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<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
{
int sx, sy;
int dx, dy;
int width, height;
int depth;
int notify = 0;
depth = s->get_bpp((VGAState *)s) / 8;
s->get_resolution((VGAState *)s, &width, &height);
/* extra x, y */
sx = (src % (width * depth)) / depth;
sy = (src / (width * depth));
dx = (dst % (width *depth)) / depth;
dy = (dst / (width * depth));
/* normalize width */
w /= depth;
/* if we're doing a backward copy, we have to adjust
our x/y to be the upper left corner (instead of the lower
right corner) */
if (s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch < 0) {
sx -= (s->cirrus_blt_width / depth) - 1;
dx -= (s->cirrus_blt_width / depth) - 1;
sy -= s->cirrus_blt_height - 1;
dy -= s->cirrus_blt_height - 1;
}
/* are we in the visible portion of memory? */
if (sx >= 0 && sy >= 0 && dx >= 0 && dy >= 0 &&
(sx + w) <= width && (sy + h) <= height &&
(dx + w) <= width && (dy + h) <= height) {
notify = 1;
}
/* make to sure only copy if it's a plain copy ROP */
if (*s->cirrus_rop != cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_src &&
*s->cirrus_rop != cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_src)
notify = 0;
/* we have to flush all pending changes so that the copy
is generated at the appropriate moment in time */
if (notify)
vga_hw_update();
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
if (notify)
s->ds->dpy_copy(s->ds,
sx, sy, dx, dy,
s->cirrus_blt_width / depth,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
/* we don't have to notify the display that this portion has
changed since dpy_copy implies this */
if (!notify)
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possibly other products, might allow local users to execute arbitrary
| code via unspecified vectors related to "attempting to mark
| non-existent regions as dirty," aka the "bitblt" heap overflow.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@4340 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
if (s->ds->dpy_copy) {
cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
} else {
if (BLTUNSAFE(s))
return 0;
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
s->vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
}
return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'CVE-2008-4539: fix a heap overflow in Cirrus emulation
The code in hw/cirrus_vga.c has changed a lot between CVE-2007-1320 has
been announced and the patch has been applied. As a consequence it has
wrongly applied and QEMU is still vulnerable to this bug if using VNC.
(noticed by Jan Niehusmann)
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@5587 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int putreg(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned long regno, unsigned long value)
{
unsigned long tmp;
/* Some code in the 64bit emulation may not be 64bit clean.
Don't take any chances. */
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_IA32))
value &= 0xffffffff;
switch (regno) {
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.fsindex = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.gsindex = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ds):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.ds = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,es):
if (value && (value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
child->thread.es = value & 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ss):
if ((value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
value &= 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs_base):
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
child->thread.fs = value;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs_base):
if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
child->thread.gs = value;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, eflags):
value &= FLAG_MASK;
tmp = get_stack_long(child, EFL_OFFSET);
tmp &= ~FLAG_MASK;
value |= tmp;
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,cs):
if ((value & 3) != 3)
return -EIO;
value &= 0xffff;
break;
}
put_stack_long(child, regno - sizeof(struct pt_regs), value);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'x86_64: Zero extend all registers after ptrace in 32bit entry path.
Strictly it's only needed for eax.
It actually does a little more than strictly needed -- the other registers
are already zero extended.
Also remove the now unnecessary and non functional compat task check
in ptrace.
This is CVE-2007-4573
Found by Wojciech Purczynski
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: ProcShmCreatePixmap(client)
register ClientPtr client;
{
PixmapPtr pMap;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
DepthPtr pDepth;
register int i, rc;
ShmDescPtr shmdesc;
REQUEST(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
unsigned int width, height, depth;
unsigned long size;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
client->errorValue = stuff->pid;
if (!sharedPixmaps)
return BadImplementation;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->pid, client);
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, M_ANY,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
VERIFY_SHMPTR(stuff->shmseg, stuff->offset, TRUE, shmdesc, client);
width = stuff->width;
height = stuff->height;
depth = stuff->depth;
if (!width || !height || !depth)
{
client->errorValue = 0;
return BadValue;
}
if (width > 32767 || height > 32767)
return BadAlloc;
if (stuff->depth != 1)
{
pDepth = pDraw->pScreen->allowedDepths;
for (i=0; i<pDraw->pScreen->numDepths; i++, pDepth++)
if (pDepth->depth == stuff->depth)
goto CreatePmap;
client->errorValue = stuff->depth;
return BadValue;
}
CreatePmap:
size = PixmapBytePad(width, depth) * height;
if (sizeof(size) == 4 && BitsPerPixel(depth) > 8) {
if (size < width * height)
return BadAlloc;
/* thankfully, offset is unsigned */
if (stuff->offset + size < size)
return BadAlloc;
}
VERIFY_SHMSIZE(shmdesc, stuff->offset, size, client);
pMap = (*shmFuncs[pDraw->pScreen->myNum]->CreatePixmap)(
pDraw->pScreen, stuff->width,
stuff->height, stuff->depth,
shmdesc->addr + stuff->offset);
if (pMap)
{
rc = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP,
pMap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
if (rc != Success) {
pDraw->pScreen->DestroyPixmap(pMap);
return rc;
}
dixSetPrivate(&pMap->devPrivates, shmPixmapPrivate, shmdesc);
shmdesc->refcnt++;
pMap->drawable.serialNumber = NEXT_SERIAL_NUMBER;
pMap->drawable.id = stuff->pid;
if (AddResource(stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP, (pointer)pMap))
{
return(client->noClientException);
}
pDraw->pScreen->DestroyPixmap(pMap);
}
return (BadAlloc);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'CVE-2007-6429: Always test for size+offset wrapping.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka,
compat_sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct sigframe __user *frame;
void __user *restorer;
int err = 0;
/* copy_to_user optimizes that into a single 8 byte store */
static const struct {
u16 poplmovl;
u32 val;
u16 int80;
u16 pad;
} __attribute__((packed)) code = {
0xb858, /* popl %eax ; movl $...,%eax */
__NR_ia32_sigreturn,
0x80cd, /* int $0x80 */
0,
};
frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto give_sigsegv;
err |= __put_user(sig, &frame->sig);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
err |= ia32_setup_sigcontext(&frame->sc, &frame->fpstate, regs,
set->sig[0]);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
if (_COMPAT_NSIG_WORDS > 1) {
err |= __copy_to_user(frame->extramask, &set->sig[1],
sizeof(frame->extramask));
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
}
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
} else {
/* Return stub is in 32bit vsyscall page */
if (current->binfmt->hasvdso)
restorer = VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso,
sigreturn);
else
restorer = &frame->retcode;
}
err |= __put_user(ptr_to_compat(restorer), &frame->pretcode);
/*
* These are actually not used anymore, but left because some
* gdb versions depend on them as a marker.
*/
err |= __copy_to_user(frame->retcode, &code, 8);
if (err)
goto give_sigsegv;
/* Set up registers for signal handler */
regs->sp = (unsigned long) frame;
regs->ip = (unsigned long) ka->sa.sa_handler;
/* Make -mregparm=3 work */
regs->ax = sig;
regs->dx = 0;
regs->cx = 0;
asm volatile("movl %0,%%ds" :: "r" (__USER32_DS));
asm volatile("movl %0,%%es" :: "r" (__USER32_DS));
regs->cs = __USER32_CS;
regs->ss = __USER32_DS;
set_fs(USER_DS);
regs->flags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP);
#if DEBUG_SIG
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SIG deliver (%s:%d): sp=%p pc=%lx ra=%u\n",
current->comm, current->pid, frame, regs->ip, frame->pretcode);
#endif
return 0;
give_sigsegv:
force_sigsegv(sig, current);
return -EFAULT;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correctly cleared at the entry of a function.
This patches changes the setup_frame() functions to clear the
direction before entering the signal handler.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * compress_data,
int compress_size,
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext, uint8_t type)
{
uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16_t c_length;
uint8_t pad;
int length;
digest_hd_st td;
uint16_t blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
uint8_t major, minor;
gnutls_protocol_t ver;
int hash_size =
_gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (session->security_parameters.
read_mac_algorithm);
ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
minor = _gnutls_version_get_minor (ver);
major = _gnutls_version_get_major (ver);
blocksize = _gnutls_cipher_get_block_size (session->security_parameters.
read_bulk_cipher_algorithm);
/* initialize MAC
*/
ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm,
session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.data,
session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.size, ver);
if (ret < 0
&& session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* actual decryption (inplace)
*/
switch (_gnutls_cipher_is_block
(session->security_parameters.read_bulk_cipher_algorithm))
{
case CIPHER_STREAM:
if ((ret = _gnutls_cipher_decrypt (&session->connection_state.
read_cipher_state,
ciphertext.data,
ciphertext.size)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size;
break;
case CIPHER_BLOCK:
if ((ciphertext.size < blocksize) || (ciphertext.size % blocksize != 0))
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
if ((ret = _gnutls_cipher_decrypt (&session->connection_state.
read_cipher_state,
ciphertext.data,
ciphertext.size)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* ignore the IV in TLS 1.1.
*/
if (session->security_parameters.version >= GNUTLS_TLS1_1)
{
ciphertext.size -= blocksize;
ciphertext.data += blocksize;
if (ciphertext.size == 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
}
pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1; /* pad */
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad;
if (pad > ciphertext.size - hash_size)
{
gnutls_assert ();
/* We do not fail here. We check below for the
* the pad_failed. If zero means success.
*/
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
/* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x)
*/
if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1 && pad_failed == 0)
for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
{
if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] !=
ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1])
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
break;
default:
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (length < 0)
length = 0;
c_length = _gnutls_conv_uint16 ((uint16_t) length);
/* Pass the type, version, length and compressed through
* MAC.
*/
if (session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{
_gnutls_hmac (&td,
UINT64DATA (session->connection_state.
read_sequence_number), 8);
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &type, 1);
if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1)
{ /* TLS 1.x */
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &major, 1);
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &minor, 1);
}
_gnutls_hmac (&td, &c_length, 2);
if (length > 0)
_gnutls_hmac (&td, ciphertext.data, length);
mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
}
/* This one was introduced to avoid a timing attack against the TLS
* 1.0 protocol.
*/
if (pad_failed != 0)
return pad_failed;
/* HMAC was not the same.
*/
if (memcmp (MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
/* copy the decrypted stuff to compress_data.
*/
if (compress_size < length)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED;
}
memcpy (compress_data, ciphertext.data, length);
return length;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix GNUTLS-SA-2008-1 security vulnerabilities.
See http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/security.html for updates.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static struct dentry *__lookup_hash(struct qstr *name,
struct dentry *base, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
int err;
inode = base->d_inode;
/*
* See if the low-level filesystem might want
* to use its own hash..
*/
if (base->d_op && base->d_op->d_hash) {
err = base->d_op->d_hash(base, name);
dentry = ERR_PTR(err);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
dentry = cached_lookup(base, name, nd);
if (!dentry) {
struct dentry *new = d_alloc(base, name);
dentry = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!new)
goto out;
dentry = inode->i_op->lookup(inode, new, nd);
if (!dentry)
dentry = new;
else
dput(new);
}
out:
return dentry;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-120'], 'message': '[patch] vfs: fix lookup on deleted directory
Lookup can install a child dentry for a deleted directory. This keeps
the directory dentry alive, and the inode pinned in the cache and on
disk, even after all external references have gone away.
This isn't a big problem normally, since memory pressure or umount
will clear out the directory dentry and its children, releasing the
inode. But for UBIFS this causes problems because its orphan area can
overflow.
Fix this by returning ENOENT for all lookups on a S_DEAD directory
before creating a child dentry.
Thanks to Zoltan Sogor for noticing this while testing UBIFS, and
Artem for the excellent analysis of the problem and testing.
Reported-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int run_diff_files(struct rev_info *revs, unsigned int option)
{
int entries, i;
int diff_unmerged_stage = revs->max_count;
int silent_on_removed = option & DIFF_SILENT_ON_REMOVED;
unsigned ce_option = ((option & DIFF_RACY_IS_MODIFIED)
? CE_MATCH_RACY_IS_DIRTY : 0);
char symcache[PATH_MAX];
if (diff_unmerged_stage < 0)
diff_unmerged_stage = 2;
entries = active_nr;
symcache[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) {
struct stat st;
unsigned int oldmode, newmode;
struct cache_entry *ce = active_cache[i];
int changed;
if (DIFF_OPT_TST(&revs->diffopt, QUIET) &&
DIFF_OPT_TST(&revs->diffopt, HAS_CHANGES))
break;
if (!ce_path_match(ce, revs->prune_data))
continue;
if (ce_stage(ce)) {
struct combine_diff_path *dpath;
int num_compare_stages = 0;
size_t path_len;
path_len = ce_namelen(ce);
dpath = xmalloc(combine_diff_path_size(5, path_len));
dpath->path = (char *) &(dpath->parent[5]);
dpath->next = NULL;
dpath->len = path_len;
memcpy(dpath->path, ce->name, path_len);
dpath->path[path_len] = '\0';
hashclr(dpath->sha1);
memset(&(dpath->parent[0]), 0,
sizeof(struct combine_diff_parent)*5);
changed = check_removed(ce, &st);
if (!changed)
dpath->mode = ce_mode_from_stat(ce, st.st_mode);
else {
if (changed < 0) {
perror(ce->name);
continue;
}
if (silent_on_removed)
continue;
}
while (i < entries) {
struct cache_entry *nce = active_cache[i];
int stage;
if (strcmp(ce->name, nce->name))
break;
/* Stage #2 (ours) is the first parent,
* stage #3 (theirs) is the second.
*/
stage = ce_stage(nce);
if (2 <= stage) {
int mode = nce->ce_mode;
num_compare_stages++;
hashcpy(dpath->parent[stage-2].sha1, nce->sha1);
dpath->parent[stage-2].mode = ce_mode_from_stat(nce, mode);
dpath->parent[stage-2].status =
DIFF_STATUS_MODIFIED;
}
/* diff against the proper unmerged stage */
if (stage == diff_unmerged_stage)
ce = nce;
i++;
}
/*
* Compensate for loop update
*/
i--;
if (revs->combine_merges && num_compare_stages == 2) {
show_combined_diff(dpath, 2,
revs->dense_combined_merges,
revs);
free(dpath);
continue;
}
free(dpath);
dpath = NULL;
/*
* Show the diff for the 'ce' if we found the one
* from the desired stage.
*/
diff_unmerge(&revs->diffopt, ce->name, 0, null_sha1);
if (ce_stage(ce) != diff_unmerged_stage)
continue;
}
if (ce_uptodate(ce))
continue;
changed = check_removed(ce, &st);
if (changed) {
if (changed < 0) {
perror(ce->name);
continue;
}
if (silent_on_removed)
continue;
diff_addremove(&revs->diffopt, '-', ce->ce_mode,
ce->sha1, ce->name, NULL);
continue;
}
changed = ce_match_stat(ce, &st, ce_option);
if (!changed) {
ce_mark_uptodate(ce);
if (!DIFF_OPT_TST(&revs->diffopt, FIND_COPIES_HARDER))
continue;
}
oldmode = ce->ce_mode;
newmode = ce_mode_from_stat(ce, st.st_mode);
diff_change(&revs->diffopt, oldmode, newmode,
ce->sha1, (changed ? null_sha1 : ce->sha1),
ce->name, NULL);
}
diffcore_std(&revs->diffopt);
diff_flush(&revs->diffopt);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fix buffer overflow in git diff
If PATH_MAX on your system is smaller than a path stored, it may cause
buffer overflow and stack corruption in diff_addremove() and diff_change()
functions when running git-diff
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Potapov <dpotapov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int exstack)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
unsigned long addr;
int ret;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
ret = addr;
goto up_fail;
}
vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vma) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto up_fail;
}
vma->vm_start = addr;
vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
/* MAYWRITE to allow gdb to COW and set breakpoints */
vma->vm_flags = VM_READ|VM_EXEC|VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYEXEC|VM_MAYWRITE;
/*
* Make sure the vDSO gets into every core dump.
* Dumping its contents makes post-mortem fully interpretable later
* without matching up the same kernel and hardware config to see
* what PC values meant.
*/
vma->vm_flags |= VM_ALWAYSDUMP;
vma->vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 7];
vma->vm_ops = &syscall_vm_ops;
vma->vm_mm = mm;
ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
goto up_fail;
}
current->mm->context.vdso = (void *)addr;
current_thread_info()->sysenter_return =
(void *)VDSO_SYM(&SYSENTER_RETURN);
mm->total_vm++;
up_fail:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': '[PATCH] i386 vDSO: use install_special_mapping
This patch uses install_special_mapping for the i386 vDSO setup, consolidating
duplicated code.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: jpc_mqdec_t *jpc_mqdec_create(int maxctxs, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_mqdec_t *mqdec;
/* There must be at least one context. */
assert(maxctxs > 0);
/* Allocate memory for the MQ decoder. */
if (!(mqdec = jas_malloc(sizeof(jpc_mqdec_t)))) {
goto error;
}
mqdec->in = in;
mqdec->maxctxs = maxctxs;
/* Allocate memory for the per-context state information. */
if (!(mqdec->ctxs = jas_malloc(mqdec->maxctxs * sizeof(jpc_mqstate_t *)))) {
goto error;
}
/* Set the current context to the first context. */
mqdec->curctx = mqdec->ctxs;
/* If an input stream has been associated with the MQ decoder,
initialize the decoder state from the stream. */
if (mqdec->in) {
jpc_mqdec_init(mqdec);
}
/* Initialize the per-context state information. */
jpc_mqdec_setctxs(mqdec, 0, 0);
return mqdec;
error:
/* Oops... Something has gone wrong. */
if (mqdec) {
jpc_mqdec_destroy(mqdec);
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: jpc_mqenc_t *jpc_mqenc_create(int maxctxs, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_mqenc_t *mqenc;
/* Allocate memory for the MQ encoder. */
if (!(mqenc = jas_malloc(sizeof(jpc_mqenc_t)))) {
goto error;
}
mqenc->out = out;
mqenc->maxctxs = maxctxs;
/* Allocate memory for the per-context state information. */
if (!(mqenc->ctxs = jas_malloc(mqenc->maxctxs * sizeof(jpc_mqstate_t *)))) {
goto error;
}
/* Set the current context to the first one. */
mqenc->curctx = mqenc->ctxs;
jpc_mqenc_init(mqenc);
/* Initialize the per-context state information to something sane. */
jpc_mqenc_setctxs(mqenc, 0, 0);
return mqenc;
error:
if (mqenc) {
jpc_mqenc_destroy(mqenc);
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void jpc_qmfb_split_col(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register int n;
register int m;
int hstartcol;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_malloc(bufsize * sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numrows >= 2) {
hstartcol = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
m = (parity) ? hstartcol : (numrows - hstartcol);
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
++dstptr;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
srcptr = &a[(2 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += stride;
srcptr += stride << 1;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartcol * stride];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += stride;
++srcptr;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int jas_cmshapmatlut_invert(jas_cmshapmatlut_t *invlut,
jas_cmshapmatlut_t *lut, int n)
{
int i;
int j;
int k;
jas_cmreal_t ax;
jas_cmreal_t ay;
jas_cmreal_t bx;
jas_cmreal_t by;
jas_cmreal_t sx;
jas_cmreal_t sy;
assert(n >= 2);
if (invlut->data) {
jas_free(invlut->data);
invlut->data = 0;
}
/* The sample values should be nondecreasing. */
for (i = 1; i < lut->size; ++i) {
if (lut->data[i - 1] > lut->data[i]) {
assert(0);
return -1;
}
}
if (!(invlut->data = jas_malloc(n * sizeof(jas_cmreal_t))))
return -1;
invlut->size = n;
for (i = 0; i < invlut->size; ++i) {
sy = ((double) i) / (invlut->size - 1);
sx = 1.0;
for (j = 0; j < lut->size; ++j) {
ay = lut->data[j];
if (sy == ay) {
for (k = j + 1; k < lut->size; ++k) {
by = lut->data[k];
if (by != sy)
break;
#if 0
assert(0);
#endif
}
if (k < lut->size) {
--k;
ax = ((double) j) / (lut->size - 1);
bx = ((double) k) / (lut->size - 1);
sx = (ax + bx) / 2.0;
}
break;
}
if (j < lut->size - 1) {
by = lut->data[j + 1];
if (sy > ay && sy < by) {
ax = ((double) j) / (lut->size - 1);
bx = ((double) j + 1) / (lut->size - 1);
sx = ax +
(sy - ay) / (by - ay) * (bx - ax);
break;
}
}
}
invlut->data[i] = sx;
}
#if 0
for (i=0;i<lut->size;++i)
jas_eprintf("lut[%d]=%f ", i, lut->data[i]);
for (i=0;i<invlut->size;++i)
jas_eprintf("invlut[%d]=%f ", i, invlut->data[i]);
#endif
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int jpc_enc_enccblk(jpc_enc_t *enc, jas_stream_t *out, jpc_enc_tcmpt_t *tcmpt, jpc_enc_band_t *band, jpc_enc_cblk_t *cblk)
{
jpc_enc_pass_t *pass;
jpc_enc_pass_t *endpasses;
int bitpos;
int n;
int adjust;
int ret;
int passtype;
int t;
jpc_bitstream_t *bout;
jpc_enc_pass_t *termpass;
jpc_enc_rlvl_t *rlvl;
int vcausal;
int segsym;
int termmode;
int c;
bout = 0;
rlvl = band->rlvl;
cblk->stream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0);
assert(cblk->stream);
cblk->mqenc = jpc_mqenc_create(JPC_NUMCTXS, cblk->stream);
assert(cblk->mqenc);
jpc_mqenc_setctxs(cblk->mqenc, JPC_NUMCTXS, jpc_mqctxs);
cblk->numpasses = (cblk->numbps > 0) ? (3 * cblk->numbps - 2) : 0;
if (cblk->numpasses > 0) {
cblk->passes = jas_malloc(cblk->numpasses * sizeof(jpc_enc_pass_t));
assert(cblk->passes);
} else {
cblk->passes = 0;
}
endpasses = (cblk->passes) ? &cblk->passes[cblk->numpasses] : 0;
for (pass = cblk->passes; pass != endpasses; ++pass) {
pass->start = 0;
pass->end = 0;
pass->term = JPC_ISTERMINATED(pass - cblk->passes, 0, cblk->numpasses, (tcmpt->cblksty & JPC_COX_TERMALL) != 0, (tcmpt->cblksty & JPC_COX_LAZY) != 0);
pass->type = JPC_SEGTYPE(pass - cblk->passes, 0, (tcmpt->cblksty & JPC_COX_LAZY) != 0);
pass->lyrno = -1;
if (pass == endpasses - 1) {
assert(pass->term == 1);
pass->term = 1;
}
}
cblk->flags = jas_matrix_create(jas_matrix_numrows(cblk->data) + 2,
jas_matrix_numcols(cblk->data) + 2);
assert(cblk->flags);
bitpos = cblk->numbps - 1;
pass = cblk->passes;
n = cblk->numpasses;
while (--n >= 0) {
if (pass->type == JPC_SEG_MQ) {
/* NOP */
} else {
assert(pass->type == JPC_SEG_RAW);
if (!bout) {
bout = jpc_bitstream_sopen(cblk->stream, "w");
assert(bout);
}
}
#if 1
passtype = (pass - cblk->passes + 2) % 3;
#else
passtype = JPC_PASSTYPE(pass - cblk->passes + 2);
#endif
pass->start = jas_stream_tell(cblk->stream);
#if 0
assert(jas_stream_tell(cblk->stream) == jas_stream_getrwcount(cblk->stream));
#endif
assert(bitpos >= 0);
vcausal = (tcmpt->cblksty & JPC_COX_VSC) != 0;
segsym = (tcmpt->cblksty & JPC_COX_SEGSYM) != 0;
if (pass->term) {
termmode = ((tcmpt->cblksty & JPC_COX_PTERM) ?
JPC_MQENC_PTERM : JPC_MQENC_DEFTERM) + 1;
} else {
termmode = 0;
}
switch (passtype) {
case JPC_SIGPASS:
ret = (pass->type == JPC_SEG_MQ) ? jpc_encsigpass(cblk->mqenc,
bitpos, band->orient, vcausal, cblk->flags,
cblk->data, termmode, &pass->nmsedec) :
jpc_encrawsigpass(bout, bitpos, vcausal, cblk->flags,
cblk->data, termmode, &pass->nmsedec);
break;
case JPC_REFPASS:
ret = (pass->type == JPC_SEG_MQ) ? jpc_encrefpass(cblk->mqenc,
bitpos, vcausal, cblk->flags, cblk->data, termmode,
&pass->nmsedec) : jpc_encrawrefpass(bout, bitpos,
vcausal, cblk->flags, cblk->data, termmode,
&pass->nmsedec);
break;
case JPC_CLNPASS:
assert(pass->type == JPC_SEG_MQ);
ret = jpc_encclnpass(cblk->mqenc, bitpos, band->orient,
vcausal, segsym, cblk->flags, cblk->data, termmode,
&pass->nmsedec);
break;
default:
assert(0);
break;
}
if (pass->type == JPC_SEG_MQ) {
if (pass->term) {
jpc_mqenc_init(cblk->mqenc);
}
jpc_mqenc_getstate(cblk->mqenc, &pass->mqencstate);
pass->end = jas_stream_tell(cblk->stream);
if (tcmpt->cblksty & JPC_COX_RESET) {
jpc_mqenc_setctxs(cblk->mqenc, JPC_NUMCTXS, jpc_mqctxs);
}
} else {
if (pass->term) {
if (jpc_bitstream_pending(bout)) {
jpc_bitstream_outalign(bout, 0x2a);
}
jpc_bitstream_close(bout);
bout = 0;
pass->end = jas_stream_tell(cblk->stream);
} else {
pass->end = jas_stream_tell(cblk->stream) +
jpc_bitstream_pending(bout);
/* NOTE - This will not work. need to adjust by # of pending output bytes */
}
}
#if 0
/* XXX - This assertion fails sometimes when various coding modes are used.
This seems to be harmless, but why does it happen at all? */
assert(jas_stream_tell(cblk->stream) == jas_stream_getrwcount(cblk->stream));
#endif
pass->wmsedec = jpc_fixtodbl(band->rlvl->tcmpt->synweight) *
jpc_fixtodbl(band->rlvl->tcmpt->synweight) *
jpc_fixtodbl(band->synweight) *
jpc_fixtodbl(band->synweight) *
jpc_fixtodbl(band->absstepsize) * jpc_fixtodbl(band->absstepsize) *
((double) (1 << bitpos)) * ((double)(1 << bitpos)) *
jpc_fixtodbl(pass->nmsedec);
pass->cumwmsedec = pass->wmsedec;
if (pass != cblk->passes) {
pass->cumwmsedec += pass[-1].cumwmsedec;
}
if (passtype == JPC_CLNPASS) {
--bitpos;
}
++pass;
}
#if 0
dump_passes(cblk->passes, cblk->numpasses, cblk);
#endif
n = 0;
endpasses = (cblk->passes) ? &cblk->passes[cblk->numpasses] : 0;
for (pass = cblk->passes; pass != endpasses; ++pass) {
if (pass->start < n) {
pass->start = n;
}
if (pass->end < n) {
pass->end = n;
}
if (!pass->term) {
termpass = pass;
while (termpass - pass < cblk->numpasses &&
!termpass->term) {
++termpass;
}
if (pass->type == JPC_SEG_MQ) {
t = (pass->mqencstate.lastbyte == 0xff) ? 1 : 0;
if (pass->mqencstate.ctreg >= 5) {
adjust = 4 + t;
} else {
adjust = 5 + t;
}
pass->end += adjust;
}
if (pass->end > termpass->end) {
pass->end = termpass->end;
}
if ((c = getthebyte(cblk->stream, pass->end - 1)) == EOF) {
abort();
}
if (c == 0xff) {
++pass->end;
}
n = JAS_MAX(n, pass->end);
} else {
n = JAS_MAX(n, pass->end);
}
}
#if 0
dump_passes(cblk->passes, cblk->numpasses, cblk);
#endif
if (bout) {
jpc_bitstream_close(bout);
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps) {
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_malloc(siz->numcomps * sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int jp2_pclr_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
int lutsize;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int j;
int_fast32_t x;
pclr->lutdata = 0;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &pclr->numlutents) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
lutsize = pclr->numlutents * pclr->numchans;
if (!(pclr->lutdata = jas_malloc(lutsize * sizeof(int_fast32_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(pclr->bpc = jas_malloc(pclr->numchans * sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numchans; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->bpc[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numlutents; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < pclr->numchans; ++j) {
if (jp2_getint(in, (pclr->bpc[j] & 0x80) != 0,
(pclr->bpc[j] & 0x7f) + 1, &x)) {
return -1;
}
pclr->lutdata[i * pclr->numchans + j] = x;
}
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: _dbus_marshal_validate_test (void)
{
DBusString str;
int i;
const char *valid_paths[] = {
"/",
"/foo/bar",
"/foo",
"/foo/bar/baz"
};
const char *invalid_paths[] = {
"bar",
"bar/baz",
"/foo/bar/",
"/foo/"
"foo/",
"boo//blah",
"//",
"///",
"foo///blah/",
"Hello World",
"",
" ",
"foo bar"
};
const char *valid_interfaces[] = {
"org.freedesktop.Foo",
"Bar.Baz",
"Blah.Blah.Blah.Blah.Blah",
"a.b",
"a.b.c.d.e.f.g",
"a0.b1.c2.d3.e4.f5.g6",
"abc123.foo27"
};
const char *invalid_interfaces[] = {
".",
"",
"..",
".Foo.Bar",
"..Foo.Bar",
"Foo.Bar.",
"Foo.Bar..",
"Foo",
"9foo.bar.baz",
"foo.bar..baz",
"foo.bar...baz",
"foo.bar.b..blah",
":",
":0-1",
"10",
":11.34324",
"0.0.0",
"0..0",
"foo.Bar.%",
"foo.Bar!!",
"!Foo.bar.bz",
"foo.$.blah",
"",
" ",
"foo bar"
};
const char *valid_unique_names[] = {
":0",
":a",
":",
":.a",
":.1",
":0.1",
":000.2222",
":.blah",
":abce.freedesktop.blah"
};
const char *invalid_unique_names[] = {
//":-",
":!",
//":0-10",
":blah.",
":blah.",
":blah..org",
":blah.org..",
":..blah.org",
"",
" ",
"foo bar"
};
const char *valid_members[] = {
"Hello",
"Bar",
"foobar",
"_foobar",
"foo89"
};
const char *invalid_members[] = {
"9Hello",
"10",
"1",
"foo-bar",
"blah.org",
".blah",
"blah.",
"Hello.",
"!foo",
"",
" ",
"foo bar"
};
const char *valid_signatures[] = {
"",
"sss",
"i",
"b"
};
const char *invalid_signatures[] = {
" ",
"not a valid signature",
"123",
".",
"("
};
/* Signature with reason */
run_validity_tests (signature_tests, _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (signature_tests),
_dbus_validate_signature_with_reason);
/* Path validation */
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (valid_paths))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, valid_paths[i]);
if (!_dbus_validate_path (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Path \"%s\" should have been valid\n", valid_paths[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid path");
}
++i;
}
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (invalid_paths))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, invalid_paths[i]);
if (_dbus_validate_path (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Path \"%s\" should have been invalid\n", invalid_paths[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("valid path");
}
++i;
}
/* Interface validation */
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (valid_interfaces))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, valid_interfaces[i]);
if (!_dbus_validate_interface (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Interface \"%s\" should have been valid\n", valid_interfaces[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid interface");
}
++i;
}
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (invalid_interfaces))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, invalid_interfaces[i]);
if (_dbus_validate_interface (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Interface \"%s\" should have been invalid\n", invalid_interfaces[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("valid interface");
}
++i;
}
/* Bus name validation (check that valid interfaces are valid bus names,
* and invalid interfaces are invalid services except if they start with ':')
*/
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (valid_interfaces))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, valid_interfaces[i]);
if (!_dbus_validate_bus_name (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Bus name \"%s\" should have been valid\n", valid_interfaces[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid bus name");
}
++i;
}
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (invalid_interfaces))
{
if (invalid_interfaces[i][0] != ':')
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, invalid_interfaces[i]);
if (_dbus_validate_bus_name (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Bus name \"%s\" should have been invalid\n", invalid_interfaces[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("valid bus name");
}
}
++i;
}
/* unique name validation */
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (valid_unique_names))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, valid_unique_names[i]);
if (!_dbus_validate_bus_name (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Bus name \"%s\" should have been valid\n", valid_unique_names[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid unique name");
}
++i;
}
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (invalid_unique_names))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, invalid_unique_names[i]);
if (_dbus_validate_bus_name (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Bus name \"%s\" should have been invalid\n", invalid_unique_names[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("valid unique name");
}
++i;
}
/* Error name validation (currently identical to interfaces)
*/
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (valid_interfaces))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, valid_interfaces[i]);
if (!_dbus_validate_error_name (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Error name \"%s\" should have been valid\n", valid_interfaces[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid error name");
}
++i;
}
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (invalid_interfaces))
{
if (invalid_interfaces[i][0] != ':')
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, invalid_interfaces[i]);
if (_dbus_validate_error_name (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Error name \"%s\" should have been invalid\n", invalid_interfaces[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("valid error name");
}
}
++i;
}
/* Member validation */
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (valid_members))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, valid_members[i]);
if (!_dbus_validate_member (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Member \"%s\" should have been valid\n", valid_members[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid member");
}
++i;
}
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (invalid_members))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, invalid_members[i]);
if (_dbus_validate_member (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Member \"%s\" should have been invalid\n", invalid_members[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("valid member");
}
++i;
}
/* Signature validation */
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (valid_signatures))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, valid_signatures[i]);
if (!_dbus_validate_signature (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Signature \"%s\" should have been valid\n", valid_signatures[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid signature");
}
++i;
}
i = 0;
while (i < (int) _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (invalid_signatures))
{
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, invalid_signatures[i]);
if (_dbus_validate_signature (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
{
_dbus_warn ("Signature \"%s\" should have been invalid\n", invalid_signatures[i]);
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("valid signature");
}
++i;
}
/* Validate claimed length longer than real length */
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, "abc.efg");
if (_dbus_validate_bus_name (&str, 0, 8))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated too-long string");
if (_dbus_validate_interface (&str, 0, 8))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated too-long string");
if (_dbus_validate_error_name (&str, 0, 8))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated too-long string");
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, "abc");
if (_dbus_validate_member (&str, 0, 4))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated too-long string");
_dbus_string_init_const (&str, "sss");
if (_dbus_validate_signature (&str, 0, 4))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated too-long signature");
/* Validate string exceeding max name length */
if (!_dbus_string_init (&str))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("no memory");
while (_dbus_string_get_length (&str) <= DBUS_MAXIMUM_NAME_LENGTH)
if (!_dbus_string_append (&str, "abc.def"))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("no memory");
if (_dbus_validate_bus_name (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated overmax string");
if (_dbus_validate_interface (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated overmax string");
if (_dbus_validate_error_name (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated overmax string");
/* overlong member */
_dbus_string_set_length (&str, 0);
while (_dbus_string_get_length (&str) <= DBUS_MAXIMUM_NAME_LENGTH)
if (!_dbus_string_append (&str, "abc"))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("no memory");
if (_dbus_validate_member (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated overmax string");
/* overlong unique name */
_dbus_string_set_length (&str, 0);
_dbus_string_append (&str, ":");
while (_dbus_string_get_length (&str) <= DBUS_MAXIMUM_NAME_LENGTH)
if (!_dbus_string_append (&str, "abc"))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("no memory");
if (_dbus_validate_bus_name (&str, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("validated overmax string");
_dbus_string_free (&str);
/* Body validation; test basic validation of valid bodies for both endian */
{
int sequence;
DBusString signature;
DBusString body;
if (!_dbus_string_init (&signature) || !_dbus_string_init (&body))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
sequence = 0;
while (dbus_internal_do_not_use_generate_bodies (sequence,
DBUS_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
&signature, &body))
{
DBusValidity validity;
validity = _dbus_validate_body_with_reason (&signature, 0,
DBUS_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
NULL, &body, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&body));
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
{
_dbus_warn ("invalid code %d expected valid on sequence %d little endian\n",
validity, sequence);
_dbus_verbose_bytes_of_string (&signature, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&signature));
_dbus_verbose_bytes_of_string (&body, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&body));
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("test failed");
}
_dbus_string_set_length (&signature, 0);
_dbus_string_set_length (&body, 0);
++sequence;
}
sequence = 0;
while (dbus_internal_do_not_use_generate_bodies (sequence,
DBUS_BIG_ENDIAN,
&signature, &body))
{
DBusValidity validity;
validity = _dbus_validate_body_with_reason (&signature, 0,
DBUS_BIG_ENDIAN,
NULL, &body, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&body));
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
{
_dbus_warn ("invalid code %d expected valid on sequence %d big endian\n",
validity, sequence);
_dbus_verbose_bytes_of_string (&signature, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&signature));
_dbus_verbose_bytes_of_string (&body, 0, _dbus_string_get_length (&body));
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("test failed");
}
_dbus_string_set_length (&signature, 0);
_dbus_string_set_length (&body, 0);
++sequence;
}
_dbus_string_free (&signature);
_dbus_string_free (&body);
}
return TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Bug 17803: Panic from dbus_signature_validate
* dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c: Ensure we validate
a basic type before calling is_basic on it.
* dbus-marshal-validate-util.c: Test.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int hfsplus_find_cat(struct super_block *sb, u32 cnid,
struct hfs_find_data *fd)
{
hfsplus_cat_entry tmp;
int err;
u16 type;
hfsplus_cat_build_key(sb, fd->search_key, cnid, NULL);
err = hfs_brec_read(fd, &tmp, sizeof(hfsplus_cat_entry));
if (err)
return err;
type = be16_to_cpu(tmp.type);
if (type != HFSPLUS_FOLDER_THREAD && type != HFSPLUS_FILE_THREAD) {
printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: found bad thread record in catalog\n");
return -EIO;
}
hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni(fd->search_key, be32_to_cpu(tmp.thread.parentID),
&tmp.thread.nodeName);
return hfs_brec_find(fd);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'hfsplus: fix Buffer overflow with a corrupted image
When an hfsplus image gets corrupted it might happen that the catalog
namelength field gets b0rked. If we mount such an image the memcpy() in
hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() writes more than the 255 that fit in the name
field. Depending on the size of the overwritten data, we either only get
memory corruption or also trigger an oops like this:
[ 221.628020] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at c82b0000
[ 221.629066] IP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
[ 221.629066] *pde = 0ea29163 *pte = 082b0160
[ 221.629066] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 221.629066] Modules linked in:
[ 221.629066]
[ 221.629066] Pid: 4845, comm: mount Not tainted (2.6.27-rc4-00123-gd3ee1b4-dirty #28)
[ 221.629066] EIP: 0060:[<c022d4b1>] EFLAGS: 00010206 CPU: 0
[ 221.629066] EIP is at hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
[ 221.629066] EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00016210 ECX: 000042c2 EDX: 00000002
[ 221.629066] ESI: c82d70ca EDI: c82b0000 EBP: c82d1bcc ESP: c82d199c
[ 221.629066] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 221.629066] Process mount (pid: 4845, ti=c82d1000 task=c8224060 task.ti=c82d1000)
[ 221.629066] Stack: c080b3c4 c82aa8f8 c82d19c2 00016210 c080b3be c82d1bd4 c82aa8f0 00000300
[ 221.629066] 01000000 750008b1 74006e00 74006900 65006c00 c82d6400 c013bd35 c8224060
[ 221.629066] 00000036 00000046 c82d19f0 00000082 c8224548 c8224060 00000036 c0d653cc
[ 221.629066] Call Trace:
[ 221.629066] [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[ 221.629066] [<c01302d2>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x1b/0x27
[ 221.629066] [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
[ 221.629066] [<c0109e32>] ? save_stack_address+0x0/0x2c
[ 221.629066] [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[ 221.629066] [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
[ 221.629066] [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
[ 221.629066] [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
[ 221.629066] [<c013553d>] ? down+0xc/0x2f
[ 221.629066] [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[ 221.629066] [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[ 221.629066] [<c013da5d>] ? mark_held_locks+0x43/0x5a
[ 221.629066] [<c013dc3a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
[ 221.629066] [<c06abec8>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x58
[ 221.629066] [<c013555c>] ? down+0x2b/0x2f
[ 221.629066] [<c022aa68>] ? hfsplus_iget+0xa0/0x154
[ 221.629066] [<c022b0b9>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x280/0x447
[ 221.629066] [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[ 221.629066] [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[ 221.629066] [<c041c9e4>] ? string+0x2b/0x74
[ 221.629066] [<c041cd16>] ? vsnprintf+0x2e9/0x512
[ 221.629066] [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
[ 221.629066] [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[ 221.629066] [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[ 221.629066] [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
[ 221.629066] [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
[ 221.629066] [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
[ 221.629066] [<c01354d3>] ? up+0xc/0x2f
[ 221.629066] [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[ 221.629066] [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[ 221.629066] [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[ 221.629066] [<c041cfb7>] ? snprintf+0x1b/0x1d
[ 221.629066] [<c01ba466>] ? disk_name+0x25/0x67
[ 221.629066] [<c0183960>] ? get_sb_bdev+0xcd/0x10b
[ 221.629066] [<c016ad92>] ? kstrdup+0x2a/0x4c
[ 221.629066] [<c022a7b3>] ? hfsplus_get_sb+0x13/0x15
[ 221.629066] [<c022ae39>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x0/0x447
[ 221.629066] [<c0183583>] ? vfs_kern_mount+0x3b/0x76
[ 221.629066] [<c0183602>] ? do_kern_mount+0x32/0xba
[ 221.629066] [<c01960d4>] ? do_new_mount+0x46/0x74
[ 221.629066] [<c0196277>] ? do_mount+0x175/0x193
[ 221.629066] [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
[ 221.629066] [<c01663b2>] ? __get_free_pages+0x1e/0x24
[ 221.629066] [<c06ac07b>] ? lock_kernel+0x19/0x8c
[ 221.629066] [<c01962e6>] ? sys_mount+0x51/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c01962f9>] ? sys_mount+0x64/0x9b
[ 221.629066] [<c01038bd>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x31
[ 221.629066] =======================
[ 221.629066] Code: 89 c2 c1 e2 08 c1 e8 08 09 c2 8b 85 e8 fd ff ff 66 89 50 06 89 c7 53 83 c7 08 56 57 68 c4 b3 80 c0 e8 8c 5c ef ff 89 d9 c1 e9 02 <f3> a5 89 d9 83 e1 03 74 02 f3 a4 83 c3 06 8b 95 e8 fd ff ff 0f
[ 221.629066] EIP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151 SS:ESP 0068:c82d199c
[ 221.629066] ---[ end trace e417a1d67f0d0066 ]---
Since hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() returns void and only has one callsite,
the check is performed at the callsite.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int uvc_parse_format(struct uvc_device *dev,
struct uvc_streaming *streaming, struct uvc_format *format,
__u32 **intervals, unsigned char *buffer, int buflen)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = streaming->intf;
struct usb_host_interface *alts = intf->cur_altsetting;
struct uvc_format_desc *fmtdesc;
struct uvc_frame *frame;
const unsigned char *start = buffer;
unsigned int interval;
unsigned int i, n;
__u8 ftype;
format->type = buffer[2];
format->index = buffer[3];
switch (buffer[2]) {
case VS_FORMAT_UNCOMPRESSED:
case VS_FORMAT_FRAME_BASED:
if (buflen < 27) {
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "device %d videostreaming"
"interface %d FORMAT error\n",
dev->udev->devnum,
alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Find the format descriptor from its GUID. */
fmtdesc = uvc_format_by_guid(&buffer[5]);
if (fmtdesc != NULL) {
strncpy(format->name, fmtdesc->name,
sizeof format->name);
format->fcc = fmtdesc->fcc;
} else {
uvc_printk(KERN_INFO, "Unknown video format "
UVC_GUID_FORMAT "\n",
UVC_GUID_ARGS(&buffer[5]));
snprintf(format->name, sizeof format->name,
UVC_GUID_FORMAT, UVC_GUID_ARGS(&buffer[5]));
format->fcc = 0;
}
format->bpp = buffer[21];
if (buffer[2] == VS_FORMAT_UNCOMPRESSED) {
ftype = VS_FRAME_UNCOMPRESSED;
} else {
ftype = VS_FRAME_FRAME_BASED;
if (buffer[27])
format->flags = UVC_FMT_FLAG_COMPRESSED;
}
break;
case VS_FORMAT_MJPEG:
if (buflen < 11) {
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "device %d videostreaming"
"interface %d FORMAT error\n",
dev->udev->devnum,
alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
return -EINVAL;
}
strncpy(format->name, "MJPEG", sizeof format->name);
format->fcc = V4L2_PIX_FMT_MJPEG;
format->flags = UVC_FMT_FLAG_COMPRESSED;
format->bpp = 0;
ftype = VS_FRAME_MJPEG;
break;
case VS_FORMAT_DV:
if (buflen < 9) {
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "device %d videostreaming"
"interface %d FORMAT error\n",
dev->udev->devnum,
alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (buffer[8] & 0x7f) {
case 0:
strncpy(format->name, "SD-DV", sizeof format->name);
break;
case 1:
strncpy(format->name, "SDL-DV", sizeof format->name);
break;
case 2:
strncpy(format->name, "HD-DV", sizeof format->name);
break;
default:
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "device %d videostreaming"
"interface %d: unknown DV format %u\n",
dev->udev->devnum,
alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber, buffer[8]);
return -EINVAL;
}
strncat(format->name, buffer[8] & (1 << 7) ? " 60Hz" : " 50Hz",
sizeof format->name);
format->fcc = V4L2_PIX_FMT_DV;
format->flags = UVC_FMT_FLAG_COMPRESSED | UVC_FMT_FLAG_STREAM;
format->bpp = 0;
ftype = 0;
/* Create a dummy frame descriptor. */
frame = &format->frame[0];
memset(&format->frame[0], 0, sizeof format->frame[0]);
frame->bFrameIntervalType = 1;
frame->dwDefaultFrameInterval = 1;
frame->dwFrameInterval = *intervals;
*(*intervals)++ = 1;
format->nframes = 1;
break;
case VS_FORMAT_MPEG2TS:
case VS_FORMAT_STREAM_BASED:
/* Not supported yet. */
default:
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "device %d videostreaming"
"interface %d unsupported format %u\n",
dev->udev->devnum, alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
buffer[2]);
return -EINVAL;
}
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "Found format %s.\n", format->name);
buflen -= buffer[0];
buffer += buffer[0];
/* Parse the frame descriptors. Only uncompressed, MJPEG and frame
* based formats have frame descriptors.
*/
while (buflen > 2 && buffer[2] == ftype) {
frame = &format->frame[format->nframes];
if (ftype != VS_FRAME_FRAME_BASED)
n = buflen > 25 ? buffer[25] : 0;
else
n = buflen > 21 ? buffer[21] : 0;
n = n ? n : 3;
if (buflen < 26 + 4*n) {
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "device %d videostreaming"
"interface %d FRAME error\n", dev->udev->devnum,
alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
return -EINVAL;
}
frame->bFrameIndex = buffer[3];
frame->bmCapabilities = buffer[4];
frame->wWidth = le16_to_cpup((__le16 *)&buffer[5]);
frame->wHeight = le16_to_cpup((__le16 *)&buffer[7]);
frame->dwMinBitRate = le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)&buffer[9]);
frame->dwMaxBitRate = le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)&buffer[13]);
if (ftype != VS_FRAME_FRAME_BASED) {
frame->dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize =
le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)&buffer[17]);
frame->dwDefaultFrameInterval =
le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)&buffer[21]);
frame->bFrameIntervalType = buffer[25];
} else {
frame->dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize = 0;
frame->dwDefaultFrameInterval =
le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)&buffer[17]);
frame->bFrameIntervalType = buffer[21];
}
frame->dwFrameInterval = *intervals;
/* Several UVC chipsets screw up dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize
* completely. Observed behaviours range from setting the
* value to 1.1x the actual frame size of hardwiring the
* 16 low bits to 0. This results in a higher than necessary
* memory usage as well as a wrong image size information. For
* uncompressed formats this can be fixed by computing the
* value from the frame size.
*/
if (!(format->flags & UVC_FMT_FLAG_COMPRESSED))
frame->dwMaxVideoFrameBufferSize = format->bpp
* frame->wWidth * frame->wHeight / 8;
/* Some bogus devices report dwMinFrameInterval equal to
* dwMaxFrameInterval and have dwFrameIntervalStep set to
* zero. Setting all null intervals to 1 fixes the problem and
* some other divisions by zero which could happen.
*/
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
interval = le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)&buffer[26+4*i]);
*(*intervals)++ = interval ? interval : 1;
}
/* Make sure that the default frame interval stays between
* the boundaries.
*/
n -= frame->bFrameIntervalType ? 1 : 2;
frame->dwDefaultFrameInterval =
min(frame->dwFrameInterval[n],
max(frame->dwFrameInterval[0],
frame->dwDefaultFrameInterval));
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "- %ux%u (%u.%u fps)\n",
frame->wWidth, frame->wHeight,
10000000/frame->dwDefaultFrameInterval,
(100000000/frame->dwDefaultFrameInterval)%10);
format->nframes++;
buflen -= buffer[0];
buffer += buffer[0];
}
if (buflen > 2 && buffer[2] == VS_STILL_IMAGE_FRAME) {
buflen -= buffer[0];
buffer += buffer[0];
}
if (buflen > 2 && buffer[2] == VS_COLORFORMAT) {
if (buflen < 6) {
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "device %d videostreaming"
"interface %d COLORFORMAT error\n",
dev->udev->devnum,
alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
return -EINVAL;
}
format->colorspace = uvc_colorspace(buffer[3]);
buflen -= buffer[0];
buffer += buffer[0];
}
return buffer - start;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-120'], 'message': 'V4L/DVB (8207): uvcvideo: Fix a buffer overflow in format descriptor parsing
Thanks to Oliver Neukum for catching and reporting this bug.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void audit_inotify_unregister(struct list_head *in_list)
{
struct audit_parent *p, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, in_list, ilist) {
list_del(&p->ilist);
inotify_rm_watch(audit_ih, &p->wdata);
/* the put matching the get in audit_do_del_rule() */
put_inotify_watch(&p->wdata);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'Fix inotify watch removal/umount races
Inotify watch removals suck violently.
To kick the watch out we need (in this order) inode->inotify_mutex and
ih->mutex. That's fine if we have a hold on inode; however, for all
other cases we need to make damn sure we don't race with umount. We can
*NOT* just grab a reference to a watch - inotify_unmount_inodes() will
happily sail past it and we'll end with reference to inode potentially
outliving its superblock.
Ideally we just want to grab an active reference to superblock if we
can; that will make sure we won't go into inotify_umount_inodes() until
we are done. Cleanup is just deactivate_super().
However, that leaves a messy case - what if we *are* racing with
umount() and active references to superblock can't be acquired anymore?
We can bump ->s_count, grab ->s_umount, which will almost certainly wait
until the superblock is shut down and the watch in question is pining
for fjords. That's fine, but there is a problem - we might have hit the
window between ->s_active getting to 0 / ->s_count - below S_BIAS (i.e.
the moment when superblock is past the point of no return and is heading
for shutdown) and the moment when deactivate_super() acquires
->s_umount.
We could just do drop_super() yield() and retry, but that's rather
antisocial and this stuff is luser-triggerable. OTOH, having grabbed
->s_umount and having found that we'd got there first (i.e. that
->s_root is non-NULL) we know that we won't race with
inotify_umount_inodes().
So we could grab a reference to watch and do the rest as above, just
with drop_super() instead of deactivate_super(), right? Wrong. We had
to drop ih->mutex before we could grab ->s_umount. So the watch
could've been gone already.
That still can be dealt with - we need to save watch->wd, do idr_find()
and compare its result with our pointer. If they match, we either have
the damn thing still alive or we'd lost not one but two races at once,
the watch had been killed and a new one got created with the same ->wd
at the same address. That couldn't have happened in inotify_destroy(),
but inotify_rm_wd() could run into that. Still, "new one got created"
is not a problem - we have every right to kill it or leave it alone,
whatever's more convenient.
So we can use idr_find(...) == watch && watch->inode->i_sb == sb as
"grab it and kill it" check. If it's been our original watch, we are
fine, if it's a newcomer - nevermind, just pretend that we'd won the
race and kill the fscker anyway; we are safe since we know that its
superblock won't be going away.
And yes, this is far beyond mere "not very pretty"; so's the entire
concept of inotify to start with.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
{
put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'Fix inotify watch removal/umount races
Inotify watch removals suck violently.
To kick the watch out we need (in this order) inode->inotify_mutex and
ih->mutex. That's fine if we have a hold on inode; however, for all
other cases we need to make damn sure we don't race with umount. We can
*NOT* just grab a reference to a watch - inotify_unmount_inodes() will
happily sail past it and we'll end with reference to inode potentially
outliving its superblock.
Ideally we just want to grab an active reference to superblock if we
can; that will make sure we won't go into inotify_umount_inodes() until
we are done. Cleanup is just deactivate_super().
However, that leaves a messy case - what if we *are* racing with
umount() and active references to superblock can't be acquired anymore?
We can bump ->s_count, grab ->s_umount, which will almost certainly wait
until the superblock is shut down and the watch in question is pining
for fjords. That's fine, but there is a problem - we might have hit the
window between ->s_active getting to 0 / ->s_count - below S_BIAS (i.e.
the moment when superblock is past the point of no return and is heading
for shutdown) and the moment when deactivate_super() acquires
->s_umount.
We could just do drop_super() yield() and retry, but that's rather
antisocial and this stuff is luser-triggerable. OTOH, having grabbed
->s_umount and having found that we'd got there first (i.e. that
->s_root is non-NULL) we know that we won't race with
inotify_umount_inodes().
So we could grab a reference to watch and do the rest as above, just
with drop_super() instead of deactivate_super(), right? Wrong. We had
to drop ih->mutex before we could grab ->s_umount. So the watch
could've been gone already.
That still can be dealt with - we need to save watch->wd, do idr_find()
and compare its result with our pointer. If they match, we either have
the damn thing still alive or we'd lost not one but two races at once,
the watch had been killed and a new one got created with the same ->wd
at the same address. That couldn't have happened in inotify_destroy(),
but inotify_rm_wd() could run into that. Still, "new one got created"
is not a problem - we have every right to kill it or leave it alone,
whatever's more convenient.
So we can use idr_find(...) == watch && watch->inode->i_sb == sb as
"grab it and kill it" check. If it's been our original watch, we are
fine, if it's a newcomer - nevermind, just pretend that we'd won the
race and kill the fscker anyway; we are safe since we know that its
superblock won't be going away.
And yes, this is far beyond mere "not very pretty"; so's the entire
concept of inotify to start with.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void ima_adpcm_reset2 (_AFmoduleinst *i)
{
ima_adpcm_data *d = (ima_adpcm_data *) i->modspec;
int framesPerBlock;
framesPerBlock = d->samplesPerBlock / d->track->f.channelCount;
d->track->fpos_next_frame = d->track->fpos_first_frame +
d->blockAlign * (d->track->nextfframe / framesPerBlock);
d->track->frames2ignore += d->framesToIgnore;
assert(d->track->nextfframe % framesPerBlock == 0);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fix decoding of multi-channel ADPCM audio files.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
{
char *name;
long ret;
/* fetch the name from userspace */
name = NULL;
if (_name) {
name = strndup_user(_name, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(name)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(name);
goto error;
}
}
/* join the session */
ret = join_session_keyring(name);
error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_join_session_keyring() */ ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'security: introduce missing kfree
Plug this leak.
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int originates_from_local_legacy_unicast_socket(AvahiServer *s, const AvahiAddress *address, uint16_t port) {
assert(s);
assert(address);
assert(port > 0);
if (!s->config.enable_reflector)
return 0;
if (!avahi_address_is_local(s->monitor, address))
return 0;
if (address->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET && s->fd_legacy_unicast_ipv4 >= 0) {
struct sockaddr_in lsa;
socklen_t l = sizeof(lsa);
if (getsockname(s->fd_legacy_unicast_ipv4, (struct sockaddr*) &lsa, &l) != 0)
avahi_log_warn("getsockname(): %s", strerror(errno));
else
return lsa.sin_port == port;
}
if (address->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET6 && s->fd_legacy_unicast_ipv6 >= 0) {
struct sockaddr_in6 lsa;
socklen_t l = sizeof(lsa);
if (getsockname(s->fd_legacy_unicast_ipv6, (struct sockaddr*) &lsa, &l) != 0)
avahi_log_warn("getsockname(): %s", strerror(errno));
else
return lsa.sin6_port == port;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'CVE-2009-0758: Reflector creates packet storm on legacy unicast traffic
Fixes rhbz #488314.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: struct nfs_server *nfs_clone_server(struct nfs_server *source,
struct nfs_fh *fh,
struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
struct nfs_server *server;
struct nfs_fattr fattr_fsinfo;
int error;
dprintk("--> nfs_clone_server(,%llx:%llx,)\n",
(unsigned long long) fattr->fsid.major,
(unsigned long long) fattr->fsid.minor);
server = nfs_alloc_server();
if (!server)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/* Copy data from the source */
server->nfs_client = source->nfs_client;
atomic_inc(&server->nfs_client->cl_count);
nfs_server_copy_userdata(server, source);
server->fsid = fattr->fsid;
error = nfs_init_server_rpcclient(server, source->client->cl_auth->au_flavor);
if (error < 0)
goto out_free_server;
if (!IS_ERR(source->client_acl))
nfs_init_server_aclclient(server);
/* probe the filesystem info for this server filesystem */
error = nfs_probe_fsinfo(server, fh, &fattr_fsinfo);
if (error < 0)
goto out_free_server;
dprintk("Cloned FSID: %llx:%llx\n",
(unsigned long long) server->fsid.major,
(unsigned long long) server->fsid.minor);
error = nfs_start_lockd(server);
if (error < 0)
goto out_free_server;
spin_lock(&nfs_client_lock);
list_add_tail(&server->client_link, &server->nfs_client->cl_superblocks);
list_add_tail(&server->master_link, &nfs_volume_list);
spin_unlock(&nfs_client_lock);
server->mount_time = jiffies;
dprintk("<-- nfs_clone_server() = %p\n", server);
return server;
out_free_server:
nfs_free_server(server);
dprintk("<-- nfs_clone_server() = error %d\n", error);
return ERR_PTR(error);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'NFS: Fix an Oops in encode_lookup()
It doesn't look as if the NFS file name limit is being initialised correctly
in the struct nfs_server. Make sure that we limit whatever is being set in
nfs_probe_fsinfo() and nfs_init_server().
Also ensure that readdirplus and nfs4_path_walk respect our file name
limits.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int tc_fill_tclass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *q,
unsigned long cl,
u32 pid, u32 seq, u16 flags, int event)
{
struct tcmsg *tcm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned char *b = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
struct gnet_dump d;
const struct Qdisc_class_ops *cl_ops = q->ops->cl_ops;
nlh = NLMSG_NEW(skb, pid, seq, event, sizeof(*tcm), flags);
tcm = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
tcm->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC;
tcm->tcm_ifindex = qdisc_dev(q)->ifindex;
tcm->tcm_parent = q->handle;
tcm->tcm_handle = q->handle;
tcm->tcm_info = 0;
NLA_PUT_STRING(skb, TCA_KIND, q->ops->id);
if (cl_ops->dump && cl_ops->dump(q, cl, skb, tcm) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (gnet_stats_start_copy_compat(skb, TCA_STATS2, TCA_STATS, TCA_XSTATS,
qdisc_root_sleeping_lock(q), &d) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (cl_ops->dump_stats && cl_ops->dump_stats(q, cl, &d) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (gnet_stats_finish_copy(&d) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - b;
return skb->len;
nlmsg_failure:
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_trim(skb, b);
return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-909'], 'message': 'tc: Fix unitialized kernel memory leak
Three bytes of uninitialized kernel memory are currently leaked to user
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: tca_get_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a, u32 pid, u32 seq,
u16 flags, int event, int bind, int ref)
{
struct tcamsg *t;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned char *b = skb->tail;
struct rtattr *x;
nlh = NLMSG_NEW(skb, pid, seq, event, sizeof(*t), flags);
t = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
t->tca_family = AF_UNSPEC;
x = (struct rtattr*) skb->tail;
RTA_PUT(skb, TCA_ACT_TAB, 0, NULL);
if (tcf_action_dump(skb, a, bind, ref) < 0)
goto rtattr_failure;
x->rta_len = skb->tail - (u8*)x;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
return skb->len;
rtattr_failure:
nlmsg_failure:
skb_trim(skb, b - skb->data);
return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': '[NETLINK]: Missing initializations in dumped data
Mostly missing initialization of padding fields of 1 or 2 bytes length,
two instances of uninitialized nlmsgerr->msg of 16 bytes length.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void __rta_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen, const void *data)
{
struct rtattr *rta;
int size = RTA_LENGTH(attrlen);
rta = (struct rtattr*)skb_put(skb, RTA_ALIGN(size));
rta->rta_type = attrtype;
rta->rta_len = size;
memcpy(RTA_DATA(rta), data, attrlen);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': '[NETLINK]: Clear padding in netlink messages
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int c;
unsigned long flags = MS_MANDLOCK;
char * orgoptions = NULL;
char * share_name = NULL;
const char * ipaddr = NULL;
char * uuid = NULL;
char * mountpoint = NULL;
char * options = NULL;
char * optionstail;
char * resolved_path = NULL;
char * temp;
char * dev_name;
int rc = 0;
int rsize = 0;
int wsize = 0;
int nomtab = 0;
int uid = 0;
int gid = 0;
int optlen = 0;
int orgoptlen = 0;
size_t options_size = 0;
size_t current_len;
int retry = 0; /* set when we have to retry mount with uppercase */
struct addrinfo *addrhead = NULL, *addr;
struct utsname sysinfo;
struct mntent mountent;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
FILE * pmntfile;
/* setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE); */
if(argc && argv)
thisprogram = argv[0];
else
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
if(thisprogram == NULL)
thisprogram = "mount.cifs";
uname(&sysinfo);
/* BB add workstation name and domain and pass down */
/* #ifdef _GNU_SOURCE
fprintf(stderr, " node: %s machine: %s sysname %s domain %s\n", sysinfo.nodename,sysinfo.machine,sysinfo.sysname,sysinfo.domainname);
#endif */
if(argc > 2) {
dev_name = argv[1];
share_name = strndup(argv[1], MAX_UNC_LEN);
if (share_name == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s", argv[0], strerror(ENOMEM));
exit(EX_SYSERR);
}
mountpoint = argv[2];
} else if (argc == 2) {
if ((strcmp(argv[1], "-V") == 0) ||
(strcmp(argv[1], "--version") == 0))
{
print_cifs_mount_version();
exit(0);
}
if ((strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0) ||
(strcmp(argv[1], "-?") == 0) ||
(strcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0))
mount_cifs_usage(stdout);
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
} else {
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
}
/* add sharename in opts string as unc= parm */
while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "afFhilL:no:O:rsSU:vVwt:",
longopts, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
/* No code to do the following options yet */
/* case 'l':
list_with_volumelabel = 1;
break;
case 'L':
volumelabel = optarg;
break; */
/* case 'a':
++mount_all;
break; */
case '?':
case 'h': /* help */
mount_cifs_usage(stdout);
case 'n':
++nomtab;
break;
case 'b':
#ifdef MS_BIND
flags |= MS_BIND;
#else
fprintf(stderr,
"option 'b' (MS_BIND) not supported\n");
#endif
break;
case 'm':
#ifdef MS_MOVE
flags |= MS_MOVE;
#else
fprintf(stderr,
"option 'm' (MS_MOVE) not supported\n");
#endif
break;
case 'o':
orgoptions = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'r': /* mount readonly */
flags |= MS_RDONLY;
break;
case 'U':
uuid = optarg;
break;
case 'v':
++verboseflag;
break;
case 'V':
print_cifs_mount_version();
exit (0);
case 'w':
flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
break;
case 'R':
rsize = atoi(optarg) ;
break;
case 'W':
wsize = atoi(optarg);
break;
case '1':
if (isdigit(*optarg)) {
char *ep;
uid = strtoul(optarg, &ep, 10);
if (*ep) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad uid value \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
} else {
struct passwd *pw;
if (!(pw = getpwnam(optarg))) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad user name \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
uid = pw->pw_uid;
endpwent();
}
break;
case '2':
if (isdigit(*optarg)) {
char *ep;
gid = strtoul(optarg, &ep, 10);
if (*ep) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad gid value \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
} else {
struct group *gr;
if (!(gr = getgrnam(optarg))) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad user name \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
gid = gr->gr_gid;
endpwent();
}
break;
case 'u':
got_user = 1;
user_name = optarg;
break;
case 'd':
domain_name = optarg; /* BB fix this - currently ignored */
got_domain = 1;
break;
case 'p':
if(mountpassword == NULL)
mountpassword = (char *)calloc(MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1,1);
if(mountpassword) {
got_password = 1;
strlcpy(mountpassword,optarg,MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1);
}
break;
case 'S':
get_password_from_file(0 /* stdin */,NULL);
break;
case 't':
break;
case 'f':
++fakemnt;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unknown mount option %c\n",c);
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
}
}
if((argc < 3) || (dev_name == NULL) || (mountpoint == NULL)) {
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
}
/* make sure mountpoint is legit */
rc = chdir(mountpoint);
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't chdir to %s: %s\n", mountpoint,
strerror(errno));
rc = EX_USAGE;
goto mount_exit;
}
rc = check_mountpoint(thisprogram, mountpoint);
if (rc)
goto mount_exit;
/* sanity check for unprivileged mounts */
if (getuid()) {
rc = check_fstab(thisprogram, mountpoint, dev_name,
&orgoptions);
if (rc)
goto mount_exit;
/* enable any default user mount flags */
flags |= CIFS_SETUID_FLAGS;
}
if (getenv("PASSWD")) {
if(mountpassword == NULL)
mountpassword = (char *)calloc(MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1,1);
if(mountpassword) {
strlcpy(mountpassword,getenv("PASSWD"),MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1);
got_password = 1;
}
} else if (getenv("PASSWD_FD")) {
get_password_from_file(atoi(getenv("PASSWD_FD")),NULL);
} else if (getenv("PASSWD_FILE")) {
get_password_from_file(0, getenv("PASSWD_FILE"));
}
if (orgoptions && parse_options(&orgoptions, &flags)) {
rc = EX_USAGE;
goto mount_exit;
}
if (getuid()) {
#if !CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK
if (!(flags & (MS_USERS|MS_USER))) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: permission denied\n", thisprogram);
rc = EX_USAGE;
goto mount_exit;
}
#endif /* !CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK */
if (geteuid()) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: not installed setuid - \"user\" "
"CIFS mounts not supported.",
thisprogram);
rc = EX_FAIL;
goto mount_exit;
}
}
flags &= ~(MS_USERS|MS_USER);
addrhead = addr = parse_server(&share_name);
if((addrhead == NULL) && (got_ip == 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "No ip address specified and hostname not found\n");
rc = EX_USAGE;
goto mount_exit;
}
/* BB save off path and pop after mount returns? */
resolved_path = (char *)malloc(PATH_MAX+1);
if (!resolved_path) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate memory.\n");
rc = EX_SYSERR;
goto mount_exit;
}
/* Note that if we can not canonicalize the name, we get
another chance to see if it is valid when we chdir to it */
if(!realpath(".", resolved_path)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to resolve %s to canonical path: %s\n",
mountpoint, strerror(errno));
rc = EX_SYSERR;
goto mount_exit;
}
mountpoint = resolved_path;
if(got_user == 0) {
/* Note that the password will not be retrieved from the
USER env variable (ie user%password form) as there is
already a PASSWD environment varaible */
if (getenv("USER"))
user_name = strdup(getenv("USER"));
if (user_name == NULL)
user_name = getusername();
got_user = 1;
}
if(got_password == 0) {
char *tmp_pass = getpass("Password: "); /* BB obsolete sys call but
no good replacement yet. */
mountpassword = (char *)calloc(MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1,1);
if (!tmp_pass || !mountpassword) {
fprintf(stderr, "Password not entered, exiting\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
strlcpy(mountpassword, tmp_pass, MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1);
got_password = 1;
}
/* FIXME launch daemon (handles dfs name resolution and credential change)
remember to clear parms and overwrite password field before launching */
if(orgoptions) {
optlen = strlen(orgoptions);
orgoptlen = optlen;
} else
optlen = 0;
if(share_name)
optlen += strlen(share_name) + 4;
else {
fprintf(stderr, "No server share name specified\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\nMounting the DFS root for server not implemented yet\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if(user_name)
optlen += strlen(user_name) + 6;
optlen += MAX_ADDRESS_LEN + 4;
if(mountpassword)
optlen += strlen(mountpassword) + 6;
mount_retry:
SAFE_FREE(options);
options_size = optlen + 10 + DOMAIN_SIZE;
options = (char *)malloc(options_size /* space for commas in password */ + 8 /* space for domain= , domain name itself was counted as part of the length username string above */);
if(options == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not allocate memory for mount options\n");
exit(EX_SYSERR);
}
strlcpy(options, "unc=", options_size);
strlcat(options,share_name,options_size);
/* scan backwards and reverse direction of slash */
temp = strrchr(options, '/');
if(temp > options + 6)
*temp = '\\';
if(user_name) {
/* check for syntax like user=domain\user */
if(got_domain == 0)
domain_name = check_for_domain(&user_name);
strlcat(options,",user=",options_size);
strlcat(options,user_name,options_size);
}
if(retry == 0) {
if(domain_name) {
/* extra length accounted for in option string above */
strlcat(options,",domain=",options_size);
strlcat(options,domain_name,options_size);
}
}
strlcat(options,",ver=",options_size);
strlcat(options,MOUNT_CIFS_VERSION_MAJOR,options_size);
if(orgoptions) {
strlcat(options,",",options_size);
strlcat(options,orgoptions,options_size);
}
if(prefixpath) {
strlcat(options,",prefixpath=",options_size);
strlcat(options,prefixpath,options_size); /* no need to cat the / */
}
/* convert all '\\' to '/' in share portion so that /proc/mounts looks pretty */
replace_char(dev_name, '\\', '/', strlen(share_name));
if (!got_ip && addr) {
strlcat(options, ",ip=", options_size);
current_len = strnlen(options, options_size);
optionstail = options + current_len;
switch (addr->ai_addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET6:
addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr->ai_addr;
ipaddr = inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &addr6->sin6_addr, optionstail,
options_size - current_len);
break;
case AF_INET:
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) addr->ai_addr;
ipaddr = inet_ntop(AF_INET, &addr4->sin_addr, optionstail,
options_size - current_len);
break;
default:
ipaddr = NULL;
}
/* if the address looks bogus, try the next one */
if (!ipaddr) {
addr = addr->ai_next;
if (addr)
goto mount_retry;
rc = EX_SYSERR;
goto mount_exit;
}
}
if (addr->ai_addr->sa_family == AF_INET6 && addr6->sin6_scope_id) {
strlcat(options, "%", options_size);
current_len = strnlen(options, options_size);
optionstail = options + current_len;
snprintf(optionstail, options_size - current_len, "%u",
addr6->sin6_scope_id);
}
if(verboseflag)
fprintf(stderr, "\nmount.cifs kernel mount options: %s", options);
if (mountpassword) {
/*
* Commas have to be doubled, or else they will
* look like the parameter separator
*/
if(retry == 0)
check_for_comma(&mountpassword);
strlcat(options,",pass=",options_size);
strlcat(options,mountpassword,options_size);
if (verboseflag)
fprintf(stderr, ",pass=********");
}
if (verboseflag)
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
rc = check_mtab(thisprogram, dev_name, mountpoint);
if (rc)
goto mount_exit;
if (!fakemnt && mount(dev_name, ".", cifs_fstype, flags, options)) {
switch (errno) {
case ECONNREFUSED:
case EHOSTUNREACH:
if (addr) {
addr = addr->ai_next;
if (addr)
goto mount_retry;
}
break;
case ENODEV:
fprintf(stderr, "mount error: cifs filesystem not supported by the system\n");
break;
case ENXIO:
if(retry == 0) {
retry = 1;
if (uppercase_string(dev_name) &&
uppercase_string(share_name) &&
uppercase_string(prefixpath)) {
fprintf(stderr, "retrying with upper case share name\n");
goto mount_retry;
}
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "mount error(%d): %s\n", errno, strerror(errno));
fprintf(stderr, "Refer to the mount.cifs(8) manual page (e.g. man "
"mount.cifs)\n");
rc = EX_FAIL;
goto mount_exit;
}
if (nomtab)
goto mount_exit;
atexit(unlock_mtab);
rc = lock_mtab();
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot lock mtab");
goto mount_exit;
}
pmntfile = setmntent(MOUNTED, "a+");
if (!pmntfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not update mount table\n");
unlock_mtab();
rc = EX_FILEIO;
goto mount_exit;
}
mountent.mnt_fsname = dev_name;
mountent.mnt_dir = mountpoint;
mountent.mnt_type = (char *)(void *)cifs_fstype;
mountent.mnt_opts = (char *)malloc(220);
if(mountent.mnt_opts) {
char * mount_user = getusername();
memset(mountent.mnt_opts,0,200);
if(flags & MS_RDONLY)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,"ro",220);
else
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,"rw",220);
if(flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,",mand",220);
if(flags & MS_NOEXEC)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,",noexec",220);
if(flags & MS_NOSUID)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,",nosuid",220);
if(flags & MS_NODEV)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,",nodev",220);
if(flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,",sync",220);
if(mount_user) {
if(getuid() != 0) {
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,
",user=", 220);
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts,
mount_user, 220);
}
}
}
mountent.mnt_freq = 0;
mountent.mnt_passno = 0;
rc = addmntent(pmntfile,&mountent);
endmntent(pmntfile);
unlock_mtab();
SAFE_FREE(mountent.mnt_opts);
if (rc)
rc = EX_FILEIO;
mount_exit:
if(mountpassword) {
int len = strlen(mountpassword);
memset(mountpassword,0,len);
SAFE_FREE(mountpassword);
}
if (addrhead)
freeaddrinfo(addrhead);
SAFE_FREE(options);
SAFE_FREE(orgoptions);
SAFE_FREE(resolved_path);
SAFE_FREE(share_name);
exit(rc);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-59'], 'message': 'mount.cifs: don't allow it to be run as setuid root program
mount.cifs has been the subject of several "security" fire drills due to
distributions installing it as a setuid root program. This program has
not been properly audited for security and the Samba team highly
recommends that it not be installed as a setuid root program at this
time.
To make that abundantly clear, this patch forcibly disables the ability
for mount.cifs to run as a setuid root program. People are welcome to
trivially patch this out, but they do so at their own peril.
A security audit and redesign of this program is in progress and we hope
that we'll be able to remove this in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int do_insn_fetch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct x86_emulate_ops *ops,
unsigned long eip, void *dest, unsigned size)
{
int rc = 0;
eip += ctxt->cs_base;
while (size--) {
rc = do_fetch_insn_byte(ctxt, ops, eip++, dest++);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'KVM: x86 emulator: limit instructions to 15 bytes
While we are never normally passed an instruction that exceeds 15 bytes,
smp games can cause us to attempt to interpret one, which will cause
large latencies in non-preempt hosts.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: nma_gconf_connection_new (GConfClient *client, const char *conf_dir)
{
NMConnection *connection;
NMAGConfConnection *gconf_connection;
g_return_val_if_fail (GCONF_IS_CLIENT (client), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail (conf_dir != NULL, NULL);
/* retrieve GConf data */
connection = nm_gconf_read_connection (client, conf_dir);
if (connection) {
gconf_connection = nma_gconf_connection_new_from_connection (client, conf_dir, connection);
g_object_unref (connection);
} else {
nm_warning ("No connection read from GConf at %s.", conf_dir);
gconf_connection = NULL;
}
return gconf_connection;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'core: fix CA cert mishandling after cert file deletion (deb #560067) (rh #546793)
If a connection was created with a CA certificate, but the user later
moved or deleted that CA certificate, the applet would simply provide the
connection to NetworkManager without any CA certificate. This could cause
NM to connect to the original network (or a network spoofing the original
network) without verifying the identity of the network as the user
expects.
In the future we can/should do better here by (1) alerting the user that
some connection is now no longer complete by flagging it in the connection
editor or notifying the user somehow, and (2) by using a freaking' cert
store already (not that Linux has one yet).'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: constructor (GType type,
guint n_construct_params,
GObjectConstructParam *construct_params)
{
GObject *object;
NMAGConfConnectionPrivate *priv;
NMConnection *connection;
GError *error = NULL;
object = G_OBJECT_CLASS (nma_gconf_connection_parent_class)->constructor (type, n_construct_params, construct_params);
if (!object)
return NULL;
priv = NMA_GCONF_CONNECTION_GET_PRIVATE (object);
if (!priv->client) {
nm_warning ("GConfClient not provided.");
goto err;
}
if (!priv->dir) {
nm_warning ("GConf directory not provided.");
goto err;
}
connection = nm_exported_connection_get_connection (NM_EXPORTED_CONNECTION (object));
utils_fill_connection_certs (connection);
if (!nm_connection_verify (connection, &error)) {
utils_clear_filled_connection_certs (connection);
g_warning ("Invalid connection: '%s' / '%s' invalid: %d",
g_type_name (nm_connection_lookup_setting_type_by_quark (error->domain)),
error->message, error->code);
g_error_free (error);
goto err;
}
utils_clear_filled_connection_certs (connection);
fill_vpn_user_name (connection);
return object;
err:
g_object_unref (object);
return NULL;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'core: fix CA cert mishandling after cert file deletion (deb #560067) (rh #546793)
If a connection was created with a CA certificate, but the user later
moved or deleted that CA certificate, the applet would simply provide the
connection to NetworkManager without any CA certificate. This could cause
NM to connect to the original network (or a network spoofing the original
network) without verifying the identity of the network as the user
expects.
In the future we can/should do better here by (1) alerting the user that
some connection is now no longer complete by flagging it in the connection
editor or notifying the user somehow, and (2) by using a freaking' cert
store already (not that Linux has one yet).'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int usb_host_handle_control(USBHostDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
{
struct usbdevfs_urb *urb;
AsyncURB *aurb;
int ret, value, index;
/*
* Process certain standard device requests.
* These are infrequent and are processed synchronously.
*/
value = le16_to_cpu(s->ctrl.req.wValue);
index = le16_to_cpu(s->ctrl.req.wIndex);
dprintf("husb: ctrl type 0x%x req 0x%x val 0x%x index %u len %u\n",
s->ctrl.req.bRequestType, s->ctrl.req.bRequest, value, index,
s->ctrl.len);
if (s->ctrl.req.bRequestType == 0) {
switch (s->ctrl.req.bRequest) {
case USB_REQ_SET_ADDRESS:
return usb_host_set_address(s, value);
case USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION:
return usb_host_set_config(s, value & 0xff);
}
}
if (s->ctrl.req.bRequestType == 1 &&
s->ctrl.req.bRequest == USB_REQ_SET_INTERFACE)
return usb_host_set_interface(s, index, value);
/* The rest are asynchronous */
aurb = async_alloc();
aurb->hdev = s;
aurb->packet = p;
/*
* Setup ctrl transfer.
*
* s->ctrl is layed out such that data buffer immediately follows
* 'req' struct which is exactly what usbdevfs expects.
*/
urb = &aurb->urb;
urb->type = USBDEVFS_URB_TYPE_CONTROL;
urb->endpoint = p->devep;
urb->buffer = &s->ctrl.req;
urb->buffer_length = 8 + s->ctrl.len;
urb->usercontext = s;
ret = ioctl(s->fd, USBDEVFS_SUBMITURB, urb);
dprintf("husb: submit ctrl. len %u aurb %p\n", urb->buffer_length, aurb);
if (ret < 0) {
dprintf("husb: submit failed. errno %d\n", errno);
async_free(aurb);
switch(errno) {
case ETIMEDOUT:
return USB_RET_NAK;
case EPIPE:
default:
return USB_RET_STALL;
}
}
usb_defer_packet(p, async_cancel, aurb);
return USB_RET_ASYNC;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'usb-linux.c: fix buffer overflow
In usb-linux.c:usb_host_handle_control, we pass a 1024-byte buffer and
length to the kernel. However, the length was provided by the caller
of dev->handle_packet, and is not checked, so the kernel might provide
too much data and overflow our buffer.
For example, hw/usb-uhci.c could set the length to 2047.
hw/usb-ohci.c looks like it might go up to 4096 or 8192.
This causes a qemu crash, as reported here:
http://www.mail-archive.com/kvm@vger.kernel.org/msg18447.html
This patch increases the usb-linux.c buffer size to 2048 to fix the
specific device reported, and adds a check to avoid the overflow in
any case.
Signed-off-by: Jim Paris <jim@jtan.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static NTSTATUS smb_set_file_unix_link(connection_struct *conn,
struct smb_request *req,
const char *pdata,
int total_data,
const struct smb_filename *smb_fname)
{
char *link_target = NULL;
const char *newname = smb_fname->base_name;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
/* Set a symbolic link. */
/* Don't allow this if follow links is false. */
if (total_data == 0) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (!lp_symlinks(SNUM(conn))) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
srvstr_pull_talloc(ctx, pdata, req->flags2, &link_target, pdata,
total_data, STR_TERMINATE);
if (!link_target) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* !widelinks forces the target path to be within the share. */
/* This means we can interpret the target as a pathname. */
if (!lp_widelinks(SNUM(conn))) {
char *rel_name = NULL;
char *last_dirp = NULL;
if (*link_target == '/') {
/* No absolute paths allowed. */
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
rel_name = talloc_strdup(ctx,newname);
if (!rel_name) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
last_dirp = strrchr_m(rel_name, '/');
if (last_dirp) {
last_dirp[1] = '\0';
} else {
rel_name = talloc_strdup(ctx,"./");
if (!rel_name) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
rel_name = talloc_asprintf_append(rel_name,
"%s",
link_target);
if (!rel_name) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
status = check_name(conn, rel_name);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
}
DEBUG(10,("smb_set_file_unix_link: SMB_SET_FILE_UNIX_LINK doing symlink %s -> %s\n",
newname, link_target ));
if (SMB_VFS_SYMLINK(conn,link_target,newname) != 0) {
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-22'], 'message': 'Fix bug 7104 - "wide links" and "unix extensions" are incompatible.
Change parameter "wide links" to default to "no".
Ensure "wide links = no" if "unix extensions = yes" on a share.
Fix man pages to refect this.
Remove "within share" checks for a UNIX symlink set - even if
widelinks = no. The server will not follow that link anyway.
Correct DEBUG message in check_reduced_name() to add missing "\n"
so it's really clear when a path is being denied as it's outside
the enclosing share path.
Jeremy.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
struct iocb __user *__user *iocbpp, bool compat)
{
struct kioctx *ctx;
long ret = 0;
int i;
struct hlist_head batch_hash[AIO_BATCH_HASH_SIZE] = { { 0, }, };
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
if (unlikely(!ctx)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: io_submit: invalid context id\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* AKPM: should this return a partial result if some of the IOs were
* successfully submitted?
*/
for (i=0; i<nr; i++) {
struct iocb __user *user_iocb;
struct iocb tmp;
if (unlikely(__get_user(user_iocb, iocbpp + i))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (unlikely(copy_from_user(&tmp, user_iocb, sizeof(tmp)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret = io_submit_one(ctx, user_iocb, &tmp, batch_hash, compat);
if (ret)
break;
}
aio_batch_free(batch_hash);
put_ioctx(ctx);
return i ? i : ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-190'], 'message': 'aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit
Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds
checking on the passed-in iocb array:
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the
number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in
the long. This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as
returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a
return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.
Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void vmx_save_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int i;
if (vmx->host_state.loaded)
return;
vmx->host_state.loaded = 1;
/*
* Set host fs and gs selectors. Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not
* allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1.
*/
vmx->host_state.ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt();
vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed = vmx->host_state.ldt_sel;
vmx->host_state.fs_sel = kvm_read_fs();
if (!(vmx->host_state.fs_sel & 7)) {
vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, vmx->host_state.fs_sel);
vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed = 0;
} else {
vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed = 1;
}
vmx->host_state.gs_sel = kvm_read_gs();
if (!(vmx->host_state.gs_sel & 7))
vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
else {
vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed = 1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE));
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, read_msr(MSR_GS_BASE));
#else
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, segment_base(vmx->host_state.fs_sel));
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, segment_base(vmx->host_state.gs_sel));
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu)) {
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < vmx->save_nmsrs; ++i)
kvm_set_shared_msr(vmx->guest_msrs[i].index,
vmx->guest_msrs[i].data,
vmx->guest_msrs[i].mask);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-400'], 'message': 'KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-2010-3698.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int packet_getname_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (peer)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
uaddr->sa_family = AF_PACKET;
rcu_read_lock();
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex);
if (dev)
strlcpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, 15);
else
memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, 14);
rcu_read_unlock();
*uaddr_len = sizeof(*uaddr);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-909'], 'message': 'net: packet: fix information leak to userland
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of
sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
int rc;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
/*
* Charge it to the socket, dropping if the queue is full.
*/
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto drop;
nf_reset(skb);
if (up->encap_type) {
/*
* This is an encapsulation socket so pass the skb to
* the socket's udp_encap_rcv() hook. Otherwise, just
* fall through and pass this up the UDP socket.
* up->encap_rcv() returns the following value:
* =0 if skb was successfully passed to the encap
* handler or was discarded by it.
* >0 if skb should be passed on to UDP.
* <0 if skb should be resubmitted as proto -N
*/
/* if we're overly short, let UDP handle it */
if (skb->len > sizeof(struct udphdr) &&
up->encap_rcv != NULL) {
int ret;
ret = (*up->encap_rcv)(sk, skb);
if (ret <= 0) {
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS,
is_udplite);
return -ret;
}
}
/* FALLTHROUGH -- it's a UDP Packet */
}
/*
* UDP-Lite specific tests, ignored on UDP sockets
*/
if ((is_udplite & UDPLITE_RECV_CC) && UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
/*
* MIB statistics other than incrementing the error count are
* disabled for the following two types of errors: these depend
* on the application settings, not on the functioning of the
* protocol stack as such.
*
* RFC 3828 here recommends (sec 3.3): "There should also be a
* way ... to ... at least let the receiving application block
* delivery of packets with coverage values less than a value
* provided by the application."
*/
if (up->pcrlen == 0) { /* full coverage was set */
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "UDPLITE: partial coverage "
"%d while full coverage %d requested\n",
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov, skb->len);
goto drop;
}
/* The next case involves violating the min. coverage requested
* by the receiver. This is subtle: if receiver wants x and x is
* greater than the buffersize/MTU then receiver will complain
* that it wants x while sender emits packets of smaller size y.
* Therefore the above ...()->partial_cov statement is essential.
*/
if (UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov < up->pcrlen) {
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING
"UDPLITE: coverage %d too small, need min %d\n",
UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov, up->pcrlen);
goto drop;
}
}
if (sk->sk_filter) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto drop;
}
rc = 0;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
rc = __udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
else if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb)) {
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
goto drop;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return rc;
drop:
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-400'], 'message': 'net: sk_add_backlog() take rmem_alloc into account
Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.
We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writers, and let user run without being slow down too much.
Introduce a sk_rcvqueues_full() helper, to avoid taking socket lock in
stress situations.
Under huge stress from a multiqueue/RPS enabled NIC, a single flow udp
receiver can now process ~200.000 pps (instead of ~100 pps before the
patch) on a 8 core machine.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code:
static int
xmlXPathCompOpEvalPositionalPredicate(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
xmlXPathStepOpPtr op,
xmlNodeSetPtr set,
int contextSize,
int minPos,
int maxPos,
int hasNsNodes)
{
if (op->ch1 != -1) {
xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp = ctxt->comp;
if (comp->steps[op->ch1].op != XPATH_OP_PREDICATE) {
/*
* TODO: raise an internal error.
*/
}
contextSize = xmlXPathCompOpEvalPredicate(ctxt,
&comp->steps[op->ch1], set, contextSize, hasNsNodes);
CHECK_ERROR0;
if (contextSize <= 0)
return(0);
}
/*
* Check if the node set contains a sufficient number of nodes for
* the requested range.
*/
if (contextSize < minPos) {
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
return(0);
}
if (op->ch2 == -1) {
/*
* TODO: Can this ever happen?
*/
return (contextSize);
} else {
xmlDocPtr oldContextDoc;
int i, pos = 0, newContextSize = 0, contextPos = 0, res;
xmlXPathStepOpPtr exprOp;
xmlXPathObjectPtr contextObj = NULL, exprRes = NULL;
xmlNodePtr oldContextNode, contextNode = NULL;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->context;
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
/*
* URGENT TODO: Check the following:
* We don't expect location sets if evaluating prediates, right?
* Only filters should expect location sets, right?
*/
#endif /* LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED */
/*
* Save old context.
*/
oldContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldContextDoc = xpctxt->doc;
/*
* Get the expression of this predicate.
*/
exprOp = &ctxt->comp->steps[op->ch2];
for (i = 0; i < set->nodeNr; i++) {
if (set->nodeTab[i] == NULL)
continue;
contextNode = set->nodeTab[i];
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = contextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = ++contextPos;
/*
* Initialize the new set.
* Also set the xpath document in case things like
* key() evaluation are attempted on the predicate
*/
if ((contextNode->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) &&
(contextNode->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = contextNode->doc;
/*
* Evaluate the predicate expression with 1 context node
* at a time; this node is packaged into a node set; this
* node set is handed over to the evaluation mechanism.
*/
if (contextObj == NULL)
contextObj = xmlXPathCacheNewNodeSet(xpctxt, contextNode);
else
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(contextObj->nodesetval,
contextNode);
valuePush(ctxt, contextObj);
res = xmlXPathCompOpEvalToBoolean(ctxt, exprOp, 1);
if ((ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) || (res == -1)) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr tmp;
/* pop the result */
tmp = valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, tmp);
/* then pop off contextObj, which will be freed later */
valuePop(ctxt);
goto evaluation_error;
}
if (res)
pos++;
if (res && (pos >= minPos) && (pos <= maxPos)) {
/*
* Fits in the requested range.
*/
newContextSize++;
if (minPos == maxPos) {
/*
* Only 1 node was requested.
*/
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) {
/*
* As always: take care of those nasty
* namespace nodes.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
}
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
set->nodeNr = 1;
set->nodeTab[0] = contextNode;
goto evaluation_exit;
}
if (pos == maxPos) {
/*
* We are done.
*/
xmlXPathNodeSetClearFromPos(set, i +1, hasNsNodes);
goto evaluation_exit;
}
} else {
/*
* Remove the entry from the initial node set.
*/
set->nodeTab[i] = NULL;
if (contextNode->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
xmlXPathNodeSetFreeNs((xmlNsPtr) contextNode);
}
if (exprRes != NULL) {
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
exprRes = NULL;
}
if (ctxt->value == contextObj) {
/*
* Don't free the temporary XPath object holding the
* context node, in order to avoid massive recreation
* inside this loop.
*/
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(contextObj->nodesetval, hasNsNodes);
} else {
/*
* The object was lost in the evaluation machinery.
* Can this happen? Maybe in case of internal-errors.
*/
contextObj = NULL;
}
}
goto evaluation_exit;
evaluation_error:
xmlXPathNodeSetClear(set, hasNsNodes);
newContextSize = 0;
evaluation_exit:
if (contextObj != NULL) {
if (ctxt->value == contextObj)
valuePop(ctxt);
xmlXPathReleaseObject(xpctxt, contextObj);
}
if (exprRes != NULL)
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt->context, exprRes);
/*
* Reset/invalidate the context.
*/
xpctxt->node = oldContextNode;
xpctxt->doc = oldContextDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = -1;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = -1;
return(newContextSize);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-415'], 'message': 'Fix a potential freeing error in XPath'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int mainloop(CLIENT *client) {
struct nbd_request request;
struct nbd_reply reply;
gboolean go_on=TRUE;
#ifdef DODBG
int i = 0;
#endif
negotiate(client->net, client, NULL);
DEBUG("Entering request loop!\n");
reply.magic = htonl(NBD_REPLY_MAGIC);
reply.error = 0;
while (go_on) {
char buf[BUFSIZE];
size_t len;
#ifdef DODBG
i++;
printf("%d: ", i);
#endif
readit(client->net, &request, sizeof(request));
request.from = ntohll(request.from);
request.type = ntohl(request.type);
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_DISC) {
msg2(LOG_INFO, "Disconnect request received.");
if (client->server->flags & F_COPYONWRITE) {
if (client->difmap) g_free(client->difmap) ;
close(client->difffile);
unlink(client->difffilename);
free(client->difffilename);
}
go_on=FALSE;
continue;
}
len = ntohl(request.len);
if (request.magic != htonl(NBD_REQUEST_MAGIC))
err("Not enough magic.");
if (len > BUFSIZE + sizeof(struct nbd_reply))
err("Request too big!");
#ifdef DODBG
printf("%s from %llu (%llu) len %d, ", request.type ? "WRITE" :
"READ", (unsigned long long)request.from,
(unsigned long long)request.from / 512, len);
#endif
memcpy(reply.handle, request.handle, sizeof(reply.handle));
if ((request.from + len) > (OFFT_MAX)) {
DEBUG("[Number too large!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (((ssize_t)((off_t)request.from + len) > client->exportsize)) {
DEBUG("[RANGE!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_WRITE) {
DEBUG("wr: net->buf, ");
readit(client->net, buf, len);
DEBUG("buf->exp, ");
if ((client->server->flags & F_READONLY) ||
(client->server->flags & F_AUTOREADONLY)) {
DEBUG("[WRITE to READONLY!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EPERM);
continue;
}
if (expwrite(request.from, buf, len, client)) {
DEBUG("Write failed: %m" );
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
SEND(client->net, reply);
DEBUG("OK!\n");
continue;
}
/* READ */
DEBUG("exp->buf, ");
if (expread(request.from, buf + sizeof(struct nbd_reply), len, client)) {
DEBUG("Read failed: %m");
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
DEBUG("buf->net, ");
memcpy(buf, &reply, sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
writeit(client->net, buf, len + sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
DEBUG("OK!\n");
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int minor = iminor(inode);
struct tpm_chip *chip = NULL, *pos;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &tpm_chip_list, list) {
if (pos->vendor.miscdev.minor == minor) {
chip = pos;
get_device(chip->dev);
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
if (test_and_set_bit(0, &chip->is_open)) {
dev_dbg(chip->dev, "Another process owns this TPM\n");
put_device(chip->dev);
return -EBUSY;
}
chip->data_buffer = kmalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE * sizeof(u8), GFP_KERNEL);
if (chip->data_buffer == NULL) {
clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
put_device(chip->dev);
return -ENOMEM;
}
atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
file->private_data = chip;
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: network_init ()
{
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
char *ca_path, *ca_path2;
gnutls_global_init ();
gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials (&gnutls_xcred);
ca_path = string_expand_home (CONFIG_STRING(config_network_gnutls_ca_file));
if (ca_path)
{
ca_path2 = string_replace (ca_path, "%h", weechat_home);
if (ca_path2)
{
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file (gnutls_xcred, ca_path2,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
free (ca_path2);
}
free (ca_path);
}
gnutls_certificate_client_set_retrieve_function (gnutls_xcred,
&hook_connect_gnutls_set_certificates);
network_init_ok = 1;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GCRYPT
gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_VERSION);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
#endif
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fix verification of SSL certificates by calling gnutls verify callback (patch #7459)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case IP6T_SO_GET_INFO:
ret = get_info(sock_net(sk), user, len, 0);
break;
case IP6T_SO_GET_ENTRIES:
ret = get_entries(sock_net(sk), user, len);
break;
case IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_MATCH:
case IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET: {
struct xt_get_revision rev;
int target;
if (*len != sizeof(rev)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&rev, user, sizeof(rev)) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
target = 1;
else
target = 0;
try_then_request_module(xt_find_revision(AF_INET6, rev.name,
rev.revision,
target, &ret),
"ip6t_%s", rev.name);
break;
}
default:
duprintf("do_ip6t_get_ctl: unknown request %i\n", cmd);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: processBatchMultiRuleset(batch_t *pBatch)
{
ruleset_t *currRuleset;
batch_t snglRuleBatch;
int i;
int iStart; /* start index of partial batch */
int iNew; /* index for new (temporary) batch */
DEFiRet;
CHKiRet(batchInit(&snglRuleBatch, pBatch->nElem));
snglRuleBatch.pbShutdownImmediate = pBatch->pbShutdownImmediate;
while(1) { /* loop broken inside */
/* search for first unprocessed element */
for(iStart = 0 ; iStart < pBatch->nElem && pBatch->pElem[iStart].state == BATCH_STATE_DISC ; ++iStart)
/* just search, no action */;
if(iStart == pBatch->nElem)
FINALIZE; /* everything processed */
/* prepare temporary batch */
currRuleset = batchElemGetRuleset(pBatch, iStart);
iNew = 0;
for(i = iStart ; i < pBatch->nElem ; ++i) {
if(batchElemGetRuleset(pBatch, i) == currRuleset) {
batchCopyElem(&(snglRuleBatch.pElem[iNew++]), &(pBatch->pElem[i]));
/* We indicate the element also as done, so it will not be processed again */
pBatch->pElem[i].state = BATCH_STATE_DISC;
}
}
snglRuleBatch.nElem = iNew; /* was left just right by the for loop */
batchSetSingleRuleset(&snglRuleBatch, 1);
/* process temp batch */
processBatch(&snglRuleBatch);
}
batchFree(&snglRuleBatch);
finalize_it:
RETiRet;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-772', 'CWE-401'], 'message': 'bugfix: fixed a memory leak and potential abort condition
this could happen if multiple rulesets were used and some output batches
contained messages belonging to more than one ruleset.
fixes: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=226
fixes: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=218'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void
mono_reflection_create_dynamic_method (MonoReflectionDynamicMethod *mb)
{
ReflectionMethodBuilder rmb;
MonoMethodSignature *sig;
MonoClass *klass;
GSList *l;
int i;
sig = dynamic_method_to_signature (mb);
reflection_methodbuilder_from_dynamic_method (&rmb, mb);
/*
* Resolve references.
*/
/*
* Every second entry in the refs array is reserved for storing handle_class,
* which is needed by the ldtoken implementation in the JIT.
*/
rmb.nrefs = mb->nrefs;
rmb.refs = g_new0 (gpointer, mb->nrefs + 1);
for (i = 0; i < mb->nrefs; i += 2) {
MonoClass *handle_class;
gpointer ref;
MonoObject *obj = mono_array_get (mb->refs, MonoObject*, i);
if (strcmp (obj->vtable->klass->name, "DynamicMethod") == 0) {
MonoReflectionDynamicMethod *method = (MonoReflectionDynamicMethod*)obj;
/*
* The referenced DynamicMethod should already be created by the managed
* code, except in the case of circular references. In that case, we store
* method in the refs array, and fix it up later when the referenced
* DynamicMethod is created.
*/
if (method->mhandle) {
ref = method->mhandle;
} else {
/* FIXME: GC object stored in unmanaged memory */
ref = method;
/* FIXME: GC object stored in unmanaged memory */
method->referenced_by = g_slist_append (method->referenced_by, mb);
}
handle_class = mono_defaults.methodhandle_class;
} else {
MonoException *ex = NULL;
ref = resolve_object (mb->module->image, obj, &handle_class, NULL);
if (!ref)
ex = mono_get_exception_type_load (NULL, NULL);
else if (mono_security_get_mode () == MONO_SECURITY_MODE_CORE_CLR)
ex = mono_security_core_clr_ensure_dynamic_method_resolved_object (ref, handle_class);
if (ex) {
g_free (rmb.refs);
mono_raise_exception (ex);
return;
}
}
rmb.refs [i] = ref; /* FIXME: GC object stored in unmanaged memory (change also resolve_object() signature) */
rmb.refs [i + 1] = handle_class;
}
klass = mb->owner ? mono_class_from_mono_type (mono_reflection_type_get_handle ((MonoReflectionType*)mb->owner)) : mono_defaults.object_class;
mb->mhandle = reflection_methodbuilder_to_mono_method (klass, &rmb, sig);
/* Fix up refs entries pointing at us */
for (l = mb->referenced_by; l; l = l->next) {
MonoReflectionDynamicMethod *method = (MonoReflectionDynamicMethod*)l->data;
MonoMethodWrapper *wrapper = (MonoMethodWrapper*)method->mhandle;
gpointer *data;
g_assert (method->mhandle);
data = (gpointer*)wrapper->method_data;
for (i = 0; i < GPOINTER_TO_UINT (data [0]); i += 2) {
if ((data [i + 1] == mb) && (data [i + 1 + 1] == mono_defaults.methodhandle_class))
data [i + 1] = mb->mhandle;
}
}
g_slist_free (mb->referenced_by);
g_free (rmb.refs);
/* ilgen is no longer needed */
mb->ilgen = NULL; ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399', 'CWE-264'], 'message': 'Don't use finalization to cleanup dynamic methods.
* reflection.c: Use a reference queue to cleanup
dynamic methods instead of finalization.
* runtime.c: Shutdown the dynamic method queue
before runtime cleanup begins.
* DynamicMethod.cs: No longer finalizable.
* icall-def.h: Remove unused dynamic method icall.
Fixes #660422
Implement a reference queue API.
* gc.c: A reference queue allows one to queue
callbcks for when objects are collected.
It allows for safe cleanup of objects that can
only be done when it is effectively collected.
The major difference with regular finalization
is that the collector makes sure the object
was collected - and can't be resurrected.
* gc-internal.h: Export entrypoints for the
new API.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void virtio_blk_handle_write(VirtIOBlockReq *req, MultiReqBuffer *mrb)
{
BlockRequest *blkreq;
uint64_t sector;
sector = ldq_p(&req->out->sector);
trace_virtio_blk_handle_write(req, sector, req->qiov.size / 512);
if (sector & req->dev->sector_mask) {
virtio_blk_rw_complete(req, -EIO);
return;
}
if (mrb->num_writes == 32) {
virtio_submit_multiwrite(req->dev->bs, mrb);
}
blkreq = &mrb->blkreq[mrb->num_writes];
blkreq->sector = sector;
blkreq->nb_sectors = req->qiov.size / BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE;
blkreq->qiov = &req->qiov;
blkreq->cb = virtio_blk_rw_complete;
blkreq->opaque = req;
blkreq->error = 0;
mrb->num_writes++;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'virtio-blk: fail unaligned requests
Like all block drivers virtio-blk should not allow small than block size
granularity access. But given that the protocol specifies a
byte unit length field we currently accept such requests, which cause
qemu to abort() in lower layers. Add checks to the main read and
write handlers to catch them early.
Reported-by: Conor Murphy <conor_murphy_virt@hotmail.com>
Tested-by: Conor Murphy <conor_murphy_virt@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: const char *string_of_NPNVariable(int variable)
{
const char *str;
switch (variable) {
#define _(VAL) case VAL: str = #VAL; break;
_(NPNVxDisplay);
_(NPNVxtAppContext);
_(NPNVnetscapeWindow);
_(NPNVjavascriptEnabledBool);
_(NPNVasdEnabledBool);
_(NPNVisOfflineBool);
_(NPNVserviceManager);
_(NPNVDOMElement);
_(NPNVDOMWindow);
_(NPNVToolkit);
_(NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool);
_(NPNVWindowNPObject);
_(NPNVPluginElementNPObject);
_(NPNVSupportsWindowless);
#undef _
default:
switch (variable & 0xff) {
#define _(VAL, VAR) case VAL: str = #VAR; break
_(10, NPNVserviceManager);
_(11, NPNVDOMElement);
_(12, NPNVDOMWindow);
_(13, NPNVToolkit);
#undef _
default:
str = "<unknown variable>";
break;
}
break;
}
return str;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'Support all the new variables added'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int cli_hm_scan(const unsigned char *digest, uint32_t size, const char **virname, const struct cli_matcher *root, enum CLI_HASH_TYPE type) {
const struct cli_htu32_element *item;
unsigned int keylen;
struct cli_sz_hash *szh;
size_t l, r;
if(!digest || !size || size == 0xffffffff || !root || !root->hm.sizehashes[type].capacity)
return CL_CLEAN;
item = cli_htu32_find(&root->hm.sizehashes[type], size);
if(!item)
return CL_CLEAN;
szh = (struct cli_sz_hash *)item->data.as_ptr;
keylen = hashlen[type];
l = 0;
r = szh->items;
while(l <= r) {
size_t c = (l + r) / 2;
int res = hm_cmp(digest, &szh->hash_array[keylen * c], keylen);
if(res < 0) {
if(!c)
break;
r = c - 1;
} else if(res > 0)
l = c + 1;
else {
if(virname)
*virname = szh->virusnames[c];
return CL_VIRUS;
}
}
return CL_CLEAN;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'bb#2818'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: gdk_pixbuf__tiff_image_load (FILE *f, GError **error)
{
return gdk_pixbuf__tiff_image_load_real (f, NULL, error);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Initial stab at getting the focus code to work.
Fri Jun 1 18:54:47 2001 Jonathan Blandford <jrb@redhat.com>
* gtk/gtktreeview.c: (gtk_tree_view_focus): Initial stab at
getting the focus code to work.
(gtk_tree_view_class_init): Add a bunch of keybindings.
* gtk/gtktreeviewcolumn.c
(gtk_tree_view_column_set_cell_data_func):
s/GtkCellDataFunc/GtkTreeCellDataFunc.
(_gtk_tree_view_column_set_tree_view): Use "notify::model" instead
of "properties_changed" to help justify the death of the latter
signal. (-:
* tests/testtreefocus.c (main): Let some columns be focussable to
test focus better.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: gdk_pixbuf__tiff_image_stop_load (gpointer data,
GError **error)
{
TiffData *context = (TiffData*) data;
gboolean retval = FALSE;
g_return_val_if_fail (data != NULL, TRUE);
fflush (context->file);
rewind (context->file);
if (context->all_okay) {
GdkPixbuf *pixbuf;
pixbuf = gdk_pixbuf__tiff_image_load_real (context->file, context, error);
if (pixbuf != NULL)
retval = TRUE;
}
fclose (context->file);
unlink (context->tempname);
g_free (context->tempname);
g_free ((TiffData *) context);
return TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Initial stab at getting the focus code to work.
Fri Jun 1 18:54:47 2001 Jonathan Blandford <jrb@redhat.com>
* gtk/gtktreeview.c: (gtk_tree_view_focus): Initial stab at
getting the focus code to work.
(gtk_tree_view_class_init): Add a bunch of keybindings.
* gtk/gtktreeviewcolumn.c
(gtk_tree_view_column_set_cell_data_func):
s/GtkCellDataFunc/GtkTreeCellDataFunc.
(_gtk_tree_view_column_set_tree_view): Use "notify::model" instead
of "properties_changed" to help justify the death of the latter
signal. (-:
* tests/testtreefocus.c (main): Let some columns be focussable to
test focus better.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: jiffies_to_compat_timeval(unsigned long jiffies, struct compat_timeval *value)
{
/*
* Convert jiffies to nanoseconds and separate with
* one divide.
*/
u64 nsec = (u64)jiffies * TICK_NSEC;
long rem;
value->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC, &rem);
value->tv_usec = rem / NSEC_PER_USEC;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void sample_to_timespec(const clockid_t which_clock,
union cpu_time_count cpu,
struct timespec *tp)
{
if (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(which_clock) == CPUCLOCK_SCHED) {
tp->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(cpu.sched,
NSEC_PER_SEC, &tp->tv_nsec);
} else {
cputime_to_timespec(cpu.cpu, tp);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: valuePop(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt)
{
xmlXPathObjectPtr ret;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->valueNr <= 0))
return (NULL);
ctxt->valueNr--;
if (ctxt->valueNr > 0)
ctxt->value = ctxt->valueTab[ctxt->valueNr - 1];
else
ctxt->value = NULL;
ret = ctxt->valueTab[ctxt->valueNr];
ctxt->valueTab[ctxt->valueNr] = NULL;
return (ret);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-415'], 'message': 'Hardening of XPath evaluation
Add a mechanism of frame for XPath evaluation when entering a function
or a scoped evaluation, also fix a potential problem in predicate
evaluation.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int32_t scsi_send_command(SCSIRequest *req, uint8_t *buf)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
int32_t len;
uint8_t command;
uint8_t *outbuf;
int rc;
command = buf[0];
outbuf = (uint8_t *)r->iov.iov_base;
DPRINTF("Command: lun=%d tag=0x%x data=0x%02x", req->lun, req->tag, buf[0]);
#ifdef DEBUG_SCSI
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i < r->req.cmd.len; i++) {
printf(" 0x%02x", buf[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
#endif
switch (command) {
case TEST_UNIT_READY:
case INQUIRY:
case MODE_SENSE:
case MODE_SENSE_10:
case RESERVE:
case RESERVE_10:
case RELEASE:
case RELEASE_10:
case START_STOP:
case ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL:
case READ_CAPACITY_10:
case READ_TOC:
case GET_CONFIGURATION:
case SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16:
case VERIFY_10:
rc = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r, outbuf);
if (rc < 0) {
return 0;
}
r->iov.iov_len = rc;
break;
case SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE:
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, 0, BDRV_ACCT_FLUSH);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_flush(s->bs, scsi_flush_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_flush_complete(r, -EIO);
}
return 0;
case READ_6:
case READ_10:
case READ_12:
case READ_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("Read (sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n", r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba)
goto illegal_lba;
r->sector = r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size;
r->sector_count = len * s->cluster_size;
break;
case WRITE_6:
case WRITE_10:
case WRITE_12:
case WRITE_16:
case WRITE_VERIFY_10:
case WRITE_VERIFY_12:
case WRITE_VERIFY_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("Write %s(sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n",
(command & 0xe) == 0xe ? "And Verify " : "",
r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba)
goto illegal_lba;
r->sector = r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size;
r->sector_count = len * s->cluster_size;
break;
case MODE_SELECT:
DPRINTF("Mode Select(6) (len %lu)\n", (long)r->req.cmd.xfer);
/* We don't support mode parameter changes.
Allow the mode parameter header + block descriptors only. */
if (r->req.cmd.xfer > 12) {
goto fail;
}
break;
case MODE_SELECT_10:
DPRINTF("Mode Select(10) (len %lu)\n", (long)r->req.cmd.xfer);
/* We don't support mode parameter changes.
Allow the mode parameter header + block descriptors only. */
if (r->req.cmd.xfer > 16) {
goto fail;
}
break;
case SEEK_6:
case SEEK_10:
DPRINTF("Seek(%d) (sector %" PRId64 ")\n", command == SEEK_6 ? 6 : 10,
r->req.cmd.lba);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba) {
goto illegal_lba;
}
break;
case WRITE_SAME_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("WRITE SAME(16) (sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n",
r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba) {
goto illegal_lba;
}
/*
* We only support WRITE SAME with the unmap bit set for now.
*/
if (!(buf[1] & 0x8)) {
goto fail;
}
rc = bdrv_discard(s->bs, r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size,
len * s->cluster_size);
if (rc < 0) {
/* XXX: better error code ?*/
goto fail;
}
break;
case REQUEST_SENSE:
abort();
default:
DPRINTF("Unknown SCSI command (%2.2x)\n", buf[0]);
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
return 0;
fail:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
return 0;
illegal_lba:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(LBA_OUT_OF_RANGE));
return 0;
}
if (r->sector_count == 0 && r->iov.iov_len == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
len = r->sector_count * 512 + r->iov.iov_len;
if (r->req.cmd.mode == SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
return -len;
} else {
if (!r->sector_count)
r->sector_count = -1;
return len;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void list_proxy(char *server, void *data __attribute__((unused)), void *rock)
{
struct enum_rock *erock = (struct enum_rock *) rock;
struct backend *be;
int r;
char *result;
be = proxy_findserver(server, &nntp_protocol,
nntp_userid ? nntp_userid : "anonymous",
&backend_cached, &backend_current, NULL, nntp_in);
if (!be) return;
prot_printf(be->out, "LIST %s %s\r\n", erock->cmd, erock->wild);
r = read_response(be, 0, &result);
if (!r && !strncmp(result, "215 ", 4)) {
while (!(r = read_response(be, 0, &result)) && result[0] != '.') {
prot_printf(nntp_out, "%s", result);
}
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-287'], 'message': 'Secunia SA46093 - make sure nntp authentication completes
Discovered by Stefan Cornelius, Secunia Research
The vulnerability is caused due to the access restriction for certain
commands only checking whether or not variable "nntp_userid" is non-NULL,
without performing additional checks to verify that a complete, successful
authentication actually took place. The variable "nntp_userid" can be set to
point to a string holding the username (changing it to a non-NULL, thus
allowing attackers to bypass the checks) by sending an "AUTHINFO USER"
command. The variable is not reset to NULL until e.g. a wrong "AUTHINFO
PASS" command is received. This can be exploited to bypass the
authentication mechanism and allows access to e.g. the "NEWNEWS" or the
"LIST NEWSGROUPS" commands by sending an "AUTHINFO USER" command without a
following "AUTHINFO PASS" command.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: add_mtab(char *devname, char *mountpoint, unsigned long flags)
{
int rc = 0;
char *mount_user;
struct mntent mountent;
FILE *pmntfile;
atexit(unlock_mtab);
rc = lock_mtab();
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot lock mtab");
rc = EX_FILEIO;
goto add_mtab_exit;
}
pmntfile = setmntent(MOUNTED, "a+");
if (!pmntfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not update mount table\n");
unlock_mtab();
rc = EX_FILEIO;
goto add_mtab_exit;
}
mountent.mnt_fsname = devname;
mountent.mnt_dir = mountpoint;
mountent.mnt_type = (char *)(void *)cifs_fstype;
mountent.mnt_opts = (char *)calloc(MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN, 1);
if (mountent.mnt_opts) {
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, "ro", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
else
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, "rw", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",mand", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",noexec", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",nosuid", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",nodev", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",sync", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (getuid() != 0) {
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",user=", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
mount_user = getusername();
if (mount_user)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, mount_user,
MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
}
}
mountent.mnt_freq = 0;
mountent.mnt_passno = 0;
rc = addmntent(pmntfile, &mountent);
endmntent(pmntfile);
unlock_mtab();
SAFE_FREE(mountent.mnt_opts);
add_mtab_exit:
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr, "unable to add mount entry to mtab\n");
rc = EX_FILEIO;
}
return rc;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'mount.cifs: guard against signals by unprivileged users
If mount.cifs is setuid root, then the unprivileged user who runs the
program can send the mount.cifs process a signal and kill it. This is
not a huge problem unless we happen to be updating the mtab at the
time, in which case the mtab lockfiles might not get cleaned up.
To remedy this, have the privileged mount.cifs process set its real
uid to the effective uid (usually, root). This prevents unprivileged
users from being able to signal the process.
While we're at it, also mask off signals while we're updating the
mtab. This leaves a SIGKILL by root as the only way to interrupt the
mtab update, but there's really nothing we can do about that.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int32_t cli_bcapi_extract_new(struct cli_bc_ctx *ctx, int32_t id)
{
cli_ctx *cctx;
int res = -1;
cli_event_count(EV, BCEV_EXTRACTED);
cli_dbgmsg("previous tempfile had %u bytes\n", ctx->written);
if (!ctx->written)
return 0;
if (ctx->ctx && cli_updatelimits(ctx->ctx, ctx->written))
return -1;
ctx->written = 0;
lseek(ctx->outfd, 0, SEEK_SET);
cli_dbgmsg("bytecode: scanning extracted file %s\n", ctx->tempfile);
cctx = (cli_ctx*)ctx->ctx;
if (cctx) {
cli_file_t current = cctx->container_type;
if (ctx->containertype != CL_TYPE_ANY)
cctx->container_type = ctx->containertype;
res = cli_magic_scandesc(ctx->outfd, cctx);
cctx->container_type = current;
if (res == CL_VIRUS) {
if (cctx->virname)
ctx->virname = *cctx->virname;
ctx->found = 1;
}
}
if ((cctx && cctx->engine->keeptmp) ||
(ftruncate(ctx->outfd, 0) == -1)) {
close(ctx->outfd);
if (!(cctx && cctx->engine->keeptmp) && ctx->tempfile)
cli_unlink(ctx->tempfile);
free(ctx->tempfile);
ctx->tempfile = NULL;
ctx->outfd = 0;
}
cli_dbgmsg("bytecode: extracting new file with id %u\n", id);
return res;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'fix recursion level crash (bb #3706).
Thanks to Stephane Chazelas for the analysis.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs,
routerinfo_t *ri, time_t now,
int naming, int listbadexits,
int listbaddirs, int vote_on_hsdirs)
{
int unstable_version =
!tor_version_as_new_as(ri->platform,"0.1.1.16-rc-cvs");
memset(rs, 0, sizeof(routerstatus_t));
rs->is_authority =
router_digest_is_trusted_dir(ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
/* Already set by compute_performance_thresholds. */
rs->is_exit = ri->is_exit;
rs->is_stable = ri->is_stable =
router_is_active(ri, now) &&
!dirserv_thinks_router_is_unreliable(now, ri, 1, 0) &&
!unstable_version;
rs->is_fast = ri->is_fast =
router_is_active(ri, now) &&
!dirserv_thinks_router_is_unreliable(now, ri, 0, 1);
rs->is_running = ri->is_running; /* computed above */
if (naming) {
uint32_t name_status = dirserv_get_name_status(
ri->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->nickname);
rs->is_named = (naming && (name_status & FP_NAMED)) ? 1 : 0;
rs->is_unnamed = (naming && (name_status & FP_UNNAMED)) ? 1 : 0;
}
rs->is_valid = ri->is_valid;
if (rs->is_fast &&
(router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD ||
router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >=
MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits,
guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) &&
is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard(ri->platform)) {
long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known(
ri->cache_info.identity_digest, now);
double wfu = rep_hist_get_weighted_fractional_uptime(
ri->cache_info.identity_digest, now);
rs->is_possible_guard = (wfu >= guard_wfu && tk >= guard_tk) ? 1 : 0;
} else {
rs->is_possible_guard = 0;
}
rs->is_bad_directory = listbaddirs && ri->is_bad_directory;
rs->is_bad_exit = listbadexits && ri->is_bad_exit;
ri->is_hs_dir = dirserv_thinks_router_is_hs_dir(ri, now);
rs->is_hs_dir = vote_on_hsdirs && ri->is_hs_dir;
rs->is_v2_dir = ri->dir_port != 0;
if (!strcasecmp(ri->nickname, UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME))
rs->is_named = rs->is_unnamed = 0;
rs->published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
memcpy(rs->identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(rs->descriptor_digest, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
rs->addr = ri->addr;
strlcpy(rs->nickname, ri->nickname, sizeof(rs->nickname));
rs->or_port = ri->or_port;
rs->dir_port = ri->dir_port;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'Add option to give guard flag to relays without the CVE-2011-2768 fix
This way, all of the DA operators can upgrade immediately, without nuking
every client's set of entry guards as soon as a majority of them upgrade.
Until enough guards have upgraded, a majority of dirauths should set this
config option so that there are still enough guards in the network. After
a few days pass, all dirauths should use the default.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int cur, l;
const xmlChar *target;
xmlParserInputState state;
int count = 0;
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '?')) {
xmlParserInputPtr input = ctxt->input;
state = ctxt->instate;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PI;
/*
* this is a Processing Instruction.
*/
SKIP(2);
SHRINK;
/*
* Parse the target name and check for special support like
* namespace.
*/
target = xmlParsePITarget(ctxt);
if (target != NULL) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"PI declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
SKIP(2);
/*
* SAX: PI detected.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->processingInstruction != NULL))
ctxt->sax->processingInstruction(ctxt->userData,
target, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
cur = CUR;
if (!IS_BLANK(cur)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"ParsePI: PI %s space expected\n", target);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (IS_CHAR(cur) && /* checked */
((cur != '?') || (NXT(1) != '>'))) {
if (len + 5 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = tmp;
}
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,cur);
NEXTL(l);
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (cur == 0) {
SHRINK;
GROW;
cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != '?') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED,
"ParsePI: PI %s never end ...\n", target);
} else {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"PI declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
SKIP(2);
#ifdef LIBXML_CATALOG_ENABLED
if (((state == XML_PARSER_MISC) ||
(state == XML_PARSER_START)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(target, XML_CATALOG_PI))) {
xmlCatalogAllow allow = xmlCatalogGetDefaults();
if ((allow == XML_CATA_ALLOW_DOCUMENT) ||
(allow == XML_CATA_ALLOW_ALL))
xmlParseCatalogPI(ctxt, buf);
}
#endif
/*
* SAX: PI detected.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->processingInstruction != NULL))
ctxt->sax->processingInstruction(ctxt->userData,
target, buf);
}
xmlFree(buf);
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = state;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'Make sure the parser returns when getting a Stop order
patch backported from chromiun bug fixes, assuming author is Chris'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: char *suhosin_decrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key, char **where TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
int o_name_len = name_len;
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
decrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
memcpy(*where, name, o_name_len);
*where += o_name_len;
**where = '='; *where +=1;
memcpy(*where, value, value_len);
*where += value_len;
return *where;
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto decrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_decrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key, &l, SUHOSIN_G(cookie_checkraddr) TSRMLS_CC);
if (d == NULL) {
goto skip_cookie;
}
d_url = php_url_encode(d, l, &l);
efree(d);
memcpy(*where, name, o_name_len);
*where += o_name_len;
**where = '=';*where += 1;
memcpy(*where, d_url, l);
*where += l;
efree(d_url);
skip_cookie:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return *where;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xmlDictComputeBigKey(const xmlChar* data, int namelen) {
uint32_t hash;
int i;
if (namelen <= 0 || data == NULL) return(0);
hash = 0;
for (i = 0;i < namelen; i++) {
hash += data[i];
hash += (hash << 10);
hash ^= (hash >> 6);
}
hash += (hash << 3);
hash ^= (hash >> 11);
hash += (hash << 15);
return hash;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'Add hash randomization to hash and dict structures
Following http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2011-003.html
it seems that having hash randomization might be a good idea
when using XML with untrusted data
* configure.in: lookup for rand, srand and time
* dict.c: add randomization to dictionaries hash tables
* hash.c: add randomization to normal hash tables'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static inline void preempt_conditional_cli(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
local_irq_disable();
dec_preempt_count();
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-400'], 'message': 'x86: Do not disable preemption in int3 on 32bit
Preemption must be disabled before enabling interrupts in do_trap
on x86_64 because the stack in use for int3 and debug is a per CPU
stack set by th IST. But 32bit does not have an IST and the stack
still belongs to the current task and there is no problem in scheduling
out the task.
Keep preemption enabled on X86_32 when enabling interrupts for
do_trap().
The name of the function is changed from preempt_conditional_sti/cli()
to conditional_sti/cli_ist(), to annotate that this function is used
when the stack is on the IST.
Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: peek_for_as4_capability (struct peer *peer, u_char length)
{
struct stream *s = BGP_INPUT (peer);
size_t orig_getp = stream_get_getp (s);
size_t end = orig_getp + length;
as_t as4 = 0;
/* The full capability parser will better flag the error.. */
if (STREAM_READABLE(s) < length)
return 0;
if (BGP_DEBUG (as4, AS4))
zlog_info ("%s [AS4] rcv OPEN w/ OPTION parameter len: %u,"
" peeking for as4",
peer->host, length);
/* the error cases we DONT handle, we ONLY try to read as4 out of
* correctly formatted options.
*/
while (stream_get_getp(s) < end)
{
u_char opt_type;
u_char opt_length;
/* Check the length. */
if (stream_get_getp (s) + 2 > end)
goto end;
/* Fetch option type and length. */
opt_type = stream_getc (s);
opt_length = stream_getc (s);
/* Option length check. */
if (stream_get_getp (s) + opt_length > end)
goto end;
if (opt_type == BGP_OPEN_OPT_CAP)
{
unsigned long capd_start = stream_get_getp (s);
unsigned long capd_end = capd_start + opt_length;
assert (capd_end <= end);
while (stream_get_getp (s) < capd_end)
{
struct capability_header hdr;
if (stream_get_getp (s) + 2 > capd_end)
goto end;
hdr.code = stream_getc (s);
hdr.length = stream_getc (s);
if ((stream_get_getp(s) + hdr.length) > capd_end)
goto end;
if (hdr.code == CAPABILITY_CODE_AS4)
{
if (hdr.length != CAPABILITY_CODE_AS4_LEN)
goto end;
if (BGP_DEBUG (as4, AS4))
zlog_info ("[AS4] found AS4 capability, about to parse");
as4 = bgp_capability_as4 (peer, &hdr);
goto end;
}
stream_forward_getp (s, hdr.length);
}
}
}
end:
stream_set_getp (s, orig_getp);
return as4;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'bgpd: Open option parse errors don't NOTIFY, resulting in abort & DoS
* bgp_packet.c: (bgp_open_receive) Errors from bgp_open_option_parse are
detected, and the code will stop processing the OPEN and return. However
it does so without calling bgp_notify_send to send a NOTIFY - which means
the peer FSM doesn't get stopped, and bgp_read will be called again later.
Because it returns, it doesn't go through the code near the end of the
function that removes the current message from the peer input streaam.
Thus the next call to bgp_read will try to parse a half-parsed stream as
if it were a new BGP message, leading to an assert later in the code when
it tries to read stuff that isn't there. Add the required call to
bgp_notify_send before returning.
* bgp_open.c: (bgp_capability_as4) Be a bit stricter, check the length field
corresponds to the only value it can be, which is the amount we're going to
read off the stream. And make sure the capability flag gets set, so
callers can know this capability was read, regardless.
(peek_for_as4_capability) Let bgp_capability_as4 do the length check.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int pagemap_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct pagemapread *pm = walk->private;
pte_t *pte;
int err = 0;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
/* find the first VMA at or above 'addr' */
vma = find_vma(walk->mm, addr);
for (; addr != end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
u64 pfn = PM_NOT_PRESENT;
/* check to see if we've left 'vma' behind
* and need a new, higher one */
if (vma && (addr >= vma->vm_end))
vma = find_vma(walk->mm, addr);
/* check that 'vma' actually covers this address,
* and that it isn't a huge page vma */
if (vma && (vma->vm_start <= addr) &&
!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
pfn = pte_to_pagemap_entry(*pte);
/* unmap before userspace copy */
pte_unmap(pte);
}
err = add_to_pagemap(addr, pfn, pm);
if (err)
return err;
}
cond_resched();
return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.38+]
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static inline unsigned long zap_pmd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct zap_details *details)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
next = zap_pte_range(tlb, vma, pmd, addr, next, details);
cond_resched();
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return addr;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.38+]
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: cdf_dump(void *v, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
unsigned char *p = v;
char abuf[16];
(void)fprintf(stderr, "%.4x: ", 0);
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < len; i++, p++) {
(void)fprintf(stderr, "%.2x ", *p);
abuf[j++] = isprint(*p) ? *p : '.';
if (j == 16) {
j = 0;
abuf[15] = '\0';
(void)fprintf(stderr, "%s\n%.4x: ", abuf, i + 1);
}
}
(void)fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': '- add float and double types
- fix debug printf formats
- fix short stream sizes
- don't fail if we don't know about a type'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: ciphertext_to_compressed (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_datum_t *ciphertext,
uint8_t * compress_data,
int compress_size,
uint8_t type, record_parameters_st * params,
uint64* sequence)
{
uint8_t tag[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint8_t pad;
int length, length_to_decrypt;
uint16_t blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
uint8_t preamble[MAX_PREAMBLE_SIZE];
unsigned int preamble_size;
unsigned int ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
unsigned int tag_size = _gnutls_auth_cipher_tag_len (¶ms->read.cipher_state);
unsigned int explicit_iv = _gnutls_version_has_explicit_iv (session->security_parameters.version);
blocksize = gnutls_cipher_get_block_size (params->cipher_algorithm);
/* actual decryption (inplace)
*/
switch (_gnutls_cipher_is_block (params->cipher_algorithm))
{
case CIPHER_STREAM:
/* The way AEAD ciphers are defined in RFC5246, it allows
* only stream ciphers.
*/
if (explicit_iv && _gnutls_auth_cipher_is_aead(¶ms->read.cipher_state))
{
uint8_t nonce[blocksize];
/* Values in AEAD are pretty fixed in TLS 1.2 for 128-bit block
*/
if (params->read.IV.data == NULL || params->read.IV.size != 4)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (ciphertext->size < tag_size+AEAD_EXPLICIT_DATA_SIZE)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH);
memcpy(nonce, params->read.IV.data, AEAD_IMPLICIT_DATA_SIZE);
memcpy(&nonce[AEAD_IMPLICIT_DATA_SIZE], ciphertext->data, AEAD_EXPLICIT_DATA_SIZE);
_gnutls_auth_cipher_setiv(¶ms->read.cipher_state, nonce, AEAD_EXPLICIT_DATA_SIZE+AEAD_IMPLICIT_DATA_SIZE);
ciphertext->data += AEAD_EXPLICIT_DATA_SIZE;
ciphertext->size -= AEAD_EXPLICIT_DATA_SIZE;
length_to_decrypt = ciphertext->size - tag_size;
}
else
{
if (ciphertext->size < tag_size)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH);
length_to_decrypt = ciphertext->size;
}
length = ciphertext->size - tag_size;
/* Pass the type, version, length and compressed through
* MAC.
*/
preamble_size =
make_preamble (UINT64DATA(*sequence), type,
length, ver, preamble);
ret = _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth (¶ms->read.cipher_state, preamble, preamble_size);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
if ((ret =
_gnutls_auth_cipher_decrypt2 (¶ms->read.cipher_state,
ciphertext->data, length_to_decrypt,
ciphertext->data, ciphertext->size)) < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
break;
case CIPHER_BLOCK:
if (ciphertext->size < MAX(blocksize, tag_size) || (ciphertext->size % blocksize != 0))
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH);
/* ignore the IV in TLS 1.1+
*/
if (explicit_iv)
{
_gnutls_auth_cipher_setiv(¶ms->read.cipher_state,
ciphertext->data, blocksize);
ciphertext->size -= blocksize;
ciphertext->data += blocksize;
if (ciphertext->size == 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
}
/* we don't use the auth_cipher interface here, since
* TLS with block ciphers is impossible to be used under such
* an API. (the length of plaintext is required to calculate
* auth_data, but it is not available before decryption).
*/
if ((ret =
_gnutls_cipher_decrypt (¶ms->read.cipher_state.cipher,
ciphertext->data, ciphertext->size)) < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
pad = ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - 1] + 1; /* pad */
if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext->size - tag_size)
{
gnutls_assert ();
_gnutls_record_log
("REC[%p]: Short record length %d > %d - %d (under attack?)\n",
session, pad, ciphertext->size, tag_size);
/* We do not fail here. We check below for the
* the pad_failed. If zero means success.
*/
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
pad %= blocksize;
}
length = ciphertext->size - tag_size - pad;
/* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x)
*/
if (ver != GNUTLS_SSL3)
for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
{
if (ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - i] !=
ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - 1])
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
if (length < 0)
{
/* Setting a proper length to prevent timing differences in
* processing of records with invalid encryption.
*/
length = ciphertext->size - tag_size;
}
/* Pass the type, version, length and compressed through
* MAC.
*/
preamble_size =
make_preamble (UINT64DATA(*sequence), type,
length, ver, preamble);
ret = _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth (¶ms->read.cipher_state, preamble, preamble_size);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
ret = _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth (¶ms->read.cipher_state, ciphertext->data, length);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
break;
default:
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
ret = _gnutls_auth_cipher_tag(¶ms->read.cipher_state, tag, tag_size);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
/* This one was introduced to avoid a timing attack against the TLS
* 1.0 protocol.
*/
/* HMAC was not the same.
*/
if (memcmp (tag, &ciphertext->data[length], tag_size) != 0 || pad_failed != 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
/* copy the decrypted stuff to compress_data.
*/
if (compress_size < length)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED);
if (compress_data != ciphertext->data)
memcpy (compress_data, ciphertext->data, length);
return length;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'changes in packet parsing.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int phar_parse_tarfile(php_stream* fp, char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, phar_archive_data** pphar, int is_data, php_uint32 compression, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char buf[512], *actual_alias = NULL, *p;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
size_t pos = 0, read, totalsize;
tar_header *hdr;
php_uint32 sum1, sum2, size, old;
phar_archive_data *myphar, **actual;
int last_was_longlink = 0;
if (error) {
*error = NULL;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
totalsize = php_stream_tell(fp);
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is not a tar file or is truncated", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*)buf;
old = (memcmp(hdr->magic, "ustar", sizeof("ustar")-1) != 0);
myphar = (phar_archive_data *) pecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data), PHAR_G(persist));
myphar->is_persistent = PHAR_G(persist);
/* estimate number of entries, can't be certain with tar files */
zend_hash_init(&myphar->manifest, 2 + (totalsize >> 12),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->mounted_dirs, 5,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->virtual_dirs, 4 + (totalsize >> 11),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->is_tar = 1;
/* remember whether this entire phar was compressed with gz/bzip2 */
myphar->flags = compression;
entry.is_tar = 1;
entry.is_crc_checked = 1;
entry.phar = myphar;
pos += sizeof(buf);
do {
phar_entry_info *newentry;
pos = php_stream_tell(fp);
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
memset(hdr->checksum, ' ', sizeof(hdr->checksum));
sum2 = phar_tar_checksum(buf, old?sizeof(old_tar_header):sizeof(tar_header));
size = entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize =
phar_tar_number(hdr->size, sizeof(hdr->size));
if (((!old && hdr->prefix[0] == 0) || old) && strlen(hdr->name) == sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1 && !strncmp(hdr->name, ".phar/signature.bin", sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1)) {
off_t curloc;
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has signature that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
bail:
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
curloc = php_stream_tell(fp);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read != size) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be read", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) \
(((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[3]) << 24) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[2]) << 16) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[1]) << 8) \
| (((unsigned char*)(buffer))[0]))
#else
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) (php_uint32) *(buffer)
#endif
myphar->sig_flags = PHAR_GET_32(buf);
if (FAILURE == phar_verify_signature(fp, php_stream_tell(fp) - size - 512, myphar->sig_flags, buf + 8, size - 8, fname, &myphar->signature, &myphar->sig_len, error TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
char *save = *error;
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be verified: %s", fname, save);
efree(save);
}
goto bail;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, curloc + 512, SEEK_SET);
/* signature checked out, let's ensure this is the last file in the phar */
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, 512, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" has entries after signature, invalid phar", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
if (!last_was_longlink && hdr->typeflag == 'L') {
last_was_longlink = 1;
/* support the ././@LongLink system for storing long filenames */
entry.filename_len = entry.uncompressed_filesize;
/* Check for overflow - bug 61065 */
if (entry.filename_len == UINT_MAX) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (invalid entry size)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename = pemalloc(entry.filename_len+1, myphar->is_persistent);
read = php_stream_read(fp, entry.filename, entry.filename_len);
if (read != entry.filename_len) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename[entry.filename_len] = '\0';
/* skip blank stuff */
size = ((size+511)&~511) - size;
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
continue;
} else if (!last_was_longlink && !old && hdr->prefix[0] != 0) {
char name[256];
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 155; i++) {
name[i] = hdr->prefix[i];
if (name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
name[i++] = '/';
for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
name[i+j] = hdr->name[j];
if (name[i+j] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i+j;
if (name[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename_len--;
}
entry.filename = pestrndup(name, entry.filename_len, myphar->is_persistent);
} else if (!last_was_longlink) {
int i;
/* calculate strlen, which can be no longer than 100 */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
if (hdr->name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i;
entry.filename = pestrndup(hdr->name, i, myphar->is_persistent);
if (entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] = '\0';
entry.filename_len--;
}
}
last_was_longlink = 0;
phar_add_virtual_dirs(myphar, entry.filename, entry.filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (sum1 != sum2) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (checksum mismatch of file \"%s\")", fname, entry.filename);
}
pefree(entry.filename, myphar->is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.tar_type = ((old & (hdr->typeflag == '\0')) ? TAR_FILE : hdr->typeflag);
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs = pos; /* header_offset unused in tar */
entry.fp_type = PHAR_FP;
entry.flags = phar_tar_number(hdr->mode, sizeof(hdr->mode)) & PHAR_ENT_PERM_MASK;
entry.timestamp = phar_tar_number(hdr->mtime, sizeof(hdr->mtime));
entry.is_persistent = myphar->is_persistent;
#ifndef S_ISDIR
#define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode)&S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
#endif
if (old && entry.tar_type == TAR_FILE && S_ISDIR(entry.flags)) {
entry.tar_type = TAR_DIR;
}
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_DIR) {
entry.is_dir = 1;
} else {
entry.is_dir = 0;
}
entry.link = NULL;
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_LINK) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(&myphar->manifest, hdr->linkname, strlen(hdr->linkname))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file - hard link to non-existent file \"%s\"", fname, hdr->linkname);
}
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
} else if (entry.tar_type == TAR_SYMLINK) {
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
}
phar_set_inode(&entry TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_add(&myphar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), (void **) &newentry);
if (entry.is_persistent) {
++entry.manifest_pos;
}
if (entry.filename_len >= sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1 && !memcmp(entry.filename, ".phar/.metadata", sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1)) {
if (FAILURE == phar_tar_process_metadata(newentry, fp TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has invalid metadata in magic file \"%s\"", fname, entry.filename);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!actual_alias && entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
/* found explicit alias */
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has alias that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read == size) {
buf[size] = '\0';
if (!phar_validate_alias(buf, size)) {
if (size > 50) {
buf[50] = '.';
buf[51] = '.';
buf[52] = '.';
buf[53] = '\0';
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: invalid alias \"%s\" in tar-based phar \"%s\"", buf, fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
actual_alias = pestrndup(buf, size, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias = actual_alias;
myphar->alias_len = size;
php_stream_seek(fp, pos, SEEK_SET);
} else {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to read alias from tar-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
size = (size+511)&~511;
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
} while (read != 0);
if (zend_hash_exists(&(myphar->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
myphar->is_data = 0;
} else {
myphar->is_data = 1;
}
/* ensure signature set */
if (!myphar->is_data && PHAR_G(require_hash) && !myphar->signature) {
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "tar-based phar \"%s\" does not have a signature", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
myphar->fname = pestrndup(fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(myphar->fname, fname_len);
#endif
myphar->fname_len = fname_len;
myphar->fp = fp;
p = strrchr(myphar->fname, '/');
if (p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p);
if (myphar->ext == p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p + 1, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p - 1);
}
if (myphar->ext) {
myphar->ext_len = (myphar->fname + fname_len) - myphar->ext;
}
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), (void **)&actual)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\" to phar registry", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
myphar = *actual;
if (actual_alias) {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 0;
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, actual_alias, myphar->alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
} else {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
if (alias_len) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, alias, alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
myphar->alias = pestrndup(alias, alias_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = alias_len;
} else {
myphar->alias = pestrndup(myphar->fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = fname_len;
}
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = myphar;
}
return SUCCESS;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'fix unchecked emalloc'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void * calloc(size_t n, size_t lb)
{
if (lb && n > SIZE_MAX / lb)
return NULL;
# if defined(GC_LINUX_THREADS) /* && !defined(USE_PROC_FOR_LIBRARIES) */
/* libpthread allocated some memory that is only pointed to by */
/* mmapped thread stacks. Make sure it's not collectable. */
{
static GC_bool lib_bounds_set = FALSE;
ptr_t caller = (ptr_t)__builtin_return_address(0);
/* This test does not need to ensure memory visibility, since */
/* the bounds will be set when/if we create another thread. */
if (!EXPECT(lib_bounds_set, TRUE)) {
GC_init_lib_bounds();
lib_bounds_set = TRUE;
}
if (((word)caller >= (word)GC_libpthread_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libpthread_end)
|| ((word)caller >= (word)GC_libld_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libld_end))
return GC_malloc_uncollectable(n*lb);
/* The two ranges are actually usually adjacent, so there may */
/* be a way to speed this up. */
}
# endif
return((void *)REDIRECT_MALLOC(n*lb));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix calloc-related code to prevent SIZE_MAX redefinition in sys headers
* malloc.c: Include limits.h for SIZE_MAX.
* malloc.c (SIZE_MAX, calloc): Define GC_SIZE_MAX instead of SIZE_MAX.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
{
/* convert pages-jiffies to Mbyte-usec */
stats->coremem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_rss_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
stats->virtmem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_vm_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
if (p->mm) {
/* adjust to KB unit */
stats->hiwater_rss = p->mm->hiwater_rss * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
stats->hiwater_vm = p->mm->hiwater_vm * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
}
stats->read_char = p->rchar;
stats->write_char = p->wchar;
stats->read_syscalls = p->syscr;
stats->write_syscalls = p->syscw;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': '[PATCH] xacct_add_tsk: fix pure theoretical ->mm use-after-free
Paranoid fix. The task can free its ->mm after the 'if (p->mm)' check.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Jay Lan <jlan@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int cbtls_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
char subject[1024]; /* Used for the subject name */
char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */
char common_name[1024];
char cn_str[1024];
char buf[64];
EAP_HANDLER *handler = NULL;
X509 *client_cert;
X509 *issuer_cert;
SSL *ssl;
int err, depth, lookup, loc;
EAP_TLS_CONF *conf;
int my_ok = ok;
REQUEST *request;
ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL;
ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
X509_STORE *ocsp_store = NULL;
#endif
client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
lookup = depth;
/*
* Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log
* issuing cert.
*/
if ((lookup > 1) && !my_ok) lookup = 1;
/*
* Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
* and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
*/
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
handler = (EAP_HANDLER *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 0);
request = handler->request;
conf = (EAP_TLS_CONF *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 1);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
ocsp_store = (X509_STORE *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 2);
#endif
/*
* Get the Serial Number
*/
buf[0] = '\0';
sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert);
/*
* For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if
* we're at the client or issuing certificate.
*/
if ((lookup <= 1) && sn && (sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) {
char *p = buf;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) {
sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]);
p += 2;
}
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
}
/*
* Get the Expiration Date
*/
buf[0] = '\0';
asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert);
if ((lookup <= 1) && asn_time && (asn_time->length < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length);
buf[asn_time->length] = '\0';
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
}
/*
* Get the Subject & Issuer
*/
subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0';
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject,
sizeof(subject));
subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0';
if ((lookup <= 1) && subject[0] && (strlen(subject) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET));
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), issuer,
sizeof(issuer));
issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0';
if ((lookup <= 1) && issuer[0] && (strlen(issuer) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET));
}
/*
* Get the Common Name, if there is a subject.
*/
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert),
NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name));
common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0';
if ((lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] && subject[0] && (strlen(common_name) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET));
}
#ifdef GEN_EMAIL
/*
* Get the RFC822 Subject Alternative Name
*/
loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(client_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0);
if (lookup <= 1 && loc >= 0) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *names = NULL;
int i;
if ((ext = X509_get_ext(client_cert, loc)) &&
(names = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
switch (name->type) {
case GEN_EMAIL:
if (ASN1_STRING_length(name->d.rfc822Name) >= MAX_STRING_LEN)
break;
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SAN_EMAIL][lookup],
ASN1_STRING_data(name->d.rfc822Name), T_OP_SET));
break;
default:
/* XXX TODO handle other SAN types */
break;
}
}
}
if (names != NULL)
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(names);
}
#endif /* GEN_EMAIL */
/*
* If the CRL has expired, that might still be OK.
*/
if (!my_ok &&
(conf->allow_expired_crl) &&
(err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) {
my_ok = 1;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error( ctx, 0 );
}
if (!my_ok) {
const char *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
radlog(L_ERR,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err, p);
radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
"Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_SET);
return my_ok;
}
switch (ctx->error) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
radlog(L_ERR, "issuer= %s\n", issuer);
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
radlog(L_ERR, "notBefore=");
#if 0
ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
#endif
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
radlog(L_ERR, "notAfter=");
#if 0
ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
#endif
break;
}
/*
* If we're at the actual client cert, apply additional
* checks.
*/
if (depth == 0) {
/*
* If the conf tells us to, check cert issuer
* against the specified value and fail
* verification if they don't match.
*/
if (conf->check_cert_issuer &&
(strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer);
my_ok = 0;
}
/*
* If the conf tells us to, check the CN in the
* cert against xlat'ed value, but only if the
* previous checks passed.
*/
if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_cn) {
if (!radius_xlat(cn_str, sizeof(cn_str), conf->check_cert_cn, handler->request, NULL)) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls (%s): xlat failed.",
conf->check_cert_cn);
/* if this fails, fail the verification */
my_ok = 0;
} else {
RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str);
if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", common_name, cn_str);
my_ok = 0;
}
}
} /* check_cert_cn */
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
if (my_ok && conf->ocsp_enable){
RDEBUG2("--> Starting OCSP Request");
if(X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer_cert, ctx, client_cert)!=1) {
radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get issuer_cert for %s", common_name);
}
my_ok = ocsp_check(ocsp_store, issuer_cert, client_cert, conf);
}
#endif
while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) {
char filename[256];
int fd;
FILE *fp;
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX",
conf->verify_tmp_dir, progname);
fd = mkstemp(filename);
if (fd < 0) {
RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s",
conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
break;
}
fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
if (!fp) {
RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s",
filename, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) {
fclose(fp);
RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file");
goto do_unlink;
}
fclose(fp);
if (!radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
"TLS-Client-Cert-Filename",
filename, T_OP_SET)) {
RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename");
goto do_unlink;
}
RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s",
conf->verify_client_cert_cmd);
if (radius_exec_program(conf->verify_client_cert_cmd,
request, 1, NULL, 0,
request->packet->vps,
NULL, 1) != 0) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name);
my_ok = 0;
} else {
RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name);
}
do_unlink:
unlink(filename);
break;
}
} /* depth == 0 */
if (debug_flag > 0) {
RDEBUG2("chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
RDEBUG2("error=%d", err);
RDEBUG2("--> User-Name = %s", handler->identity);
RDEBUG2("--> BUF-Name = %s", common_name);
RDEBUG2("--> subject = %s", subject);
RDEBUG2("--> issuer = %s", issuer);
RDEBUG2("--> verify return:%d", my_ok);
}
return my_ok;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fix CVE-2012-3547. Found by Timo Warns'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int ip_setup_cork(struct sock *sk, struct inet_cork *cork,
struct ipcm_cookie *ipc, struct rtable **rtp)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ip_options *opt;
struct rtable *rt;
/*
* setup for corking.
*/
opt = ipc->opt;
if (opt) {
if (cork->opt == NULL) {
cork->opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ip_options) + 40,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(cork->opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
}
memcpy(cork->opt, opt, sizeof(struct ip_options) + opt->optlen);
cork->flags |= IPCORK_OPT;
cork->addr = ipc->addr;
}
rt = *rtp;
if (unlikely(!rt))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We steal reference to this route, caller should not release it
*/
*rtp = NULL;
cork->fragsize = inet->pmtudisc == IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
cork->length = 0;
cork->tx_flags = ipc->tx_flags;
cork->page = NULL;
cork->off = 0;
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int ip_options_get_finish(struct net *net, struct ip_options **optp,
struct ip_options *opt, int optlen)
{
while (optlen & 3)
opt->__data[optlen++] = IPOPT_END;
opt->optlen = optlen;
if (optlen && ip_options_compile(net, opt, NULL)) {
kfree(opt);
return -EINVAL;
}
kfree(*optp);
*optp = opt;
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static struct rtable *icmp_route_lookup(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,
const struct iphdr *iph,
__be32 saddr, u8 tos,
int type, int code,
struct icmp_bxm *param)
{
struct flowi4 fl4 = {
.daddr = (param->replyopts.srr ?
param->replyopts.faddr : iph->saddr),
.saddr = saddr,
.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(tos),
.flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_ICMP,
.fl4_icmp_type = type,
.fl4_icmp_code = code,
};
struct rtable *rt, *rt2;
int err;
security_skb_classify_flow(skb_in, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return rt;
/* No need to clone since we're just using its address. */
rt2 = rt;
if (!fl4.saddr)
fl4.saddr = rt->rt_src;
rt = (struct rtable *) xfrm_lookup(net, &rt->dst,
flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), NULL, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
if (rt != rt2)
return rt;
} else if (PTR_ERR(rt) == -EPERM) {
rt = NULL;
} else
return rt;
err = xfrm_decode_session_reverse(skb_in, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), AF_INET);
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
if (inet_addr_type(net, fl4.saddr) == RTN_LOCAL) {
rt2 = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt2))
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
} else {
struct flowi4 fl4_2 = {};
unsigned long orefdst;
fl4_2.daddr = fl4.saddr;
rt2 = ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4_2);
if (IS_ERR(rt2)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
goto relookup_failed;
}
/* Ugh! */
orefdst = skb_in->_skb_refdst; /* save old refdst */
err = ip_route_input(skb_in, fl4.daddr, fl4.saddr,
RT_TOS(tos), rt2->dst.dev);
dst_release(&rt2->dst);
rt2 = skb_rtable(skb_in);
skb_in->_skb_refdst = orefdst; /* restore old refdst */
}
if (err)
goto relookup_failed;
rt2 = (struct rtable *) xfrm_lookup(net, &rt2->dst,
flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4), NULL,
XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP);
if (!IS_ERR(rt2)) {
dst_release(&rt->dst);
rt = rt2;
} else if (PTR_ERR(rt2) == -EPERM) {
if (rt)
dst_release(&rt->dst);
return rt2;
} else {
err = PTR_ERR(rt2);
goto relookup_failed;
}
return rt;
relookup_failed:
if (rt)
return rt;
return ERR_PTR(err);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: ppm_load_read_header(FILE *fp,
pnm_struct *img)
{
/* PPM Headers Variable Declaration */
gchar *ptr;
//gchar *retval;
gchar header[MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW];
gint maxval;
/* Check the PPM file Type P2 or P5 */
fgets (header,MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW,fp);
if (header[0] != ASCII_P ||
(header[1] != PIXMAP_ASCII &&
header[1] != PIXMAP_RAW))
{
g_warning ("Image is not a portable pixmap");
return FALSE;
}
img->type = header[1];
/* Check the Comments */
fgets (header,MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW,fp);
while(header[0] == '#')
{
fgets (header,MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW,fp);
}
/* Get Width and Height */
img->width = strtol (header,&ptr,0);
img->height = atoi (ptr);
fgets (header,MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW,fp);
maxval = strtol (header,&ptr,0);
if ((maxval != 255) && (maxval != 65535))
{
g_warning ("Image is not an 8-bit or 16-bit portable pixmap");
return FALSE;
}
switch (maxval)
{
case 255:
img->bpc = sizeof (guchar);
break;
case 65535:
img->bpc = sizeof (gushort);
break;
default:
g_warning ("%s: Programmer stupidity error", G_STRLOC);
}
/* Later on, img->numsamples is multiplied with img->bpc to allocate
* memory. Ensure it doesn't overflow. */
if (!img->width || !img->height ||
G_MAXSIZE / img->width / img->height / CHANNEL_COUNT < img->bpc)
{
g_warning ("Illegal width/height: %ld/%ld", img->width, img->height);
return FALSE;
}
img->numsamples = img->width * img->height * CHANNEL_COUNT;
return TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'ppm-load: CVE-2012-4433: add plausibility checks for header fields
Refuse values that are non-decimal, negative or overflow the target
type.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int ext4_split_unwritten_extents(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
int flags)
{
ext4_lblk_t eof_block;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
unsigned int ee_len;
int split_flag = 0, depth;
ext_debug("ext4_split_unwritten_extents: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
eof_block = (inode->i_size + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (eof_block < map->m_lblk + map->m_len)
eof_block = map->m_lblk + map->m_len;
/*
* It is safe to convert extent to initialized via explicit
* zeroout only if extent is fully insde i_size or new_size.
*/
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
split_flag |= ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block ? EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2;
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO;
return ext4_split_extent(handle, inode, path, map, split_flag, flags);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: transit_state_consume_1char (struct dfa *d, int s, unsigned char const **pp,
int *match_lens, int *mbclen, position_set *pps)
{
int i, j;
int s1, s2;
int* work_mbls;
status_transit_state rs = TRANSIT_STATE_DONE;
/* Calculate the length of the (single/multi byte) character
to which p points. */
*mbclen = (mblen_buf[*pp - buf_begin] == 0)? 1
: mblen_buf[*pp - buf_begin];
/* Calculate the state which can be reached from the state `s' by
consuming `*mbclen' single bytes from the buffer. */
s1 = s;
for (i = 0; i < *mbclen; i++)
{
s2 = s1;
rs = transit_state_singlebyte(d, s2, (*pp)++, &s1);
}
/* Copy the positions contained by `s1' to the set `pps'. */
copy(&(d->states[s1].elems), pps);
/* Check (inputed)match_lens, and initialize if it is NULL. */
if (match_lens == NULL && d->states[s].mbps.nelem != 0)
work_mbls = check_matching_with_multibyte_ops(d, s, *pp - buf_begin);
else
work_mbls = match_lens;
/* Add all of the positions which can be reached from `s' by consuming
a single character. */
for (i = 0; i < d->states[s].mbps.nelem ; i++)
{
if (work_mbls[i] == *mbclen)
for (j = 0; j < d->follows[d->states[s].mbps.elems[i].index].nelem;
j++)
insert(d->follows[d->states[s].mbps.elems[i].index].elems[j],
pps);
}
if (match_lens == NULL && work_mbls != NULL)
free(work_mbls);
return rs;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'grep: fix some core dumps with long lines etc.
These problems mostly occur because the code attempts to stuff
sizes into int or into unsigned int; this doesn't work on most
64-bit hosts and the errors can lead to core dumps.
* NEWS: Document this.
* src/dfa.c (token): Typedef to ptrdiff_t, since the enum's
range could be as small as -128 .. 127 on practical hosts.
(position.index): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(leaf_set.elems): Now size_t *, not unsigned int *.
(dfa_state.hash, struct mb_char_classes.nchars, .nch_classes)
(.nranges, .nequivs, .ncoll_elems, struct dfa.cindex, .calloc, .tindex)
(.talloc, .depth, .nleaves, .nregexps, .nmultibyte_prop, .nmbcsets):
(.mbcsets_alloc): Now size_t, not int.
(dfa_state.first_end): Now token, not int.
(state_num): New type.
(struct mb_char_classes.cset): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
(struct dfa.utf8_anychar_classes): Now token[5], not int[5].
(struct dfa.sindex, .salloc, .tralloc): Now state_num, not int.
(struct dfa.trans, .realtrans, .fails): Now state_num **, not int **.
(struct dfa.newlines): Now state_num *, not int *.
(prtok): Don't assume 'token' is no wider than int.
(lexleft, parens, depth): Now size_t, not int.
(charclass_index, nsubtoks)
(parse_bracket_exp, addtok, copytoks, closure, insert, merge, delete)
(state_index, epsclosure, state_separate_contexts)
(dfaanalyze, dfastate, build_state, realloc_trans_if_necessary)
(transit_state_singlebyte, match_anychar, match_mb_charset)
(check_matching_with_multibyte_ops, transit_state_consume_1char)
(transit_state, dfaexec, free_mbdata, dfaoptimize, dfafree)
(freelist, enlist, addlists, inboth, dfamust):
Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
(lex): Avoid overflow in string-to-{hi,lo} conversions.
(dfaanalyze): Redo indexing so that it works with size_t values,
which cannot go negative.
* src/dfa.h (dfaexec): Count argument is now size_t *, not int *.
(dfastate): State numbers are now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/dfasearch.c: Include "intprops.h", for TYPE_MAXIMUM.
(kwset_exact_matches): Now size_t, not int.
(EGexecute): Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
Check for overflow before converting a ptrdiff_t to a regoff_t,
as regoff_t is narrower than ptrdiff_t in 64-bit glibc (contra POSIX).
Check for memory exhaustion in re_search rather than treating
it merely as failure to match; use xalloc_die () to report any error.
* src/kwset.c (struct trie.accepting): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(struct kwset.words): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/kwset.h (struct kwsmatch.index): Now size_t, not int.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: check_matching_with_multibyte_ops (struct dfa *d, int s, int idx)
{
int i;
int* rarray;
MALLOC(rarray, d->states[s].mbps.nelem);
for (i = 0; i < d->states[s].mbps.nelem; ++i)
{
position pos = d->states[s].mbps.elems[i];
switch(d->tokens[pos.index])
{
case ANYCHAR:
rarray[i] = match_anychar(d, s, pos, idx);
break;
case MBCSET:
rarray[i] = match_mb_charset(d, s, pos, idx);
break;
default:
break; /* cannot happen. */
}
}
return rarray;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'grep: fix some core dumps with long lines etc.
These problems mostly occur because the code attempts to stuff
sizes into int or into unsigned int; this doesn't work on most
64-bit hosts and the errors can lead to core dumps.
* NEWS: Document this.
* src/dfa.c (token): Typedef to ptrdiff_t, since the enum's
range could be as small as -128 .. 127 on practical hosts.
(position.index): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(leaf_set.elems): Now size_t *, not unsigned int *.
(dfa_state.hash, struct mb_char_classes.nchars, .nch_classes)
(.nranges, .nequivs, .ncoll_elems, struct dfa.cindex, .calloc, .tindex)
(.talloc, .depth, .nleaves, .nregexps, .nmultibyte_prop, .nmbcsets):
(.mbcsets_alloc): Now size_t, not int.
(dfa_state.first_end): Now token, not int.
(state_num): New type.
(struct mb_char_classes.cset): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
(struct dfa.utf8_anychar_classes): Now token[5], not int[5].
(struct dfa.sindex, .salloc, .tralloc): Now state_num, not int.
(struct dfa.trans, .realtrans, .fails): Now state_num **, not int **.
(struct dfa.newlines): Now state_num *, not int *.
(prtok): Don't assume 'token' is no wider than int.
(lexleft, parens, depth): Now size_t, not int.
(charclass_index, nsubtoks)
(parse_bracket_exp, addtok, copytoks, closure, insert, merge, delete)
(state_index, epsclosure, state_separate_contexts)
(dfaanalyze, dfastate, build_state, realloc_trans_if_necessary)
(transit_state_singlebyte, match_anychar, match_mb_charset)
(check_matching_with_multibyte_ops, transit_state_consume_1char)
(transit_state, dfaexec, free_mbdata, dfaoptimize, dfafree)
(freelist, enlist, addlists, inboth, dfamust):
Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
(lex): Avoid overflow in string-to-{hi,lo} conversions.
(dfaanalyze): Redo indexing so that it works with size_t values,
which cannot go negative.
* src/dfa.h (dfaexec): Count argument is now size_t *, not int *.
(dfastate): State numbers are now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/dfasearch.c: Include "intprops.h", for TYPE_MAXIMUM.
(kwset_exact_matches): Now size_t, not int.
(EGexecute): Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
Check for overflow before converting a ptrdiff_t to a regoff_t,
as regoff_t is narrower than ptrdiff_t in 64-bit glibc (contra POSIX).
Check for memory exhaustion in re_search rather than treating
it merely as failure to match; use xalloc_die () to report any error.
* src/kwset.c (struct trie.accepting): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(struct kwset.words): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/kwset.h (struct kwsmatch.index): Now size_t, not int.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: transit_state_singlebyte (struct dfa *d, int s, unsigned char const *p,
int *next_state)
{
int *t;
int works = s;
status_transit_state rval = TRANSIT_STATE_IN_PROGRESS;
while (rval == TRANSIT_STATE_IN_PROGRESS)
{
if ((t = d->trans[works]) != NULL)
{
works = t[*p];
rval = TRANSIT_STATE_DONE;
if (works < 0)
works = 0;
}
else if (works < 0)
{
if (p == buf_end)
{
/* At the moment, it must not happen. */
abort ();
}
works = 0;
}
else if (d->fails[works])
{
works = d->fails[works][*p];
rval = TRANSIT_STATE_DONE;
}
else
{
build_state(works, d);
}
}
*next_state = works;
return rval;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'grep: fix some core dumps with long lines etc.
These problems mostly occur because the code attempts to stuff
sizes into int or into unsigned int; this doesn't work on most
64-bit hosts and the errors can lead to core dumps.
* NEWS: Document this.
* src/dfa.c (token): Typedef to ptrdiff_t, since the enum's
range could be as small as -128 .. 127 on practical hosts.
(position.index): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(leaf_set.elems): Now size_t *, not unsigned int *.
(dfa_state.hash, struct mb_char_classes.nchars, .nch_classes)
(.nranges, .nequivs, .ncoll_elems, struct dfa.cindex, .calloc, .tindex)
(.talloc, .depth, .nleaves, .nregexps, .nmultibyte_prop, .nmbcsets):
(.mbcsets_alloc): Now size_t, not int.
(dfa_state.first_end): Now token, not int.
(state_num): New type.
(struct mb_char_classes.cset): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
(struct dfa.utf8_anychar_classes): Now token[5], not int[5].
(struct dfa.sindex, .salloc, .tralloc): Now state_num, not int.
(struct dfa.trans, .realtrans, .fails): Now state_num **, not int **.
(struct dfa.newlines): Now state_num *, not int *.
(prtok): Don't assume 'token' is no wider than int.
(lexleft, parens, depth): Now size_t, not int.
(charclass_index, nsubtoks)
(parse_bracket_exp, addtok, copytoks, closure, insert, merge, delete)
(state_index, epsclosure, state_separate_contexts)
(dfaanalyze, dfastate, build_state, realloc_trans_if_necessary)
(transit_state_singlebyte, match_anychar, match_mb_charset)
(check_matching_with_multibyte_ops, transit_state_consume_1char)
(transit_state, dfaexec, free_mbdata, dfaoptimize, dfafree)
(freelist, enlist, addlists, inboth, dfamust):
Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
(lex): Avoid overflow in string-to-{hi,lo} conversions.
(dfaanalyze): Redo indexing so that it works with size_t values,
which cannot go negative.
* src/dfa.h (dfaexec): Count argument is now size_t *, not int *.
(dfastate): State numbers are now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/dfasearch.c: Include "intprops.h", for TYPE_MAXIMUM.
(kwset_exact_matches): Now size_t, not int.
(EGexecute): Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
Check for overflow before converting a ptrdiff_t to a regoff_t,
as regoff_t is narrower than ptrdiff_t in 64-bit glibc (contra POSIX).
Check for memory exhaustion in re_search rather than treating
it merely as failure to match; use xalloc_die () to report any error.
* src/kwset.c (struct trie.accepting): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(struct kwset.words): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/kwset.h (struct kwsmatch.index): Now size_t, not int.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: dfaexec (struct dfa *d, char const *begin, char *end,
int allow_nl, int *count, int *backref)
{
int s, s1; /* Current state. */
unsigned char const *p; /* Current input character. */
int **trans, *t; /* Copy of d->trans so it can be optimized
into a register. */
unsigned char eol = eolbyte; /* Likewise for eolbyte. */
unsigned char saved_end;
if (! d->tralloc)
build_state_zero(d);
s = s1 = 0;
p = (unsigned char const *) begin;
trans = d->trans;
saved_end = *(unsigned char *) end;
*end = eol;
if (d->mb_cur_max > 1)
{
MALLOC(mblen_buf, end - begin + 2);
MALLOC(inputwcs, end - begin + 2);
memset(&mbs, 0, sizeof(mbstate_t));
prepare_wc_buf ((const char *) p, end);
}
for (;;)
{
if (d->mb_cur_max > 1)
while ((t = trans[s]) != NULL)
{
if (p > buf_end)
break;
s1 = s;
SKIP_REMAINS_MB_IF_INITIAL_STATE(s, p);
if (d->states[s].mbps.nelem == 0)
{
s = t[*p++];
continue;
}
/* Falling back to the glibc matcher in this case gives
better performance (up to 25% better on [a-z], for
example) and enables support for collating symbols and
equivalence classes. */
if (backref)
{
*backref = 1;
free(mblen_buf);
free(inputwcs);
*end = saved_end;
return (char *) p;
}
/* Can match with a multibyte character (and multi character
collating element). Transition table might be updated. */
s = transit_state(d, s, &p);
trans = d->trans;
}
else
{
while ((t = trans[s]) != NULL)
{
s1 = t[*p++];
if ((t = trans[s1]) == NULL)
{
int tmp = s; s = s1; s1 = tmp; /* swap */
break;
}
s = t[*p++];
}
}
if (s >= 0 && (char *) p <= end && d->fails[s])
{
if (d->success[s] & sbit[*p])
{
if (backref)
*backref = (d->states[s].backref != 0);
if (d->mb_cur_max > 1)
{
free(mblen_buf);
free(inputwcs);
}
*end = saved_end;
return (char *) p;
}
s1 = s;
if (d->mb_cur_max > 1)
{
/* Can match with a multibyte character (and multicharacter
collating element). Transition table might be updated. */
s = transit_state(d, s, &p);
trans = d->trans;
}
else
s = d->fails[s][*p++];
continue;
}
/* If the previous character was a newline, count it. */
if ((char *) p <= end && p[-1] == eol)
{
if (count)
++*count;
if (d->mb_cur_max > 1)
prepare_wc_buf ((const char *) p, end);
}
/* Check if we've run off the end of the buffer. */
if ((char *) p > end)
{
if (d->mb_cur_max > 1)
{
free(mblen_buf);
free(inputwcs);
}
*end = saved_end;
return NULL;
}
if (s >= 0)
{
build_state(s, d);
trans = d->trans;
continue;
}
if (p[-1] == eol && allow_nl)
{
s = d->newlines[s1];
continue;
}
s = 0;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'grep: fix some core dumps with long lines etc.
These problems mostly occur because the code attempts to stuff
sizes into int or into unsigned int; this doesn't work on most
64-bit hosts and the errors can lead to core dumps.
* NEWS: Document this.
* src/dfa.c (token): Typedef to ptrdiff_t, since the enum's
range could be as small as -128 .. 127 on practical hosts.
(position.index): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(leaf_set.elems): Now size_t *, not unsigned int *.
(dfa_state.hash, struct mb_char_classes.nchars, .nch_classes)
(.nranges, .nequivs, .ncoll_elems, struct dfa.cindex, .calloc, .tindex)
(.talloc, .depth, .nleaves, .nregexps, .nmultibyte_prop, .nmbcsets):
(.mbcsets_alloc): Now size_t, not int.
(dfa_state.first_end): Now token, not int.
(state_num): New type.
(struct mb_char_classes.cset): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
(struct dfa.utf8_anychar_classes): Now token[5], not int[5].
(struct dfa.sindex, .salloc, .tralloc): Now state_num, not int.
(struct dfa.trans, .realtrans, .fails): Now state_num **, not int **.
(struct dfa.newlines): Now state_num *, not int *.
(prtok): Don't assume 'token' is no wider than int.
(lexleft, parens, depth): Now size_t, not int.
(charclass_index, nsubtoks)
(parse_bracket_exp, addtok, copytoks, closure, insert, merge, delete)
(state_index, epsclosure, state_separate_contexts)
(dfaanalyze, dfastate, build_state, realloc_trans_if_necessary)
(transit_state_singlebyte, match_anychar, match_mb_charset)
(check_matching_with_multibyte_ops, transit_state_consume_1char)
(transit_state, dfaexec, free_mbdata, dfaoptimize, dfafree)
(freelist, enlist, addlists, inboth, dfamust):
Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
(lex): Avoid overflow in string-to-{hi,lo} conversions.
(dfaanalyze): Redo indexing so that it works with size_t values,
which cannot go negative.
* src/dfa.h (dfaexec): Count argument is now size_t *, not int *.
(dfastate): State numbers are now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/dfasearch.c: Include "intprops.h", for TYPE_MAXIMUM.
(kwset_exact_matches): Now size_t, not int.
(EGexecute): Don't assume indexes fit in 'int'.
Check for overflow before converting a ptrdiff_t to a regoff_t,
as regoff_t is narrower than ptrdiff_t in 64-bit glibc (contra POSIX).
Check for memory exhaustion in re_search rather than treating
it merely as failure to match; use xalloc_die () to report any error.
* src/kwset.c (struct trie.accepting): Now size_t, not unsigned int.
(struct kwset.words): Now ptrdiff_t, not int.
* src/kwset.h (struct kwsmatch.index): Now size_t, not int.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: get_nondigit_option (int argc, char *const *argv, int *default_context)
{
static int prev_digit_optind = -1;
int opt, this_digit_optind, was_digit;
char buf[sizeof (uintmax_t) * CHAR_BIT + 4];
char *p = buf;
was_digit = 0;
this_digit_optind = optind;
while (opt = getopt_long (argc, (char **) argv, short_options, long_options,
NULL),
'0' <= opt && opt <= '9')
{
if (prev_digit_optind != this_digit_optind || !was_digit)
{
/* Reset to start another context length argument. */
p = buf;
}
else
{
/* Suppress trivial leading zeros, to avoid incorrect
diagnostic on strings like 00000000000. */
p -= buf[0] == '0';
}
if (p == buf + sizeof buf - 4)
{
/* Too many digits. Append "..." to make context_length_arg
complain about "X...", where X contains the digits seen
so far. */
strcpy (p, "...");
p += 3;
break;
}
*p++ = opt;
was_digit = 1;
prev_digit_optind = this_digit_optind;
this_digit_optind = optind;
}
if (p != buf)
{
*p = '\0';
context_length_arg (buf, default_context);
}
return opt;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'grep: fix integer-overflow issues in main program
* NEWS: Document this.
* bootstrap.conf (gnulib_modules): Add inttypes, xstrtoimax.
Remove xstrtoumax.
* src/main.c: Include <inttypes.h>, for INTMAX_MAX, PRIdMAX.
(context_length_arg, prtext, grepbuf, grep, grepfile)
(get_nondigit_option, main):
Use intmax_t, not int, for line counts.
(context_length_arg, main): Silently ceiling line counts
to maximum value, since there's no practical difference between
doing that and using infinite-precision arithmetic.
(out_before, out_after, pending): Now intmax_t, not int.
(max_count, outleft): Now intmax_t, not off_t.
(prepend_args, prepend_default_options, main):
Use size_t, not int, for sizes.
(prepend_default_options): Check for int and size_t overflow.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: cib_tls_close(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
shutdown(private->command.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
shutdown(private->callback.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->command.socket);
close(private->callback.socket);
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (private->command.encrypted) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->command.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->command.session));
gnutls_free(private->command.session);
gnutls_bye(*(private->callback.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->callback.session));
gnutls_free(private->callback.session);
gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials(anon_cred_c);
gnutls_global_deinit();
}
#endif
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: cib_tls_signon(cib_t * cib, struct remote_connection_s *connection)
{
int sock;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
int rc = 0;
char *server = private->server;
int ret_ga;
struct addrinfo *res;
struct addrinfo hints;
xmlNode *answer = NULL;
xmlNode *login = NULL;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks cib_fd_callbacks =
{
.dispatch = cib_remote_dispatch,
.destroy = cib_remote_connection_destroy,
};
connection->socket = 0;
connection->session = NULL;
/* create socket */
sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (sock == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Socket creation failed");
return -1;
}
/* getaddrinfo */
bzero(&hints, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_RAW;
if (hints.ai_family == AF_INET6) {
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
} else {
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_ICMP;
}
crm_debug("Looking up %s", server);
ret_ga = getaddrinfo(server, NULL, &hints, &res);
if (ret_ga) {
crm_err("getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(ret_ga));
close(sock);
return -1;
}
if (res->ai_canonname) {
server = res->ai_canonname;
}
crm_debug("Got address %s for %s", server, private->server);
if (!res->ai_addr) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed");
crm_exit(1);
}
#if 1
memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
#else
/* connect to server */
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(server);
#endif
addr.sin_port = htons(private->port);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Connection to %s:%d failed", server, private->port);
close(sock);
return -1;
}
if (connection->encrypted) {
/* initialize GnuTls lib */
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
gnutls_global_init();
gnutls_anon_allocate_client_credentials(&anon_cred_c);
/* bind the socket to GnuTls lib */
connection->session = create_tls_session(sock, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
if (connection->session == NULL) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Session creation for %s:%d failed", server, private->port);
close(sock);
cib_tls_close(cib);
return -1;
}
#else
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
#endif
} else {
connection->session = GUINT_TO_POINTER(sock);
}
/* login to server */
login = create_xml_node(NULL, "cib_command");
crm_xml_add(login, "op", "authenticate");
crm_xml_add(login, "user", private->user);
crm_xml_add(login, "password", private->passwd);
crm_xml_add(login, "hidden", "password");
crm_send_remote_msg(connection->session, login, connection->encrypted);
free_xml(login);
answer = crm_recv_remote_msg(connection->session, connection->encrypted);
crm_log_xml_trace(answer, "Reply");
if (answer == NULL) {
rc = -EPROTO;
} else {
/* grab the token */
const char *msg_type = crm_element_value(answer, F_CIB_OPERATION);
const char *tmp_ticket = crm_element_value(answer, F_CIB_CLIENTID);
if (safe_str_neq(msg_type, CRM_OP_REGISTER)) {
crm_err("Invalid registration message: %s", msg_type);
rc = -EPROTO;
} else if (tmp_ticket == NULL) {
rc = -EPROTO;
} else {
connection->token = strdup(tmp_ticket);
}
}
if (rc != 0) {
cib_tls_close(cib);
}
connection->socket = sock;
connection->source = mainloop_add_fd("cib-remote", G_PRIORITY_HIGH, connection->socket, cib, &cib_fd_callbacks);
return rc;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: refresh_account (GoaProvider *provider,
GoaClient *client,
GoaObject *object,
GtkWindow *parent,
GError **error)
{
AddAccountData data;
GVariantBuilder builder;
GoaAccount *account;
GoaHttpClient *http_client;
GtkWidget *dialog;
GtkWidget *vbox;
gboolean ret;
const gchar *password;
const gchar *username;
gchar *uri;
gchar *uri_webdav;
gint response;
g_return_val_if_fail (GOA_IS_OWNCLOUD_PROVIDER (provider), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (GOA_IS_CLIENT (client), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (GOA_IS_OBJECT (object), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (parent == NULL || GTK_IS_WINDOW (parent), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, FALSE);
http_client = NULL;
uri = NULL;
uri_webdav = NULL;
ret = FALSE;
dialog = gtk_dialog_new_with_buttons (NULL,
parent,
GTK_DIALOG_MODAL | GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
GTK_STOCK_CANCEL, GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL,
NULL);
gtk_container_set_border_width (GTK_CONTAINER (dialog), 12);
gtk_window_set_modal (GTK_WINDOW (dialog), TRUE);
gtk_window_set_resizable (GTK_WINDOW (dialog), FALSE);
vbox = gtk_dialog_get_content_area (GTK_DIALOG (dialog));
gtk_box_set_spacing (GTK_BOX (vbox), 12);
memset (&data, 0, sizeof (AddAccountData));
data.cancellable = g_cancellable_new ();
data.loop = g_main_loop_new (NULL, FALSE);
data.dialog = GTK_DIALOG (dialog);
data.error = NULL;
create_account_details_ui (provider, GTK_DIALOG (dialog), GTK_BOX (vbox), FALSE, &data);
uri = goa_util_lookup_keyfile_string (object, "Uri");
gtk_entry_set_text (GTK_ENTRY (data.uri), uri);
gtk_editable_set_editable (GTK_EDITABLE (data.uri), FALSE);
account = goa_object_peek_account (object);
username = goa_account_get_identity (account);
gtk_entry_set_text (GTK_ENTRY (data.username), username);
gtk_editable_set_editable (GTK_EDITABLE (data.username), FALSE);
gtk_widget_show_all (dialog);
g_signal_connect (dialog, "response", G_CALLBACK (dialog_response_cb), &data);
http_client = goa_http_client_new ();
uri_webdav = g_strconcat (uri, WEBDAV_ENDPOINT, NULL);
http_again:
response = gtk_dialog_run (GTK_DIALOG (dialog));
if (response != GTK_RESPONSE_OK)
{
g_set_error (&data.error,
GOA_ERROR,
GOA_ERROR_DIALOG_DISMISSED,
_("Dialog was dismissed"));
goto out;
}
password = gtk_entry_get_text (GTK_ENTRY (data.password));
g_cancellable_reset (data.cancellable);
goa_http_client_check (http_client,
uri_webdav,
username,
password,
data.cancellable,
check_cb,
&data);
gtk_widget_set_sensitive (data.connect_button, FALSE);
gtk_widget_show (data.progress_grid);
g_main_loop_run (data.loop);
if (g_cancellable_is_cancelled (data.cancellable))
{
g_prefix_error (&data.error,
_("Dialog was dismissed (%s, %d): "),
g_quark_to_string (data.error->domain),
data.error->code);
data.error->domain = GOA_ERROR;
data.error->code = GOA_ERROR_DIALOG_DISMISSED;
goto out;
}
else if (data.error != NULL)
{
gchar *markup;
markup = g_strdup_printf ("<b>%s:</b> %s",
_("Error connecting to ownCloud server"),
data.error->message);
g_clear_error (&data.error);
gtk_label_set_markup (GTK_LABEL (data.cluebar_label), markup);
g_free (markup);
gtk_button_set_label (GTK_BUTTON (data.connect_button), _("_Try Again"));
gtk_widget_set_no_show_all (data.cluebar, FALSE);
gtk_widget_show_all (data.cluebar);
goto http_again;
}
/* TODO: run in worker thread */
g_variant_builder_init (&builder, G_VARIANT_TYPE_VARDICT);
g_variant_builder_add (&builder, "{sv}", "password", g_variant_new_string (password));
if (!goa_utils_store_credentials_for_object_sync (provider,
object,
g_variant_builder_end (&builder),
NULL, /* GCancellable */
&data.error))
goto out;
goa_account_call_ensure_credentials (account,
NULL, /* GCancellable */
NULL, NULL); /* callback, user_data */
ret = TRUE;
out:
if (data.error != NULL)
g_propagate_error (error, data.error);
gtk_widget_destroy (dialog);
g_free (uri);
g_free (uri_webdav);
if (data.loop != NULL)
g_main_loop_unref (data.loop);
g_clear_object (&data.cancellable);
g_clear_object (&http_client);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'Guard against invalid SSL certificates
None of the branded providers (eg., Google, Facebook and Windows Live)
should ever have an invalid certificate. So set "ssl-strict" on the
SoupSession object being used by GoaWebView.
Providers like ownCloud and Exchange might have to deal with
certificates that are not up to the mark. eg., self-signed
certificates. For those, show a warning when the account is being
created, and only proceed if the user decides to ignore it. In any
case, save the status of the certificate that was used to create the
account. So an account created with a valid certificate will never
work with an invalid one, and one created with an invalid certificate
will not throw any further warnings.
Fixes: CVE-2013-0240'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: goa_web_view_init (GoaWebView *self)
{
GoaWebViewPrivate *priv;
GtkWidget *scrolled_window;
SoupCookieJar *cookie_jar;
SoupSession *session;
WebKitWebSettings *settings;
self->priv = GOA_WEB_VIEW_GET_PRIVATE (self);
priv = self->priv;
session = webkit_get_default_session ();
soup_session_add_feature_by_type (session, SOUP_TYPE_PROXY_RESOLVER_GNOME);
g_object_set (session, "accept-language-auto", TRUE, NULL);
soup_session_remove_feature_by_type (session, SOUP_TYPE_COOKIE_JAR);
cookie_jar = soup_cookie_jar_new ();
soup_session_add_feature (session, SOUP_SESSION_FEATURE (cookie_jar));
g_object_unref (cookie_jar);
gtk_style_context_add_class (gtk_widget_get_style_context (GTK_WIDGET (self)),
GTK_STYLE_CLASS_OSD);
scrolled_window = gtk_scrolled_window_new (NULL, NULL);
gtk_widget_set_size_request (scrolled_window, 500, 400);
gtk_scrolled_window_set_shadow_type (GTK_SCROLLED_WINDOW (scrolled_window), GTK_SHADOW_IN);
gtk_scrolled_window_set_policy (GTK_SCROLLED_WINDOW (scrolled_window),
GTK_POLICY_AUTOMATIC,
GTK_POLICY_AUTOMATIC);
gtk_container_add (GTK_CONTAINER (self), scrolled_window);
priv->web_view = webkit_web_view_new ();
priv->status = WEBKIT_LOAD_PROVISIONAL;
gtk_container_add (GTK_CONTAINER (scrolled_window), priv->web_view);
settings = webkit_web_view_get_settings (WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW (priv->web_view));
g_object_set (settings, "user-stylesheet-uri", "file://" PACKAGE_DATA_DIR "/goawebview.css", NULL);
/* statusbar is hidden by default */
priv->floating_bar = nautilus_floating_bar_new (NULL, FALSE);
gtk_widget_set_halign (priv->floating_bar, GTK_ALIGN_START);
gtk_widget_set_valign (priv->floating_bar, GTK_ALIGN_END);
gtk_widget_set_no_show_all (priv->floating_bar, TRUE);
gtk_overlay_add_overlay (GTK_OVERLAY (self), priv->floating_bar);
priv->progress_bar = gtk_progress_bar_new ();
gtk_widget_set_halign (priv->progress_bar, GTK_ALIGN_FILL);
gtk_widget_set_valign (priv->progress_bar, GTK_ALIGN_START);
gtk_overlay_add_overlay (GTK_OVERLAY (self), priv->progress_bar);
priv->notify_progress_id = g_signal_connect (priv->web_view,
"notify::progress",
G_CALLBACK (web_view_notify_progress_cb),
self);
priv->notify_load_status_id = g_signal_connect (priv->web_view,
"notify::load-status",
G_CALLBACK (web_view_notify_load_status_cb),
self);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'Guard against invalid SSL certificates
None of the branded providers (eg., Google, Facebook and Windows Live)
should ever have an invalid certificate. So set "ssl-strict" on the
SoupSession object being used by GoaWebView.
Providers like ownCloud and Exchange might have to deal with
certificates that are not up to the mark. eg., self-signed
certificates. For those, show a warning when the account is being
created, and only proceed if the user decides to ignore it. In any
case, save the status of the certificate that was used to create the
account. So an account created with a valid certificate will never
work with an invalid one, and one created with an invalid certificate
will not throw any further warnings.
Fixes: CVE-2013-0240'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: goa_http_client_check (GoaHttpClient *client,
const gchar *uri,
const gchar *username,
const gchar *password,
gboolean accept_ssl_errors,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GAsyncReadyCallback callback,
gpointer user_data)
{
CheckData *data;
CheckAuthData *auth;
g_return_if_fail (GOA_IS_HTTP_CLIENT (client));
g_return_if_fail (uri != NULL || uri[0] != '\0');
g_return_if_fail (username != NULL || username[0] != '\0');
g_return_if_fail (password != NULL || password[0] != '\0');
g_return_if_fail (cancellable == NULL || G_IS_CANCELLABLE (cancellable));
data = g_slice_new0 (CheckData);
data->res = g_simple_async_result_new (G_OBJECT (client), callback, user_data, goa_http_client_check);
data->session = soup_session_async_new_with_options (SOUP_SESSION_SSL_USE_SYSTEM_CA_FILE, TRUE,
SOUP_SESSION_SSL_STRICT, FALSE,
SOUP_SESSION_USE_THREAD_CONTEXT, TRUE,
NULL);
data->accept_ssl_errors = accept_ssl_errors;
data->msg = soup_message_new (SOUP_METHOD_GET, uri);
soup_message_headers_append (data->msg->request_headers, "Connection", "close");
if (cancellable != NULL)
{
data->cancellable = g_object_ref (cancellable);
data->cancellable_id = g_cancellable_connect (data->cancellable,
G_CALLBACK (http_client_check_cancelled_cb),
data,
NULL);
g_simple_async_result_set_check_cancellable (data->res, data->cancellable);
}
auth = g_slice_new0 (CheckAuthData);
auth->username = g_strdup (username);
auth->password = g_strdup (password);
g_signal_connect_data (data->session,
"authenticate",
G_CALLBACK (http_client_authenticate),
auth,
http_client_check_auth_data_free,
0);
soup_session_queue_message (data->session, data->msg, http_client_check_response_cb, data);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'Guard against invalid SSL certificates
For providers like Exchange which use libsoup to talk to a HTTPS
server it is not enough to warn the user about an invalid certificate.
We should make sure that we abort the connection before any
credentials have been sent.
Fixes: CVE-2013-1799'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void addReply(redisClient *c, robj *obj) {
if (_installWriteEvent(c) != REDIS_OK) return;
redisAssert(!server.vm_enabled || obj->storage == REDIS_VM_MEMORY);
/* This is an important place where we can avoid copy-on-write
* when there is a saving child running, avoiding touching the
* refcount field of the object if it's not needed.
*
* If the encoding is RAW and there is room in the static buffer
* we'll be able to send the object to the client without
* messing with its page. */
if (obj->encoding == REDIS_ENCODING_RAW) {
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,obj->ptr,sdslen(obj->ptr)) != REDIS_OK)
_addReplyObjectToList(c,obj);
} else {
/* FIXME: convert the long into string and use _addReplyToBuffer()
* instead of calling getDecodedObject. As this place in the
* code is too performance critical. */
obj = getDecodedObject(obj);
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,obj->ptr,sdslen(obj->ptr)) != REDIS_OK)
_addReplyObjectToList(c,obj);
decrRefCount(obj);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'initial changes needed to turn the current VM code into a cache system. Tons of work to do still.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * compress_data,
int compress_size,
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext, uint8_t type,
record_parameters_st * params)
{
uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16_t c_length;
unsigned int pad;
int length;
uint16_t blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
opaque preamble[PREAMBLE_SIZE];
int preamble_size;
int ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
int hash_size = _gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (params->mac_algorithm);
blocksize = gnutls_cipher_get_block_size (params->cipher_algorithm);
/* actual decryption (inplace)
*/
switch (_gnutls_cipher_is_block (params->cipher_algorithm))
{
case CIPHER_STREAM:
if ((ret =
_gnutls_cipher_decrypt (¶ms->read.cipher_state,
ciphertext.data, ciphertext.size)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size;
break;
case CIPHER_BLOCK:
if ((ciphertext.size < blocksize) || (ciphertext.size % blocksize != 0))
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
if ((ret =
_gnutls_cipher_decrypt (¶ms->read.cipher_state,
ciphertext.data, ciphertext.size)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* ignore the IV in TLS 1.1.
*/
if (_gnutls_version_has_explicit_iv
(session->security_parameters.version))
{
ciphertext.size -= blocksize;
ciphertext.data += blocksize;
}
if (ciphertext.size < hash_size)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1; /* pad */
if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - hash_size)
{
gnutls_assert ();
_gnutls_record_log
("REC[%p]: Short record length %d > %d - %d (under attack?)\n",
session, pad, ciphertext.size, hash_size);
/* We do not fail here. We check below for the
* the pad_failed. If zero means success.
*/
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad;
/* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x)
*/
if (_gnutls_version_has_variable_padding (ver) && pad_failed == 0)
for (i = 2; i <= pad; i++)
{
if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] !=
ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1])
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
break;
default:
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (length < 0)
length = 0;
c_length = _gnutls_conv_uint16 ((uint16_t) length);
/* Pass the type, version, length and compressed through
* MAC.
*/
if (params->mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{
digest_hd_st td;
ret = mac_init (&td, params->mac_algorithm,
params->read.mac_secret.data,
params->read.mac_secret.size, ver);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
preamble_size =
make_preamble (UINT64DATA
(params->read.sequence_number), type,
c_length, ver, preamble);
mac_hash (&td, preamble, preamble_size, ver);
if (length > 0)
mac_hash (&td, ciphertext.data, length, ver);
mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
}
/* This one was introduced to avoid a timing attack against the TLS
* 1.0 protocol.
*/
if (pad_failed != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return pad_failed;
}
/* HMAC was not the same.
*/
if (memcmp (MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
/* copy the decrypted stuff to compress_data.
*/
if (compress_size < length)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED;
}
memcpy (compress_data, ciphertext.data, length);
return length;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'Fixes to avoid a timing attack in TLS CBC record parsing.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int btrfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(old_dir)->root;
struct btrfs_root *dest = BTRFS_I(new_dir)->root;
struct inode *new_inode = new_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *old_inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct timespec ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
u64 index = 0;
u64 root_objectid;
int ret;
u64 old_ino = btrfs_ino(old_inode);
if (btrfs_ino(new_dir) == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)
return -EPERM;
/* we only allow rename subvolume link between subvolumes */
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID && root != dest)
return -EXDEV;
if (old_ino == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID ||
(new_inode && btrfs_ino(new_inode) == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
if (S_ISDIR(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode &&
new_inode->i_size > BTRFS_EMPTY_DIR_SIZE)
return -ENOTEMPTY;
/*
* we're using rename to replace one file with another.
* and the replacement file is large. Start IO on it now so
* we don't add too much work to the end of the transaction
*/
if (new_inode && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode->i_size &&
old_inode->i_size > BTRFS_ORDERED_OPERATIONS_FLUSH_LIMIT)
filemap_flush(old_inode->i_mapping);
/* close the racy window with snapshot create/destroy ioctl */
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
down_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
/*
* We want to reserve the absolute worst case amount of items. So if
* both inodes are subvols and we need to unlink them then that would
* require 4 item modifications, but if they are both normal inodes it
* would require 5 item modifications, so we'll assume their normal
* inodes. So 5 * 2 is 10, plus 1 for the new link, so 11 total items
* should cover the worst case number of items we'll modify.
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 20);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out_notrans;
}
if (dest != root)
btrfs_record_root_in_trans(trans, dest);
ret = btrfs_set_inode_index(new_dir, &index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
/* force full log commit if subvolume involved. */
root->fs_info->last_trans_log_full_commit = trans->transid;
} else {
ret = btrfs_insert_inode_ref(trans, dest,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len,
old_ino,
btrfs_ino(new_dir), index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
/*
* this is an ugly little race, but the rename is required
* to make sure that if we crash, the inode is either at the
* old name or the new one. pinning the log transaction lets
* us make sure we don't allow a log commit to come in after
* we unlink the name but before we add the new name back in.
*/
btrfs_pin_log_trans(root);
}
/*
* make sure the inode gets flushed if it is replacing
* something.
*/
if (new_inode && new_inode->i_size && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode))
btrfs_add_ordered_operation(trans, root, old_inode);
inode_inc_iversion(old_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(new_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(old_inode);
old_dir->i_ctime = old_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
new_dir->i_ctime = new_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
old_inode->i_ctime = ctime;
if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dentry->d_parent)
btrfs_record_unlink_dir(trans, old_dir, old_inode, 1);
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(old_inode)->root->root_key.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, root, old_dir, root_objectid,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
} else {
ret = __btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, root, old_dir,
old_dentry->d_inode,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
if (!ret)
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, old_inode);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (new_inode) {
inode_inc_iversion(new_inode);
new_inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
if (unlikely(btrfs_ino(new_inode) ==
BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(new_inode)->location.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, dest, new_dir,
root_objectid,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
BUG_ON(new_inode->i_nlink == 0);
} else {
ret = btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, dest, new_dir,
new_dentry->d_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
}
if (!ret && new_inode->i_nlink == 0) {
ret = btrfs_orphan_add(trans, new_dentry->d_inode);
BUG_ON(ret);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
}
fixup_inode_flags(new_dir, old_inode);
ret = btrfs_add_link(trans, new_dir, old_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len, 0, index);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID) {
struct dentry *parent = new_dentry->d_parent;
btrfs_log_new_name(trans, old_inode, old_dir, parent);
btrfs_end_log_trans(root);
}
out_fail:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
out_notrans:
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
up_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static inline int pmd_large(pmd_t pte)
{
return (pmd_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_PRESENT)) ==
(_PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_PRESENT);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'mm: thp: fix pmd_present for split_huge_page and PROT_NONE with THP
In many places !pmd_present has been converted to pmd_none. For pmds
that's equivalent and pmd_none is quicker so using pmd_none is better.
However (unless we delete pmd_present) we should provide an accurate
pmd_present too. This will avoid the risk of code thinking the pmd is non
present because it's under __split_huge_page_map, see the pmd_mknotpresent
there and the comment above it.
If the page has been mprotected as PROT_NONE, it would also lead to a
pmd_present false negative in the same way as the race with
split_huge_page.
Because the PSE bit stays on at all times (both during split_huge_page and
when the _PAGE_PROTNONE bit get set), we could only check for the PSE bit,
but checking the PROTNONE bit too is still good to remember pmd_present
must always keep PROT_NONE into account.
This explains a not reproducible BUG_ON that was seldom reported on the
lists.
The same issue is in pmd_large, it would go wrong with both PROT_NONE and
if it races with split_huge_page.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <jweiner@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void kvmclock_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vcpu->arch.time_page) {
kvm_release_page_dirty(vcpu->arch.time_page);
vcpu->arch.time_page = NULL;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(libxml_disable_entity_loader)
{
zend_bool disable = 1;
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameFunc old;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|b", &disable) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (disable == 0) {
old = xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
} else {
old = xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_noload);
}
if (old == php_libxml_input_buffer_noload) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'Fixed external entity loading'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int dcbnl_getperm_hwaddr(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 perm_addr[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr(netdev, perm_addr);
return nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_PERM_HWADDR, sizeof(perm_addr), perm_addr);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (user_alloc && (mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS + KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = &kvm->memslots->memslots[mem->slot];
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
#ifndef CONFIG_S390
if (npages && !new.rmap) {
new.rmap = vzalloc(npages * sizeof(*new.rmap));
if (!new.rmap)
goto out_free;
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
}
if (!npages)
goto skip_lpage;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i) {
unsigned long ugfn;
unsigned long j;
int lpages;
int level = i + 2;
/* Avoid unused variable warning if no large pages */
(void)level;
if (new.lpage_info[i])
continue;
lpages = 1 + ((base_gfn + npages - 1)
>> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
lpages -= base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level);
new.lpage_info[i] = vzalloc(lpages * sizeof(*new.lpage_info[i]));
if (!new.lpage_info[i])
goto out_free;
if (base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][0].write_count = 1;
if ((base_gfn+npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][lpages - 1].write_count = 1;
ugfn = new.userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
* other, or if explicitly asked to, disable large page
* support for this slot
*/
if ((base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1) ||
!largepages_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
new.lpage_info[i][j].write_count = 1;
}
skip_lpage:
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
#else /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
if (user_alloc)
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
#endif /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
if (!npages) {
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
slots->memslots[mem->slot].flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow(kvm);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.rmap = NULL;
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i)
new.lpage_info[i] = NULL;
}
slots->memslots[mem->slot] = new;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void pdf_parseobj(struct pdf_struct *pdf, struct pdf_obj *obj)
{
/* enough to hold common pdf names, we don't need all the names */
char pdfname[64];
const char *q2, *q3;
const char *q = obj->start + pdf->map;
const char *dict, *start;
off_t dict_length;
off_t bytesleft = obj_size(pdf, obj, 1);
unsigned i, filters=0;
enum objstate objstate = STATE_NONE;
if (bytesleft < 0)
return;
start = q;
/* find start of dictionary */
do {
q2 = pdf_nextobject(q, bytesleft);
bytesleft -= q2 -q;
if (!q2 || bytesleft < 0) {
return;
}
q3 = memchr(q-1, '<', q2-q+1);
q2++;
bytesleft--;
q = q2;
} while (!q3 || q3[1] != '<');
dict = q3+2;
q = dict;
bytesleft = obj_size(pdf, obj, 1) - (q - start);
/* find end of dictionary */
do {
q2 = pdf_nextobject(q, bytesleft);
bytesleft -= q2 -q;
if (!q2 || bytesleft < 0) {
return;
}
q3 = memchr(q-1, '>', q2-q+1);
q2++;
bytesleft--;
q = q2;
} while (!q3 || q3[1] != '>');
obj->flags |= 1 << OBJ_DICT;
dict_length = q3 - dict;
/* process pdf names */
for (q = dict;dict_length > 0;) {
int escapes = 0;
q2 = memchr(q, '/', dict_length);
if (!q2)
break;
dict_length -= q2 - q;
q = q2;
/* normalize PDF names */
for (i = 0;dict_length > 0 && (i < sizeof(pdfname)-1); i++) {
q++;
dict_length--;
if (*q == '#') {
if (cli_hex2str_to(q+1, pdfname+i, 2) == -1)
break;
q += 2;
dict_length -= 2;
escapes = 1;
continue;
}
if (*q == ' ' || *q == '\t' || *q == '\r' || *q == '\n' ||
*q == '/' || *q == '>' || *q == ']' || *q == '[' || *q == '<'
|| *q == '(')
break;
pdfname[i] = *q;
}
pdfname[i] = '\0';
handle_pdfname(pdf, obj, pdfname, escapes, &objstate);
if (objstate == STATE_LINEARIZED) {
long trailer_end, trailer;
pdfobj_flag(pdf, obj, LINEARIZED_PDF);
objstate = STATE_NONE;
trailer_end = pdf_readint(q, dict_length, "/H");
if (trailer_end > 0 && trailer_end < pdf->size) {
trailer = trailer_end - 1024;
if (trailer < 0) trailer = 0;
q2 = pdf->map + trailer;
cli_dbgmsg("cli_pdf: looking for trailer in linearized pdf: %ld - %ld\n", trailer, trailer_end);
pdf_parse_trailer(pdf, q2, trailer_end - trailer);
if (pdf->fileID)
cli_dbgmsg("cli_pdf: found fileID\n");
}
}
if (objstate == STATE_LAUNCHACTION)
pdfobj_flag(pdf, obj, HAS_LAUNCHACTION);
if (dict_length > 0 && (objstate == STATE_JAVASCRIPT ||
objstate == STATE_OPENACTION)) {
if (objstate == STATE_OPENACTION)
pdfobj_flag(pdf, obj, HAS_OPENACTION);
q2 = pdf_nextobject(q, dict_length);
if (q2 && isdigit(*q2)) {
uint32_t objid = atoi(q2) << 8;
while (isdigit(*q2)) q2++;
q2 = pdf_nextobject(q2, dict_length);
if (q2 && isdigit(*q2)) {
objid |= atoi(q2) & 0xff;
q2 = pdf_nextobject(q2, dict_length);
if (q2 && *q2 == 'R') {
struct pdf_obj *obj2;
cli_dbgmsg("cli_pdf: found %s stored in indirect object %u %u\n",
pdfname,
objid >> 8, objid&0xff);
obj2 = find_obj(pdf, obj, objid);
if (obj2) {
enum pdf_objflags flag = objstate == STATE_JAVASCRIPT ?
OBJ_JAVASCRIPT : OBJ_OPENACTION;
obj2->flags |= 1 << flag;
obj->flags &= ~(1 << flag);
} else {
pdfobj_flag(pdf, obj, BAD_INDOBJ);
}
}
}
}
objstate = STATE_NONE;
}
}
for (i=0;i<sizeof(pdfname_actions)/sizeof(pdfname_actions[0]);i++) {
const struct pdfname_action *act = &pdfname_actions[i];
if ((obj->flags & (1 << act->set_objflag)) &&
act->from_state == STATE_FILTER &&
act->to_state == STATE_FILTER &&
act->set_objflag != OBJ_FILTER_CRYPT &&
act->set_objflag != OBJ_FILTER_STANDARD) {
filters++;
}
}
if (filters > 2) { /* more than 2 non-crypt filters */
pdfobj_flag(pdf, obj, MANY_FILTERS);
}
if (obj->flags & ((1 << OBJ_SIGNED) | KNOWN_FILTERS))
obj->flags &= ~(1 << OBJ_FILTER_UNKNOWN);
if (obj->flags & (1 << OBJ_FILTER_UNKNOWN))
pdfobj_flag(pdf, obj, UNKNOWN_FILTER);
cli_dbgmsg("cli_pdf: %u %u obj flags: %02x\n", obj->id>>8, obj->id&0xff, obj->flags);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-189', 'CWE-79'], 'message': 'pdf: bb #7053'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extra_response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_extra_response), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!extra_response) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for"
" struct iscsi_extra_response.\n");
return -1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_response->er_list);
strncpy(extra_response->key, key, strlen(key) + 1);
strncpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,
strlen(NOTUNDERSTOOD) + 1);
list_add_tail(&extra_response->er_list,
¶m_list->extra_response_list);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void b43_request_firmware(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct b43_wl *wl = container_of(work,
struct b43_wl, firmware_load);
struct b43_wldev *dev = wl->current_dev;
struct b43_request_fw_context *ctx;
unsigned int i;
int err;
const char *errmsg;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return;
ctx->dev = dev;
ctx->req_type = B43_FWTYPE_PROPRIETARY;
err = b43_try_request_fw(ctx);
if (!err)
goto start_ieee80211; /* Successfully loaded it. */
/* Was fw version known? */
if (ctx->fatal_failure)
goto out;
/* proprietary fw not found, try open source */
ctx->req_type = B43_FWTYPE_OPENSOURCE;
err = b43_try_request_fw(ctx);
if (!err)
goto start_ieee80211; /* Successfully loaded it. */
if(ctx->fatal_failure)
goto out;
/* Could not find a usable firmware. Print the errors. */
for (i = 0; i < B43_NR_FWTYPES; i++) {
errmsg = ctx->errors[i];
if (strlen(errmsg))
b43err(dev->wl, errmsg);
}
b43_print_fw_helptext(dev->wl, 1);
goto out;
start_ieee80211:
wl->hw->queues = B43_QOS_QUEUE_NUM;
if (!modparam_qos || dev->fw.opensource)
wl->hw->queues = 1;
err = ieee80211_register_hw(wl->hw);
if (err)
goto err_one_core_detach;
wl->hw_registred = true;
b43_leds_register(wl->current_dev);
goto out;
err_one_core_detach:
b43_one_core_detach(dev->dev);
out:
kfree(ctx);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-134'], 'message': 'b43: stop format string leaking into error msgs
The module parameter "fwpostfix" is userspace controllable, unfiltered,
and is used to define the firmware filename. b43_do_request_fw() populates
ctx->errors[] on error, containing the firmware filename. b43err()
parses its arguments as a format string. For systems with b43 hardware,
this could lead to a uid-0 to ring-0 escalation.
CVE-2013-2852
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: AlgorithmEnum* ZRtp::findBestSASType(ZrtpPacketHello *hello) {
int i;
int ii;
int numAlgosOffered;
AlgorithmEnum* algosOffered[ZrtpConfigure::maxNoOfAlgos+1];
int numAlgosConf;
AlgorithmEnum* algosConf[ZrtpConfigure::maxNoOfAlgos+1];
int num = hello->getNumSas();
if (num == 0) {
return &zrtpSasTypes.getByName(mandatorySasType);
}
// Buildlist of configured SAS algorithm names
numAlgosConf = configureAlgos.getNumConfiguredAlgos(SasType);
for (i = 0; i < numAlgosConf; i++) {
algosConf[i] = &configureAlgos.getAlgoAt(SasType, i);
}
// Build list of offered known algos in Hello,
for (numAlgosOffered = 0, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
algosOffered[numAlgosOffered] = &zrtpSasTypes.getByName((const char*)hello->getSasType(i++));
if (!algosOffered[numAlgosOffered]->isValid())
continue;
numAlgosOffered++;
}
// Lookup offered algos in configured algos. Prefer algorithms that appear first in Hello packet (offered).
for (i = 0; i < numAlgosOffered; i++) {
for (ii = 0; ii < numAlgosConf; ii++) {
if (*(int32_t*)(algosOffered[i]->getName()) == *(int32_t*)(algosConf[ii]->getName())) {
return algosConf[ii];
}
}
}
// If we don't have a match - use the mandatory algorithm
return &zrtpSasTypes.getByName(mandatorySasType);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fix vulnerabilities found and reported by Mark Dowd
- limit length of memcpy
- limit number of offered algorithms in Hello packet
- length check in PING packet
- fix a small coding error'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void AuthorizationSession::addAuthorizedPrincipal(Principal* principal) {
// Log out any already-logged-in user on the same database as "principal".
logoutDatabase(principal->getName().getDB().toString()); // See SERVER-8144.
_authenticatedPrincipals.add(principal);
if (!principal->isImplicitPrivilegeAcquisitionEnabled())
return;
_acquirePrivilegesForPrincipalFromDatabase(ADMIN_DBNAME, principal->getName());
principal->markDatabaseAsProbed(ADMIN_DBNAME);
const std::string dbname = principal->getName().getDB().toString();
_acquirePrivilegesForPrincipalFromDatabase(dbname, principal->getName());
principal->markDatabaseAsProbed(dbname);
_externalState->onAddAuthorizedPrincipal(principal);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'SERVER-9983 Do not needlessly lock when looking up privileges for the __system@local user.
Uncorrected, this can cause replica set heartbeats to stall behind operations
that hold the read lock for a long time.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int credssp_skip_ts_request(int length)
{
length += ber_skip_integer(2);
length += ber_skip_contextual_tag(3);
length += der_skip_sequence_tag(length);
return length;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Fixed a range of BER boundary encoding bugs which would occur when any NLA packet hit the 127 character mark. Removed ber#get_content_length as it was not behaving deterministically.'</s> |