishment Clause had not been violated. Finding the provisions of the law severable, it enjoined permanently any further implementation of §§ 1 and 2, but declared the remainder of the law independently enforceable. The plaintiffs (hereinafter appellants) appealed directly to this Court, challenging the District Court's adverse decision as to the third segment of the statute. [Footnote 24] The defendant state officials (hereinafter appellees) have appealed so much of the court's decision as invalidates the first and second portions of the 1972 law, [Footnote 25] the intervenor Majority Leader and President pro tem of the Senate (hereinafter appellee or intervenor) has also appealed from those aspects of the lower court's opinion, [Footnote 26] and the intervening parents of nonpublic school children (hereinafter appellee or intervenor) have appealed only from the decision as to § 2. [Footnote 27] This Court noted probable jurisdiction over each appeal and ordered the cases consolidated for oral argument. 410 U.S. 907 (1973). Thus, the constitutionality of each of New York's recently promulgated aid provisions is squarely before us. We affirm the District Court insofar as it struck down §§ 1 and 2, and reverse its determination regarding §§ 3, 4, and 5. Page 413 U. S. 770IIThe history of the Establishment Clause has been recounted frequently, and need not be repeated here. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947); id. at 330 U. S. 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); [Footnote 28] McCollum v. Board Page 413 U. S. 771 of Education, 333 U.S. at 333 U. S. 212 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (962). It is enough to note that it is now firmly established that a law may be one "respecting an establishment of religion" even though its consequence is not to promote a "state religion," Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 612 (1971), and even though it does not aid one religion more than another, but merely benefits all religions alike. Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 330 U. S. 15. It is equally well established, however, that not every law that confers an "indirect," "remote," or "incidental" benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid. Everson, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, Page 413 U. S. 772 supra at 366 U. S. 450; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 671-672, 397 U. S. 674-675 (1970). What our cases require is careful examination of any law challenged on establishment grounds with a view to ascertaining whether it furthers any of the evils against which that Clause protects. Primary among those evils have been "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, at 397 U. S. 668; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 612.Most of the cases coming to this Court raising Establishment Clause questions have involved the relationship between religion and education. Among these religion-education precedents, two general categories of cases may be identified: those dealing with religious activities within the public schools [Footnote 29] and those involving public aid in varying forms to sectarian educational institutions. [Footnote 30] While the New York legislation places this case in the latter category, its resolution requires consideration not only of the several "aid to sectarian education" cases, but also of our other education precedents and of several important noneducation cases. For the now well defined three-part test that has emerged from our decisions is a product of considerations derived from the full sweep of the Establishment Clause cases. Taken together, Page 413 U. S. 773 these decisions dictate that, to pass muster under the Establishment Clause, the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, supra; School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), and, third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 612-613; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 403 U. S. 678 (1971). [Footnote 31]In applying these criteria to the three distinct forms of aid involved in this case, we need touch only briefly on the requirement of a "secular legislative purpose." As the recitation of legislative purposes appended to New York's law indicates, each measure is adequately supported by legitimate, nonsectarian state interests. We do not question the propriety, and fully secular content, of New York's interest in preserving a healthy and safe educational environment for all of its school children. And we do not doubt -- indeed, we fully recognize -- the validity of the State's interests in promoting pluralism and diversity among its public and nonpublic schools. Nor do we hesitate to acknowledge the reality of its concern for an already overburdened public school system that might suffer in the event that a significant percentage of children presently attending nonpublic schools should abandon those schools in favor of the public schools. Page 413 U. S. 774But the propriety of a legislature's purposes may not immunize from further scrutiny a law which either has a primary effect that advances religion, or which fosters excessive entanglements between Church and State. Accordingly, we must weigh each of the three aid provisions challenged here against these criteria of effect and entanglement.AThe "maintenance and repair" provisions of § 1 authorize direct payments to nonpublic schools, virtually all of which are Roman Catholic schools in low income areas. The grants, totaling $30 or $40 per pupil, depending on the age of the institution, are given largely without restriction on usage. So long as expenditures do not exceed 50% of comparable expenses in the public school system, it is possible for a sectarian elementary or secondary school to finance its entire "maintenance and repair" budget from state tax raised funds. No attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures related to the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes, nor do we think it possible, within the context of these religion-oriented institutions, to impose such restrictions. Nothing in the statute, for instance, bars a qualifying school from paying out of state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school chapel, or the cost of renovating classrooms in which religion is taught, or the cost of heating and lighting those same facilities. Absent appropriate restrictions on expenditures for these and similar purposes, it simply cannot be denied that this section has a primary effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary schools.The state officials nevertheless argue that these expenditures for "maintenance and repair" are similar to other financial expenditures approved by this Court. Page 413 U. S. 775 Primarily they rely on Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); and Tilton v. Richardson, supra. In each of those cases, it is true that the Court approved a form of financial assistance which conferred undeniable benefits upon private, sectarian schools. But a close examination of those cases illuminates their distinguishing characteristics. In Everson, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, approved a program of reimbursements to parents of public as well as parochial school children for bus fares paid in connection with transportation to and from school, a program which the Court characterized as approaching the "verge" of impermissible state aid. 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 16. In Allen, decided some 20 years later, the Court upheld a New York law authorizing the provision of secular textbooks for all children in grades seven through 12 attending public and nonpublic schools. Finally, in Tilton, the Court upheld federal grants of funds for the construction of facilities to be used for clearly secular purposes by public and nonpublic institutions of higher learning.These cases simply recognize that sectarian schools perform secular, educational functions as well as religious functions, and that some forms of aid may be channeled to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian. But the channel is a narrow one, as the above cases illustrate. Of course, it is true in each case that the provision of such neutral, nonideological aid, assisting only the secular functions of sectarian schools, served indirectly and incidentally to promote the religious function by rendering it more likely that children would attend sectarian schools and by freeing the budgets of those schools for use in other nonsecular areas. But an indirect and incidental effect beneficial to religious institutions has never been thought a sufficient defect to warrant the invalidation of a state law. In McGowan v. Maryland, Page 413 U. S. 776 supra, Sunday Closing Laws were sustained even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even attend religious services. Also, in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, property tax exemptions for church property were held not violative of the Establishment Clause despite the fact that such exemptions relieved churches of a financial burden.Tilton draws the line most clearly. While a bare majority was there persuaded, for the reasons stated in the plurality opinion and in MR. JUSTICE WHITE's concurrence, that carefully limited construction grants to colleges and universities could be sustained, the Court was unanimous in its rejection of one clause of the federal statute in question. Under that clause, the Government was entitled to recover a portion of its grant to a sectarian institution in the event that the constructed facility was used to advance religion by, for instance, converting the building to a chapel or otherwise allowing it to be "used to promote religious interests." 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 683. But because the statute provided that the condition would expire at the end of 20 years, the facilities would thereafter be available for use by the institution for any sectarian purpose. In striking down this provision, the plurality opinion emphasized that"[l]imiting the prohibition for religious use of the structure to 20 years obviously opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period."Ibid. And, in that event, "the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing religion." Ibid. See also id. at 403 U. S. 692 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part), 403 U. S. 659-661 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J.), 403 U. S. 665 n. 1 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). If tax raised funds may not be granted to institutions of higher learning where the possibility exists that those funds will be used to construct a facility utilized for sectarian activities 20 years hence, a fortiori they Page 413 U. S. 777 may not be distributed to elementary and secondary sectarian schools [Footnote 32] for the maintenance and repair of facilities without any limitations on their use. If the State may not erect buildings in which religious activities are to take place, it may not maintain such buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair. [Footnote 33]It might be argued, however, that, while the New York "maintenance and repair" grants lack specifically articulated secular restrictions, the statute does provide a sort of statistical guarantee of separation by limiting grants to 50% of the amount expended for comparable services in the public schools. The legislature's supposition might have been that at least 50% of the ordinary public school maintenance and repair budget would be devoted to purely secular facility upkeep in sectarian schools. The shortest answer to this argument is that the statute itself allows, as a ceiling, grants satisfying the entire "amount of expenditures for maintenance and repair of such school," providing only that it is neither more than $30 or $40 per pupil nor more than 50% of the comparable Page 413 U. S. 778 public school expenditures. [Footnote 34] Quite apart from the language of the statute, our cases make clear that a mere statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee that state funds will not be used to finance religious education. In Earle v. DiCenso, a companion case to Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, the Court struck down a Rhode Island law authorizing salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects. The grants were not to exceed 15% of any teacher's annual salary. Although the law was invalidated on entanglement grounds, the Court made clear that the State could not have avoided violating the Establishment Clause by merely assuming that its teachers would succeed in segregating "their religious beliefs from their secular educational responsibilities." 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 619."The Rhode Island Legislature has not, and could not, provide state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular teachers under religious discipline Page 413 U. S. 779 can avoid conflicts. The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion. . . ."Ibid. [Footnote 35] (Emphasis supplied.) Nor could the State of Rhode Island have prevailed by simply relying on the assumption that, whatever a secular teacher's inabilities to refrain from mixing the religious with the secular, he would surely devote at least 15% of his efforts to purely secular education, thus exhausting the state grant. It takes little imagination to perceive the extent to which States might openly subsidize parochial schools under such a loose standard of scrutiny. See also Tilton v. Richardson, supra. [Footnote 36]What we have said demonstrates that New York's maintenance and repair provisions violate the Establishment Clause because their effect, inevitably, is to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian Page 413 U. S. 780 schools. We have no occasion, therefore, to consider the further question whether those provisions, as presently written, would also fail to survive scrutiny under the administrative entanglement aspect of the three-part test because assuring the secular use of all funds requires too intrusive and continuing a relationship between Church and State, Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra.BNew York's tuition reimbursement program also fails the "effect" test, for much the same reasons that govern its maintenance and repair grants. The state program is designed to allow direct, unrestricted grants of $50 to $100 per child (but no more than 50% of tuition actually paid) as reimbursement to parents in low income brackets who send their children to nonpublic schools, the bulk of which is concededly sectarian in orientation. To qualify, a parent must have earned less than $5,000 in taxable income and must present a receipted tuition bill from a nonpublic school.There can be no question that these grants could not, consistently with the Establishment Clause, be given directly to sectarian schools, since they would suffer from the same deficiency that renders invalid the grants for maintenance and repair. In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid, in whatever form, is invalid. As Mr. Justice Black put it quite simply in Everson:"No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 16. Page 413 U. S. 781 The controlling question here, then, is whether the fact that the grants are delivered to parents, rather than schools, is of such significance as to compel a contrary result. The State and intervenor appellees rely on Everson and Allen for their claim that grants to parents, unlike grants to institutions, respect the "wall of separation" required by the Constitution. [Footnote 37] It is true that, in those cases, the Court upheld laws that provided benefits to children attending religious schools and to their parents: as noted above, in Everson, parents were reimbursed for bus fares paid to send children to parochial schools, and, in Allen, textbooks were loaned directly to the children. But those decisions make clear that, far from providing a per se immunity from examination of the substance of the State's program, the fact that aid is disbursed to parents, rather than to the schools, is only one among many factors to be considered.In Everson, the Court found the bus fare program analogous to the provision of services such as police and fire protection, sewage disposal, highways, and sidewalks for parochial schools. 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 17-18. Such services, Page 413 U. S. 782 provided in common to all citizens, are "so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function," id. at 330 U. S. 18, that they may fairly be viewed as reflections of a neutral posture toward religious institutions. Allen is founded upon a similar principle. The Court there repeatedly emphasized that, upon the record in that case, there was no indication that textbooks would be provided for anything other than purely secular courses."Of course, books are different from buses. Most bus rides have no inherent religious significance, while religious books are common. However, the language of [the law under consideration] does not authorize the loan of religious books, and the State claims no right to distribute religious literature. . . . Absent evidence, we cannot assume that school authorities . . . are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books or that they will not honestly discharge their duties under the law."392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 244-245. [Footnote 38] Page 413 U. S. 783The tuition grants here are subject to no such restrictions. There has been no endeavor"to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the former."Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 613. Indeed, it is precisely the function of New York's law to provide assistance to private schools, the great majority of which are sectarian. By reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the State seeks to relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to assure that they continue to have the option to send their children to religion-oriented schools. And while the other purposes for that aid -- to perpetuate a pluralistic educational environment and to protect the fiscal integrity of overburdened public schools -- are certainly unexceptionable, the effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions. [Footnote 39] Page 413 U. S. 784Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Allen, warned that"[i]t requires no prophet to foresee that, on the argument used to support this law others could be upheld Page 413 U. S. 785 providing for state or federal government funds to buy property on which to erect religious school buildings or to erect the buildings themselves, to pay the salaries of the religious school teachers, and finally to have the sectarian religious groups cease to rely on voluntary contributions of members of their sects while waiting for the Government to pick up all the bills for the religious schools."392 U.S. at 32 U. S. 253. His fears regarding religious buildings and religious teachers have not come to pass, Tilton v. Richardson, supra; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, and insofar as tuition grants constitute a means of "pick[ing] up . . . the bills for the religious schools," neither has his greatest fear materialized. But the ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools that periodically reach this Court abundantly support the wisdom of Mr. Justice Black's prophecy.Although we think it clear, for the reasons above stated, that New York's tuition grant program fares no better under the "effect" test than its maintenance and repair program, in view of the novelty of the question, we will address briefly the subsidiary arguments made by the state officials and intervenors in its defense.First, it has been suggested that it is of controlling significance that New York's program calls for reimbursement for tuition already paid, rather than for direct contributions which are merely routed through the parents to the schools, in advance of or in lieu of payment Page 413 U. S. 786 by the parents. The parent is not a mere conduit, we are told, but is absolutely free to spend the money he receives in any manner he wishes. There is no element of coercion attached to the reimbursement, and no assurance that the money will eventually end up in the hands of religious schools. The absence of any element of coercion, however, is irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment Clause. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra, it was contended that Bible recitations in public schools did not violate the Establishment Clause because participation in such exercises was not coerced. The Court rejected that argument, noting that, while proof of coercion might provide a basis for a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, it was not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause. 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 222-223. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's concurring views reiterated the Court's conclusion:"Thus, the short, and to me sufficient, answer is that the availability of excusal or exemption simply has no relevance to the establishment question, if it is once found that these practices are essentially religious exercises designed at least in part to achieve religious aims. . . ."Id. at 374 U. S. 288. A similar inquiry governs here: if the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments to them, the Establishment Clause is violated whether or not the actual dollars given eventually find their way into the sectarian institutions. [Footnote 40] Whether the grant is labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the same. In sum, we agree with Page 413 U. S. 787 the conclusion of the District Court that "[w]hether he gets it during the current year, or as reimbursement for the past year, is of no constitutional importance." 350 F. Supp. at 668.Second, the Majority Leader and President pro tem of the State Senate argues that it is significant here that the tuition reimbursement grants pay only a portion of the tuition bill, and an even smaller portion of the religious school's total expenses. The New York statute limits reimbursement to 50% of any parent's actual outlay. Additionally, intervenor estimates that only 30% of the total cost of nonpublic education is covered by tuition payments, with the remaining coming from "voluntary contribution, endowments and the like." [Footnote 41] On the basis of these two statistics, appellees reason that the "maximum tuition reimbursement by the State is thus only 15% of educational costs in the nonpublic schools." [Footnote 42] And,"since the compulsory education laws of the State, by necessity require significantly more than 15% of school time to be devoted to teaching secular courses,"the New York statute provides "a statistical guarantee of neutrality." [Footnote 43] It should readily be seen that this is simply another variant of the argument we have rejected as to maintenance and repair costs, supra at 413 U. S. 777-779, and it can fare no better here. Obviously, if accepted, this argument would provide the foundation for massive, direct subsidization of sectarian elementary and secondary schools. [Footnote 44] Our cases, however, have long since foreclosed Page 413 U. S. 788 the notion that mere statistical assurances will suffice to sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of "effect" and "entanglement."Finally, the State argues that its program of tuition grants should survive scrutiny because it is designed to promote the free exercise of religion. The State notes that only "low income parents" are aided by this law, and without state assistance, their right to have their children educated in a religious environment "is diminished or even denied." [Footnote 45] It is true, of course, that this Court has long recognized and maintained the right to choose nonpublic over public education. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). It is also true that a state law interfering with a parent's right to have his child educated in a sectarian school would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. But this Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, and that it may often not be possible to promote the former without offending the latter. As a result of this tension, our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of "neutrality," neither "advancing" nor "inhibiting" religion. [Footnote 46] In its attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between public and nonpublic education, the State has taken a step which can only be regarded as one "advancing" religion. However great our sympathy, Everson v. Board of Eduction, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 18 (Jackson, J., dissenting), for the burdens experienced by those who must pay public school taxes at the same time that they support other schools because Page 413 U. S. 789 of the constraints of "conscience and discipline," ibid., and notwithstanding the "high social importance" of the State's purposes, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 406 U. S. 14 (1972), neither may justify an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly emplanted.CSections 3, 4, and 5 establish a system for providing income tax benefits to parents of children attending New York's nonpublic schools. In this Court, the parties have engaged in a considerable debate over what label best fits the New York law. Appellants insist that the law is, in effect, one establishing a system of tax "credits." The State and the intervenors reject that characterization, and would label it, instead, a system of income tax "modifications." The Solicitor General, in an amicus curiae brief filed in this Court, has referred throughout to the New York law as one authorizing tax "deductions." The District Court majority found that the aid was, "in effect, a tax credit," 350 F. Supp. at 672 (emphasis in original). Because of the peculiar nature of the benefit allowed, it is difficult to adopt any single traditional label lifted from the law of income taxation. It is, at least in its form, a tax deduction, since it is an amount subtracted from adjusted gross income prior to computation of the tax due. Its effect, as the District Court concluded, is more like that of a tax credit, since the deduction is not related to the amount actually spent for tuition, and is apparently designed to yield a predetermined amount of tax "forgiveness" in exchange for performing a specific act which the State desires to encourage -- the usual attribute of a tax credit. We see no reason to select one label over another, as the constitutionality of this hybrid benefit does not turn, in any event, on the label we accord it. As MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER's opinion for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 614, notes, constitutional Page 413 U. S. 790 analysis is not a "legalistic minuet in which precise rules and forms must govern." Instead we must "examine the form of the relationship for the light that it casts on the substance."These sections allow parents of children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools to subtract from adjusted gross income a specified amount if they do not receive a tuition reimbursement under § 2, and if they have an adjusted gross income of less than $25,000. The amount of the deduction is unrelated to the amount of money actually expended by any parent on tuition, but is calculated on the basis of a formula contained in the statute. [Footnote 47] The formula is apparently the product of a legislative attempt to assure that each family would receive a carefully estimated net benefit, and that the tax benefit would be comparable to, and compatible with, the tuition grant for lower income families. Thus, a parent who earns less than $5,000 is entitled to a tuition reimbursement of $50 if he has one child attending an elementary, nonpublic school, while a parent who earns more (but less than $9,000) is entitled to have a precisely equal amount taken off his tax bill. [Footnote 48] Additionally, a taxpayer's benefit under these sections is unrelated to, and not reduced by, any deductions to which he may be entitled for charitable contributions to religious institutions. [Footnote 49]In practical terms, there would appear to be little difference, for purposes of determining whether such aid has the effect of advancing religion, between the tax Page 413 U. S. 791 benefit allowed here and the tuition grant allowed under § 2. The qualifying parent under either program receives the same form of encouragement and reward for sending his children to nonpublic schools. The only difference is that one parent receives an actual cash payment, while the other is allowed to reduce by an arbitrary amount the sum he would otherwise be obliged to pay over to the State. We see no answer to Judge Hays' dissenting statement below that, "[i]n both instances, the money involved represents a charge made upon the state for the purpose of religious education." 350 F. Supp. at 675.Appellees defend the tax portion of New York's legislative package on two grounds. First, they contend that it is of controlling significance that the grants or credits are directed to the parents, rather than to the schools. This is the same argument made in support of the tuition reimbursements, and rests on the same reading of the same precedents of this Court, primarily Everson and Allen. Our treatment of this issue in Part II-B, supra, at 413 U. S. 780-785, is applicable here, and requires rejection of this claim. [Footnote 50] Second, appellees place their strongest reliance on Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, in which New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations was upheld. We think that Walz provides no support for appellees' position. Indeed, its rationale plainly compels the conclusion that New York's tax package violates the Establishment Clause. Page 413 U. S. 792Tax exemptions for church property enjoyed an apparently universal approval in this country both before and after the adoption of the First Amendment. The Court in Walz surveyed the history of tax exemptions and found that each of the 50 States has long provided for tax exemptions for places of worship, that Congress has exempted religious organizations from taxation for over three-quarters of a century, and that congressional enactments in 1802, 1813, and 1870 specifically exempted church property from taxation. In sum, the Court concluded that"[f]ew concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the government to exercise at the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise generally."397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 676-677. [Footnote 51] We know of no historical precedent for New York's recently promulgated tax relief program. Indeed, it seems clear that tax benefits for parents whose children attend parochial schools are a recent innovation, occasioned by the growing financial plight of such nonpublic institutions and designed, albeit unsuccessfully, to tailor state aid in a manner not incompatible with the recent decisions of this Court. See Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (SD Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, post, p. 901.But historical acceptance, without more, would not alone have sufficed, as "no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use." Walz, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 678. It was the reason underlying that long history of tolerance of tax exemptions for religion that proved controlling. A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State Page 413 U. S. 793 to pursue a course of "neutrality" toward religion. Yet governments have not always pursued such a course, and oppression has taken many forms, one of which has been taxation of religion. Thus, if taxation was regarded as a form of "hostility" toward religion, "exemption constitute[d] a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those dangers." Id. at 397 U. S. 673. Special tax benefits, however, cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality established by the decisions of this Court. To the contrary, insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious institutions.Apart from its historical foundations, Walz is a product of the same dilemma and inherent tension found in most "government aid to religion" controversies. To be sure, the exemption of church property from taxation conferred a benefit, albeit an indirect and incidental one. Yet that "aid" was a product not of any purpose to support or to subsidize, but of a fiscal relationship designed to minimize involvement and entanglement between Church and State. "The exemption," the Court emphasized, "tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other." Id. at 397 U. S. 676. Furthermore,"[e]limination of the exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes."Id. at 397 U. S. 674. The granting of the tax benefits under the New York statute, unlike the extension of an exemption, would tend to increase, rather than limit, the involvement between Church and State.One further difference between tax exemptions for church property and tax benefits for parents should be Page 413 U. S. 794 noted. The exemption challenged in Walz was not restricted to a class composed exclusively or even predominantly of religious institutions. Instead, the exemption covered all property devoted to religious, educational, or charitable purposes. As the parties here must concede, tax reductions authorized by this law flow primarily to the parents of children attending sectarian, nonpublic schools. Without intimating whether this factor alone might have controlling significance in another context in some future case, it should be apparent that, in terms of the potential divisiveness of any legislative measure, the narrowness of the benefited class would be an important factor. [Footnote 52]In conclusion, we find the Walz analogy unpersuasive, and, in light of the practical similarity between New York's tax and tuition reimbursement programs, we hold that neither form of aid is sufficiently restricted to assure that it will not have the impermissible effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools.IIIBecause we have found that the challenged sections have the impermissible effect of advancing religion, we need not consider whether such aid would result in entanglement of the State with religion in the sense of "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 619. But the importance of the competing societal interests implicated here prompts us to make the further observation that, apart from any specific entanglement of the State in particular religious programs, assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion. Page 413 U. S. 795Few would question most of the legislative findings supporting this statute. We recognized in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 247, that"private education has played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and experience,"and certainly private parochial schools have contributed importantly to this role. Moreover, the tailoring of the New York statute to channel the aid provided primarily to afford low income families the option of determining where their children are to be educated is most appealing. [Footnote 53] There is no doubt that the private schools are confronted with increasingly grave fiscal problems, that resolving these problems by increasing tuition charges forces parents to turn to the public schools, and that this, in turn -- as the present legislation recognizes -- exacerbates the problems of public education at the same time that it weakens support for the parochial schools.These, in briefest summary, are the underlying reasons for the New York legislation and for similar legislation in other States. They are substantial reasons. Yet they must be weighed against the relevant provisions and purposes of the First Amendment, which safeguard the separation of Church from State and which have been regarded from the beginning as among the most cherished features of our constitutional system.One factor of recurring significance in this weighing process is the potentially divisive political effect of an aid program. As Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Everson Page 413 U. S. 796 v. Board of Education, supra, emphasizes, competition among religious sects for political and religious supremacy has occasioned considerable civil strife, "generated in large part" by competing efforts to gain or maintain the support of government. 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 9. As Mr. Justice Harlan put it,"[w]hat is at stake as a matter of policy [in Establishment Clause cases] is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point."Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 694 (separate opinion).The Court recently addressed this issue specifically and fully in Lemon v. Kurtzman. After describing the political activity and bitter differences likely to result from the state programs there involved, the Court said:"The potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need for continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow."403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 623. [Footnote 54]The language of the Court applies with peculiar force to the New York statute now before us. Section 1 (grants for maintenance) and § 2 (tuition grants) will require continuing annual appropriations. Sections 3, 4, and 5 (income tax relief) will not necessarily require Page 413 U. S. 797 annual reexamination, but the pressure for frequent enlargement of the relief is predictable. All three of these programs start out at modest levels: the maintenance grant is not to exceed $40 per pupil per year in approved schools; the tuition grant provides parents not more than $50 a year for each child in the first eight grades and $100 for each child in the high school grades; and the tax benefit, though more difficult to compute, is equally modest. But we know from long experience with both Federal and State Governments that aid programs of any kind tend to become entrenched, to escalate in cost, and to generate their own aggressive constituencies. And the larger the class of recipients, the greater the pressure for accelerated increases. [Footnote 55] Moreover, the State itself, concededly anxious to avoid assuming the burden of educating children now in private and parochial schools, has a strong motivation for increasing this aid as public school costs rise and population increases. [Footnote 56] In this situation, where the underlying issue is the deeply emotional one of Church-State relationships, the potential for seriously divisive political consequences needs no elaboration. And while the prospect of such divisiveness Page 413 U. S. 798 may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this Court, it is certainly a "warning signal" not to be ignored. 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 625.Our examination of New York's aid provisions, in light of all relevant considerations, compels the judgment that each, as written, has a "primary effect that advances religion," and offends the constitutional prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of religion." We therefore affirm the three-judge court's holding as to §§ 1 and 2, and reverse as to §§ 3, 4, and 5.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtCommittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. NyquistNo. 72-694Argued April 16, 1973Decided June 25, 1973*413 U.S. 756SyllabusAmendments to New York's Education and Tax Laws established three financial aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. The first section provides for direct money grants to "qualifying" nonpublic schools to be used for "maintenance and repair" of facilities and equipment to ensure the students' "health, welfare and safety." A "qualifying" school is a nonpublic, nonprofit elementary or secondary school serving a high concentration of pupils from low income families. The annual grant is $30 per pupil, or $40 if the facilities are more than 25 years old, which may not exceed 50% of the average per-pupil cost for equivalent services in the public schools. Legislative findings concluded that the State "has a primary responsibility to ensure the health, welfare and safety of children attending . . . nonpublic schools"; that the"fiscal crisis in nonpublic education . . . has caused a diminution of proper maintenance and repair programs, threatening the health, welfare and safety of nonpublic school children"in low income urban areas; and that "a healthy and safe school environment" contributes "to the stability of urban neighborhoods." Section 2 establishes a tuition reimbursement plan for parents of children attending nonpublic elementary or secondary schools. To qualify, a parent's annual taxable income must be less than $5,000. The amount of reimbursement is $50 per grade school child and $100 per high school student so long as those amounts do not exceed 50% of actual tuition paid. The legislature Page 413 U. S. 757 found that the right to select among alternative educational systems should be available in a pluralistic society, and that any sharp decline in nonpublic school pupils would massively increase public school enrollment and costs, seriously jeopardizing quality education for all children. Reiterating a declaration contained in the first section, the findings concluded that "such assistance is clearly secular, neutral and nonideological." The third program, contained in §§ 3, 4, and 5 of the challenged law, is designed to give tax relief to parents failing to qualify for tuition reimbursement. Each eligible taxpayer-parent is entitled to deduct a stipulated sum from his adjusted gross income for each child attending a nonpublic school. The amount of the deduction is unrelated to the amount of tuition actually paid, and decreases as the amount of taxable income increases. These sections are also prefaced by a series of legislative findings similar to those accompanying the previous sections. Almost 20% of the State's students, some 700,000 to 800,000, attend nonpublic schools, approximately 85% of which are church-affiliated. While practically all the schools entitled to receive maintenance and repair grants "are related to the Roman Catholic Church and teach Catholic religious doctrine to some degree," institutions qualifying under the remainder of the statute include a substantial number of other church-affiliated schools. The District Court held that § 1, the maintenance and repair grants, and § 2, the tuition reimbursement grants, were invalid, but that the income tax provisions of §§ 3, 4, and 5 did not violate the Establishment Clause.Held:1. The propriety of a legislature's purpose may not immunize from further scrutiny a law that either has a primary effect that advances religion or fosters excessive church-state entanglements. Pp. 413 U. S. 772-774.2. The maintenance and repair provisions of the New York statute violate the Establishment Clause because their inevitable effect is to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools. Those provisions do not properly guarantee the secularity of state aid by limiting the percentage of assistance to 50% of comparable aid to public schools. Such statistical assurances fail to provide an adequate guarantee that aid will not be utilized to advance the religious activities of sectarian schools. Pp. 413 U. S. 774-780.3. The tuition reimbursement grants, if given directly to sectarian schools, would similarly violate the Establishment Clause, and the fact that they are delivered to the parents, rather than the schools, does not compel a contrary result, as the effect of the aid Page 413 U. S. 758 is unmistakably to provide financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions. Pp. 413 U. S. 780-789.(a) The fact that the grant is given as reimbursement for tuition already paid, and that the recipient is not required to spend the amount received on education, does not alter the effect of the law. Pp. 413 U. S. 785-787.(b) The argument that the statute provides "a statistical guarantee of neutrality," since the tuition reimbursement is only 15% of the educational costs in nonpublic schools and the compulsory education laws require more than 15% of school time to be devoted to secular courses, is merely another variant of the argument rejected as to maintenance and repair costs. Pp. 413 U. S. 787-788.(c) The State must maintain an attitude of "neutrality," neither "advancing" nor "inhibiting" religion, and it cannot, by designing a program to promote the free exercise of religion, erode the limitations of the Establishment Clause. Pp. 413 U. S. 788-789.4. The system of providing income tax benefits to parents of children attending New York's nonpublic schools also violates the Establishment Clause because, like the tuition reimbursement program, it is not sufficiently restricted to assure that it will not have the impermissible effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, distinguished. Pp. 413 U. S. 789-794.5. Because the challenged sections have the impermissible effect of advancing religion, it is not necessary to consider whether such aid would yield an entanglement with religion. But it should be noted that, apart from any administrative entanglement of the State in particular religious programs, assistance of the sort involved here carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing and expanding political strife over aid to religion. Pp. 413 U. S. 794-798.350 F. Supp. 655, affirmed in part and reversed in part.POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in Part II-A of the Court's opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, and dissenting from Parts II-B and II-C, in which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 798. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 805. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in those portions of which Page 413 U. S. 759 relating to Parts II-B and II-C of the Court's opinion BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 813. |
3,216 | 1967_149 | MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.Petitioners, Wayne Dyke, Ed McKinney, and John Blackwell, were found guilty of criminal contempt by the Chancery Court of McMinn County, Tennessee. All three were given the maximum sentence authorized by statute, 10 days in jail and a $50 fine. [Footnote 1] The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, [Footnote 2] rejecting contentions that the convictions violated the Federal Constitution because a jury trial was denied [Footnote 3] and because testimony concerning Page 391 U. S. 218 a gun, allegedly discovered during an unconstitutional search, was admitted at trial. Petitioners raised both challenges in their petition for a writ of certiorari, and we granted the writ. 389 U.S. 815 (1967).In connection with a labor dispute, McMinn County Chancery Court issued, on January 24, 1966, an injunction against, inter alia,"inflicting harm or damage upon the persons or property of [respondent Taylor Implement Company's] employees, customers, visitors or any other persons."On the night of February 25, 1966, a car was seen to drive past the home of Lloyd Duckett, a nonstriking Taylor Implement employee who lived in Monroe County, which adjoins McMinn. Shots were fired from the car at or into the Duckett home. Robert Wayne Ellis, Duckett's son-in law, was standing in the front yard with another son-in law, Dale Harris; Ellis fired back at the car with a pistol, and thought his first shot hit the back of the car. Ellis informed Monroe County Sheriff Howard Kirkpatrick by telephone, and soon after, Monroe Deputy Sheriff Loyd Powers, contacted by Kirkpatrick on his radio and presumably told of the crime, spotted a suspicious car and began following it. The car raced away, but was stopped by Athens, Tennessee, policemen, notified by Powers of a speeding car heading for Athens. When Powers reached the stopped car, which contained the three petitioners, he and the Athens policemen took them to McMinn County jail, [Footnote 4] Page 391 U. S. 219 and parked their car outside the jail. While petitioners were waiting inside the jail, Powers and several Athens policemen searched the car. Under the front seat they found an air rifle. At trial, there was testimony that Ellis and Harris had recognized the car from which shots were fired as a two-tone 1960 or 1961 Dodge, that Ellis thought he hit the back of the Dodge with one shot, that the car stopped in Athens was a 1960 Dodge with a fresh bullet hole through the trunk lid, that an air rifle pellet was found the next day outside the Duckett home, and that an air rifle was found under the car's seat. [Footnote 5] The chancellor noted that the case against petitioners was "premised entirely upon circumstantial evidence," but that nonetheless he had"no trouble at all with the proof which I have heard, and I have weighed it in its severest form, that the charges made must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."The three petitioners were found guilty.Petitioners' first claim is that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when their request for trial by jury was denied. We have held today, in Duncan v. Louisiana, ante, p. 391 U. S. 145, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the States the requirement of Article III and the Sixth Amendment that jury trials be available to criminal defendants. We have also held, in Bloom v. Illinois, ante, p. 391 U. S. 194, that prosecutions for criminal contempt are within the constitutional guarantee. The Bloom and Duncan cases, however, have reaffirmed the view that the guarantee of jury trial does not extend to petty crimes. As Bloom makes clear, supra, at 391 U. S. 195-200, criminal contempt has always been thought not to be a crime of the sort that requires a jury trial regardless of the penalty authorized. Alleged criminal contemnors Page 391 U. S. 220 must be given a jury trial, therefore, unless the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty within the "petty offense" limit or, if the legislature has made no judgment about the maximum penalty that can be imposed, unless the penalty actually imposed is within that limit. This Court has not had occasion to state precisely where the line falls between punishments that can be considered "petty" and those that cannot be. From Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373 (1966), it is clear that a six-month sentence is short enough to be "petty." That holding is sufficient for resolution of this case. Here, the maximum penalty which Tennessee statutes permitted the chancellor to impose was 10 days in jail and a fine of $50. The contempt was therefore a "petty offense," and petitioners had no federal constitutional right to a jury trial.Petitioners next contend that admission at trial, over timely objection, of evidence concerning the discovery of an air rifle under the seat of the car in which they were riding when arrested violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The State concedes that the search was without a warrant, but asserts that it was not in violation of the Constitution because "reasonable." While the record is not entirely clear, petitioners appear to have been arrested for reckless driving. Whether or not a car may constitutionally be searched "incident" to arrest for a traffic offense, the search here did not take place until petitioners were in custody inside the courthouse and the car was parked on the street outside. Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964), holds that, under such circumstances, a search is "too remote in time or place to [be] incidental to the arrest. . . ." 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 368.The search in question here is not saved by Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 (1967), which upheld a warrantless search of a car impounded "as evidence" pursuant Page 391 U. S. 221 to a state statute. The police there were required to seize the car and to keep it until forfeiture proceedings could be completed. In those circumstances, said the Court,"[i]t would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their own protection, to search it."386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 61-62. In the instant case, there is no indication that the police had purported to impound or to hold the car, that they were authorized by any state law to do so, or that their search of the car was intended to implement the purposes of such custody. Here, the police seem to have parked the car near the courthouse merely as a convenience to the owner, and to have been willing for some friend or relative of McKinney (or McKinney himself if he were soon released from custody) to drive it away. The reasons that made the warrantless search in Cooper reasonable thus do not apply to the search here. The Court discussed in Cooper, 386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 61, the reasons why that case was distinguishable from Preston. The case before us is like Preston and unlike Cooper according to each of the distinguishing tests set forth in the Cooper opinion.Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have "reasonable or probable cause" to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search. The record before us does not contain evidence that Sheriff Kirkpatrick, Deputy Sheriff Powers, or the officers who assisted in the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe that evidence Page 391 U. S. 222 would be found in petitioners' car. Powers had not been told that Harris and Ellis had identified the car from which shots were fired as a 1960 or 1961 Dodge. He testified:"All I got is just that it would be an old make model car. Kinda old make model car."The record also contains no suggestion that Ellis told Sheriff Kirkpatrick, Deputy Sheriff Powers, or any other law enforcement official that he had fired at the Dodge or that he thought he had hit it with one bullet. As far as this record shows, Powers knew only that the car he chased was "an old make model car," that it speeded up when he chased it, and that it contained a fresh bullet hole. The evidence placed upon the record is insufficient to justify a conclusion that McKinney's car was searched with "reasonable or probable cause" to believe the search would be fruitful.Since the search was not shown to have been based upon sufficient cause, we need not reach the question whether Carroll and Brinegar, supra, extend to a warrantless search, based upon probable cause, of an automobile which, having been stopped originally on a highway, is parked outside a courthouse.Because evidence was admitted without a satisfactory showing that it was obtained in compliance with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the Tennessee Supreme Court for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion.Reversed | U.S. Supreme CourtDyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., Inc., 391 U.S. 216 (1968)Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., Inc.No. 149Argued January 18, 1968Decided May 20, 1968391 U.S. 216SyllabusIn connection with a labor dispute, a Tennessee county chancery court issued an injunction which, inter alia, barred inflicting harm or damage to respondent company's employees. About a month later, a shot was fired from a car at the house of one of respondent's nonstriking employees. A deputy sheriff, presumably informed of the crime but without a description of the car or further details, pursued a suspicious car which raced away but was ultimately stopped by policemen, who arrested petitioners, the car's occupants, apparently for reckless driving. The deputy sheriff arrived, and he and the policemen noted a fresh bullet hole in the car. They took petitioners to jail, and the policemen parked the car on the street outside, apparently as a convenience to the car's owner. The deputy sheriff and several policemen made a warrantless search of the car and found an air rifle under the front seat. Over petitioners' objection, evidence about the gun was admitted at their trial before the chancellor for criminal contempt for violating the injunction. Petitioners were found guilty and given the maximum sentence of 10 days in jail and a $50 fine. The State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioners' contentions that the convictions violated their constitutional rights because a jury trial was denied and because evidence concerning the gun, which they claimed had been illegally seized, had been admitted.Held:1. In the light of the maximum sentence which the Tennessee statutes allowed, the criminal contempt for which petitioners were convicted was a "petty offense," to which the federal constitutional right of a jury trial does not extend. Pp. 391 U. S. 219-220.2. The evidence in the record is insufficient to justify the conclusion that the officers, before they began their warrantless search of the car, had "reasonable or probable cause" to believe that they would find an instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime. The applicability of Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), to a warrantless search of a parked automobile upon probable cause therefore need not be decided, and petitioners' claim must be sustained that the gun was illegally Page 391 U. S. 217 seized and evidence concerning it should not have been admitted at their trial. Pp. 391 U. S. 220-222.219 Tenn. 472, 410 S.W.2d 881, reversed and remanded. |
3,217 | 1979_78-6621 | MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.We granted certiorari to decide the following question:"May a sentence of death constitutionally be imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included noncapital offense, and when the evidence would have supported such a verdict?"444 U.S. 897. We now hold that the death penalty may not be imposed under these circumstances.Petitioner was tried for the capital offense of "[r]obbery or attempts thereof when the victim is intentionally killed by the defendant." [Footnote 1] Under the Alabama death penalty statute, Page 447 U. S. 628 the requisite intent to kill may not be supplied by the felony murder doctrine. [Footnote 2] Felony murder is thus a lesser included offense of the capital crime of robbery-intentional killing. However, under the statute, the judge is specifically prohibited from giving the jury the option of convicting the defendant of a lesser included offense. [Footnote 3] Instead, the jury is given the Page 447 U. S. 629 choice of either convicting the defendant of the capital crime, in which case it is required to impose the death penalty, or acquitting him, thus allowing him to escape all penalties for his alleged participation in the crime. If the defendant is convicted and the death penalty imposed, the trial judge must then hold a hearing with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances; after hearing the evidence, the judge may refuse to impose the death penalty, sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. [Footnote 4]In this case, petitioner's own testimony established his participation in the robbery of an 80-year-old man named Roy Malone. Petitioner consistently denied, however, that he killed the man or that he intended his death. Under petitioner's version of the events, he and an accomplice entered Page 447 U. S. 630 their victim's home in the afternoon, and, after petitioner had seized the man intending to bind him with a rope, his accomplice unexpectedly struck and killed him. As the State has conceded, absent the statutory prohibition on such instructions, this testimony would have entitled petitioner to a lesser included offense instruction on felony murder as a matter of state law. [Footnote 5]Because of the statutory prohibition, the court did not instruct the jury as to the lesser included offense of felony murder. Instead, the jury was told that, if petitioner was acquitted of the capital crime of intentional killing in the course of a robbery, he "must be discharged" and "he can never be tried for anything that he ever did to Roy Malone." Record 743. The jury subsequently convicted petitioner and imposed the death penalty; after holding a hearing with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court refused to overturn that penalty.In the courts below, petitioner attacked the prohibition on lesser included offense instructions in capital cases, arguing that the Alabama statute was constitutionally indistinguishable from the mandatory death penalty statutes struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325. [Footnote 6] The Alabama Court of Criminal Page 447 U. S. 631 Appeals rejected this argument on the ground that the jury's only function under the Alabama statute is to determine guilt or innocence, and that the death sentence it is required Page 447 U. S. 632 to impose after a finding of guilt is merely advisory. [Footnote 7] In a brief opinion denying review, the Alabama Supreme Court also rejected petitioner's arguments, citing Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640 (Ala.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, in which it had upheld the constitutionality of the Alabama death penalty statute against a similar challenge. 365 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (1978).In this Court, petitioner contends that the prohibition on giving lesser included offense instructions in capital cases violates both the Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by substantially increasing the risk of error in the factfinding process. Petitioner argues that, in a case in which the evidence clearly establishes the defendant's guilt of a serious noncapital crime such as felony murder, forcing the jury to choose between conviction on the capital offense and acquittal creates a danger that it will resolve any doubts in favor of conviction. [Footnote 8] Page 447 U. S. 633 In response, Alabama argues that the preclusion of lesser included offense instructions does not impair the reliability of the factfinding process or prejudice the defendant in any way. Rather, it argues that the apparently mandatory death penalty will make the jury more prone to acquit in a doubtful case, and that the jury's ability to force a mistrial by refusing to return a verdict acts as a viable third option in a case in which the jury has doubts but is nevertheless unwilling to acquit. The State also contends that prohibiting lesser included offense instructions is a reasonable way of assuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily and capriciously as a result of compromise verdicts. Finally, it argues that any error in the imposition of the death penalty by the jury can be cured by the judge after a hearing on aggravating and mitigating circumstances.IAt common law, the jury was permitted to find the defendant guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged. [Footnote 9] This rule originally developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases in which the proof failed to establish some element of the crime charged. See 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 515, n. 54 (1969). But it has long been recognized that it can also be beneficial to the defendant because it affords the jury a less drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN explained in his opinion Page 447 U. S. 634 for the Court in Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205, 412 U. S. 208, providing the jury with the "third option" of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard:"Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a defendant may be better off without such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction -- in this context or any other -- precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. In the case before us, for example, an intent to commit serious bodily injury is a necessary element of the crime with which petitioner was charged, but not of the crime of simple assault. Since the nature of petitioner's intent was very much in dispute at trial, the jury could rationally have convicted him of simple assault if that option had been presented. But the jury was presented with only two options: convicting the defendant of assault with intent to commit great bodily injury or acquitting him outright. We cannot say that the availability of a third option -- convicting the defendant of simple assault -- could not have resulted in a different verdict. Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an Page 447 U. S. 635 instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions."Id. at 412 U. S. 212-213 (emphasis in original).Alabama's failure to afford capital defendants the protection provided by lesser included offense instructions is unique in American criminal law. [Footnote 10] In the federal courts, it has long been"beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater."Keeble v. United States, supra, at 412 U. S. 208. [Footnote 11] Similarly, the state courts that have addressed Page 447 U. S. 636 the issue have unanimously held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction where the evidence warrants it. [Footnote 12] Indeed, for all noncapital crimes, Page 447 U. S. 637 Alabama itself gives the defendant a right to such instructions under appropriate circumstances. See n 5, supra.While we have never held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction as a matter of due process, the nearly universal acceptance of the rule in both state and federal courts establishes the value to the defendant of this procedural safeguard. That safeguard would seem to be especially important in a case such as this. For when the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense -- but leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense -- the failure to give the jury the "third option" of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.Such a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. As we have often stated, there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments:"[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country. . . . From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on Page 447 U. S. 638 reason, rather than caprice or emotion."Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 430 U. S. 357-358 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). To insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of "reason, rather than caprice or emotion," we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination. [Footnote 13] The same reasoning must apply to rules that diminish the reliability of the guilt determination. Thus, if the unavailability of a lesser included offense instruction enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction, Alabama is constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing that option from the jury in a capital case. [Footnote 14]IIAlabama argues, however, that petitioner's factual premise is wrong and that, in the context of an apparently mandatory Page 447 U. S. 639 death penalty statute, the preclusion of lesser included offense instructions heightens, rather than diminishes, the reliability of the guilt determination. The State argues that, because the jury is led to believe that a death sentence will automatically follow a finding of guilt, [Footnote 15] it it will be more likely to acquit than to convict whenever it has anything approaching a reasonable doubt. In support of this theory, the State relies on the historical data described in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 293 (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), which indicated that American juries have traditionally been so reluctant to impose the death penalty that they have"with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict."The State's argument is based on a misreading of our cases striking down mandatory death penalties. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia statute that vested the jury with complete and unguided discretion to impose the death penalty or not as it saw fit, on the ground that such a procedure led to the "wanton" and "freakish" imposition of the penalty. Id. at 408 U. S. 310 (STEWART, J., concurring). In response to Furman. several States enacted statutes that purported to withdraw any and all discretion from the jury with respect to the punishment decision by making the death penalty automatic on a finding of guilt. But, as the prevailing opinion noted in Woodson v. North Carolina, in so doing, the States "simply papered over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 302 (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). For, as historical evidence indicated, juries faced with a mandatory death penalty statute often Page 447 U. S. 640 created their own sentencing discretion by distorting the factfinding process, acquitting even a clearly guilty defendant if they felt he did not deserve to die for his crime. Because the jury was given no guidance whatsoever for determining when it should exercise this de facto sentencing power, the mandatory death statutes raised the same possibility that the death penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner as the statute held invalid in Furman. [Footnote 16]The Alabama statute, which was enacted after Furman but before Woodson, has many of the same flaws that made the North Carolina statute unconstitutional. Thus, the Alabama statute makes the guilt determination depend, at least in part, on the jury's feelings as to whether or not the defendant deserves the death penalty, without giving the jury any standards to guide its decision on this issue.In Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640 (Ala.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, Chief Justice Torbert attempted to distinguish the Alabama death statute from the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes on the ground that the unavailability of lesser included offense instructions substantially reduces the risk of jury nullification. Thus, because of their reluctance to acquit a defendant who is obviously guilty of some serious crime, juries will be unlikely to disregard their oaths and acquit a defendant who is guilty of a capital crime simply because of their abhorrence of the death penalty. Page 447 U. S. 641 However, because the death penalty is mandatory, the State argues that the jury will be especially careful to accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. In the State's view, the end result is a perfect balance between competing emotional pressures that ensures the defendant a reliable procedure, while at the same time reducing the possibility of arbitrary and capricious guilt determinations. [Footnote 17]The State's theory, however, is supported by nothing more than speculation. The 96 conviction rate achieved by prosecutors under the Alabama statute hardly supports the notion that the statute creates such a perfect equipoise. [Footnote 18] Page 447 U. S. 642 Moreover, it seems unlikely that many jurors would react in the theoretically perfect way the State suggests. As Justice Shores stated in dissent in Jacobs v. State, supra, at 651-652:"The Supreme Court of the United States did remark in Furman, infra, and again in Woodson, supra, that this nation abhorred the mandatory death sentence. . . . I suggest that, although there is no historical data to support it, most, if not all, jurors at this point in our history perhaps equally abhor setting free a defendant where the evidence establishes his guilt of a serious crime. We have no way of knowing what influence either of these factors have on a jury's deliberation, and which of these unappealing alternatives a jury opts for in a particular case is a matter of purest conjecture. We cannot know that one outweighs the other. Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that their human experience has taught them. The increasing crime rate in this country is a source of concern to all Americans. To expect a jury to ignore this reality and to find a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime requires of our juries clinical detachment from the reality of human experience. . . ."In the final analysis, the difficulty with the Alabama statute is that it interjects irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the jury's attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a capital crime. Thus, on the one hand, the unavailability of the third option of convicting on a lesser included offense may encourage the jury to convict for an impermissible reason -- its belief that the defendant is guilty of some serious crime and should be punished. On the other hand, the apparently mandatory nature of the death penalty may encourage it to Page 447 U. S. 643 acquit for an equally impermissible reason -- that, whatever his crime, the defendant does not deserve death. [Footnote 19] In any particular case, these two extraneous factors may favor the defendant or the prosecution, or they may cancel each other out. But in every case they introduce a level of uncertainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a capital case.IIIThe State also argues that, whatever the effect of precluding lesser included offense instructions might otherwise be, there is no possibility of harm under the Alabama statute because of two additional safeguards. First, although the jury may not convict the defendant of a lesser included offense, the State argues that it may refuse to return any verdict at all in a doubtful case, thus creating a mistrial. After a mistrial, the State may reindict on the capital offense or on lesser included offenses. [Footnote 20] In this case, the jury was instructed Page 447 U. S. 644 that a mistrial would be declared if it was unable to agree on a verdict or if it was unable to agree on fixing the death penalty; it was also told that, in the event of a mistrial, the defendant could be tried again. Record 743.We are not persuaded by the State's argument that the mistrial "option" is an adequate substitute for proper instructions on lesser included offenses. It is extremely doubtful that juries will understand the full implications of a mistrial [Footnote 21] or will have any confidence that their choice of the mistrial option will ultimately lead to the right result. Thus, they could have no assurance that a second trial would end in the conviction of the defendant on a lesser included offense. Moreover, invoking the mistrial option in a case in which the jury agrees that the defendant is guilty of some offense, though not the offense charged, would require the jurors to violate their oaths to acquit in a proper case -- contrary to the State's assertions that juries should not be expected to make such lawless choices. Finally, the fact that lesser included offense instructions have traditionally been given in noncapital cases despite the availability of the mistrial "option" Page 447 U. S. 645 indicates that such instructions provide a necessary additional measure of protection for the defendant.The State's second argument is that, even if a defendant is erroneously convicted, the fact that the judge has the ultimate sentencing power will ensure that he is not improperly sentenced to death. Again, we are not persuaded that sentencing by the judge compensates for the risk that the jury may return an improper verdict because of the unavailability of a "third option."If a fully instructed jury would find the defendant guilty only of a lesser, noncapital offense, the judge would not have the opportunity to impose the death sentence. Moreover, it is manifest that the jury's verdict must have a tendency to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that the jury did. Indeed, according to statistics submitted by the State's Attorney General, it is fair to infer that the jury verdict will ordinarily be followed by the judge even though he must hold a separate hearing in aggravation and mitigation before he imposes sentence. [Footnote 22] Under these circumstances, we are unwilling to presume that a post-trial hearing will always correct Page 447 U. S. 646 whatever mistakes have occurred in the performance of the jury's factfinding function.Accordingly, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court isReversed | U.S. Supreme CourtBeck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)Beck v. AlabamaNo. 78-6621Argued February 20, 1980Decided June 20, 1980447 U.S. 625SyllabusUnder Alabama law, felony murder is a lesser included offense of the capital crime of robbery-intentional killing. Under the Alabama death penalty statute, the trial judge is prohibited from giving the jury the option of convicting the defendant of the lesser included offense; instead, the jury must either convict the defendant of the capital crime, in which case it must impose the death penalty, or acquit him. If the defendant is convicted, the trial judge must hold a hearing to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and may then refuse to impose the death sentence and instead sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. Petitioner was convicted of robbery-intentional killing, and the jury accordingly imposed the death sentence, which the Alabama trial court refused to overturn. At petitioner's trial, his own testimony established his participation in the robbery, but he denied killing, or any intent to kill, the victim. Because of the statutory prohibition, the trial court did not instruct the jury as to the lesser included offense of felony murder. The Alabama appellate courts upheld the conviction and death sentence, rejecting petitioner's constitutional attack on the statutory prohibition on lesser included offense instructions.Held: The death sentence may not constitutionally be imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense where the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense. Pp. 447 U. S. 633-646.(a) Providing the jury with the "third option" of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. This procedural safeguard is especially important in cases such as this one. For when the evidence establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense but leaves some doubt as to an element justifying conviction of a capital offense, the failure to give the jury such a "third option" inevitably enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Such a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. Pp. 447 U. S. 633-638.(b) Alabama's argument that, in the context of an apparently mandatory death penalty statute, the preclusion of lesser included offense instructions heightens, rather than diminishes, the reliability of the guilt determination, must be rejected. The unavailability of lesser included Page 447 U. S. 626 offense instructions and the apparently mandatory nature of the death penalty both interject irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the jury's attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a capital crime. Thus, on the one hand, the unavailability of the "third option" may encourage the jury to convict for an impermissible reason -- its belief that the defendant is guilty of some serious crime and should be punished. On the other hand, the apparently mandatory nature of the death penalty may encourage the jury to acquit for an equally impermissible reason -- that, whatever his crime, the defendant does not deserve death. While, in any particular case, these two extraneous factors may favor the defendant or the prosecution or may cancel each other out, in every case, they introduce a level of uncertainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a capital case. Pp. 447 U. S. 638-643.(c) The jury's "option" of refusing to return any verdict at all, thus causing a mistrial, is not an adequate substitute for proper instructions on lesser included offenses. Nor does the fact that the trial judge has the ultimate sentencing power compensate for the risk that the jury may return an improper verdict because of the unavailability of the "third option." If the jury finds the defendant guilty only of a lesser included offense, the judge would not have the opportunity to impose the death sentence. Moreover, the jury's verdict must have a tendency to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that the jury did. Under these circumstances, it cannot be presumed that a post-trial hearing will always correct whatever mistakes occurred in the performance of the jury's factfinding function. Pp. 447 U. S. 643-646.365 So. 2d 1006, reversed.STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 447 U. S. 646. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 447 U. S. 646. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 447 U. S. 646. Page 447 U. S. 627 |
3,218 | 1982_81-2245 | JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.In 1913, the United States sued to adjudicate water rights to the Truckee River for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and the planned Newlands Reclamation Project. Thirty-one years later, in 1944, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada entered a final decree in the case pursuant to a settlement agreement. In 1973. the United States filed the present action in the same court on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, seeking additional water rights to the Truckee River. The issue thus presented is whether the Government may partially undo the 1944 decree, or whether principles of res judicata prevent it, and the intervenor Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, from litigating this claim on the merits. Page 463 U. S. 114INevada has, on the average, less precipitation than any other State in the Union. Except for drainage in the southeastern part of the State into the Colorado River, and drainage in the northern part of the State into the Columbia River, the rivers that flow in Nevada generally disappear into "sinks." Department of Agriculture Yearbook, Climate and Man (1941). The present litigation relates to water rights in the Truckee River, one of the three principal rivers flowing through west central Nevada. It rises in the High Sierra in Placer County, Cal., flows into and out of Lake Tahoe, and thence down the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada mountains. It flows through Reno, Nev., and, after a course of some 120 miles, debouches into Pyramid Lake, which has no outlet.It has been said that Pyramid Lake is"widely considered the most beautiful desert lake in North America [and that its] fishery [has] brought it worldwide fame. A species of cutthroat trout . . . grew to world record size in the desert lake and attracted anglers from throughout the world."S. Wheeler, The Desert Lake 90-92 (1967). The first recorded sighting of Pyramid Lake by non-Indians occurred in January, 1844, when Captain John C. Fremont and his party camped nearby. In his journal, Captain Fremont reported that the lake "broke upon our eyes like the ocean," and was "set like a gem in the mountains." 1 The Expeditions of John Charles Fremont 604-605 (D. Jackson & M. Spence eds.1970). Commenting upon the fishery, as well as the Pyramid Lake Indians that his party was camping with, Captain Fremont wrote:"An Indian brought in a large fish to trade, which we had the inexpressible satisfaction to find was a salmon trout; we gathered round him eagerly. The Indians were amused with our delight, and immediately brought in numbers; so that the camp was soon stocked. Their flavor was excellent -- superior, in fact, to that of any fish I Page 463 U. S. 115 have ever known. They were of extraordinary size -- about as large as the Columbia river salmon -- generally from two to four feet in length."Id. at 609. When first viewed by Captain Fremont in early 1844, Pyramid Lake was some 50 miles long and 12 miles wide. Since that time the surface area of the lake has been reduced by about 20,000 acres.The origins of the cases before us are found in two historical events involving the Federal Government in this part of the country. First, in 1859, the Department of the Interior set aside nearly half a million acres in what is now western Nevada as a reservation for the area's Paiute Indians. In 1874, President Ulysses S. Grant, by Executive Order, confirmed the withdrawal as the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. The Reservation includes Pyramid Lake, the land surrounding it, the lower reaches of the Truckee River, and the bottom land alongside the lower Truckee.Then, with the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, the Federal Government was designated to play a more prominent role in the development of the West. That Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw from public entry arid lands in specified Western States, reclaim the lands through irrigation projects, and then to restore the lands to entry pursuant to the homestead laws and certain conditions imposed by the Act itself. Accordingly, the Secretary withdrew from the public domain approximately 200,000 acres in western Nevada, which ultimately became the Newlands Reclamation Project. The Project was designed to irrigate a substantial area in the vicinity of Fallon, Nev., with waters from both the Truckee and the Carson Rivers.The Carson River, like the Truckee, rises on the eastern slope of the High Sierra in Alpine County, Cal., and flows north and northeast over a course of about 170 miles, finally disappearing into Carson sink. The Newlands Project accomplished the diversion of water from the Truckee River to Page 463 U. S. 116 the Carson River by constructing the Derby Diversion Dam on the Truckee River, and constructing the Truckee Canal through which the diverted waters would be transported to the Carson River. Experience in the early days of the Project indicated the necessity of a storage reservoir on the Carson River, and accordingly Lahontan Dam was constructed, and Lahontan Reservoir behind that dam was created. The combined waters of the Truckee and Carson Rivers impounded in Lahontan Reservoir are distributed for irrigation and related uses on downstream lands by means of lateral canals within the Newlands Reclamation Project.Before the works contemplated by the Project went into operation, a number of private landowners had established rights to water in the Truckee River under Nevada law. The Government also asserted on behalf of the Indians of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation a reserved right under the so-called "implied-reservation-of-water" doctrine set forth in Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908). [Footnote 1] The United States therefore filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in March 1913, commencing what became known as the Orr Ditch litigation. The Government, for the benefit of both the Project and the Pyramid Lake Reservation, asserted a claim to 10,000 cubic feet of water per second for the Project and a claim to 500 cubic feet per second for the Reservation. The complaint named as defendants all water users on the Truckee River in Nevada. The Government expressly sought a final decree quieting title to the rights of all parties. Page 463 U. S. 117Following several years of hearings, a Special Master issued a report and proposed decree in July, 1924. The report awarded the Reservation an 1859 priority date in the Truckee River for 58.7 second-feet and 12,412 acre-feet annually of water to irrigate 3,130 acres of Reservation lands. [Footnote 2] The Project was awarded a 1902 priority date for 1,500 cubic feet per second to irrigate, to the extent the amount would allow, [Footnote 3] 232,800 acres of land within the Project. In February, 1926, the District Court entered a temporary restraining order declaring the water rights as proposed by the Special Master. "One of the primary purposes" for entering a temporary order was to allow for an experimental period during which modifications of the declared rights could be made if necessary. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 81-2245, p. 186a (hereafter Nevada App.).Not until almost 10 years later, in the midst of a prolonged drought, was interest stimulated in concluding the Orr Ditch litigation. Settlement negotiations were commenced in 1934 by the principal organizational defendants in the case, Washoe County Water Conservation District and the Sierra Pacific Power Co., and the representatives of the Page 463 U. S. 118 Project and the Reservation. The United States still acted on behalf of the Reservation's interests, but the Project was now under the management of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID). [Footnote 4] The defendants and TCID proposed an agreement along the lines of the temporary restraining order. The United States objected, demanding an increase in the Reservation's water rights to allow for the irrigation of an additional 2,745 acres of Reservation land. After some resistance, the Government's demand was accepted and a settlement agreement was signed on July 1, 1935. The District Court entered a final decree adopting the agreement on September 8, 1944. [Footnote 5] No appeal was taken. Thus, 31 years after its inception the Orr Ditch litigation came to a close.On December 21, 1973, the Government instituted the action below seeking additional rights to the Truckee River for the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation; the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe was permitted to intervene in support of the United States. The Government named as defendants all persons presently claiming water rights to the Truckee River and its tributaries in Nevada. The defendants include the defendants in the Orr Ditch litigation and their successors, approximately 3,800 individual farmers that own land in the Newlands Reclamation Project, and TCID. The District Court certified the Project farmers as a class and directed TCID to represent their interests. [Footnote 6] Page 463 U. S. 119In its complaint, the Government purported not to dispute the rights decreed in the Orr Ditch case. Instead, it alleged that Orr Ditch determined only the Reservation's right to "water for irrigation," Nevada App. 157a, not the claim now being asserted for"sufficient waters of the Truckee River . . . [for] the maintenance and preservation of Pyramid Lake, [and for] the maintenance of the lower reaches of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for fish,"id. at 155a-156a. The complaint further averred that, in establishing the Reservation, the United States had intended that the Pyramid Lake fishery be maintained. Since the additional water now being claimed is allegedly necessary for that purpose, the Government alleged that the Executive Order creating the Reservation must have impliedly reserved a right to this water. [Footnote 7]The defendants below asserted res judicata as an affirmative defense, saying that the United States and the Tribe were precluded by the Orr Ditch decree from litigating this claim. Following a separate trial on this issue, the District Court sustained the defense and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.In its decision, the District Court first determined that all of the parties in this action were parties, or in privity with Page 463 U. S. 120 parties, in the Orr Ditch case. The District Court then found that the Orr Ditch litigation"was intended by all concerned, lawyers, litigants and judges, as a general, all-inclusive water adjudication suit which sought to adjudicate all rights and claims in and to the waters of the Truckee . . . and required all parties to fully set up their respective water right claims."Nevada App. 185a. The court determined that, in accordance with this general intention, the United States had intended in Orr Ditch "to assert as large a water right as possible for the Indian reservation." Nevada App. 185a. The District Court further explained:"[T]he cause of action sought to be asserted in this proceeding by the plaintiff and the Tribe is the same quiet title cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in Orr Ditch for and on behalf of the Tribe and its members, that is, a Winters implied and reserved water right for the benefit of the reservation, with a priority date of December 8, 1859, from a single source of water supply, i.e., the Truckee Watershed. The plaintiff and the Tribe may not litigate several different types of water use claims, all arising under the Winters doctrine and all derived from the same water source in a piecemeal fashion. There was but one cause of action in equity to quiet title in plaintiff and the Tribe based upon the Winters reserved right theory."Id. at 188a.The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 649 F.2d 1286 (1981), modified, 666 F.2d 351 (1982). The Court of Appeals agreed that the causes of action asserted in Orr Ditch and the instant litigation are the same, and that the United States and the Tribe cannot relitigate this cause of action with the Orr Ditch defendants or subsequent appropriators of the Truckee River. But the Court of Appeals found that the Orr Ditch decree did not conclude the dispute between the Tribe and the owners of Newlands Project lands. The court said that litigants are not to be bound by a prior judgment unless they were adversaries Page 463 U. S. 121 under the earlier pleadings or unless the specific issue in dispute was actually litigated in the earlier case and the court found that neither exception applied here.The Court of Appeals conceded that "[a] strict adversity requirement does not necessarily fit the realities of water adjudications." 649 F.2d at 1309. Nevertheless, the court found that, since neither the Tribe nor the Project landowners were parties in Orr Ditch, but instead were both represented by the United States, and since their interests may have conflicted in that proceeding, the court would not find that the Government had intended to bind these nonparties inter se absent a specific statement of adversity in the pleadings. We granted certiorari in the cases challenging the Court of Appeals' decision, 459 U.S. 904 (1982), and we now affirm in part and reverse in part.IIThe Government opens the "Summary of Argument" portion of its brief by stating:"The court of appeals has simply permitted a reallocation of the water decreed in Orr Ditch to a single party -- the United States -- from reclamation uses to a Reservation use with an earlier priority. The doctrine of res judicata does not bar a single party from reallocating its water in this fashion. . . ."Brief for United States 21. We are bound to say that the Government's position, if accepted, would do away with half a century of decided case law relating to the Reclamation Act of 1902 and water rights in the public domain of the West.It is undisputed that the primary purpose of the Government in bringing the Orr Ditch suit in 1913 was to secure water rights for the irrigation of land that would be contained in the Newlands Project, and that the Government was acting under the aegis of the Reclamation Act of 1902 in bringing that action. [Footnote 8] Section 8 of that Act provides: Page 463 U. S. 122"That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."32 Stat. 390. In California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645 (1978), we described in greater detail the history and structure of the Reclamation Act of 1902, and stated:"The projects would be built on federal land and the actual construction and operation of the projects would be in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior. But the Act clearly provided that state water law would control in the appropriation and later distribution of the water."Id. at 438 U. S. 664 (emphasis added).In two leading cases, Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937), and Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945), this Court has Page 463 U. S. 123 discussed the beneficial ownership of water rights in irrigation projects built pursuant to the Reclamation Act. In Ickes v. Fox, the Court said:"Although the government diverted, stored and distributed the water, the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water or water rights became vested in the United States is not well founded. Appropriation was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the landowners; and by the terms of the law and of the contract already referred to, the water rights became the property of the landowners, wholly distinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation works. Compare Murphy v. Kerr, 296 Fed. 536, 544, 545. The government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water (ibid.), with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works. As security therefor, it was provided that the government should have a lien upon the lands and the water rights appurtenent thereto -- a provision which, in itself, imports that the water rights belong to another than the lienor, that is to say, to the landowner.""The federal government, as owner of the public domain, had the power to dispose of the land and water composing it together or separately; and by the Desert Land Act of 1877 (c. 107, 19 Stat. 377), if not before, Congress had severed the land and waters constituting the public domain and established the rule that for the future the lands should be patented separately. Acquisition of the government title to a parcel of land was not to carry with it a water right; but all non-navigable waters were reserved for the use of the public under the Page 463 U. S. 124 laws of the various arid-land states. California Power Co. v. Beaver Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 295 U. S. 162. And in those states, generally, including the State of Washington, it long has been established law that the right to the use of water can be acquired only by prior appropriation for a beneficial use; and that such right, when thus obtained, is a property right which, when acquired for irrigation, becomes, by state law and here by express provision of the Reclamation Act as well, part and parcel of the land upon which it is applied."300 U.S. at 300 U. S. 94-96. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court stated:"The Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to § 3 of the Reclamation Act, withdrew from public entry certain public lands in Nebraska and Wyoming which were required for the North Platte Project and the Kendrick Project. Initiation of both projects was accompanied by filings made pursuant to § 8 in the name of the Secretary of the Interior for and on behalf of the United States. Those filings were accepted by the state officials as adequate under state law. They established the priority dates for the projects. There were also applications to the States for permits to construct canals and ditches. They described the land to be served. The orders granting the applications fixed the time for completion of the canal, for application of the water to the land, and for proof of appropriation. Individual water users contracted with the United States for the use of project water. These contracts were later assumed by the irrigation districts. Irrigation districts submitted proof of beneficial use to the state authorities on behalf of the project water users. The state authorities accepted that proof and issued decrees and certificates in favor of the individual water users. The certificates named as appropriators the individual landowners. They designated the number of acres included, the use for which Page 463 U. S. 125 the appropriation was made, the amount of the appropriation, and the priority date. The contracts between the United States and the irrigation districts provided that, after the stored water was released from the reservoir, it was under the control of the appropriate state officials.""All of these steps make plain that those projects were designed, constructed and completed according to the pattern of state law as provided in the Reclamation Act. We can say here what was said in Ickes v. Fox, supra, pp. 300 U. S. 94-95:""Although the government diverted, stored and distributed the water, the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water or water rights became vested in the United States is not well founded. Appropriation was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the landowners; and, by the terms of the law and of the contract already referred to, the water rights became the property of the landowners, wholly distinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation works. Compare Murphy v. Kerr, 296 Fed. 536, 544, 545. The government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water (ibid.), with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works.""The property right in the water right is separate and distinct from the property right in the reservoirs, ditches or canals. The water right is appurtenant to the land, the owner of which is the appropriator. The water right is acquired by perfecting an appropriation, i.e., by an actual diversion followed by an application within a reasonable time of the water to a beneficial use. See Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536, 542, 544, 545; Commonwealth Power Co. v. State Board, 94 Neb. 613, 143 N.W. 937; Kersenbrock v. Boyes, 95 Neb. 407, 145 Page 463 U. S. 126 N.W. 837. Indeed, § 8 of the Reclamation Act provides as we have seen that""the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."325 U.S. at 325 U. S. 613-614. The law of Nevada, in common with most other Western States, requires for the perfection of a water right for agricultural purposes that the water must be beneficially used by actual application on the land. Prosole v. Steamboat Canal Co., 37 Nev. 154, 159-161, 140 P. 720, 722 (1914). Such a right is appurtenant to the land on which it is used. Id. at 160-161, 140 P., at 722.In the light of these cases, we conclude that the Government is completely mistaken if it believes that the water rights confirmed to it by the Orr Ditch decree in 1944 for use in irrigating lands within the Newlands Reclamation Project were like so many bushels of wheat, to be bartered, sold, or shifted about as the Government might see fit. Once these lands were acquired by settlers in the Project, the Government's "ownership" of the water rights was, at most, nominal; the beneficial interest in the rights confirmed to the Government resided in the owners of the land within the Project to which these water rights became appurtenant upon the application of Project water to the land. As in Ickes v. Fox and Nebraska v. Wyoming, the law of the relevant State and the contracts entered into by the landowners and the United States make this point very clear. [Footnote 9] Page 463 U. S. 127The Government's brief is replete with references to its fiduciary obligation to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians, as it properly should be. But the Government seems wholly to ignore in the same brief the obligations that necessarily devolve upon it from having mere title to water rights for the Newlands Project, when the beneficial ownership of these water rights resides elsewhere.Both the briefs of the parties and the opinion of the Court of Appeals focus their analysis of res judicata on provisions relating to the relationship between private trustees and fiduciaries, especially those governing a breach of duty by the fiduciary to the beneficiary. While these undoubtedly provide useful analogies in cases such as these, they cannot be regarded as finally dispositive of the issues. This Court has long recognized "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government" in its dealings with Indian tribes, see, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 316 U. S. 296 (1942). These concerns have been traditionally focused on the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Department of the Interior. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U. S. 365, 390 U. S. 374 (1968). See 25 U.S.C. § 1. Page 463 U. S. 128But Congress in its wisdom, when it enacted the Reclamation Act of 1902, required the Secretary of the Interior to assume substantial obligations with respect to the reclamation of arid lands in the western part of the United States. Additionally, in § 26 of the Act of Apr. 21, 1904, 33 Stat. 225, Congress provided for the inclusion of irrigable lands of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation within the Newlands Project, and further authorized the Secretary, after allotting five acres of such land to each Indian belonging to the Reservation, to reclaim and dispose of the remainder of the irrigable Reservation land to settlers under the Reclamation Act.Today, particularly from our vantage point nearly half a century after the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq., it may well appear that Congress was requiring the Secretary of the Interior to carry water on at least two shoulders when it delegated to him both the responsibility for the supervision of the Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation projects in areas adjacent to reservation lands. But Congress chose to do this, and it is simply unrealistic to suggest that the Government may not perform its obligation to represent Indian tribes in litigation when Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as well. In this regard, the Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's consent. The Government does not "compromise" its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to represent by the mere fact that it simultaneously performs another task for another interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do.With these observations in mind, we turn to the principles of res judicata that we think are involved in this case.IIIRecent cases in which we have discussed principles of estoppel by judgment include Federated Department Stores, Page 463 U. S. 129 Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147 (1979). But what we said with respect to this doctrine more than 80 years ago is still true today; it ensures"the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if . . . conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals."Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 168 U. S. 49 (1897). [Footnote 10]Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that, when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case,"[i]t is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, Page 463 U. S. 130 concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose."Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 94 U. S. 352 (1877). The final "judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever." Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 333 U. S. 597 (1948). See Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 308 U. S. 375, 308 U. S. 378 (1940). [Footnote 11]To determine the applicability of res judicata to the facts before us, we must decide first if the "cause of action" which the Government now seeks to assert is the "same cause of action" that was asserted in Orr Ditch; we must then decide whether the parties in the instant proceeding are identical to or in privity with the parties in Orr Ditch. We address these questions in turn.ADefinitions of what constitutes the "same cause of action" have not remained static over time. Compare Restatement of Judgments § 61 (1942) with Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). [Footnote 12] See generally 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas, & Page 463 U. S. 131 T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice � 0.410[1], pp. 348-363 (1983). We find it unnecessary in these cases to parse any minute differences which these differing tests might produce, because, whatever standard may be applied, the only conclusion allowed by the record in the Orr Ditch case is that the Government was given an opportunity to litigate the Reservation's entire water rights to the Truckee, and that the Government intended to take advantage of that opportunity.In its amended complaint in Orr Ditch, the Government averred:"Until the several rights of the various claimants, parties hereto, including the United States, to the use of the Page 463 U. S. 132 waters flowing in said river and its said tributaries in Nevada or used in Nevada have been settled, and the extent, nature, and order in time of each right to divert said waters from said river and its tributaries has been judicially determined the United States cannot properly protect its rights in and to the said waters, and to protect said rights otherwise than as herein sought if they could be protected would necessitate a multiplicity of suits."Nevada App. 10a. The final decree in Orr Ditch clearly shows that the parties to the settlement agreement and the District Court intended to accomplish this purpose. The decree provided in part:"The parties, persons, corporations, intervenors, grantees, successors in interest and substituted parties hereinbefore named, and their and each of their servants, agents, attorneys, assigns and all persons claiming by, through or under them and their successors, in or to the water rights or lands herein mentioned or described, are and each of them is hereby forever enjoined and restrained from asserting or claiming any rights in or to the waters of the Truckee River or its tributaries, or the waters of any of the creeks or streams or other waters hereinbefore mentioned except the rights, specified, determined and allowed by this decree. . . ."Nevada App. 145a (emphasis added).We need not, however, stop here. For evidence more directly showing the Government's intention to assert in Orr Ditch the Reservation's full water rights, we return to the amended complaint, where it was alleged:"16. On or about or prior to the 29th day of November, 1859, the Government of the United States, having for a long time previous thereto recognized the fact that certain Pah Ute and other Indians were, and they and Page 463 U. S. 133 their ancestors had for many years been, residing upon and using certain lands in the northern part of the said Truckee River Valley and around said Pyramid Lake . . . and the said Government being desirous of protecting said Indians and their descendants in their homes, fields, pastures, fishing, and their use of said lands and waters, and in affording to them an opportunity to acquire the art of husbandry and other arts of civilization, and to become civilized, did reserve said lands from any and all forms of entry or sale and for the sole use of said Indians, and for their benefit and civilization. On, to-wit, the 23d day of March, 1874, the said lands, having been previously surveyed, were by order of the then President of the United States, for the purposes aforesaid, withdrawn from sale or other disposition, and set apart for the Pah Ute and other Indians aforesaid.""* * * *" "The United States by setting aside said lands for said purposes and creating said reservation, and by virtue of the matters and things in this paragraph set forth, did on, to-wit, the 29th day of November, 1859, reserve from further appropriation, appropriate and set aside for its own use in, on, and about said Indian reservation, and the land thereof, from and of the waters of the said Truckee River, five hundred (500) cubic feet of water per second of time."Nevada App. 6a-8a. This cannot be construed as anything less than a claim for the full "implied-reservation-of-water" rights that were due the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation.This conclusion is fortified by comparing the Orr Ditch complaint with the complaint filed in the proceedings below where, for example, the Government alleged:"Members of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians have lived on the shores of Pyramid Lake from time Page 463 U. S. 134 immemorial. . . . They have relied upon water from the Truckee River for irrigation, for domestic uses, for maintenance of the lower segment of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for lake fish and for maintenance of the lake as a viable fishery.""* * * *" "In establishing the Pyramid Lake Reservation in 1859, there was, by implication, reserved for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake Indians sufficient water from the Truckee River for the maintenance and preservation of Pyramid Lake, for the maintenance of the lower reaches of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for fish and the other needs of the inhabitants of the Reservation such as irrigation and domestic use."Nevada App. 153a-154a. While the Government focuses more specifically on the Tribe's reliance on fishing in this later complaint, it seems quite clear to us that they are asserting the same reserved right for purposes of "fishing" and maintenance of "lands and waters" that was asserted in Orr Ditch. [Footnote 13]BHaving decided that the cause of action asserted below is the same cause of action asserted in the Orr Ditch litigation, Page 463 U. S. 135 we must next determine which of the parties before us are bound by the earlier decree. As stated earlier, the general rule is that a prior judgment will bar the "parties" to the earlier lawsuit, "and those in privity with them," from relitigating the cause of action. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. at 94 U. S. 352.There is no doubt but that the United States was a party to the Orr Ditch proceeding, acting as a representative for the Reservation's interests and the interests of the Newlands Project, and cannot relitigate the Reservation's "implied-reservation-of-water" rights with those who can use the Orr Ditch decree as a defense. See United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U. S. 472, 265 U. S. 482-486 (1924). We also hold that the Tribe, whose interests were represented in Orr Ditch by the United States, can be bound by the Orr Ditch decree. [Footnote 14] This Court left little room for an argument to the contrary in Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), where it plainly said that"it could not, consistently with any principle, be tolerated that, after the United States on behalf of its wards had invoked the jurisdiction of its courts . . . these wards should themselves be permitted to relitigate the question."Id. at 224 U. S. 446. See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41(1)(d) (1982). We reaffirm that principle now. [Footnote 15] Page 463 U. S. 136We then turn to the issue of which defendants in the present litigation can use the Orr Ditch decree against the Government and the Tribe. There is no dispute but that the Orr Ditch defendants were parties to the earlier decree and Page 463 U. S. 137 that they and their successors can rely on the decree. The Court of Appeals so held, and we affirm.The Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion concerning TCID and the Project farmers that it now represents. The Court of Appeals conceded that the Project's interests, Page 463 U. S. 138 like the Reservation's interests, were represented in Orr Ditch by the United States, and thus that TCID, like the Tribe, stands with respect to that litigation in privity with the United States. The court further stated, however, that, "[a]s a general matter, a judgment does not conclude parties who were not adversaries under the pleadings," and that, in "representative litigation, we should be especially careful not to infer adversity between interests represented by a single litigant." 649 F.2d at 1309. Since the pleadings in Orr Ditch did not specifically allege adversity between the claims asserted on behalf of the Newlands Project and those asserted on behalf of the Reservation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decree did not conclude the dispute between them.At the commencement of the Orr Ditch litigation, the United States sought water rights both for the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and for the irrigation of lands in the Newlands Project. It was obviously not "adverse" to itself in seeking these two separate allocations of water rights, and even if we were to treat the Paiute Tribe and the beneficial Page 463 U. S. 139 owners of water rights within the Project as being in privity with the Government, it might be that in a different kind of litigation the res judicata consequences would be different. But as the Court of Appeals noted:"A strict adversity requirement does not necessarily fit the realities of water adjudications. All parties' water rights are interdependent. See Frost v. Alturas, 11 Idaho 294, 81 P. 996, 998 (1905); Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights at 277. Stability in water rights therefore requires that all parties be bound in all combinations. Further, in many water adjudications, there is no actual controversy between the parties; the proceedings may serve primarily an administrative purpose."649 F.2d at 1309.We agree with these observations of the Court of Appeals. That court felt, however, that these factors did not control these cases, because the"Tribe and the Project were neither parties nor co-parties, however. They were non-parties who were represented simultaneously by the same government attorneys."Ibid. We disagree with the Court of Appeals as to the consequence of this fact.It has been held that the successors in interest of parties who are not adversaries in a stream adjudication nevertheless are bound by a decree establishing priority of rights in the stream. See, e.g., Morgan v. Udy, 58 Idaho 670, 79 P.2d 295 (1938). In that case, the Idaho court said:"'[I]n the settlement of cases of this character, every user of water on the stream and all of its tributaries in litigation are interested in the final award to each claimant. . . . Every claimant of the water of either stream, it matters not whether it be at the upper or lower end of either, or after the junction of the two, is interested in a final adjudication of all the claimants of all the waters that flow to the claimants at the lower end of the stream Page 463 U. S. 140 after its junction. In other words, . . . it matters but little who are plaintiffs and who are defendants in the settlement of cases of this character; the real issue being who is first in right to the use of the waters in dispute.'"Id. at 681, 79 P.2d at 299.This rule seems to be generally applied in stream adjudications in the Western States, where these actions play a critical role in determining the allocation of scarce water rights, and where each water rights claim, by its"very nature, raise[s] issues inter se as to all such parties, for the determination of one claim necessarily affects the amount available for the other claims. Marlett v. Prosser, 1919, 66 Colo. 91, 179 P. 141, 142."City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 180 P.2d 699, 715 (Cal.App.1947). See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 52 Nev. 279, 296-297, 286 P. 120, 123 (1930); In re Chewaucan River, 89 Ore. 659, 666, 171 P. 402, 403-404 (1918). See also 6 Waters and Water Rights § 513.2, p. 304 (R. Clark ed.1972 and Supp.1978).In these cases, as we have noted, the Government, as a single entity, brought the action seeking a determination both of the Tribe's reserved rights and of the water rights necessary for the irrigation of land within the Newlands Project. But it separately pleaded the interests of both the Project and the Reservation. During the settlement negotiations, the interests of the Project, and presumably of the landowners to whom the water rights actually accrued, were represented by the newly formed TCID, and the interests of the Reservation were represented by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The settlement agreement was signed by the Government and by TCID. It would seem that, at this stage of the litigation, the interests of the Tribe and TCID were sufficiently adverse for the latter to oppose the Bureau's claim for additional water rights for the Reservation during the settlement negotiations.The Court of Appeals held, however, that,"in representative litigation, we should be especially careful not to infer adversity Page 463 U. S. 141 between interests represented by a single litigant,"649 F.2d at 1309, analogizing the Government's position to that of a trustee under the traditional law of trusts. But as we have indicated previously, we do not believe that this analogy from the world of private law may be bodily transposed to the present situation.The Court of Appeals went on to conclude:"By representing the Tribe and the Project against the Orr Ditch defendants, the government compromised its duty of undivided loyalty to the Tribe. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, supra, § 170, & Comments p, q, r."Id. at 1310. This section of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) is entitled "Duty of Loyalty," and states that "(1) the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." Comments p, q, and r deal, respectively, with "[c]ompetition with the beneficiary," "[a]ction in the interest of a third person," and "[d]uty of trustee under separate trusts."As we previously intimated, we think the Court of Appeals' reasoning here runs aground because the Government is simply not in the position of a private litigant or a private party under traditional rules of common law or statute. Our cases make this plain in numerous areas of the law. See United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426, 337 U. S. 431-432 (1949); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 243 U. S. 409 (1917). In the latter case, the Court said:"As a general rule, laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the Government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. . . . A suit by the United States to enforce and maintain its policy respecting lands which it holds in trust for all the people stands upon a different plane in this and some other respects from the ordinary private suit to regain the title to real property or to remove a cloud from it."Ibid. Page 463 U. S. 142 And in the very area of the law with which we deal in these cases, this Court said in Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. at 224 U. S. 444-445:"There can be no more complete representation than that on the part of the United States in acting on behalf of these dependents -- whom Congress, with respect to the restricted lands, has not yet released from tutelage. Its efficacy does not depend on the Indian's acquiescence. It does not rest upon convention, nor is it circumscribed by rules which govern private relations. It is a representation which traces its source to the plenary control of Congress in legislating for the protection of the Indians under its care, and it recognizes no limitations that are inconsistent with the discharge of the national duty."These cases, we believe, point the way to the correct resolution of the instant cases. The United States undoubtedly owes a strong fiduciary duty to its Indian wards. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 296-297; Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476, 299 U. S. 497-498 (1937). It may be that, where only a relationship between the Government and the tribe is involved, the law respecting obligations between a trustee and a beneficiary in private litigation will in many, if not all, respects adequately describe the duty of the United States. But where Congress has imposed upon the United States, in addition to its duty to represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water rights for reclamation projects, and has even authorized the inclusion of reservation lands within a project, the analogy of a faithless private fiduciary cannot be controlling for purposes of evaluating the authority of the United States to represent different interests.At least by 1926, when TCID came into being, and very likely long before, when conveyances of the public domain to settlers within the Reclamation Project necessarily carried with them the beneficial right to appropriate water reserved to the Government for this purpose, third parties entered Page 463 U. S. 143 into the picture. The legal relationships were no longer simply those between the United States and the Paiute Tribe, but also those between the United States, TCID, and the several thousand settlers within the Project who put the Project water to beneficial use. We find it unnecessary to decide whether there would be adversity of interests between the Tribe, on the one hand, and the settlers and TCID, on the other, if the issue were to be governed by private law respecting trusts. We hold that, under the circumstances described above, the interests of the Tribe and the Project landowners were sufficiently adverse so that both are now bound by the final decree entered in the Orr Ditch suit.We turn finally to those defendants below who appropriated water from the Truckee subsequent to the Orr Ditch decree. These defendants, we believe, give rise to a difficult question, but, in the final analysis, we agree with the Court of Appeals that they too can use the Orr Ditch decree against the plaintiffs below. While mutuality has been for the most part abandoned in cases involving collateral estoppel, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971), it has remained a part of the doctrine of res judicata. Nevertheless, exceptions to the res judicata mutuality requirement have been found necessary, see 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4464, pp. 586-588 (1981 and Supp.1982), and we believe that such an exception is required in these cases.Orr Ditch was an equitable action to quiet title, an in personam action. But as the Court of Appeals determined, it "was no garden variety quiet title action." 649 F.2d at 1308. As we have already explained, everyone involved in Orr Ditch contemplated a comprehensive adjudication of water rights intended to settle once and for all the question of how much of the Truckee River each of the litigants was entitled to. Thus, even though quiet title actions are in Page 463 U. S. 144 personam actions, water adjudications are more in the nature of in rem proceedings. Nonparties such as the subsequent appropriators in these cases have relied just as much on the Orr Ditch decree in participating in the development of western Nevada as have the parties of that case. We agree with the Court of Appeals that under "these circumstances it would be manifestly unjust . . . not to permit subsequent appropriators" to hold the Reservation to the claims it made in Orr Ditch; "[a]ny other conclusion would make it impossible ever finally to quantify a reserved water right." 649 F.2d at 1309. [Footnote 16] Page 463 U. S. 145IVIn conclusion, we affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that the cause of action asserted below and the cause of action asserted in Orr Ditch are one and the same. We also affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that the Orr Ditch decree concluded the controversy on this cause of action between, on the one hand, the Orr Ditch defendants, their successors in interest, and subsequent appropriators of the Truckee River, and, on the other hand, the United States and the Tribe. We reverse the Court of Appeals, however, with respect to its finding concerning TCID, and the Project farmers it represents, and hold instead that the Orr Ditch decree also ended the dispute raised between these parties and the plaintiffs below.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtNevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983)Nevada v. United StatesNo. 81-2245Argued April 27, 1983Decided June 24, 1983*463 U.S. 110SyllabusIn 1913, the United States sued in Federal District Court, in what is known as the Orr Ditch litigation, to adjudicate water rights to the Truckee River for the benefit of both the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation (Reservation) and the Newlands Reclamation Project (Project). Named as defendants were all water users on the Truckee River in Nevada. Eventually, in 1944, the District Court entered a final decree, pursuant to a settlement agreement, awarding various water rights to the Reservation and the Project, which by this time was now under the management of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID). In 1973, the United States filed the present action in the same District Court on behalf of the Reservation, seeking additional rights to the Truckee River, and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (Tribe) was permitted to intervene in support of the United States. Named as defendants were all persons presently claiming water rights to the Truckee River and its tributaries in Nevada, including the defendants in the Orr Ditch litigation and their successors, individual farmers who owned land in the Project, and the TCID. The defendants asserted res judicata as an affirmative defense, claiming that the United States and the Tribe were precluded by the Orr Ditch decree from litigating the asserted claim. The District Court sustained the defense and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Orr Ditch decree concluded the dispute between, on the one hand, the Orr Ditch defendants, their successors in interest, and subsequent appropriators of the Truckee River, and, on the other hand, the United States and the Tribe, but not the dispute between the Tribe and the Project landowners. The court found that, since neither the Tribe nor the Project landowners were parties in Orr Ditch, but instead were represented by the United States, and since their interests may have conflicted in that proceeding, it could not be found that the United States had intended to bind these nonparties inter se, absent a specific statement of adversity in the pleadings. Page 463 U. S. 111Held: Res judicata prevents the United States and the Tribe from litigating the instant claim. Pp. 463 U. S. 121-145.(a) Where the Government represented the Project landowners in Orr Ditch, the landowners, not the Government, received the beneficial interest in the water rights confirmed to the Government. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589. Therefore, the Government is not at liberty to simply reallocate the water rights decreed to the Reservation and the Project as if it owned those rights. Pp. 463 U. S. 121-128.(b) The cause of action asserted below is the same cause of action that was asserted in the Orr Ditch case. The record in that case, including the final decree and amended complaint, clearly shows that the Government was given an opportunity to litigate the Reservation's entire water rights to the Truckee River, and that the Government intended to take advantage of that opportunity. Pp. 463 U. S. 130-134.(c) All of the parties below are bound by the Orr Ditch decree. The United States, as a party to the Orr Ditch litigation acting as a representative for the interests of the Reservation and the Project, cannot relitigate the Reservation's water rights with those who could use the Orr Ditch decree as a defense. The Tribe, whose interests were represented in Orr Ditch by the United States, also is bound by the Orr Ditch decree, as are the Orr Ditch defendants and their successors. Moreover, under circumstances where, after the Orr Ditch litigation was commenced, the legal relationships were no longer simply those between the United States and the Tribe, but were also those between the United States, TCID, and the Project landowners, the interests of the Tribe and the Project landowners were sufficiently adverse so that both are now bound by the Orr Ditch decree. It need not be determined what the effect of the Government's representation of different interests would be under the law of private trustees and fiduciaries, for that law does not apply where Congress has decreed that the Government have dual responsibilities. The Government does not "compromise" its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to represent when it simultaneously performs another task for another interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do. And as to the defendants below who appropriated water from the Truckee River subsequent to the Orr Ditch decree, they too, as a necessary exception to the res judicata mutuality requirement, can use that decree against the plaintiffs below. These defendants have relied just as much on that decree in participating in the development of western Nevada as have the parties in the Orr Ditch case, and any other conclusion would make it impossible finally to quantify a reserved water right. Pp. 463 U. S. 134-144.649 F.2d 1286 and 666 F.2d 351, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Page 463 U. S. 112REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 463 U. S. 145. Page 463 U. S. 113 |
3,219 | 1986_85-2116 | JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.This case requires that we reconsider the holding of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), that federal courts Page 483 U. S. 221 have no power to order the Governor of a State to fulfill the State's obligation under the Extradition Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, to deliver up fugitives from justice.IOn January 25, 1981, respondent Ronald Calder, then a civilian air traffic controller employed by the Federal Aviation Administration in San Juan, Puerto Rico, struck two people with his automobile. One of the victims, Antonio de Jesus Gonzalez, was injured; his wife, Army Villalba, was killed. Villalba was eight months pregnant; her unborn child did not survive. App. 3a. The incident occurred in the parking lot of a grocery store in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, after what was apparently an altercation between Calder and De Jesus Gonzalez. According to two sworn statements taken by police, one from De Jesus Gonzalez and one from a witness to the incident, after striking the couple, Calder backed his car two or three times over the prostrate body of Villalba. App. to Pet for Cert. A34-A41.On the basis of these statements, Calder was arrested, charged with homicide, arraigned before a municipal judge, and released on $5,000 bail. On February 4, 1981, Calder was arraigned before a District Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder. Calder failed to appear at a preliminary hearing on March 4, 1981, and bail was increased to $50,000. Despite representations by counsel that Calder would appear at a preliminary hearing on April 13, 1981, he did not do so. At that time, Calder was declared a fugitive from justice, and bail was increased to $300,000. The Puerto Rican police, having reason to believe that Calder had left Puerto Rico and returned to his family's home in Iowa, notified local authorities in Iowa that Calder was a fugitive wanted in Puerto Rico on murder charges. On April 24, 1981, Calder surrendered Page 483 U. S. 222 to local authorities in Polk County, Iowa, posted the $20,000 bond set by an Iowa Magistrate, and was released. Id. at A18-A19.On May 15, 1981, the Governor of Puerto Rico submitted to the Governor of Iowa a request for Calder's extradition. The requesting papers included the arrest warrant, the fugitive resolution, the charging documents, and three sworn statements of witnesses, including one in which the affiant identified a photograph of Calder as depicting the driver of the car. Counsel for Calder requested that the Governor of Iowa hold an extradition hearing, which was conducted by the Governor's counsel on June 17, 1981. Id. at A19. This hearing was only partially transcribed, but the record does show that one of Calder's counsel was permitted to testify to his belief that "a white American man . . . could not receive a fair trial in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico," App. 32a, while Calder himself testified to his understanding that, "on numerous occasions," witnesses in Puerto Rican courts had been "bought." Id. at 47a.After the extradition hearing in Iowa, discussions between and among Calder's counsel, the Governors of Iowa and Puerto Rico, and the prosecutorial authorities in Puerto Rico were held, apparently with a view to negotiating a reduction of the charges lodged against Calder. These discussions were unavailing, and on December 28, 1981, Iowa's Governor, Robert Ray, formally notified the Governor of Puerto Rico that, in the absence of a "change to a more realistic charge," the request for extradition was denied. App. to Pet. for Cert. A44. A subsequent extradition request made to Governor Ray's successor in office, respondent Terry Branstad, was also denied. Id. at A21.On February 15, 1984, petitioner Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against respondents Governor Page 483 U. S. 223 Branstad and the State of Iowa, [Footnote 1] seeking a declaration that failure to deliver Calder upon presentation of proper extradition papers violated the Extradition Clause and the Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (Act). [Footnote 2] The complaint further requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent Branstad to perform the "ministerial duty" of extradition. App. 7a-8a. Respondents stipulated before the District Court that the extradition papers fully complied with the requirements of the Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. A20. The District Court dismissed the complaint, agreeing with respondents that this Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), absolutely barred any attempt to invoke federal judicial authority to compel compliance with the Clause or the Act. Civil No. 84-126-E (SD Iowa, May 22, 1985), App. to Pet. for Cert. A10. The Court of Appeals "[r]eluctantly" affirmed. 787 F.2d 423, 424 (CA8 1986). Page 483 U. S. 224 We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 811 (1986), to consider whether the propositions concerning the limitation of federal judicial power stated in Kentucky v. Dennison in 1861 retain their validity today. We reverse.IIAKentucky v. Dennison was an action brought under this Court's original jurisdiction to compel by writ of mandamus the extradition of a fugitive felon. The grand jury of Woodford County, Kentucky, returned an indictment in October, 1859 charging Willis Lago, a "free man of color," with the crime of assisting the escape of a slave. 24 How. at 65 U. S. 67. The defendant was a resident of Ohio, and papers requesting his extradition were served upon William Dennison, the Governor of that State. Dennison secured an opinion from Ohio's Attorney General, who took the view that the Extradition Clause [Footnote 3] covered only those acts which were crimes under the law of the asylum State, or which were "regarded as malum in se by the general judgment and conscience of civilized nations." Id. at 65 U. S. 69. [Footnote 4] On this basis Dennison refused extradition, and Kentucky brought its mandamus action in this Court.The case was heard in February 1861, and decided on March 14. On that date, secession was a fact, and civil war a threatening possibility. The Representatives of the States Page 483 U. S. 225 of the Deep South had withdrawn from the Congress. Justice Campbell was reputedly engaged in mediation efforts between the seceding States and the Lincoln administration, but his resignation from the Court and departure from Washington were imminent; he resigned on April 30, 1861. See 5 C. Swisher, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Taney Period 688-689 (1974). It was in these circumstances, with the practical power of the Federal Government at its lowest ebb since the adoption of the Constitution, that Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Court.The Court firmly rejected the position taken by Dennison and the Governors of other free States that the Extradition Clause required only the delivery of fugitives charged with acts which would be criminal by the law of the asylum State. "Under such a vague and indefinite construction," the Court said, "the article would not be a bond of peace and union, but a constant source of controversy and irritating discussion." 24 How. at 65 U. S. 102. Interpreting for the first time the language of the Clause, the Court looked to the fundamental role of the right to request extradition in binding the individual States into a nation:"Looking, therefore, to the words of the Constitution -- to the obvious policy and necessity of this provision to preserve harmony between States, and order and law within their respective borders . . . -- the conclusion is irresistible, that this compact engrafted in the Constitution included, and was intended to include, every offence made punishable by the law of the State in which it was committed, and that it gives the right to the Executive authority of the State to demand the fugitive from the Executive authority of the State in which he is found; that the right given to 'demand' implies that it is an absolute right; and it follows that there must be a correlative obligation to deliver, without any reference to the character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the State to which the fugitive has fled."Id. at 65 U. S. 103. Page 483 U. S. 226The Court then turned to the Extradition Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302. In the procedures for the regulation of extradition established by that Act, the Court found the same absolute right to demand and correlative obligation to deliver. As to the Governor of the asylum State under the Act, the Court determined that"[t]he duty which he is to perform is . . . merely ministerial -- that is, to cause the party to be arrested, and delivered to the agent or authority of the State where the crime was committed."24 How. at 65 U. S. 106. But the Court concluded that "the words it shall be the duty' were not used as mandatory and compulsory, but as declaratory of the moral duty" created by the Constitution. Id. at 65 U. S. 107. Such a construction was necessary, in the Court's view, to avoid constitutional infirmity."The act does not provide any means to compel the execution of this duty, nor inflict any punishment for neglect or refusal on the part of the Executive of the State; nor is there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the Government of the United States with this power. Indeed, such a power would place every State under the control and dominion of the General Government, even in the administration of its internal concerns and reserved rights. And we think it clear that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it."Ibid.BThus, for over 125 years, Kentucky v. Dennison has stood for two propositions: first, that the Extradition Clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand; and second, that the federal courts have no authority under the Constitution to compel performance of this ministerial duty of delivery. As to the first of these conclusions, the passage of time has revealed no occasion for doubt. The language of the Clause is "clear and explicit." Michigan v. Page 483 U. S. 227 Doran, 439 U. S. 282, 439 U. S. 286 (1978). Its mandatory language furthers its intended purposes: "to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed," and "to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state." Id. at 439 U. S. 287; see Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U. S. 128, 245 U. S. 132-133 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 203 U. S. 227 (1906). The Framers of the Constitution perceived that the frustration of these objectives would create a serious impediment to national unity, and the Extradition Clause responds to that perception."It would have been far better to omit it altogether, and to have left it to the comity of the States, and their own sense of their respective interests, than to have inserted it as conferring a right, and yet defining that right so loosely as to make it a never-failing subject of dispute and ill-will."Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. at 65 U. S. 102. We reaffirm the conclusion that the commands of the Extradition Clause are mandatory, and afford no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum State. See California v. Superior Court of California, 482 U. S. 400, 482 U. S. 405-406 (1987).The second, and dispositive, holding of Kentucky v. Dennison rests upon a foundation with which time and the currents of constitutional change have dealt much less favorably. If it seemed clear to the Court in 1861, facing the looming shadow of a Civil War, that"the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it,"24 How. at 65 U. S. 107, basic constitutional principles now point as clearly the other way. Within 15 years of the decision in Dennison, it was said that,"when a plain official duty, requiring no exercise of discretion, is to be performed, and performance is refused, any person who will sustain personal injury by such refusal may have a mandamus to compel its performance,"and it was no objection that such an order might be sought in the federal courts against a state officer. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 92 U. S. 541 (1876). Page 483 U. S. 228 It has long been a settled principle that federal courts may enjoin unconstitutional action by state officials. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 209 U. S. 155-156 (1908). It would be superfluous to restate all the occasions on which this Court has imposed upon state officials a duty to obey the requirements of the Constitution, or compelled the performance of such duties; it may suffice to refer to Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). The fundamental premise of the holding in Dennison --"that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns -- is not representative of the law today."FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 456 U. S. 761 (1982).Yet, with respect to extradition, the law has remained as it was more than a century ago. Considered de novo, there is no justification for distinguishing the duty to deliver fugitives from the many other species of constitutional duty enforceable in the federal courts. Indeed, the nature of the obligation here is such as to avoid many of the problems with which federal courts must cope in other circumstances. That this is a ministerial duty precludes conflict with essentially discretionary elements of state governance, and eliminates the need for continuing federal supervision of state functions. The explicit and long-settled nature of the command, contained in a constitutional provision and a statute substantially unchanged for 200 years, eliminates the possibility that state officers will be subjected to inconsistent direction. Because the duty is directly imposed upon the States by the Constitution itself, there can be no need to weigh the performance of the federal obligation against the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment.Respondents contend, however, that an "executive common law" of extradition has developed through the efforts of Governors to employ the discretion accorded them under Dennison, and that this "common law" provides a superior alternative to the "ministerial duty" to extradite provided for by the Constitution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. Even assuming Page 483 U. S. 229 the existence of this tradition of "executive common law," no weight can be accorded to it. Long continuation of decisional law or administrative practice incompatible with the requirements of the Constitution cannot overcome our responsibility to enforce those requirements. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968). Though not articulated in these terms, respondents' argument is, in essence, a request that we reconsider our construction of the Extradition Clause to establish, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, a discretion which has hitherto been exercised solely because the Constitution's explicit command has gone unenforced. This, for the reasons previously stated, we decline to do.CRespondents further contend that, even if the holding in Kentucky v. Dennison cannot withstand contemporary scrutiny, petitioner would not profit from its demise because Puerto Rico is not a State, and has no right to demand rendition of fugitives under the Extradition Clause. It is true that the words of the Clause apply only to "States," and we have never held that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is entitled to all the benefits conferred upon the States under the Constitution. We need not decide today what applicability the Extradition Clause may have to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, however, for the Extradition Act clearly applies. The Act requires rendition of fugitives at the request of a demanding "Territory," as well as State. It was decided long ago that Puerto Rico, as a Territory of the United States, could invoke the Act to reclaim fugitives from its justice, see New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U. S. 468 (1909), and respondents do not challenge the correctness of that holding. The subsequent change to Commonwealth status through legislation, see 64 Stat. 319, 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b-731d, did not remove from the Government of the Commonwealth any power to demand extradition which it had possessed as a Territory, for the intention of that legislation Page 483 U. S. 230 was "to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union." Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 426 U. S. 594 (1976). Since the Act applies to Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth may invoke the power of federal courts to enforce against state officers rights created by federal statutes, including equitable relief to compel performance of federal statutory duties. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980). Accordingly, Puerto Rico may predicate its mandamus action on the Act, without regard to the direct applicability of the Extradition Clause. [Footnote 5]IIIKentucky v. Dennison is the product of another time. The conception of the relation between the States and the Federal Government there announced is fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development. Yet this decision has stood while the world of which it was a part has passed away. We conclude that it may stand no longer. The decision of the Court of Appeals isReversed | U.S. Supreme CourtPuerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987)Puerto Rico v. BranstadNo. 85-2116Argued March 30, 1987Decided June 23, 1987482 U.S. 219SyllabusRespondent Ronald Calder, who had been released on bail after being arraigned in a Puerto Rico court on felony charges, was declared a fugitive from justice when he failed to appear at a preliminary hearing. Believing that Calder had returned to his family's home in Iowa, Puerto Rico officials notified local authorities in Iowa, and Calder surrendered. The Governor of Puerto Rico submitted to the Governor of Iowa a request for Calder's extradition. After a hearing conducted by the Governor's counsel, and after unsuccessful negotiations between officials of the two jurisdictions for a reduction of the charges against Calder, Iowa's Governor denied the extradition request. Puerto Rico then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking mandamus relief and a declaration that failure to deliver Calder upon presentation of proper extradition papers violated the Extradition Clause of the Federal Constitution and the Extradition Act. The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the holding in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, that federal courts have no power to order a Governor to fulfill the State's obligation under the Extradition Clause to deliver up fugitives from justice. The Court of Appeals affirmed.Held:1. Dennison's holding that the federal courts have no authority under the Constitution to compel performance by an asylum State of the mandatory, ministerial duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand can stand no longer. Pp. 483 U. S. 224-229.(a) When Dennison was decided in 1861, the practical power of the Federal Government was at its lowest ebb since the adoption of the Constitution. Secession of States from the Union was a fact, and civil war was a threatening possibility. Pp. 483 U. S. 224-225.(b) The other proposition for which Dennison stands -- that the Extradition Clause's commands are mandatory and afford no discretion to executive officers of the asylum State -- is reaffirmed. However, the Dennison holding as to the federal courts' authority to enforce the Extradition Clause rested on a fundamental premise -- that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns -- which is not representative of current law. It has long Page 483 U. S. 220 been a settled principle that federal courts may enjoin unconstitutional action by state officials. Considered de novo, there is no justification for distinguishing the duty to deliver fugitives from the many other species of constitutional duty enforceable in the federal courts. Because the duty is directly imposed upon the States by the Constitution itself, there is no need to weigh the performance of the federal obligation against the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. Even assuming, as respondents contend, that there is an "executive common law" of extradition, developed under Dennison, which provides a superior alternative to the "ministerial duty" to extradite provided for by the Constitution, no weight can be accorded to it. Long continuation of decisional law or administrative practice incompatible with the Constitution's requirements cannot overcome this Court's responsibility to enforce those requirements. Pp. 483 U. S. 226-229.2. It need not be determined what applicability the Extradition Clause, which refers only to "States," may have to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, since the Extradition Act clearly applies. Puerto Rico may predicate its mandamus action on the Act, without regard to the Clause's direct applicability. Pp. 483 U. S. 229-230.787 F.2d 423, reversed.MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, in Parts I, II-A, II-C, and III of which POWELL and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which POWELL, J., joined, post p. 483 U. S. 230. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post p. 483 U. S. 231. |
3,220 | 1995_95-244 | Syllabus(c) Applying Burford to this case, the federal interests are pronounced, as Allstate's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act implicates a substantial federal concern for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. With regard to the state interests, the case appears at first blush to present nothing more than a runof-the-mill contract dispute: The Commissioner seeks damages for Allstate's failure to perform its obligations under a reinsurance agreement. Pp.728-730.(d) To the extent the Ninth Circuit held only that a federal court cannot, under Burford, dismiss or remand an action when the relief sought is not discretionary, its judgment is consistent with this Court's abstention cases. The Commissioner appears to have conceded that the relief sought is neither equitable nor otherwise committed to the court's discretion. However, by limiting Burford abstention to equitable cases, the court applied a per se rule more rigid than this Court's precedents require. Since abstention principles are not completely inapplicable in damages actions, Burford might have supported an order to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the state court litigation on the setoff issue. Only the remand order which the Ninth Circuit entered is being reviewed, and, thus, it is not necessary to determine whether a more limited abstention-based stay order would have been warranted on the facts of this case. Pp. 730-731.47 F.3d 350, affirmed.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SCALIA, J., post, p. 731, and KENNEDY, J., post, p. 733, filed concurring opinions.Karl L. Rubinstein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dana Carli Brooks, Melissa S. Kooistra, William W Palmer, and David L. Shapiro.Donald Francis Donovan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Carl Micarelli, Joseph D. Lee, and James G. Sporleder. ** Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley filed a brief for the Council of State Governments et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Thomas W Rynard; for the National Association of Independent Insurers et al. by Charles Platto and Phillip Stano; and for the Reinsurance Association of America et al. by Maureen E. Mahoney.709JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.In this case, we consider whether an abstention-based remand order is appealable as a final order under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, and whether the abstention doctrine first recognized in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), can be applied in a common-law suit for damages.IPetitioner, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of California, was appointed trustee over the assets of the Mission Insurance Company and its affiliates (Mission companies) in 1987, after those companies were ordered into liquidation by a California court. In an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission companies, the Commissioner filed the instant action against respondent Allstate Insurance Company in state court, seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate's alleged breach of certain reinsurance agreements, as well as a general declaration of Allstate's obligations under those agreements.Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Commissioner sought remand to state court, arguing that the District Court should abstain from hearing the case under Burford, supra, because its resolution might interfere with California's regulation of the Mission insolvency. Specifically, the Commissioner indicated that Allstate would be asserting its right to set off its own contract claims against the Commissioner's recovery under the contract, that the viability of these setoff claims was a hotly disputed question of state law, and that this question was currently pending before the state courts in another case arising out of the Mission insolvency.The District Court observed that "California has an overriding interest in regulating insurance insolvencies and liquidations in a uniform and orderly manner," and that in this710case "this important state interest could be undermined by inconsistent rulings from the federal and state courts." App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. Based on these observations, and its determination that the setoff question should be resolved in state court, the District Court concluded this case was an appropriate one for the exercise of Burford abstention. The District Court did not stay its hand pending the California courts' resolution of the setoff issue, but instead remanded the entire case to state court. The District Court entered this remand order without ruling on Allstate's motion to compel arbitration.After determining that appellate review of the District Court's remand order was not barred by 28 U. s. C. § 1447(d), see Garamendi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 352 (CA9 1995) (citing Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976)), and that the remand order was appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 as a final collateral order, see 47 F. 3d, at 353-354 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983)), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. The Ninth Circuit concluded that federal courts can abstain from hearing a case under Burford only when the relief being sought is equitable in nature, and therefore held that abstention was inappropriate in this case because the Commissioner purported to be seeking only legal relief. 47 F. 3d, at 354-356; App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-37a (order denying petition for rehearing because Commissioner had waived any argument that this case involved a request for equitable relief).The Ninth Circuit's holding that abstention-based remand orders are appealable conflicts with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, see Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856, 865 (CA1 1993) (order not appealable); Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co., Ltd., 842 F.2d 31, 34 (CA2 1988) (same); In re Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., 54 F.3d 475, 477,711n. 7 (CA8 1995) (same); but see Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F. 3d 590, 593 (CA2 1994) (order appealable under collateral order doctrine), as does its determination that Burford abstention can only be exercised in cases in which equitable relief is sought, see Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 1033, 1045 (CA3 1988) (Burford abstention appropriate in case seeking declaratory relief); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1192, n. 17 (CA4 1988) (Burford abstention appropriate in action for damages); Wolfson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 141, 147 (CA8 1995) (same); but see Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 882 (CA1 1993) (federal court can abstain under Burford only if it is "sitting in equity"); University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 272 (CA3 1991) (same); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives v. Farmer's Cheese Cooperative, 583 F.2d 104, 111 (CA3 1978) (same). We granted certiorari to resolve these conflicts, 516 U. S. 929 (1995), and now affirm on grounds different from those provided by the Ninth Circuit.IIWe first consider whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear Allstate's appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which confers jurisdiction over appeals from "final decisions" of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d), which provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."We agree with the Ninth Circuit and the parties that § 1447(d) interposes no bar to appellate review of the remand order at issue in this case. See 47 F. 3d, at 352; Brief for Petitioner 29-30; Brief for Respondent 13-14, n. 12. As we held in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, supra, at 345-346, and reiterated this Term in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127 (1995), "§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so712that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d)." This gloss renders § 1447(d) inapplicable here: The District Court's abstentionbased remand order does not fall into either category of remand order described in § 1447(c), as it is not based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in removal procedure.Finding no affirmative bar to appellate review of the District Court's remand order, we must determine whether that review may be obtained by appeal under § 1291. The general rule is that "a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated." Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we have held that a decision is ordinarily considered final and appealable under § 1291 only if it "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945); see also Digital, supra, at 867 (quoting this standard). We have also recognized, however, a narrow class of collateral orders which do not meet this definition of finality, but which are nevertheless immediately appealable under § 1291 because they" 'conclusively determine [a] disputed question'" that is " 'completely separate from the merits of the action,'" "'effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,'" Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 431 (1985) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)), and "too important to be denied review," Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949).The application of these principles to the appealability of the remand order before us is controlled by our decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., supra. The District Court in that case entered an order under Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), staying a federal diversity suit713pending the completion of a declaratory judgment action that had been filed in state court. The Court of Appeals held that this stay order was appealable under § 1291, and we affirmed that determination on two independent grounds.We first concluded that the abstention-based stay order was appealable as a "final decision" under § 1291 because it put the litigants" 'effectively out of court,'" 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713, 715, n. 2 (1962) (per curiam)), and because its effect was "precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court," 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11. These standards do not reflect our oft-repeated definition of finality, see supra, at 712 (citing Catlin, supra, at 233); see, e. g., Digital, supra, at 867 (citing the Catlin definition); Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 497 (1989) (same); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 521-522 (1988) (same), but in Moses H. Cone we found their application to be compelled by precedent, see 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11 ("Idlewild's reasoning is limited to cases where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar doctrine) the object of the stay is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state forum").As an alternative to this reliance on Idlewild, we also held that the stay order at issue in Moses H. Cone was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 460 U. S., at 11. We determined that a stay order based on the Colorado River doctrine "presents an important issue separate from the merits" because it "amounts to a refusal to adjudicate" the case in federal court; that such orders could not be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the federal action because the district court would be bound, as a matter of res judicata, to honor the state court's judgment; and that unlike other stay orders, which might readily be reconsidered by the district court, abstention-based stay orders of this ilk are "conclusive" because they are the practical equivalent of an order dismissing the case. 460 U. S., at 12.714The District Court's order remanding on grounds of Burford abstention is in all relevant respects indistinguishable from the stay order we found to be appealable in Moses H. Cone. No less than an order staying a federal court action pending adjudication of the dispute in state court, it puts the litigants in this case" 'effectively out of court,'" Moses H. Cone, supra, at 11, n. 11 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, supra, at 715, n. 2), and its effect is "precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court," 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11. Indeed, the remand order is clearly more "final" than a stay order in this sense. When a district court remands a case to a state court, the district court disassociates itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court's docket.The District Court's order is also indistinguishable from the stay order we considered in Moses H. Cone in that it conclusively determines an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism. See infra, at 716-717, 727-728. In addition, the rights asserted on appeal from the District Court's abstention decision are, in our view, sufficiently important to warrant an immediate appeal. See infra, at 716, 723-728 (describing interests weighed in decision to abstain under Burford); cf. Digital, 511 U. S., at 878 (review under collateral order doctrine limited to those issues" 'too important to be denied review''') (quoting Cohen, supra, at 546). And, like the stay order we found appealable in Moses H. Cone, the District Court's remand order in this case will not be subsumed in any other appealable order entered by the District Court.We have previously stated that "an order remanding a removed action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal." Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S., at 352-353. Petitioner asks that we adhere to that statement and hold that appellate review of the District715Court's remand order can only be obtained through a petition for writ of mandamus. To the extent Thermtron would require us to ignore the implications of our later holding in Moses H. Cone, however, we disavow it. Thermtron's determination that remand orders are not reviewable "final judgments" doubtless was necessary to the resolution of that case, see 423 U. S., at 352 (posing the question whether mandamus was the appropriate vehicle), but our principal concern in Thermtron was the interpretation of the bar to appellate review embodied in 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d), see supra, at 711-712, and our statement concerning the appropriate procedural vehicle for reviewing a district court's remand order was peripheral to that concern. Moreover, the parties in Thermtron did not brief the question, our opinion does not refer to Catlin or its definition of "final decisions," and our opinion nowhere addresses whether any class of remand order might be appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Indeed, the only support Thermtron cites for the proposition that remand orders are reviewable only by mandamus, not by appeal, is Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 23 Wall. 507 (1875), the superannuated reasoning of which is of little vitality today, compare id., at 508 (deeming a "writ of error to review what has been done" an inappropriate vehicle for reviewing a court of appeals' "refusal to hear and decide"), with Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 10-11, n. 11 (holding that a stay order is appealable because it amounts to a refusal to hear and decide a case).Admittedly, remand orders like the one entered in this case do not meet the traditional definition of finality-they do not "en[d] the litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment," Catlin, 324 U. S., at 233. But because the District Court's remand order is functionally indistinguishable from the stay order we found appealable in Moses H. Cone, see supra, at 714, we conclude that it is appealable, and turn to the merits of the Ninth Circuit's decision respecting Burford abstention.716III AWe have often acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress. See, e. g., Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 821 ("[F]ederal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them' "); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415 (1964) (" 'When a federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction''') (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19,40 (1909)); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not"). This duty is not, however, absolute. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S. S., Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 422 (1932) ("[T]he proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true"). Indeed, we have held that federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise " 'exceptional circumstances,'" where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest, Colorado River, supra, at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185, 189 (1959)), for example, where abstention is warranted by considerations of "proper constitutional adjudication," "regard for federal-state relations," or "wise judicial administration," Colorado River, supra, at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted).We have thus held that federal courts have the power to refrain from hearing cases that would interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), or with certain types of state civil proceedings, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977); cases in which the resolution of a federal constitutional question might be obviated717if the state courts were given the opportunity to interpret ambiguous state law, see Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); cases raising issues "intimately involved with [the States'] sovereign prerogative," the proper adjudication of which might be impaired by unsettled questions of state law, see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25, 28 (1959); id., at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring); cases whose resolution by a federal court might unnecessarily interfere with a state system for the collection of taxes, see Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943); and cases which are duplicative of a pending state proceeding, see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935).Our longstanding application of these doctrines reflects "the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted," New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U. S. 350, 359 (1989) (NOPSI) (citing Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 570-577 (1985)). And, as the Ninth Circuit correctly indicated, 47 F. 3d, at 354, it has long been established that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it "is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity," Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). This tradition informs our understanding of the jurisdiction Congress has conferred upon the federal courts, and explains the development of our abstention doctrines. In Pullman, for example, we explained the principle underlying our abstention doctrines as follows:" ... The history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of the injunction .... Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction718with state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforcement of the criminal law, or the administration of a specialized scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, or the final authority of a state court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state. These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system, whereby the federal courts, 'exercising a wise discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary. This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers." 312 U. S., at 500-501 (citations omitted).Though we have thus located the power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts "sitting in equity," we have not treated abstention as a "technical rule of equity procedure." Thibodaux, supra, at 28. Rather, we have recognized that the authority of a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which the court has discretion to grant or deny relief. See NOPS!, supra, at 359 (mandate of federal jurisdiction "does not eliminate ... the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief"). Accordingly, we have not limited the application of the abstention doctrines to suits for injunctive relief, but have also required federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over certain classes of declaratory judgments, see, e. g., Huffman, 319 U. S., at 297 (federal court must abstain from hearing declaratory judgment action challenging constitutionality of a state tax); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 69-70, 72-73 (1971) (extending Younger abstention to declaratory judgment actions), the granting of which is generally committed to the courts' discretion, see Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U. S. 277, 282 (1995) (federal courts have "discretion in719determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites").Nevertheless, we have not previously addressed whether the principles underlying our abstention cases would support the remand or dismissal of a common-law action for damages. Cf. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193,202, and n. 6 (1988) (reserving the question whether Younger requires abstention in an action for damages); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992) (discussing, without applying, Burford abstention in damages action). To be sure, we held in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, supra, that a federal court should not entertain a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit for damages based on the enforcement of a state tax scheme, see 454 U. S., at 115, but we have subsequently indicated that Fair Assessment was a case about the scope of the § 1983 cause of action, see National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U. S. 582, 589-590 (1995), not the abstention doctrines. To the extent Fair Assessment does apply abstention principles, its holding is very limited. The damages action in that case was based on the unconstitutional application of a state tax law, and the award of damages turned first on a declaration that the state tax was in fact unconstitutional. We therefore drew an analogy to Huffman and other cases in which we had approved the application of abstention principles in declaratory judgment actions, and held that the federal court should decline to hear the action because "[t]he recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a 'declaration' or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation." Fair Assessment, supra, at 115.Otherwise, we have applied abstention principles to actions "at law" only to permit a federal court to enter a stay order that postpones adjudication of the dispute, not to dismiss the federal suit altogether. See, e. g., Thibodaux, supra, at 28-30 (approving stay order); Fornaris v. Ridge720Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 44 (1970) (per curiam) (directing District Court to "hold its hand until the Puerto Rican Supreme Court has authoritatively ruled on the local law question in light of the federal claims" (footnote omitted)) (emphasis added); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U. S. 134, 135-136 (1962) (per curiam) ("Wise judicial administration in this case counsels that decision of the federal question be deferred until the potentially controlling statelaw issue is authoritatively put to rest"); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U. S. 207, 212 (1960) (approving "postponement of decision" in damages suit).Our decisions in Thibodaux and County of Allegheny v.Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185 (1959), illustrate the distinction we have drawn between abstention-based remand orders or dismissals and abstention-based decisions merely to stay adjudication of a federal suit. In Thibodaux, a city in Louisiana brought an eminent domain proceeding in state court, seeking to condemn for public use certain property owned by a Florida corporation. After the corporation removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, the Federal District Court decided on its own motion to stay the case, pending a state court's determination whether the city could exercise the power of eminent domain under state law. The case did not arise within the "equity" jurisdiction of the federal courts, 360 U. S., at 28, because the suit sought compensation for a taking, and the District Court lacked discretion to deny relief on the corporation's claim. Nonetheless, the issues in the suit were "intimately involved with [the State's] sovereign prerogative." Ibid. We concluded that "[t]he considerations that prevailed in conventional equity suits for avoiding the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts of state government or needless friction between state and federal authorities are similarly appropriate in a state eminent domain proceeding brought in, or removed to, a federal court." Ibid. And based on that conclusion, we affirmed the District Court's order staying the case.721County of Allegheny was decided the same day as Thibodaux, and like Thibodaux it involved review of a District Court order abstaining from the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over a state law eminent domain action. Unlike in Thibodaux, however, the District Court in County of Allegheny had not merely stayed adjudication of the federal action pending the resolution of an issue in state court, but rather had dismissed the federal action altogether. Based in large measure on this distinction, we reversed the District Court's order. See 360 U. S., at 190; Thibodaux, 360 U. S., at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("In Mashuda, the Court holds that it was error for the District Court to dismiss the complaint" (emphasis added)).We were careful to note in Thibodaux that the District Court had only stayed the federal suit pending adjudication of the dispute in state court. Unlike the outright dismissal or remand of a federal suit, we held, an order merely staying the action "does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition." Id., at 29. We have thus held that in cases where the relief being sought is equitable in nature or otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court. By contrast, while we have held that federal courts may stay actions for damages based on abstention principles, we have not held that those principles support the outright dismissal or remand of damages actions.One final line of cases bears mentioning. Though we deal here with our abstention doctrines, we have recognized that federal courts have discretion to dismiss damages actions, in certain narrow circumstances, under the common-law doctrine offorum non conveniens. The seminal case recognizing this authority is Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501722(1947), in which we considered whether a Federal District Court sitting in diversity in New York could dismiss a tort action for damages on the grounds that Virginia provided a more appropriate locale for adjudicating the dispute. Id., at 503. We conceded that the application of this doctrine should be "rare," id., at 509, but also held that the exercise of forum non conveniens is not limited to actions in equity:"This Court[,] in recognizing and approving it by name has never indicated that it was rejecting application of the doctrine to law actions which had been an integral and necessary part of [the] evolution of the doctrine. Wherever it is applied in courts in other jurisdictions, its application does not depend on whether the action is at law or in equity." Id., at 505, n. 4 (citations omitted).The dispute in Gulf Oil was over venue, not jurisdiction, and the expectation was that after dismissal of the suit in New York the parties would refile in federal court, not the state courts of Virginia. This transfer of venue function of the forum non conveniens doctrine has been superseded by statute, see 28 U. s. C. § 1404(a); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 253 (1981), and to the extent we have continued to recognize that federal courts have the power to dismiss damages actions under the common-law forum non conveniens doctrine, we have done so only in "cases where the alternative forum is abroad." American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 449, n. 2 (1994); see, e. g., Piper, supra, at 265-269 (dismissal of wrongful death action).The fact that we have applied the forum non conveniens doctrine in this manner does not change our analysis in this case, where we deal with the scope of the Burford abstention doctrine. To be sure, the abstention doctrines and the doctrine offorum non conveniens proceed from a similar premise: In rare circumstances, federal courts can relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum. But our abstention doctrine is of a distinct historical pedigree, and the tradi-723tional considerations behind dismissal for forum non conveniens differ markedly from those informing the decision to abstain. Compare American Dredging, supra, at 448-449 (describing "multifarious factors," including both public and private interests, which might allow a district court to dismiss a case under doctrine of forum non conveniens), with Burford, 319 U. S., at 332-333 (describing "federal-state conflict" that requires a federal court to yield jurisdiction in favor of a state forum). Federal courts abstain out of deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and federalism. See, e. g., ibid.; Younger, 401 U. S., at 44-45. Dismissal for forum non conveniens, by contrast, has historically reflected a far broader range of considerations, see Piper, supra, at 241, 257-262 (describing the interests which bear on forum non conveniens decision); Gulf Oil, supra, at 508-509 (same), most notably the convenience to the parties and the practical difficulties that can attend the adjudication of a dispute in a certain locality, see Piper, supra, at 257-259 (evidentiary problems, unavailability of witnesses, difficulty of coordinating multiple suits); Gulf Oil, supra, at 511 (availability of witnesses, need to interplead Virginia corporation, location of evidence).BWith these background principles in mind, we consider the contours of the Burford doctrine. The principal issue presented in Burford was the "reasonableness" of an order issued by the Texas Railroad Commission, which granted "a permit to drill four oil wells on a small plot of land in the East Texas oil field." 319 U. S., at 317. Due to the potentially overlapping claims of the many parties who might have an interest in a common pool of oil and the need for uniform regulation of the oil industry, Texas endowed the Railroad Commission with exclusive regulatory authority in the area. Texas also placed the authority to review the Commission's724orders in a single set of state courts, "[t]o prevent the confusion of multiple review," id., at 326, and to permit an experienced cadre of state judges to obtain "specialized knowledge" in the field, id., at 327. Though Texas had thus demonstrated its interest in maintaining uniform review of the Commission's orders, the federal courts had, in the years preceding Burford, become increasingly involved in reviewing the reasonableness of the Commission's orders, both under a constitutional standard imposed under the Due Process Clause, see, e. g., Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, 577 (1940), and under state law, which established a similar standard, see Burford, 319 U. S., at 317, 326.Viewing the case as "a simple proceeding in equity to enjoin the enforcement of the Commissioner's order," id., at 317, we framed the question presented in terms of the power of a federal court of equity to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction:"Although a federal equity court does have jurisdiction of a particular proceeding, it may, in its sound discretion, whether its jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diversity of citizenship or otherwise, 'refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest,' for it 'is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy.' While many other questions are argued, we find it necessary to decide only one: Assuming that the federal district court had jurisdiction, should it, as a matter of sound equitable discretion, have declined to exercise that jurisdiction here?" Id., at 317318 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352, 360 (1933), and Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S., at 185).725Having thus posed the question in terms of the District Court's discretion, as a court sitting "in equity," to decline jurisdiction, we approved the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on a number of grounds that were unique to that case. We noted, for instance, the difficulty of the regulatory issues presented, stating that the "order under consideration is part of the general regulatory system devised for the conservation of oil and gas in Texas, an aspect of 'as thorny a problem as has challenged the ingenuity and wisdom of legislatures.'" 319 U. S., at 318 (quoting Rowan, supra, at 579). We also stressed the demonstrated need for uniform regulation in the area, 319 U. S., at 318-319, citing the unified procedures Texas had established to "prevent the confusion of multiple review," id., at 325-326, and the important state interests this uniform system of review was designed to serve, id., at 319-320. Most importantly, we also described the detrimental impact of ongoing federal court review of the Commission's orders, which review had already led to contradictory adjudications by the state and federal courts. Id., at 327-328, 331-332.We ultimately concluded in Burford that dismissal was appropriate because the availability of an alternative, federal forum threatened to frustrate the purpose of the complex administrative system that Texas had established. See id., at 332 ("The whole cycle of federal-state conflict cannot be permitted to begin again"). We have since provided more generalized descriptions of the Burford doctrine, see, e. g., County of Allegheny, 360 U. S., at 189 ("abstention on grounds of comity with the States where the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court would disrupt a state administrative process"); Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 814-816 (abstention where "exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern"), but with the exception of cases that rest only loosely on the Burford rationale, e. g.,726Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25 (1959), we have revisited the decision only infrequently in the intervening 50 years. See NOPSI, 491 U. S. 350 (1989).In NOPSI, our most recent exposition of the Burford doctrine, we again located the power to dismiss based on abstention principles in the discretionary power of a federal court sitting in equity, and we again illustrated the narrow range of circumstances in which Burford can justify the dismissal of a federal action. The issue in NOPSI was pre-emption. A New Orleans utility that had been saddled by a decision of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with part of the cost of building and operating a nuclear reactor sought approval of a rate increase from the Council of the City of New Orleans. The council denied the rate increase on the grounds that "a public hearing was necessary to explore 'the legality and prudency' [sic]" of the expenses allocated to the utility under the FERC decision, 491 U. S., at 355, and the utility brought suit in federal court, seeking an injunction against enforcement of the council's order and a declaration that the utility was entitled to a rate increase. The utility claimed that "federal law required the Council to allow it to recover, through an increase in retail rates, its FERC-allocated share of the [cost of the reactor]." Ibid. The federal pre-emption question was the only issue raised in the case; there were no state law claims.In reversing the District Court's decision to dismiss under Burford, we recognized "the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief," 491 U. S., at 359, and we indicated, as we had previously in Alabama Pub. Servo Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 350-351 (1951), that Burford permits "a federal court sitting in equity," 491 U. S., at 361, to dismiss a case only in extraordinary circumstances. We thus indicated that Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents "'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in727the case then at bar,'" or if its adjudication in a federal forum "'would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.'" 491 U. S., at 361 (quoting Colorado River, supra, at 814).We ultimately held that Burford did not provide proper grounds for an abstention-based dismissal in NOPSI because the "case [did] not involve a state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims [were] 'in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed,'" 491 U. S., at 361 (quoting McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187,373 U. S. 668, 674 (1963)), and because there was no serious threat of conflict between the adjudication of the federal claim presented in the case and the State's interest in ensuring uniformity in ratemaking decisions:"While Burford is concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal influence, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a 'potential for conflict' with state regulatory law or policy. Here, NOPSI's primary claim is that the Council is prohibited by federal law from refusing to provide reimbursement for FERC-allocated wholesale costs. Unlike a claim that a state agency has misapplied its lawful authority or has failed to take into consideration or properly weigh relevant state-law factors, federal adjudication of this sort of pre-emption claim would not disrupt the State's attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an 'essentially local problem.'" 491 U. S., at 362 (quoting Alabama Pub. Servo Comm'n, supra, at 347) (citations omitted).These cases do not provide a formulaic test for determining when dismissal under Burford is appropriate, but they do demonstrate that the power to dismiss under the Burford728doctrine, as with other abstention doctrines, see supra, at 716-723 (describing the traditional application of the abstention doctrines), derives from the discretion historically enjoyed by courts of equity. They further demonstrate that exercise of this discretion must reflect "principles of federalism and comity." Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 32 (1993). Ultimately, what is at stake is a federal court's decision, based on a careful consideration of the federal interests in retaining jurisdiction over the dispute and the competing concern for the "independence of state action," Burford, 319 U. S., at 334, that the State's interests are paramount and that a dispute would best be adjudicated in a state forum. See NOPS!, supra, at 363 (question under Burford is whether adjudication in federal court would "unduly intrude into the processes of state government or undermine the State's ability to maintain desired uniformity"). This equitable decision balances the strong federal interest in having certain classes of cases, and certain federal rights, adjudicated in federal court, against the State's interests in maintaining "uniformity in the treatment of an 'essentially local problem,'" 491 U. S., at 362 (quoting Alabama Pub. Servo Comm'n, supra, at 347), and retaining local control over "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import," Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 814. This balance only rarely favors abstention, and the power to dismiss recognized in Burford represents an "'extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of the District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.'" Colorado River, supra, at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U. S., at 188).CWe turn, finally, to the application of Burford in this case.As in NOPS!, see 491 U. S., at 363, the federal interests in this case are pronounced, as Allstate's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) implicates a substantial federal concern for the enforcement of arbitra-729tion agreements. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985) (FAA reflects "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution"); cf. Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 25-26 (in deciding whether to defer to state court adjudication under the Colorado River doctrine, "the presence of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against surrender"). With regard to the state interests, however, the case appears at first blush to present nothing more than a run-of-the-mill contract dispute. The Commissioner seeks damages from Allstate for Allstate's failure to perform its obligations under a reinsurance agreement. What differentiates this case from other diversity actions seeking damages for breach of contract, if anything, is the impact federal adjudication of the dispute might have on the ongoing liquidation proceedings in state court: The Commissioner claims that any recovery by Allstate on its setoff claims would amount to an illegal "preference" under state law. This question appears now to have been conclusively answered by the California Supreme Court, see Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 3 Cal. 4th 1118, 842 P. 2d 48 (1992) (permitting reinsurers to assert setoff claims in suits filed by the Commissioner in the Mission insolvency), although at the time the District Court ruled this question was still hotly contested.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the District Court's remand order was inappropriate because "Burford abstention does not apply to suits seeking solely legal relief." 47 F. 3d, at 354. Addressing our abstention cases, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal courts' power to abstain in certain cases is "locat[ed] ... in the unique powers of equitable courts," and that it derives from equity courts' "'discretionary power to grant or withhold relief.''' 47 F. 3d, at 355 (quoting Alabama Pub. Servo Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S., at 350-351). The Ninth Circuit's reversal of the District Court's abstention-based remand order in this case therefore730reflects the application of a per se rule: "[T]he power of federal courts to abstain from exercising their jurisdiction, at least in Burford abstention cases, is founded upon a discretion they possess only in equitable cases." 47 F. 3d, at 355-356.To the extent the Ninth Circuit held only that a federal court cannot, under Burford, dismiss or remand an action when the relief sought is not discretionary, its judgment is consistent with our abstention cases. We have explained the power to dismiss or remand a case under the abstention doctrines in terms of the discretion federal courts have traditionally exercised in deciding whether to provide equitable or discretionary relief, see supra, at 717-719, 721-722, and the Commissioner appears to have conceded that the relief being sought in this case is neither equitable nor otherwise committed to the discretion of the court. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-37a (order denying petition for rehearing). In those cases in which we have applied traditional abstention principles to damages actions, we have only permitted a federal court to "withhold action until the state proceedings have concluded," Growe, 507 U. S., at 32; that is, we have permitted federal courts applying abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not permitted them to dismiss the action altogether, see supra, at 719-721.The per se rule described by the Ninth Circuit is, however, more rigid than our precedents require. We have not strictly limited abstention to "equitable cases," 47 F. 3d, at 356, but rather have extended the doctrine to all cases in which a federal court is asked to provide some form of discretionary relief. See Huffman, 319 U. S., at 297; Samuels, 401 U. S., at 69-70,72-73; supra, at 718-719. Moreover, as demonstrated by our decision in Thibodaux, see supra, at 719721, we have not held that abstention principles are completely inapplicable in damages actions. Burford might support a federal court's decision to postpone adjudication of a damages action pending the resolution by the state courts731of a disputed question of state law. For example, given the situation the District Court faced in this case, a stay order might have been appropriate: The setoff issue was being decided by the state courts at the time the District Court ruled, see Prudential Reinsurance Co., supra, and in the interest of avoiding inconsistent adjudications on that point, the District Court might have been justified in entering a stay to await the outcome of the state court litigation.Like the Ninth Circuit, we review only the remand order which was entered, and find it unnecessary to determine whether a more limited abstention-based stay order would have been warranted on the facts of this case. We have no occasion to resolve what additional authority to abstain might be provided under our decision in Fair Assessment, see supra, at 719. Nor do we find it necessary to inquire fully as to whether this case presents the sort of "exceptional circumstance" in which Burford abstention or other grounds for yielding federal jurisdiction might be appropriate. Under our precedents, federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary. Because this was a damages action, we conclude that the District Court's remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine. The judgment is affirmed.It is so ordered | OCTOBER TERM, 1995SyllabusQUACKENBUSH, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMMISSIONER v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO.CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITNo. 95-244. Argued February 20, 1996-Decided June 3, 1996Petitioner California Insurance Commissioner, as trustee over the assets of the Mission Insurance Company and its affiliates, filed a state court action against respondent Allstate Insurance Company, seeking, among other things, contract and tort damages for Allstate's alleged breach of reinsurance agreements. Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Commissioner sought remand to state court, arguing that the District Court should abstain from hearing the case under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, because its resolution might interfere with California's regulation of the Mission insolvency. Specifically, the Commissioner indicated that the issue whether Allstate could set off its own contract claims against the Commissioner's recovery was a question of state law currently pending before the state courts in another Mission insolvency case. Observing that the State's overriding interest in the uniform and orderly regulation of insurance insolvencies and liquidations could be undermined by inconsistent rulings from the federal and state courts, and determining that the setoff question should be resolved in state court, the District Court concluded that Burford abstention was appropriate and remanded the case to state court without ruling on Allstate's arbitration motion. After determining that appellate review of the District Court's remand order was not barred by 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d), and that the remand order was appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 as a final collateral order, the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. Concluding that Burford abstention is limited to equitable actions, the court held that abstention was inappropriate in this damages action.Held:1. An abstention-based remand order is appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Section 1447(d)-which provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise" -interposes no bar to appellate review of the order at issue. Only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d), and the District Court's order in this707case does not fall into either category of remand order described in § 1447(c): It is not based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in removal procedure. The remand order here falls within that narrow class of collateral orders that are immediately appealable under § 1291. It puts the litigants in this case effectively out of court, and its effect is precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 11, n. 11. The order also conclusively determines an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism; the rights asserted on appeal from the abstention decision are sufficiently important to warrant an immediate appeal; and the remand order will not be subsumed in any other appealable order entered by the District Court. See Moses H. Cone, supra. The decision in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 352-353, that "an order remanding a removed action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal," is disavowed to the extent it would require this Court to ignore the implications of the later holding in Moses H. Cone. Pp.711-715.2. Federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary. Because this was a damages action, the District Court's remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine. Pp. 716-731.(a) In cases where the relief sought is equitable in nature or otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court. See, e. g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297. By contrast, federal courts may stay actions for damages based on abstention principles, but those principles do not support the outright dismissal or remand of damages actions. See, e. g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25, 28. Pp.716-723.(b) Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar," or if its adjudication in a federal forum "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 814. This power to dismiss represents an extraordinary and narrow exception to a district court's duty to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Pp.723-728.708Full Text of Opinion |
3,221 | 1981_80-2070 | CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.We granted certiorari to decide whether Article VIII(1) of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between Page 457 U. S. 178 the United States and Japan provides a defense to a Title VII employment discrimination suit against an American subsidiary of a Japanese company.IPetitioner, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., is a New York corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Sumitomo Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, a Japanese general trading company or sogo shosha. [Footnote 1] Respondents are past and present female secretarial employees of Sumitomo. [Footnote 2] All but one of the respondents are United States citizens; that one exception is a Japanese citizen living in the United States. Respondents brought this suit as a class action claiming that Sumitomo's alleged practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens to fill executive, managerial, and sales positions violated both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). [Footnote 3] Respondents sought both injunctive relief and damages. Page 457 U. S. 179Without admitting the alleged discriminatory practice, Sumitomo moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint. Sumitomo's motion was based on two grounds: (1) discrimination on the basis of Japanese citizenship does not violate Title VII or § 1981; and (2) Sumitomo's practices are protected under Article VIII(1) of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. The District Court dismissed the § 1981 claim, holding that neither sex discrimination nor national origin discrimination are cognizable under that section. 473 F. Supp 506 (SDNY 1979). The court refused to dismiss the Title VII claims, however; it held that, because Sumitomo is incorporated in the United States, it is not covered by Article VIII(1) of the Treaty. The District Court then certified for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the question of whether the terms of the Treaty exempted Sumitomo from the provisions of Title VII.The Court of Appeals reversed in part. 638 F.2d 552 (CA2 1981). The court first examined the Treaty's language and its history and concluded that the Treaty parties intended Article VIII(1) to cover locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign companies such as Sumitomo. The court then held that the Treaty language does not insulate Sumitomo's executive employment practices from Title VII scrutiny. The court concluded that, under certain conditions, Japanese citizenship could be a bona fide occupational qualification for high-level employment with a Japanese-owned domestic corporation and that Sumitomo's practices might Page 457 U. S. 180 thus fit within a statutory exception to Title VII. [Footnote 4] The court remanded for further proceedings. [Footnote 5]We granted certiorari, 454 U.S. 962 (1981), and we vacate and remand.IIInterpretation of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between Japan and the United States must, of course, begin with the language of the Treaty itself. The clear import of treaty language controls unless"application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories."Maximov v. United States, 373 U. S. 49, 373 U. S. 54 (1963). See also The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 19 U. S. 72 (1821). Page 457 U. S. 181Article VIII(1) of the Treaty provides in pertinent part:"[C]ompanies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."(Emphasis added.) [Footnote 6] Page 457 U. S. 182 Clearly Article VIII(1) only applies to companies of one of the Treaty countries operating in the other country. Sumitomo contends that it is a company of Japan, and that Article VIII(1) of the Treaty grants it very broad discretion to fill its executive, managerial, and sales positions exclusively with male Japanese citizens. [Footnote 7]Article VIII(1) does not define any of its terms; the definitional section of the Treaty is contained in Article XXII. Article XXII(3) provides:"As used in the present Treaty, the term 'companies' means corporations, partnerships, companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other Party."(Emphasis added.)Sumitomo is "constituted under the applicable laws and regulations" of New York; based on Article XXII(3), it is a company of the United States, not a company of Japan. [Footnote 8] As Page 457 U. S. 183 a company of the United States operating in the United States, under the literal language of Article XXII(3) of the Treaty, Sumitomo cannot invoke the rights provided in Article VIII(1), which are available only to companies of Japan operating in the United States and to companies of the United States operating in Japan.The Governments of Japan and the United States support this interpretation of the Treaty. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the United States Department of State agree that a United States corporation, even when wholly owned by a Japanese company, is not a company of Japan under the Treaty, and is therefore not covered by Article VIII(1). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated its position to the American Embassy in Tokyo with reference to this case:"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the Office of [the Government of Japan] responsible for the interpretation of the [Friendship, Commerce and Navigation] Treaty, reiterates its view concerning the application of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty: for the purpose of the Treaty, companies constituted under the applicable laws . . . of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and, therefore, a subsidiary of a Japanese company which is incorporated under the laws of New York is not Page 457 U. S. 184 covered by Article 8 Paragraph 1 when it operates in the United States. [Footnote 9]"The United States Department of State also maintains that Article VIII(1) rights do not apply to locally incorporated subsidiaries. [Footnote 10] Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies Page 457 U. S. 185 charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 187, 366 U. S. 194 (1961). [Footnote 11]Our role is limited to giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties. When the parties to a treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty provision, and that interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, we must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to that interpretation. [Footnote 12]IIISumitomo maintains that, although the literal language of the Treaty supports the contrary interpretation, the intent of Japan and the United States was to cover subsidiaries regardless of their place of incorporation. We disagree.Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals and the claims of Sumitomo, adherence to the language of the Treaty would not "overlook the purpose of the Treaty." 638 F.2d at 556. The Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between Japan and the United States is but one of a series of similar commercial agreements negotiated after World War II. [Footnote 13] The primary purpose of the corporation provisions of Page 457 U. S. 186 the Treaties was to give corporations of each signatory legal status in the territory of the other party, and to allow them to conduct business in the other country on a comparable basis with domestic firms. Although the United States negotiated commercial treaties as early as 1778, and thereafter throughout the 19th century and early 20th century, [Footnote 14] these early commercial treaties were primarily concerned with the trade and shipping rights of individuals. Until the 20th century, international commerce was much more an individual than a corporate affair. [Footnote 15]As corporate involvement in international trade expanded in this century, old commercial treaties became outmoded. Because "corporation[s] can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which [they are] created," Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 38 U. S. 588 (1839), it became necessary to negotiate new treaties granting corporations legal status and the right to function abroad. A series of Treaties negotiated before World War II gave corporations legal status and access to foreign courts, [Footnote 16] but it was not until the Page 457 U. S. 187 postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties that United States corporations gained the right to conduct business in other countries. [Footnote 17] The purpose of the Treaties was Page 457 U. S. 188 not to give foreign corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but instead to assure them the right to conduct business on an equal basis without suffering discrimination based on their alienage.The Treaties accomplished their purpose by granting foreign corporations "national treatment" [Footnote 18] in most respects and by allowing foreign individuals and companies to form locally incorporated subsidiaries. These local subsidiaries are considered for purposes of the Treaty to be companies of the country in which they are incorporated; they are entitled to the rights, and subject to the responsibilities of other domestic corporations. By treating these subsidiaries as domestic companies, the purpose of the Treaty provisions -- to assure that corporations of one Treaty party have the right to conduct business within the territory of the other party without suffering discrimination as an alien entity -- is fully met. Page 457 U. S. 189Nor can we agree with the Court of Appeals view that literal interpretation of the Treaty would create a "crazy-quilt pattern" in which the rights of branches of Japanese companies operating directly in the United States would be greatly superior to the right of locally incorporated subsidiaries of Japanese companies. 638 F.2d at 556. The Court of Appeals maintained that, if such subsidiaries were not considered companies of Japan under the Treaty, they, unlike branch offices of Japanese corporations, would be denied access to the legal system, would be left unprotected against unlawful entry and molestation, and would be unable to dispose of property, obtain patents, engage in importation and exportation, or make payments, remittances, and transfers of funds. Ibid. That this is not the case is obvious; the subsidiaries, as companies of the United States, would enjoy all of those rights and more. The only significant advantage branches may have over subsidiaries is that conferred by Article VIII(1).IVWe are persuaded, as both signatories agree, that, under the literal language of Article XXII(3) of the Treaty, Sumitomo is a company of the United States; we discern no reason to depart from the plain meaning of the Treaty language. Accordingly, we hold that Sumitomo is not a company of Japan, and is thus not covered by Article VIII(1) of the Treaty. [Footnote 19] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, Page 457 U. S. 190 and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.Vacated and remanded | U.S. Supreme CourtSumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982)Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. AvaglianoNo. 80-2070Argued April 26, 1982Decided June 15, 1982*457 U.S. 176SyllabusPetitioner Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., is a New York corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese general trading company. Past and present female secretarial employees of Sumitomo, who, with one exception, are United States citizens, brought a class action in Federal District Court against Sumitomo, claiming that its alleged practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens to fill executive, managerial, and sales positions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sumitomo moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that its practices were protected under Art. VIII(1) of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Japan. Article VIII(1) provides that the"companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."Article XXII(3) of the Treaty defines "companies" as "[c]ompanies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party." The District Court refused to dismiss, holding that, because Sumitomo was incorporated in the United States, it was not covered by Art. VIII(1), but the court then certified for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals the question whether the terms of the Treaty exempted Sumitomo from Title VII's provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Art. VIII(1) was intended to cover locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign companies, but that the Treaty language did not insulate Sumitomo's employment practices from Title VII scrutiny.Held: Sumitomo is not a company of Japan, and thus is not covered by Art. VIII(1) of the Treaty. Pp. 457 U. S. 180-189.(a) Under Art. XXII(3)'s literal language, Sumitomo is a company of the United States, since it was "constituted under the applicable laws and regulations" of New York. As a company of the United States, it cannot invoke the rights provided in Art. VIII(1), which are available only to companies of Japan operating in the United States and to companies Page 457 U. S. 177 of the United States operating in Japan. Where both parties to the Treaty agree with this meaning and such interpretation follows from the clear Treaty language, deference will be given to it, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence. Pp. 457 U. S. 180-185.(b) Adherence to the Treaty language does not overlook the Treaty's purpose, since the primary purpose of the corporation provisions was to give corporations of each signatory legal status in the territory of the other party and to allow them to conduct business in the other country on a comparable basis with domestic firms. Pp. 457 U. S. 185-189.638 F.2d 552, vacated and remanded.BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. |
3,222 | 1957_481 | MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.This case concerns two applications for passports, denied by the Secretary of State. One was by Rockwell Kent, who desired to visit England and attend a meeting of an organization known as the "World Council of Peace" in Helsinki, Finland. The Director of the Passport Office informed Kent that issuance of a passport was precluded by § 51.135 of the Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State on two grounds: [Footnote 1] (1) that he was a Page 357 U. S. 118 Communist and (2) that he had had "a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line." The letter of denial specified in some detail the facts on which those conclusions were based. Kent was also advised of his right to an informal hearing under § 51.137 of the Regulations. But he was also told that, whether or not a hearing was requested, it would be necessary, before a passport would be issued, to submit an affidavit as to whether he was then or ever had been a Communist. [Footnote 2] Kent did not ask for a hearing, but filed a new passport application listing several European countries he desired to visit. When advised that a hearing was still available to him, his attorney replied that Kent took the position Page 357 U. S. 119 that the requirement of an affidavit concerning Communist Party membership "is unlawful, and that, for that reason and as a matter of conscience," he would not supply one. He did, however, have a hearing at which the principal evidence against him was from his book It's Me O Lord, which Kent agreed was accurate. He again refused to submit the affidavit, maintaining that any matters unrelated to the question of his citizenship were irrelevant to the Department's consideration of his application. The Department advised him that no further consideration of his application would be given until he satisfied the requirements of the Regulations.Thereupon, Kent sued in the District Court for declaratory relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondent. On appeal, the case of Kent was heard with that of Dr. Walter Briehl, a psychiatrist. When Briehl applied for a passport, the Director of the Passport Office asked him to supply the affidavit covering membership in the Communist Party. Briehl, like Kent, refused. The Director then tentatively disapproved the application on the following grounds:"In your case, it has been alleged that you were a Communist. Specifically, it is alleged that you were a member of the Los Angeles County Communist Party; that you were a member of the Bookshop Association, St. Louis, Missouri; that you held Communist Party meetings; that, in 1936 and 1941, you contributed articles to the Communist Publication 'Social Work Today'; that, in 1939, 1940, and 1941, you were a sponsor to raise funds for veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in calling on the President of the United States by a petition to defend the rights of the Communist Party and its members; that you contributed to the Civil Rights Congress bail fund to be used in raising bail on behalf of convicted Communist leaders in New York City; that Page 357 U. S. 120 you were a member of the Hollywood Arts, Sciences and Professions Council and a contact of the Los Angeles Committee for Protection of Foreign Born and a contact of the Freedom Stage, Incorporated."The Director advised Briehl of his right to a hearing, but stated that, whether or not a hearing was held, an affidavit concerning membership in the Communist Party would be necessary. Briehl asked for a hearing, and one was held. At that hearing, he raised three objections: (1) that his "political affiliations" were irrelevant to his right to a passport; (2) that "every American citizen has the right to travel regardless of politics", and (3) that the burden was on the Department to prove illegal activities by Briehl. Briehl persisted in his refusal to supply the affidavit. Because of that refusal, Briehl was advised that the Board of Passport Appeals could not, under the Regulations, entertain an appeal.Briehl filed his complaint in the District Court, which held that his case was indistinguishable from Kent's, and dismissed the complaint.The Court of Appeals heard the two cases en banc, and affirmed the District Court by a divided vote. 101 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 239, 248 F.2d 600, 561. The cases are here on writ of certiorari. 355 U.S. 881.The Court first noted the function that the passport performed in American law in the case of Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 9 Pet. 692, 34 U. S. 699, decided in 1835:"There is no law of the United States in any manner regulating the issuing of passports or directing upon what evidence it may be done or declaring their legal effect. It is understood, as matter of practice, that some evidence of citizenship is required by the secretary of state before issuing a passport. This, however, is entirely discretionary Page 357 U. S. 121 with him. No inquiry is instituted by him to ascertain the fact of citizenship, or any proceedings had, that will in any manner bear the character of a judicial inquiry. It is a document which, from its nature and object, is addressed to foreign powers; purporting only to be a request that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely, and is to be considered rather in the character of a political document by which the bearer is recognized in foreign countries as an American citizen, and which, by usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact."A passport not only is of great value -- indeed necessary -- abroad; it is also an aid in establishing citizenship for purposes of reentry into the United States. See Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 312 U. S. 339; 3 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906), § 512. But throughout most of our history -- until indeed quite recently -- a passport, though a great convenience in foreign travel, was not a legal requirement for leaving or entering the United States. See Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 Foreign Affairs 17. Apart from minor exceptions to be noted, it was first [Footnote 3] made a requirement by § 215 of the Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185, which states that, after a prescribed proclamation by the President, it is"unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United Page 357 U. S. 122 States unless he bears a valid passport. [Footnote 4]"And the Proclamation necessary to make the restrictions of this Act applicable and in force has been made. [Footnote 5]Prior to 1952, there were numerous laws enacted by Congress regulating passports, and many decisions, rulings, and regulations by the Executive Department concerning them. Thus, in 1803, Congress made it unlawful for an official knowingly to issue a passport to an alien certifying that he is a citizen. 2 Stat. 205. In 1815, just prior to the termination of the War of 1812, it made it illegal for a citizen to "cross the frontier" into enemy Page 357 U. S. 123 territory, to board vessels of the enemy on waters of the United States or to visit any of his camps within the limits of the United States, "without a passport first obtained" from the Secretary of State or other designated official. 3 Stat. 199-200. The Secretary of State took similar steps during the Civil War. See Dept. of State, The American Passport (1898), 50. In 1850 Congress ratified a treaty with Switzerland requiring passports from citizens of the two nations. 11 Stat. 587, 589-590. Finally, in 1856, Congress enacted what remains today as our basic passport statute. Prior to that time, various federal officials, state and local officials, and notaries public had undertaken to issue either certificates of citizenship or other documents in the nature of letters of introduction to foreign officials requesting treatment according to the usages of international law. By the Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 52, 60-61, 22 U.S.C. § 211a, Congress put an end to those practices. [Footnote 6] This provision, as codified by the Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat., Part 2, 887, reads."The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."Thus, for most of our history, a passport was not a condition to entry or exit.It is true that, at intervals, a passport has been required for travel. Mention has already been made of the restrictions imposed during the War of 1812 and during the Civil War. A like restriction, which was the forerunner of that contained in the 1952 Act, was imposed by Congress in 1918. Page 357 U. S. 124The Act of May 22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559, made it unlawful, while a Presidential Proclamation was in force, for a citizen to leave or enter the United States "unless he bears a valid passport." See H.R.Rep. No. 485, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. That statute was invoked by Presidential Proclamation No. 1473 on August 8, 1918, 40 Stat. 1829, which continued in effect until March 3, 1921. 41 Stat. 1359.The 1918 Act was effective only in wartime. It was amended in 1941 so that it could be invoked in the then-existing emergency. 55 Stat. 252. See S.Rep. No. 444, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. It was invoked by Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, November 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1696. That emergency continued until April 28, 1952. Proc. No. 2974, 66 Stat. C31. Congress extended the statutory provisions until April 1, 1953. 66 Stat. 54, 57, 96, 137, 330, 333. It was during this extension period that the Secretary of State issued the Regulations here complained of. [Footnote 7]Under the 1926 Act and its predecessor, a large body of precedents grew up which repeat over and again that the issuance of passports is "a discretionary act" on the part of the Secretary of State. The scholars, [Footnote 8] the courts, [Footnote 9] the Chief Executive, [Footnote 10] and the Attorneys General [Footnote 11] all Page 357 U. S. 125 so said. This long-continued executive construction should be enough, it is said, to warrant the inference that Congress had adopted it. See Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 347 U. S. 544-545; United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 U. S. 306, 352 U. S. 310. But the key to that problem, as we shall see, is in the manner in which the Secretary's discretion was exercised, not in the bare fact that he had discretion.The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. So much is conceded by the Solicitor General. In Anglo-Saxon law, that right was emerging at least as early as the Magna Carta. [Footnote 12] Chafee, Page 357 U. S. 126 Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787 (1956), 171-181, 187 et seq., shows how deeply engrained in our history this freedom of movement is. Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values. See Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 73 U. S. 44; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 179 U. S. 274; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160. "Our nation," wrote Chafee,"has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases."Id. at 197.Freedom of movement also has large social values. As Chafee put it:"Foreign correspondents and lecturers on public affairs need first-hand information. Scientists and scholars gain greatly from consultations with colleagues in other countries. Students equip themselves for more fruitful careers in the United States by instruction in foreign universities. [Footnote 13] Then there are reasons close to the core of personal life -- marriage, reuniting families, spending hours with old friends. Finally, travel abroad enables American citizens to understand that people like themselves live in Europe, and helps them to be well informed Page 357 U. S. 127 on public issues. An American who has crossed the ocean is not obliged to form his opinions about our foreign policy merely from what he is told by officials of our government or by a few correspondents of American newspapers. Moreover, his views on domestic questions are enriched by seeing how foreigners are trying to solve similar problems. In many different ways, direct contact with other countries contributes to sounder decisions at home."Id. at 195-196. And see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 6, 13-14.Freedom to travel is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's "liberty." We need not decide the extent to which it can be curtailed. We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has authorized its curtailment.The difficulty is that, while the power of the Secretary of State over the issuance of passports is expressed in broad terms, it was apparently long exercised quite narrowly. So far as material here, the cases of refusal of passports generally fell into two categories. First, questions pertinent to the citizenship of the applicant and his allegiance to the United States had to be resolved by the Secretary, for the command of Congress was that"No passport shall be granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States."32 Stat. 386, 22 U.S.C. § 212. Second was the question whether the applicant was participating in illegal conduct, trying to escape the toils of the law, promoting passport frauds, or otherwise engaging in conduct which would violate the laws of the United States. See 3 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906), § 512; 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942), 268; 2 Hyde, International Law (2d rev. ed.), § 401. Page 357 U. S. 128The grounds for refusal asserted here do not relate to citizenship or allegiance, on the one hand, or to criminal or unlawful conduct, on the other. Yet, so far as relevant here, those two are the only ones which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice. One can find in the records of the State Department rulings of subordinates covering a wider range of activities than the two indicated. But, as respects Communists, these are scattered rulings, and not consistently of one pattern. We can say with assurance that whatever may have been the practice after 1926, at the time the Act of July 3, 1926, was adopted, the administrative practice, so far as relevant here, had jelled only around the two categories mentioned. We therefore hesitate to impute to Congress, when, in 1952, it made a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose.More restrictive regulations were applied in 1918 and in 1941 as war measures. We are not compelled to equate this present problem of statutory construction with problems that may arise under the war power. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579.In a case of comparable magnitude, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 323 U. S. 218, we allowed the Government in time of war to exclude citizens from their homes and restrict their freedom of movement only on a showing of "the gravest imminent danger to the public safety." There, the Congress and the Chief Executive moved in coordinated action; and, as we said, the Nation was then at war. No such condition presently exists. No such showing of extremity, no such showing of joint action by the Chief Executive and the Congress to curtail a constitutional right of the citizen, has been made here. Page 357 U. S. 129Since we start with an exercise by an American citizen of an activity included in constitutional protection, we will not readily infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to grant or withhold it. If we were dealing with political questions entrusted to the Chief Executive by the Constitution, we would have a different case. But there is more involved here. In part, of course, the issuance of the passport carries some implication of intention to extend the bearer diplomatic protection, though it does no more than "request all whom it may concern to permit safely and freely to pass, and, in case of need, to give all lawful aid and protection" to this citizen of the United States. But that function of the passport is subordinate. Its crucial function today is control over exit. And, as we have seen, the right of exit is a personal right included within the word "liberty" as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of the Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra. And if that power is delegated, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 293 U. S. 420-430. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 307; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 340 U. S. 271. Where activities or enjoyment natural and often necessary to the wellbeing of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 323 U. S. 301-302. Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 327 U. S. 156; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 345 U. S. 46. We hesitate to find in this broad generalized power an authority to trench so heavily on the rights of the citizen.Thus, we do not reach the question of constitutionality. We only conclude that § 1185 and § 211a do not delegate to the Secretary the kind of authority exercised here. Page 357 U. S. 130 We deal with beliefs, with associations, with ideological matters. We must remember that we are dealing here with citizens who have neither been accused of crimes nor found guilty. They are being denied their freedom of movement solely because of their refusal to be subjected to inquiry into their beliefs and associations. They do not seek to escape the law, nor to violate it. They may or may not be Communists. But, assuming they are, the only law which Congress has passed expressly curtailing the movement of Communists across our borders has not yet become effective. [Footnote 14] It would therefore be strange to infer that, pending the effectiveness of that law, the Secretary has been silently granted by Congress the larger, the more pervasive, power to curtail in his discretion the free movement of citizens in order to satisfy himself about their beliefs or associations.To repeat, we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen, a right which we must assume Congress will be faithful to respect. We would be faced with important constitutional questions were we to hold that Congress, by § 1185 and § 211a, had given the Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associations. Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms, and, absent one, the Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' right of free movement.Reversed | U.S. Supreme CourtKent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)Kent v. DullesNo. 481Argued April 10, 1958Decided June 16, 1958357 U.S. 116SyllabusAt a time when an Act of Congress required a passport for foreign travel by citizens if a state of national emergency had been declared by the President, and when the Proclamation necessary to make the Act effective had been made, the Secretary of State denied passports to petitioners because of their alleged Communistic beliefs and associations and their refusal to file affidavits concerning present or past membership in the Communist Party.Held: The Secretary was not authorized to deny the passports for these reasons under the Act of July 3, 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a, or § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185. Pp. 357 U. S. 117-130.(a) The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 357 U. S. 125-127.(b) The broad power of the Secretary under 22 U.S.C. § 211a to issue passports, which has long been considered "discretionary," has been construed generally to authorize the refusal of a passport only when the applicant (1) is not a citizen or a person owing allegiance to the United States, or (2) was engaging in criminal or unlawful conduct. Pp. 357 U. S. 124-125, 357 U. S. 127-128.(c) This Court hesitates to impute to Congress, when, in 1952, it made a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose. P. 357 U. S. 128.(d) No question concerning the exercise of the war power is involved in this case. P. 357 U. S. 128.(e) If a citizen's liberty to travel is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed. P. 357 U. S. 129.(f) The Act of July 3, 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a, and § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185, do not delegate to the Secretary authority to withhold passports to Page 357 U. S. 117 citizens because of their beliefs or associations, and any Act of Congress purporting to do so would raise grave constitutional questions. Pp. 357 U. S. 129-130.(g) The only Act of Congress expressly curtailing the movement of Communists across our borders, §§ 2 and 6 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, has not yet become effective, because the Communist Party has not registered under that Act, and there is not in effect a final order of the Board requiring it to do so. P. 357 U. S. 121, n. 3, p. 357 U. S. 130.101 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 239, 248 F.2d 600, 561, reversed. |
3,223 | 1971_71-227 | MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.In 1969, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated two "car service rules" that would have the Page 406 U. S. 743 general effect of requiring that freight cars, after being unloaded, be returned in the direction of the lines of the road owning the cars. Several railroads and shippers instituted two separate suits under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2325 to enjoin enforcement of these rules. In Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 1076 (MD Fla.1971), the action of the Commission was sustained by a three-judge court, but, in the case now before us, a similar court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held the Commission's order invalid. 325 F. Supp. 352 (WD Pa.1971). We noted probable jurisdiction, 404 U.S. 937, and, for the reasons hereinafter stated, we conclude that the Commission's action here challenged was within the scope of the authority conferred upon it by Congress and conformed to procedural requirements.The country's railroads long ago abandoned the custom of shifting freight between the cars of connecting roads, and adopted the practice of shipping the same loaded car over connecting lines to its ultimate destination. The freight cars of the Nation thus became, in essence, a single common pool, used by all roads. This practice necessarily required some arrangements for eventual return of a freight car to the lines of the road which owned it, and, in 1902, the railroads, through their trade association, dealt with this and related problems in a code of car service rules with which the roads agreed among themselves to comply. The effect of the Commission's order now under review is to promulgate two of these rules [Footnote 1] as the Commission's own, with the result that sanctions attach to their violation by the railroads. Page 406 U. S. 744Because of critical freight-car shortages experienced during World War I, Congress enacted the Esch Car Service Act of 1917, which empowered the Commission to establish reasonable rules and practices with respect to car service by railroads. 40 Stat. 101, 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a). The pertinent language of that Act provides:"The Commission may . . . establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service by common carriers by railroad subject to this chapter . . ."No party to this proceeding has questioned that the rules promulgated by the Commission are "rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service," and therefore the issue before us is whether these rules are "reasonable" as that term is used in the Esch Act. The court below concluded, and the appellees here contend, that, for a number of reasons, the rules in question do not meet the statutory requirement of reasonableness. Appellees also contend that the findings of the Commission Page 406 U. S. 745 are insufficient under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.The record of proceedings before the Commission establishes that the Commission has been increasingly concerned with recurring shortages of freight cars available to serve the Nation's shippers. It found that shortages of varying duration and severity occur both as an annual phenomenon at peak loading periods and also during times of national emergency. The result of these shortages has been that roads were unable to promptly supply freight cars to shippers who had need of them.Underlying these chronic shortages of available freight cars, the Commission found, was an inadequate supply of freight cars owned by the Nation's railroads. The Commission concluded that one of the principal factors causing this inadequate supply of freight cars was the operation of the national car-pool system. In practice, this system resulted in freight cars' being on lines other than those of the owning road for long periods of time, since the rules providing for the return of unloaded freight cars in the direction of the lines of the owning road were observed, more often than not, in the breach. Since the owning road was deprived of the use of its own freight cars for extended periods of time, the Commission found, there was very little incentive for it to acquire new freight cars. In addition, since a road which owned a supply of freight cars inadequate to serve its own on-line shippers could generally, by hook or by crook, arrange to utilize cars owned by other roads, the national car-pool system significantly reduced the normal incentive for a railroad to acquire sufficient equipment to serve its customers. The rules promulgated by the Commission are intended to make those railroads whose undersupply of freight cars contributes to the national shortage more directly feel the Page 406 U. S. 746 pinch resulting from the shortage that they have helped to cause. By thus requiring each road to face up to any inadequacies in its ownership of freight cars, the rules are intended, in the long run, to correct the nationwide short supply of freight cars that the Commission has found to exist.Central to the justification for the Commission's promulgation of these rules is its finding that there was a nationwide shortage of freight car ownership. The court below assumed the correctness of that finding, and we conclude that it was supported by substantial evidence.Shortly after the Second World War, the Commission conducted an investigation into the adequacy of freight car supply and utilization by the Nation's railroads. The Commission in that proceeding concluded that there was "an inadequacy in freight car ownership by rail carriers as a group." Recognizing that this inadequacy was caused at least in part by the inability of the railroads to acquire new equipment, first during an era of wartime demand and then during an era of post-war boom, the Commission at that time imposed no obligation on the railroads except to require them to file with it their rules and regulations with respect to car service.In 1963, the Commission began this investigation into the adequacy of car ownership, distribution, and utilization. At the conclusion of the investigatory phase of the proceeding in 1964, the Commission determined that there was a shortage of freight cars in general service. 323 I.C.C. 48 (1964). Formal notification of proposed rulemaking was then issued, and a questionnaire was submitted to the various railroads for the purpose of compiling data on car ownership and use. After these data were gathered, railroads, shippers, and other interested parties were permitted to file verified statements providing further factual material and to adduce Page 406 U. S. 747 legal arguments. The Commission, through its Bureau of Operations, presented to the Hearing Examiner tabular collations of the freight car ownership and use data, and suggested a formula by which a railroad might compute the sufficiency of its freight car ownership. The Bureau also proposed that the entire Code of Car Service Rules adopted by the Association of American Railroads be promulgated by the Commission for mandatory observance.Many railroads and shippers opposed mandatory enforcement of the rules. Some roads and shippers appeared in favor of at least some mandatory enforcement of the rules, arguing that, unless some compulsion were used in enforcing them, cars purchased by a railroad for use by its shippers would continue to be detained for inordinately long periods of time by other roads.After 50 days of hearings, the Trial Examiner issued his report, recommending against mandatory enforcement of the car service rules. Although the Commission, prior to referring the matter to him, had previously made a definitive finding that a shortage of freight cars existed, the Examiner's report stated that there was no competent evidence in the record developed before him upon which such a determination could be made. The Examiner assigned several reasons for recommending against mandatory enforcement of the rules.The Commission issued a comprehensive opinion disagreeing with the trial examiner in many respects, and ordering that two of the car service rules be promulgated as rules of the Commission with sanctions attaching to noncompliance. Finding that "[t]he continuing relocation of cars on owner's lines is of major importance to the maintenance of an adequate car supply," [Footnote 2] the Commission Page 406 U. S. 748 concluded that the inconveniences feared by the shippers were outweighed by the long-term benefit that would accrue from the mandatory enforcement of the two car service rules.After its first order adopting the two rules was issued, the Commission considered claims that there was need for some procedure for exceptions to the mandatory enforcement of the rules. A supplemental order that established another rule that permitted the railroads to seek exception from the Commission's Bureau of Operations, in order to alleviate inequities and hardships. [Footnote 3]The court below held that the rules were not "reasonable," as that term is used in the Esch Act, for three reasons. First, although there was a general finding of a nationwide freight car shortage, the court said that a specific shortage on owner lines should have been found in order to justify the promulgation of these rules. Second, it said there should have been a finding as to the financial effects upon the railroads and shippers who would be affected by the rules. Finally, it supported its conclusion that the rules were not "reasonable" by the fact that, even though violation of the rules could be enforced by monetary penalties, the Commission nonetheless conceded that obtaining complete compliance with them would be impossible.The standard of judicial review for actions of the Interstate Commerce Commission in general, Western Chemical Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268 (1926), Page 406 U. S. 749 and for actions taken by the Commission under the authority of the Esch Act in particular, Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1927), is well established by prior decisions of this Court. We do not weigh the evidence introduced before the Commission; we do not inquire into the wisdom of the regulations that the Commission promulgates, and we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which the Commission reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally supported. In judicially reviewing these particular rules promulgated by the Commission, we must be alert to the differing standard governing review of the Commission's exercise of its rulemaking authority, on the one hand, and that governing its adjudicatory function, on the other:"In the cases cited, the Commission was determining the relative rights of the several carriers in a joint rate. It was making a partition, and it performed a function quasi-judicial in its nature. In the case at bar, the function exercised by the Commission is wholly legislative. Its authority to legislate is limited to establishing a reasonable rule. But, in establishing a rule of general application, it is not a condition of its validity that there be adduced evidence of its appropriateness in respect to every railroad to which it will be applicable. In this connection, the Commission, like other legislators, may reason from the particular to the general."Assigned Car Cases, supra, at 274 U. S. 583.The finding of the Commission as to a nationwide shortage of freight cars was based primarily on data submitted by the railroads themselves covering the years 1955 through 1964. Over this 10-year period, total freight car ownership of Class I railroads dropped 12.4%, and aggregate carrying capacity of those railroads dropped 5%. Over the same period, revenue tons originated Page 406 U. S. 750 dropped 2.9%. The decline in ownership of plain boxcars, as opposed to more sophisticated types of cars, was even more dramatic; ownership of cars over the 10-year period in question dropped 22.1%, while aggregate carrying capacity of such cars dropped 18.9%. Testimony of witnesses for the National Industrial Traffic League, the Western Wood Products Association, the American Plywood Association, and the Vulcan Materials Association also supported the finding of a car shortage. These statistics, taken together with the Commission's post-war determination of a car shortage, portray a gradually worsening ratio of carrying capacity to revenue tons originated.The Commission further found that freight car shortages, in the sense that a particular road was unable to promptly supply freight cars to particular shippers who needed them, have occurred chronically, both during peak loading seasons each year and during times of national emergency. It is quite true, as appellees suggest, that inability of the roads to supply cars to shippers at particular times is not conclusive evidence that there is a national shortage of freight car ownership. Conceivably, freight car ownership could be adequate, yet poor utilization of the supply could result in shortages. Nonetheless, the Commission may fairly rely on these chronic shortages in availability of freight cars as one factor upon which to base its conclusion that there was an overall shortage of ownership of freight cars.The Commission also found that a surprisingly low percentage of freight cars was actually on the tracks of the roads owning the cars at any given time, and that this percentage had been decreasing during the period in question. In March, 1966, less than 30% of the railroads' plain boxcars were on the line of their owner, and, during the preceding year, that percentage Page 406 U. S. 751 remained mostly in the low thirties. The Commission summarized the factual situation it found in these words:"From the evidence adduced and the data collected, it is obvious that an adequate freight car supply is as much a problem today as it was during the period considered in our last proceeding in 1947. Car service which involves a shortage of approximately one out of every ten cars ordered or even one out of every fifteen cars ordered demands that every available means be marshalled to eliminate such deficiencies."335 I.C.C. at 285.One of the means marshaled by the Commission to eliminate such deficiencies was the promulgation of the two rules under attack here. The thrust of these rules is to require that freight cars, after unloading, be dispatched in the direction of the lines of the owning road.Thus, the Commission concluded after investigation that the railroads were frequently unable to supply shippers with freight cars. It reasoned from this fact, and from statistics showing a significantly more rapid decline in aggregate carrying capacity than in revenue tons originated, that an underlying and important cause of the unavailability of boxcars to shippers was that the Nation's railroads simply did not jointly own a sufficient number of freight cars to adequately serve shippers of goods over their lines. Because of the existence of the national pool of freight cars, whereby roads may service on-line shippers with foreign cars, it was difficult, if not impossible, to relate inadequate ownership statistically to any particular road or roads. The Commission therefore chose to make mandatory two of the car service rules that would have the effect of aligning more closely than at present the ownership of freight cars on the part of the road with the availability of those freight cars to the owning Page 406 U. S. 752 road for use of its on-line shippers. The result of these rules, over the long-term, the Commission reasoned, would be to bring home to those roads which themselves had an inadequate supply of cars to serve their on-line shippers that fact, and also, without doubt, to supply incentive to such roads to augment their supply of freight cars in order to adequately serve their on-line shippers. The national supply of freight cars would thereby be augmented, and the railroads, as a result, would be better able to supply the needs of shippers.Appellees' fundamental substantive contention is that the short-term consequences of the enforcement of these rules will so seriously disrupt established industry practices as to outweigh any possible long-term benefits in service that might accrue from them, and that, therefore, the rules are not "reasonable" as that term is used in the Esch Act. [Footnote 4] While, of course, conceding that the railroads themselves originally promulgated the rules for voluntary compliance, appellees argue that, because the rules have been observed largely in the breach, usages and practices have grown up that permit far more efficient utilization of the existing fleet of freight cars than would be permitted if the two rules in question were enforced by the Commission. Appellees state that, in reliance on the existence of a national pool of freight cars, and on the consequent availability to shippers of cars not owned by the line originating the shipment, manufacturing plants have been located and enlarged. Page 406 U. S. 753 They claim that enforcement of the rules now would seriously hamper the movement of freight traffic from these and other shipping points.It may be conceded that the immediate effect of the Commission's order will be to disrupt some established practices with respect to the handling and routing of freight cars, and, on occasion, to cause serious inconvenience to shippers and railroads alike. If the Commission were thrusting these regulations upon an admittedly smoothly functioning transportation industry, well supplied with necessary rolling stock and adequately serving all shippers, the rationality of its action might well be open to question.But such is not the case. The Commission's finding that there are recurring periods of significant length when there is not an adequate freight car supply to service shippers is supported by substantial evidence. While the flexible system of routing freight cars presently in existence may well have short-term advantages both for some shippers and some roads, the Commission could quite reasonably conclude that it has long-term drawbacks as well. The otherwise adverse effect on a road's ability to serve shippers that would result from its owning too few cars is cushioned; the beneficial effect on a road's ability to serve shippers that would result from its owning a sufficient supply of cars is dissipated. The Commission undoubtedly felt that rules designed only to most efficiently utilize the existing inadequate fleet of freight cars would have little or no effect on the nationwide shortage of such cars. Indeed, the appellees stress the concession by the Commission that these rules"are not designed to improve the utilization of freight cars, except insofar as return loading is compatible with the primary objective of increasing availability of cars to the owner."335 I.C.C. at 294.But only if we were to hold that Congress, in enacting Page 406 U. S. 754 the Esch Car Service Act, intended that the only criterion that the Commission might consider in establishing "reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service" was the optimum utilization of an existing fleet of freight cars, however numerically inadequate that fleet might be, could this argument be sustained. Neither the language that Congress used nor the legislative history of the Act supports such a narrow reading of its grant of authority to the Commission. On the record before it, the Commission was justified in deciding that the railroads and the shippers were afflicted with an economic illness that might have to get worse before it got better. Existing practices respecting car service tended to destroy any incentive on the part of railroads to acquire new cars, and the resulting failure to acquire new equipment contributed to an overall nationwide shortage of freight cars that prevented the railroad industry from adequately serving shippers. Car service rules that would tend to restore incentive to the various roads to augment their supply of freight cars, even at the temporary expense of optimum utilization of the existing fleet of freight cars, conform under these circumstances to the statutory requirement of reasonableness.Appellees support their claim that the Commission's promulgation of these rules is not "reasonable" under the Esch Act on two grounds not directly related to the rules' claimed adverse effect on the ability of the roads to serve shippers. They attack the absence of a Commission finding as to the financial ability of roads inadequately supplied with freight cars to purchase new ones, and they cite the conceded impossibility of obtaining complete compliance with the rules as additional evidence of their unreasonableness.The Commission's order does not require any road to purchase any freight cars. It abridges to some extent Page 406 U. S. 755 the existing practice among railroads of treating the freight cars that they own as a pool, and, for that reason, may ultimately cause roads that do not have an adequate supply of freight cars to serve on-line shippers to be less able to serve such shippers than they are now. If, as a result of this fact, such roads are placed under economic and competitive pressure to acquire additional freight cars, there is certainly no principle of law we know of that would require the Commission to permit them to avoid this economic pressure by continuing to borrow freight cars acquired and owned by other lines.The Commission, acceding to the arguments of shippers and railroads on rehearing, agreed that mandatory total compliance with the rules promulgated would be impossible in view of the tremendous number of units involved, and, accordingly a procedure by which exceptions might be applied for was established. How the provision for exceptions will be administered in practice is a matter about which we could only speculate at present. It is well established that an agency's authority to proceed in a complex area such as car service regulation by means of rules of general application entails a concomitant authority to provide exemption procedures in order to allow for special circumstances. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 390 U. S. 784-786 (1968). What bearing any of these factors might have on an action under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 1(17) for the collection of penalties for a violation of the rules in question is a question best decided in such a proceeding. The fact that violation of a rule promulgated under the Esch Car Service Act may be the basis for a proceeding to collect a penalty does not either expand or contract the statutory definition of "reasonable" found in that Act.What we have said thus far is enough to indicate our view that there is sufficient relationship between the Page 406 U. S. 756 Commission's conclusions and the factual bases in the record upon which it relied to substantively support this exercise of its authority under the Esch Act. Appellees press on us an additional claim that the Commission failed to comply with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, S U.S.C. § 551 et seq., citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156 (1962), and Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U. S. 645 (1954). Burlington Truck Lines is clearly inapposite, however, since, in that case, the Court was dealing with adjudication, not rulemaking. In criticizing the Commission's action there, the Court said that "the Administrative Procedure Act will not permit us to accept such adjudicatory practice," 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 167. In Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, supra, the Court reviewed the Commission's action not under the Administrative Procedure Act, but on the basis of its prior cases establishing the standard for judicial review of agency action. Commenting that,"[i]n dealing with technical and complex matters like these, the Commission must necessarily have wide discretion in formulating appropriate solutions,"the Court went on to conclude that the Commission "has not adequately explained its departure from prior norms, and has not sufficiently spelled out the legal basis of its decision." 347 U.S. at 347 U. S. 652-653. For the reasons previously stated, we find no such infirmities here.This Court has held that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173, 361 U. S. 192 (1959). Appellees claim that the Commission's procedure here departed from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 of the Act. Those sections, however, govern a rulemaking proceeding only when 5 U.S.C. § 553 so requires. The latter section, dealing generally with rulemaking, Page 406 U. S. 757 makes applicable the provisions of §§ 556 and 557 only "[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. . . ." The Esch Act, authorizing the Commission"after hearing, on a complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, [to] establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service . . . ,"49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a), does not require that such rules "be made on the record." 5 U.S.C. § 553. That distinction is determinative for this case. "A good deal of significance lies in the fact that some statutes do expressly require determinations on the record." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.08, p. 225 (1958). Sections 556 and 557 need be applied "only where the agency statute, in addition to providing a hearing, prescribes explicitly that it be on the record.'" Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 307, 314, 400 F.2d 778, 785 (1968); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc. v. Dillon, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 115 n. 9, 344 F.2d 497, 500 n. 9 (1965). Cf. First National Bank v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 96 U.S.App.D.C.194, 225 F.2d 33 (1955). We do not suggest that only the precise words "on the record" in the applicable statute will suffice to make §§ 556 and 557 applicable to rulemaking proceedings, but we do hold that the language of the Esch Car Service Act is insufficient to invoke these sections.Because the proceedings under review were an exercise of legislative rulemaking power, rather than adjudicatory hearings, as in Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U. S. 292 (1937), and because 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) does not require a determination "on the record," the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 were inapplicable. Page 406 U. S. 758This proceeding, therefore, was governed by the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring basically that notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register, that, after notice, the agency give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through appropriate submissions, and that, after consideration of the record so made, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. [Footnote 5] The "Findings" and "Conclusions" embodied in the Commission's report fully comply with these requirements, and nothing more was required by the Administrative Procedure Act.We conclude that the Commission's action in promulgating these rules was substantively authorized by the Esch Act and procedurally acceptable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The judgment of the District Court must therefore beReversed | U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972)United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.No. 71-227Argued March 27, 1972Decided June 7, 1972406 U.S. 742Syllabus1. Two "car service rues" promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), requiring generally that unloaded freight cars be returned in the direction of the owning railroad, are "reasonable" under the Esch Car Service Act of 1917 in view of the ICC's finding, for which there is substantial record support, of a national freight car shortage, and its conclusion that the shortage could be alleviated by mandatory observance of the rule, which would give the railroads greater use of their cars and provide an incentive for the purchase of new equipment. Pp. 744-755.2. The ICC proceeding in this case was governed by, and fully complied with, § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Pp. 756758.325 F. Supp. 352, reversed.REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. |
3,224 | 1968_776 | MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.This is before us on appellant's motion to dismiss its appeal under Rule 60. Ordinarily, parties may by consensus agree to dismissal of any appeal pending before this Court. [Footnote 1] However, there is an exception where the dismissal implicates a mandate we have entered in a cause. [Footnote 2] Our mandate is involved here. We therefore ordered oral argument at which all parties concerned were afforded an opportunity to be heard on the question whether there had been compliance with the mandate. 394 U.S. 970. At the oral argument, a number of appellees supported appellant's motion. They included the United States, the State of California, El Paso Natural Gas Company, Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, Intermountain Gas Company, Northwest Natural Gas Company, the Washington Page 395 U. S. 467 Water Power Company, Washington Natural Gas Company, Idaho Public Utilities Commission, Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon, Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Colorado Interstate Corporation, Southern California Gas Company, and Southern Counties Gas Company of California. The motion was opposed by John J. Flynn and I. Daniel Stewart, by brief amicus curiae, and by William M. Bennett, who appeared for the State of California when the case was last here, Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U. S. 129, 386 U. S. 131 (1967), and now presents himself, and argued orally, as "consumer spokesman." This is a Clayton Act § 7 case, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 18, in which the acquisition of the stock and assets of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation by El Paso Natural Gas Company raised the "ultimate issue" whether "the acquisition substantially lessened competition in the sale of natural gas in California." United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651, 376 U. S. 652. We ordered divestiture "without delay." Id. at 376 U. S. 662. That was in 1964. The United States later agreed to settle the case. As to that, we said:"We do not question the authority of the Attorney General to settle suits after, as well as before, they reach here. The Department of Justice, however, by stipulation or otherwise, has no authority to circumscribe the power of the courts to see that our mandate is carried out. No one except this Court has authority to alter or modify our mandate. United States v. du Pont & Co., 366 U. S. 316, 366 U. S. 325. Our direction was that the District Court provide for 'divestiture without delay.' That mandate, in the context of the opinion, plainly meant that Pacific Northwest or a new company be at once restored to a position where it could compete with El Paso in the California market."386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 136. Page 395 U. S. 468We set aside that consent decree and remanded for additional findings and a new solution, saying:"In the present case, protection of California interests in a competitive system was at the heart of our mandate directing divestiture. For it was the absorption of Pacific Northwest by El Paso that stifled that competition and disadvantaged the California interests. It was, indeed, their interests, as part of the public interest in a competitive system, that our mandate was designed to protect."Id. at 386 U. S. 135.On remand, the District Court decided it should choose from among the various applicants the one that is "best qualified to make New Company a serious competitor" in the California market. That court chose Colorado Interstate Corp., the only gas pipeline operator among the various applicants.Under the plan approved by the District Court, El Paso receives 5,000,000 shares of New Company nonvoting preferred stock, convertible into common stock at the end of five years. What the conversion ratio will be is not known, but, it is said, there will be provisions to restrict Fl Paso control over the New Company. The New Company also assumes approximately $170,000,000 of El Paso's system-wide bond and debenture indebtedness, an amount designated the Northwest Division's pro-rata share of that indebtedness.Utah's jurisdictional statement, which she now moves to dismiss, was filed here November 25, 1968. That jurisdictional statement presents the question whether the decree entered below satisfies our mandate. It is the filing of that jurisdictional statement that brings the question here. See United States v. du Pont & Co., 366 U. S. 316. In fact, in its jurisdictional statement, Utah urged that the decree does not meet the requirements of Page 395 U. S. 469 du Pont. We thus need not decide whether the papers filed by amicus curiae or Mr. Bennett properly presented the question of compliance. We find that the decree of the District Court does not comply with our mandate: it does not apportion the gas reserves between El Paso and New Company in a manner consistent with the purpose of the mandate, and it does not provide for complete divestiture. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.IWhen the case was last here we said,"The gas reserves granted the New Company must be no less in relation to present existing reserves than Pacific Northwest had when it was independent, and the new gas reserves developed since the merger must be equitably divided between El Paso and the New Company. We are told by the intervenors that El Paso gets the new reserves in the San Juan Basin -- which, due to their geographical propinquity to California, are critical to competition in that market. But the merged company, which discovered them, represented the interests both of El Paso and of Pacific Northwest. We do not know what an equitable division would require. Hearings are necessary, followed by meticulous findings made in light of the competitive requirements to which we have adverted."386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 136-137.The District Court awarded 21.8% of the San Juan Basin reserves to the New Company, saying that was "no less in relation to present existing reserves" than Northwest had when it was independent. The District Court also gave the New Company more than 50% of the net additions to the reserves developed since the merger. Concededly, the total reserves of the New Company will not be sufficient to meet the old Northwest's existing requirements and those of a California project. Page 395 U. S. 470This attempt to paralyze competition in the California market started years ago; the Clayton Act suit was filed in 1957. The record up to the entry of the present decree shows, as the District Court found, that delay has strengthened El Paso's position. First, the delay has strengthened El Paso's hold on the California market, making it more and more difficult for a new out-of-state supplier to enter. Second, an additional out-of-state supplier has entered the California market during this 12-year period, taking what well might have been the place of the old Northwest Company had not its competition been stifled. Third, permits for new pipelines from Texas to California are now pending before the Federal Power Commission.The purpose of our mandate was to restore competition in the California market. An allocation of gas reserves should be made which is "equitable" with that purpose in mind. The position of the New Company must be strengthened, and the leverage of El Paso not increased. That is to say, an allocation of gas reserves -- particularly those in the San Juan Basin -- must be made to rectify, if possible, the manner in which El Paso has used the illegal merger to strengthen its position in the California market. The object of the allocation of gas reserves must be to place New Company in the same relative competitive position vis-a-vis El Paso in the California market as that which Pacific Northwest enjoyed immediately prior to the illegal merger.A reallocation of gas reserves under this standard may permit an applicant other than Colorado Interstate Corporation to acquire New Company and make it a competitive force in California. Thus, the District Court is directed to effect this reallocation of gas reserves, and, in light of the reallocation, to reopen consideration of which applicant should acquire New Company. Such Page 395 U. S. 471 consideration should, of course, include whether an award to a particular applicant will have any anti-competitive effects either in the California market or in other markets.IIOur mandate directed complete divestiture. The District Court did not, however, direct complete divestiture. Neither appellant nor any party supporting the dismissal argues that the District Court did so. Rather, they argue that the disposition made by the District Court was the best that might be made without complete divestiture. Clearly this does not comply with our mandate. United States v. du Pont & Co., 366 U. S. 316, was another § 7 case in which we ordered "complete divestiture." Id. at 366 U. S. 328. One plan proposed was a distribution of General Motors shares held by du Pont, most of them to be distributed pro rata over a 10-year period to du Pont stockholders, the rest were to be sold gradually over the same 10-year period. Id. at 366 U. S. 319-320. Du Pont's alternate plan was to retain all attributes of ownership, passing through to its shareholders the voting rights proportional to their holdings of du Pont shares. We did not approve that plan, but directed "complete divestiture." Id. at 366 U. S. 334. We said:"The very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy. Divestiture or dissolution has traditionally been the remedy for Sherman Act violations whose heart is intercorporate combination and control."366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 329. We said that divestiture only of voting rights was not an adequate remedy. What was necessary was dissolution "of the intercorporate community of interest which we found to violate the law." Id. at 366 U. S. 331.The reason advanced for allowing El Paso to take a stock interest in the New Company, rather than cash is to reduce its income tax burden. We have emphasized Page 395 U. S. 472 that the pinch on private interests is not relevant to fashioning an antitrust decree, as the public interest is our sole concern. United States v. du Pont & Co., supra, at 366 U. S. 326.The same reasoning is applicable to the present case. Retention by El Paso and its stockholders of the preferred stock is perpetuation to a degree of the illegal intercorporate community. Assumption of $170,000,000 of El Paso's indebtedness helps keep the two companies in league. The severance of all managerial and all financial connections between El Paso and the New Company must be complete for the decree to satisfy our mandate. Only a cash sale will satisfy the rudiments of complete divestiture.We vacate the judgment of the District Court, and remand the cause for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtUtah Pub. Svc. Comm'n v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969)Utah Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.No. 776Argued April 29, 1969Decided June 16, 1969395 U.S. 464SyllabusIn United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651 (1964), this Court ordered that appellee El Paso Natural Gas Co. divest itself of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Co., which El Paso was held to have acquired in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. On remand, the Government and El Paso entered into a consent decree that would have transferred the illegally acquired assets to a New Company. In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U. S. 129 (1967), the Court set the consent decree aside as being contrary to the divestiture mandate, which was designed to restore competition in the California market, and suggested guidelines for an appropriate decree. The District Court, on the second remand, then chose Colorado Interstate Gas Co. as the applicant "best qualified to make New Company a serious competitor" in the California market. El Paso was to receive 5,000,000 shares of New Company nonvoting preferred stock convertible into common stock after five years. New Company was to assume Northwest Division's pro-rata share (about $170,000,000) of El Paso's system-wide bond and debenture indebtedness. The District Court awarded the New Company 21.8% of the San Juan Basin gas reserves, which it said was "no less in relation to present existing reserves" than Northwest had when it was independent, and also gave the New Company more than 50% of the net additions to the reserves developed since the merger, though concededly the New Company's total reserves will not meet the old Northwest's existing requirements and those of a California project. Appellant filed a jurisdictional statement in this Court presenting the question whether the District Court's decree comported with this Court's mandate, but later moved to dismiss its appeal under Rule 60. The motion to dismiss was supported by a number of appellees and opposed by an amicus curiae and a "consumer spokesman," and the Court ordered oral Page 395 U. S. 465 argument as to whether there had been compliance with its mandate.Held:1. The filing of a motion under Rule 60 to dismiss the appeal does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to determine whether the mandate it issued in this case has been complied with. P. 395 U. S. 466.2. The District Court's decree does not comply with this Court's mandate. Pp. 395 U. S. 469-472.(a) The allocation of gas reserves (particularly those in the San Juan Basin) must place the New Company in the same relative competitive position in the California market vis-a-vis El Paso as Pacific Northwest occupied before the illegal merger. The District Court's decree fails to meet that objective, and that court must therefore reconsider the question of which applicant, in light of the reallocation, should acquire the New Company. Pp. 395 U. S. 470-471.(b) In order to accomplish the complete divestiture which this Court mandated all managerial and financial connections between El Paso and the New Company must be severed, and there must be a cash sale of Northwest Division. Pp. 395 U. S. 471-472.291 F. Supp. 3, vacated and remanded. Page 395 U. S. 466 |
3,225 | 1968_574 | MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.This case involves the application of § 811(c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to a so-called "reciprocal trust" situation. [Footnote 1] After Joseph P. Grace's Page 395 U. S. 318 death in 1950, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the value of a trust created by his wife was includible in his gross estate. A deficiency was assessed and paid, and, after denial of a claim for a refund, this refund suit was brought. The Court of Claims, with two judges dissenting, ruled that the value of the trust was not includible in decedent's estate under § 811(c)(1)(B), and entered judgment for respondent. Estate of Grace v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 745, 393 F.2d 939 (1968). We granted certiorari because of an alleged conflict between the decision below and certain decisions in the courts of appeals and because of the importance of the issue presented to the administration of the federal estate tax laws. 393 U.S. 975 (1968). We reverse.IDecedent was a very wealthy man at the time of his marriage to the late Janet Grace in 1908. Janet Grace had no wealth or property of her own, but, between 1908 and 1931, decedent transferred to her a large amount of personal and real property, including the family's Long Island estate. Decedent retained effective control over the family's business affairs, including the property transferred to his wife. She took no interest and no part in business affairs, and relied upon her husband's judgment. Whenever some formal action was required regarding property in her name, decedent would have the appropriate instrument prepared, and she would execute it.On December 15, 1931, decedent executed a trust instrument, hereinafter called the Joseph Grace trust. Page 395 U. S. 319 Named a trustees were decedent, his nephew, and a third party. The trustees were directed to pay the income of the trust to Janet Grace during her lifetime, and to pay to her any part of the principal which a majority of the trustees might deem advisable. Janet was given the power to designate, by will or deed, the manner in which the trust estate remaining at her death was to be distributed among decedent and their children. The trust properties included securities and real estate interests.On December 30, 1931, Janet Grace executed a trust instrument, hereinafter called the Janet Grace trust, which was virtually identical to the Joseph Grace trust. The trust properties included the family estate and corporate securities, all of which had been transferred to her by decedent in preceding years.The trust instruments were prepared by one of decedent's employees in accordance with a plan devised by decedent to create additional trusts before the advent of a new gift tax expected to be enacted the next year. Decedent selected the properties to be included in each trust. Janet Grace, acting in accordance with this plan, executed her trust instrument at decedent's request.Janet Grace died in 1937. The Joseph Grace trust terminated at her death. Her estate's federal estate tax return disclosed the Janet Grace trust and reported it as a nontaxable transfer by Janet Grace. The Commissioner asserted that the Janet and Joseph Grace trusts were "reciprocal," and asserted a deficiency to the extent of mutual value. Compromises on unrelated issues resulted in 55% of the smaller of the two trusts, the Janet Grace trust, being included in her gross estate.Joseph Grace died in 1950. The federal estate tax return disclosed both trusts. The Joseph Grace trust was reported as a nontaxable transfer, and the Janet Grace trust was reported as a trust under which decedent Page 395 U. S. 320 held a limited power of appointment. Neither trust was included in decedent's gross estate.The Commissioner determined that the Joseph and Janet Grace trusts were "reciprocal," and included the amount of the Janet Grace trust in decedent's gross estate. A deficiency in the amount of $363,500.97, plus interest, was assessed and paid.IISection 811(c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided that certain transferred property in which a decedent retained a life interest was to be included in his gross estate. The general purpose of the statute was to include in a decedent's gross estate transfers that are essentially testamentary -- i.e., transfers which leave the transferor a significant interest in or control over the property transferred during his lifetime. See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632, 335 U. S. 643-644 (1949).The doctrine of reciprocal trusts was formulated in response to attempts to draft instruments which seemingly avoid the literal terms of § 811(c)(1)(B), while still leaving the decedent the lifetime enjoyment of his property. [Footnote 2] The doctrine dates from Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (C.A.2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1040). In Lehman, decedent and his brother owned equal shares in certain stocks and bonds. Each brother placed his interest in trust for the other's benefit for life, with remainder to the life tenant's issue. Each brother also gave the other the right to withdraw $150,000 of the principal. If the brothers had each reserved the right to withdraw $150,000 from the trust that each had created, the trusts would have been includible in their gross estates as interests of which each Page 395 U. S. 321 had made a transfer with a power to revoke. When one of the brothers died, his estate argued that neither trust was includible, because the decedent did not have a power over a trust which he had created.The Second Circuit disagreed. That court ruled that the effect of the transfers was the same as if the decedent had transferred his stock in trust for himself, remainder to his issue, and had reserved the right to withdraw $150,000. The court reasoned:"The fact that the trusts were reciprocated or 'crossed' is a trifle, quite lacking in practical or legal significance. . . . The law searches out the reality, and is not concerned with the form."109 F.2d at 100. The court ruled that the decisive point was that each brother caused the other to make a transfer by establishing his own trust.The doctrine of reciprocal trusts has been applied numerous times since the Lehman decision. [Footnote 3] It received congressional approval in § 6 of the Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 893. [Footnote 4] The present case is, however, this Court's first examination of the doctrine.The Court of Claims was divided over the requirements for application of the doctrine to the situation of this case. Relying on some language in Lehman and certain other courts of appeals' decisions, [Footnote 5] the majority held that Page 395 U. S. 322 the crucial factor was whether the decedent had established his trust as consideration for the establishment of the trust of which he was a beneficiary. The court ruled that decedent had not established his trust as a quid pro quo for the Janet Grace trust, and that Janet Grace had not established her trust in exchange for the Joseph Grace trust. Rather, the trusts were found to be part of an established pattern of family giving, with neither party desiring to obtain property from the other. Indeed, the court found that Janet Grace had created her trust because decedent requested that she do so. It therefore found the reciprocal trust doctrine inapplicable.The court recognized that certain cases had established a slightly different test for reciprocity. [Footnote 6] Those cases inferred consideration from the establishment of two similar trusts at about the same time. The court held that any inference of consideration was rebutted by the evidence in the case, particularly the lack of any evidence of an estate tax avoidance motive on the part of the Graces. In contrast, the dissent felt that the majority's approach placed entirely too much weight on subjective intent. Once it was established that the trusts were interrelated, the dissent felt that the subjective intent of the parties in establishing the trusts should become irrelevant. The relevant factor was whether the trusts created by the settlors placed each other in approximately the same objective economic position as they would have been in if each had created his own trust with himself, rather than the other, as life beneficiary.We agree with the dissent that the approach of the Court of Claims majority places too much emphasis on the subjective intent of the parties in creating the trusts, and for that reason, hinders proper application of the federal estate tax laws. It is true that there is language Page 395 U. S. 323 in Lehman and other cases that would seem to support the majority's approach. It is also true that the results in some of those cases arguably support the decision below. [Footnote 7] Nevertheless, we think that these cases are not in accord with this Court's prior decisions interpreting related provisions of the federal estate tax laws.Emphasis on the subjective intent of the parties in creating the trusts, particularly when those parties are members of the same family unit, creates substantial obstacles to the proper application of the federal estate tax laws. As this Court said in Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 335 U. S. 705-706 (1949):"Any requirement . . . [of] a post-death attempt to probe the settlor's thoughts in regard to the transfer would partially impair the effectiveness of . . . [section 811(c)] as an instrument to frustrate estate tax evasions."We agree that"the taxability of a trust corpus . . . does not hinge on a settlor's motives, but depends on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer."Id. at 335 U. S. 705. See also Commissioner v. Estate of Church, supra.We think these observations have particular weight when applied to the reciprocal trust situation. First, inquiries into subjective intent, especially in intrafamily transfers, are particularly perilous. The present case illustrates that it is, practically speaking, impossible to determine after the death of the parties what they had in mind in creating trusts over 30 years earlier. Second, there is a high probability that such a trust arrangement was indeed created for tax avoidance purposes. And, even if there was no estate tax avoidance motive, the settlor, in a very real and objective sense, did retain an economic interest while purporting to give away his Page 395 U. S. 324 property. [Footnote 8] Finally, it is unrealistic to assume that the settlors of the trusts, usually members of one family unit, will have created their trusts as a bargained-for exchange for the other trust. "Consideration," in the traditional legal sense, simply does not normally enter into such intrafamily transfers. [Footnote 9]For these reasons, we hold that application of the reciprocal trust doctrine is not dependent upon a finding that each trust was created as a quid pro quo for the other. Such a "consideration" requirement necessarily involves a difficult inquiry into the subjective intent of the settlors. Nor do we think it necessary to prove the existence of a tax avoidance motive. As we have said above, standards of this sort, which rely on subjective factors, are rarely workable under the federal estate tax laws. Rather, we hold that application of the reciprocal trust doctrine requires only that the trusts be interrelated, and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic position as they would have been in had they created trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries. [Footnote 10] Page 395 U. S. 325Applying this test to the present case, we think it clear that the value of the Janet Grace trust fund must be included in decedent's estate for federal estate tax purposes. It is undisputed that the two trusts are interrelated. They are substantially identical in terms, and were created at approximately the same time. Indeed, they were part of a single transaction designed and carried out by decedent. It is also clear that the transfers in trust left each party, to the extent of mutual value, in the same objective economic position as before. Indeed, it appears, as would be expected in transfers between husband and wife, that the effective position of each party vis-a-vis the property did not change at all. It is no answer that the transferred properties were different in character. For purposes of the estate tax, we think that economic value is the only workable criterion. Joseph Grace's estate remained undiminished to the extent of the value of his wife's trust, and the value of his estate must accordingly be increased by the value of that trust.The Judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969)United States v. Estate of GraceNo. 574Argued April 22, 1969Decided June 2, 1969395 U.S. 316SyllabusIn 1931 decedent, Joseph Grace, executed a trust instrument providing for payment of income to his wife, Janet, for her life, with payment to her of any part of the principal which a majority of the trustees thought advisable. Mrs. Grace was given power to designate the manner in which the trust estate remaining at her death was to be distributed among decedent and their children. Shortly thereafter, Janet Grace, at decedent's request, executed a virtually identical trust instrument naming decedent as life beneficiary, with the trust corpus consisting of the family estate and securities which decedent had transferred to his wife in preceding years. Upon decedent's death in 1950, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the trusts were "reciprocal," and included the amount of the Janet Grace trust in decedent's gross estate. A deficiency was assessed and paid, and this refund suit was filed. The Court of Claims held that the value of the trust was not includible in decedent's estate under § 811(c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which provided that certain transferred property in which a decedent retained a life interest was to be included in his gross estate.Held: The doctrine of reciprocal trusts, which was formulated in response to attempts to draft instruments which seemingly avoid the literal terms of § 811(c)(1)(B) while still leaving the decedent the lifetime enjoyment of his property, Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99, applies here, and the value of decedent's estate must include the value of the Janet Grace trust. Pp. 395 U. S. 320-325.(a) "[T]he taxability of a trust corpus . . . does not hinge on a settlor's motives, but depends upon the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer," and, in the reciprocal trust situation, inquiries into subjective intent, especially in intrafamily transfers, create obstacles to the proper application of the federal tax laws. P. 395 U. S. 323.(b) The application of the reciprocal trust doctrine does not depend on a finding that each trust was created as consideration for the other, and does not require a tax avoidance motive, as such standards, relying on subjective factors, are rarely workable under federal estate tax laws. Pp. 395 U. S. 323-324. Page 395 U. S. 317(c) The application of the doctrine requires that the trusts be interrelated, and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic position as if they had created trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries. P. 395 U. S. 324.(d) Here, the trusts are interrelated, as they are substantially identical and were part of a single transaction designed and carried out by the decedent, and the transfers in trust, even though of properties of different character, left each party, to the extent of mutual value, in the same objective economic position as before. P. 395 U. S. 325.183 Ct.Cl. 745, 393 F.2d 939, reversed and remanded. |
3,226 | 1967_335 | MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.Hanover Shoe, Inc. (hereafter Hanover) is a manufacturer of shoes and a customer of United Shoe Machinery Corporation (hereafter United), a manufacturer and distributor of shoe machinery. In 1954, this Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 110 F. Supp. 295 (1953), in favor of the United States in a civil action against United under § 4 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 4. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 347 U. S. 521. In 1955, Hanover brought the present treble damage action against United in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In 1965, the District Court rendered judgment for Hanover and awarded trebled damages, including interest, of $4,239,609, as well as $650,000 in counsel fees. 245 F. Supp. 258. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the finding of liability, but disagreed with the District Court on certain questions relating to the damage award. 377 F.2d 776 (1967). Both Hanover and United sought review of the Court of Appeals' decision, and we granted both petitions. 389 U.S. 818 (1967).IHanover's action against United alleged that United had monopolized the shoe machinery industry in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; that United's practice of leasing and refusing to sell its more complicated and important shoe machinery had been an instrument of the unlawful monopolization, and that, therefore, Hanover Page 392 U. S. 484 should recover from United the difference between what it paid United in shoe machine rentals and what it would have paid had United been willing during the relevant period to sell those machinesSection 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 69 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a), makes a final judgment or decree in any civil or criminal suit brought by the United States under the antitrust laws "prima facie evidence . . . as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto. . . ." Relying on this provision, Hanover submitted the findings, opinion, and decree rendered by Judge Wyzanski in the Government's case as evidence that United monopolized and that the practice of refusing to sell machines was an instrument of the monopolization. United does not contest that prima facie weight is to be given to the judgment in the Government's case. It does, however, contend that Judge Wyzanski's decision did not determine that the practice of leasing and refusing to sell was an instrument of monopolization. This claim, rejected by the courts below, is the threshold issue in No. 463. If the 1953 judgment is not prima facie evidence of the illegality of the practice from which Hanover's asserted injury arose, then Hanover, having offered no other convincing evidence of illegality, should not have recovered at all. [Footnote 1]Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the lease only policy had been held illegal in Page 392 U. S. 485 the Government's suit. We find no error in that determination. It is true that § 4 of the decree, [Footnote 2] on which United relies, condemned only certain clauses in the standard lease, and that nowhere in the decree was any other aspect of United's leasing system expressly described or characterized as illegal monopolization. It is also arguable that § 5 of the decree, which required that United thenceforward not "offer for lease any machine type, unless it also offers such type for sale," was included merely to insure an effective remedy to dissipate the accumulated consequences of United's monopolization. We are not, however, limited to the decree in determining the extent of estoppel resulting from the judgment in the Government's case. If, by reference to the findings, opinion, and decree, it is determined that an issue was actually adjudicated in an antitrust suit brought by the Government, the private plaintiff can treat the outcome of the Government's case as prima facie evidence on that issue. See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U. S. 558, 340 U. S. 566-569 (1951).Section 5 of the decree would have been a justifiable remedy even if the practice it banned had not been instrumental in the monopolization of the market. But, in our view, the trial court's findings and opinion put on firm ground the proposition that the Government's case involved condemnation of the lease only system as such. In both its opinion with respect to violation and its opinion with respect to remedy, the court not only dealt with the objectionable clauses in the standard Page 392 U. S. 486 lease, but also addressed itself to the consequences of only leasing machines and to the manner in which that practice related to the maintenance of United's monopoly power. [Footnote 3] These portions of the court's opinion are well supported by its findings of fact, which also estop United as against the Government and which therefore constitute prima facie evidence in this case. We have set out the relevant findings in an 392 U.S. 481app|>Appendix to this opinion. They are themselves sufficient to show that the lease only system played a significant role in United's monopolization of the shoe machinery market. Those findings were not limited to the particular provisions of United's Page 392 U. S. 487 leases. They dealt as well with United's policy of leasing but not selling its important machines, with the advantages of that practice to United, and with its impact on potential and actual competition. When the applicable standard for determining monopolization under § 2 is applied to these facts, it must be concluded that the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that United's practice of leasing and refusing to sell its major machines was determined to be illegal monopolization in the Government's case. [Footnote 4]IIThe District Court found that Hanover would have bought, rather than leased, from United had it been given the opportunity to do so. [Footnote 5] The District Court determined that, if United had sold its important machines, the cost to Hanover would have been less than the rental paid for leasing these same machines. This difference in cost, trebled, is the judgment awarded to Hanover in the District Court. United claims, however, that Hanover suffered no legally cognizable injury, contending Page 392 U. S. 488 that the illegal overcharge during the damage period was reflected in the price charged for shoes sold by Hanover to its customers, and that Hanover, if it had bought machines at lower prices, would have charged less and made no more profit than it made by leasing. At the very least, United urges, the District Court should have determined on the evidence offered whether these contentions were correct. The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, rejected this assertion of the so-called "passing-on" defense, and we affirm that judgment. [Footnote 6]Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides that any person"who shall be injured Page 392 U. S. 489 in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained. . . ."We think it sound to hold that, when a buyer shows that the price paid by him for materials purchased for use in his business is illegally high, and also shows the amount of the overcharge, he has made out a prima facie case of injury and damage within the meaning of § 4.If, in the face of the overcharge, the buyer does nothing and absorbs the loss, he is entitled to treble damages. This much seems conceded. The reason is that he has paid more than he should, and his property has been illegally diminished, for, had the price paid been lower, his profits would have been higher. It is also clear that, if the buyer, responding to the illegal price, maintains his own price but takes steps to increase his volume or to decrease other costs, his right to damages is not destroyed. Though he may manage to maintain his profit level, he would have made more if his purchases from the defendant had cost him less. We hold that the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the price for his own product. As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller remains illegally high, and his profits would be greater were his costs lower.Fundamentally, this is the view stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906), where Atlanta sued the defendants for treble damages for antitrust violations in connection with the city's purchases of pipe for its waterworks system. The Court affirmed a judgment in favor of the city for an amount measured by the difference between the price paid and what the market or fair price would have been had the sellers not combined, Page 392 U. S. 490 the Court saying that the city"was injured in its property, at least, if not in its business of furnishing water, by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe. A person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his property."Id. at 203 U. S. 396. The same approach was evident in Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917), another treble damage antitrust case. [Footnote 7] With respect to overcharge cases arising under the transportation laws, similar views were expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U. S. 531, 245 U. S. 533 (1918), and by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397, 286 U. S. 406-408 (1932). In those cases, the possibility that plaintiffs had recouped the overcharges from their customers was held irrelevant in assessing damages. [Footnote 8] Page 392 U. S. 491United seeks to limit the general principle that the victim of an overcharge is damaged within the meaning of § 4 to the extent of that overcharge. The rule, United argues, should be subject to the defense that economic Page 392 U. S. 492 circumstances were such that the overcharged buyer could only charge his customers a higher price because the price to him was higher. It is argued that, in such circumstances, the buyer suffers no loss from the overcharge. This situation might be present, it is said, where the overcharge is imposed equally on all of a buyer's competitors and where the demand for the buyer's product is so inelastic that the buyer and his competitors could all increase their prices by the amount of the cost increase without suffering a consequent decline in sales. We are not impressed with the argument that sound laws of economics require recognizing this defense. A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normally, the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, Page 392 U. S. 493 had one fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world, rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the overcharge, and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge, or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense would require a convincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable. [Footnote 9] On the other hand, it is not unlikely that, if the existence of the defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defendants will frequently seek to establish its applicability. Treble damage actions would often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories. Page 392 U. S. 494In addition, if buyers are subjected to the passing-on defense, those who buy from them would also have to meet the challenge that they passed on the higher price to their customers. These ultimate consumers, in today's case, the buyers of single pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit, and little interest in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws by price-fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against them. Treble damage actions, the importance of which the Court has many times emphasized, would be substantially reduced in effectiveness.Our conclusion is that Hanover proved injury and the amount of its damages for the purposes of its treble damage suit when it proved that United had overcharged it during the damage period and showed the amount of the overcharge; United was not entitled to assert a passing-on defense. We recognize that there might be situations -- for instance, when an overcharged buyer has a preexisting "cost-plus" contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged -- where the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted in this case would not be present. We also recognize that, where no differential can be proved between the price unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was required by law to charge, establishing damages might require a showing of loss of profits to the buyer. [Footnote 10] Page 392 U. S. 495IIIThe District Court held that Hanover was entitled to damages for the period commencing July 1, 1939, and terminating September 21, 1955. The former date represented the greatest retrospective reach permitted under the applicable statute of limitations, and the latter date was that upon which Hanover filed its suit. In addition to somewhat shortening the forward reach of the damage period, [Footnote 11] the Court of Appeals ruled that June 10, 1946, rather than July 1, 1939, marked the commencement of the damages period. June 10, 1946, was the date this Court decided American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, which endorsed the views of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945). In the case before us, the Court of Appeals concluded that the decisions in Alcoa-American Tobacco fundamentally altered the law of monopolization -- that, prior to them, it was necessary to prove the existence of predatory practices as well as monopoly power, whereas, afterwards, proof of predatory practices was not essential. The Court of Appeals was also of the view that, because, in prior litigation, United's leases had escaped condemnation as predatory practices illegal under § 1, United's conduct should not be held to have violated § 2 at any time prior to June 10, 1946. 377 F.2d at 790. This holding has been challenged, and we reverse it. Page 392 U. S. 496The theory of the Court of Appeals seems to have been that, when a party has significantly relied upon a clear and established doctrine, and the retrospective application of a newly declared doctrine would upset that justifiable reliance to his substantial injury, considerations of justice and fairness require that the new rule apply prospectively only. Pointing to recent decisions of this Court in the area of the criminal law, the Court of Appeals could see no reason why the considerations which had favored only prospective application in those cases should not be applied as well as in the civil area, especially in a treble damage action. There is, of course, no reason to confront this theory unless we have before us a situation in which there was a clearly declared judicial doctrine upon which United relied and under which its conduct was lawful, a doctrine which was overruled in favor of a new rule according to which conduct performed in reliance upon the old rule would have been unlawful. Because we do not believe that this case presents such a situation, we have no occasion to pass upon the theory of the Court of Appeals.Neither the opinion in Alcoa nor the opinion in American Tobacco indicated that the issue involved was novel, that innovative principles were necessary to resolve it, or that the issue had been settled in prior cases in a manner contrary to the view held by those courts. In ruling that it was not necessary to exclude competitors to be guilty of monopolization, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied upon a long line of cases in this Court stretching back to 1912. 148 F.2d at 429. The conclusion that actions which will show monopolization are not "limited to manoeuvres not honestly industrial" was also premised on earlier opinions of this Court, particularly United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 286 U. S. 116 (1932). In the American Tobacco case, this Court noted Page 392 U. S. 497 that the precise question before it had not been previously decided, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 811, and gave no indication that it thought it was adopting a radically new interpretation of the Sherman Act. Like the Court of Appeals, this Court relied for its conclusion upon existing authorities. [Footnote 12] These cases make it clear that there was no accepted Page 392 U. S. 498 interpretation of the Sherman Act which conditioned a finding of monopolization under § 2 upon a showing of predatory practices by the monopolist. [Footnote 13] In neither case was there such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one. Whatever Page 392 U. S. 499 development in antitrust law was brought about was based to a great extent on existing authorities, and was an extension of doctrines which had been growing and developing over the years. These cases did not constitute a sharp break in the line of earlier authority or an avulsive change which caused the current of the law thereafter to flow between new banks. We cannot say that, prior to those cases, potential antitrust defendants would have been justified in thinking that then-current antitrust doctrines permitted them to do all acts conducive to the creation or maintenance of a monopoly so long as they avoided direct exclusion of competitors or other predatory acts. [Footnote 14]United relies heavily on three Sherman Act cases brought against it or its predecessors by the United States and decided by this Court. United argues that these cases demonstrate both that, before Alcoa-American Tobacco, the law was substantially different, and that its leasing practices had been deemed by this Court not to be instruments of monopolization. United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202 (1913); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of New Jersey, 247 U. S. 32 (1918); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922). In our opinion, however, United overreads and exaggerates the significance of these three cases. In Winslow, the Government charged the three groups of companies which had merged to form United with a violation of § 1. The trial court construed the indictment to pertain only to the merger of the companies, and not to business practices which resulted from the merger; most significantly, it excluded United's leasing policies Page 392 U. S. 500 from consideration. The Court specifically stated that "[t]he validity of the leases or of a combination contemplating them cannot be passed upon in this case." 227 U.S. at 227 U. S. 217.The third case, decided in 1922, was brought under § 3 of the Clayton Act, rather than § 2 of the Sherman Act. This Court affirmed a decree enjoining United from making leases containing certain clauses, terms, and conditions. Nothing in that case indicates that predatory practices had to be shown to prove a § 2 monopoly charge or that the leases, or the clauses in them which were left undisturbed, would not adequately demonstrate monopolization by an enterprise with monopoly power.Of the three cases, the 1918 case most strongly supports United. It involved a civil action by the United States charging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Government contended that United's machinery leases and license agreements had been used to consummate both violations. A three-judge court dismissed the bill, and this Court affirmed by a vote of 4 to 3. There is no question but that the leases, as they were then constituted, were held unassailable under § 1; the reasons for this ruling are not clear. As for the § 2 charge, we cannot read the opinion as specifying what course of conduct would amount to monopolization under § 2 if engaged in by a concern with monopoly power. At most, the holding was that the leases themselves did not prove a § 2 charge -- did not themselves prove monopoly power, as well as monopolization. But the issue in the case before us now is not whether United's leasing system proves monopoly power, but whether, once monopoly power is shown, leasing the way United leased sufficiently shows an intent to exercise that power. There is little, if anything, in the 1918 opinion which is illuminating on this issue. Indeed, it may fairly be read as holding that United did not have monopoly power over the market at all, for, in rejecting the claim that United's practice of Page 392 U. S. 501 leasing was illegal when used by a corporation dominant in the market, the Court said:"This, however, is assertion, and relies for its foundation upon the assumption of an illegal dominance by the United Company that has been found not to exist. This element, therefore, must be put to one side, and the leases regarded in and of themselves and by the incentives that induced their execution. . . ."247 U.S. at 247 U. S. 60.Any comfort United might have received from the 1918 case with respect to the legality of its leasing system when employed by one with monopoly power should have been short-lived. In the third case, which was brought under § 3 of the Clayton Act and in which all the remaining Justices making up the majority in the 1918 case except Mr. Justice McKenna voted with the Court, the opinion for the Court described the 1918 decision as follows:"That the leases were attacked under the former bill as violative of the Sherman Act is true, but they were sustained as valid and binding agreements within the rights of holders of patents."258 U.S. at 258 U. S. 460. This view was supported by other references to the 1918 opinion which described the question at issue there as being whether United's leases went beyond the exercise of a lawful monopoly.One might possibly disagree with this reading of the 1918 opinion, but it was an authoritative gloss. After 1922, and after the expiration of the patents on its major machines, there was no sound basis to justify reliance by United on the 1918 case as a definitive pronouncement that its leasing system provided legally insufficient evidence of monopolization, once United's power over the market was satisfactorily shown. The prior cases immunized United's monopoly insofar as it originated Page 392 U. S. 502 in a merger of allegedly competing companies, and perhaps are of some help to United in other respects. But they do not establish either that, prior to 1946, there was a well defined interpretation of the Sherman Act which was abruptly overruled in Alcoa-American Tobacco, or that United's leasing system could not be considered an instrument for the exercise and maintenance of monopoly power.In these circumstances, there is no room for argument that Hanover's damages should reach back only to the date of the American Tobacco decision. Having rejected the contention that Alcoa-American Tobacco changed the law of monopolization in a way which should be given only prospective effect, it follows that Hanover is entitled to damages for the entire period permitted by the applicable statute of limitations. [Footnote 15]IVTwo questions are raised here about the manner in which damages were computed by the courts below. Hanover argues that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring the District Court, on remand, to take account of the additional taxes Hanover would have paid had it purchased machines, instead of renting them, during the years in question. The Court of Appeals evidently Page 392 U. S. 503 felt that, since only after-tax profits can be reinvested or distributed to shareholders, Hanover was damaged only to the extent of the after-tax profits that it failed to receive. The view of the Court of Appeals is sound in theory, but it overlooks the fact that, in practice, the Internal Revenue Service has taxed recoveries for tortious deprivation of profits at the time the recoveries are made, not by reopening the earlier years. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426 (1955). As Hanover points out, since it will be taxed when it recovers damages from United for both the actual and the trebled damages, to diminish the actual damages by the amount of the taxes that it would have paid had it received greater profits in the years it was damaged would be to apply a double deduction for taxation, leaving Hanover with less income than it would have had if United had not injured it. It is true that accounting for taxes in the year when damages are received, rather than the year when profits were lost can change the amount of taxes the Revenue Service collects; as United shows, actual rates of taxation were much higher in some of the years when Hanover was injured than they are today. But because the statute of limitations frequently will bar the Commissioner from recomputing for earlier years, and because of the policy underlying the statute of limitations -- the fact that such recomputations are immensely difficult or impossible when a long period has intervened -- the rough result of not taking account of taxes for the year of injury, but then taxing recovery when received seems the most satisfactory outcome. The District Court therefore did not err on this question, and the Court of Appeals should not have required a recomputation.United contends that, if Hanover had bought machines, instead of leasing them, it would have had to invest its own capital in the machines. United argues that the District Court erred in computing damages, because it did not properly take account of the cost of capital to Page 392 U. S. 504 Hanover. The District Court found that, in the years in question, Hanover was able to borrow money for between 2% and 2.5% per annum, and that, had Hanover bought machines, it would have obtained the necessary capital by borrowing at about this rate. It therefore deducted an interest component of 2.5% from the profits it thought Hanover would have earned by purchasing machines. Our review of the record convinces us that the courts below did not err in these determinations; on the basis of the determinations of fact, Hanover's damages were properly computed. [Footnote 16]The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtHanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.No. 335Argued March 5, 1968Decided June 17, 1968*392 U.S. 481SyllabusFollowing this Court's affirmance of a district court judgment in a civil action against United Shoe Machinery Corp. (United), a manufacturer and distributor of shoe machinery, which the Government had brought under § 4 of the Sherman Act, Hanover Shoe, Inc. (Hanover), a shoe manufacturer and customer of United's, brought this private treble damage suit against United for its alleged monopolization of the shoe machinery industry in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, by means of its practice of leasing and refusing to sell its shoe machinery. Hanover, relying on § 5(a) of the Clayton Act (making a final judgment or decree in a Government antitrust suit prima facie evidence as to all matters respecting which the judgment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties thereto), submitted the court's findings, opinion, and decree in the Government's case as its evidence that United had monopolized the shoe machinery industry and that its refusal to sell the machines was an instrument of the monopolization. In 1965, the District Court rendered judgment for Hanover, holding that it was entitled to damages for the period from July 1, 1939 (the earliest date permitted by the statute of limitations), to September 21, 1955, when this suit was filed, in an amount equal to three times the difference between what Hanover had paid in rentals and what it would have paid had United been willing to sell the machines, plus interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to liability, but disagreed with the District Court on certain aspects of the damage award, including the relevant damage period. It fixed that period's end date somewhat earlier, and ruled that its start was June 10, 1946, when this Court decided American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, and endorsed the views in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (C.A.2d Cir.), prior to which the Court of Appeals concluded it had been necessary in an action for violation of § 2 to prove the Page 392 U. S. 482 existence of predatory practices as well as monopoly power. Both parties were granted review of the Court of Appeals decision. United contends that the decision in the Government's suit against it did not determine that United's leasing practice was an instrument of monopolization; that Hanover sustained no injury, since any excess cost of leasing over cost of ownership was not absorbed by Hanover, but passed on to its customers, and that the District Court's damage calculations, which the Court of Appeals upheld, were erroneous because they did not properly allow for the cost of capital to Hanover as an element of the cost of acquiring the shoe machinery, the District Court having made an adjustment only to the extent of deducting a 2.5% interest component from the profits it thought Hanover would have earned by buying the machines. Hanover contends that the Court of Appeals erred in changing the start of the damage period and in ordering the District Court, on remand, to reduce its damage calculations by whatever tax advantages Hanover might have obtained by leasing, as compared with buying, the shoe machinery.Held:1. The courts below did not err in holding that United's practice of leasing and refusing to sell its major machines was determined to be illegal monopolization in the Government's case, as reference to the court's findings and opinion, as well as decree, in that case makes clear. Pp. 392 U. S. 483-487.2. Hanover proved injury and the amount of its damages within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act when it proved that United had overcharged it during the damage period and showed the amount of the overcharge, and the possibility that it might have recouped the overcharge by "passing it on" to its customers was not relevant in the assessment of its damages. Pp. 392 U. S. 487-494.3. Hanover is entitled to damages for the entire period of the applicable statute of limitations, since the Alcoa-American Tobacco decisions did not fundamentally alter the law of monopolization in a way which should be given only prospective effect. Pp. 392 U. S. 495-502.4. The District Court did not otherwise err in its computation of damages. Pp. 392 U. S. 502-504.377 F.2d 776, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Page 392 U. S. 483 |
3,227 | 1975_74-712 | MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.The False Claims Act provides that the United States may recover from a person who presents a false claim or causes a false claim to be presented to it a forfeiture of $2,000 plus an amount equal to double the amount of damages that it sustains by reason of the false claim. [Footnote 1] This case presents two interpretative problems Page 423 U. S. 306 that arise when the United States sues a subcontractor under the Act on the ground that the subcontractor has caused the prime contractor to present false claims: first, Page 423 U. S. 307 how should the number of $2,000 forfeitures be counted? Second, when the United States has already recovered damages from the prime contractor because of the subcontractor's fraud, what effect does that recovery have upon the Government's right to recover double damages from the subcontractor?IIn 1962, the United States entered into a $2,100,000 contract with Model Engineering & Manufacturing Corporation, Inc. (Model), for the provision of radio kits. Each kit was to contain electron tubes that met certain specifications. Model subcontracted with United National Labs (United) to supply these tubes at a price of $32 each. The tubes that United sent to Model under this subcontract were not of the required quality, but were falsely marked by United to indicate that they were. United sent at least 21 boxes of these falsely marked tubes to Model, in three separately invoiced shipments. The radio kits that Model in turn shipped to the United States contained 397 of those falsely marked tubes. Model sent 35 invoices to the Government for the radio kits, and each invoice included claims for payment for the falsely marked tubes that had been supplied to Model by United. After the Government discovered the fraud, it recovered $40.72 per tube from Model and also retained the falsely marked tubes. Page 423 U. S. 308Subsequently, the Government brought this civil action in a Federal District Court under the False Claims Act against United and two of its owner-officers, the respondents Philip L. Bornstein and Gerald Page. [Footnote 2] The complaint alleged that United was liable for 35 $2,000 forfeitures -- one forfeiture for each invoice that it had "caused" Model to submit, [Footnote 3] and also claimed damages of $16,205.54, consisting of $40.82 per tube for 397 tubes. The trial court agreed that there had been 35 forfeitures, but ruled that, before the Government's damages could be doubled, they were to be reduced by the amount of Model's payment to the United States. The court accordingly computed double damages at only $79.40, and awarded the Government a total of $70,079.40. 361 F. Supp. 869 (NJ). On cross-appeals, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court on the double damages issue, but concluded that, since there had been only one subcontract involved, there should be only one statutory forfeiture. Accordingly, the appellate court held that United was liable for only $2,079.40. 504 F.2d 368 (CA3). We granted the Government's petition for certiorari to consider the statutory questions presented. 420 U.S. 906.IIThe Number of Statutory ForfeituresThe False Claims Act provides that a person "who Page 423 U. S. 309 shall do or commit any of the acts prohibited by" Rev.Stat. § 5438 "shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two thousand dollars. . . ." Rev.Stat. § 3490. Section 5438 makes it illegal for a person to present or cause to be presented"for payment or approval . . . any claim upon or against the Government of the United States . . . knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent."It is settled that the Act permits recovery of multiple forfeitures, and that it gives the United States a cause of action against a subcontractor who causes a prime contractor to submit a false claim to the Government. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537. The precise issue presented here is whether the subcontractor should be liable for each claim submitted by its prime contractor, or whether it should be liable only for certain identifiable acts that it itself committed. [Footnote 4]The legislative history of the Act offers little guidance on how properly to determine the number of forfeitures. The Act was originally aimed principally at stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors during the Civil War. [Footnote 5] There is no indication that Congress Page 423 U. S. 310 gave any thought to the question of how the number of forfeitures should be determined in cases involving subcontractor fraud. But the absence of specific legislative history in no way modifies the conventional judicial duty to give faithful meaning to the language Congress adopted in the light of the evident legislative purpose in enacting the law in question.The respondents defend the decision of the Court of Appeals that held them liable for only one forfeiture. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally on its earlier decision in United States v. Rohleder, 157 F.2d 126 (CA3), where it found that 16 forfeitures were appropriate because 16 contracts were involved. The Rohleder court had relied, in turn, on this Court's decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra. The Hess case involved several electrical contractors who had collusively bid on 56 Public Works Administration projects. The District Court in Hess had imposed 56 forfeitures, rejecting the defendants' claim that only one forfeiture should have been imposed because there had been only one fraudulent scheme. This Court concluded that the District Court was correct, because the incidence of fraud on each separate project was clearly individualized. 317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 552. No party argued in this Court that more than 56 forfeitures should have been imposed, and no statement in the Hess opinion expressly limited the number of imposable forfeitures to the number of contracts involved in a case. Hess simply approved the result reached by the District Court which had found that, "in each project, there was a single, false, or fraudulent claim." 41 F. Supp. 197, 216 (WD Pa.). Page 423 U. S. 311The Hess case, therefore, in no way stands for the proposition that the number of forfeitures is inevitably measured by the number of contracts involved in a case. Such an automatic measurement would ignore the plain language of the statute, as the present case itself illustrates. United is liable under the statute only because it engaged in conduct that caused false claims to be submitted to the United States. While it is true that no false claims would have been submitted had United and Model not entered into a contractual relationship, the entry into that relationship did not, in itself, cause the submission of any false claims. Had United shipped tubes of the required quality to Model, no false claims would have been presented. By the same token, Model was not caused to file a false claim until it received shipments of falsely branded tubes from United. The language of the statute focuses on false claims, not on contracts. See n 4, supra. That language does not support a conclusion that United is chargeable with only one forfeiture in this case.To equate the number of forfeitures with the number of contracts would, in a case such as this, result almost always in but a single forfeiture, no matter how many fraudulent acts the subcontractor might have committed. This result would not only be at odds with the statutory language; it would also defeat the statutory purpose. [Footnote 6] Such a limitation would, in the language of the Government's brief, convert "the Act's forfeiture provision into little more than a $2,00 license for subcontractor fraud."At the other extreme, the Government urges that 35 forfeitures should be assessed, in accord with the position of the District Court, which ruled that"[United's fraudulent] acts caused Model to submit thirty-five false Page 423 U. S. 312 claims, each of which constituted a separate violation justifying a separate forfeiture."361 F. Supp. at 879. The difficulty with this position is that it fails to distinguish between the acts committed by Model and the acts committed by United. [Footnote 7] The distinction is a critical one, because the statute imposes liability only for the commission of acts which cause false claims to be presented.If United had committed one act which caused Model to file a false claim, it would clearly be liable for a single forfeiture. If, as a result of the same act by United, Model had filed three false claims, United would still have committed only one act that caused the filing of false claims, and thus, under the language of the statute, would again be liable for only one forfeiture. If, on the other hand, United had committed three separate such causative acts, United would be liable for three forfeitures, even if Model had filed only one false claim. The Act, in short, penalizes a person for his own acts, not for the acts of someone else.The Government's claim that United "caused" Model to submit 35 false claims is simply not accurate. While United committed certain acts which caused Model to submit false claims, it did not cause Model to submit any particular number of false claims. The fact that Model chose to submit 35 false claims instead of some other number was, so far as United was concerned, wholly irrelevant -- completely fortuitous and beyond United's knowledge or control. The Government suggests that United assumed the risk that Model might send 35 invoices when United sent the falsely branded tubes to Model. The statute, however, does not penalize United for what Model did. It penalizes United for what it did. The construction given to the statutory Page 423 U. S. 313 language by the District Court is, therefore, no more satisfactory than the interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeals.A correct application of the statutory language requires, rather, that the focus in each case be upon the specific conduct of the person from whom the Government seeks to collect the statutory forfeitures. In the present case, United committed three acts which caused Model to submit false claims to the Government -- the three separately invoiced shipments to Model. If United had not shipped any falsely branded tubes to Model, Model could not have incorporated such tubes into its radio kits and would not have had occasion to submit any false claims to the United States. When, however, United dispatched each shipment of falsely marked tubes to Model, it did so knowing that Model would incorporate the tubes into the radio kits it later shipped to the Government, and that it would ask for payment from the Government on account of those tubes. Thus, United's three shipments of falsely branded tubes to Model caused Model to submit false claims to the United States, and United is thus liable for three $2,000 statutory forfeitures representing the three separate shipments that it made to Model. [Footnote 8]IIIComputation of Double DamagesIn the District Court, "[t]he Government . . . established that the per unit cost to replace the [falsely Page 423 U. S. 314 branded] tubes was $40.82." 361 F. Supp. at 875. Finding that the Government had already received $40.72 per tube as damages from Model, the court concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the Government's total statutory damages were $79.40 -- double the 10-cent difference per tube between its replacement costs and the payment already received from Model for the 397 tubes.The Government argues that both courts were wrong, and that its damages under the Act should be calculated by doubling the amount of its original loss and only then deducting Model's payment from that doubled amount. [Footnote 9] We agree that the Government's damages should be doubled before any compensatory payments are deducted, because that method of computation most faithfully conforms to the language and purpose of the Act. [Footnote 10]Although there is nothing in the legislative history that specifically bears on the question of how to calculate double damages, past decisions of this Court have reflected a clear understanding that Congress intended the double damages provision to play an important role in compensating the United States in cases where it has been defrauded."We think the chief purpose of the [Act's civil penalties] was to provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud, and that the device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be made completely whole."United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 551-552. For Page 423 U. S. 315 several different reasons, this make-whole purpose of the Act is best served by doubling the Government's damages before any compensatory payments are deducted.First, this method of computation comports with the congressional judgment that double damages are necessary to compensate the Government completely for the costs, delays, and inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent claims. [Footnote 11] Second, the rule that damages should be doubled prior to any deductions fixes the liability of the defrauder without reference to the adventitious actions of other persons. The position adopted by the Court of Appeals would mean that two subcontractors who committed Page 423 U. S. 316 similar acts and caused similar damage could be subjected to widely disparate penalties depending upon whether and to what extent their prime contractors had paid the Government in settlement of the Government's claims against them. Just as fortuitous acts of the prime contractor should not determine the liability of the subcontractor under the forfeiture provision of the Act, so likewise the prime contractor's fortuitous acts should not determine the liability of the subcontractor under the double damages provision. Third, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and the District Court would enable the subcontractor to avoid the Act's double damages provision by tendering the amount of the undoubled damages at any time prior to judgment. This possibility would make the double damages provision meaningless. Doubling the Government's actual damages before any deduction is made for payments previously received from any source in mitigation of those damages forecloses such a result. [Footnote 12]For these reasons, we hold that, in computing the double damages authorized by the Act, the Government's actual damages are to be doubled before any subtractions are made for compensatory payments previously received by the Government from any source. [Footnote 13] This method of Page 423 U. S. 317 computation, which maximizes the deterrent impact of the double damages provision and fixes the relative rights and liabilities of the respective parties with maximum precision, best comports, in our view, with the language and purpose of the Act.The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976)United States v. BornsteinNo. 74-712Argued October 8, 1975Decided January 14, 1976423 U.S. 303SyllabusA prime contractor (Model) had a contract with the Government to provide radio kits containing electron tubes meeting certain specifications. A subcontractor (United), which was to supply the tubes, sent to Model in three separately invoiced shipments tubes that were not of the required quality but were falsely marked to indicate that they were. The radio kits that Model in turn shipped to the Government contained 397 of these falsely marked tubes. Model then sent 35 invoices to the Government for the kits, each invoice including claims for payment for the falsely marked tubes. After the Government discovered the fraud, it recovered in settlement from Model $40.72 per tube or a total of $16,165.84. Subsequently the Government sued United and two of its owner-officers (respondents) under the False Claims Act (Act), which provides that the Government may recover from a person who presents a false claim or causes a false claim to be presented to it a forfeiture of $2,000 plus an amount equal to double the amount of damages that it sustains by reason of the false claim. The Government alleged that United was liable for 35 $2,000 forfeitures, one for each invoice that it "caused" Model to submit, and also claimed damages of $16,205.54, consisting of a replacement cost of $40.82 per tube for 397 tubes. The District Court agreed that there had been 35 forfeitures, but ruled that before the Government's damages could be doubled, they had to be reduced by the amount of Model's payment to the Government, and accordingly computed double damages at only $79.40 (double the 10-cent difference per tube between its replacement cost and the payment already received from Model). On cross-appeals, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court on the double damages issue, but held that, since there had been only one subcontract involved, there should be only one forfeiture.Held:1. A correct application of the Act's language requires that the focus in each case be upon the specific conduct of the person from whom the Government seeks to collect the forfeiture. Thus, Page 423 U. S. 304 here United committed three acts that caused Model to submit false claims to the Government -- the three separately invoiced shipments of falsely branded tubes to Model -- and hence is liable for three $2,000 forfeitures representing those three shipments. Pp. 423 U. S. 308-313.(a) The number of $2,000 forfeitures is not to be measured by the number of contracts involved, since such an automatic measurement, which would almost always result in only a single forfeiture no matter how many fraudulent acts the subcontractor might have committed, would not only contravene the Act's plain language, which focuses on false claims, not on contracts, but would defeat the statutory purpose of punishing and preventing frauds. Pp. 423 U. S. 310-311.(b) Nor is the number of forfeitures to be measured by the 35 false claims presented by Model to the Government, since this method fails to distinguish between the acts committed by Model and those committed by United, a critical distinction, since the Act imposes liability only for the conduct that causes false claims to be presented. Thus, here, the statute does not penalize United for what Model did, but penalizes United for what it did. Pp. 423 U. S. 311-313.2. In computing the double damages authorized by the Act, the Government's actual damages are to be doubled before any subtractions are made for compensatory payments previously received from any source. This computation method best conforms to the Act's language, and reflects the congressional judgment that double damages are necessary to compensate the Government completely for the costs, delays, and inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent claims; fixes the defrauder's liability without reference to the adventitious actions of other persons (such as the prime contractor here); and forecloses the subcontractor from avoiding the double damages provision by tendering the amount of the undoubled damages at any time before judgment. Pp. 423 U. S. 313-317.504 F.2d 368, reversed and remanded.STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, J., joined, Page 423 U. S. 305 post, p. 423 U. S. 317. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. |
3,228 | 1972_71-1134 | MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of of the Court.The question presented in this case is whether the seizure of allegedly obscene material, contemporaneous with and as an incident to an arrest for the public exhibition of such material in a commercial theater, may be accomplished without a warrant.On September 29, 1970, the sheriff of Pulaski County, Kentucky, accompanied by the district prosecutor, purchased tickets to a local drive-in theater. There, the sheriff observed, in its entirety, a film called "Cindy and Donna" and concluded that it was obscene and that its exhibition was in violation of a state statute. A substantial part of the film was also observed by a deputy sheriff from a vantage point on the road outside the theater. Since the petitioner conceded the obscenity of the film at trial, that issue is not before us for decision. [Footnote 1]The sheriff, at the conclusion of the film, proceeded to the projection booth, where he arrested petitioner, the manager of the theater, on the charge of exhibiting an obscene film to the public contrary to Ky.Rev.Stat. § 436.101 (1973). [Footnote 2] Concurrent with the arrest, the sheriff Page 413 U. S. 498 seized one copy of the film for use as evidence. It is uncontested: (a) that the sheriff had no warrant when he made the arrest and seizure, (b) that there had been no Page 413 U. S. 499 prior determination by a judicial officer on the question of obscenity, and (c) that the arrest was based solely on the sheriff's observing the exhibition of the film.On September 30, 1970, the day following the arrest of petitioner and the seizure of the film, the Grand Jury of Pulaski County heard testimony concerning the scenes and content of the film and returned an indictment charging petitioner with exhibiting an obscene film in violation of Ky.Rev.Stat. § 436.101. On October 3, 1970, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty in the Pulaski Circuit Court, and the case was set for trial. On October 12, 1970, petitioner filed a motion to suppress the film as evidence and to dismiss the indictment. The motion was predicated upon the ground that the film was "improperly, unlawfully and illegally seized, contrary to . . . the laws of the land." Four days later, on October 16, 1970, the Pulaski Circuit Court heard argument at an adversary hearing on petitioner's motion. The motion was denied.Petitioner's trial began on October 20, 1970. The arresting sheriff and one of his deputies were the only witnesses for the prosecution. The sheriff testified that the film displayed nudity and "intimate love scenes." The sheriff further testified that, upon viewing the film, he determined that it was obscene and that its exhibition Page 413 U. S. 500 violated state law. He therefore arrested petitioner. Together with the testimony of the sheriff, the film itself was introduced in evidence. Petitioner's motion to suppress the film was renewed, and again overruled. The sheriff's deputy took the stand and testified that he had viewed the final 30 minutes of the film from a vantage point on a public road outside the theater. Following this testimony, the jury was permitted to see the film.Petitioner testified in his own behalf. He stated that, to his knowledge, no juveniles had been admitted to see the film, and that he had received no complaints about the film until it was seized by the sheriff. At the close of his testimony, the jury found petitioner guilty as charged. The jury rendered both a general verdict of guilty and a special verdict that the film was obscene, as provided by Ky.Rev.Stat. § 436.101(8).On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed petitioner's conviction. The Court of Appeals first emphasized that"[i]t was conceded by [petitioner's] counsel in closing argument to the jury that the film is obscene. No issue is presented on appeal as to the obscenity of the material."473 S.W.2d 814, 815 (1971). The Court of Appeals then held that the film was properly seized incident to a lawful arrest, distinguishing the holdings of this Court in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205 (1964), and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 (1961), on the ground that those decisions related to seizure of allegedly obscene materials "for destruction or suppression, not to seizures incident to an arrest for possessing, selling, or exhibiting a specific item." 473 S.W.2d at 815. It also distinguished Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636 (1968), on the grounds that there, film "had been seized pursuant to a [defective] search warrant, not incident to an arrest." 473 S.W.2d at 816. The Court of Appeals relied on a decision of a federal three-judge Page 413 U. S. 501 court in Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527 (SD Miss.1970), which concluded that:"[S]eizure of an allegedly obscene film as an incident to lawful arrests for a crime committed in the presence of the arresting officers, i.e., the public showing of such film, does not exceed constitutional bounds in the absence of a prior judicial hearing on the question of its obscenity."Id. at 533. The Court of Appeals specifically declined to follow a decision by another federal three-judge court in Ledesma v. Perez, 304 F. Supp. 662 (ED La.1969), which held unconstitutional the seizure of allegedly obscene material incident to an arrest, but without a warrant or a prior adversary hearing. [Footnote 3]IThe Fourth Amendment proscription against "unreasonable . . . seizures," applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, must not be read in a vacuum. A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another kind of material. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 403 U. S. 471-472 (1971); id. at 403 U. S. 509-510 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 403 U. S. 512-513 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting). The question to be resolved is whether the seizure of the film without a warrant was unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards and, if so, Page 413 U. S. 502 whether the film was therefore inadmissible at the trial. The seizure of instruments of a crime, such as a pistol or a knife, or "contraband or stole goods or objects dangerous in themselves," id. at 403 U. S. 472, are to be distinguished from quantities of books and movie films when a court appraises the reasonableness of the seizure under Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment standards.Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra, held that a warrant for the seizure of allegedly obscene books could not be issued on the conclusory opinion of a police officer that the books sought to be seized were obscene. Such a warrant lacked the safeguards demanded"to assure nonobscene material the constitutional protection to which it is entitled. . . . [T]he warrants issued on the strength of the conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered by the complainant to be obscene."367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 731-732. There had been "no step in the procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity." Id. at 367 U. S. 732.The sense of this holding was reaffirmed in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra, where the Court found unconstitutional a "massive seizure" of books from a commercial bookstore for the purpose of destroying the books as contraband. The result was premised on the lack of an adversary hearing prior to seizure, and the Court did not find it necessary to reach the claim that the seizure violated Fourth Amendment standards. 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 210 n. 2. However, the Court emphasized:"It is no answer to say that obscene books are contraband, and that consequently the standards governing searches and seizures of allegedly obscene books should not differ from those applied with respect to narcotics, gambling paraphernalia and Page 413 U. S. 503 other contraband. We rejected that proposition in Marcus."Id. at 378 U. S. 211-212.Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, supra, was to the same effect with regard to seizure of a film from a commercial theater regularly open to the public. There, a warrant for the seizure of the film was issued on the basis of a police officer's affidavit giving the titles of the film and asserting in conclusory fashion that he had personally viewed the films and considered them obscene. The films were seized pursuant to the warrant, and introduced into evidence in a criminal case against the exhibitor. Conviction ensued. On review, the Court held that "[t]he admission of the films in evidence requires reversal of petitioner's conviction" because"[t]he procedure under which the warrant issued solely upon the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the officer's conclusions was not a procedure 'designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,' id., [Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra,] at 367 U. S. 732, and therefore fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression."392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 637. No mention was made in the brief per curiam Lee Art Theatre opinion as to whether or not the seizure was incident to an arrest. The Court relied on Marcus and A Quantity of Books.The common thread of Marcus, A Quantity of Books, and Lee Art Theatre is to be found in the nature of the materials seized and the setting in which they were taken. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 379 U. S. 486 (1965). [Footnote 4] Page 413 U. S. 504 In each case the material seized fell arguably within First Amendment protection, and the taking brought to an abrupt halt an orderly and presumptively legitimate distribution or exhibition. Seizing a film then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a bookstore. Such precipitate action by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. The seizure is unreasonable not simply because it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. The setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater, each presumptively under the protection of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant requirements because we examine what is "unreasonable" in the light of the values of freedom of expression. [Footnote 5] As we stated in Stanford v. Texas, supra:"In short, . . . the constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717; A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205. No less a standard could be faithful to First Amendment freedoms. The constitutional impossibility of leaving Page 413 U. S. 505 the protection of those freedoms to the whim of the officers charged with executing the warrant is dramatically underscored by what the officers saw fit to seize under the warrant in this case."379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 485 (footnotes omitted).Moreover, ordinary human experience should teach that the seizure of a movie film from a commercial theater with regularly scheduled performances, where a film is being played and replayed to paid audiences, presents a very different situation from that in which contraband is changing hands or where a robbery or assault is being perpetrated. In the latter settings, the probable cause for an arrest might justify the seizure of weapons, or other evidence or instruments of crime, without a warrant. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 395 U. S. 764 (1969); id. at 395 U. S. 773-774 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 376 U. S. 367 (1964). Where there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be "now or never" to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation. [Footnote 6] See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 399 U. S. 47-51 (1970). Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The facts surrounding the "massive seizures" of books in Marcus Page 413 U. S. 506 and A Quantity of Books, or the seizure of the film in Lee Art Theatre, presented no such "now or never" circumstances.IIThe film seized in this case was being exhibited at a commercial theater showing regularly scheduled performances to the general public. The seizure proceeded solely on a police officer's conclusions that the film was obscene; there was no warrant. Nothing prior to seizure afforded a magistrate an opportunity to "focus searchingly on the question of obscenity." See Heller v. New York, ante at 413 U. S. 488-489; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 732. If, as Marcus and Lee Art Theatre held, a warrant for seizing allegedly obscene material may not issue on the mere conclusory allegations of an officer, a fortiori, the officer may not make such a seizure with no warrant at all."The use by government of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications is not new. . . . The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression."Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra, at 367 U. S. 724, 367 U. S. 729. In this case, as in Lee Art Theatre, the admission of the film in evidence requires reversal of petitioner's conviction. 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 637.The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky is reversed, and this case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.Reversed | U.S. Supreme CourtRoaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973)Roaden v. KentuckyNo. 71-1134Argued November 14, 1972Decided June 25, 1973413 U.S. 496SyllabusA county sheriff viewed a sexually explicit film at a local drive-in theater. At the conclusion of the showing, he arrested petitioner, the theater manager, for exhibiting an obscene film in violation of Kentucky law, and seized, without a warrant, one copy of the film for use as evidence. There was no prior judicial determination of obscenity. Petitioner's motion to suppress the film as evidence on the ground of illegal seizure was denied, and he was convicted. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the concededly obscene film was properly seized incident to a lawful arrest.Held: The seizure by the sheriff, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, was unreasonable under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards. The seizure is not unreasonable simply because it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717. This case does not present an exigent circumstance in which police action must be "now or never" to preserve the evidence of the crime, and where it may be reasonable to permit action without prior judicial approval. Pp. 413 U. S. 501-506.473 S.W.2d 814, reversed and remanded.BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which STEWART and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 507. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, ante, p. 413 U. S. 494. Page 413 U. S. 497 |
3,229 | 1962_529 | MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.This case involves the interpretation and application of the "Wunderlich Act," 68 Stat. 81, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322, [Footnote 1] Page 373 U. S. 710 an Act designed to permit judicial review of decisions made by federal departments and agencies under standard "disputes" clauses [Footnote 2] in government contracts. The issue before us is whether, in a suit governed by this statute, the court is restricted to a review of the administrative record on issues of fact submitted to administrative determination, or is free to receive new evidence on such issues.In 1946, the respondent, Carlo Bianchi and Company, entered into a contract with the Army Corps of Engineers for the construction of a flood control dam. Included in the work to be performed was the construction of a 710-foot tunnel, designed for the diversion of water, to be lined with concrete and to have permanent steel supports as protection for a 50-foot section at either end. The specifications did not call for such permanent supports throughout the remainder of the tunnel, but only for "[t]emporary tunnel protection . . . where required for safety of the workmen." The contract contained a standard "changed conditions" clause, authorizing the contracting officer to provide for an increase in cost if the contractor encountered subsurface conditions materially different from those indicated in the contract or to be reasonably Page 373 U. S. 711 anticipated, and also contained the standard "disputes" clause quoted, supra, note 2After the tunnel had been drilled by a subcontractor, but before it was lined with concrete, the respondent took the position that unforeseen conditions created extreme hazards for workmen, requiring permanent protection throughout the tunnel, and that it should be compensated for installing such protection. The contracting officer decided that compensation would not be made, and, pursuant to the "disputes" clause, a timely appeal from his decision was taken to the Board of Claims and Appeals of the Corps of Engineers. While the appeal was pending, respondent installed the tunnel supports and completed work on the tunnel.An adversary hearing was held before the Board at which a record was made and each side offered its evidence and had an opportunity for cross-examination. In December, 1948, the Board issued a decision against the contractor, resolving certain conflicts in the evidence in favor of the Government and holding, in substance, that there were no unanticipated or unforeseen conditions requiring the use of permanent steel protection throughout the tunnel.Almost six years later, in December, 1954, respondent brought the present action for breach of contract in the Court of Claims, seeking substantial damages and alleging that the decisions of the contracting officer and the Board were "capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or were not supported by substantial evidence." At a hearing before a Commissioner in 1956, the Government took the position that, on the question whether the Board's decision was entitled to be considered final, no evidence was admissible except the record before the Board. But the Commissioner received evidence de novo, including, over government objection, a substantial amount of evidence that had not Page 373 U. S. 712 been before the Board. He subsequently made extensive findings of fact, and concluded that the respondent was entitled to recover.In an opinion issued in January, 1959, the Court of Claims accepted the Commissioner's findings and conclusions, ruling that, "on consideration of all the evidence, the contracting officer's decision (as affirmed by the Board) cannot be said to have substantial support," and thus "does not have finality." 169 F. Supp. 514, 517, 144 Ct.Cl. 500, 506. On the question whether it was limited in its consideration to the evidence before the Board, the court stated:"In our opinion in Volentine and Littleton v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 952, 136 Ct.Cl. 638, holding that the trial in this court should not be limited to the record made before the contracting agency, but should be de novo, we recognized that there were logical weaknesses in our position. We concluded, however, that the intent of Congress in enacting the Wunderlich Act was in accord with our conclusion, and we adhere to that conclusion in this case."Ibid. After receiving additional evidence on damages, the court entered judgment for respondent in the amount of $149,617.36. We granted certiorari, 371 U.S. 939, to resolve a conflict among the lower courts [Footnote 3] on the important question of the kind of judicial proceeding to be afforded in cases governed by the Wunderlich Act. Page 373 U. S. 713IThe jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in the present case is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1491, since this is a suit for judgment against the United States "founded" upon an "express or implied contract with the United States." Ordinarily, when questions of fact arise in such suits, the function of the court is to receive evidence and to make appropriate findings as to the facts in dispute. But this Court long ago upheld the validity of clauses in government contracts delegating to a government employee the authority to make determinations of disputed questions of fact, and required such determinations to be given conclusive effect in any subsequent suit in the absence of fraud or gross mistake implying fraud or bad faith. See Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398; Ripley v. United States, 223 U. S. 695. Thus, the function of the Court of Claims in matters governed by "disputes" clauses was, in effect, to give an extremely limited review of the administrative decision, and although the scope of review was somewhat expanded by that court over the years, [Footnote 4] it was expressly restricted in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U. S. 98, 342 U. S. 100, to determining whether or not the departmental decision had been founded on fraud, i.e., "conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest."The Wunderlich decision, rendered over strong dissents, evoked considerable effort to obtain legislation expanding the scope of review beyond questions of fraud. A number of bills were introduced in the Eighty-second and Eighty-third Congresses; hearings were held in the Senate [Footnote 5] and House of Representatives; [Footnote 6] and the resulting Page 373 U. S. 714 statute known as the "Wunderlich Act" was ultimately approved by both Houses in 1954. This statute, quoted in full in note 1 supra, is entitled an Act "To permit review of decisions of the heads of departments . . . involving questions arising under Government contracts," and provides in substance that a departmental decision on a question of fact rendered pursuant to a "disputes" clause shall be final and conclusive in accordance with the provisions of the contract"unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."Respondent has not argued in this Court that the underlying controversy in the present suit is beyond the scope of the "disputes" clause in the contract, or that it is not governed by the quoted language in the Wunderlich Act. Thus, the sole issue, as stated supra, p. 373 U. S. 710, is whether the Court of Claims is limited to the administrative record with respect to that controversy, or is free to take new evidence. In considering this issue, we put to one side questions of fraud, which are not involved in this case, which normally require the receipt of evidence outside the administrative record for their resolution, and which could be considered in judicial proceedings even prior to the enactment of the statute.It is our conclusion that, apart from questions of fraud, determination of the finality to be attached to a departmental decision on a question arising under a "disputes" clause must rest solely on consideration of the record before the department. This conclusion is based both on the language of the statute and on its legislative history.1. With respect to the language used, we note that the statute is designated as an Act "[t]o permit review," and that the reviewing function is one ordinarily limited to consideration of the decision of the agency or court below Page 373 U. S. 715 and of the evidence on which it was based. Indeed, in cases where Congress has simply provided for review, without setting forth the standards to be used or the procedures to be followed, this Court has held that consideration is to be confined to the administrative record, and that no de novo proceeding may be held. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 319 U. S. 227. And, of course, as shown by the Tagg Bros. and NBC cases themselves, the function of reviewing an administrative decision can be and frequently is performed by a court of original jurisdiction, as well as by an appellate tribunal.Moreover, the standards of review adopted in the Wunderlich Act -- "arbitrary," "capricious," and "not supported by substantial evidence" -- have frequently been used by Congress, and have consistently been associated with a review limited to the administrative record. [Footnote 7] The term "substantial evidence," in particular, has become a term of art to describe the basis on which an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court. This standard goes to the reasonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the evidence before it, for a decision may be supported by substantial evidence even though it could be refuted by other evidence that was not presented to the decisionmaking body.2. The legislative history supports our conclusion that the language used in the Act should be given its customary meaning. It is true that several witnesses representing contractors explained the purpose of the proposed legislation as restoring rights the contractors had before Wunderlich, [Footnote 8] and that it had apparently been the practice Page 373 U. S. 716 of the Court of Claims to receive evidence on matters covered by "disputes" clauses. [Footnote 9] But is seems clear in context that these witnesses meant only that the standards of review should cover more than conscious fraud, as the Court of Claims had assumed prior to Wunderlich. Indeed with respect to the procedural significance of the substantial evidence test, a leading contractor's representative stated that it would"result in these various departments and agencies feeling that they will have to produce their witnesses at these hearings and permit the contractor to examine them in order to have in the record some substantial evidence to support their decisions when they go up on appeal to the court. [Footnote 10]"The House Report recommending the bill ultimately enacted leaves little doubt that the review intended was one confined to the administrative record. H.R.Rep.No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. The explicit references to the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009, and to this Court's discussion of the standards of review in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 305 U. S. 229, are only the least indications. Even more significant is the Committee's view, echoing that of the witness quoted above, that the standards proposed would remedy the practice in many departments of failing to acquaint the contractor with the evidence in support of the Government's position:"It is believed that, if the standard of substantial evidence is adopted, this condition will be corrected, and Page 373 U. S. 717 that the records of hearing officers will hereafter contain all of the testimony and evidence upon which they have relied in making their decisions. It would not be possible to justify the retention of the finality clauses in Government contracts unless the hearing procedures were conducted in such a way as to require each party to present openly its side of the controversy and afford an opportunity of rebuttal."H.R.Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5.This sound and clearly expressed purpose would be frustrated if either side were free to withhold evidence at the administrative level and then to introduce it in a judicial proceeding. Moreover, the consequence of such a procedure would, in many instances, be a needless duplication of evidentiary hearings, and a heavy additional burden in the time and expense required to bring litigation to an end. Thus, in the present case, judicial proceedings began in 1954, almost six years after completion of the departmental proceedings, and a final decision on the issue of liability was not rendered until 1959. This is surely delay at its worst, and we would be loath to condone any procedure under which the need for expeditious resolution would be so ill served. Here the procedure is clearly inconsistent with the legislative directive.It is contended that the Court of Claims has no power to remand a case such as this to the department concerned, cf. United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641, 336 U. S. 670-671, and thus, if the administrative record is defective or inadequate, or reveals the commission of some prejudicial error, the court can only hold an evidentiary hearing and proceed to judgment. There are, we believe, two answers to this contention. First, there would undoubtedly be situations in which the court would be warranted, on the basis of the administrative record, in granting judgment for the contractor without the need for further administrative action. Second, in situations where the court Page 373 U. S. 718 believed that the existing record did not warrant such a course, but that the departmental determination could not be sustained under the standards laid down by Congress, we see no reason why the court could not stay its own proceedings pending some further action before the agency involved. Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U. S. 202. Such a stay would certainly be justified where the department had failed to make adequate provision for a record that could be subjected to judicial scrutiny, for it was clearly part of the legislative purpose to achieve uniformity in this respect. And, in any case in which the department failed to remedy the particular substantive or procedural defect or inadequacy, the sanction of judgment for the contractor would always be available to the court.IIIn its argument here, the Government has urged that, if judicial review is confined to the administrative record, it must be concluded that the Board's determination is supported by substantial evidence, and thus is entitled to finality under the Wunderlich Act. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that there were several irregularities in the Board's procedures that preclude giving its determination conclusive effect.Neither of these matters is properly embraced within our grant of certiorari, and we are therefore not called upon to pass on them. We hold only that, in its consideration of matters within the scope of the "disputes" clause in the present case, the Court of Claims is confined to review of the administrative record under the standards in the Wunderlich Act, and may not receive new evidence. We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., Inc., 373 U.S. 709 (1963)United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., Inc.No. 529Argued April 29, 1963Decided June 3, 1963373 U.S. 709SyllabusThe so-called "Wunderlich Act" of May 11, 1954, 68 Stat. 81, provides, in substance, that a departmental decision on a question of fact pursuant to a "disputes" clause in a government contract shall be final and conclusive in accordance with the provisions of the contract,"unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."Held: In a suit on a government contract, apart from questions of fraud, determination of the finality to be attached to a departmental decision on a question arising under a "disputes" clause must rest solely on consideration of the record before the department, and no new evidence may be received or considered. Pp. 373 U. S. 709-718.157 Ct. Cl. ___, judgment vacated and cause remanded. |
3,230 | 2002_01-1572 | jury and that blameless or unknowing taxpayers will be unfairly taxed for the wrongdoing of local officials. Neither of these concerns is serious in FCA cases. The presumption against punitive damages thus brings only limited vigor to the County's aid. Working against the County's position, however, is a different presumption, this one at full strength: the "cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503. Inferring repeal of municipal liability from the increase in the damages ceiling from double to triple would be difficult in the abstract, but it is impossible given that the basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make the FCA a more useful tool against fraud in modern times. Whether or not this was true in 1863, local governments now often administer or receive federal funds. It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by the very Act it passed to strengthen the Government's hand in fighting false claims. Pp. 129-134.277 F.3d 969, affirmed.SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Donna M. Lach argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Richard A. Devine, Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Sanjay T. Tailor, Jerold S. Solovy, and Barry Sullivan.Judson H. Miner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were George F. Galland, Jr., and Charlotte Crane.Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Douglas N. Letter, and Michael E. Robinson. **Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of New York et al. by Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, Gail Rubin, Merita A. Hopkins, A. Scott Chinn, and Grant F. Langley; for the County of Orange, California, et al. by Walter Dellinger, Jonathan D. Hacker, and James R. Asperger; for 43 Local Governmental Airport Proprietors by Scott P. Lewis; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda, Robert K. Huffman, Miriam R. Nemetz, Charles A. Rothfeld, and Robert L. Bronston; for the National Association of Public Hospitals and122122 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERJUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000), we held that States are not "persons" subject to qui tam actions under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729-3733. Here, the question is whether local governments are amenable to such suits, and we hold that they are.IStevens, supra, at 768-770, explains in some detail how the FCA currently provides for civil penalties against "[a]ny person" who (so far as it concerns us here) "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." § 3729(a)(1). Although the Attorney General may sue under the FCA, so may a private person, known as a relator, in a qui tam action brought "in the name of the Government," but with the hope of sharing in any recovery. § 3730(b). The relator must inform the Department of Justice of her intentions and keep the pleadings under seal for 60 days while the Government decides whether to intervene and do its own litigating. § 3730(b)(2); see also § 3730(c). If the claim succeeds, the defendant is liable to the Government for a civil penalty between $5,000 and $10,000 for each violation, treble damages (reducible to double damages for cooperative defendants), and costs.Health Systems et al. by Charles Luband; and by the Texas Association of School Boards Legal Assistance Fund et al. by William J. Boyce and Warren S. Huang.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for K & R Limited Partnership et al. by Carl A. S. Coan III and Regina D. Poserina; and for Taxpayers Against Fraud, the False Claims Act Legal Center, by CharlesMichael P. Dignazio and Francis X. Crowley filed a brief as amicus curiae for the County of Delaware, Pennsylvania.123§ 3729(a).1 The relator's share of the "proceeds of the action or settlement" may be up to 30 percent, depending on whether the Government intervened and, if so, how much the relator contributed to the prosecution of the claim. § 3730(d).2 The relator may also get reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney's fees. Ibid.The fraud in this case allegedly occurred in administering a $5 million grant from the National Institute of Drug Abuse to Cook County Hospital, owned and operated as the name implies, with the object of studying a treatment regimen for pregnant drug addicts. The grant was subject to a variety of conditions, including the terms of a compliance plan meant to assure that the study would jibe with federal regulations for research on human subjects. Administration of the study was later transferred to the Hektoen Institute for Medical Research, a nonprofit research organization affiliated with the hospital. Respondent, Dr. Janet Chandler, ran the study from September 1993 until the institute fired her in January 1995.1 The statutory penalties are adjusted upward for inflation under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410, § 5, 104 Stat. 891, note following 28 U. S. C. § 2461. The penalty is currently $5,500 to $11,000. 28 CFR § 85.3(a)(9) (2002).2 If the Government does not intervene, the relator is entitled to 25 to 30 percent of the proceeds. 31 U. S. C. § 3730(d)(2). If the Government chooses to intervene, the relator "shall ... receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action." § 3730(d)(I). If, however, the court determines that the action was "based primarily on disclosures of specific information (other than information provided by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 10 percent of the proceeds .... " Ibid. (footnote omitted).124124 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERIn 1997, Chandler filed this qui tam action, claiming that Cook County (hereinafter County) and the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds in violation of § 3729(a)(1).3 Chandler said that the defendants had violated the grant's express conditions, had failed to comply with the regulations on human-subject research, and had submitted false reports of what she called "ghost" research subjects. Chandler also alleged that she was fired for reporting the fraud to doctors at the hospital and to the granting agency, rendering her dismissal a violation of both state law and the whistle-blower provision of the FCA, § 3730(h).4 The Government declined to intervene in the action.The County moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing, among other things, that it was not a "person" subject to liability under the FCA.5 The District Court denied the motion, reading the term "person" in the FCA to include state and local governments. United States ex rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Institute for Medical Research, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (ND Ill. 1999). The Court of Appeals dismissed the County's interlocutory appeal, and we denied certiorari. 528 U. S. 931 (1999). After Stevens came down, however, the District Court reconsidered the County's motion and dismissed Chandler's action. Although the court found "no reason to alter its conclusion that the County is a 'person' for purposes of the FCA," it held that the County, like a State, could not be subjected to treble damages, which Stevens, supra, at 784, described not as "remedial" but as "essentially punitive." 118 F. Supp. 2d 902, 903 (2000). The3 The hospital was originally a defendant as well but was dismissed from the case as having no identity independent of the County. 277 F.3d 969, 971, n. 2 (CA72002).4 Chandler's retaliation claims against the County were dismissed because the institute, not the County, was her employer. United States ex rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Institute for Medical Research, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1087 (ND Ill. 1999).5 The institute also moved to dismiss, on different grounds; the denial of that motion is not before us. 277 F. 3d, at 969, n. 1.125Court of Appeals, in conflict with two other Circuits,6 distinguished Stevens and reversed, 277 F.3d 969 (CA72002). We granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 956 (2002), and now affirm the Court of Appeals.IIWhile § 3729 does not define the term "person," we have held that its meaning has remained unchanged since the original FCA was passed in 1863. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 783, n. 12. There is no doubt that the term then extended to corporations, the Court in 1826 having expressly recognized the presumption that the statutory term "person" " 'extends as well to persons politic and incorporate, as to natural persons whatsoever.'" United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392, 412 (1826) (quoting 2 E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 736 (1787 ed.) (reprinted in 5B 2d Historical Writings in Law and Jurisprudence (1986)); see 11 Wheat., at 412 ("That corporations are, in law, for civil purposes, deemed persons, is unquestionable"); accord, Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Del., 12 Pet. 102, 135 (1838); see also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 667 (1819) (opinion of Story, J.) (A corporation "is, in short, an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers and franchises which, though they must be exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet considered as subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage"). This position accorded with the common understanding among contemporary commentators that corporations were "persons" in the general enjoyment of the capacity to sue and be sued. See, e. g., 2 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 332 (6th ed. 1856) (def. 2: The term "person" "is also used to denote a corporation which is an artificial person"); 1 S. Kyd, A Trea-6 United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 279 F.3d 219 (CA3 2002); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 244 F.3d 486 (CA5 2001).126126 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERtise on the Law of Corporations 13 (1793) ("A CORPORATION then, or a body politic, or body incorporate, is a collection of many individuals, united into one body, ... and vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued ... "). While it is true that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 86-87 (1809), declined to rely on the presumption when it decided the separate issue whether a corporation was a "citizen" for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, by 1844 the Deveaux position had been abandoned and a corporation was understood to have citizenship independent of its constituent members by virtue of its status as "a person, although an artificial person." Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558 (1844); see 1 A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 383 (2d ed. 1859) ("A corporation has been declared to be not only a person, ... but to be capable of being considered an inhabitant of a state, and even of being treated as a citizen, for all purposes of suing and being sued").Essentially conceding that private corporations were taken to be persons when the FCA was passed in 1863, the County argues that municipal corporations were not so understood until six years later, when Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118 (1869), applied the Letson rule to them. Cowles, however, was not an extension of principle but a natural recognition of an understanding going back at least to Coke, supra, that municipal corporations and private ones were simply two species of "body politic and corporate," treated alike in terms of their legal status as persons capable of suing and being sued. See, e. g., W. Glover, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations 41 (1837) (Municipal corporations have, as an attribute "necessarily and inseparably incident to every corporation," the ability "[t]o sue or be sued, ... and do all other acts as natural127persons may"); see also 1 J. Dillon, The Law of Municipal Corporations 92 (rev. 2d ed. 1873). Indeed, "[t]he archetypal American corporation of the eighteenth century [was] the municipality"; only in the early 19th century did private corporations become widespread. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, p. 112 (1977). This history explains how the Court in Cowles could conclude "automatically and without discussion" that municipal corporations, like private ones, "should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 687-688 (1978); see Cowles, supra, at 121 (describing the question as one that "presents but little difficulty").7Of course, the meaning of "person" recognized in Cowles is the usual one, but not immutable, see Monell, supra, at 688, and the County asks us to take a cue from the qualification included in the later definition in the Dictionary Act, Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, that "the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that [it was] intended to be used in a more limited sense." Cf. J. Angell & S. Ames, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate 4 (rev. 3d ed. 1846) ("The construction is, that when 'persons' are mentioned in a statute, corporations are included if they fall within the general reason and design of the statute"). The County invokes two points of context that it takes as7 The County and some of its supporting amici urge a further distinction between full-fledged municipal corporations such as towns and cities, which were incorporated at the request of their inhabitants, and "quasi corporations" such as counties, which were unilateral creations of the State. See Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 552 (1876). While the liability of quasi corporations at common law may have differed from that of municipal corporations, see ibid., both were treated equally as legal "persons." Indeed, Cowles itself applied to an Illinois county like Cook County.128128 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERindicating that in the FCA Congress intended a more limited meaning.First, it says that the statutory text is "inherently inconsistent with local governmental liability," Brief for Petitioner 13, owing to the references of the original enactment to "any person in the land or naval forces of the United States" and "any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States," together with a provision imposing criminal liability, including imprisonment, on defendants in the latter category, see Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1,3, 12 Stat. 696, 697, 698.8 But the old text merely shows that "any person in the land or naval forces" was directed at natural persons. The second phrase, covering all other "persons," could not have been that limited, or even private corporations would be outside the FCA's coverage, a reading that not even the County espouses and one that we seriously doubted in Stevens, 529 U. S., at 782. As for the FCA's reference to criminalliability, "[t]he short answer is that it has not been regarded as anomalous to require compliance by municipalities with the substantive standards of ... federal laws which impose [both civil and criminal] sanctions upon 'persons.'" Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). Municipalities may not be susceptible to every statutory penalty, but that is no reason to exempt them from remedies that sensibly apply. Id., at 400-401; United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50, 54-55 (1909).The other contextual evidence cited by the County is the history of the FCA. We recounted in Stevens that Congress's primary concern in 1863 was" 'stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large [private] contractors during the Civil War.'" 529 U. S., at 781 (quoting United States v. Bornstein, 423 U. S. 303, 309 (1976), but adding "[private]"). Local governments, the County says, were not players in the8 The FCA's civil and criminal provisions were bifurcated in 1878, see Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592, n. 8 (1958), and the latter provisions have since been recodified at 18 U. S. C. § 287.129game of war profiteering that the FCA was meant to stop. Of course, this is true, but in no way does it affect the fact that Congress wrote expansively, meaning "to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financialloss to the Government." United States v. NeifertWhite Co., 390 U. S. 228, 232 (1968). Whatever municipal corporations may have been doing in 1863, in 2003 local governments are commonly at the receiving end of all sorts of federal funding schemes and thus no less able than individuals or private corporations to impose on the federal fisc and exploit the exercise of the federal spending power. Cf. Monell, supra, at 685-686 (noting that municipalities can, "equally with natural persons, create the harms intended to be remedied [by 42 U. S. C. § 1983]"). In sum, neither history nor text points to exclusion of municipalities from the class of "persons" covered by the FCA in 1863.IIINor is the application of this reading of the statute affected by the County's alternative position, based on the evolution of the FCA's provisions for relief. The County's argument leads off, at least, with a sound premise about the historical tension between municipal liability and damages imposed as punishment. Although it was well established in 1863 "that a municipality, like a private corporation, was to be treated as a natural person subject to suit for a wide range of tortious activity, ... this understanding did not extend to the award of punitive or exemplary damages," Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 259-260 (1981). Since municipalities' common law resistance to punitive damages still obtains, "[t]he general rule today is that no punitive damages are allowed unless expressly authorized by statute." Id., at 260, n. 21.The County relies on this general statement in asking us to infer a remarkable consequence unstated in the 1986 amendments to the FCA. As part of an effort to modernize130130 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERthe FCA, Congress then raised the fine from $2,000 to the current range of $5,000 to $10,000, and raised the ceiling on damages recoverable under § 3729(a) from double to treble. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, § 2(7), 100 Stat. 3153. In Stevens, we spoke of this change as turning what had been a "remedial" provision into an "essentially punitive" one. 529 U. S., at 784, 785. The County relies on this characterization to argue that, even if municipalities were covered by the term "person" from 1863 to 1986, Congress's adoption of a "punitive" remedy entailed the elimination of municipal liability in 1986.Although we did indeed find the punitive character of the treble damages provision a reason not to read "person" to include a State, see id., at 785, it does not follow that the punitive feature has the force to show congressional intent to repeal implicitly the existing definition of that word, which included municipalities. To begin with it is important to realize that treble damages have a compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives. See, e. g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 635-636 (1985) (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 485-486 (1977)); American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556, 575 (1982); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 151 (1987). While the tipping point between payback and punishment defies general formulation, being dependent on the workings of a particular statute and the course of particular litigation, the facts about the FCA show that the damages multiplier has compensatory traits along with the punitive.There is no question that some liability beyond the amount of the fraud is usually "necessary to compensate the Government completely for the costs, delays, and inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent claims." Bornstein, supra, at 315; see United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 445 (1989) (noting that the Government's injury includes "not merely the131amount of the fraud itself, but also ancillary costs, such as the costs of detection and investigation, that routinely attend the Government's efforts to root out deceptive practices directed at the public purse"). The most obvious indication that the treble damages ceiling has a remedial place under this statute is its qui tam feature with its possibility of diverting as much as 30 percent of the Government's recovery to a private relator who began the action. In qui tam cases the rough difference between double and triple damages may well serve not to punish, but to quicken the self-interest of some private plaintiff who can spot violations and start litigating to compensate the Government, while benefiting himself as well. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 547 (1943). The treble feature thus leaves the remaining double damages to provide elements of makewhole recovery beyond mere recoupment of the fraud. Cf. Bornstein, 423 U. S., at 315, and n. 11. It may also be necessary for full recovery even when there is no qui tam relator to be paid. The FCA has no separate provision for prejudgment interest, which is usually thought essential to compensation, see, e. g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U. S. 1, 10-11 (2001), and might well be substantial given the FCA's long statute of limitations, § 3731(b). Nor does the FCA expressly provide for the consequential damages that typically come with recovery for fraud, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(1)(b), and Comment d (1976).9Thus, although Stevens recognized that the FCA's treble damages remedy is still "punitive" in that recovery will exceed full compensation in a good many cases, the force of this9 The treble damages provision was, in a way, adopted by Congress as a substitute for consequential damages. The Senate version of the bill proposed consequential damages on top of treble damages, while the House version proposed consequential damages plus double damages. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, p. 39 (1986) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep. No. 99-660, p. 20 (1986). Ultimately, the Senate's treble figure was adopted and the consequential damages provision dropped.132132 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERpunitive nature in arguing against municipal liability is not as robust as if it were a pure penalty in all cases. Treble damages certainly do not equate with classic punitive damages, which leave the jury with open-ended discretion over the amount and so raises two concerns specific to municipal defendants. One is that a local government's taxing power makes it an easy target for an unduly generous jury. See Newport, 453 U. S., at 270-271. But under the FCA, the jury is open to no such temptation; if it finds liability, its instruction is to return a verdict for actual damages, for which the court alone then determines any multiplier, just as the court alone sets any separate penalty. § 3729(a); see 277 F. 3d, at 978. There is mitigation, also, for the second worry, that "blameless or unknowing taxpayers" will be unfairly taxed for the wrongdoing of local officials. Newport, 453 U. S., at 267. This very case shows how FCA liability may expose only local taxpayers who have already enjoyed the indirect benefit of the fraud, to the extent that the federal money has already been passed along in lower taxes or expanded services. Cf. ibid. The question in such cases is whether the local taxpayer should make up for an undeserved benefit, or the federal taxpayer be permanently out of pocket, a question that can be answered in any given case, not by an opportunistic qui tam relator, but by a combination of the judge's discretion and the Government's power to intervene and dismiss or settle an action, see § 3730(c)(2).The presumption against punitive damages thus brings only limited vigor to the County's aid. Working against the County's position, however, is a different presumption, this one at full strength: the "cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). Inferring repeal from legislative silence is hazardous at best, and error seems overwhelmingly likely in the notion that the 1986 amendments wordlessly redefined "person" to exclude municipalities. The County's argument, it must be remembered, is not133merely that the treble damages feature of the 1986 amendments was meant to bypass municipal corporations; the argument is that the treble damages amendment must be read to eliminate the FCA's coverage of municipal corporations entirely, after being the statutory law for over a century. This would be a hard case to make in the abstract, but it is impossible when we consider what is known about the object of the amendments in 1986.The basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make the FCA a "more useful tool against fraud in modern times." S. Rep., at 2. Because Congress was concerned about pervasive fraud in "all Government programs," ibid., it allowed private parties to sue even based on information already in the Government's possession, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 946 (1997); increased the Government's measure of recovery; and enhanced the incentives for relators to bring suit. Yet the County urges that in so doing Congress made local governments, which today often administer or receive federal funds, immune not only from treble damages but from any liability whatsoever under the FCA. Congress could have done that, of course, but it makes no sense to suggest Congress did it under its breath.10 It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by the very Act it passed to strengthen the Government's hand10 Indeed, there is some evidence that Congress affirmatively endorsed municipal liability when it passed the 1986 amendments. See S. Rep., at 8 (noting that "[t]he term 'person' is used in its broad sense to include partnerships, associations, and corporations ... as well as States and political subdivisions thereof" (citing, inter alia, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978))). Although in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000), we considered this evidence insufficient to overcome the background presumption that States are not "persons," in the present case the statement belies the County's argument that Congress meant to change the contrary presumption applicable to local governments and to remove municipal liability.134134 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERin fighting false claims. See Burns v. United States, 501 U. S. 129, 136 (1991).11IVThe term "person" in § 3729 included local governments in 1863 and nothing in the 1986 amendments redefined it. The judgment of the Court of Appeals isAffirmed | OCTOBER TERM, 2002SyllabusCOOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUITNo. 01-1572. Argued January 14, 2003-Decided March 10,2003Under the False Claims Act (FCA), "[a]ny person" who, inter alia, "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval," 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a)(1), is liable to the Government for a civil penalty, treble damages, and costs, § 3729(a). Although the Attorney General may sue under the FCA, a private person, known as a relator, may also bring a qui tam action "in the name of the Government." § 3730(b). The relator must inform the Justice Department of her intentions and keep the pleadings under seal while the Government decides whether to intervene and do its own litigating. § 3730(b)(2). If the claim succeeds, the relator's share may be up to 30 percent of the proceeds of the action, plus reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney's fees. § 3730(d). This case involves a National Institute of Drug Abuse research grant to Cook County Hospital for a study that was later administered by a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital. Respondent Chandler, who ran the study for the institute, filed this qui tam action, claiming that Cook County (hereinafter County) and the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds in violation of § 3729(a)(1). After this Court held in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, that States are not "persons" subject to FCA qui tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to dismiss the claims against it. The court held that the County, like a State, could not be subjected to treble damages, which Stevens described as "essentially punitive," id., at 784. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Stevens and reversed.Held: Local governments are "persons" amenable to qui tam actions under the FCA. Pp. 125-134.(a) While § 3729 does not define the term "person," its meaning has remained unchanged since the original FCA was passed in 1863. Stevens, supra, at 783, n. 12. There is no doubt that the term then extended to corporations. Indeed, this Court as early as 1826 in United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392, 412, recognized the presumption that "person" also includes "persons politic and incorporate." Essentially conceding that private corporations were taken to be persons when the120120 COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLERSyllabusFCA was passed in 1863, the County argues that municipal corporations were not so understood until six years later, when the Court decided Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118. Cowles, however, was not an extension of principle but a natural recognition of the common understanding that municipal corporations and private ones were to be treated alike in terms of their legal status as persons capable of suing and being sued. This explains how the Court in Cowles could conclude "automatically and without discussion" that municipal corporations, like private ones, "should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 687-688. Of course, the meaning of "person" recognized in Cowles was only a presumptive one, but neither the history nor the text of the original FCA provides contextual evidence that Congress intended to exclude municipalities from the class of "persons" covered by the FCA in 1863. pp. 125-129.(b) The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 did not repeal municipal liability. As part of an effort to modernize the FCA, the 1986 amendments raised the ceiling on damages recoverable under § 3729(a) from double to treble. Relying on the common law presumption against punitive damages for municipalities, see Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 259-260, and n. 21, and on this Court's statement in Stevens, supra, at 784, 785, that the change from double to treble damages turned what had been a "remedial" provision into an "essentially punitive" one, the County argues that, even if municipalities were covered by the term "person" from 1863 to 1986, Congress's adoption of a "punitive" remedy entailed the elimination of municipal liability in 1986. It does not follow from Stevens, however, that the punitive feature of FCA damages has the force to show congressional intent to repeal implicitly the existing definition of "person." To begin with, the FCA's damages multiplier has a compensatory function as well as a punitive one. Most obviously, the statute's qui tam feature means that as much as 30 percent of the Government's recovery may go to a private relator who began the action. Even when there is no qui tam relator to be paid, liability beyond actual damages may be necessary for full recovery, since the FCA has no separate provision for prejudgment interest or consequential damages. The force of the treble damages remedy's "punitive" nature in arguing against municipal liability is not as robust as it would be if that remedy were a pure penalty in all cases. What is more, treble damages certainly does not equate with classic punitive damages, which leaves the jury with open-ended discretion over the amount, and so raises two concerns specific to municipal defendants: that local government's taxing power will make it an easy target for an unduly generous121Full Text of Opinion |
3,231 | 1983_83-747 | JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.Section 4(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426, 33 U.S.C. § 904(a), makes general contractors responsible for obtaining workers' compensation coverage for the employees of subcontractors under certain circumstances. The question presented by this case is when, if ever, these general contractors are entitled to the immunity from tort liability provided in § 5(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).IPetitioner Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) is a government agency created in 1966 by the District of Columbia, the State of Maryland, and the Commonwealth of Virginia with the consent of the United States Congress. [Footnote 1] WMATA is charged with the construction and operation of a rapid transit system (Metro) for the District of Columbia and the surrounding metropolitan region. Under the interstate compact that governs its existence, WMATA is authorized to hire subcontractors to work on various aspects of the Metro construction project. [Footnote 2] Since 1966, WMATA has engaged several hundred subcontractors, who in turn have employed more than a thousand sub-subcontractors. [Footnote 3]Of the multifarious problems WMATA faced in constructing the Metro system, one has been ensuring that workers engaged in the project in the District of Columbia are covered Page 467 U. S. 928 by workers' compensation insurance. Under § 4(a) of the LHWCA, [Footnote 4] general contractors"shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of [workers'] compensation to employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has secured such payment."33 U.S.C. § 904(a). A company "secures" compensation either by purchasing an insurance policy or by obtaining permission from the Secretary of Labor to self-insure and make compensation payments directly to injured workers. 33 U.S.C. § 932(a). The effect of § 4(a) is to require general contractors like WMATA [Footnote 5] to obtain workers' compensation coverage for the employees of subcontractors that have not secured their own compensation. See infra at 467 U. S. 938.During the initial phase of Metro construction, which ran from 1969 to 1971, WMATA relied upon its subcontractors to purchase workers' compensation insurance for subcontractor employees. However, when the second phase of construction began, WMATA abandoned this policy in favor of a more centralized insurance program. As a financial matter, WMATA discovered that it could reduce the cost of workers' compensation insurance if it, rather than its numerous subcontractors, arranged for insurance. Practical considerations Page 467 U. S. 929 also influenced WMATA's decision to change its workers' compensation program. Requiring subcontractors to purchase their own insurance apparently hampered WMATA's affirmative action program, because many minority subcontractors were unable to afford or lacked sufficient business experience to qualify for their own workers' compensation insurance policies. [Footnote 6] Moreover, as the number of Metro subcontractors grew, it became increasingly burdensome for WMATA to monitor insurance coverage at every tier of the Metro hierarchy. Periodically, subcontractors' insurance would expire or their insurance companies would go out of business without WMATA's being informed. In such cases, a group of employees went uninsured, and WMATA technically breached its statutory duty to ensure that these employees were covered by compensation plans.For all of these reasons, WMATA elected to assume responsibility for securing workers' compensation insurance for all Metro construction employees. Effective July 31, 1971, WMATA purchased a comprehensive "wrap-up" policy from the Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. Under the policy, WMATA paid a single premium and, in return, Lumberman's Mutual agreed to make compensation payments for any injuries suffered by workers employed at Metro construction sites and compensable under the relevant workers' compensation regimes. [Footnote 7] After arranging for this "wrap-up" coverage, WMATA informed potential subcontractors that WMATA would, "for the benefit of contractors and others, procure and pay premiums" for workers' compensation insurance, and that the cost of securing such compensation insurance Page 467 U. S. 930 need no longer be included in bids submitted for Metro construction jobs. App. 104, 106. Subcontractors, however, were also advised that, if they deemed it necessary, they could, "at their own expense and effort," obtain their own workers' compensation insurance. Id. at 104. Once subcontractors were awarded Metro contracts, Lumberman's Mutual issued certificates of insurance confirming that the subcontractor's employees were covered by WMATA's policy. On these certificates, both WMATA and the subcontractor were listed as parties to whom the insurance was issued. Id. at 225.Respondents are employees of subcontractors engaged in the Metro project. Each respondent filed a compensation claim for work-related injuries. Most of these claims alleged respiratory injuries caused by high levels of silica dust and other industrial pollutants at Metro sites. None of respondents' employers had secured its own workers' compensation insurance, and respondents' claims were therefore handled under the Lumberman's Mutual policy purchased by WMATA. Lumberman's Mutual paid five of the respondents lump-sum compensation awards in complete settlement of their claims. The remaining two respondents received partial awards from Lumberman's Mutual.The instant litigation arose when respondents attempted to supplement their workers' compensation awards by bringing tort actions against WMATA. These suits, which were filed before five different judges in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, involved the same work-related incidents that had given rise to respondents' LHWCA claims. In each of the actions, WMATA moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from tort liability for such claims under § 5(a) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). In all of the District Court cases, WMATA's motions for summary judgment were granted, each judge agreeing that, by purchasing workers' compensation insurance for the employees of its subcontractors, WMATA had earned Page 467 U. S. 931 § 5(a)'s immunity from tort suits brought for work-related injuries.In a consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 230 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 717 F.2d 574 (1983). The Court of Appeals reasoned that § 5(a) of the LHWCA grants general contractors immunity from tort actions by subcontractor employees only if the general contractor has secured compensation insurance in satisfaction of a statutory duty. According to the Court of Appeals, WMATA had not acted under such a duty in this case. Had respondents' employers actually refused to secure the worker's compensation insurance, then WMATA, as general contractor, would have had what the Court of Appeals considered a statutory duty to secure insurance for respondents. However, WMATA never gave respondents' employers the opportunity to default on their statutory obligations to secure compensation; WMATA preempted its subcontractors through its unilateral decision to purchase a "wrap-up" policy covering all subcontractor employees. The Court of Appeals concluded that, by preempting its subcontractors, WMATA acted voluntarily, and was therefore not entitled to § 5(a)'s immunity. We granted WMATA's petition for a writ of certiorari, 464 U.S. 1068 (1984), and we now reverse.IIWorkers' compensation statutes, such as the LHWCA, "provide for compensation, in the stead of liability, for a class of employees." S.Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1926). These statutes reflect a legislated compromise between the interests of employees and the concerns of employers. On both sides, there is a quid pro quo. In return for the guarantee of compensation, the employees surrender common law remedies against their employers for work-related injuries. For the employer, the reward for securing compensation is immunity from employee tort suits. See Page 467 U. S. 932 Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, OWCP, 461 U. S. 624, 461 U. S. 636 (1983); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U. S. 268, 449 U. S. 282, and n. 24 (1980); see also 2A A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation § 72.31(c) (1982).In the case of the LHWCA, § 4(a)(b) and § 5(a) codify the compromise at the heart of workers' compensation. The relevant portions of these provisions read as follows:"SEC. 4. (a) Every employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees of the compensation payable under sections 7, 8, 9. In the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has secured such payment.""(b) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury."44 Stat. (part 2) 1426, 33 U.S.C. §§ 904(a), (b)."SEC. 5. (a) The liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee . . . except that, if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act, an injured employee . . . may elect to claim compensation under this Act, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages. . . ."86 Stat. 1263, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).The current case stems from an ambiguity in the wording of these sections. It is unclear how § 5(a)'s grant of immunity applies to the contractors mentioned in § 4(a). This interpretative question divides into two distinct inquiries. First, does § 5(a)'s grant of immunity ever extend to general contractors? And second, if § 5(a) can extend to general contractors, what must a contractor do to qualify for § 5(a)'s immunity? We will consider these questions in turn. Page 467 U. S. 933AThe language of § 5(a)'s grant of immunity does not effortlessly embrace contractors. Section 5(a) speaks in terms of "an employer" and, at least as far as the employees of subcontractors are concerned, a general contractor does not act as an employer.A few courts have accepted a literal reading of the language of § 5(a) and analogous state immunity provisions. For instance, in Fiore v. Royal Painting Co., 398 So. 2d 863, 865 (1981), a Florida appellate court concluded: "Only the actual employer . . . may get under the immunity umbrella of [33 U.S.C.] § 905." Similarly, in interpreting an almost identical provision of New York workers' compensation law, [Footnote 8] the New York Court of Appeals has reasoned that tort immunity should not apply to contractors, because "[t]he word "employee" denotes a contractual relationship,'" and a contractor never is contractually bound to the employees of a subcontractor. Sweezey v. Arc Electrical Construction Co., 295 N.Y. 306, 310-311, 67 N.E.2d 369, 370-371 (1946) (quoting Passarelli Columbia Engineering and Contracting Co., 270 N.Y. 68, 75, 200 N.E. 583, 585 (1936)).The more widely held view, however, is that the term "employer" as used in § 5(a) has a statutory definition somewhat broader than that word's ordinary meaning. The majority of courts considering the issue, including the Court of Appeals in this case, have concluded that § 5(a)'s tort immunity can extend to general contractors, at least when the contractor has fulfilled its responsibilities to secure compensation for subcontractor employees in accordance with the requirements of § 4(a). See, e.g., Johnson v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., supra, at 302, 717 F.2d at 581; Thomas v. George Hyman Construction Co., 173 F. Supp. 381, 383 Page 467 U. S. 934 (DC 1959); DiNicola v. George Hyman Construction Co., 407 A.2d 670, 674 (D.C.1979). [Footnote 9]In choosing between these conflicting interpretations of § 5(a), we are predisposed in favor of the majority view that tort immunity should extend to contractors. This position is presumptively the better view, because it is more consistent with the compromise underlying the LHWCA. The reward for securing compensation and assuming strict liability for worker-related injuries has traditionally been immunity from tort liability. See supra at 467 U. S. 931-932."Since the general contractor is [by the operation of provisions like § 4(a) of the LHWCA], in effect, made the employer for the purposes of the compensation statute, it is obvious that he should enjoy the regular immunity of an employer from third-party suit when the facts are such that he could be made liable for compensation."2A Larson, supra, § 72.31(a), at 14-112.Our only difficulty in adopting the majority view is that it requires a slightly strained reading of the word "employer." As we have repeatedly admonished courts faced with technical questions arising under the LHWCA, "the wisest course is to adhere closely to what Congress has written." Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U. S. 596, 451 U. S. 617 (1981); see Director, OWCP v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S. 29, 440 U. S. 47 (1979). Absent convincing evidence of contrary congressional intent, we are reluctant to depart from this sound canon of statutory construction. However, upon reviewing the use of the term "employer" elsewhere in the Act, we find ample evidence to infer that Congress intended the term "employer" to include general contractors as well as direct employers.The second sentence of § 4(a) provides that "unless the subcontractor has secured [worker's] compensation," the contractor "shall secure the payment of such compensation." Page 467 U. S. 935 This section clearly assumes that contractors have the capacity to secure compensation for subcontractor employees. Securing compensation is a term of art in this area of law. Under the LHWCA, compensation can be secured only through the procedures outlined in § 32(a) of the LHWCA. See supra at 467 U. S. 928. However, § 32(a) speaks only of insurance being secured by an "employer." 33 U.S.C. § 932(a). Because the LHWCA requires that contractors secure compensation for subcontractor employees under certain circumstances, the term "employer" as used in § 32(a) must be read to encompass general contractors.Similarly, under § 4(a), contractors are made liable for payment of "compensation payable under sections 7, 8, and 9." These three sections refer exclusively to employers' making payments; they contain no references to contractors. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 907(a), 908(f). For purposes of these sections as well, contractors would appear to qualify as statutory employers.Further evidence that contractors can be employers under the LHWCA is found in § 33(b), which governs the assignment of an injured worker's right to recover damages from third parties to the worker's "employer." 33 U.S.C. § 933(b); see Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., supra. It is difficult to believe that Congress did not intend for contractors making compensation payments under § 4(a) to receive assignments under § 33(b), or that Congress wanted the assignment to run to a worker's actual employer, who may never have secured any compensation insurance. Accordingly, it seems highly probable that "employer" as used in § 33(b) also covers contractors.Finally, there are the enforcement provisions of § 38 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 938. It is generally assumed that contractors who fail to comply with the requirements of § 4(a) may be liable for § 38's criminal penalties. App. 263-265, 299. This assumption seems reasonable, for, if contractors are not covered by § 38, then the LHWCA contains no apparent Page 467 U. S. 936 mechanism for enforcing the second sentence of § 4(a). But, once again, § 38 refers only to "[a]ny employer required to secure the payment of compensation under this Act." If contractors are truly liable under § 38, then contractors must be considered statutory employers.From the foregoing examples, it is clear that Congress must have meant for the term "employer" in other sections of the LHWCA to include contractors. [Footnote 10] It is reasonable to infer that Congress intended the term "employer" to have that same broad meaning in § 5(a). This is particularly so inasmuch as granting tort immunity to contractors that comply with § 4(a) is consistent with the quid pro quo underlying workers' compensation statutes. For both of these reasons, we adopt the majority view that general contractors can be embraced by the term "employer" as used in § 5(a).BHaving concluded that § 5(a) can cover general contractors, we now consider the conditions under which contractors may qualify for § 5(a)'s immunity. The Court of Appeals took the view that, to qualify for § 5(a)'s grant of immunity,"WMATA must first require its subcontractors to purchase the insurance. It is only by providing compensation insurance when the subcontractors fail to do so that WMATA obtains immunity as a statutory employer."230 U.S.App.D.C. at 303, 717 F.2d at 582 (emphasis in original). This view -- Page 467 U. S. 937 that § 5(a) covers general contractors only if the contractor secures compensation after the subcontractor actually defaults -- is consistent with the opinions of several other federal courts. See, e.g., Probst v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 379 F.2d 763, 767 (CA5 1967); Thomas v. George Hyman Construction, Co., 173 F. Supp. at 383.The Court of Appeals' interpretation of the LHWCA rests on the notion that general contractors are entitled to the reward of tort immunity only when the contractor has been statutorily required to secure compensation. In essence, the Court of Appeals would withhold the quid of tort immunity until the contractor had been legally bound to provide the quo of securing compensation. Though plausible, given the logic of workers' compensation statutes, [Footnote 11] the Court of Appeals' view is difficult to square with the language of the LHWCA.Section 5(a) does not say that employers are immune from tort liability if they secure compensation in accordance with the Act. The section provides just the obverse -- that employers shall be immune from liability unless the employer "fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act." Immunity is not cast as a reward for employers that secure compensation; rather, loss of immunity is levied as a penalty on those that neglect to meet their statutory obligations. Page 467 U. S. 938Since we have already determined that contractors qualify as employers under § 5(a), the most natural reading of § 5(a) would offer general contractors tort immunity so long as they do not fail to meet their statutory obligations to secure compensation. Under § 4(a), a contractor "shall be liable for and shall secure [compensation] unless the subcontractor has secured such payment." Contrary to the Court of Appeals' reading of the Act, this provision contains no suggestion that the contractor must make a demand on its subcontractors before securing compensation, or that the contractor should forestall securing compensation until the subcontractor has affirmatively defaulted. Rather, the section simply places on general contractors a contingent obligation to secure compensation whenever a subcontractor has failed to do so. Taken together, §§ 4(a) and 5(a) would appear to grant a general contractor immunity from tort suits brought by subcontractor employees unless the contractor has neglected to secure workers' compensation coverage after the subcontractor failed to do so.Besides being faithful to the plain language of the statute, this reading furthers the policy underlying the LHWCA, which is to ensure that workers are not deprived workers' compensation coverage. If the benefits of securing compensation insurance -- that is, tort immunity -- did not accrue to contractors until subcontractors had affirmatively elected to default, then contractors would be reluctant to incur the considerable expense of securing compensation insurance until they were absolutely convinced that subcontractors were in statutory default. Inevitably, such a rule would create gaps in workers' compensation coverage -- a result Congress clearly wanted to avoid. The reason for passing the LHWCA was to bring one of the last remaining groups of uninsured workers under the umbrella of workers' compensation. [Footnote 12] Page 467 U. S. 939A further argument in favor of accepting the natural reading of §§ 4(a) and 5(a) is that it saves courts from the onerous task of determining when subcontractors have defaulted on their own statutory obligations. If a contractor's tort immunity were contingent upon an affirmative default on the part of subcontractors, then every time a subcontractor employee sued the general contractor after recovering compensation under the contractor's compensation policy, the contractor would be forced to establish that the worker's direct employer had been given a reasonable chance to secure compensation for itself, and then had failed to respond to the opportunity. Nothing in the LHWCA or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to unleash such a difficult set of factual inquiries. And it is unlikely that Congress would silently impose such a barrier to contractor immunity. [Footnote 13]As the natural reading of §§ 4(a) and 5(a) comports with the policies underlying the LHWCA and is consistent with the legislative history of the Act, there is no cause not to "adhere closely to what Congress has written." Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 617. We conclude, therefore, that §§ 4(a) and 5(a) of the LHWCA render a general Page 467 U. S. 940 contractor immune from tort liability provided the contractor has not failed to honor its statutory duty to secure compensation for subcontractor employees when the subcontractor itself has not secured such compensation. So long as general contractors have not defaulted on this statutory obligation to secure back-up compensation for subcontractor employees, they qualify for § 5(a)'s grant of immunity.IIIApplying our interpretation of § 4(a) and § 5(a) to the facts of this case, we conclude that WMATA was entitled to immunity from the tort actions brought by respondents. Far from "fail[ing] to secure payment of compensation as required by [the LHWCA]," 33 U.S.C. § 905(a), WMATA acted above and beyond its statutory obligations. In order to prevent subcontractor employees from going uninsured, WMATA went to the considerable effort and expense of purchasing "wrap-up" insurance on behalf of all of its subcontractors. Rather than waiting to secure its own compensation until subcontractors failed to secure, WMATA guaranteed that every Metro subcontractor would satisfy and keep satisfied its primary statutory obligation to obtain worker's compensation coverage. [Footnote 14] Due to the comprehensiveness of its "wrap-up" Page 467 U. S. 941 policy, WMATA's statutory duty to secure back-up compensation for its subcontractor employees has not been triggered since the second phase of Metro construction began, and WMATA has therefore had no opportunity to default on its statutory obligations established in § 4(a). Under these circumstances, it is clear that WMATA remains entitled to § 5(a)'s grant of tort immunity.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtWash. Metro. Area Transit v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925 (1984)Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. JohnsonNo. 83-747Argued April 24, 1984Decided June 26, 1984467 U.S. 925SyllabusSection 4(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act) provides that "[e]very employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees" of compensation payable under the Act, and further provides that,"[i]n the case of an employer who is a subcontractor, the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor has secured such payment."Section 5(a) provides that the liability of an "employer" prescribed in § 4 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of "such employer" to the employee, except that, if an "employer" fails to secure payment of compensation as required by the Act, an injured employee may elect to claim compensation under the Act or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages. Petitioner, a general contractor governed by the Act and responsible for construction of a rapid transit system (Metro) for the District of Columbia and surrounding metropolitan area, purchased a comprehensive "wrap-up" workers' compensation insurance policy to cover all employees of subcontractors engaged in the construction of Metro. Respondents, employees of subcontractors who had not secured their own workers' compensation insurance, after having obtained compensation awards from petitioner's insurer for work-related injuries, each brought a tort action against petitioner in Federal District Court to supplement such awards. The court in each case awarded summary judgment to petitioner, holding that, by purchasing workers' compensation insurance for the employees of its subcontractors, petitioner had earned § 5(a)'s immunity from tort suits brought for work-related injuries. In a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, taking the view that § 5(a)'s grant of immunity applies to a general contractor only if the contractor secures compensation after the subcontractor fails to do so. The court therefore concluded that, since petitioner unilaterally purchased the "wrap-up" policy, and thus preempted its subcontractors, it was not entitled to § 5(a)'s immunity.Held:1. Section 5(a)'s grant of immunity extends to general contractors. While § 5(a) speaks in terms of an "employer" and a general contractor Page 467 U. S. 926 does not act as an employer of a subcontractor's employees, there is ample evidence in the use of the term "employer" elsewhere in the LHWCA to infer that Congress intended the term to include general contractors as well as direct employers. This is particularly so with respect to § 5(a), inasmuch as granting tort immunity to contractors who comply with § 4(a) is consistent with the quid pro quo underlying workers' compensation statutes, whereby, in return for the guarantee of compensation, the employees surrender common law remedies against their employers for work-related injuries, while the employer, as a reward for securing compensation, is granted immunity from employee tort suits. Pp. 467 U. S. 933-936.2. A general contractor qualifies for § 5(a) immunity as long as it does not fail to meet its obligations to secure compensation for subcontractor employees under § 4(a). Section 4(a) simply places on general contractors a contingent obligation to secure compensation whenever a subcontractor has failed to do so. This is the most natural reading of § 4(a). Moreover, this reading furthers the underlying policy of the LHWCA to ensure that workers are not deprived of compensation coverage, and saves courts from the onerous task of determining when subcontractors have defaulted on their own statutory obligations. Pp. 467 U. S. 936-940.3. Based on the above interpretations of §§ 4(a) and 5(a), petitioner was entitled to immunity from respondents' tort actions. Far from failing to secure payment of compensation as required by the LHWCA, petitioner acted above and beyond its statutory obligation by purchasing the "wrap-up" insurance on behalf of all its subcontractors. Pp. 467 U. S. 940-941.230 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 717 F.2d 574, reversed and remanded.MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 467 U. S. 941. Page 467 U. S. 927 |
3,232 | 1980_79-1794 | JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.As Detroit police officers were about to execute a warrant to search a house for narcotics, they encountered respondent descending the front steps. They requested his assistance in gaining entry, and detained him while they searched the premises. After finding narcotics in the basement and ascertaining that respondent owned the house, the police arrested him, searched his person, and found in his coat pocket an envelope containing 8.5 grams of heroin. [Footnote 1] Page 452 U. S. 694Respondent was charged with possession of the heroin found on his person. He moved to suppress the heroin as the product of an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, [Footnote 2] and the trial judge granted the motion and quashed the information. That order was affirmed by a divided panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals, 68 Mich.App. 571, 243 N.W.2d 689, and by the Michigan Supreme Court over the dissent of three of its justices. 407 Mich. 432, 286 N.W.2d 226. We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 449 U.S. 898, and now reverse.IThe dispositive question in this case is whether the initial detention of respondent violated his constitutional right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his person. The State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's person by arguing that the authority to search premises granted by the warrant implicitly included the authority to search persons on those premises, just as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and containers in which the particular things described might be concealed. But as the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly noted, even if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify the initial detention of respondent outside the premises described in the warrant. See 68 Mich.App. at 578-580, 243 N.W. Page 452 U. S. 695 2d at 62-693. If that detention was permissible, there is no need to reach the question whether a search warrant for premises includes the right to search persons found there, because when the police searched respondent, they had probable cause to arrest him and had done so. [Footnote 3] Our appraisal of the validity of the search of respondent's person therefore depends upon a determination whether the officers had the authority to require him to reenter the house and to remain there while they conducted their search. [Footnote 4] Page 452 U. S. 696IIIn assessing the validity of respondent's initial detention, we note first that it constituted a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. [Footnote 5] The State does not contend otherwise, and the record demonstrates that respondent was not free to leave the premises while the officers were searching his home. It is also clear that respondent was not formally arrested until after the search was completed. The dispute therefore involves only the constitutionality of a pre-arrest "seizure," which we assume was unsupported by probable cause.In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that an official seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal arrest is made. In that case, police officers located a murder suspect at a neighbor's house, took him into custody, and transported him to the police station, where interrogation ultimately produced a confession. Because the suspect was not arrested until after he had confessed, and because he presumably would have been set free if probable cause had not been established during his questioning, the State argued that the pre-arrest detention should not be equated with an arrest, and should be upheld as "reasonable" in view of the serious character of the crime and the fact that the police had an articulable basis for suspecting that Dunaway was involved. Id. at 442 U. S. 207. The Court firmly rejected the State's argument, noting that "the detention of petitioner was, in Page 452 U. S. 697 important respects, indistinguishable from a traditional arrest." Id. at 442 U. S. 212. [Footnote 6] We stated:"Indeed any 'exception' that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.""The central importance of the probable cause requirement to the protection of a citizen's privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment's guarantees cannot be compromised in this fashion. "The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history." Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 361 U. S. 100 (1959). Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that "common rumor or report, suspicion, or even strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest." Id. at 361 U. S. 101 (footnotes omitted). The familiar threshold standard of probable cause for Fourth Amendment seizures reflects the benefit of extensive experience accommodating the factors relevant to the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and provides the relative simplicity and clarity necessary to the implementation of a workable rule. See Brinegar v. United States, [338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 175-176]." Id. at 442 U. S. 213.Although we refused in Dunaway to find an exception that would swallow the general rule, our opinion recognized that some seizures significantly less intrusive than an arrest have withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In these cases, the intrusion Page 452 U. S. 698 on the citizen's privacy "was so much less severe" than that involved in a traditional arrest that "the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer's safety" could support the seizure as reasonable. Id. at 442 U. S. 209.In the first such case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, the Court recognized the narrow authority of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on less than probable cause. The Court approved a "frisk" for weapons as a justifiable response to an officer's reasonable belief that he was dealing with a possibly armed and dangerous suspect. [Footnote 7] In the second such case, Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, the Court relied on Terry to hold that an officer could forcibly stop a suspect to investigate an informant's tip that the suspect was armed and carrying narcotics. [Footnote 8] And in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, the Court held that the special enforcement problems confronted by roving Border Patrol agents, though not sufficient to justify random stops of vehicles Page 452 U. S. 699 near the Mexican border to question their occupants about their citizenship, id. at 422 U. S. 882-884, [Footnote 9] were adequate to support vehicle stops based on the agents' awareness of specific articulable facts indicating that the vehicle contained illegal aliens. The Court reasoned that the difficulty in patrolling the long Mexican border and the interest in controlling the influx of illegal aliens justified the limited intrusion, usually lasting no more than a minute, involved in the stop. Id. at 422 U. S. 878-880. [Footnote 10] See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411.These cases recognize that some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained, and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity. In these cases, as in Dunaway, the Court was applying the ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Page 452 U. S. 700 Fourth Amendment. [Footnote 11] They are consistent with the general rule that every arrest, and every seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause. But they demonstrate that the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified by special law enforcement interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams. [Footnote 12] Therefore, in Page 452 U. S. 701 order to decide whether this case is controlled by the general rule, it is necessary to examine both the character of the official intrusion and its justification.IIIOf prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent's house for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house, and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there. The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself. [Footnote 13] Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens -- unless they intend flight to avoid arrest -- would elect to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions. Furthermore, the type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search, and not through the detention. [Footnote 14] Page 452 U. S. 702 Moreover, because the detention in this case was in respondent's own residence, it could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself, and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station. [Footnote 15] In sharp contrast to the custodial interrogation in Dunaway, the detention of this respondent was "substantially less intrusive" than an arrest. 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 210. [Footnote 16]In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant, both the law enforcement interest and the nature of the "articulable facts" supporting the detention are relevant. Most obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. Although no special danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. [Footnote 17] The risk of harm to both the Page 452 U. S. 703 police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Cf. 2 W. LaFave Search and Seizure § 4.9, pp. 150-151 (1978). Finally, the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present. Their self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also delay the completion of the task at hand.It is also appropriate to consider the nature of the articulable and individualized suspicion on which the police base the detention of the occupant of a home subject to a search warrant. We have already noted that the detention represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant. The existence of a search warrant, however, also provides an objective justification for the detention. A judicial officer has determined that police have probable cause to believe that someone in the home is committing a crime. Thus, a neutral magistrate, rather than an officer in the field, has made the critical determination that the police should be given a special authorization to thrust themselves into the privacy of a home. [Footnote 18] The connection of an occupant to that home Page 452 U. S. 704 gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant.In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, we held that police officers may not enter a private residence to make a routine felony arrest without first obtaining a warrant. In that case, we rejected the suggestion that only a search warrant could adequately protect the privacy interests at stake, noting that the distinction between a search warrant and an arrest warrant was far less significant than the interposition of the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen:"It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen. If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within."Id. at 445 U. S. 602-603. That holding is relevant today. If the evidence that a citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade Page 452 U. S. 705 a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. [Footnote 19] Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband [Footnote 20] founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. [Footnote 21]Because it was lawful to require respondent to reenter and to remain in the house until evidence establishing probable cause to arrest him was found, his arrest and the search incident thereto were constitutionally permissible. The judgment Page 452 U. S. 706 of the Supreme Court of Michigan must therefore be reversed.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtMichigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)Michigan v. SummersNo. 79-1794Argued February 25, 1981 -- Decided June 22, 1981452 U.S. 692SyllabusWhen police officers executing a warrant to search a house for narcotics encountered respondent descending the front steps, they requested his assistance in gaining entry and detained him while they searched the premises. After finding narcotics and ascertaining that respondent owned the house, the police arrested him, searched his person, and found heroin in his coat pocket. Respondent, who was charged with possession of the heroin found on his person, moved to suppress the heroin as the product of an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial judge granted the motion and quashed the information, and both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.Held: The initial detention of respondent, which constituted a "seizure" and was assumed to be unsupported by probable cause, did not violate his constitutional right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his person. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Because it was lawful to require respondent to reenter and to remain in the house until evidence establishing probable cause to arrest him was found, his arrest and the search incident thereto were constitutionally permissible. Pp. 452 U. S. 694-705.407 Mich. 432, 286 N.W.2d 226, reversed.STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 452 U. S. 706. Page 452 U. S. 693 |
3,233 | 1984_83-1878 | JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.This case presents the question of the extent to which a decision of an administrative agency to exercise its "discretion" not to undertake certain enforcement actions is subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (APA). Respondents are several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection of drugs. They petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), alleging that, under the circumstances, the use of these drugs for capital punishment violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (FDCA), and requesting that the FDA take various enforcement actions to prevent these violations. The FDA refused their request. We review here a decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held the FDA's refusal to take enforcement actions both reviewable and an abuse of discretion, and remanded the case with directions that the agency be required "to fulfill its statutory function." 231 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 153, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191 (1983).IRespondents have been sentenced to death by lethal injection of drugs under the laws of the States of Oklahoma and Texas. Those States, and several others, have recently adopted this method for carrying out the capital sentence. Respondents first petitioned the FDA, claiming that the drugs used by the States for this purpose, although approved by the FDA for the medical purposes stated on their labels, were not approved for use in human executions. They alleged that the drugs had not been tested for the purpose for which they were to be used, and that, given that the drugs would likely be administered by untrained personnel, it was also likely that the drugs would not induce the quick and painless death intended. They urged that use of these drugs for human execution was the "unapproved use of an approved drug," and Page 470 U. S. 824 constituted a violation of the Act's prohibitions against "misbranding." [Footnote 1] They also suggested that the FDCA's requirements for approval of "new drugs" applied, since these drugs were now being used for a new purpose. Accordingly, respondents claimed that the FDA was required to approve the drugs as "safe and effective" for human execution before they could be distributed in interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 355. They therefore requested the FDA to take various investigatory and enforcement actions to prevent these perceived violations; they requested the FDA to affix warnings to the labels of all the drugs stating that they were unapproved and unsafe for human execution, to send statements to the drug manufacturers and prison administrators stating that the drugs should not be so used, and to adopt procedures for seizing the drugs from state prisons and to recommend the prosecution of all those in the chain of distribution who knowingly distribute or purchase the drugs with intent to use them for human execution.The FDA Commissioner responded, refusing to take the requested actions. The Commissioner first detailed his disagreement with respondents' understanding of the scope of FDA jurisdiction over the unapproved use of approved drugs for human execution, concluding that FDA jurisdiction in the area was generally unclear, but in any event should not be exercised to interfere with this particular aspect of state criminal justice systems. He went on to state:"Were FDA clearly to have jurisdiction in the area, moreover, we believe we would be authorized to decline to exercise it under our inherent discretion to decline to pursue certain enforcement matters. The unapproved use of approved drugs is an area in which the case law is far from uniform. Generally, enforcement proceedings in this area are initiated only when there is a serious Page 470 U. S. 825 danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud. We cannot conclude that those dangers are present under State lethal injection laws, which are duly authorized statutory enactments in furtherance of proper State functions. . . ."Respondents then filed the instant suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming the same violations of the FDCA and asking that the FDA be required to take the same enforcement actions requested in the prior petition. [Footnote 2] Jurisdiction was grounded in the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and review of the agency action was sought under the judicial review provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701706. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner. It began with the proposition that"decisions of executive departments and agencies to refrain from instituting investigative and enforcement proceedings are essentially unreviewable by the courts."Chaney v. Schweiker, Civ. No. 81-2265 (DC, Aug. 30, 1982), App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a (emphasis in original). The court then cited case law stating that nothing in the FDCA indicated an intent to circumscribe the FDA's enforcement discretion or to make it reviewable.A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The majority began by discussing the FDA's jurisdiction over the unapproved use of approved drugs for human execution, and concluded that the FDA did have jurisdiction over such a use. The court then addressed the Government's assertion of unreviewable discretion Page 470 U. S. 826 to refuse enforcement action. It first discussed this Court's opinions which have held that there is a general presumption that all agency decisions are reviewable under the APA, at least to assess whether the actions were "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 387 U. S. 139-141 (1967); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). It noted that the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701, only precludes judicial review of final agency action -- including refusals to act, see 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) -- when review is precluded by statute, or "committed to agency discretion by law." Citing this Court's opinions in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), for the view that these exceptions should be narrowly construed, the court held that the "committed to agency discretion by law" exception of § 701(a)(2) should be invoked only where the substantive statute left the courts with "no law to apply." 231 U.S.App.D.C. at 146, 718 F.2d at 1184 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra, at 401 U. S. 410). The court cited Dunlop as holding that this presumption "applies with no less force to review of . . . agency decisions to refrain from enforcement action." 231 U.S.App.D.C. at 146, 718 F.2d at 1184. The court found "law to apply" in the form of a FDA policy statement which indicated that the agency was "obligated" to investigate the unapproved use of an approved drug when such use became "widespread" or"endanger[ed] the public health." Id. at 148, 718 F.2d at 1186 (citing 37 Fed.Reg. 16504 (1972)). The court held that this policy statement constituted a "rule," and was considered binding by the FDA. Given the policy statement indicating that the FDA should take enforcement action in this area, and the strong presumption that all agency action is subject to judicial review, the court concluded that review of the agency's refusal was not foreclosed. It then proceeded to assess whether the agency's decision not to act was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Citing evidence that the FDA assumed Page 470 U. S. 827 jurisdiction over drugs used to put animals to sleep [Footnote 3] and the unapproved uses of drugs on prisoners in clinical experiments, the court found that the FDA's refusal, for the reasons given, was irrational, and that respondents' evidence that use of the drugs could lead to a cruel and protracted death was entitled to more searching consideration. The court therefore remanded the case to the District Court, to order the FDA "to fulfill its statutory function."The dissenting judge expressed the view that an agency's decision not to institute enforcement action generally is unreviewable, and that such exercises of "prosecutorial discretion" presumptively fall within the APA's exception for agency actions "committed to agency discretion by law." He noted that traditionally courts have been wary of second-guessing agency decisions not to enforce, given the agency's expertise and better understanding of its enforcement policies and available resources. He likewise concluded that nothing in the FDCA or FDA regulations would provide a basis for a court's review of this agency decision. A divided Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing. 233 U.S.App.D.C. 146, 724 F.2d 1030 (1984). We granted certiorari to review the implausible result that the FDA is required to exercise its enforcement power to ensure that States only use drugs that are "safe and effective" for human execution. 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). We reverse.IIThe Court of Appeals' decision addressed three questions: (1) whether the FDA had jurisdiction to undertake the enforcement actions requested, (2) whether if it did have jurisdiction Page 470 U. S. 828 its refusal to take those actions was subject to judicial review, and (3) whether, if reviewable, its refusal was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In reaching our conclusion that the Court of Appeals was wrong, however, we need not and do not address the thorny question of the FDA's jurisdiction. For us, this case turns on the important question of the extent to which determinations by the FDA not to exercise its enforcement authority over the use of drugs in interstate commerce may be judicially reviewed. That decision in turn involves the construction of two separate but necessarily interrelated statutes, the APA and the FDCA.The APA's comprehensive provisions for judicial review of "agency actions" are contained in 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Any person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency action, see § 702, including a "failure to act," is entitled to "judicial review thereof," as long as the action is a "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," see § 704. The standards to be applied on review are governed by the provisions of § 706. But before any review at all may be had, a party must first clear the hurdle of § 701(a). That section provides that the chapter on judicial review"applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that -- (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."Petitioner urges that the decision of the FDA to refuse enforcement is an action "committed to agency discretion by law" under § 701(a)(2).This Court has not had occasion to interpret this second exception in § 701(a) in any great detail. On its face, the section does not obviously lend itself to any particular construction; indeed, one might wonder what difference exists between § (a)(1) and § (a)(2). The former section seems easy in application; it requires construction of the substantive statute involved to determine whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review of certain decisions. That is the approach taken with respect to § (a)(1) in cases such as Southern Page 470 U. S. 829 R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp, 442 U. S. 444 (1979), and Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 567. But one could read the language "committed to agency discretion by law" in § (a)(2) to require a similar inquiry. In addition, commentators have pointed out that construction of § (a)(2) is further complicated by the tension between a literal reading of § (a)(2), which exempts from judicial review those decisions committed to agency "discretion," and the primary scope of review prescribed by § 706(2)(A) -- whether the agency's action was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." How is it, they ask, that an action committed to agency discretion can be unreviewable and yet courts still can review agency actions for abuse of that discretion? See 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 28:6 (1984) (hereafter Davis); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 Colum.L.Rev. 55, 58 (1965). The APA's legislative history provides little help on this score. Mindful, however, of the common-sense principle of statutory construction that sections of a statute generally should be read "to give effect, if possible, to every clause . . . ," see United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 348 U. S. 538-539 (1955), we think there is a proper construction of §(a)(2) which satisfies each of these concerns.This Court first discussed § (a)(2) in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971). That case dealt with the Secretary of Transportation's approval of the building of an interstate highway through a park in Memphis, Tennessee. The relevant federal statute provided that the Secretary "shall not approve" any program or project using public parkland unless the Secretary first determined that no feasible alternatives were available. Id. at 401 U. S. 411. Interested citizens challenged the Secretary's approval under the APA, arguing that he had not satisfied the substantive statute's requirements. This Court first addressed the "threshold question" of whether the agency's action was at all reviewable. After setting out the language of § 701(a), the Court stated: Page 470 U. S. 830"In this case, there is no indication that Congress sought to prohibit judicial review, and there is most certainly no "showing of clear and convincing evidence' of a . . . legislative intent" to restrict access to judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 387 U. S. 141 (1967). . . ." "Similarly, the Secretary's decision here does not fall within the exception for action 'committed to agency discretion.' This is a very narrow exception. . . . The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)."Overton Park, supra, at 401 U. S. 410 (footnote omitted).The above quote answers several of the questions raised by the language of § 701(a), although it raises others. First, it clearly separates the exception provided by § (a)(1) from the § (a)(2) exception. The former applies when Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review. The latter applies in different circumstances; even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute ("law") can be taken to have "committed" the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely. This construction avoids conflict with the "abuse of discretion" standard of review in § 706 -- if no judicially manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for "abuse of discretion." In addition, this construction satisfies the principle of statutory construction mentioned earlier, by identifying a separate class of cases to which § 701(a)(2) applies.To this point, our analysis does not differ significantly from that of the Court of Appeals. That court purported to apply Page 470 U. S. 831 the "no law to apply" standard of Overton Park. We disagree, however, with that court's insistence that the "narrow construction" of § (a)(2) required application of a presumption of reviewability even to an agency's decision not to undertake certain enforcement actions. Here we think the Court of Appeals broke with tradition, case law, and sound reasoning.Overton Park did not involve an agency's refusal to take requested enforcement action. It involved an affirmative act of approval under a statute that set clear guidelines for determining when such approval should be given. Refusals to take enforcement steps generally involve precisely the opposite situation, and, in that situation, we think the presumption is that judicial review is not available. This Court has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 442 U. S. 123-124 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 418 U. S. 693 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 386 U. S. 182 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869). This recognition of the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved Page 470 U. S. 832 in the proper ordering of its priorities. Similar concerns animate the principles of administrative law that courts generally will defer to an agency's construction of the statute it is charged with implementing, and to the procedures it adopts for implementing that statute. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 435 U. S. 543 (1978); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60, 421 U. S. 87 (1975).In addition to these administrative concerns, we note that, when an agency refuses to act, it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect. Similarly, when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner. The action at least can be reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory powers. See, e.g., FTC v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 (1929). Finally, we recognize that an agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict -- a decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S.Const., Art. II, § 3.We of course only list the above concerns to facilitate understanding of our conclusion that an agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2). For good reasons, such a decision has traditionally been "committed to agency discretion," and we believe that the Congress enacting the APA did not intend to alter that tradition. Cf. 5 Davis § 28:5 (APA did not significantly alter the "common law" of judicial review of agency action). In so stating, we emphasize that the decision is only presumptively unreviewable; the presumption Page 470 U. S. 833 may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. [Footnote 4] Thus, in establishing this presumption in the APA, Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency administers. Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue. How to determine when Congress has done so is the question left open by Overton Park.Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975), relied upon heavily by respondents and the majority in the Court of Appeals, presents an example of statutory language which supplied sufficient standards to rebut the presumption of unreviewability. Dunlop involved a suit by a union employee, under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481 et seq. (LMRDA), asking the Secretary of Labor to investigate and file suit to set aside a union election. Section 482 provided that, upon filing of a complaint by a union member,"[t]he Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation . . . has occurred . . . he shall . . . bring a civil action. . . ."After investigating the plaintiff's claims, the Secretary of Labor declined to file suit, and the plaintiff sought judicial review under the APA. This Court held that Page 470 U. S. 834 review was available. It rejected the Secretary's argument that the statute precluded judicial review, and, in a footnote, it stated its agreement with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the decision was not "an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion." 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 567, n. 7. Our textual references to the "strong presumption" of reviewability in Dunlop were addressed only to the § (a)(1) exception; we were content to rely on the Court of Appeals' opinion to hold that the § (a)(2) exception did not apply. The Court of Appeals, in turn, had found the "principle of absolute prosecutorial discretion" inapplicable, because the language of the LMRDA indicated that the Secretary was required to file suit if certain "clearly defined" factors were present. The decision therefore was not "beyond the judicial capacity to supervise.'" Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 87-88 (CA3 1974) (quoting Davis § 28.16, p. 984 (1970 Supp.)).Dunlop is thus consistent with a general presumption of unreviewability of decisions not to enforce. The statute being administered quite clearly withdrew discretion from the agency and provided guidelines for exercise of its enforcement power. Our decision that review was available was not based on "pragmatic considerations," such as those cited by the Court of Appeals, see 231 U.S.App.D.C. at 147, 718 F.2d at 1185, that amount to an assessment of whether the interests at stake are important enough to justify intervention in the agencies' decisionmaking. The danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with sufficient vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are the most appropriate body to police this aspect of their performance. That decision is in the first instance for Congress, and we therefore turn to the FDCA to determine whether in this case Congress has provided us with "law to apply." If it has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that discretion, there is "law to apply" under § 701(a)(2), and courts Page 470 U. S. 835 may require that the agency follow that law; if it has not, then an agency refusal to institute proceedings is a decision "committed to agency discretion by law" within the meaning of that section.IIITo enforce the various substantive prohibitions contained in the FDCA, the Act provides for injunctions, 21 U.S.C. § 332, criminal sanctions, §§ 333 and 335, and seizure of any offending food, drug, or cosmetic article, § 334. The Act's general provision for enforcement, § 372, provides only that "[t]he Secretary is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations . . ." (emphasis added). Unlike the statute at issue in Dunlop, § 332 gives no indication of when an injunction should be sought, and § 334, providing for seizures, is framed in the permissive -- the offending food, drug, or cosmetic "shall be liable to be proceeded against." The section on criminal sanctions states baldly that any person who violates the Act's substantive prohibitions "shall be imprisoned . . . or fined." Respondents argue that this statement mandates criminal prosecution of every violator of the Act, but they adduce no indication in case law or legislative history that such was Congress' intention in using this language, which is commonly found in the criminal provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 471 (counterfeiting); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements to Government officials); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud). We are unwilling to attribute such a sweeping meaning to this language, particularly since the Act charges the Secretary only with recommending prosecution; any criminal prosecutions must be instituted by the Attorney General. The Act's enforcement provisions thus commit complete discretion to the Secretary to decide how and when they should be exercised.Respondents nevertheless present three separate authorities that they claim provide the courts with sufficient indicia of an intent to circumscribe enforcement discretion. Two of these may be dealt with summarily. First, we reject Page 470 U. S. 836 respondents' argument that the Act's substantive prohibitions of "misbranding" and the introduction of "new drugs" absent agency approval, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f)(1), 355, supply us with "law to apply." These provisions are simply irrelevant to the agency's discretion to refuse to initiate proceedings.We also find singularly unhelpful the agency "policy statement" on which the Court of Appeals placed great reliance. We would have difficulty with this statement's vague language even if it were a properly adopted agency rule. Although the statement indicates that the agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative actions, that language did not arise in the course of discussing the agency's discretion to exercise its enforcement power, but rather in the context of describing agency policy with respect to unapproved uses of approved drugs by physicians. In addition, if read to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, the statement conflicts with the agency rule on judicial review, 21 CFR § 10.45(d)(2) (1984), which states that"[t]he Commissioner shall object to judicial review . . . if (i) [t]he matter is committed by law to the discretion of the Commissioner, e.g., a decision to recommend or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement action. . . ."But in any event, the policy statement was attached to a rule that was never adopted. Whatever force such a statement might have, and leaving to one side the problem of whether an agency's rules might under certain circumstances provide courts with adequate guidelines for informed judicial review of decisions not to enforce, we do not think the language of the agency's "policy statement" can plausibly be read to override the agency's express assertion of unreviewable discretion contained in the above rule. [Footnote 5] Page 470 U. S. 837Respondents' third argument, based upon § 306 of the FDCA, merits only slightly more consideration. That section provides:"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the Secretary to report for prosecution, or for the institution of libel or injunction proceedings, minor violations of this chapter whenever he believes that the public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or ruling."21 U.S.C. § 336.Respondents seek to draw from this section the negative implication that the Secretary is required to report for prosecution all "major" violations of the Act, however those might be defined, and that it therefore supplies the needed indication of an intent to limit agency enforcement discretion. We think that this section simply does not give rise to the negative implication which respondents seek to draw from it. The section is not addressed to agency proceedings designed to discover the existence of violations, but applies only to a situation where a violation has already been established to the satisfaction of the agency. We do not believe the section speaks to the criteria which shall be used by the agency for investigating possible violations of the Act.IVWe therefore conclude that the presumption that agency decisions not to institute proceedings are unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) is not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA. The FDA's decision not to take the Page 470 U. S. 838 enforcement actions requested by respondents is therefore not subject to judicial review under the APA. The general exception to reviewability provided by § 701(a)(2) for action "committed to agency discretion" remains a narrow one, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), but within that exception are included agency refusals to institute investigative or enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indicated otherwise. In so holding, we essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially reviewable. No colorable claim is made in this case that the agency's refusal to institute proceedings violated any constitutional rights of respondents, and we do not address the issue that would be raised in such a case. Cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 415 U. S. 366 (1974); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 118 U. S. 372-374 (1886). The fact that the drugs involved in this case are ultimately to be used in imposing the death penalty must not lead this Court or other courts to import profound differences of opinion over the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution into the domain of administrative law.The judgment of the Court of Appeals isReversed | U.S. Supreme CourtHeckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)Heckler v. ChaneyNo. 83-1878Argued December 3, 1984Decided March 20, 1985470 U.S. 821SyllabusRespondent prison inmates were convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection of drugs. They petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), alleging that use of the drugs for such a purpose violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and requesting that the FDA take various enforcement actions to prevent those violations. The FDA refused the request. Respondents then brought an action in Federal District Court against petitioner Secretary of Health and Human Services, making the same claim and seeking the same enforcement actions. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner, holding that nothing in the FDCA indicated an intent to circumscribe the FDA's enforcement discretion or to make it reviewable. The Court of Appeals reversed. Noting that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) only precludes judicial review of federal agency action when it is precluded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), or "committed to agency discretion by law," § 701(a)(2), the court held that § 701(a)(2)'s exception applies only where the substantive statute leaves the courts with "no law to apply," that here there was "law to apply," that therefore the FDA's refusal to take enforcement action was reviewable, and that, moreover, such refusal was an abuse of discretion.Held: The FDA's decision not to take the enforcement actions requested by respondents was not subject to review under the APA. Pp. 470 U. S. 827-838.(a) Under § 701(a)(2), judicial review of an administrative agency's decision is not to be had if the statute in question is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute ("law") can be taken to have "committed" the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely. An agency's decision not to take enforcement action is presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2). Such a decision has traditionally been "committed to agency discretion," and it does not appear that Congress, in enacting the APA, intended to alter that tradition. Accordingly, such a decision is unreviewable unless Congress has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement Page 470 U. S. 822 discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that discretion. Pp. 827- 470 U. S. 835.(b) The presumption that agency decisions not to institute enforcement proceedings are unreviewable under § 701(a)(2) is not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA. Those provisions commit complete discretion to the Secretary to decide how and when they should be exercised. The FDCA's prohibition of "misbranding" of drugs and introduction of "new drugs," absent agency approval, does not supply this Court with "law to apply." Nor can the FDA's "policy statement" indicating that the agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative actions be plausibly read to override the agency's rule expressly stating that the FDA Commissioner shall object to judicial review of a decision to recommend or not to recommend civil or criminal enforcement action. And the section of the FDCA providing that the Secretary need not report for prosecution minor violations of the Act does not give rise to the negative implication that the Secretary is required to investigate purported, "major" violations of the Act. Pp. 470 U. S. 835-837.231 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 718 F.2d 1174, reversed.REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 470 U. S. 838. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 470 U. S. 840. Page 470 U. S. 823 |
3,234 | 1989_88-1076 | Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented is the constitutionality of a federal "rails-to-trails" statute, under which unused railroad rights-of-way are converted into recreational trails notwithstanding whatever reversionary property interests may exist under state law. Petitioners contend that the statute violates both the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8. We find it unnecessary to evaluate the merits of the taking claim because we hold that, even if the rails-to-trails statute gives rise to a taking, compensation is available to petitioners under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Page 494 U. S. 5 § 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.), and the requirements of the Fifth Amendment are satisfied. We also hold that the statute is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.IAThe statute at issue in this case, the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (Amendments), Pub.L. 98-11, 97 Stat. 48, to the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), Pub.L. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (codified, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq.), is the culmination of congressional efforts to preserve shrinking rail trackage by converting unused rights-of-way to recreational trails. [Footnote 1] In 1920, the Nation's railway system reached its peak of 272,000 miles; today only about 141,000 miles are in use, and experts predict that 3,000 miles will be abandoned every year through the end of this century. [Footnote 2] Concerned about the loss of trackage, Congress included in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act), Pub.L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 144, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1982 ed.), several provisions aimed at promoting the conversion of abandoned [Footnote 3] lines Page 494 U. S. 6 to trails. Section 809(a) of the 4-R Act required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a report on alternative uses for abandoned railroad rights-of-way. Section 809(b) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to encourage conversion of abandoned rights-of-way to recreational and conservational uses through financial, educational, and technical assistance to local, state, and federal agencies. See note following 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1982 ed.). Section 809(c) authorized the ICC to delay the disposition of rail property for up to 180 days after the effective date of an order permitting abandonment, unless the property had first been offered for sale on reasonable terms for public purposes, including recreational use. See 49 U.S.C. § 10906.By 1983, Congress recognized that these measures"ha[d] not been successful in establishing a process through which railroad rights-of-way which are not immediately necessary for active service can be utilized for trail purposes."H.R.Rep. No. 98-28, p. 8 (1983) (H.R.Rep.); S.Rep. No. 98-1, p. 9 (1983) (S.Rep.) (same), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, pp. 112, 119. Congress enacted the Amendments to the Trails Act, which authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) to preserve for possible future railroad use rights-of-way not currently in service and to allow interim use of the land as recreational trails. Section 8(d) provides that a railroad wishing to cease operations along a particular route may negotiate with a State, municipality, or private group that is prepared to assume Page 494 U. S. 7 financial and managerial responsibility for the right-of-way. [Footnote 4] If the parties reach agreement, the land may be transferred to the trail operator for interim trail use, subject to ICC-imposed terms and conditions; if no agreement is reached, the railroad may abandon the line entirely and liquidate its interest. [Footnote 5] Page 494 U. S. 8Section 8(d) of the amended Trails Act provides that interim trail use"shall not be treated, for any purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes."16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). This language gives rise to a taking question in the typical rails-to-trails case because many railroads do not own their rights-of-way outright, but rather hold them under easements or similar property interests. While the terms of these easements and applicable state law vary, frequently the easements provide that the property reverts to the abutting landowner upon abandonment of rail operations. State law generally governs the disposition of reversionary interests, subject of course to the ICC's "exclusive and plenary" jurisdiction to regulate abandonments, Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 450 U. S. 321 (1981), and to impose conditions affecting post-abandonment use of the property. See Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622, 467 U. S. 633 (1984). By deeming interim trail use to be like discontinuance, rather than abandonment, see n 3, supra, Congress prevented property interests from reverting under state law:"The key finding of this amendment is that interim use of a railroad right-of-way for trail use, when the route itself remains intact for future railroad purposes, shall not constitute an abandonment of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. This finding alone should eliminate many of the problems with this program. The concept of attempting to establish trails only after the formal abandonment of a railroad right-of-way is self-defeating; once a right-of-way is abandoned for railroad purposes there may be nothing left for trail use. This amendment would ensure that potential interim trail use will be considered prior to abandonment."H.R.Rep. at 8-9. Page 494 U. S. 9 See S.Rep. at 9 (same). The primary issue in this case is whether Congress has violated the Fifth Amendment by precluding reversion of state property interests.BPetitioners claim a reversionary interest in a railroad right-of-way adjacent to their land in Vermont. In 1962, the State of Vermont acquired the Rutland-Canadian Railway Company's interest in the right-of-way and then leased the right-of-way to Vermont Railway, Inc. Vermont Railway stopped using the route more than a decade ago, and has since removed all railroad equipment, including switches, bridges, and track, from the portion of the right-of-way claimed by petitioners. In 1981, petitioners brought a quiet-title action in the Superior Court of Chittenden County, alleging that the easement had been abandoned and was thus extinguished, and that the right-of-way had reverted to them by operation of state property law. In August, 1983, the Superior Court dismissed the action, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the ICC had not authorized abandonment of the route, and therefore still exercised exclusive jurisdiction over it. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A.2d 151 (1985).Petitioners then sought a certificate of abandonment of the rail line from the ICC. The State of Vermont intervened, claiming title in fee simple to the right-of-way and arguing in the alternative that, even if the State's interest were an easement, the land could not revert while it was still being used for a public purpose. Vermont Railway and the State then petitioned the ICC to permit the railroad to discontinue rail service and transfer the right-of-way to the City of Burlington for interim use as a public trail under § 8(d) of the Trails Act. By a Notice of Exemption decided January 2, 1986, the ICC allowed the railroad to discontinue service and approved the agreement between the State and the City for interim trail use. See 51 Fed.Reg. 454-455. On February 4, 1986, the Page 494 U. S. 10 ICC Chairman denied petitioners' application for a stay pending administrative review, [Footnote 6] and the decision became effective on February 5, 1986. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration and/or clarification was denied on July 17. 1987. The Commission noted that"[i]nevitably, interim trail use will conflict with the reversionary rights of adjacent landowners, but that is the very purpose of the Trails Act."State of Vermont and Vermont Railway, Inc. -- Discontinuance of Service Exemption in Chittenden County, 3 I.C.C.2d 903, 908.Petitioners sought review of the ICC's order in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that § 8(d) of the Trails Act is unconstitutional on its face because it takes private property without just compensation and because it is not a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. 853 F.2d 145 (1988). It reasoned that the ICC has "plenary and exclusive authority" over abandonments, id. at 151, and that federal law must be considered in determining the property right held by petitioners."For as long as it determines that the land will serve a 'railroad purpose,' the ICC retains jurisdiction over railroad rights-of-way; it does not matter whether that purpose is immediate or in the future."Ibid. Because the court believed that no reversionary interest could vest until the ICC determined that abandonment was appropriate, the court concluded that the Trails Act did not result in a taking. Next, the court found that the Trails Act was reasonably adapted to two legitimate congressional purposes under the commerce Clause: "preserving rail corridors for future railroad use" and "permitting public recreational use of trails." Id. at 150. The Court of Appeals therefore dismissed petitioners' Commerce Clause challenge. We granted certiorari. 490 U.S. 1034 (1989). Page 494 U. S. 11IIThe Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." The Amendment "does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 482 U. S. 314 (1987). It is designed"not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 473 U. S. 194 (1985). All that is required is the existence of a "reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation'" at the time of the taking. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 419 U. S. 124-125 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 135 U. S. 659 (1890))."If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process 'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim against the Government' for the taking."Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 195-195 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 467 U. S. 1013, 467 U. S. 1018, n. 21 (1984)).For this reason,"taking claims against the Federal Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act."Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 195; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 474 U. S. 127-128, (1985); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 1016; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 438 U. S. 94, n. 39 (1978). The Tucker Act provides jurisdiction Page 494 U. S. 12 in the United States Claims Court for any claim against the Federal Government to recover damages founded on the Constitution, a statute, a regulation, or an express or implied-in-fact contract. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.); see also § 1346(a)(2) (Little Tucker Act, which creates concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts for such claims not exceeding $10,000 in amount)."If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the [Claims Court] to hear and determine."United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 328 U. S. 267 (1946).The critical question in this case, therefore, is whether a Tucker Act remedy is available for claims arising out of takings pursuant to the Amendments. The proper inquiry is not whether the statute "expresses an affirmative showing of congressional intent to permit recourse to a Tucker Act remedy," but rather"whether Congress has in the [statute] withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction to the [Claims Court] to hear a suit involving the [statute] 'founded . . . upon the Constitution.'"Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 126 (emphasis in original). Under this standard, we conclude that the Amendments did not withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. Congress did not exhibit the type of "unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy," Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 1019, that is necessary to preclude a Tucker Act claim. See Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1108, 1120-1121 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 316, 324-325 (CA8 1989).Neither the statute nor its legislative history mentions the Tucker Act. As indirect evidence of Congress' intent to prevent recourse to the Tucker Act, petitioners point to § 101 of the Amendments, which, although it was not codified into law, provides in relevant part that:"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, authority to enter into contracts, and to make payments, under this Act shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Page 494 U. S. 13 Acts."97 Stat. 42, note following 16 U.S.C. § 1249. Petitioners contend that this section limits the ICC's authority for conversions to those not requiring the expenditure of any funds and to those others for which funds had been appropriated in advance. Thus, any conversion that could result in Claims Court litigation was not authorized by Congress, since payment for such an acquisition would not have been approved by Congress in advance. Petitioners insist that such unauthorized government actions cannot create Tucker Act liability, citing Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S. 322, 218 U. S. 335 (1910), and Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 127, n. 16.We need not decide what types of official authorization, if any, are necessary to create federal liability under the Fifth Amendment, because we find that rail-to-trail conversions giving rise to just compensation claims are clearly authorized by § 8(d). That section speaks in capacious terms of trail "interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way" (emphasis added) and does not support petitioners' proposed distinction between conversions that might result in a taking and those that do not. Although Congress did not explicitly promise to pay for any takings, we have always assumed that the Tucker Act is an "implie[d] promis[e]" to pay just compensation which individual laws need not reiterate. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 309 U. S. 21 (1940). Petitioners' argument that specific congressional authorization is required for those conversions that might result in takings is a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the established method for determining whether Tucker Act relief is available for claims arising out of takings pursuant to a federal statute. We reaffirm that a Tucker Act remedy exists unless there are unambiguous indications to the contrary.Section 101, moreover, speaks only to appropriations under the Amendments themselves, and not to relief available Page 494 U. S. 14 under the Tucker Act, as evidenced by § 101's opening clause -- "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act" (emphasis added) -- which refers to the 1983 Amendments. The section means simply that payments made pursuant to the Amendments, such as funding for scenic trails, markers, and similar purposes, see Amendments § 209(5)(c), 97 Stat. 49 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1249(c)(2)) (authorizing appropriations for the development and administration of certain National Scenic and National Historic Trails), are effective only "in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts," a concept that mirrors Art. 1, § 9, of the Constitution ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law"). Payments for takings claims are not affected by this language, because such claims "arise" under the Fifth Amendment, see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 315-316. Payments for takings would be made "under" the Tucker Act, not the Trails Act, and would be drawn from the Judgment Fund, which is a separate appropriated account, see 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982 ed.). Section 101 does not manifest the type of clear and unmistakable congressional intent necessary to withdraw Tucker Act coverage.Petitioners next assert that Congress' desire that the Amendments operate at "low cost," H.R.Rep., at 3, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, p. 114, somehow indicates that Congress withdrew the Tucker Act remedy. There is no doubt that Congress meant to keep the costs of the Amendments to a minimum. [Footnote 7] This intent, however, has little bearing on the Tucker Act question. We Page 494 U. S. 15 have previously rejected the argument that a generalized desire to protect the public fisc is sufficient to withdraw relief under the Tucker Act. In the Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, we recognized that the Rail Act established "[m]aximum" funding authorizations, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 127-128, but we nevertheless held that those limits were not an unambiguous repeal of the Tucker Act remedy. We reasoned that the maximum limits might "support the inference that Congress was so convinced that the huge sums provided would surely equal or exceed the required constitutional minimum that it never focused upon the possible need for a suit in the Court of Claims." Id. at 419 U. S. 128. In Monsanto, we stated that:"Congress in [the statute] did not address the liability of the Government to pay just compensation should a taking occur. Congress' failure specifically to mention or provide for recourse against the Government may reflect a congressional belief that use of data by [the Government] in the ways authorized by [the statute] effects no Fifth Amendment taking or it may reflect Congress' assumption that the general grant of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act would provide the necessary remedy for any taking that may occur. In any event, the failure cannot be construed to reflect an unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy."467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 1018-1019. Similar logic applies to the instant case. The statements made in Congress during the passage of the Trails Act Amendments might reflect merely the decision not to create a program of direct federal purchase, [Footnote 8] construction, and Page 494 U. S. 16 maintenance of trails, and instead to allow state and local governments and private groups to establish and manage trails. The alternative chosen by Congress is less costly than a program of direct federal trail acquisition because, under any view of takings law, only some rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings. Some rights-of-way are held in fee simple. See National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10, 850 F.2d 694, 703 (1988). Others are held as easements that do not even as a matter of state law revert upon interim use as nature trails. [Footnote 9] In addition, under § 8(d) the Federal Government neither incurs the costs of constructing and maintaining the trails nor assumes legal liability for the transfer or use of the right-of-way. In contrast, the costs of acquiring and administering National Scenic and National Historic Trails are borne directly by the Federal Government. See n. 1, supra. Thus, the "low cost" language might reflect Congress' rejection of a more ambitious program of federally owned and managed trails, rather than withdrawal of a Tucker Act remedy. The language does not amount to the "unambiguous intention" required by our prior cases. [Footnote 10] Page 494 U. S. 17In sum, petitioners' failure to make use of the available Tucker Act remedy renders their taking challenge to the ICC's order premature. We need not decide whether a taking occurred in this case.IIIPetitioners also contend that the Amendments to the Trails Act are not a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, because the true purpose of § 8(d) is to prevent reversion of railroad rights-of-way to property owners after abandonment and to create recreational trails, rather than to preserve rail corridors for future railroad use. We evaluate this claim under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce "if there is any rational basis for such a finding," Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 452 U. S. 276 (1981), and we must ensure only that the means selected by Congress are "reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.'" Ibid. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 379 U. S. 262 (1964)); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 452 U. S. 323-324 (1981). The Amendments clearly pass muster.Two congressional purposes are evident. First, Congress intended to "encourage the development of additional trails" and to "assist recreation[al] users by providing opportunities for trail use on an interim basis." H.R.Rep. at 8, 9; S.Rep. at 9, 10 (same), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1983, p. 119; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1241(a) (Trails Act "promote[s] the preservation of, public access to, travel within, and enjoyment and appreciation of the open-air, out-door Page 494 U. S. 18 areas and historic resources of the Nation"). Second, Congress intended"to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use."H.Rep. at 8; S.Rep. at 9, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, p. 119; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). These are valid congressional objectives to which the Amendments are reasonably adapted.Petitioners contend that the Amendments do not reasonably promote the latter purpose because the ICC cannot authorize trail use until it has found that the right-of-way at issue is not necessary for "present or future public convenience and necessity." 49 U.S.C. § 10903(a) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added). The ICC has explained that:"In every Trails Act case, we will already have found that the public convenience and necessity permit abandonment (or that regulatory approval is not required under 49 U.S.C. 10505)."54 Fed.Reg. 8012, n. 3 (1989). Thus, trail conversion is permitted only after the Commission determines that rail service will not be not needed in the foreseeable future. This, according to petitioners, reveals that the rail banking rationale is a sham. If Congress really wished to address the problem of shrinking trackage, it would not have left conversions to voluntary agreements between railroads and State and local agencies or private groups. Rather, petitioners suggest, Congress would have created a mandatory program administered directly by the ICC.We note at the outset that, even under petitioners' reading, the Amendments would still be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause because they are reasonably adapted to the goal of encouraging the development of additional recreational trails. There is no requirement that a law serve more than one legitimate purpose. Moreover, we are not at liberty under the rational basis standard of review to hold the Amendments invalid merely Page 494 U. S. 19 because more Draconian measures -- such as a program of mandatory conversions or a prohibition of all abandonments -- might advance more completely the rail banking purpose. The process of legislating often involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions, and our ability to imagine ways of redesigning the statute to advance one of Congress' ends does not render it irrational. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 449 U. S. 469 (1981). The history of congressional attempts to address the problem of rail abandonments, see supra at 918-919, provides sufficient reason to defer to the legislative judgment that § 8(d) is an appropriate answer. Here, as in Hodel, "Congress considered the effectiveness of existing,legislation and concluded that additional measures were necessary." 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 283.Petitioners' argument that § 8(d) does not serve the rail banking purpose, moreover, is not well taken. That the ICC must certify that public convenience and necessity permit abandonment before granting a CITU or NITU does not indicate that the statute fails to promote its purpose of preserving rail corridors. Congress did not distinguish between short-term and long-term rail banking, nor did it require that the Commission develop a specific contingency plan for reactivation of a line before permitting conversion. To the contrary, Congress apparently believed that every line is a potentially valuable national asset that merits preservation even if no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable. Given the long tradition of congressional regulation of railroad abandonments, see, e.g., Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926), that is a judgment that Congress is entitled to make.For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtPreseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990)Preseault v. Interstate Commerce CommissionNo. 88-1076Argued Nov. 1, 1989Decided Feb. 21, 1990494 U.S. 1SyllabusBecause preexisting federal law failed to deal adequately with the national problem of shrinking rail trackage, Congress enacted the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (Amendments) to the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), which authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) to preserve for possible future railroad use rights-of-way not currently in service and to allow interim use of the land as recreational trails. Section 8(d) of this so-called "rails-to-trails" statute provides that a railroad wishing to cease operations along a particular route may negotiate with a State, municipality, or private group prepared to assume financial and managerial responsibility for the right-of-way. If the parties reach agreement, the land may, subject to ICC-imposed terms and conditions, be transferred to the trail operator for interim trail use notwithstanding whatever reversionary interests may exist in the property under state law. If no agreement is reached, the railroad may abandon the line entirely, thereby allowing the property to revert to abutting landowners if the terms of applicable easements and state law provide for such reversion. After Vermont Railway, Inc., stopped using a right-of-way adjacent to petitioners' land in Vermont, petitioners brought a state court quiet title action, alleging that the railroad's easement had been abandoned and thus extinguished, and that the right-of-way had therefore reverted to them under state law. Holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the ICC had not authorized Page 494 U. S. 2 abandonment of the route, and therefore still exercised exclusive jurisdiction over it, the court dismissed the action, and the State Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioners then sought a certificate of abandonment from the ICC, but the Commission granted a petition to permit the railroad to discontinue rail service and transfer the right-of-way to the city of Burlington for interim trail use under § 8(d). The Federal Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioners' contentions that § 8(d) is unconstitutional on its face because it takes private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment and because it is not a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power.Held:1. Even if the rails-to-trails statute gives rise to a taking, compensation is available under the Tucker Act, and the requirements of the Fifth Amendment are therefore satisfied. Since the Amendments and their legislative history do not mention the Tucker Act -- which provides Claims Court jurisdiction over claims against the Government to recover damages founded on, inter alia, the Constitution -- the Amendments do not exhibit the type of "unambiguous intention" to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy that is necessary to preclude a claim under that Act. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 467 U. S. 1019. Section 101 of the Amendments -- which provides that"authority to . . . make payments . . . under this Act shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts"does not, as petitioners claim, indirectly manifest the necessary intent by rendering "unauthorized," as not approved by Congress for payment in advance, any rail-to-trail conversion that could result in Claims Court litigation. Since § 8(d) speaks in capacious terms of interim use of any right-of-way, it clearly authorizes conversions giving rise to just compensation claims, and therefore does not support petitioners' contention. That there is no explicit promise to pay for any takings is irrelevant, since the Tucker Act constitutes an implied promise to pay just compensation which individual laws need not reiterate. Moreover, § 101 speaks only to payments under the Amendments themselves, and not to takings claims that "arise" under the Fifth Amendment and for which payments are made "under" the Tucker Act from the separately appropriated Judgment Fund. Nor do statements in the legislative history indicating Congress' desire that the Amendments operate at "low cost" demonstrate an unambiguous intent to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy, since a generalized desire to protect the public fisc is insufficient for that purpose, see, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 419 U. S. 127-128, and since the statements might simply reflect Congress' rejection of a more ambitious program of federally owned and managed trails. Because petitioners' failure to make use of the available Tucker Act remedy Page 494 U. S. 3 renders their takings challenge to the ICC's order premature, there is no need to determine whether a taking occurred. Pp. 494 U. S. 11-17.2. The Amendments are a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power. The stated congressional purposes -- (1) to encourage the development of additional recreational trails on an interim basis and (2) to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service -- are valid objectives to which the Amendments are reasonably adapted. Even if petitioners were correct that the rail banking purpose is a sham concealing a true purpose of preventing reversion of rights-of-way to property owners after abandonment, the Amendments would still be valid because they are reasonably adapted to the goal of encouraging the development of additional trails. There is no requirement that a law serve more than one legitimate purpose. Moreover, this Court is not free under the applicable rational basis standard of review to hold the Amendments invalid simply because the rail banking purpose might be advanced more completely by measures more Draconian than § 8(d) -- such as a program of mandatory conversions or a prohibition of all abandonments. The long history of congressional attempts to address the problem of rail abandonments provides sufficient reason to defer to the legislative judgment that § 8(d) is an appropriate answer. Furthermore, in light of that history, Congress was entitled to make the judgment that every line is a potentially valuable national asset meriting preservation even if no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable, so that the fact that the ICC must certify that public convenience and necessity permit abandonment before granting an interim trail use permit does not indicate that the statute fails to promote its purpose of preserving rail corridors. Pp. 494 U. S. 17-19.853 F.2d 145 (CA2 1988), affirmed.BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 494 U. S. 20. Page 494 U. S. 4OPINION |
3,235 | 1980_79-6740 | JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919), concerned a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced Page 451 U. S. 432 to life imprisonment, and who then obtained, upon confession of error by the Solicitor General, a reversal of his conviction and a new trial. This Court, by a unanimous vote in that case, held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment [Footnote 1] did not bar the imposition of the death penalty when Stroud, at his new trial, was again convicted.The issue in the present case is whether the reasoning of Stroud is also to apply under a system where a jury's sentencing decision is made at a bifurcated proceeding's second stage at which the prosecution has the burden of proving certain elements beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed.IMissouri law provides two, and only two, possible sentences for a defendant convicted of capital murder: [Footnote 2] (a) death, or (b) life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.008.1 (1978). [Footnote 3]Like most death penalty legislation enacted after this Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), Page 451 U. S. 433 the Missouri statutes contain substantive standards to guide the discretion of the sentencer. The statutes also afford procedural safeguards to the convicted defendant. Section 565.006 provides that the trial court shall conduct a separate presentence hearing for the defendant who is convicted by a jury of capital murder. [Footnote 4] The hearing must be held before Page 451 U. S. 434 the same jury [Footnote 5] that found the defendant guilty, and "additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment" shall be heard. "Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible." The jury must consider whether the evidence shows that there exist any of the 10 [Footnote 6] aggravating circumstances or the 7 mitigating circumstances specified by the statute, see §§ 565.012.2 and 565.012.3; whether any other mitigating or aggravating circumstances authorized by law exist; whether any aggravating circumstances that do exist are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty; and whether any mitigating circumstances that exist outweigh the aggravating circumstances. § 565.012.1. A jury that imposes the death penalty must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds beyond a reasonable doubt. § 565.012.4. It also must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds to exist are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Missouri Approved Instructions -- Criminal (MAI-Cr) § 15.42 (1979). A Missouri jury is instructed that it is not compelled to impose the death Page 451 U. S. 435 penalty, even if it decides that a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist and that it or they are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. MAI-Cr. § 15.46. A jury's decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. If the jury is unable to agree, the defendant receives the alternative sentence of life imprisonment described above. § 565.006.2; MAI-Cr. § 15.48.IIIn December, 1977, petitioner Robert Bullington was indicted in St. Louis County, Mo., for capital murder and other crimes arising out of the abduction of a young woman and her subsequent death by drowning. [Footnote 7]The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted petitioner's pretrial motion for a change of venue to Jackson County in the western part of the State. The prosecution, by letter, informed the defense that the State would seek the death penalty if the jury convicted the defendant of capital murder. App. 12. The letter-notice stated that the prosecution would present evidence of two aggravating circumstances specified by the statute: that "[t]he offense was committed by a person . . . who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," § 565.012.2(1), and that "[t]he offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind," § 565.012.2(7).At the guilt or innocence phase of petitioner's trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of capital murder. App. 21. On the following day, the trial court proceeded to hold the presentence hearing required by § 565.006.2. Evidence submitted by the prosecution was received. None was offered by the defense. After argument by counsel, instructions from the judge, and deliberation, the jury returned its Page 451 U. S. 436 additional verdict fixing petitioner's punishment not at death, but at imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. App. 27.Petitioner then moved, on various grounds, for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. While that motion was pending, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 357 (1979), was decided. In that case, this Court held that Missouri's constitutional and statutory provisions allowing women to claim automatic exemption from jury service deprived a defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The trial court overruled petitioner's motion for acquittal but, relying upon Duren, granted his motion for a new trial. App. 44.Soon thereafter, the prosecution served and filed a formal "Notice of Evidence in Aggravation," stating that it intended again to seek the death penalty . The notice specified the same aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove at the first trial, see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, and asserted that it would introduce the evidence that was previously disclosed to defense counsel. App. 45-46. The defense moved to strike the notice, id. at 47, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment (as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 395 U. S. 794 (1969)) barred the imposition of the penalty of death when the first jury had declined to impose the death sentence.The trial court announced that it would grant that motion and would not permit the State to seek the death penalty. Before the court issued a formal order to this effect, the prosecution sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus from the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District. After granting a temporary "stop order," App. 56, the Court of Appeals, without opinion, denied the State's request and dissolved the stop order. Id. at 57. The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, granted the prosecution's motion for Page 451 U. S. 437 transfer of the case to that court and issued preliminary writ of prohibition. After argument, the court, sitting en banc and by a divided vote, sustained the State's position and made the writ absolute. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (1980). It held that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause barred the imposition of the death penalty upon petitioner at his new trial, and that allowing the prosecution to seek capital punishment would not impermissibly chill a defendant's effort to seek redress for any constitutional violation committed at his initial trial.We granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 819 (1980), [Footnote 8] in order to consider the important issues raised by petitioner regarding the administration of the death penalty. [Footnote 9]IIIIt is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted of the crime charged. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 449 U. S. 129-130 (1980); Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 437 U. S. 16 (1978); Page 451 U. S. 438 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 430 U. S. 571 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 369 U. S. 143 (1962); Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957). This Court, however, has resisted attempts to extend that principle to sentencing. The imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an "acquittal" of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed. The Court generally has concluded, therefore, that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 133, 449 U. S. 137-138; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 412 U. S. 23-24 (1973); Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919).The procedure that resulted in the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment upon petitioner Bullington at his first trial, however, differs significantly from those employed in any of the Court's cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable to sentencing. The jury in this case was not given unbounded discretion to select an appropriate punishment from a wide range authorized by statute. Rather, a separate hearing was required and was held, and the jury was presented both a choice between two alternatives and standards to guide the making of that choice. Nor did the prosecution simply recommend what it felt to be an appropriate punishment. It undertook the burden of establishing certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in its quest to obtain the harsher of the two alternative verdicts. The presentence hearing resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue of punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes. [Footnote 10] Page 451 U. S. 439In contrast, the sentencing procedures considered in the Court's previous cases did not have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence. In Pearce, Chaffin, and Stroud, there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required to prove -- beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise -- additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence. In each of those cases, moreover, the sentencer's discretion was essentially unfettered. In Stroud, no standards had been enacted to guide the jury's discretion. [Footnote 11] In Pearce, the judge had a wide range of punishments from which to choose, with no explicit standards imposed to guide him. [Footnote 12] And in Chaffin, the discretion given to the jury was extremely broad. That defendant, convicted in Georgia of Page 451 U. S. 440 robbery, could have been sentenced to death, to life imprisonment, or to a prison term of between 4 and 20 years. 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 18, and n. 1. The statute contained no standards to guide the jury's exercise of its discretion. [Footnote 13]In only one prior case, United States v. DiFrancesco, has this Court considered a separate or bifurcated sentencing procedure at which it was necessary for the prosecution to prove additional facts. The federal statute under consideration there, the "dangerous special offender" provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575 and 3576, requires a separate presentence hearing. The Government must prove the additional fact that the defendant is a "dangerous special offender," as defined in the statute, in order for the court to impose an enhanced sentence. But there are highly pertinent differences between the Missouri procedures controlling the present case and those found constitutional in DiFrancesco. The federal procedures at issue in DiFrancesco include appellate review of a sentence "on the record of the sentencing court," § 3576, not a de novo proceeding that gives the Government the opportunity to convince a second factfinder of its view of the facts. [Footnote 14] Moreover, the choice presented to the federal judge under § 3575 is far broader than that faced by the state jury at the present petitioner's trial. Bullington's Missouri jury was given -- and, under the State's statutes, could be given -- only two choices, death or life imprisonment. On the other hand, if Page 451 U. S. 441 the Federal Government proves that a person convicted of a felony is a dangerous special offender, the judge may sentence that person to"an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony."§ 3575(b). Finally, although the statute requires the Government to prove the additional fact that the defendant is a "dangerous special offender," it need do so only by a preponderance of the evidence. Ibid. This stands in contrast to the reasonable doubt standard of the Missouri statute, the same standard required to be used at the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). The State's use of this standard indicates that, as has been said generally of the criminal case,"the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that . . . they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. . . . [O]ur society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself."Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 441 U. S. 423-424 (1979).IVThese procedural differences become important when the underlying rationale of the cases is considered. The State here relies principally upon North Carolina v. Pearce. [Footnote 15] The Page 451 U. S. 442 Court's starting point in that case, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 719-720, was the established rule that there is no double jeopardy bar to retrying a defendant who has succeeded in overturning his conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U. S. 463 (1964); United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 163 U. S. 672 (1896). The Court stated that this rule rests on the premise that the original conviction has been nullified and "the slate wiped clean." 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 721. Therefore, if the defendant is convicted again, he constitutionally may be subjected to whatever punishment is lawful, subject only to the limitation that he receive credit for time served.There is an important exception, however, to the rule recognized in Pearce. A defendant may not be retried if he obtains a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict. Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978). The reasons for this exception are relevant here:"[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its cases. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. . . .""The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it can assemble. . . . Since we necessarily accord absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal -- no matter how erroneous its decision -- it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest Page 451 U. S. 443 in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."Id. at 116 (emphasis in original).The decision in Burks was foreshadowed by Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957). In that case, the defendant had been indicted for first-degree murder, and the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him either of that crime or of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. The Court held that a retrial on the first-degree murder charge was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant "was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge, and the jury refused to convict him." Id. at 355 U. S. 190. See also Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323 (1970).Thus, the "clean slate" rationale recognized in Pearce is inapplicable whenever a jury agrees or an appellate court decides that the prosecution has not proved its case.In the usual sentencing proceeding, however, it is impossible to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum "constitute[s] a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case." [Footnote 16] In the normal Page 451 U. S. 444 process of sentencing, "there are virtually no rules or tests or standards -- and thus no issues to resolve. . . ." M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 38 (1973). Thus,"[t]he discretion of the judge . . . in [sentencing] matters is virtually free of substantive control or guidance. Where the judge has power to select a term of imprisonment within a range, the exercise of that authority is left fairly at large."Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 904, 916 (1962).The Court's cases that have considered the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in sentencing have noted this absence of sentencing standards. In DiFrancesco, for example, we observed:"[A] sentence is characteristically determined in large part on the basis of information, such as the presentence report, developed outside the courtroom. It is purely a judicial determination, and much that goes into it is the result of inquiry that is nonadversary in nature."449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 136-137. And even if it is the jury that imposes the sentence, "[n]ormally, there would be no way for the jury to place on the record the reasons for its collective sentencing determination. . . ." Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 28, n. 15.By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, however, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has "proved its case." Both Burks and Green, as has been noted, state an exception to the general rule relied upon Page 451 U. S. 445 in North Carolina v. Pearce. That exception is applicable here, and we therefore refrain from extending the rationale of Pearce to the very different facts of the present case. Chief Justice Bardgett, in his dissent from the ruling of the Missouri Supreme Court majority, observed that the sentence of life imprisonment which petitioner received at his first trial meant that "the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence." 594 S.W.2d at 922. We agree.A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of course, absolutely final. The values that underlie this principle, stated for the Court by Justice Black, are equally applicable when a jury has rejected the State's claim that the defendant deserves to die:"The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State, with all its resources and power, should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be found guilty."Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 355 U. S. 187-188. See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 136. The "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" and the "anxiety and insecurity" faced by a defendant at the penalty phase of a Missouri capital murder trial surely are at least equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial. The "unacceptably high risk that the [prosecution], with its superior resources, would wear down a defendant," id. at 449 U. S. 130, thereby leading to an erroneously imposed death sentence, would exist if the State were to have a further opportunity to convince a jury to impose the ultimate punishment. Page 451 U. S. 446 Missouri's use of the reasonable doubt standard indicates that, in a capital sentencing proceeding, it is the State, not the defendant, that should bear "almost the entire risk of error." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 424. Given these considerations, our decision today does not at all depend upon the State's announced intention to rely only upon the same aggravating circumstances it sought to prove at petitioner's first trial or upon its statement that it would introduce no new evidence in support of its contention that petitioner deserves the death penalty. Having received "one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble," Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 16, the State is not entitled to another.VThe Court already has held that many of the protections available to a defendant at a criminal trial also are available at a sentencing hearing similar to that required by Missouri in a capital case. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605 (1967) (due process protections such as right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and right to present favorable evidence are available at hearing at which sentence may be imposed based upon "a new finding of fact . . . that was not an ingredient of the offense charged," id. at 386 U. S. 608). Because the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial. [Footnote 17] We therefore refrain from extending the reasoning of Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919), to this very different situation.The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed, Page 451 U. S. 447 and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtBullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981)Bullington v. MissouriNo. 79-6740Argued January 14, 1981Decided May 4, 1981451 U.S. 430SyllabusMissouri law provides only two possible sentences for a defendant convicted of capital murder: (a) death, or (b) life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. Under state statutes, a separate presentence hearing, at which additional evidence in mitigation and aggravation of punishment is heard, must be held before the same jury that found the defendant guilty; the prosecution must prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed; and a jury that imposes the death penalty must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds beyond a reasonable doubt. The guilt or innocence phase of petitioner's state court trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of capital murder, and his presentence hearing resulted in the jury's additional verdict fixing petitioner's punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. After granting petitioner's post-trial motion for a new trial because of the intervening decision in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 357, which held that Missouri's allowing automatic exemption of women from jury service was unconstitutional, the trial court announced that it would grant petitioner's motion, based on double jeopardy grounds, to strike the prosecution's notice that it intended again to seek the death penalty on the basis of the same aggravating circumstances it had sought to prove at the first trial. The Missouri Court of Appeals denied the State's request for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, but the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately granted a writ of prohibition.Held: Because, under Missouri law, the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial. The reasoning of Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, is not controlling. Pp. 451 U. S. 437-446.(a) This Court generally has concluded that, because the imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an "acquittal" of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed, the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside. See North Carolina v. Pearce, Page 451 U. S. 431 395 U. S. 711; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17; Stroud v. United States, supra; United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117. However, in those cases, unlike the present case, the sentencing procedures did not have the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence. In the first three cases, there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required to prove additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence, and the sentencer's discretion in determining punishment was essentially unfettered. Although United States v. DiFrancesco, supra,. involved a separate sentencing procedure, the prosecution was required to prove an additional fact warranting a harsher penalty only by a preponderance of the evidence, and the sentencer's choice of punishment was far broader than the two choices available to petitioner's jury under Missouri law. Pp. 451 U. S. 437-441.(b) The rationale of Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, which held that a defendant may not be retried if he obtains a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict, is relevant here. In the usual sentencing proceeding, it is impossible, because of the absence of sentencing standards, to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum constitutes a decision to the effect that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. But by enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has "proved its case." Petitioner's sentence of life imprisonment at his first trial meant that the jury has already acquitted him of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence. Pp. 451 U. S. 441-446.594 S.W.2d 908, reversed and remanded.BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 451 U. S. 447. |
3,236 | 1974_73-1734 | MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.Mississippi imposes a 5% sales tax upon the "gross proceeds of the retail sales" of tangible personal property, including gasoline. Miss.Code Ann. § 27-65-17 (Supp. 1974). [Footnote 1] Petitioner operates as a sole proprietorship from West Memphis, Ark. He owns and operates five gasoline service stations in Mississippi, and also sells gasoline at four other stations in Mississippi on a consignment basis. He purchases his gasoline tax-free Page 421 U. S. 202 from sources in Tennessee and Arkansas. He transports the gasoline to his Mississippi stations in his own trucks. He holds a Mississippi distributor's permit, and is also federally licensed because he is a "producer" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code as one who sells gasoline bought tax-free from other "producers." [Footnote 2] He adds to his pump prices the amount of a Mississippi gasoline excise tax, now nine cents per gallon, Miss.Code Ann. § 27-55-11 (Supp. 1974), and a federal gasoline excise tax of four cents per gallon, 26 U.S.C. § 4081(a). [Footnote 3] The State computes his gross proceeds of retail sales "without any deduction for . . . taxes of any kind. . . ." Miss.Code Ann. § 27-65-3(h) (Supp. 1974). [Footnote 4] Petitioner contends that the denial of a deduction Page 421 U. S. 203 of the amount of the excise taxes added to his pump prices in the computation of his "gross proceeds of the retail sales" of gasoline, and the resultant application of the 5% sales tax to so much of his pump prices as reflects the amount of the taxes, are unconstitutional. He therefore paid the sales taxes to that extent under protest, and sued for a refund in Mississippi Chancery Court, Hinds County. Respondent cross-claimed for unpaid sales taxes accruing after the filing of the suit. [Footnote 5] After trial, the Chancery Court dismissed petitioner's suit and entered judgment for respondent on the cross-claim. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed. 288 So. 2d 868. We granted certiorari, 419 U.S. 1018 (1974). We affirm.IPetitioner's principal argument is that he acts as a mere collector of the taxes for the two governments because the legal incidence of both excise taxes is upon the purchaser-consumer. Upon that premise, he argues:"Consequently, to impose the Mississippi sales tax upon amounts so received by [petitioner] would be to tax him upon gross receipts which are not his gross receipts, but rather the gross receipts of [the two governments]. This would not only violate the fundamental conception of right and justice, but it would be taking [petitioner's] property without due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."Brief for Petitioner 37. He cites in support the statement in Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U. S. 206, 284 U. S. 215 (1931), that"any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's property or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. "Page 421 U. S. 204Also, petitioner advances an alternative argument limited to the denial of the deduction of the amount of the federal excise tax. He contends that the denial results to that extent in"a state tax on . . . monies held in trust by [petitioner] as agent for the United States [and] is, in essence, a tax upon the United States . . . [that] . . . is clearly unconstitutional"as violating the constitutional immunity of the United States and its property from taxation by the States. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). Brief for Petitioner 48.Petitioner's arguments can prevail, as he apparently concedes, only if the legal incidence of the excise taxes is not upon petitioner, but upon the purchaser-consumer. Our task therefore is to determine upon whom the legal incidence of each tax rests.IIThe economic burden of taxes incident to the sale of merchandise is traditionally passed on to the purchasers of the merchandise. Therefore, the decision as to where the legal incidence of either tax falls is not determined by the fact that petitioner, by increasing his pump prices in the amounts of the taxes, shifted the economic burden of the taxes from himself to the purchaser-consumer. The Court has laid to rest doubts on that score raised by such decisions as Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1931); and Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U. S. 110 (1954), at least under taxing schemes, as here, where neither statute required petitioner to pass the tax on to the purchaser-consumer. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941); Lash's Products Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 175 (1929); Wheeler Lumber Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 572 (1930); First Page 421 U. S. 205 Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U. S. 339 (1968); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U. S. 451 (1965).A majority of courts that have considered the question have held, in agreement with the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case, that the legal incidence of the federal excise tax is upon the statutory "producer" such as petitioner and not upon his purchaser-consumer. Martin Oil Service. Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 49 Ill. 2d 260, 273 N.E.2d 823 (1971); People v. Werner, 364 Ill. 594, 5 N.E.2d 238 (1936); Sun Oil Co. v. Gross Income Tax Division, 238 Ind. 111, 149 N.E.2d 115 (1958); State v. Thoni Oil Magic Benzol Gas Stations, Inc., 121 Ga.App. 454, 174 S.E.2d 224, aff'd, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S.E.2d 173 (1970). Contra, see Tax Review Board v. Esso Standard Division, 424 Pa. 355, 227 A.2d 657 (1967); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. State, 283 Mich. 85, 276 N.W. 908 (1937); Standard Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 71 N.D. 146, 299 N.W. 447 (1941). Our independent examination of the federal statute and its legislative history persuades us also that the legal incidence of the federal tax falls upon the statutory "producer" such as petitioner.The wording of the federal statute plainly places the incidence of the tax upon the "producer," that is, by definition, upon federally licensed distributors of gasoline such as petitioner. Section 4082(a) provides that "[a]ny person to whom gasoline is sold tax-free . . . shall be considered the producer of such gasoline," and § 4081(a) expressly imposes the tax "on gasoline sold by the producer. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The congressional purpose to lay the tax on the "producer" and only upon the "producer" could not be more plainly revealed. Persuasive also that such was Congress' purpose is the fact that, if the producer does not pay the tax, the Government cannot collect it from his vendees; the statute has Page 421 U. S. 206 no provision making the vendee liable for its payment. [Footnote 6] First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm'n, supra, at 392 U. S. 347.It is true that the purchaser-consumer who buys gasoline for use on his farm, 26 U.S.C. § 6420(a), or for other nonhighway purposes, § 6421(a), or for a local transit system, § 6421(b), can recover payment of all or part of the amount of the tax passed on by the "producer." But this is not proof that Congress laid the tax upon the purchaser-consumer. Rather, since the proceeds of this tax go not into the general treasury, but into a special fund used to defray the cost of the federal highway system, S.Rep. No. 367, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), the refunds authorized simply reflect a congressional determination that, because the economic burden of such taxes is traditionally passed on to the purchaser-consumer in the form of increased pump prices, farmers and other off-highway users should be relieved of the economic burden of the cost of the highway program, and that the cost should be borne entirely by motorists who use gasoline to drive on the highways. Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, supra, at 265, 273 N.E.2d at 827.Petitioner cites references by President Johnson to the tax as a "user tax" as proving that it is not and never was intended that the tax be imposed upon the "producer," but rather upon the purchaser-consumer. Page 421 U. S. 207 President Johnson's message to Congress of May 17, 1965, on the subject of reform of the excise tax structure stated that such"reform . . . will . . . leave . . . excises on alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gasoline, tires, trucks, air transportation (and a few other user charge and special excises). . . ."H.R.Doc. No. 173, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). (Emphasis added.) Petitioner relies also on the report of the House Committee on Ways and Means accompanying H.R. 8371, H.R.Rep. No. 433, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (1965). It states:"Taxes such as those on gasoline . . . are user taxes. . . . A tax on gasoline taxes users of the highways in rough proportion to their use of the service."(Emphasis added.) These references obviously were not made in the context of consideration of the legal incidence of the gasoline tax but merely as recognition that the reality is that users bear the economic burden of the tax. These references were rejected in Martin Oil Service, Inc., supra, by the Illinois Supreme Court as irrelevant to the question whether the tax must be considered as one whose incidence rests on the purchaser-consumer. We agree with, and adopt, that court's analysis:"We consider the references to the tax as a 'user tax' were not intended to be descriptive of the legal incidence of the gasoline tax. It is not disputed that the ultimate economic burden of the tax rests upon the purchaser-consumer. A practical nontechnical description of the tax as a 'user tax' is explainable, consistently with the legal incidence of the tax being on the producer. The economic burden of the tax has no relevance to the issue before us."49 Ill. 2d at 264, 273 N.E.2d at 826.We therefore hold that the Mississippi Supreme Court, which relied upon Martin Oil Service, Inc., see 288 So. 2d at 873, properly concluded that the federal excise tax is Page 421 U. S. 208 imposed solely on statutory "producers" such as petitioner and not on the purchaser.IIIThe Mississippi Supreme Court held that the legal incidence of the Mississippi excise tax also falls upon petitioner. It is true, of course, that this Court is the final judicial arbiter of the question where the legal incidence of the federal excise tax falls. But a State's highest court is the final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes, Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. at 314 U. S. 9-10, and therefore our review of the holding of a state court respecting the legal incidence of a state excise tax is guided by the following:"When a state court has made its own definitive determination as to the operating incidence, our task is simplified. We give this finding great weight in determining the natural effect of a statute, and, if it is consistent with the statute's reasonable interpretation, it will be deemed conclusive."American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. at 380 U. S. 455-456.This is manifestly a case in which the holding of the Mississippi Supreme Court that the legal incidence of the state excise tax falls upon petitioner should be "deemed conclusive." Mississippi Code Ann. § 27-55-11 (Supp. 1974), provides that the tax "attaches on the distributor or other person for each gallon of gasoline brought into the state . . . " in the case of distribution of gasoline by distributors, such as petitioner, who bring gasoline into Mississippi "by means other than through a common carrier." The Mississippi Supreme Court relied primarily upon this provision in reaching its conclusion, and we cannot say that its conclusion is not "consistent with the statute's reasonable interpretation."Our determination is buttressed by the holding of a three-judge District Court in United States v. Sharp, 302 Page 421 U. S. 209 F.Supp. 668 (SD Miss.1969). The United States sought a declaratory judgment that the Mississippi tax was invalid with respect to gasoline purchased by the Federal Government, its agencies, and personnel when used on Mississippi highways on Government business. The three-judge court held that the legal incidence of the state tax was upon the distributor-vendor and not upon the purchaser United States, and dismissed the action. The court stated:"We do not quarrel with the contention that a statute's practical operation and effect determines where the legal incidence of the tax falls. We simply agree that the tax burden in the Mississippi statute falls plainly and squarely on the distributor to whom the state looks for the payment of the tax, albeit the amount of the tax may ultimately be borne by the vendee, in this case, the federal government."Id. at 671.Petitioner argues, however, that the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court is foreclosed by this Court's decision in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928). The argument is without merit. In that case, Mississippi sued Panhandle Oil Co. to recover gasoline excise taxes imposed by Chapter 116 of the 1922 Laws of Mississippi, as amended, a predecessor to the present Miss.Code Ann. § 27-55-11. The taxes claimed were on account of sales made by Panhandle to the United States for the use of its Coast Guard Fleet in service in the Gulf of Mexico, and of its Veterans' Hospital at Gulfport, Miss. The Court, over the dissents of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and McReynolds, held that the tax as applied was invalid as a tax upon the means used by the United States for governmental purposes. The dissenters' view was that it was not a tax upon means used by the United States, but that Panhandle merely Page 421 U. S. 210 shifted the economic burden of the tax to its vendees by adding it to the price of the gasoline.The Court's Panhandle opinion did not focus upon whether the Mississippi statute laid the legal incidence of the tax upon the distributor. Rather, the rationale was that the tax was bad because, if laid upon distributors, the distributors were able to shift its burden to the purchaser. The Court has since expressly abandoned that view, and has accepted the analysis of the dissent. In Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. at 314 U. S. 9, the Court held: "So far as a different view has prevailed, see Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox . . . , we think it no longer tenable."IVFinally, petitioner argues that, even if the legal incidence of the two taxes is on him, rather than on the consumer, the provision of § 27-617 denying the deduction of the taxes in the computation of his "gross proceeds of . . . retail sales" is invalid for two reasons.First, he argues:"Since [petitioner] sells only to the ultimate consumer, the excise tax attaches simultaneously with the sale and with the sales tax; therefore, there can be no sales tax upon the excise tax."Brief for Petitioner 47. In other words, his argument is that the liability for the excise taxes, state and federal, and the liability for the sales tax arise simultaneously, and, in that circumstance, one should not be included in computing the other. We read the opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court to reject this argument and to hold that the taxes fall on the "producer at a time prior to the point of retail sale or other consumer transaction. . . ." 288 So. 2d at 870. That interpretation of the Mississippi statutes is, of course, binding on us as respects the state excise tax; indeed, the interpretation is not merely "reasonable," but seems obvious in light of the express provision of Page 421 U. S. 211 § 27-55-11 that, in cases of distributors, like petitioner, bringing gasoline into Mississippi in their own trucks, the tax "attaches . . . at the time when and at the point where such gasoline is brought into the state." Further, we agree with the Mississippi court that the federal tax also attaches prior to the point of the retail sale. However, even if the liability for the excise taxes did arise simultaneously with the sales tax, we cannot see any legal distinction, constitutional or otherwise, arising from that circumstance. The Illinois Supreme Court also addressed this contention when made in Martin Oil Service, Inc., supra, as to the federal excise tax, and rejected it for the following reasons, with which we agree."The legal incidence of the Federal gasoline tax is on the producer, who is under no legal duty to pass the burden of the tax on to the consumer. If he does pass on the burden of the tax it is simply done by charging the consumer a higher price. This higher price is the result of the added cost, because of the burden of the Federal tax, to the producer in selling his gasoline. It is no different from other costs he incurs in bringing his product to market, including the costs of raw material, its processing and its delivery. All these costs are includable in his 'gross receipts' or the 'consideration' he receives for his gasoline. No reason has been given . . . why the cost of the gasoline tax should be regarded differently from the other costs of the producer-retailer, and we perceive none."49 Ill. 2d at 268, 273 N.E.2d at 828.Second, petitioner argues that,"since other independent oil dealers in those states which do not include the federal excise tax as a part of the sales tax base would not be forced to pay such tax [e.g., Pennsylvania, see Tax Review Board v. Esso Standard, supra], then the arbitrary Page 421 U. S. 212 imposition of such tax upon [petitioner] and those other independent oil dealers in his class (who have to pay a sales tax on federal excise tax) would deprive [petitioner] of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee to equal protection of the laws."Brief for Petitioner 21. The contention is patently frivolous. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause is against denial by the State, here Mississippi, as between taxpayers subject to its laws. Petitioner makes no claim of unconstitutional discrimination by Mississippi in the application of its sales tax Act to taxpayers subject to that tax.Affirmed | U.S. Supreme CourtGurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200 (1975)Gurley v. RhodenNo. 73-1734Argued March 18, 1975Decided May 12, 1975421 U.S. 200SyllabusMississippi imposes a 5% sales tax upon the "gross proceeds" of retail sales of tangible personal property, including gasoline, and such gross proceeds are computed without deduction for any taxes. Mississippi also imposes a gasoline excise tax on each gallon sold by a distributor, which, in the case of a distributor bringing gasoline into the State otherwise than by common carrier, accrues at the time when and at the point where the gasoline is brought into the State. And a federal gasoline excise tax is imposed on each gallon sold by a "producer," 26 U.S.C. § 4081(a), defined to include any person to whom gasoline is sold tax-free, § 4082(a). Contending that the denial of a deduction for the Mississippi and federal excise taxes in computing the gross proceeds of retail gasoline sales for purpose of the sales tax was unconstitutional as a taking of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he acts as a mere collector of the excise taxes whose legal incidence is upon the purchaser-consumer, petitioner, an operator of several service stations in Mississippi who purchased his gasoline tax-free in other States and transported it to Mississippi in his own trucks, paid the sales taxes under protest and sued for a refund in state court. His suit was dismissed, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legal incidence of both excise taxes is on petitioner, and not on the purchaser-consumer.Held: The denial of the deduction of the Mississippi and federal gasoline excise taxes in computing the gross proceeds of retail sales for purposes of the sales tax is not unconstitutional. Pp. 421 U. S. 203-212(a) As reflected by the language of 26 U.S.C. §§ 4081(a) and 4082(a), and their legislative history, the legal incidence of the federal excise tax is on the statutory "producer," such as petitioner, and not on his purchaser-consumer. Pp. 421 U. S. 204-208.(b) The Mississippi Supreme Court's holding that the legal incidence of the state excise tax falls on petitioner, being consistent Page 421 U. S. 201 with a reasonable interpretation of the statute, is conclusive. Pp. 421 U. S. 208-210.(c) Petitioner's claim that liability for the excise taxes and sales tax arises simultaneously and results in a sales tax upon the excise tax is without merit, since the excise taxes attach prior to the point of the retail sale. Pp. 421 U. S. 210-211.(d) Petitioner is not denied equal protection as against dealers in other States who are not required to include the federal excise tax as part of the sales tax base, since the prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause is against its denial by the State as between taxpayers subject to its laws. Pp. 421 U. S. 211-212288 So. 2d 868, affirmed.BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except DOUGLAS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. |
3,237 | 1968_199 | MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.This case presents the question whether state prisoners who have commenced habeas corpus proceedings in a federal district court may, in proper circumstances, utilize the instrument of interrogatories for discovery purposes.IPetitioner is the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Respondent is the warden of the California State Prison at an Quentin. The proceeding was initiated by Alfred Walker who had been convicted in the California courts of the crime of possession of marihuana. After exhausting Page 394 U. S. 289 state remedies, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, alleging that evidence seized in the search incident to his arrest was improperly admitted at his trial. The basis for this claim was his allegation that the arrest and incidental search were based solely on the statement of an informant who, according to Walker's sworn statement, was not shown to have been reliable; who, in fact, was unreliable, and whose statements were accepted by the police without proper precautionary procedures.The District Court issued an order to show cause and respondent made return. Thereafter, Walker filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, which the District Court granted. Two months later, Walker served upon the respondent warden a series of interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking discovery of certain facts directed to proof of the informant's unreliability. Respondent filed objections to the interrogatories, alleging the absence of authority for their issuance. The District Judge, without stating his reasons, disallowed the objections and directed that the interrogatories be answered. Respondent applied to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Ninth Circuit vacated the order of the District Court. It held that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings, and that 28 U.S.C. § 2246, the statutory provision specifically relating to the use of interrogatories in habeas corpus proceedings, did not authorize their use for discovery. Wilson v. Harris, 378 F.2d 141 (1967).Because of the importance of the questions presented and the diversity of views among the district and appellate courts that have considered the problem, [Footnote 1] we granted Page 394 U. S. 290 certiorari. 392 U. S. 925. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings, and that 28 U.S.C. § 2246 does not authorize interrogatories except in limited circumstances not applicable to this case; but we conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a district court, confronted by a petition for habeas corpus which establishes a prima facie case for relief, may use or authorize the use of suitable discovery procedures, including interrogatories, reasonably fashioned to elicit facts necessary to help the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case in order that the District Court may reconsider the matter before it in light of our opinion and judgment.IIThe writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary Page 394 U. S. 291 and lawless state action. Its preeminent role is recognized by the admonition in the Constitution that: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended. . . ." U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The scope and flexibility of the writ -- its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention -- its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes -- have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.As Blackstone phrased it, habeas corpus is "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." [Footnote 2] As this Court said in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 401-402 (1963), the office of the writ is "to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints." See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 391 U. S. 65-67 (1968).It is now established beyond the reach of reasonable dispute that the federal courts not only may grant evidentiary hearings to applicants, but must do so upon an appropriate showing. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 372 U. S. 313 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 344 U. S. 464, n.19 (1953). And this Court has emphasized, taking into account the office of the writ and the fact that the petitioner, being in custody, is usually handicapped in developing the evidence needed to support in necessary detail the facts alleged in his petition, that a habeas Page 394 U. S. 292 corpus proceeding must not be allowed to founder in a "procedural morass." Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 334 U. S. 269 (1948).There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus for it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that he is deprived of his freedom contrary to law. This Court has insistently said that the power of the federal courts to conduct inquiry in habeas corpus is equal to the responsibility which the writ involves:"The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary."Townsend v. Sain, supra at 372 U. S. 312.In the present case, we are confronted with a procedural problem which tests the reality of these great principles. We are asked by Walker to establish the existence of rights for those in custody to discover facts which may aid their petitions for release. We are asked to do this by declaring that the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure granting such rights to litigants in civil causes are available to Walker; or if we refuse so to conclude, to affirm the existence of power in the District Court to authorize discovery by written interrogatories. We address ourselves to those issues.IIIRule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: "These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature . . . with the exceptions stated in Rule 81." At the time of the decision below Rule 81(a)(2) provided, in relevant part, that the Rules were not applicable in habeas corpus"except to the extent that the practice in Page 394 U. S. 293 such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States, and has heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits in equity. [Footnote 3]"The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the second requirement -- "conformity" with practice -- made it necessary to show that,"prior to September 16, 1938, discovery was actually being used in habeas proceedings, and that such use conformed to the then discovery practice in actions at law or suits in equity."378 F.2d at 144. No such showing was made, and it is not here contended that it can be made. Walker contends, however, that the rule requires only a showing that habeas proceedings conformed generally to preexisting practice in law and equity, and he contends that this general requirement is met.We need not consider this contention that the Court of Appeals took an unnecessarily restricted view of the thrust of the "conformity" requirement, because, for other reasons, we conclude that the intended scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the history of habeas corpus procedure make it clear that Rule 81(a)(2) must be read to exclude the application of Rule 33 in habeas corpus proceedings.It is, of course, true that habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as "civil." See, e.g., Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174, 203 U. S. 181 (1906). But the label is gross and Page 394 U. S. 294 inexact. [Footnote 4] Essentially, the proceeding is unique. Habeas corpus practice in the federal courts has conformed with civil practice only in a general sense. There is no indication that with respect to pretrial proceedings for the development of evidence, habeas corpus practice had conformed to the practice at law or in equity "to the extent" that the application of rules newly developed in 1938 to govern discovery in "civil" cases should apply in order to avoid a divergence in practice which had theretofore been substantially uniform. Although there is little direct evidence, relevant to the present problem, of the purpose of the "conformity" provision of Rule 81(a)(2), the concern of the draftsmen, as a general matter, seems to have been to provide for the continuing applicability of the "civil" rules in their new form to those areas of practice in habeas corpus and other enumerated proceedings in which the "specified" proceedings had theretofore utilized the modes of civil practice. Otherwise, those proceedings were to be considered outside of the scope of the rules without prejudice, of course, to the use of particular rules by analogy or otherwise, where appropriate. [Footnote 5] Page 394 U. S. 295Such specific evidence as there is with respect to the intent of the draftsmen of the rules indicates nothing more than a general and nonspecific understanding that the rules would have very limited application to habeas corpus proceedings. At the very least, it is clear that there was no intention to extend to habeas corpus, as a matter of right, the broad discovery provisions which, even in ordinary civil litigation, were "one of the most significant innovations" of the new rules. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 329 U. S. 500 (1947). Walker does not claim that there was any general discovery practice in habeas corpus proceedings prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.In considering the intended application of the new rules to habeas corpus, it is illuminating to note that, in 1938 the expansion of federal habeas corpus to its present scope was only in its early stages. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942). It was not until many years later that the federal courts considering a habeas corpus petition were held to be required in many cases to make an independent determination of the factual basis of claims that state convictions had violated the petitioner's federal constitutional rights. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963). In these circumstances, it is readily understandable that, as indicated by the language and the scanty contemporary exegesis of Rule 81(a)(2) which is available, the draftsmen Page 394 U. S. 296 of the rule did not contemplate that the discovery provisions of the rules would be applicable to habeas corpus proceedings.It is also of some relevance that, in 1948, when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2246 expressly referring to the right of parties in habeas corpus proceedings to propound written interrogatories, its legislation was limited to interrogatories for the purpose of obtaining evidence from affiants where affidavits were admitted in evidence. Again, the restricted scope of this legislation indicates that the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not intended to make available in habeas corpus proceedings the discovery provisions of those rules.Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the draftsmen of the Rules or Congress would have applied the discovery rules without modification to habeas corpus proceedings because their specific provisions are ill-suited to the special problems and character of such proceedings. For example, Rule 33, which Walker here invoked, provides for written interrogatories to be served by any party upon any "adverse party." As the present case illustrates, this would usually mean that the prisoner's interrogatories must be directed to the warden, although the warden would be unable to answer from personal knowledge questions relating to petitioner's arrest and trial. Presumably, the warden could solicit answers from the appropriate officials and reply "under oath," as the rule requires; but the warden is clearly not the kind of "adverse party" contemplated by the discovery rules, and the result of their literal application would be to invoke a procedure which is circuitous, burdensome, and time consuming.The scope of interrogatories which may be served under Rule 33 also indicates the unsuitability of applying to habeas corpus provisions which were drafted without reference to its peculiar problems. Page 394 U. S. 297By reference to Rule 26(b), the rule would give the prisoner a right to inquire into "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action," whether admissible at trial or not. This rule has been generously construed to provide a great deal of latitude for discovery. See Hickman v. Taylor, supra, at 329 U. S. 507; 2A Barron & Holtzoff, supra, § 646. Such a broad-ranging preliminary inquiry is neither necessary nor appropriate in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding.Except for interrogatories to be served by the "plaintiff" within 10 days after the commencement of "the action," Rule 33 provides that the interrogatories may be served without leave of court. The "adverse party" must then take the initiative to contest the interrogatories and a hearing in court on his objections is required. Unavoidably, unless there is a measure of responsibility in the originator of the proceeding, the "plaintiff" or petitioner, this procedure can be exceedingly burdensome and vexatious. The interrogatory procedure would be available to the prisoners themselves since most habeas petitions are prepared and filed by prisoners, generally without the guidance or restraint of members of the bar. For this reason, too, we conclude that the literal application of Rule 33 to habeas corpus proceedings would do violence to the efficient and effective administration of the Great Writ. The burden upon courts, prison officials, prosecutors, and police, which is necessarily and properly incident to the processing and adjudication of habeas corpus proceedings, would be vastly increased, and the benefit to prisoners would be counterbalanced by the delay which the elaborate discovery procedures would necessarily entail.It is true that the availability of Rule 33 would provide prisoners with an instrument of discovery which could be activated on their own initiative, without prior Page 394 U. S. 298 court approval, and that this would be of considerable tactical advantage to them in the prosecution of their efforts to demonstrate such error in their trial as would result in their release. But despite the forceful and ingenious argument of Walker's counsel and amici curiae, [Footnote 6] this consideration cannot carry the day. It is a long march from this contention to a conclusion that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to extend to habeas corpus proceedings. We have no power to rewrite the Rules by judicial interpretations. We have no power to decide that Rule 33 applies to habeas corpus proceedings unless, on conventional principles of statutory construction, we can properly conclude that the literal language or the intended effect of the Rules indicates that this was within the purpose of the draftsmen or the congressional understanding.IVTo conclude that the Federal Rules' discovery provisions do not apply completely and automatically by virtue of Rule 81(a)(2) is not to say that there is no way in which a district court may, in an appropriate case, arrange for procedures which will allow development, for purposes of the hearing, of the facts relevant to disposition of a habeas corpus petition. Petitioners in habeas corpus proceedings, as the Congress and this Court have emphasized, and as we have discussed, supra, at 394 U. S. 290-292, are entitled to careful consideration and plenary processing of their claims including full opportunity for presentation of the relevant facts. Congress has provided that, once a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, unless Page 394 U. S. 299 the court is of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to an order to show cause, the writ must be awarded "forthwith," or an order to show cause must be issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Thereafter, if the court concludes that the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, cf. Townsend v. Sain, supra; 28 U.S.C. § 2254, it shall order one to be held promptly. 28 U.S.C. § 2243.Flexible provision is made for taking evidence by oral testimony, by deposition, or upon affidavit and written interrogatory. 28 U.S.C. § 2246. Cf. §§ 2245, 2254(e). The court shall "summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. But with respect to methods for securing facts where necessary to accomplish the objective of the proceedings Congress has been largely silent. Clearly, in these circumstances, the habeas corpus jurisdiction and the duty to exercise it being present, the courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage. Where their duties require it, this is the inescapable obligation of the courts. Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. This statute has served since its inclusion, in substance, in the original Judiciary Act as a "legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve the rational ends of law.'" Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 334 U. S. 282 (1948), quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 317 U. S. 273 (1942). It has been recognized that the courts may rely upon this statute in issuing orders appropriate to assist them in conducting factual inquiries. American Lithographic Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603, 221 U. S. 609 (1911) (subpoenas duces tecum); Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 126, 127 (C.A. 1st Cir. 1941) (order that certain documents be produced for the purpose of pretrial discovery). In Price v. Johnston, supra, this Court held Page 394 U. S. 300 explicitly that the purpose and function of the All Writs Act to supply the courts with the instruments needed to perform their duty, as prescribed by the Congress and the Constitution, provided only that such instruments are "agreeable" to the usages and principles of law, extend to habeas corpus proceedings.At any time in the proceedings, when the court considers that it is necessary to do so in order that a fair and meaningful evidentiary hearing may be held so that the court may properly "dispose of the matter as law and justice require," either on its own motion or upon cause shown by the petitioner, it may issue such writs and take or authorize such proceedings with respect to development, before or in conjunction with the hearing of the facts relevant to the claims advanced by the parties, as may be "necessary or appropriate in aid of [its jurisdiction] . . . and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651.We do not assume that courts, in the exercise of their discretion, will pursue or authorize pursuit of all allegations presented to them. We are aware that confinement sometimes induces fantasy which has its basis in the paranoia of prison, rather than in fact. But where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry. Obviously, in exercising this power, the court may utilize familiar procedures, as appropriate, whether these are found in the civil or criminal rules or elsewhere in the "usages and principles of law." [Footnote 7] Page 394 U. S. 301Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.Reversed | U.S. Supreme CourtHarris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)Harris v. NelsonNo.199Argued December 9, 1968Decided March 24, 1969.394 U.S. 286SyllabusA state prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, alleging that the admission of certain evidence at his trial was improper because the evidence had been seized incident to an arrest based upon information from an unreliable informant. The District Court ordered an evidentiary hearing and the prisoner served on respondent a series of interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to establish the informant's unreliability. The District Court overruled respondent's objections that there was no authority for issuance of the interrogatories. Upon respondent's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's order authorizing the interrogatories, on the grounds that Rule 81(a)(2) made the discovery procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings, and that the statutory provision for interrogatories in habeas corpus proceedings (28 U.S.C. § 2246) did not authorize their use for discovery. Rule 81(a)(2) at that time provided that the Rules did not apply to habeas corpus proceedings"except to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits in equity."Held:1. Federal courts upon an appropriate showing must grant evidentiary hearings to petitioners for writs of habeas corpus and "the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 372 U. S. 312 (1963). Pp. 394 U. S. 290-292.2. The intended scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the history of habeas corpus procedure make it clear that Rule 81(a)(2) excludes the application of Rule 33 in habeas corpus proceedings. Pp. 394 U. S. 292-298.3. Section 2246 of 28 U.S.C. does not authorize interrogatories in habeas corpus proceedings except in limited circumstances not applicable to this case. Pp. 394 U. S. 290, 394 U. S. 296. Page 394 U. S. 2874. A district court considering a petition for habeas corpus is free to use or authorize interrogatories or other suitable discovery procedures reasonably fashioned to elicit facts to help the court "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Pp. 394 U. S. 290, 394 U. S. 298-300.5. Since Congress has not specified comprehensive procedures for securing the facts which federal courts must have to dispose of habeas corpus petitions, the court may fashion appropriate procedures for development of relevant facts, by analogy to existing rules or judicial usages. Their authority to do so is confirmed by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Pp. 394 U. S. 298-300.378 F.2d 141, reversed and remanded. Page 394 U. S. 288 |
3,238 | 1967_56 | MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.Appellants are an exhibitor and the distributor of a motion picture named "Viva Maria," which, pursuant to a city ordinance, the Motion Picture Classification Board of the appellee City of Dallas classified as "not suitable for young persons." A county court upheld the Board's determination and enjoined exhibition of the film without acceptance by appellants of the requirements imposed by the restricted classification. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, [Footnote 1] and we noted probable jurisdiction, 387 U.S. 903, to consider the First and Fourteenth Amendment issues raised by appellants with respect to appellee's classification ordinance.That ordinance, adopted in 1965, may be summarized as follows. [Footnote 2] It establishes a Motion Picture Classification Board, composed of nine appointed members, all of whom serve without pay. The Board classifies films as "suitable for young persons" or as "not suitable for young persons," young persons being defined as children who have not reached their 16th birthday. An exhibitor must be specially licensed to show "not suitable" films.The ordinance requires the exhibitor, before any initial showing of a film, to file with the Board a proposed classification of the film together with a summary of its Page 390 U. S. 679 plot and similar information. The proposed classification is approved if the Board affirmatively agrees with it, or takes no action upon it within five days of its filing.If a majority of the Board is dissatisfied with the proposed classification, the exhibitor is required to project the film before at least five members of the Board at the earliest practicable time. At the showing, the exhibitor may also present testimony or other support for his proposed classification. Within two days, the Board must issue its classification order. Should the exhibitor disagree, he must file within two days [Footnote 3] a notice of nonacceptance. The Board is then required to go to court within three days to seek a temporary injunction, and a hearing is required to be set on that application within five days thereafter; if the exhibitor agrees to waive notice and requests a hearing on the merits of a permanent injunction, the Board is required to waive its application for a temporary injunction and join in the exhibitor's request. If an injunction does not issue within 10 days of the exhibitor's notice of nonacceptance, the Board's classification order is suspended. [Footnote 4] The ordinance does not define the scope of judicial review of the Board's determination, but the Court of Civil Appeals held that de novo review in the trial court was required. [Footnote 5] If an injunction issues and the exhibitor seeks appellate review, or if an injunction is refused and the Board appeals, the Page 390 U. S. 680 Board must waive all statutory notices and times, and join a request of the exhibitor to advance the case on the appellate court's docket, i.e., do everything it can to assure a speedy determination.The ordinance is enforced primarily by a misdemeanor penalty: an exhibitor is subject to a fine of up to $200 if he exhibits a film that is classified "not suitable for young persons" without advertisements clearly stating its classification or without the classification being clearly posted, exhibits on the same program a suitable and a not suitable film, knowingly admits a youth under age 16 to view the film without his guardian or spouse accompanying him, [Footnote 6] makes any false or willfully misleading statement in submitting a film for classification, or exhibits a not suitable film without having a valid license therefor.The same penalty is applicable to a youth who obtains admission to a not suitable film by falsely giving his age as 16 years or over, and to any person who sells or gives to a youth under 16 a ticket to a not suitable film, or makes any false statements to enable such a youth to gain admission. [Footnote 7]Other means of enforcement, as against the exhibitor, are provided. Repeated violations of the ordinance, or persistent failure"to use reasonable diligence to determine whether those seeking admittance to the exhibition of a film classified 'not suitable for young persons' are below the age of sixteen,"may be the basis for revocation Page 390 U. S. 681 of a license to show not suitable films. [Footnote 8] Such a persistent failure, or exhibition of a not suitable film by an exhibitor with three convictions under the ordinance, inter alia, are defined as "public nuisances," which the Board may seek to restrain by a suit for injunctive relief.The substantive standards governing classification are as follows:"'Not suitable for young persons' means: ""(1) Describing or portraying brutality, criminal violence or depravity in such a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage crime or delinquency on the part of young persons; or""(2) Describing or portraying nudity beyond the customary limits of candor in the community, or sexual promiscuity or extramarital or abnormal sexual relations in such a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient interest.""A film shall be considered 'likely to incite or encourage' crime delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons, if, in the judgment of the Board, there is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly accepted. Page 390 U. S. 682 A film shall be considered as appealing to 'prurient interest' of young persons if in the judgment of the Board, its calculated or dominant effect on young persons is substantially to arouse sexual desire. In determining whether a film is 'not suitable for young persons,' the Board shall consider the film as a whole, rather than isolated portions, and shall determine whether its harmful effects outweigh artistic or educational values such film may have for young persons."Appellants attack those standards as unconstitutionally vague. We agree. Motion pictures are, of course, protected by the First Amendment, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952), and thus we start with the premise that "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone," NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 438 (1963). And while it is true that this Court refused to strike down, against a broad and generalized attack, a prior restraint requirement that motion pictures be submitted to censors in advance of exhibition, Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43 (1961), there has been no retreat in this area from rigorous insistence upon procedural safeguards and judicial superintendence of the censor's action. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965). [Footnote 9]In Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948), this Court struck down as vague and indefinite a statutory standard interpreted by the state court to be "criminal news or stories of deeds of bloodshed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes. . . ." Id. at 333 U. S. 518. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, the Court dealt with a film licensing standard of "sacrilegious," which was found to have such an all-inclusive definition as to result in "substantially unbridled censorship." 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. 502. Following Page 390 U. S. 683 Burstyn, the Court held the following film licensing standards to be unconstitutionally vague: "of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said City," Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952); "moral, educational or amusing and harmless," Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587 (1954); "immoral," and "tend to corrupt morals," Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U. S. 57 (1954); "approve such films . . . [as] are moral and proper; . . . disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals," Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955). [Footnote 10] See also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 360 U. S. 699-702 (Clark, J., concurring in result).The vice of vagueness is particularly pronounced where expression is sought to be subjected to licensing. It may be unlikely that what Dallas does in respect to the licensing of motion pictures would have a significant effect Page 390 U. S. 684 upon film makers in Hollywood or Europe. But what Dallas may constitutionally do, so may other cities and States. Indeed, we are told that this ordinance is being used as a model for legislation in other localities. Thus, one who wishes to convey his ideas through that medium, which, of course, includes one who is interested not so much in expression as in making money, must consider whether what he proposes to film, and how he proposes to film it, is within the terms of classification schemes such as this. If he is unable to determine what the ordinance means, he runs the risk of being foreclosed, in practical effect, from a significant portion of the movie-going public. Rather than run that risk, he might choose nothing but the innocuous, perhaps save for the so-called "adult" picture. Moreover, a local exhibitor who cannot afford to risk losing the youthful audience when a film may be of marginal interest to adults -- perhaps a "Viva Maria" -- may contract to show only the totally inane. The vast wasteland that some have described in reference to another medium might be a verdant paradise in comparison. The First Amendment interests here are, therefore, broader than merely those of the film maker, distributor, and exhibitor, and certainly broader than those of youths under 16.Of course, as the Court said in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. 502,"[i]t does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places."What does follow, at the least, as the cases above illustrate, is that the restrictions imposed cannot be so vague as to set "the censor . . . adrift upon a boundless sea . . . ," id. at 343 U. S. 504. In short, as Justice Frankfurter said, "legislation must not be so vague, the language so loose, as to leave to those who have to apply it too wide a discretion . . . ," Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 694 (concurring in result), one reason being Page 390 U. S. 685 that"where licensing is rested, in the first instance, in an administrative agency, the available judicial review is, in effect, rendered inoperative [by vagueness],"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, at 343 U. S. 532 (concurring opinion). Thus, to the extent that vague standards do not sufficiently guide the censor, the problem is not cured merely by affording de novo judicial review. Vague standards, unless narrowed by interpretation, encourage erratic administration whether the censor be administrative or judicial;"individual impressions become the yardstick of action, and result in regulation in accordance with the beliefs of the individual censor, rather than regulation by law,"Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, supra, at 360 U. S. 701 (Clark, J., concurring in result). [Footnote 11]The dangers inherent in vagueness are strikingly illustrated in these cases. Five members of the Board viewed "Viva Maria." Eight members voted to classify it as "not suitable for young persons," the ninth member not voting. The Board gave no reasons for its determination. [Footnote 12] Appellee alleged in its petition for an injunction Page 390 U. S. 686 that the classification was warranted because the film portrayed"sexual promiscuity in such a manner as to be in the judgment of the Board likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient interests."Two Board members, a clergyman and a lawyer, testified at the hearing. Each adverted to several scenes in the film which, in their opinion, portrayed male-female relationships in a way contrary to "acceptable and approved behavior." Each acknowledged, in reference to scenes in which clergymen were involved in violence, most of which was farcical, that "sacrilege" might have entered into the Board's determination. And both conceded that the asserted portrayal of "sexual promiscuity" was implicit, rather than explicit, i.e., that it was a product of inference by, and imagination of, the viewer.So far as "judicial superintendence" [Footnote 13] and de novo review are concerned, the trial judge, after viewing the film and hearing argument, stated merely:"Oh, I realize you gentlemen might be right. There are two or three features in this picture that look to me would be unsuitable to young people. . . . So I enjoin the exhibitor . . . from exhibiting it. [Footnote 14]"Nor did the Court of Civil Appeals provide much enlightenment or a narrowing definition of the ordinance. United Artists argued that the obscenity standards similar to those set forth in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), and other decisions of this Court ought to be controlling. [Footnote 15] The majority of Page 390 U. S. 687 the Court of Civil Appeals held, alternatively, (1) that such cases were not applicable because the legislation involved in them resulted in suppression of the offending expression, rather than its classification; (2) that, if obscenity standards were applicable, then "Viva Maria" was obscene as to adults (a patently untenable conclusion), and therefore entitled to no constitutional protection, and (3) that, if obscenity standards were modified as to children, the film was obscene as to them, a conclusion which was not in terms given as a narrowing interpretation of any specific provision of the ordinance. 402 S.W.2d 770, 775-776. In regard to the last alternative holding, we must conclude that the court in effect ruled that the "portrayal . . . of sexual promiscuity as acceptable," id. at 775, is, in itself, obscene as to children. [Footnote 16] The court also held that the standards of the ordinance were "sufficiently definite." Ibid.Thus, we are left merely with the film and directed to the words of the ordinance. The term "sexual promiscuity" is not there defined, [Footnote 17] and was not interpreted in the state courts. It could extend, depending upon one's moral judgment, from the obvious to any sexual contacts outside a marital relationship. The determinative Page 390 U. S. 688 manner of the "describing or portraying" of the subjects covered by the ordinance (see supra at 390 U. S. 681), including "sexual promiscuity," is defined as"such a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons."A film is so"'likely to incite or encourage' crime delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons, if, in the judgment of the Board, there is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly accepted."It might be excessive literalism to insist, as do appellants, that, because those last six adjectives are stated in the disjunctive, they represent separate and alternative subtle determinations the Board is to make, any of which results in a not suitable classification. Nonetheless,"[w]hat may be to one viewer the glorification of an idea as being 'desirable, acceptable or proper' may to the notions of another be entirely devoid of such a teaching. The only limits on the censor's discretion is his understanding of what is included within the term 'desirable, acceptable or proper.' This is nothing less than a roving commission. . . ."Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 701 (Clark, J., concurring in result). [Footnote 18]Vagueness and the attendant evils we have earlier described, see supra at 390 U. S. 683-685, are not rendered less objectionable because the regulation of expression is one of classification, rather than direct suppression. Cf. 372 U. S. S. 689� Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,@ 372 U. S. 58 (1963). [Footnote 19] Nor is it an answer to an argument that a particular regulation of expression is vague to say that it was adopted for the salutary purpose of protecting children. The permissible extent of vagueness is not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of the power to regulate or control expression with respect to children. As Chief Judge Fuld has said:"It is . . . essential that legislation aimed at protecting children from allegedly harmful expression -- no less than legislation enacted with respect to adults -- be clearly drawn and that the standards adopted be reasonably precise so that those who are governed by the law and those that administer it will understand its meaning and application."People v. Kahn, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 313, 206 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1965) (concurring opinion). [Footnote 20]The vices -- the lack of guidance to those who seek to adjust their conduct and to those who seek to administer Page 390 U. S. 690 the law, as well as the possible practical curtailing of the effectiveness of judicial review -- are the same.It is not our province to draft legislation. Suffice it to say that we have recognized that some believe "motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, at 343 U. S. 502, and we have indicated more generally that, because of its strong and abiding interest in youth, a State may regulate the dissemination to juveniles of, and their access to, material objectionable as to them, but which a State clearly could not regulate as to adults. Ginsberg v. New York, ante, p. 390 U. S. 629. [Footnote 21] Here, we conclude only that "the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to follow," Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 340 U. S. 271 (1951), is fatal. [Footnote 22] Page 390 U. S. 691The judgment of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtInterstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968)Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of DallasNo. 56Argued January 15-16, 1968Decided April 22, 1968*390 U.S. 676SyllabusAppellee, the City of Dallas, enacted an ordinance establishing a Motion Picture Classification Board to classify films as suitable or not suitable for young persons, who are defined as those under 16 years old. In classifying a picture as "not suitable for young persons," the Board must follow standards set forth in the ordinance and find that, in its judgment, the film describes or portrays (1) brutality, criminal violence, or depravity in such a manner as likely to incite young persons to crime or delinquency or (2) "sexual promiscuity or extra-marital or abnormal sexual relations in such a manner as . . . likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient interest." A film shall be considered likely to produce such results if, in the Board's judgment,"there is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly accepted."If the exhibitor does not accept the Board's "not suitable" classification, the Board must file suit to enjoin the showing of the picture, and the Board's determination is subject to de novo review. The ordinance is enforceable by a misdemeanor penalty, injunction, and license revocation. Acting pursuant to the ordinance the Board, without giving reasons for its determination, classified as "not suitable for young persons" the film "Viva Maria," for which appellants are respectively the exhibitor and distributor. Following the exhibitor's notice of nonacceptance of the Board's classification, appellee petitioned for an injunction alleging in terms of the ordinance that the classification was warranted because of the film's portrayal of sexual promiscuity. Two Board members testified at the hearing that several scenes portraying male-female relationships contravened "acceptable and approved behavior." The trial judge, concluding that there were "two or three features in the picture that look Page 390 U. S. 677 to me would be unsuitable to young people," issued an injunction. The appellate court, without limiting the standards of the ordinance, affirmed.Held: The ordinance is violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments as being unconstitutionally vague, since it lacks "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to follow," Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 340 U. S. 271 (1951). Pp. 390 U. S. 682-691.(a) Motion pictures are protected by the First Amendment, and cannot be regulated except by precise and definite standards. Pp. 390 U. S. 682-683.(b) The vice of vagueness is particularly pronounced where expression is subjected to licensing. P. 390 U. S. 683.(c) Vague censorship standards are not cured merely by de novo judicial review, and, unless narrowed by interpretation, only encourage erratic administration. P. 390 U. S. 685.(d) The term "sexual promiscuity" is not defined in the ordinance, and was not interpreted in the state courts. The failure to limit that term or related terms used in the ordinance and the breadth of the standard "profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly accepted" give the censor a roving commission. Pp. 390 U. S. 687-688.(e) The evil of vagueness is not cured because the regulation of expression is one of classification, rather than direct suppression or was adopted for the salutary purpose of protecting children. Pp. 390 U. S. 688-689.402 S.W.2d 770, reversed and remanded. Page 390 U. S. 678 |
3,239 | 2001_01-417 | right to appeal from an action that finally disposes of one's rights has a statutory basis. 28 U. S. C. § 1291. pp. 11-14.265 F.3d 195, reversed and remanded.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 15.Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioner.With him on the briefs were Erik S. Jaffe and Brian Wolfman.Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Andrew D. Roth, David L. Shapiro, William F. Hanrahan, and Kenneth M. Johnson.Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Gregory G. Garre, Marleigh D. Dover, Irene M. Solet, David M. Becker, Jacob H. Stillman, and Eric Summergrad. *JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a nonnamed member of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), sought to appeal the approval of a settlement over objections he stated at the fairness hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that he lacked the power to bring such an appeal because he was not a named class representative and because*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Council of Institutional Investors by Mark C. Hansen and Neil M. Gorsuch; and for Charles C. Yeomans by Katherine K. Yunker.Seth P. Waxman, Edward C. DuMont, and Christopher R. Lipsett filed a brief for Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.Thaddeus Holt filed a brief for Charles L. Grimes et al. as amici curiae.4he had not successfully moved to intervene in the litigation. We now reverse.IPetitioner Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union (Union), participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, on the recommendation of the Plan's trustees, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living adjustment (COLA) for retired and active employees. As it turned out, however, the Plan was not able to support such a large benefits increase. To address this problem, the Plan's new trustees sought to freeze the COLA. Because they were concerned about incurring Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) liability by eliminating the COLA for retired workers, see 29 U. S. C. § 1054(g)(1) (1994 ed.) (providing that accrued benefits "may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan"), the trustees froze the COLA only as to active employees. Because the Plan still lacked sufficient funds, the new trustees obtained an equitable decree from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 1995 declaring that the former trustees had breached their fiduciary duties and that ending the COLA for retired workers would not violate ERISA. Scardelletti v. Bobo, 897 F. Supp. 913 (Md. 1995); Scardelletti v. Bobo, No. JFM-95-52 (D. Md., Sept. 8, 1997). Accordingly, in a 1997 amendment, the new trustees eliminated the COLA for all Plan members.In October 1997, those trustees filed the present class action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 amendment was binding on all Plan members or, alternatively, that the 1991 COLA amendment was void. Originally, petitioner was proposed as a class representative for a subclass of retired workers because of his previous involvement in the issue. He refused to become a named representative, however, preferring to bring a separate action in5the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing, among other things, that the 1997 Plan amendment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The New York District Court dismissed petitioner's claim involving the 1997 amendment, which was later affirmed by the Second Circuit because:"The exact COLA issue that the appellants are pursuing ... is being addressed by the district court in Maryland ... .It seems eminently sensible that the Maryland district court should resolve fully the COLA amendment issue." Devlin v. Transportation Communications lnt'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (CA2 1999).At the time petitioner's claim was dismissed, the District Court in Maryland had already conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), dividing it into two subclasses: a subclass of active employees and a subclass of retirees. On April 20, 1999, petitioner's attorney sent a letter to the District Court informally seeking to intervene in the class action. On May 12, 1999, petitioner sent another letter repeating this request. He did not, however, formally move to intervene at that time.Also in May, the Plan's trustees and the class representatives agreed on a settlement whereby the COLA benefits would be eliminated in exchange for the addition of other benefits. On August 27, 1999, the trustees filed a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. On September 10, 1999, petitioner formally moved to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. On November 12, 1999, the District Court denied petitioner's intervention motion as "absolutely untimely." Scardelletti v. Debarr, 265 F.3d 195, 201 (CA4 2001). It then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by petitioner, and, concluding that the settlement was fair, approved it. App. C to Pet. for Cert.1-3.6Shortly thereafter, petitioner noted his appeal, challenging the District Court's dismissal of his intervention motion as well as its decision to approve the settlement. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of intervention under an abuse of discretion standard. 265 F. 3d, at 203-204. It further held that, because petitioner was not a named representative of the class and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the fairness of the settlement on appeal. Id., at 208-210.Petitioner sought review of the Fourth Circuit's holding that he lacked the ability to appeal the District Court's approval of the settlement. We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 1064 (2001), to resolve a disagreement among the Circuits as to whether nonnamed class members who fail to properly intervene may bring an appeal of the approval of a settlement. Compare Cook v. Powell Buick, Inc., 155 F.3d 758, 761 (CA5 1998) (holding that nonnamed class members who have not successfully intervened may not appeal settlement approval); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1008-1009 (CAlO 1993) (same); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626,628-629 (CAll 1987) (same); Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1061 (CA6 1994) (same), with In re Paine Webber Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litigation, 94 F.3d 49,53 (CA2 1996) (any nonnamed class member who objected at the fairness hearing may appeal); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 710 (CA3 1993) (same); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F. 2d 1173, 1176 (CA9 1977) (same).IIAlthough the Fourth Circuit framed the issue as one of standing, 265 F. 3d, at 204, we begin by clarifying that this issue does not implicate the jurisdiction of the courts under Article III of the Constitution. As a member of the retiree class, petitioner has an interest in the settlement that creates a "case or controversy" sufficient to satisfy the constitutional7requirements of injury, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992); see also In re Navigant Consulting, Inc., Securities Litigation, 275 F. 3d 616,620 (CA7 2001).Nor do appeals by nonnamed class members raise the sorts of concerns that are ordinarily addressed as a matter of prudential standing. Prudential standing requirements include:"[T]he general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked." Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).Because petitioner is a member of the class bound by the judgment, there is no question that he satisfies these three requirements. The legal rights he seeks to raise are his own, he belongs to a discrete class of interested parties, and his complaint clearly falls within the zone of interests of the requirement that a settlement be fair to all class members. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e).What is at issue, instead, is whether petitioner should be considered a "party" for the purposes of appealing the approval of the settlement. We have held that "only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment." Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U. S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam). Respondents argue that, because petitioner is not a named class representative and did not successfully move to intervene, he is not a party for the purposes of taking an appeal.We have never, however, restricted the right to appeal to named parties to the litigation. In Blossom v. Milwaukee & Chicago R. Co., 1 Wall. 655 (1864), for instance, we allowed a bidder for property at a foreclosure sale, who was not a8named party in the foreclosure action, to appeal the refusal of a request he made during that action to compel the sale. In Hinckley v. Gilman, c., & S. R. Co., 94 U. S. 467 (1877), we allowed a receiver, who was an officer of the court rather than a named party to the case, to appeal from an order "relat[ing] to the settlement of his accounts," reasoning that "[f]or this purpose he occupies the position of a party to the suit." Id., at 469. More recently, we have affirmed that "[t]he right of a nonparty to appeal an adjudication of contempt cannot be questioned," United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U. S. 72, 76 (1988), given the binding nature of that adjudication upon the interested nonparty.JUSTICE SCALIA attempts to distinguish these cases by characterizing them as appeals from collateral orders to which the appellants "were parties." Post, at 16 (dissenting opinion). But it is difficult to see how they were parties in the sense in which JUSTICE SCALIA uses the term-those "'named as a party to an action,'" usually "'in the caption of the summons or complaint.'" Post, at 15 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 34(1), p. 345 (1980); id., Comment a, Reporter's Note, at 347). Because they were not named in the action, the appellants in these cases were parties only in the sense that they were bound by the order from which they were seeking to appeal.Petitioner's interest in the District Court's approval of the settlement is similar. Petitioner objected to the settlement at the District Court's fairness hearing, as nonnamed parties have been consistently allowed to do under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs"); see also 2 H. Newberg & A. Conte, Class Actions § 11.55, p. 11-132 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining that Rule 23(e) entitles all class members9to an opportunity to object). The District Court's approval of the settlement-which binds petitioner as a member of the class-amounted to a "final decision of [petitioner's] right or claim" sufficient to trigger his right to appeal. See Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 699 (1884) (describing the cases discussed above). And like the appellants in the prior cases, petitioner will only be allowed to appeal that aspect of the District Court's order that affects him-the District Court's decision to disregard his objections. Cf. supra, at 6. Petitioner's right to appeal this aspect of the District Court's decision cannot be effectively accomplished through the named class representative-once the named parties reach a settlement that is approved over petitioner's objections, petitioner's interests by definition diverge from those of the class representative.Marino v. Ortiz, supra, is not to the contrary. In that case, we refused to allow an appeal of a settlement by a group of white police officers who were not members of the class of minority officers that had brought a racial discrimination claim against the New York Police Department. Although the settlement affected them, the District Court's decision did not finally dispose of any right or claim they might have had because they were not members of the class.Nor does considering nonnamed class members parties for the purposes of bringing an appeal conflict with any other aspect of class action procedure. In a related case, the Seventh Circuit has argued that nonnamed class members cannot be considered parties for the purposes of bringing an appeal because they are not considered parties for the purposes of the complete diversity requirement in suits under 28 U. S. C. § 1332. See Navigant Consulting, 275 F. 3d, at 619; see also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S. 332, 340 (1969). According to the Seventh Circuit, "[c]lass members cannot have it both ways, being non-parties (so that more cases can come to federal court) but still having a party's ability to litigate independently." 275 F. 3d, at 619. Nonnamed class mem-10bers, however, may be parties for some purposes and not for others. The label "party" does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.Nonnamed class members are, for instance, parties in the sense that the filing of an action on behalf of the class tolls a statute of limitations against them. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974). Otherwise, all class members would be forced to intervene to preserve their claims, and one of the major goals of class action litigationto simplify litigation involving a large number of class members with similar claims-would be defeated. The rule that nonnamed class members cannot defeat complete diversity is likewise justified by the goals of class action litigation. Ease of administration of class actions would be compromised by having to consider the citizenship of all class members, many of whom may even be unknown, in determining jurisdiction. See 7 A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1755, pp. 63-64 (2d ed. 1986). Perhaps more importantly, considering all class members for these purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class actions. Nonnamed class members are, therefore, not parties in that respect.What is most important to this case is that nonnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being bound by the settlement. It is this feature of class action litigation that requires that class members be allowed to appeal the approval of a settlement when they have objected at the fairness hearing. To hold otherwise would deprive nonnamed class members of the power to preserve their own interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them, despite their expressed objections before the trial court. Particularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to opt out of the settlement, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(1), appealing the approval of the settlement is petitioner's only11means of protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he finds unacceptable and that a reviewing court might find legally inadequate.JUSTICE SCALIA rightly notes that other nonnamed parties may be bound by a court's decision, in particular, those in privity with the named party. See post, at 18. True enough. It is not at all clear, however, that such parties may not themselves appeal. Although this Court has never addressed the issue, nonnamed parties in privity with a named party are often allowed by other courts to appeal from the order that affects them. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review § 265 (1995).Respondents argue that, nonetheless, appeals from nonnamed parties should not be allowed because they would undermine one of the goals of class action litigation, namely, preventing multiple suits. See Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F. 2d, at 629 (arguing that allowing nonnamed class members' appeals would undermine a "fundamental purpose of the class action": "to render manageable litigation that involves numerous members of a homogenous class, who would all otherwise have access to the court through individual lawsuits"). Allowing such appeals, however, will not be as problematic as respondents claim. For one thing, the power to appeal is limited to those nonnamed class members who have objected during the fairness hearing. This limits the class of potential appellants considerably. As the longstanding practice of allowing nonnamed class members to object at the fairness hearing demonstrates, the burden of considering the claims of this subset of class members is not onerous.IIIThe Government, as amicus curiae, admits that nonnamed class members are parties who may appeal the approval of a settlement, but urges us nonetheless to require class members to intervene for purposes of appeal. See Brief for12United States et al. as Amici Curiae 12-27. To address the fairness concerns to objecting nonnamed class members bound by the settlement they wish to appeal, however, the Government also asserts that such a limited purpose intervention generally should be available to all those, like petitioner, whose objections at the fairness hearing have been disregarded. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as of right:"Upon timely application ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."According to the Government, nonnamed class members who state objections at the fairness hearing should easily meet these three criteria. For one thing, it claims, a settlement binding on them will establish the requisite interest in the action. Moreover, it argues, any intervention motion filed "within the time period in which the named plaintiffs could have taken an appeal" should be considered "timely filed" for the purposes of such limited intervention. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 396 (1977). Finally, it asserts, the approval of a settlement over a nonnamed class member's objection, and the failure of a class representative to appeal such an approval, should "invariably" show that the class representative does not adequately represent the nonnamed class member's interests on appeal. Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 20.Given the ease with which nonnamed class members who have objected at the fairness hearing could intervene for purposes of appeal, however, it is difficult to see the value of the Government's suggested requirement. It identifies only13a limited number of instances where the initial intervention motion would be of any use: where the objector is not actually a member of the settlement class or is otherwise not entitled to relief from the settlement, where an objector seeks to appeal even though his objection was successful, where the objection at the fairness hearing was untimely, or where there is a need to consolidate duplicative appeals from class members. Id., at 23-25. In such situations, the Government argues, a district court can disallow such problematic and unnecessary appeals.This seems to us, however, of limited benefit. In the first two of these situations, the objector stands to gain nothing by appeal, so it is unlikely such situations will arise with any frequency. JUSTICE SCALIA argues that if such objectors were undeterred by this fact at the time they filed their original objections, they will be undeterred at the appellate level. See post, at 21-22. This misunderstands the point. As to the first group-those who are not actually entitled to relief-one would not expect them to have filed objections in the district court in the first place. The few irrational persons who wish to pursue one round of meaningless relief will, we agree, probably be irrational enough to pursue a second. But there should not be many of such persons in any case. As for the second-those whose objections were successful at the district court level-they were far from irrational in the filing of their initial objections, and they should not generally be expected to lose this level of sensibility when faced with the prospect of a meaningless appeal. Moreover, even if such cases did arise with any frequency, such concerns could be addressed by a standing inquiry at the appellate level.The third situation-dealing with untimely objectionsimplicates basic concerns about waiver and should be easily addressable by a court of appeals. A court of appeals also has the ability to avoid the fourth by consolidating cases rais-14ing duplicative appeals. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(b)(2). If the resolution of any of these issues should turn out to be complex in a given case, there is little to be gained by requiring a district court to consider these issues, which are the type of issues (standing to appeal, waiver of objections below, and consolidation of appeals) typically addressed only by an appellate court. As such determinations still would most likely lead to an appeal, such a requirement would only add an additional layer of complexity before the appeal of the settlement approval may finally be heard.Nor do we agree with the Government that, regardless of the desirability of an intervention requirement for effective class management, the structure of the rules of class action procedure requires intervention for the purposes of appeal. According to the Government, intervention is the method contemplated under the rules for nonnamed class members to gain the right to participate in class action proceedings. We disagree. Just as class action procedure allows nonnamed class members to object to a settlement at the fairness hearing without first intervening, see supra, at 8-9, it should similarly allow them to appeal the District Court's decision to disregard their objections. Moreover, no federal statute or procedural rule directly addresses the question of who may appeal from approval of class action settlements, while the right to appeal from an action that finally disposes of one's rights has a statutory basis. 28 U. s. C. § 1291.IVWe hold that nonnamed class members like petitioner who have objected in a timely manner to approval of the settlement at the fairness hearing have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | CASES ADJUDGEDIN THESUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESATOCTOBER TERM, 2001SyllabusDEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI ET AL.CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUITNo. 01-417. Argued March 26, 2002-Decided June 10,2002Petitioner retiree participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) that was amended in 1991 to add a cost of living increase (COLA). Because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase, its trustees ultimately eliminated the COLA in 1997 and filed a class action in the Maryland Federal District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 amendment was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. Petitioner's separate challenge to the 1997 amendment was dismissed by a New York Federal District Court, which found that the Maryland court should resolve the matter. By this time, the Maryland court had already conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1). After the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, petitioner moved to intervene. The District Court denied his motion as untimely. It then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by petitioner, and approved the settlement. Petitioner appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of intervention and held that, because petitioner was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement.Held: Nonnamed class members like petitioner who have objected in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening. Pp. 6-14.2Syllabus(a) This issue, though framed by the Fourth Circuit as one of standing, does not implicate the jurisdiction of the courts, as petitioner satisfies both constitutional and prudential standing requirements. What is at issue is whether petitioner is a "party" for purposes of appealing the settlement approval, for only a lawsuit's parties, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. This Court has never restricted the right to appeal to named parties. Petitioner's interest in the settlement approval is similar to those of the nonnamed parties this Court has allowed to appeal in the past. He objected to the settlement at the fairness hearing, as permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. And the settlement's approval notwithstanding his objections amounted to a final decision of his right or claim sufficient to trigger his right to appeal. That right cannot be effectively accomplished through the named class representative-once the named parties reach a settlement that is approved over the petitioner's objections, petitioner's interests diverge from those of the class representative. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U. S. 301, in which white police officers who were not members of the class of minority officers who had brought a racial discrimination suit were not allowed to appeal the settlement, is not to the contrary. Although the settlement affected them, the District Court's decision did not dispose of any right or claim they might have had because they were not class members. Nor does considering nonnamed class members as parties for the purpose of bringing an appeal conflict with any other aspect of class action procedure. Such members may be parties for some purposes and not for others. What is important here is that they are parties in the sense of being bound by the settlement. Allowing them to appeal a settlement approval when they have objected at the fairness hearing preserves their own interests in a settlement that will bind them, despite their expressed objections before the trial court. Allowing such appeals will not undermine the class action goal of preventing multiple suits. Restricting the power to appeal to those members who objected at the fairness hearing limits the class of potential appellants considerably. Pp. 6-11.(b) This Court rejects the Government's argument that class members should be required to intervene for purposes of appeal. Nor does the Court agree with the Government that the structure of class action procedural rules requires intervention for purposes of appeal. A procedure that allows nonnamed class members to object to a settlement at the fairness hearing without first intervening should similarly allow them to appeal the district court's decision to disregard their objections. Moreover, no statute or procedural rule directly addresses the question of who may appeal from approval of class action settlements, while the3Full Text of Opinion |
3,240 | 1985_85-390 | JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.Respondent Preferred Communications, Inc., sued petitioners City of Los Angeles (City) and the Department of Water and Power (DWP) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The complaint alleged a violation of respondent's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, by reason of the City's refusal to grant respondent a cable television franchise and of DWP's refusal to grant access to DWP's poles or underground conduits used for power lines. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed with respect to the Sherman Act, but reversed as to the First Amendment claim. 754 F.2d 1396 (1985). We granted certiorari with respect to the latter issue, 474 U.S. 979 (1985).Respondent's complaint against the City and DWP alleged, inter alia, the following facts: respondent asked Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PT&T) and DWP for permission to lease space on their utility poles in order to provide cable television service in the south central area of Los Angeles. App. 6a. These utilities responded that they would not lease the space unless respondent first obtained a cable television franchise from the City. Ibid. Respondent asked the City for a franchise, but the City refused to grant it one, stating that respondent had failed to participate in an auction that was to award a single franchise in the area. Id. at 6a-7a. [Footnote 1] Page 476 U. S. 491The complaint further alleged that cable operators are First Amendment speakers, id. at 3a, that there is sufficient excess physical capacity and economic demand in the south central area of Los Angeles to accommodate more than one cable company, id. at 4a, and that the City's auction process allowed it to discriminate among franchise applicants based on which one it deemed to be the "best." Id. at 6a. Based on these and other factual allegations, the complaint alleged that the City and DWP had violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Page 476 U. S. 492 the California Constitution, and certain provisions of state law. Id. at 11a-19a.The City did not deny that there was excess physical capacity to accommodate more than one cable television system. But it argued that the physical scarcity of available space on public utility structures, the limits of economic demand for the cable medium, and the practical and esthetic disruptive effect that installing and maintaining a cable system has on the public right-of-way justified its decision to restrict access to its facilities to a single cable television company. 754 F.2d at 1401.The District Court dismissed the free speech claim without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). It also dismissed the antitrust claims, reasoning that petitioners were immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1963). Finally, it declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 754 F.2d 1396 (1985). It upheld the conclusion that petitioners were immune from liability under the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 1411-1415. But it reversed the District Court's dismissal of the First Amendment claim, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1401-1411. It held that, taking the allegations in the complaint as true, id. at 1399, the City violated the First Amendment by refusing to issue a franchise to more than one cable television company when there was sufficient excess physical and economic capacity to accommodate more than one. Id. at 1401-1405, 1411. The Court of Appeals expressed the view that the facts alleged in the complaint brought respondent into the ambit of cases such as Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), rather than of cases such as Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969), Page 476 U. S. 493 and Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 (1984). 754 F.2d at 1403-1411.We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent's complaint should not have been dismissed, and we therefore affirm the judgment of that court; but we do so on a narrower ground than the one taken by it. The well-pleaded facts in the complaint include allegations of sufficient excess physical capacity and economic demand for cable television operators in the area which respondent sought to serve. [Footnote 2] The City, while admitting the existence of excess physical capacity on the utility poles, the rights-of-way, and the like, justifies the limit on franchises in terms of minimizing the demand that cable systems make for the use of public property. The City characterizes these uses as the stringing of "nearly 700 miles of hanging and buried wire and other appliances necessary for the operation of its system." Brief for Petitioners 12. The City also characterizes them as "a permanent visual blight," ibid., and adds that the process of installation and repair of such a system in effect subjects city facilities designed for other purposes to a servitude which will cause traffic delays and hazards and esthetic unsightliness. Respondent in its turn replies that the City does not "provide anything more than speculations and assumptions," and that the City's "legitimate concerns are easily satisfied without the need to limit the right to speak to a single speaker." Brief for Respondent 9.We of course take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss, see, e.g., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117, 421 U. S. 125-126, n. 5 (1975). Ordinarily such a motion frames a legal issue such as the one which the Court of Appeals undertook to decide in this case. Page 476 U. S. 494 But this case is different from a case between private litigants for two reasons: first, it is an action of a municipal corporation taken pursuant to a city ordinance that is challenged here, and, second, the ordinance is challenged on colorable First Amendment grounds. The City has adduced essentially factual arguments to justify the restrictions on cable franchising imposed by its ordinance, but the factual assertions of the City are disputed at least in part by respondent. We are unwilling to decide the legal questions posed by the parties without a more thoroughly developed record of proceedings in which the parties have an opportunity to prove those disputed factual assertions upon which they rely.We do think that the activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First Amendment interests. Respondent alleges:"The business of cable television, like that of newspapers and magazines, is to provide its subscribers with a mixture of news, information and entertainment. As do newspapers, cable television companies use a portion of their available space to reprint (or retransmit) the communications of others, while at the same time providing some original content."App. 3a. Thus, through original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, respondent seeks to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats. We recently noted that cable operators exercise "a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their programming will include." FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 440 U. S. 707 (1979). Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public speakers, and pamphleteers. Respondent's proposed activities would seem to implicate First Amendment interests, as do the activities of wireless broadcasters, which were found Page 476 U. S. 495 to fall within the ambit of the First Amendment in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 395 U. S. 386, even though the free speech aspects of the wireless broadcasters' claim were found to be outweighed by the Government interests in regulating by reason of the scarcity of available frequencies.Of course, the conclusion that respondent's factual allegations implicate protected speech does not end the inquiry. "Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 473 U. S. 799 (1985). Moreover, where speech and conduct are joined in a single course of action, the First Amendment values must be balanced against competing societal interests. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, supra, at 466 U. S. 805-807; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 391 U. S. 376-377 (1968). We do not think, however, that it is desirable to express any more detailed views on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question raised by respondent's complaint and the City's responses to it without a fuller development of the disputed issues in the case. We think that we may know more than we know now about how the constitutional issues should be resolved when we know more about the present uses of the public utility poles and rights-of-way and how respondent proposes to install and maintain its facilities on them.The City claims that no such trial of the issues is required, because the City need not "generate a legislative record" in enacting ordinances which would grant one franchise for each area of the City. Brief for Petitioners 44. "Whether a limitation on the number of franchises . . . is reasonable,'" the City continues, "thus cannot turn on a review of historical facts." Id. at 46. The City supports its contention in this regard by citation to cases such as United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 449 U. S. 179 (1980), and Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 450 U. S. 236-237 (1981). Brief for Petitioners 45, n. 52. Page 476 U. S. 496The flaw in the City's argument is that both Fritz and Wilson involved Fifth Amendment equal protection challenges to legislation, rather than challenges under the First Amendment. Where a law is subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does not have the same controlling force. But cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 436 U. S. 459 (1978). This Court"may not simply assume that the ordinance will always advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive activity."Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 803, n. 22; Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 435 U. S. 843-844 (1978).We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the dismissal of respondent's complaint by the District Court, and remand the case to the District Court so that petitioners may file an answer and the material factual disputes between the parties may be resolved.It is so ordered | U.S. Supreme CourtLos Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488 (1986)City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.No. 85-390Argued April 29, 1986Decided June 2, 1986476 U.S. 488SyllabusRespondent sued petitioners, the city of Los Angeles and its Department of Water and Power (DWP), in Federal District Court, alleging, inter alia, a violation of its rights under the First Amendment by reason of (1) the city's refusal to grant respondent a cable television franchise on the ground that respondent had failed to participate in an auction for a single franchise in the area and (2) DWP's refusal to grant access to poles or underground conduits used for power lines. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.Held: The complaint should not have been dismissed. The activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First Amendment interests. Through original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, respondent seeks to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats. But where speech and conduct are joined in a single course of action, the First Amendment values must be balanced against competing societal interests. Thus, where the city has made factual assertions to justify restrictions on cable television franchising and these assertions are disputed by respondent, there must be a fuller development of the disputed factual issues before this Court will decide the legal issues. Accordingly, the case will be remanded to the District Court so that petitioners may file an answer and the material factual disputes may be resolved. Pp. 476 U. S. 493-496.754 F.2d 1396, affirmed and remanded.REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MARSHALL and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 476 U. S. 496. Page 476 U. S. 490 |
3,241 | 1977_76-1137 | MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented in this case is the validity of the provision of Treas.Reg. § 1.562-1(a), 26 CFR § 1.562-1(a) (1977), that a personal holding company's distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders results, under § 561 and 562 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 561 and 562, in a dividends-paid deduction limited to an amount that is "the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distributing corporation at the time of the distribution." [Footnote 1] The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the validity of the provision in this case, 545 F.2d 268 (1976), disagreeing with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in H. Wetter Mfg. Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1033 (1972), which had concluded that the limitation on the dividends-paid deduction is invalid, and that a personal holding company is entitled to a deduction equal in amount to the fair market Page 434 U. S. 530 value of property distributed. [Footnote 2] We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 431 U.S. 928 (1977). We agree with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that the limitation on the dividends-paid deduction provided by the regulations is valid, and therefore affirm its judgment.IThe maximum income tax rate applied to corporations has for many years been substantially below marginal tax rates applicable to high-income individuals. As early as 1913, Congress recognized that this disparity provided an incentive for individuals to create corporations solely to avoid taxes. In response, Congress imposed a tax on the shareholders of any corporation "formed or fraudulently availed of" for the purpose of avoiding personal income taxes. Tariff Act of 1913, § II-A, Subdivision 2, 38 Stat. 166; see Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U. S. 617, 422 U. S. 624-625, and n. 8 (1975). Section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 247, shifted the incidence of this tax to the corporation itself, where it has remained to this day. See Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, supra at 422 U. S. 625 n. 8.Early statutes designed to combat abuse of the corporate form were not notably successful, however, and, in 1934, Congress concluded that the "incorporated pocketbook" -- a closely held corporation formed to receive passive investment property and to accumulate income accruing with respect to that property -- had become a major vehicle of tax avoidance. [Footnote 3] Page 434 U. S. 531 Congress' response was the personal holding company tax, enacted in 1934, and now codified as §§ 541-547 and 561-565 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, [Footnote 4] 26 U.S.C. §§ 541-547 and 561-565 (1970 ed. and Supp. V).The object of the personal holding company tax is to force corporations which are "personal holding companies" [Footnote 5] to pay in each tax year dividends at least equal to the corporation's undistributed personal holding company income -- i.e. its adjusted taxable income less dividends paid to shareholders of the corporation, see § 545 -- thus ensuring that taxpayers cannot escape personal taxes by accumulating income at the corporate level. This object is effectuated by imposing on a personal holding company both the ordinary income tax applicable to its operation as a corporation and a penalty tax of 70% on its undistributed personal holding company income. See §§ 541, 545, 561. Since the penalty tax rate equals or exceeds the highest rate applicable to individual taxpayers, see 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), it will generally be in the interest of those controlling the personal holding company to distribute all personal holding company income, thereby avoiding the 70% tax at the corporate level by reducing to zero the tax base against which it is applied. [Footnote 6]IIPetitioners are the successors to Pierce Investment Corp. In 1966, the Commissioner audited Pierce and determined that it was a personal holding company for the tax years 1959, 1960, Page 434 U. S. 532 1962, and 1963. Deficiencies in personal holding company taxes of $26,571.30 were assessed against Pierce. In response to the audit, Pierce entered an agreement with the Commissioner pursuant to § 547 of the Code which provides that a corporation in Pierce's position may enter such an agreement, acknowledging its deficiency and personal holding company status, and may within 90 days thereafter make "deficiency dividend" payments that become a deduction against personal holding company income in the years for which a deficiency was determined and reduce that deficiency. Shares of stock Pierce held in other companies were promptly distributed as deficiency dividends. The fair market value of this stock at the time of distribution is agreed to have been $32,535; its adjusted tax basis, $18,725.11.Pierce then filed a claim for a deficiency-dividend deduction, as required by § 547(e), indicating that the value of dividends distributed for the tax years in question was $32,535. The Commissioner, relying on Treas.Reg. § 1.562-1(a), allowed this claim only to the extent of Pierce's adjusted basis in the stock, and he determined a new deficiency after reducing Pierce's personal holding company income by the amount of the deficiency dividends allowed. Pierce paid this tax and the Commissioner denied its claim for a refund.Petitioners as Pierce's successors thereafter brought a refund suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, arguing that the deficiency dividends should have been valued at their fair market value. The District Court on cross-motions for summary judgment denied relief, 407 F. Supp. 1039 (1976), and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Each court found the Treasury Regulation to be a reasonable interpretation of the personal holding company tax statute, and each expressly refused to follow the contrary holding of H. Wetter Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra. [Footnote 7] Accordingly, a refund was denied. Page 434 U. S. 533III"[I]t is fundamental . . . that as 'contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of' the Code, [Treasury] Regulations 'must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes,' and 'should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.'"Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U. S. 741, 394 U. S. 749-750 (1969), quoting Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U. S. 496, 333 U. S. 501 (1948); accord, United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 389 U. S. 306-307 (1967). This rule of deference is particularly appropriate here, [Footnote 8] since, while obviously some rule of valuation must be applied, Congress, as we shall see, failed expressly to provide one. See United States v. Correll, supra; 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).Section 547(a) of the Code requires that a taxpayer who like Pierce pays dividends after a determination of liability by the Commissioner "shall be allowed""a deduction . . . for the amount of deficiency dividends (as defined in subsection (d)) for the purpose of determining the personal holding company tax."Subsection 547(d) in turn provides that"the term 'deficiency dividends' means the amount of the dividends paid by the corporation . . . , which would have been includible in the computation of the deduction for dividends paid under section 561 for the taxable year with respect to which the liability for personal holding Page 434 U. S. 534 company tax exists, if distributed during such taxable year."Continuing this chain of definitions, § 561(a) provides that the deduction for dividends "shall be the sum of," inter alia, dividends paid during the taxable year; and § 561(b)(1) points to § 562 as the source of a rule for valuing such dividends. Section 562, however, provides only exceptions to a basic rule said to be provided by § 316 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 316. But when we turn to § 316, the trail of definitions finally turns cold, for that section states only that a dividend is a "distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders" out of current or accumulated earnings or, in the case of personal holding companies, out of its current personal holding company income. Inexplicably, moreover, the draftsmen refer us back to § 562 for "[r]ules applicable in determining dividends eligible for dividends paid credit deduction." See Cross References following § 316.Petitioners suggest that the way out of this circularity is to adopt the valuation rules for distributions of property found in § 301 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 301. We cannot agree, for § 301 deals not with the problem of valuing the distribution with respect to the distributing corporation, but establishes rules governing the valuation with respect to distributees. This is not to deny the logical force of petitioners' argument that, since the purpose of the personal holding company tax is to force individuals to include personal holding company income in their individual returns, the corporate distributor should get a deduction at the corporate level equal to the income generated by the distribution at the shareholder level as defined by § 301, that is, the fair market value of the appreciated property in this case. [Footnote 9] See 26 U.S.C. § 301(b) Page 434 U. S. 535 (1)(A). Indeed, H. Wetter Mfg Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1033 (1972), and Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 75-2 USTC � 9620 (WD La.), appeal docketed, No. 75-3767 Page 434 U. S. 536 (CA5 1975), have taken the view urged by petitioners, and but for the Regulation, the argument might well prevail. [Footnote 10] But, as we have indicated, the issue before us is not how we might resolve the statutory ambiguity in the first instance, but whether there is any reasonable basis for the resolution embodied in the Commissioner's Regulation. We conclude that there is.In the Revenue Act of 1936, Congress enacted a surtax on undistributed profits intended to supplement the 1934 enactment of the personal holding company tax. In § 27(c) of the 1936 Act, 49 Stat. 1665, later codified as § 27(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 20, Congress expressly provided the "adjusted basis" measure for valuation with respect to the distributing corporation of dividends paid in appreciated property, rather than money:"If a dividend is paid in property other than money . . . the dividends paid credit with respect thereto shall be the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the corporation at the time of the payment, or the fair market value of the property at the time of the payment, whichever is the lower."Although this section may not have been enacted with the personal holding company tax primarily in mind, [Footnote 11] § 351(b)(2)(C) of the 1936 Act [Footnote 12] nonetheless expressly provided that the dividends-paid credit for that tax would be governed by § 27(c). At the same time, in contrast, the 1936 Act provided that property distributed as a dividend would be valued with Page 434 U. S. 537 respect to distributees at its fair market value. See Revenue Act of 1936, § 115(j), 49 Stat. 1689.The relevant provisions of the 1936 Revenue Act were carried over without material change into the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. See §§ 27(d), 115(j), of that Code, 53 Stat. 20, 48. Thus, the logical symmetry between the gain recognized at the shareholder level and the dividend credit allowed at the corporate level, which petitioners argue should be the touchstone for our decision, was not part of the scheme of the Internal Revenue Code from 1936 to 1954.Nor can Congress' failure to reenact a counterpart to § 27(c) in the 1954 Code be read unambiguously to indicate that Congress had abandoned the "adjusted basis" measure in favor of the "fair market value" measure. In describing the purpose of § 562(a), which defines dividends eligible for deduction for personal holding company tax purposes, the Senate Finance Committee explained:"Subsection (a) provides that the term 'dividend' for purposes of this part shall include, except as otherwise provided in this section, only those dividends described in section 316. . . . The requirements of sections 27(d), (e), (f), and (i) of existing law [Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended] are contained in the definition of 'dividend' in section 312, and accordingly are not restated in section 562."S.Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 325 (1954). The Report of the House Ways and Means Committee is in haec verba, except that it says that the requirements of §§ 27(d), (e), (f), and (i) are contained in what is now § 316 of the 1954 Code. [Footnote 13] See H.R.Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Page 434 U. S. 538 A181 (1954). The discrepancy between the House and Senate Reports is not material, however, since, as we have explained, there is no way to reach the result of § 27(c) by following any path through the language of the 1954 Code. [Footnote 14] In light of the failure of the language of the Code to create the result of § 27(c), the statement in the House and Senate Reports could be read to indicate that Congress meant to incorporate only so much of § 27 as was actually enacted -- that is, none of it. But this meaning is not compelled, and we cannot say that the language of the Reports cannot be real to evince Congress' intention, albeit erroneously abandoned in execution, to retain the "adjusted basis" valuation rule of § 27(c).At the least, it is not unreasonable for the Commissioner to have assumed that Congress intended to carry forward the law existing prior to the 1954 Code with respect to the measure of valuation. As we said in United States v. Ryder, 110 U. S. 729, 110 U. S. 740 (1884):"It will not be inferred that the legislature, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their policy, unless such intention be clearly expressed."Accord, Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 422 U. S. 309 n. 12 (1975); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454, 422 U. S. 467-472 (1975); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U. S. 222, Page 434 U. S. 539 353 U. S. 227 (1957). If we will not read legislation to abandon previously prevailing law when, as here, a recodification of law is incomplete or departs substantially and without explanation from prior law, we cannot conclude that the Commissioner may not adopt a similar rationale in drafting his rule. [Footnote 15] In any case, given the law under the 1939 Code and the ambiguity surrounding the House and Senate Reports on § 662, it is impossible to identify in this case any "weighty reasons" that would justify setting aside the Treasury Regulation.Affirmed | U.S. Supreme CourtFulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978)Fulman v. United StatesNo. 76-1137Argued November 29, 1977Decided February 22, 1978434 U.S. 528SyllabusThe provision of Treas.Reg. § 1.562-1(a) that a personal holding company's distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders results, under §§ 561 and 562 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in a dividends-paid deduction limited to an amount that is the adjusted tax basis of the property in the hands of the company at the time of the distribution held valid as having a reasonable basis, as against the contention that such deduction should be equal in amount to the fair market value of the property distributed. Given the fact that § 27(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 expressly provided the "adjusted basis" measure for valuation of dividends paid in appreciated property, rather than money, and the ambiguity surrounding the legislative history of § 562 of the 1954 Code, which sets forth the rules applicable in determining dividends eligible for the dividends-paid deduction but contains no counterpart to § 27(d) of the 1939 Code, no "weighty reason" justifying setting aside the regulation in question can be identified. Pp. 434 U. S. 530-539.545 F.2d 268, affirmed.BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and concurring in part, post, p. 434 U. S. 539. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 434 U. S. 539. BLACKMUN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Page 434 U. S. 529 |
3,242 | 1994_94-3 | Ohio held that, despite Bendix, Ohio's tolling law continues to apply to tort claims that accrued before that decision. This holding, in our view, violates the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. We therefore reverse the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment.The accident that led to this case, a collision between a car and a truck, occurred in Ashtabula County, Ohio, on March 5, 1984. More than three years later, on August 11, 1987, Carol Hyde (respondent here) sued the truck's driver, John Blosh, and its owner, Reynoldsville Casket Company (petitioners). All parties concede that, had Blosh and Reynoldsville made their home in Ohio, Ohio law would have given Hyde only two years to bring her lawsuit. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10 (1991). But, because petitioners were from Pennsylvania, a special provision of Ohio law tolled the running of the statute of limitations, making the lawsuit timely. See § 2305.15(A) (tolling the statute of limitations while a person against whom "a cause of action accrues" is "out of" or "departs from" the State).Ten months after Hyde brought her suit, this Court, in Bendix, supra, held that the tolling provision on which she relied, § 2305.15(A), places an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. Soon thereafter, the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, finding this case indistinguishable from Bendix, held that the tolling provision could not constitutionally be applied to the case, and dismissed the lawsuit as untimely. The intermediate appellate state court affirmed the dismissal. However, the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the suit. Its syllabus, which under Ohio law sets forth the authoritative basis for its decision, see Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions Rule l(B) (1994-1995); Akers v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 31 Ohio St. 3d 78, 79, n. 1, 508 N. E. 2d 964, 965, n. 1 (1987), simply says, "Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc .... may not be retroactively applied to bar claims in state courts which had accrued prior to the announcement of that deci-752sion. (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution, applied.)" 68 Ohio St. 3d 240, 240-241, 626 N. E. 2d 75 (1994). We granted certiorari to decide whether the Federal Constitution permits Ohio to continue to apply its tolling statute to pre-Bendix torts. And, as we have said, we conclude that it does not.Hyde acknowledges that this Court, in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993), held that, when (1) the Court decides a case and applies the (new) legal rule of that case to the parties before it, then (2) it and other courts must treat that same (new) legal rule as "retroactive," applying it, for example, to all pending cases, whether or not those cases involve predecision events. She thereby concedes that, the Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus to the contrary notwithstanding, Bendix applies to her case. And, she says, as "a result of Harper, there is no question that Bendix retroactively invalidated" the tolling provision that makes her suit timely. Brief for Respondent 8.Although one might think that is the end of the matter, Hyde ingeniously argues that it is not. She asks us to look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done, not through the lens of "retroactivity," but through that of "remedy." States, she says, have a degree of legal leeway in fashioning remedies for constitutional ills. She points to Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971), in which this Court applied prospectively only its ruling that a i-year statute of limitations governed certain tort cases-primarily because that ruling had "effectively overruled a long line of decisions" applying a more generous limitations principle (that of laches), upon which plaintiffs had reasonably relied. Id., at 107. She concedes that Harper overruled Chevron Oil insofar as the case (selectively) permitted the prospective-only application of a new rule of law. But, she notes the possibility of recharacterizing Chevron Oil as a case in which the Court simply took reliance interests into account in tailoring an appropriate remedy for a violation of federal law. See753Harper, supra, at 133-134 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 218-225 (1990) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). And she quotes Justice Harlan, who, before Chevron Oil, pointed out that "equitable considerations" such as "'reliance'" might prove relevant to "relief." United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1970) (concurring opinion).Thus, Hyde asks, why not look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done in this case as if it were simply an effort to fashion a remedy that takes into consideration her reliance on pre-Bendix law? Here, the remedy would actually consist of providing no remedy for the constitutional violation or, to put the matter more precisely, of continuing to toll the 2-year statute of limitations in pre-Bendix cases, such as hers, as a state law "equitable" device for reasons of reliance and fairness. She claims that use of this device violates no federal constitutional provision (such as the Due Process Clause) and is therefore permissible.One serious problem with Hyde's argument lies in the Ohio Supreme Court's legal description of why, in fact, it refused to dismiss Hyde's case. As we have pointed out, the Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus (the legally authoritative statement of its holding) speaks, not about remedy, but about retroactivity. Regardless, we do not see how, in the circumstances before us, the Ohio Supreme Court could change a legal outcome that federal law, applicable under the Supremacy Clause, would otherwise dictate simply by calling its refusal to apply that federal law an effort to create a remedy. The Ohio Supreme Court's justification for refusing to dismiss Hyde's suit is that she, and others like her, may have reasonably relied upon pre-Bendix law-a reliance of the same kind and degree as that involved in Chevron Oil. But, this type of justification-often present when prior law is overruled-is the very sort that this Court, in Harper, found insufficient to deny retroactive application of a new legal rule (that had been applied in the case that first an-754nounced it). If Harper has anything more than symbolic significance, how could virtually identical reliance, without more, prove sufficient to permit a virtually identical denial simply because it is characterized as a denial based on "remedy" rather than "nonretroactivity"?Hyde tries to answer this question by pointing to other cases in which, she claims, this Court has allowed state courts effectively to avoid retroactive application of federal law by denying a particular remedy for violation of that law or by refusing to provide any remedy at all. She argues that these cases are similar enough to her own to permit a "remedial" exception to the retroactive application of Bendix. We have examined the cases to which Hyde looks for support, and conclude that they all involve very different circumstances.First, Hyde points to a statement in the opinion announcing the Court's judgment in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U. S. 529 (1991), that once "a rule is found to apply 'backward,' there may then be a further issue of remedies, i. e., whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one." Id., at 535 (opinion of SouTER, J.); ibid. ("Subject to possible constitutional thresholds, ... the remedial inquiry is one governed by state law, at least where the case originates in state court"); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S., at 178 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) (speaking of the need to "distinguish the question of retroactivity ... from the distinct remedial question"); id., at 210 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (distinguishing "between retroactivity as a choice-of-Iaw rule and retroactivity as a remedial principle"). This language, however, read both literally and in context, makes clear that the ordinary application of a new rule of law "backwards," say, to pending cases, mayor may not, involve a further matter of remedies. Whether it does so, and, if so, what kind of remedy the state court may fashion, depend-like almost all legal issues-755upon the kind of case, matter, and circumstances involved. Not all cases concerning retroactivity and remedies are of the same sort.Second, Hyde points to tax cases in which the Court applied retroactively new rules holding certain state tax laws unconstitutional, but nonetheless permitted the state courts a degree of leeway in designing a remedy, including a remedy that would deny state taxpayers, with pending refund cases, the refund that they sought. See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86 (1993); Beam, supra. If state courts may at the same time apply new law (invalidating tax statutes) and withhold relief (tax refunds) from tax plaintiffs, asks Hyde, why can they not at the same time apply new law (invalidating tolling statutes) and withhold relief (dismissal) from tort defendants?The answer to this question lies in the special circumstances of the tax cases. The Court has suggested that some of them involve a particular kind of constitutional violation-a kind that the State could cure without repaying back taxes. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 40-41 (1990). Where the violation depends, in critical part, upon differential treatment of two similar classes of individuals, then one might cure the problem either by similarly burdening, or by similarly unburdening, both groups. Where the violation stemmed from, say, taxing the retirement funds of one group (retired Federal Government employees) but not those of another (retired state government employees), see Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989), then the State might cure the problem either (1) by taxing both (imposing, say, back taxes on the previously advantaged group, to the extent constitutionally permissible), or (2) by taxing neither (and refunding back taxes). Cf. McKesson Corp., supra, at 40-41, and n. 23. And, if the State chooses the first, then the taxpayers need receive no refund. But, that result flows not from some general "reme-756dial" exception to "retroactivity" law, but simply from the fact that the state law that the taxpayer had attacked now satisfies the Constitution.One can imagine a roughly comparable situation in the statute of limitations context. Suppose that Ohio violated the Constitution by treating two similar classes of tort defendants differently, say, by applying a 2-year statute of limitations to the first (in-state defendants) but a 4-year statute to the second (out-of-state defendants). Ohio might have cured this (imaginary) constitutional problem either (1) by applying a 4-year statute to both groups, or (2) by applying a 2-year statute to both groups. Had it chosen the first of these remedies, then Hyde's case could continue because the 4-year statute would no longer violate the Federal Constitution. This imaginary case, however, is not the case at hand, for the Ohio Supreme Court's "remedy" here (allowing Hyde to proceed) does not cure the tolling statute's problem of unconstitutionality. And, her tort claim critically depends upon Ohio tolling law that continues to violate the Commerce Clause.Other tax examples present different, remedial problems.Suppose a State collects taxes under a taxing statute that this Court later holds unconstitutional. Taxpayers then sue for a refund of the unconstitutionally collected taxes. Retroactive application of the Court's holding would seem to entitle the taxpayers to a refund of taxes. But what if a preexisting, separate, independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with retroactivity-a rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund suit-nonetheless barred the taxpayers' refund suit? See McKesson Corp., supra, at 45; Reich v. Collins, 513 U. S. 106, 111 (1994). Depending upon whether or not this independent rule satisfied other provisions of the Constitution, it could independently bar the taxpayers' refund claim. See McKesson Corp., supra, at 45.757This tax scenario simply reflects the legal commonplace that, when two different rules of law each independently bar recovery, then a decision, the retroactive application of which invalidates one rule, will make no difference to the result. The other, constitutionally adequate rule remains in place. Hyde cannot bring her case within the protection of this principle, for the Ohio Supreme Court did not rest its holding upon a pre-existing, separate rule of state law (having nothing to do with retroactivity) that independently permitted her to proceed. Rather, the maintenance of her action critically depends upon the continued application of the Ohio statute's "tolling" principle-a principle that this Court has held unconstitutional.Third, Hyde points to the law of qualified immunity, which, she says, imposes a "remedial" limitation upon the "retroactive" application of a new rule to pending cases. To understand her argument, consider the following scenario: (1) Smith sues a police officer claiming injury because of an unconstitutional arrest; (2) the police officer asserts that the arrest was constitutional; (3) this Court then holds, in a different case, that an identical arrest is not constitutional; (4) the holding of this different case applies retroactively to Smith's case; but (5) the police officer still wins on grounds of qualified immunity because the new rule of law was not "clearly established" at the time of the arrest. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). In one sense, Smith lost for a reason similar to the tax plaintiffs mentioned above, namely, that a previously existing, separate, constitutional legal ground (that of the law not being "clearly established") bars her claim. We acknowledge, however, that this separate legal ground does reflect certain remedial considerations. In particular, it permits government officials to rely upon old law. But, it does so lest threat of liability "'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching758discharge of their duties.'" Id., at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949)). And, it reflects the concern that "society as a whole," without that immunity, would have to bear "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office." 457 U. S., at 814. These very facts-that a set of special federal policy considerations have led to the creation of a well-established, independent rule of law-distinguish the qualified immunity cases from the case before us, where a concern about reliance alone has led the Ohio court to create what amounts to an ad hoc exemption from retroactivity.Finally, Hyde points to the line of cases starting with Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), in which, she says, this Court has held that a habeas corpus petitioner cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy where doing so would require the habeas court to apply retroactively a new rule of criminal law. The Teague doctrine, however, does not involve a special "remedial" limitation on the principle of "retroactivity" as much as it reflects a limitation inherent in the principle itself. New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed. Cf. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S., at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring) (at some point, "the rights of the parties should be considered frozen" and a "conviction ... final"). And, much as the qualified immunity doctrine embodies special federal policy concerns related to the imposition of damages liability upon persons holding public office, the Teague doctrine embodies certain special concerns-related to collateral review of state criminal convictions-that affect which cases are closed, for which retroactivity-related purposes, and under what circumstances. No such special finality-related concerns are present here.The upshot is that Hyde shows, through her examples, the unsurprising fact that, as courts apply "retroactively" a new rule of law to pending cases, they will find instances where759that new rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case. Thus, a court may find (1) an alternative way of curing the constitutional violation, or (2) a previously existing, independent legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief, or (3) as in the law of qualified immunity, a well-established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy justifications, or (4) a principle of law, such as that of "finality" present in the Teague context, that limits the principle of retroactivity itself. But, this case involves no such instance; nor does it involve any other special circumstance that might somehow justify the result Hyde seeks. Rather, Hyde offers no more than simple reliance (of the sort at issue in Chevron Oil) as a basis for creating an exception to Harper's rule of retroactivity-in other words, she claims that, for no special reason, Harper does not apply. We are back where we started. Hyde's necessary concession, that Harper governs this case, means that she cannot prevail.The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio isReversed | OCTOBER TERM, 1994SyllabusREYNOLDSVILLE CASKET CO. ET AL. v. HYDECERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO No. 94-3. Argued February 27, 1995-Decided May 15, 1995More than three years after respondent Hyde was in an accident in Ohio with a truck owned by a Pennsylvania company, she filed suit in an Ohio county court against the company and the truck's driver, petitioners herein. The suit was timely under an Ohio provision that tolls the running of the State's 2-year statute of limitations in lawsuits against outof-state defendants. However, while her case was pending, this Court, in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S. 888, held that the tolling provision places an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. The county court dismissed her suit as untimely, but it was ultimately reinstated by the State Supreme Court, which held that Bendix could not be applied retroactively to bar claims that had accrued prior to the announcement of that decision.Held: The Supremacy Clause bars Ohio from applying its tolling statute to pre-Bendix torts. Pp. 752-759.(a) Hyde acknowledges that this Court, in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 97, held that, when it decides a case and applies the new legal rule of that case to the parties before it, then it and other courts must treat the same rule as "retroactive," applying it, for example, to pending cases, whether or not they involve predecision events. She thereby concedes that Bendix applies to her case and retroactively invalidated the tolling provision that makes her suit timely. She argues instead that the issue here is not one of retroactivity, and that the Ohio Supreme Court's action is permissible because all that court has done is to fashion a remedy that takes into consideration her reliance on pre-Bendix law. Pp. 752-753.(b) There are serious problems with Hyde's argument. The Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus (the legally authoritative statement of its holding) speaks, not about remedy, but about retroactivity. That court's refusal to dismiss her suit on the ground that she may have reasonably relied upon pre-Bendix law is the very sort of justification that this Court, in Harper, found insufficient to deny retroactive application of a new legal rule. She correctly notes that, as courts apply "retroactively" a new rule of law to pending cases, they may find instances where the new rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case. However, this case involves no instance or special circumstance that might somehow justify the result she seeks.750It does not concern (1) an alternative way of curing the constitutional violation; or (2) a previously existing, independent legal basis for denying relief, see, e. g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 40-41; or (3) a well-established general legal rule, such as qualified immunity, that trumps the new rule of law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy justifications, see, e. g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818; or (4) a principle of law that limits the principle of retroactivity itself, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288. Hyde has offered no more than simple reliance as a basis for creating an exception to Harper's retroactivity rule and has conceded that Harper governs this case. Her concession means that she cannot prevail. pp.753-759.68 Ohio St. 3d 240, 626 N. E. 2d 75, reversed.BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 759. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 761.William E. Riedel argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.Timothy B. Dyk argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was David J. Eardley. *JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S. 888 (1988), this Court held unconstitutional (as impermissibly burdening interstate commerce) an Ohio "tolling" provision that, in effect, gave Ohio tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state) defendants. Subsequently, in the case before us, the Supreme Court of* Irene C. Keyse- Walker filed a brief for the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust as amicus curiae urging reversal.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Ohio by Lee Fisher, Attorney General, Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas; and for Brown & Szaller Co., L. P. A., et al. by James F. Szaller, Robert A. Marcis, Larry S. Stewart, and Jeffrey R. White.751Full Text of Opinion |
3,243 | 1996_96-110 | Syllabusthe medical profession's integrity and ethics and maintaining physicians' role as their patients' healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons, the terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide toward voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia. The relative strengths of these various interests need not be weighed exactingly, since they are unquestionably important and legitimate, and the law at issue is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection. Pp. 728-735.79 F.3d 790, reversed and remanded.REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined in part, post, p. 736. STEVENS, J., post, p. 738, SOUTER, J., post, p. 752, GINSBURG, J., post, p. 789, and BREYER, J., post, p. 789, filed opinions concurring in the judgment.William L. Williams, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and William Berggren Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney General.Acting Solicitor General Dellinger argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Preston, Irving L. Gornstein, and BarbaraKathryn L. Tucker argued the cause for respondents.With her on the brief were David J. Burman, Kari Anne Smith, and Laurence H. Tribe. **Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Robert L. Mukai, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Alvin J. Korobkin, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Lazar, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows:Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Cur-705CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented in this case is whether Washington's prohibition against "caus[ing]" or "aid[ing]" a suicideran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Pedro R. Pierluisi of Puerto Rico, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, Mark W Barnett of South Dakota, Charles W Burson of Tennessee, and James S. Gilmore III of Virginia; for the State of Oregon by Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Thomas A. Balmer, Deputy Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Stephen K. Bushong, Assistant Attorney General; for Wayne County, Michigan, by John D. O'Hair and Timothy A. Baughman; for the District Attorney of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, by E. Michael McCann, pro se, and John M. Stoiber; for Agudath Israel of America by David Zwiebel and Morton M. Avigdor; for the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging et al. by Joel G. Chefitz and Robert K. Niewijk; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, James M. Henderson, Sr., Walter M. Weber, Keith A. Fournier, John G. Stepanovich, and Thomas P. Monaghan; for the American Geriatrics Society by John H. Pickering and Joseph E. Schmitz; for the American Hospital Association by Michael K. Kellogg and Margaret J. Hardy; for the American Medical Association et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Mark E. Haddad, Paul E. Kalb, Katherine L. Adams, Kirk B. Johnson, and Michael L. Ile; for the American Suicide Foundation by Ellen H. Moskowitz, Edward R. Grant, and John F. Cannon; for the Catholic Health Association of the United States by James A. Serritella, James C. Geoly, Kevin R. Gustafson, Thomas C. Shields, Peter M. Leibold, and Charles S. Gilham; for the Catholic Medical Association by Joseph J. Frank, Sergio Alvarez-Mena III, and Peter Buscemi; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Edward J. Larson, Kimberlee Wood Colby, and Steven T. McFarland; for the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Susan D. Reece Martyn, Henry J. Bourguignon, and Phillip H. Harris; for the Family Research Council by Cathleen A. Cleaver, Mark A. Rothe, and Edward R. Grant; for the Institute for Public Affairs of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America et al. by Richard B. Stone; for the Legal Center for Defense of Life, Inc., et al. by Dwight G. Duncan and Michael P. Tierney; for the National Association of Prolife Nurses et al. by Jacqulyn Kay Hall; for the National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities et al. by James Bopp, Jr., Thomas J. Marzen, Daniel Avila, and Jane E. T. Brockmann; for the National Hospice Organization by E. Barrett Pretty-706offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not.It has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington. In 1854, Washington's first Territorial Leg-man, Jr.; for the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., et al. by James Bopp, Jr., Thomas J. Marzen, Daniel Avila, and Jane E. T. Brockmann; for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson; for the National Spinal Cord Injury Association, Inc., by Leonard F. Zandrow, Jr., and Calum B. Anderson; for the Project on Death in America et al. by Robert A. Burt; for the Rutherford Institute by Gregory D. Smith and John W Whitehead; for the Schiller Institute by Max Dean; for the United States Catholic Conference et al. by Mark E. Chopko; for Senator Orrin Hatch et al. by Michael W McConnell; for Members of the New York and Washington State Legislatures by Paul Benjamin Linton and Clarke D. Forsythe; for Bioethics Professors by George J. Annas; for Gary Lee, M. D., et al. by James Bopp, Jr., Bary A. Bostrom, and Richard E. Coleson; and for Richard Thompson by Mr. Thompson, pro se, and Richard H. Browne.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Cameron Clark, Karen E. Boxx, and Steven R. Shapiro; for Americans for Death with Dignity et al. by John R. Reese and Page R. Barnes; for the American Medical Student Association et al. by John H. Hall; for the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy by Janet Benshoof and Kathryn Kolbert; for the Coalition of Hospice Professionals by Gerald A. Rosenberg and Frances Kulka Browne; for the Council for Secular Humanism et al. by Ronald A. Lindsay; for Gay Men's Health Crisis et al. by Andrew I. Batavia; for the National Women's Health Network et al. by Sylvia A. Law; for 36 Religious Organizations, Leaders, and Scholars by Barbara McDowell and Gregory A. Castanias; for the Washington State Psychological Association et al. by Edward C. DuMont; for Bioethicists by Martin R. Gold and Robert P. Mulvey; for Law Professors by Charles H. Baron, David A. Hoffman, and Joshua M. Davis; for State Legislators by Sherry F. Colb; and for Julian M. Whitaker, M. D., by Jonathan W Emord.Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American College of Legal Medicine by Miles J. Zaremski, Bruce C. Nelson, and Ila S. Rothschild; for the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force by Wesley J. Smith; for the Southern Center for Law and Ethics by Tony G. Miller; for Surviving Family Members in Support of Physician-Assisted Dying by Katrin E. Frank, Robert A. Free, and Kathleen Wareham; and for Ronald Dworkin et al. by Mr. Dworkin, pro se, Peter L. Zimroth, Philip H. Curtis, Kent A. Yalowitz, Anand Agneshwar, and Abe Krash.707islature outlawed "assisting another in the commISSIOn of self-murder." 1 Today, Washington law provides: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994). "Promoting a suicide attempt" is a felony, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment and up to a $10,000 fine. §§ 9A.36.060(2) and 9A.20.021(1)(c). At the same time, Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the "withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment" at a patient's direction "shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide." Wash. Rev. Code § 70.122.070(1).2Petitioners in this case are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. Respondents Harold Glucksberg, M. D., Abigail Halperin, M. D., Thomas A. Preston, M. D., and Peter Shalit, M. D., are physicians who practice in Washington. These doctors occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, and declare that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for Washington's assisted-suicide ban.3 In January 1994, respondents, along with three gravely ill, pseudonymous plaintiffs who have since died and1 Act of Apr. 28, 1854, § 17, 1854 Wash. Laws 78 ("Every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter"); see also Act of Dec. 2, 1869, § 17, 1869 Wash. Laws 201; Act of Nov. 10, 1873, § 19, 1873 Wash. Laws 184; Criminal Code, ch. 249, §§ 135-136, 1909 Wash. Laws, 11th Sess., 929.2 Under Washington's Natural Death Act, "adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own health care, including the decision to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition." Wash. Rev. Code § 70.122.010 (1994). In Washington, "[a]ny adult person may execute a directive directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition," § 70.122.030, and a physician who, in accordance with such a directive, participates in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is immune from civil, criminal, or professionalliability, § 70.122.051.3 Glucksberg Declaration, App. 35; Halperin Declaration, id., at 49-50; Preston Declaration, id., at 55-56; Shalit Declaration, id., at 73-74.708Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide, sued in the United States District Court, seeking a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994) is, on its face, unconstitutional. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (WD Wash. 1994).4The plaintiffs asserted "the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide." Ibid. Relying primarily on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), and Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261 (1990), the District Court agreed, 850 F. Supp., at 1459-1462, and concluded that Washington's assisted-suicide ban is unconstitutional because it "places an undue burden on the exercise of [that] constitutionally protected liberty interest." Id., at 1465.5 The District Court also decided that the Washington statute violated the Equal Protection Clause's requirement that" 'all persons similarly situated ... be treated alike.'" Id., at 1466 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 439 (1985)).A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that "[i]n the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional right to aid in killing4John Doe, Jane Roe, and James Poe, plaintiffs in the District Court, were then in the terminal phases of serious and painful illnesses. They declared that they were mentally competent and desired assistance in ending their lives. Declaration of Jane Roe, id., at 23-25; Declaration of John Doe, id., at 27-28; Declaration of James Poe, id., at 30-31; Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp., at 1456-1457.5 The District Court determined that Casey's "undue burden" standard, 505 U. S., at 874 (joint opinion), not the standard from United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (requiring a showing that "no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid"), governed the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the assisted-suicide ban. 850 F. Supp., at 1462-1464.709oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final jurisdiction." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (1995). The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en bane, reversed the panel's decision, and affirmed the District Court. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (1996). Like the District Court, the en bane Court of Appeals emphasized our Casey and Cruzan decisions. 79 F. 3d, at 813-816. The court also discussed what it described as "historical" and "current societal attitudes" toward suicide and assisted suicide, id., at 806-812, and concluded that "the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death-that there is, in short, a constitutionally-recognized 'right to die.''' Id., at 816. After "[w]eighing and then balancing" this interest against Washington's various interests, the court held that the State's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional "as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians." Id., at 836, 837.6 The court did not reach the District Court's equal protection holding. Id., at 838.7 We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1057 (1996), and now reverse.6 Although, as JUSTICE STEVENS observes, post, at 739 (opinion concurring in judgments), "[the court's] analysis and eventual holding that the statute was unconstitutional was not limited to a particular set of plaintiffs before it," the court did note that "[d]eclaring a statute unconstitutional as applied to members of a group is atypical but not uncommon." 79 F. 3d, at 798, n. 9, and emphasized that it was "not deciding the facial validity of [the Washington statute]," id., at 797-798, and nn. 8-9. It is therefore the court's holding that Washington's physician-assisted suicide statute is unconstitutional as applied to the "class of terminally ill, mentally competent patients," post, at 750 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments), that is before us today.7 The Court of Appeals did note, however, that "the equal protection argument relied on by [the District Court] is not insubstantial," 79 F. 3d, at 838, n. 139, and sharply criticized the opinion in a separate case then pending before the Ninth Circuit, Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (Ore. 1995) (Oregon's Death With Dignity Act, which permits physician-assisted710IWe begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. See, e. g., Casey, supra, at 849-850; Cruzan, supra, at 269-279; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting importance of "careful 'respect for the teachings of history' "). In almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide.8 The States' assisted-suicide bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life. Cruzan, supra, at 280 ("[T]he States-indeed, all civilized nations-demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the major-suicide, violates the Equal Protection Clause because it does not provide adequate safeguards against abuse), vacated, Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (CA9 1997) (concluding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing). Lee, of course, is not before us, any more than it was before the Court of Appeals below, and we offer no opinion as to the validity of the Lee courts' reasoning. In Vacco v. Quill, post, p. 793, however, decided today, we hold that New York's assisted-suicide ban does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.8See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 847, and nn. 10-13 (CA9 1996) (Beezer, J., dissenting) ("In total, forty-four states, the District of Columbia and two territories prohibit or condemn assisted suicide") (citing statutes and cases); Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D. L. R. (4th) 342, 404 (Can. 1993) ("[A] blanket prohibition on assisted suicide ... is the norm among western democracies") (discussing assisted-suicide provisions in Austria, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and France). Since the Ninth Circuit's decision, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Iowa have enacted statutory assisted-suicide bans. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.12 (West Supp. 1997); R. 1. Gen. Laws §§ 11-60-1,11-60-3 (Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 707 A.2, 707 A.3 (Supp. 1997). For a detailed history of the States' statutes, see Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone, & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. 1, 148-242 (1985) (App.) (hereinafter Marzen).711ity of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide"); see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 373 (1989) ("[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is ... the pattern of enacted laws"). Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide-and, therefore, of assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages. See generally Marzen 17-56; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context 77-82 (May 1994) (hereinafter New York Task Force).More specifically, for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.9 Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 294-295 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In the 13th century, Henry de Bracton, one of the first legal-treatise writers, observed that "[j]ust as a man may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by slaying himself." 2 Bracton on Laws and Customs of England 423 (f. 150) (G. Woodbine ed., S. Thorne transl., 1968). The real and personal property of one who killed himself to avoid conviction and punishment for a crime were forfeit to the King; however, thought Bracton, "if a man slays himself in weariness of life or because he is unwilling to endure further bodily pain ... [only] his movable goods [were] confiscated." Id., at 423-424 (f. 150). Thus, "[t]he principle that suicide of a sane person, for whatever reason, was a punishable felony was ... introduced into9The common law is thought to have emerged through the expansion of pre-Norman institutions sometime in the 12th century. J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 11 (2d ed. 1979). England adopted the ecclesiastical prohibition on suicide five centuries earlier, in the year 673 at the Council of Hereford, and this prohibition was reaffirmed by King Edgar in 967. See G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 257 (1957).712English common law." 10 Centuries later, Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England not only provided a definitive summary of the common law but was also a primary legal authority for 18th- and 19th-century American lawyers, referred to suicide as "self-murder" and "the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *189. Blackstone emphasized that "the law has ... ranked [suicide] among the highest crimes," ibid., although, anticipating later developments, he conceded that the harsh and shameful punishments imposed for suicide "borde[r] a little upon severity." Id., at *190.For the most part, the early American Colonies adopted the common-law approach. For example, the legislators of the Providence Plantations, which would later become Rhode Island, declared, in 1647, that "[s]elf-murder is by all agreed to be the most unnatural, and it is by this present Assembly declared, to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself out10 Marzen 59. Other late-medieval treatise writers followed and restated Bracton; one observed that "man-slaughter" may be "[o]f [one]self; as in case, when people hang themselves or hurt themselves, or otherwise kill themselves of their own felony" or "[o]f others; as by beating, famine, or other punishment; in like cases, all are man-slayers." A. Horne, The Mirrour of Justices, ch. 1, § 9, pp. 41-42 (w. Robinson ed. 1903). By the mid-16th century, the Court at Common Bench could observe that "[suicide] is an Offence against Nature, against God, and against the King .... [T]o destroy one's self is contrary to Nature, and a Thing most horrible." Hales v. Petit, 1 Plowd. Com. 253,261,75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (1561-1562).In 1644, Sir Edward Coke published his Third Institute, a lodestar for later common lawyers. See T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 281-284 (5th ed. 1956). Coke regarded suicide as a category of murder, and agreed with Bracton that the goods and chattels-but not, for Coke, the lands-of a sane suicide were forfeit. 3 E. Coke, Institutes *54. William Hawkins, in his 1716 Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, followed Coke, observing that "our laws have always had ... an abhorrence of this crime." 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 27, §4, p. 164 (T. Leach ed. 1795).713of a premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor: ... his goods and chattels are the king's custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be an infant, a lunatic, mad or distracted man, he forfeits nothing." The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1647-1719, p. 19 (J. Cushing ed. 1977). Virginia also required ignominious burial for suicides, and their estates were forfeit to the Crown. A. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 108, and n. 93, 198, and n. 15 (1930).Over time, however, the American Colonies abolished these harsh common-law penalties. William Penn abandoned the criminal-forfeiture sanction in Pennsylvania in 1701, and the other Colonies (and later, the other States) eventually followed this example. Cruzan, supra, at 294 (SCALIA, J., concurring). Zephaniah Swift, who would later become Chief Justice of Connecticut, wrote in 1796:"There can be no act more contemptible, than to attempt to punish an offender for a crime, by exercising a mean act of revenge upon lifeless clay, that is insensible of the punishment. There can be no greater cruelty, than the inflicting [of] a punishment, as the forfeiture of goods, which must fall solely on the innocent offspring of the offender .... [Suicide] is so abhorrent to the feelings of mankind, and that strong love of life which is implanted in the human heart, that it cannot be so frequently committed, as to become dangerous to society. There can of course be no necessity of any punishment." 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 304 (1796).This statement makes it clear, however, that the movement away from the common law's harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance of suicide; rather, as Chief Justice Swift observed, this change reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish the suicide's family for his wrongdoing. Cruzan, supra, at 294 (SCALIA, J., concurring). Nonethe-714less, although States moved away from Blackstone's treatment of suicide, courts continued to condemn it as a grave public wrong. See, e. g., Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284, 286 (1876) (suicide is "an act of criminal selfdestruction"); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 App. Div. 2d 66, 70-71, 450 N. Y. S. 2d 623, 626-627 (1982); Blackwood v. Jones, 111 Fla. 528, 532, 149 So. 600, 601 (1933) ("No sophistry is tolerated ... which seek[s] to justify self-destruction as commendable or even a matter of personal right").That suicide remained a grievous, though nonfelonious, wrong is confirmed by the fact that colonial and early state legislatures and courts did not retreat from prohibiting assisting suicide. Swift, in his early 19th-century treatise on the laws of Connecticut, stated that "[i]f one counsels another to commit suicide, and the other by reason of the advice kills himself, the advisor is guilty of murder as principal." 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 270 (1823). This was the well-established common-law view, see In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 434-435, 667 P. 2d 1176, 1179 (1983); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 428 (1877) (" 'Now if the murder of one's self is felony, the accessory is equally guilty as if he had aided and abetted in the murder' ") (quoting Chief Justice Parker's charge to the jury in Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816)), as was the similar principle that the consent of a homicide victim is "wholly immaterial to the guilt of the person who cause[d] [his death]," 3 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 16 (1883); see 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law §§ 451-452 (9th ed. 1885); Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 10181019, 37 S. E. 2d 43, 47 (1946) ('''The right to life and to personal security is not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is inalienable' "). And the prohibitions against assisting suicide never contained exceptions for those who were near death. Rather, "[t]he life of those to whom life ha[d] become a burden-of those who [were] hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded-nay, even the lives of criminals715condemned to death, [were] under the protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who [were] in the full tide oflife's enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live." Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872); see Bowen, supra, at 360 (prisoner who persuaded another to commit suicide could be tried for murder, even though victim was scheduled shortly to be executed).The earliest American statute explicitly to outlaw assisting suicide was enacted in New York in 1828, Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 20, § 4, 1828 N. Y. Laws 19 (codified at 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, Tit. 2, Art. 1, § 7, p. 661 (1829)), and many of the new States and Territories followed New York's example. Marzen 73-74. Between 1857 and 1865, a New York commission led by Dudley Field drafted a criminal code that prohibited "aiding" a suicide and, specifically, "furnish[ing] another person with any deadly weapon or poisonous drug, knowing that such person intends to use such weapon or drug in taking his own life." Id., at 76-77. By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was a crime in most States to assist a suicide. See Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 294-295 (SCALIA, J., concurring). The Field Penal Code was adopted in the Dakota Territory in 1877 and in New York in 1881, and its language served as a model for several other western States' statutes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Marzen 76-77, 205-206, 212-213. California, for example, codified its assisted-suicide prohibition in 1874, using language similar to the Field Code's.l1 In this century, the Model Penal Code also prohibited "aiding" suicide, prompting many States to enact or revise their assisted-suicide11 In 1850, the California Legislature adopted the English common law, under which assisting suicide was, of course, a crime. Act of Apr. 13, 1850, ch. 95, 1850 Cal. Stats. 219. The provision adopted in 1874 provided that "[e]very person who deliberately aids or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony." Act of Mar. 30, 1874, ch. 614, § 13,400 (codified at Cal. Penal Code § 400 (T. Hittel ed. 1876)).716bans.12 The code's drafters observed that "the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim." American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.5, Comment 5, p. 100 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).Though deeply rooted, the States' assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed. Because of advances in medicine and technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to die in institutions, from chronic illnesses. President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 16-18 (1983). Public concern and democratic action are therefore sharply focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at the end of life, with the result that there have been many significant changes in state laws and in the attitudes these laws reflect. Many States, for example, now permit "living wills," surrogate health-care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. See Vacco v. Quill, post, at 804-806; 79 F. 3d, at 818-820; People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 478-480, and nn. 53-56, 527 N. W. 2d 714, 731-732, and nn. 53-56 (1994). At the same time, however, voters and legislators continue for the most part to reaffirm their States' prohibitions on assisting suicide.The Washington statute at issue in this case, Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.36.060 (1994), was enacted in 1975 as part of a revision of that State's criminal code. Four years later,12 "A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony in the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor." American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.5(2) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).717Washington passed its Natural Death Act, which specifically stated that the "withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment ... shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide" and that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing .... " Natural Death Act, 1979 Wash. Laws, ch. 112, § 8(1), p. 11 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.122.070(1), 70.122.100 (1994)). In 1991, Washington voters rejected a ballot initiative which, had it passed, would have permitted a form of physicianassisted suicide.13 Washington then added a provision to the Natural Death Act expressly excluding physician-assisted suicide. 1992 Wash. Laws, ch. 98, § 10; Wash. Rev. Code § 70.122.100 (1994).California voters rejected an assisted-suicide initiative similar to Washington's in 1993. On the other hand, in 1994, voters in Oregon enacted, also through ballot initiative, that State's "Death With Dignity Act," which legalized physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill adults.14 Since the Oregon vote, many proposals to legalize assisted-suicide have been and continue to be introduced in the States' legislatures, but none has been enacted.15 And13 Initiative 119 would have amended Washington's Natural Death Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 70.122.010 et seq. (1994), to permit "aid-in-dying," defined as "aid in the form of a medical service provided in person by a physician that will end the life of a conscious and mentally competent qualified patient in a dignified, painless and humane manner, when requested voluntarily by the patient through a written directive in accordance with this chapter at the time the medical service is to be provided." App. H to Pet. for Cert. 3-4.14 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 et seq. (1996); Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (Ore. 1995) (Oregon Act does not provide sufficient safeguards for terminally ill persons and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause), vacated, Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (CA9 1997).15 See, e. g., Alaska H. B. 371 (1996); Ariz. S. B. 1007 (1996); Cal. A. B. 1080, A. B. 1310 (1995); Colo. H. B. 1185 (1996); Colo. H. B. 1308 (1995); Conn. H. B. 6298 (1995); Ill. H. B. 691, S. B. 948 (1997); Me. H. P. 663 (1997); Me. H. P. 552 (1995); Md. H. B. 474 (1996); Md. H. B. 933 (1995); Mass. H. B. 3173 (1995); Mich. H. B. 6205, S. B. 556 (1996); Mich. H. B. 4134718just last year, Iowa and Rhode Island joined the overwhelming majority of States explicitly prohibiting assisted suicide. See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 707 A.2, 707 A.3 (Supp. 1997); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-60-1, 11-60-3 (Supp. 1996). Also, on April 30, 1997, President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide. Pub. L. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 14401 et seq.).16(1995); Miss. H. B. 1023 (1996); N. H. H. B. 339 (1995); N. M. S. B. 446 (1995); N. Y. S. B. 5024, A. B. 6333 (1995); Neb. L. B. 406 (1997); Neb. L. B. 1259 (1996); R. 1. S. 2985 (1996); Vt. H. B. 109 (1997); Vt. H. B. 335 (1995); Wash. S. B. 5596 (1995); Wis. A. B. 174, S. B. 90 (1995); Senate of Canada, Of Life and Death, Report of the Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide A-156 (June 1995) (describing unsuccessful proposals, between 1991-1994, to legalize assisted suicide).16 Other countries are embroiled in similar debates: The Supreme Court of Canada recently rejected a claim that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms establishes a fundamental right to assisted suicide, Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D. L. R. (4th) 342 (1993); the British House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics refused to recommend any change in Great Britain's assisted-suicide prohibition, House of Lords, Session 1993-94 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, 12 Issues in Law & Med. 193, 202 (1996) ("We identify no circumstances in which assisted suicide should be permitted"); New Zealand's Parliament rejected a proposed "Death With Dignity Bill" that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide in August 1995, Graeme, MPs Throw out Euthanasia Bill, The Dominion (Wellington), Aug. 17, 1995, p. 1; and the Northern Territory of Australia legalized assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia in 1995, see Shenon, Australian Doctors Get Right to Assist Suicide, N. Y. Times, July 28, 1995, p. A8. As of February 1997, three persons had ended their lives with physician assistance in the Northern Territory. Mydans, Assisted Suicide: Australia Faces a Grim Reality, N. Y. Times, Feb. 2,1997, p. A3. On March 24,1997, however, the Australian Senate voted to overturn the Northern Territory's law. Thornhill, Australia Repeals Euthanasia Law, Washington Post, Mar. 25, 1997, p. A14; see Euthanasia Laws Act 1997, No. 17, 1997 (Austl.). On the other hand, on May 20, 1997, Colombia's Constitutional Court legalized voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill people. C-239/97 de Mayo 20, 1997, Corte719Thus, the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues. For example, New York State's Task Force on Life and the Law-an ongoing, blue-ribbon commission composed of doctors, ethicists, lawyers, religious leaders, and interested laymen-was convened in 1984 and commissioned with "a broad mandate to recommend public policy on issues raised by medical advances." New York Task Force vii. Over the past decade, the Task Force has recommended laws relating to end-of-life decisions, surrogate pregnancy, and organ donation. Id., at 118-119. After studying physician-assisted suicide, however, the Task Force unanimously concluded that "[l]egalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia would pose profound risks to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable .... [T]he potential dangers of this dramatic change in public policy would outweigh any benefit that might be achieved." Id., at 120.Attitudes toward suicide itself have changed since Bracton, but our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not retreated from this prohibition. Against this backdrop of history, tradition, and practice, we now turn to respondents' constitutional claim.IIThe Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the "liberty" it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992) (Due Process Clause "protects individual liberty against 'certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them''') (quot-Constitucional, M. P. Carlos Gaviria Diaz; see Colombia's Top Court Legalizes Euthanasia, Orlando Sentinel, May 22, 1997, p. A1S.720ing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986)). The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-302 (1993); Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); to use contraception, ibid.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), and to abortion, Casey, supra. We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 278-279.But we "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Collins, 503 U. S., at 125. By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field," ibid., lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court, Moore, 431 U. S., at 502 (plurality opinion).Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,721"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," id., at 503 (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934) ("so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"), and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 326 (1937). Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Flores, supra, at 302; Collins, supra, at 125; Cruzan, supra, at 277278. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking," Collins, supra, at 125, that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe ... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 507 U. S., at 302.JUSTICE SOUTER, relying on Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961), would largely abandon this restrained methodology, and instead ask "whether [Washington's] statute sets up one of those 'arbitrary impositions' or 'purposeless restraints' at odds with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," post, at 752 (quoting Poe, supra, at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting))P17 In JUSTICE SOUTER'S opinion, Justice Harlan's Poe dissent supplies the "modern justification" for substantive-due-process review. Post, at 756, and n. 4 (opinion concurring in judgment). But although Justice Harlan's opinion has often been cited in due process cases, we have never abandoned our fundamental-rights-based analytical method. Just four Terms ago, six of the Justices now sitting joined the Court's opinion in Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-305 (1993); Poe was not even cited. And in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261 (1990), neither the Court's nor the concurring opinions relied on Poe; rather, we concluded that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was so rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to require special protection under the722In our view, however, the development of this Court's substantive-due-process jurisprudence, described briefly supra, at 719-720, has been a process whereby the outlines of the "liberty" specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment-never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully clarified-have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition. This approach tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial review. In addition, by establishing a threshold requirement-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case.Turning to the claim at issue here, the Court of Appeals stated that "[p]roperly analyzed, the first issue to be resolved is whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's death," 79 F. 3d, at 801, or, in other words, "[i]s there a right to die?," id., at 799. Similarly, respondents assert a "liberty to choose how to die" and a right to "control of one's final days," Brief for Respondents 7, and describe the asserted liberty as "the right to choose a humane, dignified death," id., at 15, and "the liberty to shape death," id., at 18. As noted above, we have a tradition of carefully formulating the interest at stake in substantivedue-process cases. For example, although Cruzan is often described as a "right to die" case, see 79 F. 3d, at 799; post, at 745 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments) (Cruzan recognized "the more specific interest in making decisions aboutFourteenth Amendment. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 278-279; id., at 287-288 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). True, the Court relied on Justice Harlan's dissent in Casey, 505 U. S., at 848-850, but, as Flores demonstrates, we did not in so doing jettison our established approach. Indeed, to read such a radical move into the Court's opinion in Casey would seem to fly in the face of that opinion's emphasis on stare decisis. 505 U. S., at 854-869.723how to confront an imminent death"), we were, in fact, more precise: We assumed that the Constitution granted competent persons a "constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 279; id., at 287 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("[A] liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions"). The Washington statute at issue in this case prohibits "aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide," Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994), and, thus, the question before us is whether the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing SO.18We now inquire whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation's traditions. Here, as discussed supra, at 710719, we are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State. See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31 (1922) ("If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it"); Flores, 507 U. S., at 303 ("The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that 'substantive due process' sustains it").Respondents contend, however, that the liberty interest they assert is consistent with this Court's substantive-due-18 See, e. g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (CA2 1996) ("right to assisted suicide finds no cognizable basis in the Constitution's language or design"); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (CA9 1995) (referring to alleged "right to suicide," "right to assistance in suicide," and "right to aid in killing oneself"); People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436,476, n. 47, 527 N. W. 2d 714, 730, n. 47 (1994) ("[T]he question that we must decide is whether the [C]onstitution encompasses a right to commit suicide and, if so, whether it includes a right to assistance").724process line of cases, if not with this Nation's history and practice. Pointing to Casey and Cruzan, respondents read our jurisprudence in this area as reflecting a general tradition of "self-sovereignty," Brief for Respondents 12, and as teaching that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes "basic and intimate exercises of personal autonomy," id., at 10; see Casey, 505 U. S., at 847 ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter"). According to respondents, our liberty jurisprudence, and the broad, individualistic principles it reflects, protects the "liberty of competent, terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions free of undue government interference." Brief for Respondents 10. The question presented in this case, however, is whether the protections of the Due Process Clause include a right to commit suicide with another's assistance. With this "careful description" of respondents' claim in mind, we turn to Casey and Cruzan.In Cruzan, we considered whether Nancy Beth Cruzan, who had been severely injured in an automobile accident and was in a persistive vegetative state, "ha[d] a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment" at her parents' request. 497 U. S., at 269. We began with the observation that "[a]t common law, even the touching of one person by another without consent and without legal justification was a battery." Ibid. We then discussed the related rule that "informed consent is generally required for medical treatment." Ibid. After reviewing a long line of relevant state cases, we concluded that "the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment." Id., at 277. Next, we reviewed our own cases on the subject, and stated that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior725decisions." Id., at 278. Therefore, "for purposes of [that] case, we assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id., at 279; see id., at 287 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). We concluded that, notwithstanding this right, the Constitution permitted Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id., at 280-281.Respondents contend that in Cruzan we "acknowledged that competent, dying persons have the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment and thus hasten death," Brief for Respondents 23, and that "the constitutional principle behind recognizing the patient's liberty to direct the withdrawal of artificial life support applies at least as strongly to the choice to hasten impending death by consuming lethal medication," id., at 26. Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that "Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of artificial provision of life-sustaining food and water, necessarily recognize[d] a liberty interest in hastening one's own death." 79 F. 3d, at 816.The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and constitutional traditions. The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct. See Quill v. Vacco, post, at 800-808. In Cruzan itself, we recognized that most States outlawed assisted suicide-and even more do today-and we certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be some-726how transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide. 497 U. S., at 280.Respondents also rely on Casey. There, the Court's opinion concluded that "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade[, 410 U. S. 113 (1973),] should be retained and once again reaffirmed." 505 U. S., at 846. We held, first, that a woman has a right, before her fetus is viable, to an abortion "without undue interference from the State"; second, that States may restrict postviability abortions, so long as exceptions are made to protect a woman's life and health; and third, that the State has legitimate interests throughout a pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the unborn child. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the opinion discussed in some detail this Court's substantive-due-process tradition of interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect certain fundamental rights and "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," and noted that many of those rights and liberties "involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime." Id., at 851.The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, found Casey "'highly instructive'" and" 'almost prescriptive'" for determining "'what liberty interest may inhere in a terminally ill person's choice to commit suicide''':"Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy.'" 79 F. 3d, at 813-814.Similarly, respondents emphasize the statement in Casey that:"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they727formed under compulsion of the State." 505 U. S., at 851.Brief for Respondents 12. By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described, in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.19 The opinion moved from the recognition that liberty necessarily includes freedom of conscience and belief about ultimate considerations to the observation that "though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise." Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, San An-19 See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (emphasis added)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 485-486 (1965) (intrusions into the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" offend rights "older than the Bill of Rights"); id., at 495-496 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (the law in question "disrupt[ed] the traditional relation of the family-a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987) ("[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental right"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 140 (1973) (stating that at the founding and throughout the 19th century, "a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy"); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty includes "those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").728tonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 33-35 (1973), and Casey did not suggest otherwise.The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Constitution also requires, however, that Washington's assistedsuicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319-320 (1993); Flores, 507 U. S., at 305. This requirement is unquestionably met here. As the court below recognized, 79 F. 3d, at 816-817,20 Washington's assisted-suicide ban implicates a number of state interestsP See 49 F. 3d, at 592-593; Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 26-29; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-27.First, Washington has an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life." Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 282. The State's prohibition on assisted suicide, like all homicide laws, both reflects and advances its commitment to this interest. See id., at 280; Model Penal Code § 210.5, Comment 5, at 100 ("[T]he interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of20 The court identified and discussed six state interests: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties and use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family members and loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) avoiding future movement toward euthanasia and other abuses. 79 F. 3d, at 816-832.21 Respondents also admit the existence of these interests, Brief for Respondents 28-39, but contend that Washington could better promote and protect them through regulation, rather than prohibition, of physicianassisted suicide. Our inquiry, however, is limited to the question whether the State's prohibition is rationally related to legitimate state interests.729another").22 This interest is symbolic and aspirational as well as practical:"While suicide is no longer prohibited or penalized, the ban against assisted suicide and euthanasia shores up the notion of limits in human relationships. It reflects the gravity with which we view the decision to take one's own life or the life of another, and our reluctance to encourage or promote these decisions." New York Task Force 131-132.Respondents admit that "[t]he State has a real interest in preserving the lives of those who can still contribute to society and have the potential to enjoy life." Brief for Respondents 35, n. 23. The Court of Appeals also recognized Washington's interest in protecting life, but held that the "weight" of this interest depends on the "medical condition and the wishes of the person whose life is at stake." 79 F. 3d, at 817. Washington, however, has rejected this sliding-scale approach and, through its assisted-suicide ban, insists that all persons' lives, from beginning to end, regardless of physicalor mental condition, are under the full protection of the law. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 558 (1979) (" ... Congress could reasonably have determined to protect the terminally ill, no less than other patients, from the vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise"). As we have previously affirmed, the States "may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy," Cruzan,22 The States express this commitment by other means as well: "[N]early all states expressly disapprove of suicide and assisted suicide either in statutes dealing with durable powers of attorney in health-care situations, or in 'living will' statutes. In addition, all states provide for the involuntary commitment of persons who may harm themselves as the result of mental illness, and a number of states allow the use of nondeadly force to thwart suicide attempts." People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich., at 478-479, and nn. 53-56, 527 N. W. 2d, at 731-732, and nn. 53-56.730supra, at 282. This remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for those who are near death.Relatedly, all admit that suicide is a serious public-health problem, especially among persons in otherwise vulnerable groups. See Washington State Dept. of Health, Annual Summary of Vital Statistics 1991, pp. 29-30 (Oct. 1992) (suicide is a leading cause of death in Washington of those between the ages of 14 and 54); New York Task Force 10,23-33 (suicide rate in the general population is about one percent, and suicide is especially prevalent among the young and the elderly). The State has an interest in preventing suicide, and in studying, identifying, and treating its causes. See 79 F. 3d, at 820; id., at 854 (Beezer, J., dissenting) ("The state recognizes suicide as a manifestation of medical and psychological anguish"); Marzen 107-146.Those who attempt suicide-terminally ill or not-often suffer from depression or other mental disorders. See New York Task Force 13-22, 126-128 (more than 95% of those who commit suicide had a major psychiatric illness at the time of death; among the terminally ill, uncontrolled pain is a "risk factor" because it contributes to depression); PhysicianAssisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (Comm. Print 1996); cf. Back, Wallace, Starks, & Pearlman, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State, 275 JAMA 919, 924 (1996) ("[l]ntolerable physical symptoms are not the reason most patients request physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia"). Research indicates, however, that many people who request physician-assisted suicide withdraw that request if their depression and pain are treated. H. Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and the Dutch Cure 24-25 (1997) (suicidal, terminally ill patients "usually respond well to treatment for depressive illness and pain medication and are then grateful to be alive"); New York Task Force 177-178.731The New York Task Force, however, expressed its concern that, because depression is difficult to diagnose, physicians and medical professionals often fail to respond adequately to seriously ill patients' needs. Id., at 175. Thus, legal physician-assisted suicide could make it more difficult for the State to protect depressed or mentally ill persons, or those who are suffering from untreated pain, from suicidal impulses.The State also has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. In contrast to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the integrity of the medical profession would [not] be threatened in any way by [physician-assisted suicide]," 79 F. 3d, at 827, the American Medical Association, like many other medical and physicians' groups, has concluded that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer." American Medical Association, Code of Ethics § 2.211 (1994); see Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229,2233 (1992) ("[T]he societal risks of involving physicians in medical interventions to cause patients' deaths is too great"); New York Task Force 103-109 (discussing physicians' views). And physician-assisted suicide could, it is argued, undermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-honored line between healing and harming. Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 355-356 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) ("The patient's trust in the doctor's whole-hearted devotion to his best interests will be hard to sustain").Next, the State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes. The Court of Appeals dismissed the State's concern that disadvantaged persons might be pressured into physician-assisted suicide as732"ludicrous on its face." 79 F. 3d, at 825. We have recognized, however, the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 281. Similarly, the New York Task Force warned that "[l]egalizing physician-assisted suicide would pose profound risks to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable .... The risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social group." New York Task Force 120; see Compassion in Dying, 49 F. 3d, at 593 ("An insidious bias against the handicapped-again coupled with a cost-saving mentality-makes them especially in need of Washington's statutory protection"). If physicianassisted suicide were permitted, many might resort to it to spare their families the substantial financial burden of endof-life health-care costs.The State's interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and "societal indifference." 49 F. 3d, at 592. The State's assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued than the lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously disabled person's suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as anyone else's. See New York Task Force 101-102; Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, supra, at 9, 20 (discussing prejudice toward the disabled and the negative messages euthanasia and assisted suicide send to handicapped patients).Finally, the State may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia. The Court of Appeals struck down733Washington's assisted-suicide ban only "as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors." 79 F. 3d, at 838. Washington insists, however, that the impact of the court's decision will not and cannot be so limited. Brief for Petitioners 44-47. If suicide is protected as a matter of constitutional right, it is argued, "every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it." Compassion in Dying, 49 F. 3d, at 591; see Kevorkian, 447 Mich., at 470, n. 41, 527 N. W. 2d, at 727-728, n. 41. The Court of Appeals' decision, and its expansive reasoning, provide ample support for the State's concerns. The court noted, for example, that the "decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself," 79 F. 3d, at 832, n. 120; that "in some instances, the patient may be unable to self-administer the drugs and ... administration by the physician ... may be the only way the patient may be able to receive them," id., at 831; and that not only physicians, but also family members and loved ones, will inevitably participate in assisting suicide, id., at 838, n. 140. Thus, it turns out that what is couched as a limited right to "physician-assisted suicide" is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police and contain.23 Washington's ban on assisting suicide prevents such erosion.23JU8TICE SOUTER concludes that "[t]he case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here, not because recognizing one due process right would leave a court with no principled basis to avoid recognizing another, but because there is a plausible case that the right claimed would not be readily containable by reference to facts about the mind that are matters of difficult judgment, or by gatekeepers who are subject to temptation, noble or not." Post, at 785 (opinion concurring in judgment). We agree that the case for a slippery slope has been made out, but-bearing in mind Justice Cardozo's observation of "[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic," The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1932)-we also recognize the reasonableness of the widely expressed734This concern is further supported by evidence about the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The Dutch government's own study revealed that in 1990, there were 2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as "the deliberate termination of another's life at his request"), 400 cases of assisted suicide, and more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit request. In addition to these latter 1,000 cases, the study found an additional 4,941 cases where physicians administered lethal morphine overdoses without the patients' explicit consent. Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, supra, 12-13 (citing Dutch study). This study suggests that, despite the existence of various reporting procedures, euthanasia in the Netherlands has not been limited to competent, terminally ill adults who are enduring physical suffering, and that regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses in cases involving vulnerable persons, including severely disabled neonates and elderly persons suffering from dementia. Id., at 16-21; see generally C. Gomez, Regulating Death: Euthanasia and the Case of the Netherlands (1991); H. Hendin, Seduced By Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure (1997). The New York Task Force, citing the Dutch experience, observed that "assisted suicide and euthanasia are closely linked," New York Task Force 145, and concluded that the "risk of ... abuse is neither speculative nor distant," id., at 134. Washington, like mostskepticism about the lack of a principled basis for confining the right. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26 ("Once a legislature abandons a categorical prohibition against physician assisted suicide, there is no obvious stopping point"); Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae 21-29; Brief for Bioethics Professors as Amici Curiae 23-26; Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, App. 133, 140 ("[I]f assisted suicide is permitted, then there is a strong argument for allowing euthanasia"); New York Task Force 132; Kamisar, The "Right to Die"; On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 Duquesne L. Rev. 481 (1996); Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even in a Very Limited Form, 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 735 (1995).735other States, reasonably ensures against this risk by banning, rather than regulating, assisted suicide. See United States v. 12 200ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U. S. 123, 127 (1973) ("Each step, when taken, appear[s] a reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance").We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection. We therefore hold that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994) does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or "as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors." 79 F. 3d, at 838.24***Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society. The decision of the en banc Court of Appeals is24JUSTICE STEVENS states that "the Court does conceive of respondents' claim as a facial challenge-addressing not the application of the statute to a particular set of plaintiffs before it, but the constitutionality of the statute's categorical prohibition .... " Post, at 740 (opinion concurring in judgments). We emphasize that we today reject the Court of Appeals' specific holding that the statute is unconstitutional "as applied" to a particular class. See n. 6, supra. JUSTICE STEVENS agrees with this holding, see post, at 750, but would not "foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge," ibid. Our opinion does not absolutely foreclose such a claim. However, given our holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide heightened protection to the asserted liberty interest in ending one's life with a physician's assistance, such a claim would have to be quite different from the ones advanced by respondents here.736reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | OCTOBER TERM, 1996SyllabusWASHINGTON ET AL. v. GLUCKSBERG ET AL.CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITNo. 96-110. Argued January 8, 1997-Decided June 26,1997It has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington.The State's present law makes "[p]romoting a suicide attempt" a felony, and provides: "A person is guilty of [that crime] when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." Respondents, four Washington physicians who occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, declare that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for the State's assisted-suicide ban. They, along with three gravely ill plaintiffs who have since died and a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide, filed this suit against petitioners, the State and its Attorney General, seeking a declaration that the ban is, on its face, unconstitutional. They assert a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide. Relying primarily on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, and Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, the Federal District Court agreed, concluding that Washington's assistedsuicide ban is unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on the exercise of that constitutionally protected liberty interest. The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed.Held: Washington's prohibition against "caus[ing]" or "aid[ing]" a suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause. Pp. 710-736.(a) An examination of our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices demonstrates that Anglo-American common law has punished or otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide for over 700 years; that rendering such assistance is still a crime in almost every State; that such prohibitions have never contained exceptions for those who were near death; that the prohibitions have in recent years been reexamined and, for the most part, reaffirmed in a number of States; and that the President recently signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide. Pp. 710-719.(b) In light of that history, this Court's decisions lead to the conclusion that respondents' asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.703The Court's established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, the Court has regularly observed that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. E. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (plurality opinion). Second, the Court has required a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. E. g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302. The Ninth Circuit's and respondents' various descriptions of the interest here at stake-e. g., a right to "determin[e] the time and manner of one's death," the "right to die," a "liberty to choose how to die," a right to "control of one's final days," "the right to choose a humane, dignified death," and "the liberty to shape death" -run counter to that second requirement. Since the Washington statute prohibits "aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide," the question before the Court is more properly characterized as whether the "liberty" specially protected by the Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so. This asserted right has no place in our Nation's traditions, given the country's consistent, almost universal, and continuing rejection of the right, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, the Court would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State. Respondents' contention that the asserted interest is consistent with this Court's substantive-due-process cases, if not with this Nation's history and practice, is unpersuasive. The constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition that was discussed in Cruzan, supra, at 279, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy, but was instead grounded in the Nation's history and traditions, given the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment. And although Casey recognized that many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy, 505 U. S., at 852, it does not follow that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 33-34. Casey did not suggest otherwise. Pp. 719-728.(c) The constitutional requirement that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests, see, e. g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319-320, is unquestionably met here. These interests include prohibiting intentional killing and preserving human life; preventing the serious public-health problem of suicide, especially among the young, the elderly, and those suffering from untreated pain or from depression or other mental disorders; protecting704Full Text of Opinion |
3,244 | 1993_93-518 | CounselDeputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, James E. Brookshire, and Martin W Matzen. **Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, John J. Rademacher, and Richard L. Krause; for Defenders of Property Rights et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Georgia Public Policy Foundation et al. by G. Stephen Parker; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor III, Clint Bolick, and Richard A. Epstein; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by William H. Ethier, Mary DiCrescenzo, and Stephanie McEvily; for the National Association of Realtors et al. by Richard M. Stephens; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robin L. Rivett, James S. Burling, Deborah J. La Fetra, and John M. Groen; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar; for Jon A. Chandler, pro se; and for Terence Wellner et al. by Daniel G. Marsh.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, Jack M. Sabatino and Mary Carol Jacobson, Assistant Attorneys General, and Rachel J. Horowitz, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson of Guam, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Tom Udall of New Mexico, G. Oliver Koppell of New York, Lee Fisher of Ohio, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles W Burson of Tennessee, Rosalie S. Ballentine of the Virgin Islands, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for the State of Oregon by Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Thomas A. Balmer, Deputy Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Michael D. Reynolds and John T. Bagg, Assistant Attorneys General; for Broward County by John J. Copelan, Jr., and Anthony C. Musto; for the City of New York by Paul A. Crotty, Leonard J. Koerner, and Linda H. Young; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold; for the Association of State Floodplan Managers by Michael J. Bean; for the Rails-to- Trails Conservancy et al. by Andrea C. Ferster, Daniel L. Rabinowitz, and Glenn P. Sugameli; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda, Lee Fennell, and Barbara E. Etkind; for the National Audubon377CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.Petitioner challenges the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court which held that the city of Tigard could condition the approval of her building permit on the dedication of a portion of her property for flood control and traffic improvements. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P. 2d 437 (1993). We granted certiorari to resolve a question left open by our decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), of what is the required degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed development.IThe State of Oregon enacted a comprehensive land use management program in 1973. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.005197.860 (1991). The program required all Oregon cities and counties to adopt new comprehensive land use plans that were consistent with the statewide planning goals. §§ 197.175(1), 197.250. The plans are implemented by land use regulations which are part of an integrated hierarchy of legally binding goals, plans, and regulations. §§ 197.175, 197.175(2)(b). Pursuant to the State's requirements, the city of Tigard, a community of some 30,000 residents on the southwest edge of Portland, developed a comprehensive plan and codified it in its Community Development Code (CDC). The CDC requires property owners in the area zoned Central Business District to comply with a 15% open space and landscaping requirement, which limits total site coverage, including all structures and paved parking, to 85% of the parcel. CDC, ch. 18.66, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-16 to G-17. After the completion of a transportation study that identifiedSociety by John D. Echeverria; and for 1000 Friends of Oregon et al. by H. Bissell Carey III, Dwight H. Merriam, and Edward J. Sullivan.Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by William Perry Pendley; for the Northwest Legal Foundation by Jeanette R. Burrage; and for Thomas H. Nelson, pro se, et al.378congestion in the Central Business District as a particular problem, the city adopted a plan for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to encourage alternatives to automobile transportation for short trips. The CDC requires that new development facilitate this plan by dedicating land for pedestrian pathways where provided for in the pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan.1The city also adopted a Master Drainage Plan (Drainage Plan). The Drainage Plan noted that flooding occurred in several areas along Fanno Creek, including areas near petitioner's property. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 2, pp. 2-5 to 2-8; 4-2 to 4-6; Figure 4-1. The Drainage Plan also established that the increase in impervious surfaces associated with continued urbanization would exacerbate these flooding problems. To combat these risks, the Drainage Plan suggested a series of improvements to the Fanno Creek Basin, including channel excavation in the area next to petitioner's property. App. to Pet. for Cert. G-13, G-38. Other recommendations included ensuring that the floodplain remains free of structures and that it be preserved as greenways to minimize flood damage to structures. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 5, pp. 5-16 to 5-21. The Drainage Plan concluded that the cost of these improvements should be shared based on both direct and indirect benefits, with property owners along the waterways paying more due to the direct benefit that they would receive. Id., ch. 8, p. 8-11. CDC Chapters 18.84 and 18.861 CDC § 18.86.040.A.1.b provides: "The development shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circulation if the site is located on a street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated greenway/open space/park. Specific items to be addressed [include]: (i) Provision of efficient, convenient and continuous pedestrian and bicycle transit circulation systems, linking developments by requiring dedication and construction of pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the comprehensive plan. If direct connections cannot be made, require that funds in the amount of the construction cost be deposited into an account for the purpose of constructing paths." App. to Brief for Respondent B-33 to B-34.379and CDC § 18.164.100 and the Tigard Park Plan carry out these recommendations.Petitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumbing and electric supply store located on Main Street in the Central Business District of the city. The store covers approximately 9,700 square feet on the eastern side of a 1.67-acre parcel, which includes a gravel parking lot. Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern corner of the lot and along its western boundary. The year-round flow of the creek renders the area within the creek's 100-year floodplain virtually unusable for commercial development. The city's comprehensive plan includes the Fanno Creek floodplain as part of the city's greenway system.Petitioner applied to the city for a permit to redevelop the site. Her proposed plans called for nearly doubling the size of the store to 17,600 square feet and paving a 39-space parking lot. The existing store, located on the opposite side of the parcel, would be razed in sections as construction progressed on the new building. In the second phase of the project, petitioner proposed to build an additional structure on the northeast side of the site for complementary businesses and to provide more parking. The proposed expansion and intensified use are consistent with the city's zoning scheme in the Central Business District. CDC § 18.66.030, App. to Brief for Petitioner C-1 to C-3.The City Planning Commission (Commission) granted petitioner's permit application subject to conditions imposed by the city's CDC. The CDC establishes the following standard for site development review approval:"Where landfill and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year floodplain, the City shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for greenway adjoining and within the floodplain. This area shall include portions at a suitable elevation for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the380floodplain in accordance with the adopted pedestrian! bicycle plan." CDC § 18.120.180.A.8, App. to Brief for Respondent B-45 to B-46.Thus, the Commission required that petitioner dedicate the portion of her property lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage system along Fanno Creek and that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian!bicycle pathway.2 The dedication required by that condition encompasses approximately 7,000 square feet, or roughly 10% of the property. In accordance with city practice, petitioner could rely on the dedicated property to meet the 15% open space and landscaping requirement mandated by the city's zoning scheme. App. to Pet. for Cert. G-28 to G-29. The city would bear the cost of maintaining a landscaped buffer between the dedicated area and the new store. Id., at G-44 to G-45.Petitioner requested variances from the CDC standards.Variances are granted only where it can be shown that, owing to special circumstances related to a specific piece of the land, the literal interpretation of the applicable zoning provisions would cause "an undue or unnecessary hardship" unless the variance is granted. CDC § 18.134.010, App. to Brief for Respondent B-47.3 Rather than posing alterna-2 The city's decision includes the following relevant conditions: "1. The applicant shall dedicate to the City as Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] (i. e., all portions of the property below elevation 150.0) and all property 15 feet above (to the east of) the 150.0 foot floodplain boundary. The building shall be designed so as not to intrude into the greenway area." App. to Pet. for Cert. G-43.3 CDC § 18.134.050 contains the following criteria whereby the decisionmaking authority can approve, approve with modifications, or deny a variance request:"(1) The proposed variance will not be materially detrimental to the purposes of this title, be in conflict with the policies of the comprehensive381tive mitigating measures to offset the expected impacts of her proposed development, as allowed under the CDC, petitioner simply argued that her proposed development would not conflict with the policies of the comprehensive plan. Id., at E-4. The Commission denied the request.The Commission made a series of findings concerning the relationship between the dedicated conditions and the projected impacts of petitioner's project. First, the Commission noted that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that customers and employees of the future uses of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for their transportation and recreational needs." City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-24. The Commission noted that the site plan has provided for bicycle parking in a rack in front of the proposed building and "[i]t is reasonable to expect that some of the users of the bicycle parking provided for by the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to Fanno Creek if it is constructed." Ibid. In addition, the Commission found that creation of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transportation "couldplan, to any other applicable policies and standards, and to other properties in the same zoning district or vicinity;"(2) There are special circumstances that exist which are peculiar to the lot size or shape, topography or other circumstances over which the applicant has no control, and which are not applicable to other properties in the same zoning district;"(3) The use proposed will be the same as permitted under this title and City standards will be maintained to the greatest extent possible, while permitting some economic use of the land;"(4) Existing physical and natural systems, such as but not limited to traffic, drainage, dramatic land forms, or parks will not be adversely affected any more than would occur if the development were located as specified in the title; and"(5) The hardship is not self-imposed and the variance requested is the minimum variance which would alleviate the hardship." App. to Brieffor Respondent B-49 to B-50.382offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion." Ibid.The Commission went on to note that the required floodplain dedication would be reasonably related to petitioner's request to intensify the use of the site given the increase in the impervious surface. The Commission stated that the "anticipated increased storm water flow from the subject property to an already strained creek and drainage basin can only add to the public need to manage the stream channel and floodplain for drainage purposes." Id., at G-37. Based on this anticipated increased storm water flow, the Commission concluded that "the requirement of dedication of the floodplain area on the site is related to the applicant's plan to intensify development on the site." Ibid. The Tigard City Council approved the Commission's final order, subject to one minor modification; the city council reassigned the responsibility for surveying and marking the floodplain area from petitioner to the city's engineering department. Id., at G-7.Petitioner appealed to the Land D se Board of Appeals (L DBA) on the ground that the city's dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development, and, therefore, those requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of her property under the Fifth Amendment. In evaluating the federal taking claim, L DBA assumed that the city's findings about the impacts of the proposed development were supported by substantial evidence. Dolan v. Tigard, LDBA 91-161 (Jan. 7, 1992), reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. D-15, n. 9. Given the undisputed fact that the proposed larger building and paved parking area would increase the amount of impervious surfaces and the runoff into Fanno Creek, L DBA concluded that "there is a 'reasonable relationship' between the proposed development and the requirement to dedicate land along Fanno Creek for a greenway." Id., at D-16. With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, L DBA noted the Commission's finding that a signifi-383cantly larger retail sales building and parking lot would attract larger numbers of customers and employees and their vehicles. It again found a "reasonable relationship" between alleviating the impacts of increased traffic from the development and facilitating the provision of a pedestrian! bicycle pathway as an alternative means of transportation. Ibid.The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner's contention that in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), we had abandoned the "reasonable relationship" test in favor of a stricter "essential nexus" test. 113 Ore. App. 162, 832 P. 2d 853 (1992). The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P. 2d 437 (1993). The court also disagreed with petitioner's contention that the Nollan Court abandoned the "reasonably related" test. 317 Ore., at 118, 854 P. 2d, at 442. Instead, the court read Nollan to mean that an "exaction is reasonably related to an impact if the exaction serves the same purpose that a denial of the permit would serve." 317 Ore., at 120, 854 P. 2d, at 443. The court decided that both the pedestrian!bicycle pathway condition and the storm drainage dedication had an essential nexus to the development of the proposed site. Id., at 121, 854 P. 2d, at 443. Therefore, the court found the conditions to be reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of petitioner's business. Ibid.4 We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 989 (1993), because of an alleged conflict between the Oregon Supreme Court's decision and our decision in Nollan, supra.IIThe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chi-4 The Supreme Court of Oregon did not address the consequences of petitioner's failure to provide alternative mitigation measures in her variance application and we take the case as it comes to us. Accordingly, we do not pass on the constitutionality of the city's variance provisions.384cago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897), provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 5 One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). Without question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred. Nollan, supra, at 831. Such public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979).On the other side of the ledger, the authority of state and local governments to engage in land use planning has been sustained against constitutional challenge as long ago as our decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished5 JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent suggests that this case is actually grounded in "substantive" due process, rather than in the view that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But there is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 122 (1978); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 827 (1987). Nor is there any doubt that these cases have relied upon Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), to reach that result. See, e. g., Penn Central, supra, at 122 ("The issu[e] presented ... [is] whether the restrictions imposed by New York City's law upon appellants' exploitation of the Terminal site effect a 'taking' of appellants' property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897)").385without paying for every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922). A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980).6The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited, however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present case. First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city. In Nollan, supra, we held that governmental authority to exact such a condition was circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional righthere the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968).Petitioner contends that the city has forced her to choose between the building permit and her right under the Fifth6 There can be no argument that the permit conditions would deprive petitioner of "economically beneficial us[e]" of her property as she currently operates a retail store on the lot. Petitioner assuredly is able to derive some economic use from her property. See, e. g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, at 124.386Amendment to just compensation for the public easements. Petitioner does not quarrel with the city's authority to exact some forms of dedication as a condition for the grant of a building permit, but challenges the showing made by the city to justify these exactions. She argues that the city has identified "no special benefits" conferred on her, and has not identified any "special quantifiable burdens" created by her new store that would justify the particular dedications required from her which are not required from the public at large.IIIIn evaluating petitioner's claim, we must first determine whether the "essential nexus" exists between the "legitimate state interest" and the permit condition exacted by the city. Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837. If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development. We were not required to reach this question in Nollan, because we concluded that the connection did not meet even the loosest standard. Id., at 838. Here, however, we must decide this question.AWe addressed the essential nexus question in Nollan.The California Coastal Commission demanded a lateral public easement across the N ollans' beachfront lot in exchange for a permit to demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom house. Id., at 828. The public easement was designed to connect two public beaches that were separated by the Nollans' property. The Coastal Commission had asserted that the public easement condition was imposed to promote the legitimate state interest of diminishing the "blockage of the view of the ocean" caused by construction of the larger house.We agreed that the Coastal Commission's concern with protecting visual access to the ocean constituted a legitimate387public interest. Id., at 835. We also agreed that the permit condition would have been constitutional "even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere." Id., at 836. We resolved, however, that the Coastal Commission's regulatory authority was set completely adrift from its constitutional moorings when it claimed that a nexus existed between visual access to the ocean and a permit condition requiring lateral public access along the Nollans' beachfront lot. Id., at 837. How enhancing the public's ability to "traverse to and along the shorefront" served the same governmental purpose of "visual access to the ocean" from the roadway was beyond our ability to countenance. The absence of a nexus left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an easement through gimmickry, which converted a valid regulation of land use into "'an out-and-out plan of extortion.''' Ibid., quoting J. E. D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 584, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981).No such gimmicks are associated with the permit conditions imposed by the city in this case. Undoubtedly, the prevention of flooding along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the Central Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld. Agins, 447 U. S., at 260-262. It seems equally obvious that a nexus exists between preventing flooding along Fanno Creek and limiting development within the creek's 100-year floodplain. Petitioner proposes to double the size of her retail store and to pave her now-gravel parking lot, thereby expanding the impervious surface on the property and increasing the amount of storm water runoff into Fanno Creek.The same may be said for the city's attempt to reduce traffic congestion by providing for alternative means oftransportation. In theory, a pedestrian/bicycle pathway provides a useful alternative means of transportation for workers and shoppers: "Pedestrians and bicyclists occupying dedicated388spaces for walking and/or bicycling ... remove potential vehicles from streets, resulting in an overall improvement in total transportation system flow." A. Nelson, Public Provision of Pedestrian and Bicycle Access Ways: Public Policy Rationale and the Nature of Private Benefits 11, Center for Planning Development, Georgia Institute of Technology, Working Paper Series (Jan. 1994). See also Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (recognizing pedestrian and bicycle facilities as necessary components of any strategy to reduce traffic congestion).BThe second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed development. Nollan, supra, at 834, quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127 (1978) (" '[A] use restriction may constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose' "). Here the Oregon Supreme Court deferred to what it termed the "city's unchallenged factual findings" supporting the dedication conditions and found them to be reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of petitioner's business. 317 Ore., at 120-121,854 P. 2d, at 443.The city required that petitioner dedicate "to the City as Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] ... and all property 15 feet above [the floodplain] boundary." Id., at 113, n. 3, 854 P. 2d, at 439, n. 3. In addition, the city demanded that the retail store be designed so as not to intrude into the greenway area. The city relies on the Commission's rather tentative findings that increased storm water flow from petitioner's property "can only add to the public need to manage the [floodplain] for drainage purposes" to support its conclusion that the "requirement of dedication of the floodplain area on389the site is related to the applicant's plan to intensify development on the site." City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-37.The city made the following specific findings relevant tothe pedestrian/bicycle pathway:"In addition, the proposed expanded use of this site is anticipated to generate additional vehicular traffic thereby increasing congestion on nearby collector and arterial streets. Creation of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transportation could offset some of the traffic demand on these nearby streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion." Id., at G-24.The question for us is whether these findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on petitioner's building permit. Since state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have, we turn to representative decisions made by them.In some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. See, e. g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P. 2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673 (1966). We think this standard is too lax to adequately protect petitioner's right to just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose.Other state courts require a very exacting correspondence, described as the "specifi[c] and uniquely attributable" test. The Supreme Court of Illinois first developed this test in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N. E. 2d 799, 802 (1961).7 Under this standard,7 The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test has now been adopted by a minority of other courts. See, e. g., J. E. D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 585, 432 A. 2d 12, 15 (1981); Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Wayne, 66 N. J. 582, 600-601, 334 A. 2d 30, 40390if the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need, the exaction becomes "a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations." Id., at 381, 176 N. E. 2d, at 802. We do not think the Federal Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved.A number of state courts have taken an intermediate position, requiring the municipality to show a "reasonable relationship" between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed development. Typical is the Supreme Court of Nebraska's opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 245, 292 N. W. 2d 297, 301 (1980), where that court stated:"The distinction, therefore, which must be made between an appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain is whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or permit."Thus, the court held that a city may not require a property owner to dedicate private property for some future public use as a condition of obtaining a building permit when such future use is not "occasioned by the construction sought to be permitted." Id., at 248, 292 N. W. 2d, at 302.Some form of the reasonable relationship test has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. See, e. g., Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965); Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976) (requiring a showing of a reasonable relationship between(1975); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 176, 270 N. E. 2d 370, 374 (1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R. I. 63, 69, 264 A. 2d 910, 913 (1970).391the planned subdivision and the municipality's need for land); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S. W. 2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) (affirming use of the reasonable relation test). Despite any semantical differences, general agreement exists among the courts "that the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the needs created by the [development]." Ibid. See generally Note, "'Take' My Beach Please!":Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a RationalNexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 823 (1989); see also Parks v. Watson, 716We think the "reasonable relationship" test adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously discussed. But we do not adopt it as such, partly because the term "reasonable relationship" seems confusingly similar to the term "rational basis" which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.88JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent takes us to task for placing the burden on the city to justify the required dedication. He is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U. S., at 836. This conclusion is not, as he suggests, undermined by our decision in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977), in which we struck down a housing ordinance392JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent relies upon a law review article for the proposition that the city's conditional demands for part of petitioner's property are "a species of business regulation that heretofore warranted a strong presumption of constitutional validity." Post, at 402. But simply denominating a governmental measure as a "business regulation" does not immunize it from constitutional challenge on the ground that it violates a provision of the Bill of Rights. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), we held that a statute authorizing a warrantless search of business premises in order to detect OSHA violations violated the Fourth Amendment. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Colo. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861 (1974); New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987). And in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), we held that an order of the New York Public Service Commission, designed to cut down the use of electricity because of a fuel shortage, violated the First Amendment insofar as it prohibited advertising by a utility company to promote the use of electricity. We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances. We turn now to analysis of whether the findings relied upon by the city here, first with respect to the floodplain easement, and second with respect to the pedestrian/bicycle path, satisfied these requirements.It is axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious surface will increase the quantity and rate of storm water flow from petitioner's property. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 4,that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ordinance at issue in Moore intruded on choices concerning family living arrangements, an area in which the usual deference to the legislature was found to be inappropriate. Id., at 499.393p. 4-29. Therefore, keeping the floodplain open and free from development would likely confine the pressures on Fanno Creek created by petitioner's development. In fact, because petitioner's property lies within the Central Business District, the CDC already required that petitioner leave 15% of it as open space and the undeveloped floodplain would have nearly satisfied that requirement. App. to Pet. for Cert. G-16 to G-17. But the city demanded more-it not only wanted petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property along Fanno Creek for its greenway system. The city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control.The difference to petitioner, of course, is the loss of her ability to exclude others. As we have noted, this right to exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 176. It is difficult to see why recreational visitors trampling along petitioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek, and the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its request.The city contends that the recreational easement along the greenway is only ancillary to the city's chief purpose in controlling flood hazards. It further asserts that unlike the residential property at issue in Nollan, petitioner's property is commercial in character and, therefore, her right to exclude others is compromised. Brief for Respondent 41, quoting United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 142 (1973) (" 'The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home' "). The city maintains that "[t]here is nothing to suggest that preventing [petitioner] from prohibiting [the easements] will unreasonably impair the value of [her] property as a [retail store]." PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74,83 (1980).394Admittedly, petitioner wants to build a bigger store to attract members of the public to her property. She also wants, however, to be able to control the time and manner in which they enter. The recreational easement on the greenway is different in character from the exercise of state-protected rights of free expression and petition that we permitted in PruneYard. In PruneYard, we held that a major private shopping center that attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons had to provide access to persons exercising their state constitutional rights to distribute pamphlets and ask passers-by to sign their petitions. Id., at 85. We based our decision, in part, on the fact that the shopping center "may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions." Id., at 83. By contrast, the city wants to impose a permanent recreational easement upon petitioner's property that borders Fanno Creek. Petitioner would lose all rights to regulate the time in which the public entered onto the greenway, regardless of any interference it might pose with her retail store. Her right to exclude would not be regulated, it would be eviscerated.If petitioner's proposed development had somehow encroached on existing greenway space in the city, it would have been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some alternative greenway space for the public either on her property or elsewhere. See Nollan, 483 U. S., at 836 ("Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end"). But that is not the case here. We conclude that the findings upon which the city re-395lies do not show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and the petitioner's proposed new building.With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, we have no doubt that the city was correct in finding that the larger retail sales facility proposed by petitioner will increase traffic on the streets of the Central Business District. The city estimates that the proposed development would generate roughly 435 additional trips per day. 9 Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use. But on the record before us, the city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's development reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. The city simply found that the creation of the pathway "could offset some of the traffic demand ... and lessen the increase in traffic congestion." 10As Justice Peterson of the Supreme Court of Oregon explained in his dissenting opinion, however, "[t]he findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system 'could offset some of the traffic demand' is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand." 317 Ore., at 127, 854 P. 2d, at 447 (emphasis in original). No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in9The city uses a weekday average trip rate of 53.21 trips per 1,000 square feet. Additional Trips Generated = 53.21 x (17,600 -9,720). App. to Pet. for Cert. G-15.10 In rejecting petitioner's request for a variance from the pathway dedication condition, the city stated that omitting the planned section of the pathway across petitioner's property would conflict with its adopted policy of providing a continuous pathway system. But the Takings Clause requires the city to implement its policy by condemnation unless the required relationship between petitioner's development and added traffic is shown.396support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated.IVCities have long engaged in the commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization, particularly in metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city's goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and providing for public greenways, are laudable, but there are outer limits to how this may be done. "A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U. S., at 416.The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.It is so ordered | OCTOBER TERM, 1993SyllabusDOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARDCERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OREGON No. 93-518. Argued March 23, 1994-Decided June 24,1994The City Planning Commission of respondent city conditioned approval of petitioner Dolan's application to expand her store and pave her parking lot upon her compliance with dedication ofland (1) for a public greenway along Fanno Creek to minimize flooding that would be exacerbated by the increases in impervious surfaces associated with her development and (2) for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to relieve traffic congestion in the city's Central Business District. She appealed the commission's denial of her request for variances from these standards to the Land Use Board of Appeals (L UBA), alleging that the land dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development and therefore constituted an uncompensated taking of her property under the Fifth Amendment. LUBA found a reasonable relationship between (1) the development and the requirement to dedicate land for a greenway, since the larger building and paved lot would increase the impervious surfaces and thus the runoff into the creek, and (2) alleviating the impact of increased traffic from the development and facilitating the provision of a pathway as an alternative means of transportation. Both the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.Held: The city's dedication requirements constitute an uncompensated taking of property. Pp. 383-396.(a) Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit. In evaluating Dolan's claim, it must be determined whether an "essential nexus" exists between a legitimate state interest and the permit condition. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 837. If one does, then it must be decided whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of the proposed development. Id., at 834. Pp. 383-386.(b) Preventing flooding along Fanno Creek and reducing traffic congestion in the district are legitimate public purposes; and a nexus exists between the first purpose and limiting development within the creek's375floodplain and between the second purpose and providing for alternative means of transportation. Pp. 386-388.(c) In deciding the second question-whether the city's findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed on Dolan's permit-the necessary connection required by the Fifth Amendment is "rough proportionality." No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the proposed development's impact. This is essentially the "reasonable relationship" test adopted by the majority of the state courts. Pp.388-391.(d) The findings upon which the city relies do not show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and Dolan's proposed building. The Community Development Code already required that Dolan leave 15% of her property as open space, and the undeveloped floodplain would have nearly satisfied that requirement. However, the city has never said why a public, as opposed to a private, greenway is required in the interest of flood control. The difference to Dolan is the loss of her ability to exclude others from her property, yet the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its request. The city has also not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by Dolan's development reasonably relates to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pathway easement. The city must quantify its finding beyond a conclusory statement that the dedication could offset some of the traffic demand generated by the development. Pp. 392-396.317 Ore. 110,854 P. 2d 437, reversed and remanded.REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 396. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 411.David B. Smith argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.Timothy v: Ramis argued the cause for respondent.With him on the brief were James M. Coleman and Richard J. Lazarus.376Full Text of Opinion |
3,245 | 1964_399 | MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.In this case, we review for the first time a conviction under § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which makes it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or (except in clerical or custodial positions) as an employee of a labor union. [Footnote 1] Section 504, the purpose of which is to protect Page 381 U. S. 439 the national economy by minimizing the danger of political strikes, [Footnote 2] was enacted to replace § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which conditioned a union's access to the National Labor Relations Board upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union's officers attesting that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party. [Footnote 3] Page 381 U. S. 440Respondent has been a working longshoreman on the San Francisco docks, and an open and avowed Communist, for more than a quarter of a century. He was elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union for consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961. On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-count indictment returned in the Northern District of California with"knowingly and wilfully serv[ing] as a member of an executive board of a labor organization . . . while a member of the Communist Party, in wilful violation of Title 29, United States Code, Section 504."It was neither charged nor proven that respondent at any time advocated or suggested illegal activity by the union, or proposed a political strike. [Footnote 4] The jury found respondent guilty, and he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded with instructions to set aside the conviction and dismiss the indictment, holding that § 504 violates the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. 334 F.2d 488. We granted certiorari, 379 U.S. 899.Respondent urges -- in addition to the grounds relied on by the court below -- that the statute under which he was convicted is a bill of attainder, and therefore violates Art. I, § 9, of the Constitution. [Footnote 5] We agree that § 504 is void as a bill of attainder. and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on that basis. We therefore find it unnecessary to consider the First and Fifth Amendment arguments. Page 381 U. S. 441IThe provisions outlawing bills of attainder were adopted by the Constitutional Convention unanimously, and without debate. [Footnote 6]"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed (by the Congress)."Art. I, § 9, cl. 3."No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ."Art. I, § 10. A logical starting place for an inquiry into the meaning of the prohibition is its historical background. The bill of attainder, a parliamentary act sentencing to death one or more specific persons, was a device often resorted to in sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century England for dealing with persons who had attempted, or threatened to attempt, to overthrow the government. [Footnote 7] In addition to the death sentence, attainder generally carried with it a "corruption of blood," which meant that the attainted party's heirs could not inherit his property. [Footnote 8] The "bill of pains and penalties" was identical to the bill of attainder, except that it prescribed a penalty short of death, [Footnote 9] e.g., banishment, [Footnote 10] deprivation of the right to Page 381 U. S. 442 vote, [Footnote 11] or exclusion of the designated party's sons from Parliament. [Footnote 12] Most bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties named the parties to whom they were to apply; a few, however, simply described them. [Footnote 13] While some left the designated parties a way of escaping the penalty, others did not. [Footnote 14] The use of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties was not limited to England. During the American Revolution, the legislatures of all thirteen States passed statutes directed against the Tories; among these statutes were a large number of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties. [Footnote 15]While history thus provides some guidelines, the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitution bills of attainder indicates that the proper scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance to contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting to discern the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it was designed to eliminate. The best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or, more simply, trial by legislature.The Constitution divides the National Government into three branches -- Legislative, Executive and Judicial. Page 381 U. S. 443 This "separation of powers" was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against tyranny. For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given policy can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will. James Madison wrote:"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. [Footnote 16]"The doctrine of separated powers is implemented by a number of constitutional provisions, some of which entrust certain jobs exclusively to certain branches, while others say that a given task is not to be performed by a given branch. For example, Article III's grant of "the judicial Power of the United States" to federal courts has been interpreted both as a grant of exclusive authority over certain areas. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, and as a limitation upon the judiciary, a declaration that certain tasks are not to be performed by courts, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579.The authors of the Federalist Papers took the position that, although under some systems of government (most notably, the one from which the United States had just broken), the Executive Department is the branch most likely to forget the bounds of its authority,"in a representative republic . . . where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly . . . which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet Page 381 U. S. 444 not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions . . . ,"barriers had to be erected to ensure that the legislature would not overstep the bounds of its authority and perform the functions of the other departments. [Footnote 17] The Bill of Attainder Clause was regarded as such a barrier. Alexander Hamilton wrote:"Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions by letting into the government principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disqualification, disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The dangerous consequences of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disfranchise any number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes to a small number of partisans, and establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy; if it may banish at discretion all those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious, without hearing or trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he may be the innocent victim of a prevailing faction. The name of liberty applied to such a government would be a mockery of common sense. [Footnote 18] "Page 381 U. S. 445Thus, the Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one implementation of the general principle of fractionalized power, but also reflected the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness, of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons."Everyone must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly excited -- the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this mode. [Footnote 19] "Page 381 U. S. 446By banning bills of attainder, the Framers of the Constitution sought to guard against such dangers by limiting legislatures to the task of rulemaking."It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments."Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 136. [Footnote 20] Page 381 U. S. 447IIIt is in this spirit that the Bill of Attainder Clause was consistently interpreted by this Court -- until the decision in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, which we shall consider hereafter. In 1810, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 138, stated that "[a] bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both." This means, of course, that what were known at common law as bills of pains and penalties are outlawed by the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Court's pronouncement therefore served notice that the Bill of Attainder Clause was not to be given a narrow historical reading (which would exclude bills of pains and penalties), but was instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar: legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 25 U. S. 286.The approach which Chief Justice Marshall had suggested was followed in the twin post-Civil War cases of Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. Cummings involved the constitutionality of amendments to the Missouri Constitution of 1865 which provided that no one could engage in a number of specified professions (Cummings was a priest) unless he first swore that he had taken no part in the rebellion against the Union. At issue in Garland was a federal statute which required attorneys to take a similar oath before they could practice in federal courts. This Court struck down both provisions as bills of attainder on the ground that they were legislative acts inflicting punishment on a specific group: clergymen and lawyers who had taken part in the rebellion and therefore could not truthfully take the oath. In reaching its result, the Court emphatically rejected the argument that the constitutional Page 381 U. S. 448 prohibition outlawed only a certain class of legislatively imposed penalties:"The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification from office may be punishment, as in cases of conviction upon impeachment. Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from positions of trust, or from the privilege of appearing in the courts, or acting as an executor, administrator, or guardian, may also, and often has been, imposed as punishment."4 Wall. at 71 U. S. 320.The next extended discussion of the Bill of Attainder Clause [Footnote 21] came in 1946, in United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, where the Court invalidated § 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943, 57 Stat. 431, 450, which prohibited payment of further salary to three named federal employees, [Footnote 22] as a bill of attainder."[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable Page 381 U. S. 449 members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution. . . . This permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and of a most severe type. . . . No one would think that Congress could have passed a valid law, stating that after investigation it had found Lovett, Dodd, and Watson 'guilty' of the crime of engaging in 'subversive activities,' defined that term for the first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion from any government employment. Section 304, while it does not use that language, accomplishes that result."Id. at 328 U. S. 315-316. [Footnote 23]IIIUnder the line of cases just outlined, § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact Page 381 U. S. 450 legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use such positions to bring about political strikes. In § 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leave to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possess the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability -- members of the Communist Party. [Footnote 24]Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, lends support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1958 ed.). The definition of "Communist action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in § 3 of the Act:"[A]ny organization in the United States . . . which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Page 381 U. S. 451 Communist movement. . . ."64 Stat. 989, 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1958 ed.). A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that § 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations set forth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board had determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:"In this proceeding, the Board has found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtue of the activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at any time choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to § 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief."367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 87. The entire Court did not share the view of the majority that § 3's definition constituted rulemaking, rather than specification. [Footnote 25] See also Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716, 341 U. S. 723. However, language incorporated in the majority opinion indicates that there was agreement on one point: by focusing upon"the crucial constitutional significance of what Congress did when it rejected the approach of outlawing the Party by name, and accepted instead a statutory program regulating not enumerated organizations but designated activities,"367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 84-85, the majority clearly implied that, if the Act had applied to the Communist Party by name, it would have been a bill of attainder:"The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches not to specified organizations, but to described activities Page 381 U. S. 452 in which an organization may or may not engage. . . . The Subversive Activities Control Act . . . requires the registration only of organizations which, after the date of the Act, are found to be under the direction, domination, or control of certain foreign powers and to operate primarily to advance certain objectives. This finding must be made after full administrative hearing, subject to judicial review which opens the record for the reviewing court's determination whether the administrative findings as to fact are supported by the preponderance of the evidence."Id. at 367 U. S. 86-87. [Footnote 26] In this case, no disagreement over whether the statute in question designates a particular organization can arise, for § 504, in terms, inflicts its disqualification upon members of the Communist Party. The moment § 504 was enacted, respondent was given the choice of declining a leadership position in his union or incurring criminal liability. Page 381 U. S. 453The Solicitor General points out that, in Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441, this Court applied § 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, which provides:"No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank except in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may allow such service by general regulations when, in the judgment of the said Board, it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments. [Footnote 27]"He suggests that, for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause, such conflict of interest laws [Footnote 28] are not meaningfully distinguishable from the statute before us. We find this argument without merit. First, we note that § 504, unlike § 32 of the Banking Act, inflicts its deprivation upon the members of a political group thought to present a threat to the national security. As we noted above, such groups were the targets of the overwhelming majority of English and early American bills of attainder. Second, § 32 incorporates no judgment censuring or condemning Page 381 U. S. 454 any man or group of men. In enacting it, Congress relied upon its general knowledge of human psychology, and concluded that the concurrent holding of the two designated positions would present a temptation to any man -- not just certain men or members of a certain political party. Thus, insofar as § 32 incorporates a condemnation, it condemns all men. Third, we cannot accept the suggestion that § 32 constitutes an exercise in specification, rather than rulemaking. It seems to us clear that § 32 establishes an objective standard of conduct. Congress determined that a person who both (a) held a position in a bank which could be used to influence the investment policies of the bank or its customers, and (b) was in a position to benefit financially from investment in the securities handled by a particular underwriting house, might well be tempted to"use his influence in the bank to involve it or its customers in securities which his underwriting house has in its portfolio or has committed itself to take."329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 447. In designating bank officers, directors and employees as those persons in position (a), and officers, directors, partners and employees of underwriting houses as those persons in position (b), Congress merely expressed the characteristics it was trying to reach in an alternative, shorthand way. [Footnote 29] That Congress was legislating with Page 381 U. S. 455 respect to general characteristics, rather than with respect to a specific group of men, is well demonstrated by the fact that § 32 provides that the prescribed disqualification should not obtain whenever the Board of Governors determined that"it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments."We do not suggest that such an escape clause is essential to the constitutionality of § 32, but point to it only further to point up the infirmity of the suggestion that § 32, like § 504, incorporates an empirical judgment of, and inflicts its deprivation upon, a particular group of men.It is argued, however, that, in § 504, Congress did no more than it did in enacting § 32: it promulgated a general rule to the effect that persons possessing characteristics which make them likely to incite political strikes should not hold union office, and simply inserted in place of a list of those characteristics an alternative, shorthand criterion -- membership in the Communist Party. Again, we cannot agree. The designation of Communists as those persons likely to cause political strikes is not the substitution of a semantically equivalent phrase; on the contrary, it rests, as the Court in Douds explicitly recognized, 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 389, upon an empirical investigation by Congress of the acts, characteristics and propensities of Communist Party members. In a number of decisions, this Court has pointed out the fallacy of the suggestion that membership in the Communist Party, or any other political organization, can be regarded as an alternative, but equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable characteristics. For, as the Court noted in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 320 U. S. 136,"under our traditions, beliefs are personal, and not a matter of mere association, and . . . men, in adhering to a political party or other organization, notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly Page 381 U. S. 456 to all of its platforms or asserted principles. [Footnote 30]"Just last Term, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, we held § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act to violate the Constitution because it "too broadly and indiscriminately" restricted constitutionally protected freedoms. One of the factors which compelled us to reach this conclusion was that § 6 inflicted its deprivation upon all members of the Communist organizations without regard to whether there existed any demonstrable relationship between the characteristics of the person involved and the evil Congress sought to eliminate. Id. at 378 U. S. 509-511. These cases are relevant to the question before us. Even assuming that Congress had reason to conclude that some Communists would use union positions to bring about political strikes, "it cannot automatically be inferred that all members shar[e] their evil purposes or participat[e] in their illegal conduct." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 353 U. S. 246. In utilizing the term "members of the Communist Party" to designate those persons who are likely to incite political strikes, it plainly is not the case that Congress has merely substituted a convenient shorthand term for a list of the characteristics it was trying to reach. [Footnote 31]IVThe Solicitor General argues that § 504 is not a bill of attainder, because the prohibition it imposes does not constitute "punishment." In support of this conclusion, he urges that the statute was enacted for preventive, rather Page 381 U. S. 457 than retributive reasons -- that its aim is not to punish Communists for what they have done in the past, but rather to keep them from positions where they will in the future be able to bring about undesirable events. He relies on American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, which upheld § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, the predecessor of the statute presently before us. In Douds, the Court distinguished Cummings, Garland, and Lovett on the ground that, in those cases"the individuals involved were in fact being punished for past actions, whereas, in this case, they are subject to possible loss of position only because there is substantial ground for the congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future conduct."Id. at 339 U. S. 413.This case is not necessarily controlled by Douds. For, to prove its assertion that § 9(h) was preventive, rather than retributive, in purpose, [Footnote 32] the Court in Douds focused Page 381 U. S. 458 on the fact that members of the Communist Party could escape from the class of persons specified by Congress simply by resigning from the Party:"Here, the intention is to forestall future dangerous acts; there is no one who may not by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which impel him to action, become eligible to sign the affidavit. We cannot conclude that this section is a bill of attainder."Id. at 339 U. S. 414.Section 504, unlike § 9(h), disqualifies from the holding of union office not only present members of the Communist Party, but also anyone who has, within the past five years, been a member of the Party. However, even if we make the assumption that the five-year provision was inserted not out of desire to visit retribution, but purely out of a belief that failure to include it would lead to pro forma resignations from the Party which would not decrease the threat of political strikes, it still clearly appears that § 504 inflicts "punishment" within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It would be archaic to limit the definition of "punishment" to "retribution." Punishment serves several purposes; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent -- and preventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of attainder ban to instances of retribution. A number of English bills of attainder were enacted for preventive purposes -- that is, the legislature made a judgment, undoubtedly based largely on past acts and associations (as § 504 is), [Footnote 33] that a given person or group was likely to cause trouble (usually, overthrow the Page 381 U. S. 459 government), and therefore inflicted deprivations upon that person or group in order to keep it from bringing about the feared event. [Footnote 34] It is also clear that many of the early American bills attainting the Tories were passed in order to impede their effectively resisting the Revolution."In the progress of the conflict, and particularly in its earliest periods, attainder and confiscation had been resorted to generally, throughout the continent, as a means of war. But it is a fact important to the history of the revolting colonies that the acts prescribing penalties usually offered to the persons against whom they were directed the option of avoiding them by acknowledging their allegiance to the existing governments.""It was a preventive, not a vindictive, policy. In the same humane spirit, as the contest approached its close, and the necessity of these severities diminished, many of the states passed laws offering pardons Page 381 U. S. 460 to those who had been disfranchised, and restoring them to the enjoyment of their property. . . . [Footnote 35]"Thus, Justice Iredell was on solid historical ground when he observed, in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U. S. 399-400, that "attainders, on the principle of retaliation and proscription, have marked all the vicissitudes of party triumph." (Emphasis supplied.)We think that the Court in Douds misread United States v. Lovett when it suggested, 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 413, that that case could be distinguished on the ground that the sanction there imposed was levied for purely retributive reasons. In Lovett, the Court, after reviewing the legislative history of § 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 308-313, concluded that the statute was the product of a congressional drive to oust from government persons whose (congressionally determined) "subversive" tendencies made their continued employment dangerous to the national welfare:"the purpose of all who sponsored Section 304 . . . clearly was to 'purge' the then existing and all future lists of Government employees of those whom Congress deemed guilty of 'subversive activities,' and therefore 'unfit' to hold a federal job."Id. at 328 U. S. 314. Similarly, the purpose of the statute before us is to purge the governing boards of labor unions of those whom Congress regards as guilty of subversive acts and associations, and therefore unfit to fill positions which might affect interstate commerce. [Footnote 36] Page 381 U. S. 461The Solicitor General urges us to distinguish Lovett on the ground that the statute struck down there "singled out three identified individuals." It is, of course, true that § 504 does not contain the words "Archie Brown," and that it inflicts its deprivation upon more than three people. However, the decisions of this Court, as well as the historical background of the Bill of Attainder Clause, make it crystal clear that these are distinctions without a difference. It was not uncommon for English acts of attainder to inflict their deprivations upon relatively large groups of people, [Footnote 37] sometimes by description, rather than name. [Footnote 38] Moreover, the statutes voided in Cummings and Garland were of this nature. [Footnote 39] We cannot agree that the fact that § 504 inflicts its deprivation upon the membership of the Communist Party, rather than upon a list of named individuals, takes it out of the category of bills of attainder.We do not hold today that Congress cannot weed dangerous persons out of the labor movement, any more than the Court held in Lovett that subversives must be permitted to hold sensitive government positions. Rather, we make again the point made in Lovett: that Congress must accomplish such results by rules of general applicability. It cannot specify the people upon whom the sanction it prescribes is to be levied. Under our Constitution, Congress possesses full legislative authority, but the task of adjudication must be left to other tribunals. Page 381 U. S. 462This Court is always reluctant to declare that an Act of Congress violates the Constitution, but, in this case, we have no alternative. As Alexander Hamilton observed:"By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. [Footnote 40]"The judgment of the Court of Appeals isAffirmed | U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965)United States v. BrownNo. 399Argued March 29, 1965Decided June 7, 1965381 U.S. 437SyllabusRespondent was convicted under §504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which makes it a crime for one who belongs to the Communist Party or who has been a member thereof during the preceding five years wilfully to serve as a member of the executive board of a labor organization. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding § 504 violative of the First and Fifth Amendments.Held: Section 504 constitutes a bill of attainder, and is therefore unconstitutional. Pp. 381 U. S. 441-462.(a) The Bill of Attainder Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, was intended to implement the separation of powers among the three branches of the Government by guarding against the legislative exercise of judicial power. Pp. 381 U. S. 441-446.(b) The Bill of Attainder Clause is to be liberally construed in the light of its purpose to prevent legislative punishment of designated persons or groups. Cummins v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. Pp. 381 U. S. 447-449.(c) In designating Communist Party members as those persons who cannot hold union office, Congress has exceeded its Commerce Clause power to enact generally applicable legislation disqualifying from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use such positions to cause political strikes. Pp. 381 U. S. 449-452.(d) Section 504 is distinguishable from such conflict of interest statutes as § 32 of the Banking Act, where Congress was legislating with respect to general characteristics, rather than with respect to the members of a specific group. Pp. 381 U. S. 453-455.(e) The designation of Communist Party membership cannot be justified as an alternative, "shorthand" expression for the characteristics which render men likely to incite political strikes. Pp. 381 U. S. 455-456.(f) A statute which inflicts its deprivation upon named or described persons or groups constitutes a bill of attainder whether its aim is retributive, punishing past acts, or preventive, discouraging future conduct. In America Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, where the Court upheld § 9(h) of the National Page 381 U. S. 438 Labor Relations Act, the predecessor of § 504, the Court erroneously assumed that only a law visiting retribution for past acts could constitute a bill of attainder, and misread the statute involved in United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, which it sought to distinguish from § 9(h), as being in that category. Pp. 381 U. S. 456-460.(g) The legislative specification of those to whom the enacted sanction is to apply invalidates a provision as a bill of attainder whether the individuals are designated by name, as in Lovett, or by description, as here. Pp. 381 U. S. 461-462.334 F.2d 488, affirmed. |
Subsets and Splits