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Who owns a copyright of a work that is found to be infringing? For example Warhol case that SCOTUS heard Warhol made screen prints from Lynn Goldsmith's photograph. Those prints have earned millions of dollars. If SCOTUS finds that Warhol infringed, who owns copyright to the Warhol prints? If they are not transformative enough to qualify as fair use, does Goldsmith own the copyright to the prints? Or does Warhol own them and he has to pay a licensing fee?

Arguably, no one owns the copyright in the general case. This is a similar case to a previous question I've answered. In short, the US has a statutory provision which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright. In this particular case, it's helpful to take a look at what the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to say. While evaluating transformativeness, they did not declare Warhol's works to be derivatives, but left that possibility open and stated it was closer to being a derivative than transformative fair use: Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. That Warhol's prints might have no copyright attached to them does not mean that anyone can use them though – they are still very much based on Goldsmith's photo and the underlying copyright to the original still belongs to Goldsmith. This could well mean that Goldsmith would be able to use the Warhol prints as if she owned its copyrights. Update: The Supreme Court has now affirmed, albeit on a narrow appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which dropped the issue that this question is about. Only the first fair use factor of transformativeness was challenged by the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF). Additionally, and more important for this question is that only a single use was ruled on: the licensing of one of the prints by AWF for a 2016 magazine article reprint following Prince's death. This is because Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Here's where I realize I missed a key distinguishing fact in the case: There was indeed a narrow license for use of the photo for "artist reference" in relation to an article to be published in a 1984 Vanity Fair issue. In effect, due to the license, the (probable) derivative could be considered non-infringing1. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the use in the 2016 issue was not fair (given there was no license for use beyond the 1984 article, AWF had to rely on a fair use defense). In other words, the Warhol prints as a whole are not necessarily infringing derivatives2, rather, the specific use in the 2016 article was affirmed to be infringing. In particular, I'd like to highlight the following from court: The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fair when used for one purpose but not another. The full license text is not in any of the court decisions, so it's impossible for us to know for sure, but the portions that are quoted lead me to believe the license is vaguely worded. In particular, its in the realm of possibility that only the single derivative used on the 1984 article was licensed, but I would argue its reasonable to expect an artist to try multiple derivatives given a license for "artist reference." This could potentially have been of some consequence as the print used in the 2016 article is not the same as the one used in the 1984 article. But since this case was initiated in district court by the AWF seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement, my understanding of the matter is that once the case is passed back to the district court, it will enter in that declaration given Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Take this with a grain of salt, I'm not very well-versed in trial procedure.

The significant question is whether such a statement as "no copyright infringement intended" will be viewed by the courts as evidence to suggest innocent infringement or rather as evidence to support willful infringement. This consideration of willful versus innocent is relevant when a copyright holder seeks statutory damages. 17 USC §504(c)(2) says (emphasis mine): In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc. says of willfulness (emphasis mine): Thus, in order to prove willfulness, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct constituted copyright infringement. Similarly, in order to establish innocent intent, the defendant must prove that it did not know and should not have known that its conduct constituted infringement. One defense to an allegation of willfulness is the defendant's reasonable and good faith belief that its actions do not constitute copyright infringement. The central question, then, seems to be whether the notice "no copyright infringement intended" aids or harms an argument that the infringer "did not know or should not have known" that they were infringing copyright, or else that they had a "reasonable and good faith belief" of non-infringement. I am not aware of any case law that concerns such a notice, but my layman intuition suggests to me that such a notice lends evidential weight that the defendant did indeed know the work in question was under copyright; since the defendant was therefore aware the work was under copyright, it is unlikely that they could successfully claim a reasonable belief that publicly distributing the entirety of (or a substantial portion of) the work without permission was not infringement. Ultimately, I don't think such a notice does anything to aid the defendant's argument that they "should not have known" their use was infringing. Nor do I think it furthers an argument of "reasonable and good faith belief" by the defendant: the reasonableness of such a belief will rest significantly on the facts of the infringement, not only on how loudly they shouted, "I swear this isn't infringement!" Conversely, such a notice may further the idea that the defendant did know that copyright applied to the work, strengthening the plaintiff's argument that the defendant should have known the use was infringing.

You need permission from the copyright holder(s) to make the prints at all unless it falls under some fair use doctrine or is a work in Public Domain. If permission is granted, it would presumably involve you paying money on some negotiated basis. An artist might flatly refuse to give permission to your plan to use their art as a component of your art.

Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.

Company B has created a derived work from company A's copyright-protected work, so yes, B has infringed on A's copyright. It might be difficult for A to prove it, however, so B might get away with it, but it's still infringement. On the other hand, if B creates software that behaves like A's through reverse engineering, that is, by examining the program's function without examining its code, then they will not have infringed the copyright in the code.

The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.

Copyright does not contain the right to attribution (except with respect to authors of visual arts at 17 USC 106A). A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce a work, create derivative works, distribute copies, etc. (17 USC §106). As we already answered here, when a copyright owner gives somebody else permission to do some of those things, the copyright owner can attach a condition to that permission. A common condition is that the licensee give credit to the the original creator. With respect to visual arts, the attribution right gives the author the right to "prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation." 17 USC §106A(a)(2)

Eventually. This was a state matter prior to the enactment of the Constitution. Without the Copyright Clause, it would have been up to each state to enact such a law (apparently Delaware did not bother). This would have quickly led to inter-state disputes (a New York author being infringed by a New Jersey party), therefore the matter would have been heard by the federal courts. The current understanding of the Commerce Clause easily allows Congress to enact a copyright law, because copyright is quite commercial and potentially crosses state lines. It took a while for that clause to be interpreted by the courts the way it is now. This is a brief summary of historically shifting views on the Commerce Clause.

Is Crypto the same as any foreign currency? A foreign currency exchange is nothing new. On the other hand cryptographic currency ("crypto" i.e. Bitcoin) is relatively new, as are their exchanges. https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/sec-brings-charges-cryptocurrency-trading-platform-coinbase-99866462 If crypto is a currency, Why not regulate it as a currency and not a security?

Is Crypto the same as any foreign currency? No. Crypto is generally treated as a commodity and capital asset, like gold, and not like a currency, under U.S. tax law. Other jurisdictions vary in how they treat cryptocurrency legally and for tax purposes. Bitcoin (unlike other cryptocurrencies) is also regulated on a non-tax basis as a commodity by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Other cryptocurrencies are regulated in the U.S. as securities by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Why not regulate it as a currency and not a security? Cyptocurrencies are not very much like currencies which is why they are not regulated in that way. The basis for treating it more like a security and less like a foreign currency for securities fraud/disclosure purposes is that it is a better fit to securities law which is designed for more varied legal arrangements than foreign currency laws. Foreign currencies are backed by the full faith and credit of sovereign countries (which are non-profit entities). Also, foreign currencies are transparently based upon laws that are almost always a matter of public record and relatively straightforward. And, of course, banks and money changing firms trading in foreign currencies are subject to significant tax and financial regulation of their own, although not as securities. In contrast, like other securities, cryptocurrencies are private creatures of contract created by entities with shareholders which do not have uniform legal properties. New "coins" can be created in different ways in different crypto currencies, and the relationship between the cryptocurrency to the non-crypto financial markets varies. Securities-like disclosures are necessary for members of the public dealing with it to understand the risks, benefits, and mechanics of the cryptocurrency in question. The U.S. Securities And Exchange position and its basis is suggested by the ABC News story linked in the question, which states: Coinbase has been targeted by U.S. regulators in a new lawsuit Tuesday that alleges the cryptocurrency platform is operating as an unregistered securities platform and brokerage service. The lawsuit from the Securities and Exchange Commission comes only a day after it filed charges against Binance, the world's largest crypto exchange, and its founder Changpeng Zhao are accused of misusing investor funds, operating as an unregistered exchange and violating a slew of U.S. securities laws. Coinbase shares plunged nearly 15% early Tuesday. In its complaint, the SEC said Coinbase made billions acting as the middle man for cryptocurrency buyers and sellers but did not give investors lawful protections while acting as a broker. “Coinbase has for years defied the regulatory structures and evaded the disclosure requirements that Congress and the SEC have constructed for the protection of the national securities markets and investors,” the SEC said in its complaint, which was filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. It seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus interest, penalties, and other equitable relief.

Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them.

If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech.

The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court.

Update (12/2/16) - Just received the following confirmation from Apple Export Compliance: The [redacted] app presently uploaded into your account CAN BE legally released to US and Canada only, it will not be necessary to go through Export Regulations. They have also rephrased the question "Does your app qualify for any of the exemptions...?" to the following: Does your app meet any of the following: (a) Qualifies for one or more exemptions provided under category 5 part 2, (b) Use of encryption is limited to encryption within the operating system (iOS or macOS), (c) Only makes call(s) over HTTPS, (d) App is made available only in the U.S. and/or Canada. Update (12/1/16) - In addition to the research below, a list of "Sample Scenarios" are given in iTunes Connect Resources and Help, one of which states: A developer chooses to release his app in the U.S. and Canada only. -- No U.S. CCATS or ERN is required. No France Import Declaration is required. The following statement (mentioned earlier in the same page) should also be taken into consideration regarding exemptions: All liabilities associated with misinterpretation of the export regulations or claiming exemption inaccurately are borne by owners and developers of the apps. So it appears the correct answer is likely not: N.B. to Note 3 (Cryptography Note): You must submit a classification request or self classification report to BIS for mass market encryption commodities and software eligible for the Cryptography Note employing a key length greater than 64 bits for the symmetric algorithm ... in accordance with the requirements of § 740.17(b) of the EAR in order to be released from the “EI” and “NS” controls of ECCN 5A002 or 5D002. Furthermore, under Note 4: Category 5 - Part 2 does not apply to items incorporating or using "cryptography" and meeting all of the following: a. The primary function or set of functions is not any of the following: “Information security”; A computer, including operating systems, parts and components therefor; Sending, receiving or storing information (except in support of entertainment, mass commercial broadcasts, digital rights management or medical records management); or Networking (includes operation, administration, management and provisioning); b. The cryptographic functionality is limited to supporting their primary function or set of functions; and c. When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs a. and b. above. I suppose there could be clarification under this note, but if I understand it correctly, an iOS app having the sole purpose of performing symmetric encryption with keys greater than 56 bits would have the primary function of: "Information security" Being "a computer" Barring clarification on these points that would qualify for exemption, NLR, etc. self-classification would likely be [any of the following]: 5D002.a.1.a (software) - Designed or modified to use "cryptography" employing digital techniques performing any cryptographic function other than authentication, digital signature, or execution of copy-protected "software," and having ... A "symmetric algorithm" employing a key length in excess of 56-bits Encryption registration may have also been required prior to September 20, 2016 (see linked reference). "Companies no longer are required to submit an encryption registration to BIS before self-classifying and exporting certain encryption items..." (Wiley Rein LLP) References: Commerce Control List: Category 5 Part 2 (Cryptographic "Information Security") - BIS Export Compliance - f5 License Exception ENC (740.17) - BIS Information Security Updates (September 20, 2016) BIS Publishes New Encryption Rule - Wiley Rein LLP

99.999% of people treat bank deposits as bailment. This is not borne out by the evidence. The evidence is that most people do not conceptualize their daily interactions and relationships in legal categories like "contract," "bailment," etc. Most people do not turn their minds to the web of risks and rights that they operate in day to day. But under FDIC rules, only the first 0.25 million is bailment. This is also not true. No monetary deposit is a bailment. The concept of bailment is limited to tangible property (e.g. the contents of a safe-deposit box). This is well-established common-law principle, but see generally Dickerson, "Bailor Beware" (1988). The remainder of your question asks for multiple opinions, each of which appears off-topic here, so I have tried to correct misunderstandings in your premise.

It is hard to know with certainty why this distinction was made in this case. There is a fair amount of gamesmanship that goes into having a device classified as an administrative matter in dealings with a regulatory agency, since the details are technical and the language of the regulations is subject to differing interpretations. This is why attorneys in this area get paid the big bucks. I can't tell you precisely what went into each determination but the relevant regulations restated below, at least, gives you a sense of what the issues that can be fought over in those discussions can be. I suspect that the arguments probably involve whether or not evidence was presented to the relevant regulators by the manufacturers that particular items were or were not sold as "mass market encryption commodities", perhaps based upon sales data or information about how the different items are marketed. It could also be that the regulators a exercising discretion to "flex their regulatory muscles" less aggressively in the case of E.U. source products that could be sold directly outside of U.S. distributions channels anyway, entirely avoiding interfacing with the U..S. export control regime, in order to encourage commerce to be routed through U.S. companies instead. In contrast, the Japanese manufacturer may not have had the same direct distribution network available to it, or may not have had someone as skilled to advocate for it on this basis in the regulatory process. Relevant Legal Authority The legal authority that pertains to this question is set forth below, but even after reading all of it, it isn't manifestly clear why there is a difference so we are left to read between the lines as I have done above. The primary regulation is found here (the first seven pages are the ones applicable to this question). The introductory material for Category 5A002 states: Related Controls: (1) ECCN 5A002.a controls “components” providing the means or functions necessary for “information security.” All such “components” are presumptively “specially designed” and controlled by 5A002.a. (2) See USML Categories XI (including XI(b)) and XIII(b) (including XIII(b)(2)) for controls on systems, equipment, and components described in 5A002.d or .e that are subject to the ITAR. (3) For “satellite navigation system” receiving equipment containing or employing decryption see 7A005, and for related decryption “software” and “technology” see 7D005 and 7E001. (4) Noting that items may be controlled elsewhere on the CCL, examples of items not controlled by ECCN 5A002.a.4 include the following: (a) An automobile where the only ‘cryptography for data confidentiality’ having a ‘described security algorithm’ is performed by a Category 5 – Part 2 Note 3 eligible mobile telephone that is built into the car. In this case, secure phone communications support a non-primary function of the automobile but the mobile telephone (equipment), as a standalone item, is not controlled by ECCN 5A002 because it is excluded by the Cryptography Note (Note 3) (See ECCN 5A992.c). (b) An exercise bike with an embedded Category 5 – Part 2 Note 3 eligible web browser, where the only controlled cryptography is performed by the web browser. In this case, secure web browsing supports a non-primary function of the exercise bike but the web browser (“software”), as a standalone item, is not controlled by ECCN 5D002 because it is excluded by the Cryptography Note (Note 3) (See ECCN 5D992.c). (5) After classification or self-classification in accordance with § 740.17(b) of the EAR, mass market encryption commodities that meet eligibility requirements are released from “EI” and “NS” controls. These commodities are designated 5A992.c. Category 5A992.c, meanwhile, means "Equipment not controlled by 5A002" because it is one of the "Commodities classified as mass market encryption commodities in accordance with § 740.17(b) of the EAR." This states: (b) Classification request or self-classification. For certain products described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section that are self-classified, a self-classification report in accordance with paragraph (e)(3) of this section is required from specified exporters, reexporters and transferors; for products described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section that are classified by BIS via a CCATS, a self-classification report is not required. For products described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) of this section, a thirty-day (30-day) classification request is required in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section. An exporter, reexporter, or transferor may rely on the producer's self-classification (for products described in (b)(1), only) or CCATS for an encryption item eligible for export or reexport under License Exception ENC under paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section. Exporters are still required to comply with semi-annual sales reporting requirements under paragraph (e)(1) or (2) of this section, even if relying on a CCATS issued to a producer for specified encryption items described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3)(iii) of this section. Note to paragraph (b) introductory text: Mass market encryption software that would be considered publicly available under § 734.3(b)(3) of the EAR, and is authorized for export under this paragraph (b), remains subject to the EAR until all applicable classification or self-classification requirements set forth in this section are fulfilled. (1) Immediate authorization. This paragraph (b)(1) authorizes the exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the associated commodities self-classified under ECCNs 5A002.a or 5B002, and equivalent or related software therefor classified under 5D002, except any such commodities, software, or components described in (b)(2) or (3) of this section, subject to submission of a self-classification report in accordance with § 740.17(e)(3) of the EAR. Items described in this paragraph (b)(1) that meet the criteria set forth in Note 3 to Category 5 - Part 2 of the Commerce Control List (the “mass market” note) are classified as ECCN 5A992.c or 5D992.c following self-classification or classification by BIS and are removed from “EI” and “NS” controls. (2) Classification request required. Thirty (30) days after the submission of a classification request with BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph under License Exception ENC authorizes certain exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the items specified in paragraph (b)(2) and submitted for classification. Note to paragraph (b)(2) introductory text: Immediately after the classification request is submitted to BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph also authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of: All submitted encryption items described in this paragraph (b)(2), except “cryptanalytic items,” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a or c.3.a, or 5E002, to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part; Encryption source code as described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) to non-“government end users” in any country; “Cryptanalytic items,” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a or c.3.a, or 5E002, to non-“government end users,” only, located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part; and Items described in paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv)(A) of this section, to specified destinations and end users. (i) Cryptographic commodities, software, and components. License Exception ENC authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the items in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section to “less sensitive government end users” and non- “government end users” located or headquartered in a country not listed in supplement no. 3 to this part, and the items in paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(B) through (H) to non “government end users” located or headquartered in a country not listed in supplement no. 3. (A) 'Network Infrastructure.' ' Network infrastructure' commodities and software, and components therefor, meeting any of the following with key lengths exceeding 80-bits for symmetric algorithms: (1) WAN, MAN, VPN, backhaul and long-haul. Aggregate encrypted WAN, MAN, VPN, backhaul or long-haul throughput (including communications through wireless network elements such as gateways, mobile switches, and controllers) equal to or greater than 250 Mbps; (2) [Reserved] (3) Satellite infrastructure. Transmission over satellite at data rates exceeding 10 Mbps; (4) Media gateways and other unified communications (UC) infrastructure, including Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. Media (voice/video/data) encryption or encrypted signaling to more than 2,500 endpoints, including centralized key management therefor; or (5) Terrestrial wireless infrastructure. Air interface coverage (e.g., through base stations, access points to mesh networks, and bridges) exceeding 1,000 meters, where any of the following applies: (i) Maximum transmission data rates exceeding 10 Mbps (at operating ranges beyond 1,000 meters); or (ii) Maximum number of concurrent full-duplex voice channels exceeding 30; Notes to paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A): The License Exception ENC eligibility restrictions of paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A)(3) (satellite infrastructure) and (b)(2)(i)(A)(5) (terrestrial wireless infrastructure) do not apply to satellite terminals or modems meeting all of the following: a. The encryption of data over satellite is exclusively from the user terminal to the gateway earth station, and limited to the air interface; and b. The items meet the requirements of the Cryptography Note (Note 3) in Category 5 - Part 2 of the Commerce Control List. 'Network infrastructure' (as applied to encryption items). A 'network infrastructure' commodity or software is any “end item,” commodity or “software” for providing one or more of the following types of communications:” (a) Wide Area Network (WAN); (b) Metropolitan Area Network (MAN); (c) Virtual Private Network (VPN); (d) Satellite; (e) Digital packet telephony/media (voice, video, data) over Internet protocol; (f) Cellular; or (g) Trunked. Note 1 to paragraph 2: 'Network infrastructure' end items are typically operated by, or for, one or more of the following types of end users: (1) Medium- or large- sized businesses or enterprises; (2) Governments; (3) Telecommunications service providers; or (4) Internet service providers. Note 2 to paragraph 2: Commodities, software, and components for the “cryptographic activation” of a 'network infrastructure' item are also considered 'network infrastructure' items. (B) Certain “encryption source code.” “Encryption source code” that is not publicly available as that term is used in § 742.15(b) of the EAR; (C) Customized items. Encryption software, commodities and components therefor, where any of the following applies: (1) Customized for government end users or end uses. The item has been designed, modified, adapted, or customized for “government end user(s);” or (2) Custom or changeable cryptography. The cryptographic functionality of the item has been designed or modified to customer specification or can be easily changed by the user; (D) Quantum cryptography. ECCN 5A002.c or 5D002 “quantum cryptography” commodities or software; (E) [Reserved] (F) Network penetration tools. Encryption commodities and software that provide penetration capabilities that are capable of attacking, denying, disrupting or otherwise impairing the use of cyber infrastructure or networks; (G) Public safety/first responder radio (private mobile radio (PMR)). Public safety/first responder radio (e.g., implementing Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) and/or Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International (APCO) Project 25 (P25) standards); (H) Specified cryptographic ultra-wideband and “spread spectrum” items. Encryption commodities and components therefor, classified under ECCNs 5A002.d or .e, and equivalent or related software therefor classified under ECCN 5D002. (ii) Cryptanalytic commodities and software. “ Cryptanalytic items” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a, or 5D002.c.3.a, to non- “government end users” located or headquartered in countries not listed in supplement no. 3 to this part. (iii) “Open cryptographic interface” items. Items that provide an “open cryptographic interface,” to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part. (iv) Specific encryption technology. Specific encryption technology as follows: (A) Technology for “non-standard cryptography.” Encryption technology classified under ECCN 5E002 for “non-standard cryptography,” to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part; (B) Other technology. Encryption technology classified under ECCN 5E002 except technology for “cryptanalytic items” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a or 5D002.c.3.a, “non-standard cryptography” or any “open cryptographic interface,” to any non-“government end user” located in a country not listed in Country Group D:1, E:1, or E:2 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR. Note to paragraph (b)(2): Commodities, components, and software classified under ECCNs 5A002.b or 5D002.b, for the “cryptographic activation” of commodities or software specified by this paragraph (b)(2) are also controlled under this paragraph (b)(2). (3) Classification request required for specified commodities, software, and components. Thirty (30) days after a classification request is submitted to BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the items submitted for classification, as further described in this paragraph (b)(3), to any end user, provided the item does not perform the functions, or otherwise meet the specifications, of any item described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Items described in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) or (iv) of this section that meet the criteria set forth in Note 3 to Category 5 - Part 2 of the CCL (the “mass market” note) are classified under ECCN 5A992.c or 5D992.c following classification by BIS. Note to introductory text of paragraph (b)(3): Immediately after the classification request is submitted to BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph also authorizes exports, reexports, transfers (in-country) of the items described in this paragraph (b)(3) to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part. (i) Non-“mass market” “components,” toolsets, and toolkits. Specified components classified under ECCN 5A002.a and equivalent or related software classified under ECCN 5D002 that do not meet the criteria set forth in Note 3 to Category 5 - Part 2 of the CCL (the “mass market” note) and are not described by paragraph (b)(2) or (b)(3)(ii) of this section, as follows: (A) Chips, chipsets, electronic assemblies and field programmable logic devices; (B) Cryptographic libraries, modules, development kits and toolkits, including for operating systems and cryptographic service providers (CSPs). (ii) “Non-standard cryptography” (by items not otherwise described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.) Encryption commodities, software and components not described by paragraph (b)(2) of this section, that provide or perform “non-standard cryptography” as defined in part 772 of the EAR. (iii) Advanced network vulnerability analysis and digital forensics. Encryption commodities and software not described by paragraph (b)(2) of this section, that provide or perform vulnerability analysis, network forensics, or computer forensics functions characterized by any of the following: (A) Automated network vulnerability analysis and response. Automated network analysis, visualization, or packet inspection for profiling network flow, network user or client behavior, or network structure/topology and adapting in real-time to the operating environment; or (B) Digital forensics and investigative tools. Items specified in ECCN 5A004.b, 5D002.a.3.b, or 5D002.c.3.b, see supplement no. 1 to part 774 Commerce Control List. (iv) “Cryptographic activation” commodities, components, and software. Commodities, components, and software classified under ECCNs 5A002.b or 5D002.b where the product or cryptographic functionality is not otherwise described in paragraphs (b)(2) or (b)(3)(i) of this section. The critical Note 3 is as follows: Note 3 to Category 5, Part 2 Note 3: Cryptography Note: ECCNs 5A002, 5A003, 5A004 and 5D002, do not control items as follows: a. Items meeting all of the following: Generally available to the public by being sold, without restriction, from stock at retail selling points by means of any of the following: a. Over-the-counter transactions; b. Mail order transactions; c. Electronic transactions; or d. Telephone call transactions; The cryptographic functionality cannot be easily changed by the user; Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier; and [RESERVED] When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter’s country in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs 1. through 3. of this Note a.; b. Hardware components or ‘executable software’, of existing items described in paragraph a. of this Note, that have been designed for these existing items, and meeting all of the following: “Information security” is not the primary function or set of functions of the component or ‘executable software’; The component or ‘executable software’ does not change any cryptographic functionality of the existing items, or add new cryptographic functionality to the existing items; The feature set of the component or ‘executable software’ is fixed and is not designed or modified to customer specification; and When necessary, as determined by the appropriate authority in the exporter’s country, details of the component or ‘executable software’, and details of relevant end-items are accessible and will be provided to the authority upon request, in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described above. Technical Note: For the purpose of the Cryptography Note, ‘executable software’ means “software” in executable form, from an existing hardware component excluded from 5A002, 5A003 or 5A004 by the Cryptography Note. Note: ‘Executable software’ does not include complete binary images of the “software” running on an end-item. Note to the Cryptography Note: To meet paragraph a. of Note 3, all of the following must apply: a. The item is of potential interest to a wide range of individuals and businesses; and b. The price and information about the main functionality of the item are available before purchase without the need to consult the vendor or supplier. A simple price inquiry is not considered to be a consultation. In determining eligibility of paragraph a. of Note 3, BIS may take into account relevant factors such as quantity, price, required technical skill, existing sales channels, typical customers, typical use or any exclusionary practices of the supplier. N.B. to Note 3 (Cryptography Note): You must submit a classification request or self-classification report to BIS for mass market encryption commodities and software eligible for the Cryptography Note employing a key length greater than 64 bits for the symmetric algorithm (or, for commodities and software not implementing any symmetric algorithms, employing a key length greater than 768 bits for asymmetric algorithms or greater than 128 bits for elliptic curve algorithms) in accordance with the requirements of § 740.17(b) of the EAR in order to be released from the “EI” and “NS” controls of ECCN 5A002 or 5D002.

Since you don't say which country you're in, it's likely that you're interested in United States law. You are probably in the clear here, though you're getting close enough to the edge of breaking the law that I wouldn't be confident about not being prosecuted and/or convicted. The relevant laws in this case appear to be 18 USC 471, 18 USC 472, and perhaps 18 USC 514. All three of them begin "Whoever, with the intent to defraud...". It's questionable whether creating counterfeit money as a burglar decoy counts as defrauding the burglar.

Would a poker buyin share voucher be a "security"? Hello I am trying to learn more about securities and really confused by the laws regarding unregistered securities in the US. NJ state if that helps too. I made a scenario and I am needing help to understand if this would be legal or not. In online poker you play poker and when you win the tournament against other players then are granted a entry ticket into the next event. As you may know you can win money in poker. I am having trouble understanding the Howey Test which is "investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others." Which is used to deem what is and isn't a security. Here's my thought experiment from my thinking into this concept: If you were to play a poker tournament, win it and be issued a ticket that gave you access to a percentage of all the money paid into the NEXT tournament by other players (let's call it a "money ticket") as a prize would this "money ticket" be a security? Why/why not? The "money ticket" would basically be a revenue share voucher. Edit: What if you only got the profits if you won the second tournament as well? Would the ticket still be a security? Thank you!

Almost certainly yes. As you say, the test is indeed the Howey Test, which, as you say, asks if it is an "investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others." Here, the "efforts of others" would be running the poker tournament. The "expectation of profits" is to be derived from the proceeds of their efforts running the tournament, advertising it, etc. It's basically pretty similar to receiving something like equity in the tournament, and equity is of course well-established to be a security. To avoid running afoul of laws against unregistered security offerings, they would likely need to either limit the people who could win such a ticket to accredited investors or go to the trouble of formally registering the securities. The latter isn't impossible: banks routinely register a wide variety of securities that they sell to their various customers. But it is a lot more process, and banks who do this are set up to be able to do it with as little process overhead as possible. Whether that would be practical for a company running poker tournaments would probably depend a lot on the details of the situation.

Note that what is being bought or sold here is actually information about the exploit. Attempting to criminally penalize the transmission of information in the US often runs into First Amendment issues. If a person has good reason to know that information is going to be used to commit a crime, or is likely to be so used, and there is no plausible legitimate use for the information, that person might be charged with complicity or conspiracy for distributing the information. But where there are legitimate uses, that is much less likely. Here the information could be used to defend against the exploit, or to identify and remove software subject to the exploit, or for research into such exploits generally. There may be other legit uses as well. Some years ago the Federal government attempted to prosecute a person for exporting a book describing how to create an encryption program. The courts eventually ruled that this was protected speech. I suspect a similar ruling would be made in the sort of case described in the question, but the details would matter.

In the worst case if they shut shop, then how might I go about getting my money back? It is unlikely that you can. A SAFE is not a loan (and for that matter isn't even a share in the company) and doesn't create an enforceable contractual right to get your money back. If you make an equity investment and the company loses money and goes out of business, you lose everything you invested. If the promoter made false representations that induced you to invest, or actively concealed material facts about the investment, you might be able to sue the promoter for securities fraud under federal regulation 10b-5, or under a state securities law, or under a common law fraud theory. You could also sue to issuer of the investment (i.e. the company) but that would usually be futile because the company is broke and hence judgment proof. State or federal securities regulators or a local district attorney or state attorney-general might pursue the case in lieu of a private civil action by you, but getting them to take action is often quite difficult. But, if your investment wasn't induced by fraud and instead the management of the company simply made bad decisions that caused the company to fail, you have no remedy. The investment was for a SAFE (Simple Agreement for Future Equity). I have the signed SAFE with me. This is a very unusual way for a QoZ to be structured, which adds to the sense that this may have been a shady venture.

No California has no laws on social gambling so it is treated identically to commercial gambling. Since betting on outcomes other than sports betting is illegal in California, such a bet would be illegal. While it’s unlikely to be prosecuted, as a contract it would be void its illegality and thus unenforceable.

It might possibly be illegal. For criminal law, usually you need to obey the laws of three countries: The country you are a national of (by personality principle) The country from where you make the sale (by territoriality principle) The country that hosts the attacked interest (by territoriality principle) Then it depends on the jurisdiction (and other factors) whether the sale is legal or not. I'll use the example of my country, Czech Republic. There is a crime called "Unauthorized access to a computer system or data storage device". For example, you commit this crime by exploiting a vulnerability in a web application and copying the web owner's data on your computer. It is also codified that whoever wilfully facilitates the committing of a crime by providing the criminal with resources (such as the exploit) is considered to have also committed the crime. For this to apply, you must have known or expected that the exploit will be used to commit a crime. The courts would decide this.

Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.

Maybe not. The ICO says that The right of access enables individuals to obtain their personal data rather than giving them a right to see copies of documents containing their personal data. It might be valid to interpret the DPA / UKGDPR in a way that the relevant personal data undergoing processing in their system is the existence of the letters, but that you are not entitled to a copy of the letters. This is in line with the purpose of the right to access, that you can check what data they are processing about you and whether it is correct. If that argument holds and the data subject insists on receiving a copy of the letters, it might be legitimate to charge them a fee for these copies. But in practice: The data controller might not make this argument and just hand over the copies. It is worth a try. A right to access founded in data protection might not be the only way to receive a copy of these materials. If the letters are relevant for legal proceedings, they could perhaps be requested during the disclosure process.

The criminal complaint against Sarao can be found on the US Department of Justice's website. He was charged under four different sections of US Code: 18 USC 1343, which prohibits the use of inter-state or foreign telecommunications in the furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. 18 USC 1348, which prohibits fraud concerning securities and commodities markets. 7 USC 13(a)(2), which prohibits manipulation of commodities markets. 7 USC 6c(a)(5)(C), which specifically prohibits "spoofing" of commodities markets. It's this last one that you seem to be most interested in. Spoofing is defined as "bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution." In other words, it's legal to change your mind after you place an order, but it's not legal to place an order that you have no intent of following through on. This section was actually enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, which took effect a few months after the "Flash Crash"; the charge against Sarao under this section stemmed from actions he took later, in 2014. The charges against Sarao specifically relating to the "Flash Crash" were under the wire fraud and securities fraud statutes instead. In the end, Sarao pled guilty to one count of wire fraud (covering his ongoing actions from 2009–2014) and one count of spoofing, presumably as part of a plea deal.

Do any jurisdictions besides Texas permit a couple to register a marriage years after the fact? A couple in Texas, otherwise unmarried, can go to the county courthouse and register their marriage on any date they choose. The date can be years earlier. Is this allowed elsewhere? What legal system is this practice likely to be inherited from? I would like to offer more information about why I am curious about formalization of informal marriages. First, as in Texas, same sex couples could obtain certification of marriages that were initiated before such marriages were legal. People could obtain the benefits of a long standing marriage, even predating Obergefell versus Hodges. Moreover, Texas law does not seem to prohibit any couple from moving to Texas, becoming residents, and formalizing their long-standing relationship, though started elsewhere. This might take only a few days or possibly a month depending on the requirements for residency. Second, I met a couple who had recently married in Britain in a Hindu (I believe) ceremony, but did not marry in a church or registry office. Thus, their marriage was not registered. I met them on the airplane when they were flying to Las Vegas with the intention of marrying there to obtain legal recognition of their marriage. They seemed to believe that others had done the same. From news sources I understand that marriage without documentation in Britain is fairly common among both Hindus and Muslims. This presents a problem, particularly to women, if they later seek a divorce since they are not recognized as married by the British courts.

The question mischaracterizes Texas law. Texas allows a common law marriage to be formally acknowledged in a document signed by the parties, for bureaucratic convenience and to end uncertainty. As clarified in the comments: this procedure isn't for couples who are "otherwise unmarried", but for those who are already married under common law (by living together as spouses, etc). And the date presumably can't actually be any date they choose, but only within the time period of their common-law marriage. In Texas, there is a common law marriage (per the link above) when you and your partner: are not already married, informally or formally, to anyone else at the time the marriage was created, AND both you and your partner were at least 18 years of age when the marriage was created; and you agreed to be married, AND afterward, lived in Texas as a married couple, and represented to others that you are married (“holding out” to others). These requirements, or some close variant of them, are typical of almost all common law marriage states. Common law marriages may be formed in the following U.S. states: Colorado: Common law marriage contracted on or after Sept. 1, 2006, is valid if, at the time the marriage was entered into, both parties are 18 years or older, and the marriage is not prohibited by other law (Colo. Stat. §14-2-109.5) Iowa: Common law marriage for purposes of the Support of Dependents Chapter (Iowa Code §252A.3) Otherwise it is not explicitly prohibited (Iowa Code §595.1A) Kansas: Common law marriage will be recognized if the parties are 18 or older and for purposes of the Divorce and Maintenance Article, proof of common law marriage is allowed as evidence of marriage of the parties (Kan. Stat. §23-2502; Kan. Stat. §23-2714) Montana: Not strictly prohibited, they are not invalidated by the Marriage Chapter (Mont. Stat. §40-1-403) New Hampshire: Common Law Marriage: "persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married." (N.H. Stat. §457:39) South Carolina: allows for marriages without a valid license (S.C. Stat. §20-1-360) Texas: Common Law Marriage in specific circumstances (Tex. Family Law §1.101; Tex. Family Law §2.401-2.402) Utah: Utah Stat. §30-1-4.5 While Texas provides a standard form for doing so, affidavits from each spouse, possibly filed in public real property records where the parties reside, would have the same effect. The use of a standardized safe harbor state approved form for doing this is a Texas-specific innovation. Common law marriage derives from English law, although it has since been abolished in England. The practice of formally documenting events and relationships that arise by operation of law with a signed instrument is a long standing one in all sorts of legal contexts. The Texas standard form Declaration would be prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it about the common law marriage of the parties, that would be hard to rebut. But, if someone had a legitimate reason to question whether they were actually married on the date stated (e.g. to overcome a claim of spousal confidential communications privilege) this could be overcome with evidence offered in an evidentiary hearing to the contrary (e.g. proof that the couple didn't meet until two years after the date recited).

There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule.

Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.

UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a "Presidential election" of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. "This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states," said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.

The full answer is too broad (it's a 50-state survey question). Here is a starter, though. In Washington, annulment may be sought if (i) The marriage or domestic partnership should not have been contracted because of age of one or both of the parties, lack of required parental or court approval, a prior undissolved marriage of one or both of the parties, a prior domestic partnership of one or both parties that has not been terminated or dissolved, reasons of consanguinity, or because a party lacked capacity to consent to the marriage or domestic partnership, either because of mental incapacity or because of the influence of alcohol or other incapacitating substances, or because a party was induced to enter into the marriage or domestic partnership by force or duress, or by fraud involving the essentials of marriage or domestic partnership, and that the parties have not ratified their marriage or domestic partnership by voluntarily cohabiting after attaining the age of consent, or after attaining capacity to consent, or after cessation of the force or duress or discovery of the fraud, shall declare the marriage or domestic partnership invalid as of the date it was purportedly contracted But then also (ii) The marriage or domestic partnership should not have been contracted because of any reason other than those above, shall upon motion of a party, order any action which may be appropriate to complete or to correct the record and enter a decree declaring such marriage or domestic partnership to be valid for all purposes from the date upon which it was purportedly contracted So an annulment would have to fit into one of these latter unspecified reasons. Although material fraud is considered to be such a reason, the closest case (an attempt to annul based on fraud), the WA Supreme Court avoided deciding whether a particular instance of alleged fraud sufficed to invalidate a marriage, since in addition one party was incompetent and the marriage was not solemnized, as required by state law. In Radochonski v. Radochonski (1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 765), the husband sought a declaration of invalidity of marriage based on fraud in the essentials of the marriage (the allegation was that the wife entered into the marriage to get permanent residency). The petition was denied because "the alleged fraud does not go to the 'essentials' of marriage" and because he "cannot demonstrate reasonable reliance on any statements Barbara made as to her motive in marrying him". The court notes that there is only one case, Harding v. Harding, addressing what the essentials of marriage are: where one of the parties to a marriage ceremony determines before the ceremony that he or she will not engage in sexual intercourse with the other after marriage, not disclosing such intention to the other, and carries out such determination, the offending spouse commits a fraud in the contract of marriage affecting an essential of the marital relation, against which the injured party may be relieved by annulment of the marriage. The court said that fraud in an essential may be found (citing cases in other states) where one spouse has misled another on an attribute that prevents sexual relations between the parties such as impotence, venereal disease, and drug abuse, the latter on the theory that narcotics cause impotence. These attributes have gone to the essentials of marriage because they affected the sexual relations that are at the heart of the marriage but no so in the case of premarital chastity, false representations as to love and affection, misrepresentation of affection, failure to disclose out-of-wedlock children, fraudulent representation of pregnancy, and failure to end a previous relationship. So it is highly unlikely that fraud in the essentials of marriage would be found at least in Washington.

Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).

There are great jurisdiction by jurisdiction differences in the statutes of limitations that apply to crimes. Some jurisdictions have no statute of limitations for any serious crime (e.g. Canada and if I recall correctly Virginia). Others have statutes of limitations for almost all serious crimes other than murder (e.g. Colorado). Where there is a statute of limitations, the primary issue is that the ability of the prosecution and defense to secure reliable evidence that will allow a jury to enter an accurate verdict. This potential to conduct a fair trial can be compromised by a delay in pressing charges. Alibi witnesses can die or disappear to someplace that they can't be located, the location of the alleged crime can change in ways pertinent to proof, memories of witnesses in general can fade. Records or correspondence that could show intent can be destroyed. This is particularly a burden for an innocent criminal defendant who did not know that he or she needed to prepare a defense and gather evidence to respond to criminal charges. Some states toll statutes of limitations during a period of a victims minority or incapacity when brining charges may not be feasible. Other states have a long statute of limitations in rape cases where there is DNA evidence available that can conclusively tie a defendant to the scene of the crime (lack of consent would still have to be established), but a shorter statute of limitations in other rape cases. Murder and fraud are the most common offenses to lack a statute of limitations, in the first case, because it is considered the most serious crime and because the victim is unable to report the crime, and in the latter case, because fraud, by its nature and by the perpetrator's design, may go undiscovered for very long periods of time. Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution? While I've given some examples of the considerations that apply, ultimately, this is a legislative and political decision and not a legal one. You can't determine by reason alone which classes of crimes will have a limited window for prosecution. Different legislative bodies make different decisions on the same issues at different times and in different places.

Let's back up. It's premature to say that SB 8 "avoids the constitutional restrictions on banning abortions". The constitutionality of SB 8 has not been resolved; the Supreme Court said so explicitly (page 2). In fact there is good reason to think that is unconstitutional under existing interpretation of the Constitution per Roe v. Wade and the like. (Whether the court will actually follow existing interpretation is another question, of course.) But the courts do not determine the constitutionality of laws just because someone asks them; they only do so when it needs to be decided to resolve a particular case. For instance, if a person is charged with a crime, they can challenge the constitutionality of the law under which they are charged, and courts will address that question unless the case is resolved some other way. There are also ways that a person who wants to violate the law can pre-emptively sue the government to prevent them from enforcing the law, if they can show such enforcement is likely to affect them. The issue in SB 8 is that since it wouldn't be the government enforcing the law, it's unclear who an abortion provider can pre-emptively sue. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, they tried to sue the State of Texas, its courts, and a private party who they thought might be likely to sue them. The SCOTUS majority found that none of those defendants were relevant. However, if and when an abortion provider actually does get sued, there'll be a clear case which has proper parties and is ripe, and courts then will have to consider whether SB 8 is constitutional or not. So if your hypothetical gun control statute were treated similarly, the law might avoid pre-emptive challenges, with a chilling effect on gun sales. But sooner or later, someone would probably violate the law (maybe deliberately as a test case), and the courts would consider whether it was constitutional or not. Under prevailing interpretations of the Second Amendment, they'd probably find that it wasn't. A key difference, of course, is that abortions are much more time-sensitive than gun purchases; being temporarily blocked from having an abortion is much more consequential in most cases than being temporarily blocked from buying a gun. The other subtext is that, although SCOTUS said their decision in Whole Woman's Health is not based on the constitutionality of SB 8, it's widely suspected that several of the justices are not all that keen on the constitutional right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade, and might look to overturn Roe when it comes up. As such, they may not be very motivated to look for procedural avenues to block SB 8 in the short term, since they might be inclined to uphold it in the long term. The dissenters in Whole Woman's Health certainly thought those avenues were available. But in the case of your hypothetical gun control bill, if a majority of justices were pretty convinced that the law was unconstitutional, they might try harder to come up with grounds to block it pre-emptively.

Can terms of a will be legally kept secret before filed in court? Let's say a father has two sons and he creates a will. He leaves something to son A and something else to son B. He doesn't want either of the sons to know the amount the other gets. And let's assume neither of the sons are aware of the total amount in order to figure out the other's portion of the inheritance. We can introduce more than 2 sons to remove the assumption of the sons' unawareness of the total. Is it possible to create a will like that? I am in the United States. If it varies by state, could you share examples of states with different answers? CLARIFICATIONS: The father doesn't want his executor to disclose son A's inheritance to son B and vice versa. If the sons want to share this information between them, that's their choice. The will is a complete secret from his family until his death.

FIRST: A last will and testament does not have to be disclosed to anyone [1] prior to death. But at death, notice of the commencement of a probate proceeding which is necessary for the will to be given effect must generally be given to: (1) everyone who takes under the will, and (2) everyone who would take if either that particular version of the will were invalid and a prior will that it revokes is valid, and (3) everyone who would take if there were no valid will, and (4) creditors whose claims are accepted as valid, but are not paid due to the insolvency of the probate estate. Everyone entitled to notice of the probate of a will is entitled to see the last will and testament submitted to the court in its entirety. The case could be placed under seal to prevent people other than interested parties and their lawyers from seeing the will, but not sons of a decedent who are interested parties by definition even if they get nothing under the will, because they would take if there was no will. SECOND: This said, it is easy to make a secret transfer effective upon death via a variety of non-probate transfers such as a beneficiary designation on an account, or the provisions of a trust, that don't require a court proceedings to take effect the way that a will does (people who think that they can avoid probate by having a will are fundamentally mistaken, probate is a court proceeding necessary to give a will legal effect). Only some of these methods of making a secret gift work if the estate is subject to estate taxes which requires disclosures to be made on gift and estate tax returns of all transfers taking effect at death (something that can be circumvented by making a transfer during life that is not reportable during life because it is within some exception to gift taxation). NOTES: [1] Usually a will has to be shown to the two witnesses to a will, unless it is executed under the recently repealed Louisiana law allowing for a "mystic will" which has seven people witness the envelope but no one witness the will itself prior to death. Of course, holographic wills, substantially in the handwriting of the person writing them, don't have to be witnessed at all.

Since Probate had already closed (12/20), is it legal for the Probate court to, in essence, change the terms of the will? I have several witnesses willing to provide affidavits to the effect that my mother, the deceased, made it clear that I would get the real-estate and that the grandson in question would get nothing. Often, for a relatively short period of time after an estate is closed, it can be reopened and the judgment closing the estate can be set aside for good cause. This is also true in most other kinds of lawsuits. if I cannot beat this challenge, can I remove myself as beneficiary and have the Probate court declare that all 5 blood-related grandchildren will get equal shares? Removing yourself as a beneficiary is called filing a "disclaimer" in legalese. It means to refuse to accept a gift or inheritance. But you can't do that if you have already received any personal benefit from the estate and there are other statutory restrictions. For tax purposes, the deadline to do is nine months after the date of death, but the state law deadline could be different. What would happen if you do so depends upon the language of the will. Usually, gifts to a group of people are made "per stirpes" (also called "by representation") which means that if a child predeceases or makes a timely disclaimer that their children share in the share that their parent would have received only. It is possible that it says something different, but that would be by far the most common provision. Under the original Probate interpretation, when the real-estate sold, I invested the proceeds in the stock market and there have been losses. If the challenge wins, will I have to come up with the delta--since the investment losses occurred under the original interpretation? If you had the authority to sell the real estate (which you probably did if a third-party title company went through with the transaction), then their claim would almost surely be limited to the proceeds of the real estate and not "the delta" unless the person entitled to take could show that you breached your fiduciary duties in the manner in which you invested the proceeds, for example, by investing all of it in a small number of penny stocks, rather than a diversified portfolio suitable for the purposes of the estate. Also, there is a question over whether the stock investment was made by you as the executor, and was subject to fiduciary standards, or was instead made after it was distributed to you outright. Further, there is the question of whether the estate can actually be opened if you gave notice of the closing of the estate to everyone who was entitled to it, including the grandchild, and whether the grandchild was entitled to it. You really need to hire a WV lawyer who handles probate cases at this point and would be doing yourself great harm by trying to represent yourself. Probate procedures are too arcane for you to reasonably have faith that you are doing it right for yourself.

Yes. There is both a duty to disclose and permit inspection of certain records (e.g. those that adversely affect either party's case or support another party's case) and a right for the court to demand access to other specific records. In england-and-wales the applicable rules are found in Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. For example: Standard disclosure 31.6 Standard disclosure requires a party to disclose only– (a) the documents on which he relies; and (b) the documents which – (i) adversely affect his own case; (ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or (iii) support another party’s case; and (c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a relevant practice direction. Specific disclosure (1) The court may make an order for specific disclosure or specific inspection. (2) An order for specific disclosure is an order that a party must do one or more of the following things – (a) disclose documents or classes of documents specified in the order; (b) carry out a search to the extent stated in the order; (c) disclose any documents located as a result of that search. Party's control 31.8 (1) A party’s duty to disclose documents is limited to documents which are or have been in his control. (2) For this purpose a party has or has had a document in his control if – (a) it is or was in his physical possession; (b) he has or has had a right to possession of it; or (c) he has or has had a right to inspect or take copies of it. Right of inspection 31.3 (1) A party to whom a document has been disclosed has a right to inspect that document except where – (a) the document is no longer in the control of the party who disclosed it; (b) the party disclosing the document has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of it, or (c) paragraph (2) applies. (2) Where a party considers that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the case to permit inspection of documents within a category or class of document disclosed under rule 31.6(b) – (a) he is not required to permit inspection of documents within that category or class; but (b) he must state in his disclosure statement that inspection of those documents will not be permitted on the grounds that to do so would be disproportionate. Inspection and copying 31.15 Where a party has a right to inspect a document– (a) that party must give the party who disclosed the document written notice of his wish to inspect it; (b) the party who disclosed the document must permit inspection not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the notice; and (c) that party may request a copy of the document and, if he also undertakes to pay reasonable copying costs, the party who disclosed the document must supply him with a copy not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the request. And, in case there's any doubt that this applies to electronic records: Meaning of document 31.4 In this Part – ‘document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded;

It might maybe be enforceable under contract law. One party offers something of value (information) under the condition that they get something of value (non-disclosure). Obviously there has to be agreement in advance of disclosure. The matter is even clearer-cut when the information is protected by privacy laws, therefore conditional consent makes the difference between invasion of privacy and not. Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 is a case where information was disclosed to reporters, provided that his identity be kept confidential. While the reporters agreed, they nevertheless published plaintiffs name, and he got fired. He sued (fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract), and ultimately won (under the theory of promissory estoppel).

You make spending a night in the house within, say, 3 months of your death, a condition of the bequest In general, while conditions in wills are ethically questionable, there is generally no legal impediment. They are binding unless: it violates the rule of law; it is uncertain or impossible to fulfil; or it is contrary to established public policy. Assuming you own the house in question (and still own it when you die) and the house still exists (e.g. it hasn’t burned down) then the condition would be enforceable. As for your second question: No. See What happens if a person is thought to be dead and their estate is administered, and then they turn up alive? Also, if you actually faked you death, rather than just being missing, you’re going to jail for fraud.

Short Answer Usually, a divorce decree doesn't leave former spouses as co-owners of the former marital residence, but sometimes this happens anyway. To oversimplify, if the divorce decree leaves a couple a co-owners, either of them can usually force the sale of the property and a division of the proceeds left after paying off the mortgage, in a special kind of lawsuit called a partition action. The rights of mortgage lenders and lienholders against both former spouses cannot be changed without paying off the loan in most cases. If a spouse who lives there isn't able to pay off the old loan and refinance it in their name alone, this usually means that the house will be sold to a third party with the net proceeds of the sale split. The net proceeds from the sale of the house are divided in proportion to their ownership interests in the co-owned property that can sometimes be tricky to calculate. Often the ability of either party to force a sale of the house in a partition action leads the parties to reach a settlement in the shadow of the possible outcome. Long Answer Caveats This answer sets forth the general rules that apply the vast majority of the time. There are some rare and obscure exceptions to these rules that can apply buried in dark corners of Texas law, and this answer doesn't not comprehensively ferret out every single such exception to the general rules. This answer also doesn't discuss ways in which outcomes that shouldn't be allowed by these rules can be made possible by one party or another's procedural mistakes in the court system, which is fact specific and can arise in certain situations. What Is A Divorce Decree? The only way a divorce case can end is for the divorce to be called off (either by mutual agreement or because one or both of the divorcing spouses die before the case is over), or for a divorce decree to be entered by the court, ending the marriage and establishing the rights of the parties after the divorce with respect to each other and their property. A divorce decree can be entered either by mutual agreement of the spouses in a divorce case, but if they can't agree, the judge in the divorce case will impose a divorce decree dividing property and handling other issues in the divorce as the divorce judge sees fit consistent with Texas law. Either way, it isn't official until it is signed by the judge. Sometimes a divorce decree will be very short, but will incorporate by reference one or more other documents like a mutually agreed separation agreement, or a parenting plan, or a schedule of who gets what property in the divorce. The Role of A Divorce Decree Almost anything can be done by mutual agreement (although all decisions related to children must be approved by the judge with a finding that the agreement is in the best interests of the children). A judge has far more limitations on what the judge can do in a divorce decree to establish the post-divorce property rights of the ex-spouses, but the judge still has great discretion in how the judge may make those decisions. Usually, the ownership of a house is handled in a way that leaves only one spouse owning the house in connection with a divorce proceeding. For example, ex-husband may be ordered to transfer the house to ex-wife, and ex-wife may be ordered to transfer her pension to ex-husband in exchange, if that is what the divorce decree says. One of the grounds for appealing a judge's divorce decree decision to a higher court is that the judge didn't adequately separate the spouses financially. But that doesn't mean that a divorce decree can never leave ex-spouses as co-owners of property. Once the divorce case is over, if nothing in the divorce decree separates ownership of the house, then the ex-husband and ex-wife have the same rights with respect to each other that a house co-owned by two people who were never married would have (unless the divorce decree states otherwise). Some divorce decrees, however, prohibit the sale or transfer of the house without the mutual consent of the former husband and former wife (for former husband and former husband, or former wife and former wife, in a same sex marriage), either indefinitely, or for some time period defined in the divorce decree. In rare cases, the divorcing spouses could agree to do something that leaves neither of them owning their house, like agreeing to sell it, or agreeing to give it to charity, or putting it in the trust for their children. The Rights Of Unmarried Co-Owners Of Property When A Divorce Decree Doesn't Provide Otherwise A lawsuit to terminate co-ownership of real estate without the consent of all of the owners of the real estate is called a partition action. In the case of a house that cannot feasibly be divided in kind the way that, for example, farmland could be, what a partition action does is force the house to be sold, with the proceeds divided. Conceivably, one spouse or the other could be both one of the two sellers, and one of the buyers at the partition sale if the spouse that is both selling and buying is the highest bidder in a sale that is open to the general public. In this case, the partition sale is functionally equivalent to cashing out the equity of a spouse who is not the highest bidder at a partition sale. Frequently, given the inevitability of an ultimate partition sale in these cases, the parties will instead reach a mutual agreement to either have one party cash out the other for an agreed valuation of the house and allocation of the equity in the house. Alternatively, another common form of settlement is that the co-owners will agree to sell the house for an agreed price to a third-party and then to divide the net proceeds either according to a pre-agreed formula or in litigation over net proceeds from the agreed sale held in a court controlled bank pending a judicial determination of each spouse's share of the proceeds. Partition actions aren't the most expensive kind of court case, but usually, at least one of the parties needs to have a lawyer for it to go smoothly and the legal fees aren't usually negligible either. Critically, the fact that "mom pays mortgage and lives in the house" doesn't matter much in a partition action after the divorce is over. Paying the mortgage and living in the house are frequently considered to cancel out, rather than changing the share of the equity to which each former spouse is entitled. An ex-wife cannot just get an ex-husband off of the title without being the highest bidder at a partition sale. If ex-husband is the highest bidder, he will stay on the title and she will be off the title and will have to move out or pay him rent. If the third-party is the highest bidden, she will have to move out or pay rent to the third-party, and neither of them will be on the title anymore. The Rights Of Mortgage And Lien Creditors The fact that both ex-spouses are responsible to the mortgage company (and any lienholders who have rights identical to mortgage companies for the purposes of this question) if they were both on the mortgage before the divorce can't be changed without the mortgage lenders consent (which is almost never given), unless the mortgage is paid off in full and (if necessary) refinanced. If there is a partition sale, the mortgage debt must be paid off before either spouse gets any of the proceeds from the partition sale. The Impact of Community Property Laws In Texas One complicating factor in this analysis is that Texas is a community property state. So, to determine what share of the equity in a house belongs to each spouse (if any) you have to apply community property rules that are deceptively simply, but are quite complicated to apply in practice. The general rule of community property in Texas is that property acquired before the marriage or by gift or inheritance by a single spouse, or allocated to a spouse in divorce decree, is separate property. All other property of the couple of community property. Any property for which separate property status can't be proven, or for which there is too much co-mingling of community and separate property, is community property. A spouse is entitled to 100% of the that spouse's separate property, and in addition, to 50% of the community property of the couple, upon divorce. Also, at death, a decedent can't leave the surviving spouse's separate property to someone else, can't leave the 50% of the property that is community property immediately prior to death, that is owned by the surviving spouse, to anyone other than the surviving spouse, without the surviving spouse's consent. Ideally, the divorce decree will spell out what percentage of each piece of land or other property that is owned by each former spouse once they are divorced. But, sometimes a divorce decree entered by mutual agreement, or by a judge, is sloppy and doesn't make that point clear. If the divorce decree doesn't clarify what percentage of the property is owed by each ex-spouse, this has to be cleared up later when the house is sold in a partition action, if there is no mutual agreement to the contrary. A valid pre-nuptial agreement, or a valid post-nuptial agreement, however, can modify the community property rules of Texas that would otherwise apply. The application of community property rules is also particularly complicated in cases where the couple spends part of their marriage in Texas, and part of their marriage either in a state that is not a community property state or that has very different community property laws on some key issues. The Impact Of Post-Divorce Economic Activity Related To The House Also, the amounts spent by the co-owners of the house after the divorce, and the question of whether one of the co-owner has been excluded from the co-owned house by the other, could change the share of each co-owner in the equity in the house after the divorce. The exact rules for how these adjustments are made are complicated, and are often subject to a judge's discretionary decision about this issue should be resolved in a partition action. Footnote Re Gender All of the rules discussed above, even if I haven't worded my explanations that way, are gender neutral. The rules are the same for ex-husbands as they are for ex-wives (and vice versa) in opposite sex marriages, for ex-husbands in same sex marriages, and for ex-wives in same sex marriages.

If this is Florida, then a will has to be written. If there is no written will, the estate falls under the law of intestate succession, part 1. Per § 732.502, every will must be in writing, signed, and witnessed (therefore a voice mail is not a will). If there are any relatives, they may be entitled to a share; otherwise, the estate goes to the state, where it is sold and the funds go into the state school fund (§732.107).

It is certainly possible to give gifts to your relatives (or to anyone really). But, the harder question is whether or not it is really a gift. A characterization of a transaction as a gift is less likely to be questioned if it is between related parties, and it is less likely to be questioned if it isn't obviously a quid pro quo. If you told your brother that you would make a gift to him of all of the appreciation in the house, if he made the guarantee in advance, it would be a guarantee fee (or an equitable or nominee ownership) rather than a gift. But, with the timing and motives described in this post, it is certainly a closer call. The fact that the "gift" amount exactly matches the appreciation casts doubt on the theory that this is really a gift, but doesn't absolutely clearly require the conclusion that it is not. This could end up being resolved either way, and ultimately, could be very dependent upon the detailed facts and how they are presented to the person determining if tax is owed.

Who gets to see the will when somebody dies When somebody dies, who has the right to see the will? I am thinking the executor does and all the beneficiaries do. Does a contingent beneficiary have the right to see the will? Is there anybody else who has the right to see the will?

Normally a will lodged with the Surrogate's Court is a matter of public record. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction to compel discovery as to the existence or whereabouts of any paper purporting to be a will of any decedent who died a resident of the county, which has not been offered for probate, and to require the paper to be lodged with the surrogate of the county for probate. N.J. Stat. § 3B:3-29. If a will has been registered in the New Jersey Will registry then a search of the registry in furtherance of the goal of locating a will is allowed for interested persons: Only interested persons and their representatives may conduct a search of the registry. As used in this act, "interested persons" means children, spouses, potential heirs, devisees, fiduciaries, creditors, beneficiaries and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding. N.J. Stat. § 3B:3-2.1.

He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.

Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.

Normally, a recorded deed is taken at face value. If Bob acquires a house and conveys the house to Bob and Clark, his cousin, a joint tenants with right of survivorship, or pays for 99% of the price of a house and directs that it will be deeded to Bob and Clark as joint tenants with right of survivorship, the normal interpretation of that transaction is that Bob made a gift of an undivided one half interest in the property with right of survivorship to Clark. It sounds like the fact pattern is that Bob dies before Clark, giving Clark 100% title of record to the house subject to the mortgage, and Bob's heirs are not cool about that fact and would like to escape that consequence. This is a tall order for Bob's heirs. Normally, at least two important rules of evidence will preclude admission of testimony to the contrary. One is the parole evidence rule. This excludes as a matter of law evidence of discussions entered into prior to execution of an unambiguous written instrument that is not on its face incomplete, even if other evidence, called "extrinsic evidence" is available. The other is the dead man's statute, which is quite tricky in its technical application, but is basically designed to prevent an interested party from offering self-serving testimony that economically benefits them about what a deceased person said. The classic examples would be "I'll sell you these gold bars for $10", or "I'm giving you this painting", or "I agree to let you live in my house after I die rent free for 11 months." A statement regarding an intended ownership interest in joint tenancy with right of survivorship real estate asserting that it is not 50-50 when nothing on the face of the deed suggests that this is case might be barred by the dead man's statute since these are statements of a dead man that favor the person offering the evidence. But, as I say, the application of the rule is quite technical. Also, to the extent that any third-party like a lender or a judgment creditor of the surviving joint tenant gets a lien or other property right in the property that is recorded, and that person had no knowledge of the claims of ownership outside real property records of the relative rights of the joint tenants, that evidence couldn't be used to impair or reduce the third-party's rights in the property by virtue of the recording statutes. If a dispute arose while the co-owners were alive at a time when there were no disputed claims of third-parties to the property, the joint tenancy would be easy to severed into a tenancy-in-common, and the actual relative contributions and right of the parties could be litigated in court with the testimony of those parties. But, usually, the four unities are in practice, a consequence of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship deed being prepared and recorded, rather than primarily being a condition precedent to it. If a single deed is executed that says that grantee are two or more people who are described as joint tenants with right of survivorship, then the legal consequence of that deed is that the co-owners become equal owners with a right of survivorship and unlimited right to possession of the whole. Also, even though it isn't standard, it isn't impossible for property to be in a tenancy-in-common which a side agreement to make a transfer upon death to the remaining tenant-in-common, even if it isn't a true joint tenancy with right of survivorship. So, if one proved by some competent and admissible evidence that a 50-50 ownership was not intended and that it wasn't a true canonical joint tenancy, this wouldn't necessarily invalidate the survivorship provisions on the face of the deed. A judge would be more likely to treat the deed as a non-standard non-probate transfer at death than to treat it as a tenancy-in-common without a right of survivorship, despite language of survivorship on the face of the recorded deed. Now, something other than equal co-ownership might be admissible for some purposes, like tax consequences, but that wouldn't go to who gets the property when a co-owner of the property dies. From an evidentiary standpoint, the case would [be based upon] . . . non-will ledgers, third party banking transactions, and letters of evidence that show the decedent undertook full responsibility for expenses related to the acquisition and maintenance of the property. The joint tenant was involved in the deed and mortgage issuance by the decedent for the sole purpose of mortgage qualification (i.e. credit requirements) This doesn't sound very convincing. First, there is nothing inconsistent with a joint tenancy with right of survivorship with one co-owner being the person who provides the funds for purchasing the home and handling all of the maintenance and expenses. This is more common than not in the case of a married couple or pair of unmarried domestic partners that own the real property as joint tenants with right of survivorship and it used to be even more common. Second, a lender would almost always require that all people obligated on the mortgage be owners of the property, and that all owners of the property be obligated on the mortgage. (Strictly speaking, in California, it would probably be a deed of trust rather than a mortgage, but that is functionally equivalent.) But, it wouldn't be very common as a commercial requirement to insist on joint tenancy with right of survivorship as opposed to tenancy-in-common ownership. Also since providing credit to a transaction is something of value, getting an ownership interest in the property in exchange isn't beyond the realm on possibility and plausibility in a deal that isn't entirely arms length but isn't entire a gift either. Providing credit is probably sufficient consideration to support the deal as a binding contractual agreement. Now, the best strategy might be a letter or exchange of letters that amount to an agreement. This wouldn't bind the mortgage company, but might have some relevant. Still, if the letters predate the execution of the joint tenancy deed, the parole evidence rule might keep the letters out of evidence. Some sort of express trust theory, treating the letters as a trust agreement, might if the language was right, be a stronger legal argument. I'm trying to wrap my head around how a court would interpret documentation vs. intent with regard to the joint tenancy ownership of real property. The key point being that the decedent didn't 'generally' pay for the property, but always paid for it. This is almost completely irrelevant. It is consistent with the alternative characterization of the transaction, but it is also consistent with the deed terms. In particular, if the decedent described the remaining joint tenant as a 'renter' during an interval of co-habitation, and no financial transactions between the two took place subsequent to that. I could imagine bringing a legal action to reform the deed, but the threshold of proof to win that action is pretty high. Absent some sort on undue influence or abuse of a confidential relationship, I have a hard time seeing a deed like this being reformed by a court to reflect a different kind of transaction, even if that was the original intent of the parties, but it isn't impossible if the right facts and evidence were available (which the dead man's statute, again, heavily constrains). If Bob was defrauded by Clark, I could also imagine some sort of legal remedy being available. But it is hard to think that Bob who was the primary mover in the deal would have been defrauded by Clark in this fact pattern. In California, the relevant case law seems to be Kershman v Kershman, Milian v DeLeon, and Cosler v Norwood Kershman v. Kershman is not on point. It is a divorce case dealing with the issues of marital v. separate property under California's community property regime which is an entirely different body of law that doesn't apply to unmarried co-owners of property. Milian v. De Leon is more on point, involving unmarried people with unequal contributions to the property who take title by a deed that says joint tenancy. it found that, “once the court in a partition action has determined that a true joint tenancy exists, it may not order reimbursement or contribution on account of differences in the amounts the parties have paid toward the initial acquisition of the property.” Milian v. De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1195. (Source) This holding is the standard common law rule. It isn't isn't really relevant here, however, because that case applies in the context of a partition action while the co-owners are alive, and not after death when the survivorship feature causes the surviving co-owner to be sole owner by operation of law. Cosler v. Norwood is a much older case, from 1950, and seems to stand for the proposition that the language of the deed regarding equal ownership that flows from calling the co-owners joint tenants can be overcome by extrinsic evidence in the context of a partition action, although it is arguably implicitly repealed by Milian v. De Leon. But it isn't on point for the same reason that Milian v. DeLeon in not on point - it considers the rights of two living parties in a partition action dispute (i.e. a lawsuit to untangle co-ownership of property), not concerning the validity of a survivorship provision in the deed in the presence of unequal contributions to the acquisition price. Changes to the survivorship rights do not obviously at all flow from the existence of unequal contributions.

Sadly, her assets will go into probate, and a judge/probate master will have to rule on how they're disbursed. Typically someone will be appointed as Administrator to the mother's estate. The administrator will contact all creditors, assemble and inventory/appraise the assets (i.e. furniture, car, house, bank accounts, etc.) and pay funerary expenses. Since she died intestate, there will be certain specific rules about who inherits the proceeds. The best avenue for the OP is to petition the court to appoint her as administrator of the estate.

Yes. There are two different meanings of "to execute" in law. Also note that terms can vary in different jurisdictions. In the UK, most people wouldn't use 'to execute' when signing a Will - they'd just sign it. 1. To bring a written document into effect. Any mark made by the testator on the document validates the will, provided that they intended it to be their signature, and that this signature is meant to execute the will. https://www.thegazette.co.uk/wills-and-probate/content/100522 The Witness Requirement to Execute a Will A will typically must be properly witnessed to be valid. https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/wills-trusts/witness-requirement-execute.html Amendments to a will can only be made while executing a will or after the date of execution of the will. Amendments to a will must comply with the same requirements for a valid will and if you cannot write, with the same requirements listed under that heading. http://www.justice.gov.za/master/m_deseased/deceased_wills.html The term "execute" is not restricted to Wills: When a person "executes" a document, he or she signs it with the proper "formalities". For example: If there is a legal requirement that the signature on the document be witnessed, the person executes the document by signing it in the presence of the required number of witnesses. https://www.apostille.us/faq/what-does-it-mean-to-quotexecutequot-a-documen.shtml Documents are most commonly executed as simple contracts. ... Deeds can also be advantageous even when they are not strictly required by law. For example, if only one party under a contract is receiving a real benefit from an agreement, it would be advisable under English law to execute the contract as a deed so that it is not void for lack of consideration. Another potential advantage of deeds is that they have a longer statutory limitation period than contracts: twelve years. However, a deed requires some additional execution formality beyond a simple signature. Deeds must be in writing and will typically be executed in the presence of a witness, although in the case of a company a deed may be executed effectively by two directors or a director and the company secretary. https://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/synapse/commercial_execution.html 2. To carry out the instructions in a Will of a deceased person (in the UK the corresponding role in relation to an intestate estate is an administrator). An executor (male) or executrix (female) is the person named in a will to perform these duties. An administrator (male) or administratrix (female) is the person appointed by the probate court to complete these tasks when there is no will or no executor or executrix has been named in the will. http://www.attorneys.com/wills-trusts-and-probate/executor-versus-administrator Executors and Administrators are responsible for administering the Estate of someone who has died. They are known collectively as Personal Representatives. The Executor’s authority is taken from the Will, and comes into effect immediately on the death of the person who made the Will. In theory, the Executor can exercise all their powers from the date of death. https://www.co-oplegalservices.co.uk/media-centre/articles-may-aug-2017/the-difference-between-an-executor-and-an-administrator/

When a person dies intestate, California law (or the law of any other state) does not allow a presumed heir to unilaterally legally take over the estate, or part of the estate. This most likely involves a court procedure to decide who gets what. However, if all parties agree, it would be possible for one or more heirs to occupy the house without them owning it – this creates a legal mess that can be difficult and costly to untangle, so presumed-heir squatting is not a good idea. Ultimately, the property will have to go through probate in order for it to be sold to someone else. Obviously, property taxes and other assessments must be paid, but the state does not care who writes the check. There are also liability issues, if the property damages other property (example: the underground oil tank ruptures and pollutes the neighbors' property). If one of the heirs disputes the arrangement, they can sue to force proper disposition of the estate. Creditors may also have a legal claim against the estate. A person can petition the court (here is the form) to be appointed as the personal representative of the deceased. If someone else has "taken" the property, this petition triggers questioning as to who is entitled to a share of the estate, and the court will assure that it is distributed according to law, and if this is an adversarial process, each interested party may need to hire their own attorney (thus it is best to reach an agreement beforehand).

what reasoning would the court use to evaluate the competing claims? Absent a verifiable contract, the dispute would require assessment of the extrinsic evidence and/or of other aspects reflecting the parties' credibility. Those types of factors would help for discerning whose position is meritorious. You are right in that Bella's co-signing of the loan is likely to render her hypothetical allegation of gift not credible. Bella's history of defaulting on her debts as well as her failure to keep up with insurance & tags are examples of prior act evidence. As such, these might be inadmissible for proving that she entered the contract with Abe. However, they are admissible both for proving Bella's pattern of missing her commitments and possibly for detecting inconsistencies in Bella's allegations (thereby weakening Bella's credibility). Unless Bella is able to point greater inconsistencies or weaknesses in Abe's credibility, a competent and honest court (where available) would rule in favor of Abe.

Is the use of the singular "they/their/them" in legal writing and legislative drafting recognized to be acceptable / appropriate? Is use of the singular "they/their/them" in legal writing and/or legislative drafting recognized to be acceptable / appropriate?

canada Guidance from the Government of Canada Yes. The Government of Canada's guide on legislative drafting has a section on gender-neutral language. It emphasizes that "gender-specific language should not be used in legislation." The first-listed alternative strategy (alongside others) is to "use the singular 'they' and its other grammatical forms... to refer to indefinite pronouns and singular nouns." It acknowledges that "[i]n the past, the masculine pronoun was commonly used in the English language to signify the non-specific 'he or she'" but that "[i]t is now generally well-accepted that gender-specific language should only be used for references to persons of one gender or the other." One example from the guide: Every taxpayer shall file their tax return no later than April 30 of the year following the year in which they earned the income on which they are paying taxes. Guidance from the British Columbia Law Institute In the guide, Gender Diversity in Legal Writing, the institute explains: Canadian lawyers no longer write law, or write about the law, as if it only applies to men of European descent who own real property. ... Language and the law continue to evolve, moving towards even more inclusive language in legal writing. ... The highest levels of our profession have recognized that gender inclusivity is a matter of justice and professionalism. The British Columbia courts require all counsel to identify themselves and their pronouns. ... We have adopted gender-inclusive ways of referring to people, in particular the use of “they” as a singular pronoun. The guide says: They/them is also used as a gender non-specific singular pronoun when a writer does not know a person’s pronouns. Just like the pronoun “you,” they/them can be used in singular or plural forms. One example it provides: Minister Williams said they misspoke when they said their budget was “balanced to the last penny.” French text It is slightly more complex to render French legal writing to be gender-inclusive, given that adjectives and third-person plural pronouns are gendered, but the Government of Canada's Translation Bureau shares several resources, including guidance from the Commission de la construction du Québec, and an article from the Canadian Bar Review.

Yes Written contracts do not have to be written in any particular language or character set. Purely visual contracts are used and are legally binding. If a pictorial term is ambiguous it is resolved by the court the same way as a textual term would be.

You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.

I've never heard the phrase used this way, and it wouldn't make any sense, anyway; "indemnity" is security against a consequence, so the existence of civil and criminal consequences would be a double non-indemnification. Maybe ask the lecturer for a published example of this usage.

If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.

company does not warrant that use of the Software will operate uninterrupted or error free. A court will not find that statement to be ambiguous or contradictory. Mere grammatical differences will not void a contract. See Typing errors in legal contract I have recently encountered the following perl of perspicuous and immaculate syntax: Correct grammar and usage is "pearl", not "perl". Perl is a programming language; as for a pearl, you must be thinking of the definition of Pearl Of Wisdom (Merriam-Webster).

Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights").

D should be subpoenaing anything and everything they need from anyone and everyone, including E. No matter how good terms you are on, if you are involved in a lawsuit you should not be relying on anyone's good faith to supply you what you need. Suppose you ask nicely and they say yes but, for whatever reason, they don't supply them by your court date. Without a subpoena, if you ask for a continuance the judge will say "tough t*^%^$s"; with a subpoena they will say " Yes certainly, oh, and Mr Sheriff, here is a warrant for the documents, go and get them for me please. Oh and a warrant for the arrest of the person who ignored my subpoena." Where do you want to be?

What law requires me to safeguard classified information? Let's say I have a briefcase full of Top Secret papers, and I carelessly leave it on the table at Burger King and it falls into the wrong hands. 18 U.S. Code § 798 apparently only applies if I "knowingly and willfully" provide the information to an unauthorized person. My employer certainly expects me to safeguard the information I have been entrusted with, but does my negligence actually violate any law?

Assuming all the required elements are met, 18 U.S. Code § 793(f)(1) would presumably apply: Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information (f)Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information, relating to the national defense (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.

This is a super complex question and no one really knows the answer yet. Orin Kerr is probably the leading scholar on this question, and he generally argues that forced decryption of one's own device is not a Fifth Amendment violation. As I understand it (and oversimplifying by a lot), one key piece of his position is that requiring you to put in your password is a statement about your knowledge of the password itself, not about the contents of the machine into which you are entering it. And because your knowledge of the password for your own devices is presumed, an exception for "foregone conclusions" would leave this compulsion unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. You can read one of his explanations here. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that approach, but a California judge recently reached a conclusion similar to Kerr's. This will probably by a question for SCOTUS before too long.

You do not have to. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove that you made the threat. Reasonable doubt exists in the circumstances that you describe, that there are no logs of who accessed what when and how. Your attorney may have to introduce expert witnesses who can explain how it is possible that text from your computer can end up on a web page, and they can testify that there are many ways that data can be entered into the database, only a few of which actually involve you.

The most apparent potential offences would be under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, but these require the mens rea of "knowingly" or "intentionally" doing things without authorization, or doing so "with intent to defraud", etc. See also the Department of Justice's manual entry on this family of offences. Particularly relevant is this quote: As part of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant was aware of the facts that made the defendant’s access unauthorized at the time of the defendant’s conduct. Given your stipulation that the person has unintentionally viewed or downloaded the material without authorization, this would not be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030.

What does your Data Protection Officer say? It’s their role to be aware of and assess if you policies, procedures and processes comply with the principles. For the particular application is it: “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”? “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary” “kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed” “processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures” And can you clearly demonstrate compliance with the above? Just a personal observation: WTF are you using a spreadsheet for what is clearly a database problem? This is several dozen steps away from best practice data security.

It may not be libel, but it may violate other statutes and may support a judgement against the person publishing this information as long as there is an injury-in-fact ("an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"). A recent case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 578 U.S. ___ (2016) considered the case where a company created a profile for a person. That profile stated "that he is married, has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate degree". The plaintiff asserted that all of this was incorrect. The plaintiff made a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act because the information was false. However, mere violation of statute is not sufficient to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing. Congress can't create standing via statute. Injury-in-fact still requires a "concrete" injury. This does not need to be a physical, tangible injury. But, it does need to be concrete. On its own, publication of false information, even when statute prohibits it, does not create standing. There must be an injury-in-fact.

I'm not familiar with this law, but if it works like other tax confidentiality laws I'm familiar with, it would be interpreted so broadly that there would effectively be no difference between "facts," "particulars" or "information." People receiving tax returns under this law would be prohibited from disclosing any of them. Anything that is in the return would be considered secret.

Whats the point of a federal law that does not get enforced? In the USA, the Constitution requires a Census every ten years. Anyone living here, legally or not, are required by law to respond to the Census, as well as be truthful. This has been the case from from the first Census taken in 1790, till that last one in 2020. The punishment has even been amended by Congress twice since its inception. However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. And of those, only two people have been convicted. Of those two, one had the conviction overturned. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? This might be more of a political question, but maybe there is a legal reason? Edit: I cant find exact numbers - and exact numbers might be impossible to get - but from some quick research, it sounds like not answering the census at all is fairly common. From one post on the Census Bureau's website, the answer rate is over 60%. And as far as I can tell, there is no numbers on people responding being complete or truthful.

However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. The census bureau has noticed that a more effective way to get everyone counted is to follow up in person if someone neglects to respond to the questionnaire. Once they follow up and the person has responded, there's no longer a basis for prosecuting. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? The possibility of prosecution is presumably thought to increase the response rate even if virtually nobody is ever prosecuted. The law also serves as a formal statement by congress that responding to the census is important, even if the executive doesn't prosecute people for failing to do so. Another thing to consider is that an element of the offense specified in 13 USC 221 is refusal or willful neglect. Without evidence of an affirmative refusal to respond, the prosecutor would need evidence of willfulness, which goes to state of mind, and that is notoriously difficult to prove. Any defendant who claims to have intended to respond but for chronic forgetfulness would introduce reasonable doubt unless the prosecutor had something to show that the defendant intentionally refrained from responding.

All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out.

In fact, the immigration quotas do not discriminate. The described limit is that "No more than 7 percent of the visas may be issued to natives of any one independent country in a fiscal year; no more than 2 percent may issued to any one dependency of any independent country". All countries get the same upper limit. Additionally, anti-discrimination laws are subject matter specific: they exist because Congress passed a law that prohibits using race as a basis for employing a person (which Congress can do because of the Commerce Clause). Congress has not passed any such law pertaining to granting of visas. There is a path of reasoning that could lead to concluding that national quotas violate anti-discrimination laws, based on an "effects test" (disparate impact). It appears to be a fact that an applicant for a visa has a much higher probability of being denied a visa is their country of origin is China or India, as opposed to Sweden, which one could spin into a disparate impact argument. In order for this argument to become the law, there would have to be a case brought to the federal courts to the effect that national quotas are illegal, and as far as I know there has never been such a case. There are no provisions in anti-discrimination legislation that support a disparate impact doctrine in immigration, and pretty clear evidence that it was not congressionally intended since Title 8 Ch. 12 clearly calls for nation-based quotas. A final point: "national origin discrimination" is based on "an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group". A Swedish citizen of "Chinese national origin" is subject to the Swedish quota, not the Chinese quota, thus the discrimination is based on country of citizenship, not national origin.

Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial.

This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.

I'm just going to talk about the US. The First Amendment to the US Constitution codifies that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;... What is clearly prohibited by this Amendment would be Congress (or any inferior legislature via the 14th Amendment) restricting the ability of religions which refuse to marry same-sex couples from marrying opposite-sex couples, or in general outlawing any kind of religious law about who a particular church is willing to marry (e.g. only marrying if both parties are of the religion). However, legislatures are generally allowed to influence action via government inducements (I'll just use inducements to describe subsidies, tax breaks, etc). The current precedent for determining whether a particular legislative action violates the Establishment Clause is the "Lemon Test," from Lemon v. Kurtzman, which has the following test: Government action violates the Establishment Clause unless it: Has a significant secular (i.e., non-religious) purpose, Does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and Does not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. On the first point, I think the law fails - inducing religious establishments to perform same-sex marriage does not have a "significant secular purpose" because ultimately the government doesn't care whether or not you have a marriage ceremony, just that you sign a marriage certificate with an appropriate witness, which can be a government official. The law could survive on the second point if it could be shown to have at least the preponderance of being for social good, if it is argued that the law's purpose is to make church marriage ceremonies more accessible for same-sex couples by inducing more churches to perform them, and not to harm churches that don't perform them. However, this would probably be an uphill battle, since the law has the practical effect of promoting some religions' beliefs over others. The law probably fails on the third point as well, going back to the previous point that it effectively results in the government choosing one religious practice to promote over another. However, the Lemon Test often criticized or entirely disregarded by the current Supreme Court, for example in the case American Legion v American Humanist Association (a case decided by the current Supreme Court): This pattern is a testament to the Lemon test's shortcomings. As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and practices came to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them. It could not "explain the Establishment Clause's tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings, . . . certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, including Thanksgiving. Even without the Lemon Test, we can look at Walz v. Tax Commission of New York for an idea of when tax breaks for religious establishments is allowed (emphasis mine): The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion... New York, in common with the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such;... The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. This paragraph seems to provide some argument both ways. First, the bolded section would seem to prohibit using government inducements to promote one religious practice over another, and that the government can only assist religious institutions when the assistance is applied equally. On the other hand, states are allowed to grant tax relief to religious organizations "that foster..."moral or mental improvement,"..." A legislature could argue that the law promotes "moral improvement" by encouraging acceptance of same-sex marriage, rather than a particular religious belief. However, I don't think that such an argument would prevail over the general prohibition on promoting any religious exercise over another. Government assistance for religious organizations is very thinly held to be permissible only when it is equal. In my opinion, the Supreme Court already has to use twisted gymnastics to argue in favor of any government assistance of religious organizations granted because of their religious status, so they are unlikely to allow something this far (especially since it is usually the conservative justices arguing in favor of these policies, and they are less likely to do same-sex marriage any favors). On the other hand, a permissible policy may be to have government grants for any organization that performs same-sex marriage ceremonies, whether or not that organization is religious. Whether or not that is allowed is likely going to depend on what proportion of the receiving organizations are religious in nature, but there may be enough hotels and other non-religious venues that would qualify that such a law might survive.

The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.

I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.

Does the renaming of the German 'ebay Kleinanzeigen' to 'Kleinanzeigen' mean they loose any trademark to their name? So ebay Kleinanzeigen is a company that owns a website for classified ads. People can post classified ads there and search the website to buy things from classified ads. I suppose ebay has the exact same business model in various other countries. This is the German branch. Now the German word 'Kleinanzeige' means exactly classified ad. Recently they renamed both their website and the company itself to just 'Kleinanzeigen'. To me this looks like a classic example of a trademark for common words as in this or this question and in their case this seems to be exactly a generic term. The name of the company is exactly what they sell. To me this means they shouldn't be able to get any trademark or copyright for that name. Anyone else offering Kleinanzeigen in Germany can just call them Kleinanzeigen because that is what they are. Is that what happened here or do they have some other way to protect their company name? It seems very strange to me to deliberately rename the company to lose any trademark associated with it.

There is already any number of other pages that are named kleinanzeigen, just with different top level domains (probably sprung into existence after the plan for the renaming became public). But if you are a Website operating in Germany that owns the kleinanzeigen.de domain, that probably does not worry you too much (you could probably fight others over the use of the word for a specific purpose such as a classifieds website, because sometimes specific uses might be protected; but that would be an uphill battle, since as pointed out the name is the literal description of the business model). What might worry you is that somebody is tricked into confusing kleinanzeigen.eu or kleinanzeigen.biz with your valuable property. The way to avoid that is to register a "Wort-Bild-Marke", a combination of your name with one or more distinctive graphic elements. You will notice that the "kleinanzeigen" name on the website is rendered in a specific font and is preceded by what on closer inspection turns out to be a stylized letter "k". That is something that can be protected by law. Nobody else is allowed to be too close to that design, so that minimizes the danger that visitors confuse a competitor's page with the "original" kleinanzeigen page. Since the question alludes to eBay's business, kleinanzeigen is no longer a part of eBay - for some three years now they belong to Adevinta, a Norwegian conglomerate that runs classified portals in various countries. So keeping "ebay" in their name was not really an option (and all alternatives to "kleinanzeigen" were probably worse).

Apparently, Yes In the ECJ's Breyer decision the final conclusion reads: Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is true that in this case the decision was actually under Directive 95/46/EC, not the GDPR, but the GDPR took its definition of personal Data directly from Directive 95/46/EC, so that should make no difference. It is also true that in this case the website in question was operated by the German Federal government, an not by a private individual, or by a private business. A government might have "legal means" to link an IP address with an individual that a private actor does not. However in point 23 of the decision, the Court refered to the IP addresses as: ... stored by the Federal Republic of Germany, acting in its capacity as an online media services provider, ... which seems to indicate that the same ruels were being applied to it as would have been to a private entity. Point 44 of the decision says that: The fact that the additional data necessary to identify the user of a website are held not by the online media services provider, but by that user’s internet service provider does not appear to be such as to exclude that dynamic IP addresses registered by the online media services provider constitute personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46. In point 47, the court says that: ... in the event of cyber attacks legal channels exist so that the online media services provider is able to contact the competent authority, so that the latter can take the steps necessary to obtain that information from the internet service provider and to bring criminal proceedings. This leads the court to point 49, where it says that; Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, ... Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. Nothing in the decision indicates that any particular governmental authority was considered to provide the "legal means" to get an ISP to link an IP used at a particular time to an individual. In this page from Intersoft consulting it is said that: Since the definition includes “any information,” one must assume that the term “personal data” should be as broadly interpreted as possible. ... The same also applies to IP addresses. If the controller has the legal option to oblige the provider to hand over additional information which enable him to identify the user behind the IP address, this is also personal data. In this page from eugdprcompliant.com it is said that: A much discussed topic is the IP address. The GDPR states that IP addresses should be considered personal data as it enters the scope of ‘online identifiers’. Of course, in the case of a dynamic IP address – which is changed every time a person connects to a network – there has been some legitimate debate going on as to whether it can truly lead to the identification of a person or not. The conclusion is that the GDPR does consider it as such. The logic behind this decision is relatively simple. The internet service provider (ISP) has a record of the temporary dynamic IP address and knows to whom it has been assigned. A website provider has a record of the web pages accessed by a dynamic IP address (but no other data that would lead to the identification of the person). If the two pieces information would be combined, the website provider could find the identity of the person behind a certain dynamic IP address. However, the chances of this happening are small, as the ISP has to meet certain legal obligations before it can hand the data to a website provider. The conclusion is, all IP addresses should be treated as personal data, in order to be GDPR compliant. Finally the european Commission says, on this official page: Personal data is any information that relates to an identified or identifiable living individual. Different pieces of information, which collected together can lead to the identification of a particular person, also constitute personal data. ... Examples of personal data ... an Internet Protocol (IP) address; While the case law is scanty on the point, it appears that the consensus is that IP addresses, even dynamic IP addresses, will be considered to be Personal Data under the GDPR. >

Can they have a clause in the fine print that in laymans terms just says 'we might just not fulfill our side of the deal'. That paraphrase appears to trivialize the actual terms of the contract (of which fine print you mention you don't know in detail). Germany's Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) at §262 entitles the shipping company --insofar as obligor-- to a choice of service, provided that the company duly informs the customer, Id. at §263. The latter section of the BGB is not explicit as to whether the obligor's notification ought to happen at the formation of the contract, although I am almost positive that that is so and is premised on the BGB itself. Since delivery at the post office and delivery at the home address are mutually exclusive (i.e., they preclude each other), by virtue of §262 the company may outline in the contract both alternatives and thereafter decide for one of these unilaterally. If the company makes its contractual [post office] alternative contingent on "being too busy with other things" and the customer proves that the company opted for post office despite not being that busy, the customer could prevail on grounds that the company contravened Treu und Glauben. See Id. at §162(2). The "I will mow your lawn" example you outline is not a good analogy. The shipping company may argue that, even if the product is not delivered at customer's home address, the customer still benefited by having to retrieve it from a location --such as a nearby post office-- that is closer from the location where the product was commercialized or manufactured. The customer would prevail only if delivery were at a location which is more inconvenient to him than if he discarded transacting with the shipping company. See Id. at § 226.

Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46".

The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law

united-states If the computer is in fact a HAL-9001 (no doubt running the Clarke-68 OS) then the reseller can so describe it without trademark infringement. This is a case of nominative use, where the trademark is used as the name of the thing, to describe and/or refer to it. In addition, under US law, an attempt to prohibit the reseller from using that term would run into first amendment issues, and would be subject to strict scrutiny. If the term were used in such a way as to disparage the brand, there could possibly be an action for tarnishment of the trademark. but such actions are now limited in the US on first amendment grounds, following the case of Matal v. Tam. See What is trademark tarnishment or dilution under US law? for more details.

That is private. Who you work for is not information that is disclosed publicly by any state actor in Germany, just like your taxes. In fact, that or who you are employed at is often regarded as personal and private information. Nigh impossible through agencies Public agencies like the Fiskus (tax), Agentur für Arbeit, and immigration are not allowed to give any information about a person to anyone but that person or another agency that has the right to that information. Yes, (generally speaking) the tax office may not even say that a person exists (or doesn't) and what their tax number is to anyone but the person in question.

Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book.

Is it common for software licenses to, as written, technically prohibit normal and expected use of the software? In Is distributing software that makes modifications to video games legal? an example snippet of a video game license is given, which reads: You may not copy the Software (except as specifically permitted herein) and, except as expressly permitted by law, you may not modify, translate, reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble or create derivative works of the Software. Presumably "as specifically permitted herein" gives you the right to copy the software to your computer and into memory to run it. But no such exception seems to be given allowing you to "modify" or "translate" the software where technically necessary. I'm not aware of any common computing platform where loading an application does not usually involve "modifying" it (to link it together in memory with required system dynamic libraries). And similarly, "translating" running software (from instruction set architecture instructions to some internal representation of micro-operations inside the CPU) is technically necessary for execution on almost any real computer. And setting a global variable in an anonymously-mapped page in memory will create a derivative work; the software almost certainly creates ephemeral derivative works of itself in normal operation. Is it common for software license agreements to be so poorly drafted that, if taken literally, they fail to usefully license the software as would be needed for execution on real machines? Do courts tend to expand them to grant the necessary permissions after all, to fulfill the intent of the agreement? Or do they tend to read them restrictively, giving developers a free pass to extract damages from any ordinary users they don't like? Is there a statute about this that "expressly permits" people to actually use software they license?

There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.

In principle, every single copyright license allows someone to do something that plain copyright law wouldn't allow them to do. Very often there are conditions: They are allowed to do X, which plain copyright law wouldn't allow them to do, but only if they fulfil some condition Y. The consequence is that if they do X without fulfilling the condition Y, then they are committing copyright infringement. Details are different from country to country. In the USA, you cannot force someone to do what the license asks the, to do, but if they don't, it's copyright infringement, and you can sue them and ask for damages. Other countries see it as a contract, where by doing X they agree to do Y as well, and not doing it would be breach of contract. Often with the interesting effect that you as the copyright holder cannot prove that they accepted the license, so in court they can tell the judge whether they were committing copyright infringement or whether they are in breach of contract. You can of course use your own license - however, one of the standard licenses mean the license was likely checked by a better lawyer than you would want to pay, and is much more likely to achieve what you want to achieve. If there were any problems say with the Creative Commons license, people would have found those problems and fixed them a long time ago.

It doesn't work like that! If the code is not properly licensed, you can not acquire a license for it. If you don't have a license, you can not use it. Usage without a license is copyright infringement and not allowed: the copyright is with the author, and only the author may make derivates or copies or allow them to be made by licensing it. You do not gain copyright by fixing a licensing error - in fact, you commit copyright infringement if you do not have a license, and providing wrong copyright management information is illegal under 17 USC 1202

My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses.

The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.

It's really your client that should be asking these questions. Writing the app is perfectly legal. So you can enter a contract with that client to write the app and deliver it to them, ready to be put on the Google Play store or the App Store (entering a contract needs to be done carefully, obviously). I'd make 100 million percent sure that the contract states clearly that you have zero responsibility if the app is rejected or removed for non-technical reasons, and that the legality of actually selling and running the app is also not your responsibility. The reason is that I very much suspect that running the app might be illegal, and that the chances of getting it permanently on one of the stores are rather slim. And solving those problems is outside of what a software developer can competently do.

It is possible if and only if you can say exactly what you mean, and what you mean isn't prohibited by law. Software licenses can have all sorts of conditions attached to them, such as use (commercial or not; educational) or a quasi-demographic (are a student at UX, are employed by Z; reside in Y). "Mega-corporation" is not at all defined, so you would need to specify what it means to be a "mega-corporation" (is it defined in terms of assets, or income, and what is the magic number that is not to be crossed). What do you mean by "corporation"? Your license might not achieve what you intended it to achieve, if you don't think about ways to legally get around the restriction (can a mega-corporation have an employee incorporate your code into a product, as an individual, and then sell the rights to the product to the mega-corporation for $1, or for $1,000,000? If not, what part of the license says you can't). Also bear in mind that a license might be for a fixed period (a nuisance), or perpetual (the usual case), but status as a "mega-corporation" is ever-changing (Microsoft was a garage operation a few years ago; Blockbuster was a mega-corporation a few years ago). Do you want people or companies to lose their license right once they make a certain salary / income? The license would be discriminatory, but not all forms of discrimination are illegal – I don't think this would actually run afoul of any anti-discrimination laws.

Per the comment, the applicable license term seems to be Licensee agrees to maintain in confidence the source code version of the Licensed Software by using at least the same physical and other security measures as Licensee uses for its own confidential technical information and documentation, but in no case less than reasonable measures. So if your own code is on a physically unconnected thumbprint-secured blah blah blah computer deep in a mountain, with files encrypted, so must theirs be. If yours is stored in "the cloud" with decent password protection, theirs must be as well. This seems to describe your Github use (I don't have any knowledge of the degree of hackability of private Github repositories). The legal judgment as to whether this is "reasonably secure" is based on whether a prudent person would know that it is practical to gain unauthorized access. Protecting a file with the password "password" would probably be found to be unreasonably insecure.

Can a judge force/require laywers to sign declarations/pledges? I read this story where a US judge is forcing lawyers in his court to sign a pledge saying they did not use ChatGPT to generate filings without being checked by a human. While that's a very reasonable thing, I am wondering where that authority comes from, or what the limits are. Can a US judge require lawyers in their court to sign other types of pledges? What if they refuse? What if they don't agree with it or feel it violates a freedom? Is this similar to a judge's authority to charge people with contempt which also has no recourse?

canada In Canada, this would fall within a court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes. For example (in another context): Based on a reading of the authorities, I am able to conclude that the Courts have the inherent jurisdiction to require parties and their solicitors to enter into undertakings regarding the use of documents produced for discovery. (Anderson v. Anderson et al., 1979 CanLII 1673 (ON SC)) The inherent jurisdiction of a court to control its own processes extends to controlling the conduct of lawyers, being officers of the court (see e.g. R. v. Faulkner, 2013 ONSC 1824, paragraphs 8-9). If the lawyer or their client believes a particular exercise of this inherent jurisdiction is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, they could challenge it on those grounds. The court's order as such is not subject to the Charter, but the common law governing its issuance is subject to Charter scrutiny. See generally Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.

The general rule is, anything is allowed unless it is forbidden (and not that you can only do things that are expressly permitted). The logical structure of law may be a bit more challenging than procedural programming logic, since it may require a global knowledge and evaluation of the entire code (typically but not absolutely, the scope of the search for "unless otherwise" conditions is restricted to "in this chapter"). In other words, the law is a set of propositions which must all be true, and unlike actual execution of instructions in a sequence, law is to be interpreted simultaneously but hierarchically (that is: the order in which clauses are written is not significant). The appearance that the law is self-contradictory is largely illusory, though the resolution of the conflict may require a careful reading of the law and knowledge of jurisdictional hierarchy (federal law is superior to state law, which entails a particular resolution of the apparent conflict). Sometimes there are real conflicts, which usually result from using words in conflicting ways (note the practice of re-defining words "in this chapter/section/title"). The reason why law is not a science is that law is normative, not descriptive: it dictates what is allowed (a determination made through the political process), and does not attempt to discover what independently is. The reason why the legal process cannot be implemented in software is that software does not yet correctly interpret natural language, and law is written in natural language following interpretations based on judgments of what choices a reasonable would make. Perhaps if you propose a piece of law that you think is contradictory, it would be possible to show how the contradiction is illusory.

In the event of a dispute, the person resolving the matter, probably an arbitrator in the case of a commission dispute between two realtors and either an arbitrator or a judge and jury depending upon what your listing agreement says about that issue, would hear the testimony from both parties and decide. The intent of the parties is supposed to govern in cases of clerical errors, but a signed document has a lot of weight, especially in such a prominent term. It is a little hard from the way the question is posed to determine who is willing to correct the typo and who insists on enforcing the contract containing the typo.

I am guessing that the question is about the United States, since the "objection!" procedure is not the same in other places. The Supreme Court has held that even though you have the right to represent yourself, this is conditional on your maintenance of proper conduct. If you disrupt proceedings and disregard judicial directions, then the judge can find you in contempt of court, just as with anybody else who was doing that. In Illinois v Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), a self-represented litigant "started to argue with the judge in a most abusive and disrespectful manner", threatened the judge's life, and made clear that he intended to filibuster the process, saying "There is going to be no proceeding. I'm going to start talking and I'm going to keep on talking all through the trial. There's not going to be no trial like this." The judge ordered him removed from the courtroom on several instances of this behavior, and also appointed professional counsel. Following a series of appeals against all this, the Supreme Court ultimately said: Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464 (1938), we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course. be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.

Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.

Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed.

Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.

I've never heard of a rule specifically addressing this in the united-states, but I expect most courts would disallow it. I suspect a court would believe that the note-taking would be a distraction to the witness, whose focus should be on listening to the questions and providing truthful answers. The note-taking may be perceived as a distraction from the testimony for others in the courtroom, as well. If I were examining the witness, I would probably be entitled to see what the notes say, dragging out the witness's examination. Then the witness would want to take notes about my questions about her notes, and I'd want to see those notes, and you can see how it can get out of control.

Why and when would an attorney be handcuffed to their client? While reading about the trial of Hans Reiser I came across this peculiar sentence: On Monday, July 7, 2008, Reiser led police to Nina's shallow grave in the Oakland Hills. Reiser's attorney, William Du Bois, who was handcuffed to Reiser and accompanied by a heavy police guard to the site, said that the remains were found buried on the side of a hill […] (Originally reported by SFGate) I find this very strange for multiple reasons: The attorney is not legally responsible for the defendant's safety or security. The attorney is free to leave at any time. The attorney is not required to be armed and can not be expected to defend himself from a violent defendant …nor can he be expected to physically restrain the defendant if necessary. If the heavy police guard has to intervene, having an innocent civilian chained to the target must make their job much more difficult in case the defendant has to be subdued by force. Why and when would this be standard practice, and who would order that? Is it something that the Judge would order, or would the attorney himself have to suggest it?† † Unfortunately we can not ask him personally since, while researching the question, I found that he recently passed away.

My impression, and the plausible explanation in the absence of the actual facts, is that this was something that the attorney agreed to, in order to allow a skittish client to reveal information pursuant to a favorable plea agreement. The police probably insisted that the client be handcuffed to someone while doing this to prevent the client from fleeing. The attorney probably offered to do the job instead of a police officer, to be able to provide advice to his client and keep his client calm enough to do it, which might not have happened (sacrificing the favorable plea deal that the attorney negotiated) if someone else were in that role.

@Dale M is basically correct, but fudges a bit on the process. The court issuing the order would issue an order to show cause to a government official who is alleged by the person who sought the order to have violated the order after having received legal notice (i.e. service) of the order. If that individual fails to appear at the appointed time and place in the order to show cause, a warrant issues for that individual's arrest. If that individual does appear, the allegedly contemptuous individual is read their rights and a hearing date is set. At the hearing, if the person appears, the person seeking the contempt finding (or some other attorney appointed by the court) prosecutes the case and if the person is found in contempt, then contempt sanctions issue. If they do not appear, a warrant issues for their arrest and a hearing is held on the merits promptly following that arrest. An individual can also be ordered to show cause in an official capacity in which case the contempt sanctions would be imposed against the organization rather than the individual. Usually, in federal court, the U.S. Marshal's office has primary responsibility for arresting people on contempt warrants. The U.S. Marshal's office primarily reports to the judicial branch, although strictly speaking, it is part of the Justice Department, and ultimately reports to the Attorney-General. There are actually two kinds of contempt - remedial and punitive. Remedial contempt sanction can include indefinite incarceration or a fine (often a per day fine) until the violation of the order of the court ceases and is allowed only when it is possible to comply with the order going forward. Punitive contempt has a sanction comparable to a misdemeanor conviction and applies in cases where the goal is to punish someone for a past violation of a court order whether or not it is possible to comply going forward. (Both of these are examples of "indirect contempt", i.e. violations of court orders that take place outside the courtroom. A different summary process called "direct contempt" applies when someone misbehaves in the presence of the court - this is summary incarceration or fine without a trial on the spot for disrespecting the dignity of the court in the courtroom.) Established practice is to direct a contempt order at the lowest level official necessary to remedy the violation of the order. There are a few examples in living memory of cabinet members being held in contempt, however (e.g. the Secretary of Interior, with regard to Indian Trust fund litigation), and keep in mind that in the case of remedial contempt an official can purge the contempt and be released from any sanction by resigning from office, after which the official no longer has the ability to comply. I am not aware of any instance in which the President of the United States has personally been held in contempt of court, but I am also not aware of any authority that specifically prohibits a court from holding the President in contempt of court. While contempt is the only "hard" remedy for a violation of a court order, the bureaucratic structure of the federal government is also set up in a manner that once a court order definitively resolves a legal issue, the higher ups in a federal agency are supposed to take all reasonable actions to insure that their subordinates follow that order (and they are themselves subject to contempt sanctions if they fail to do so). And, keep in mind that most of the people in the chain of command are civil servants with legal protections from unlawful employment actions hired on a merit basis, not political appointees, and that lots of the people in the chain of command are also members of unions that provide individual employees with the ability to fight wrongful employment action from a superior for violating a court order. In particular, the top lawyers in the executive branch would in ordinary times direct government employees to follow a clear court order and to cease and desist from explicitly disobeying one. Among other things, the courts could probably deny lawyers who refused to do so the right to practice law in federal court. But, usually things never reach this point. Then again, we are living in interesting times. There are about 670 political appointee positions in the executive branch, many of which are currently vacant and less than a dozen of which would be relevant to any given dispute in any case. There are about a million, civilian, non-defense department, non-postal service employees in the United States government, of which perhaps 100,000 or so are in the Department of Homeland Security and fewer are in the CBP. As far as I know, the CBP political appointees from the Obama administration have resigned and a replacement has not been confirmed by the U.S. Senate yet (there has been a Department of Homeland Security appointee confirmed if I recall correctly), and there are only a few people in the agency that political appointees can hire without either receiving Senate confirmation or using the merit based hiring process for civil servants (which takes a while, especially given an executive order imposing a hiring freeze). So, realistically, we have a case where the acting head of the CBP is probably a GS-15 or Senior Executive Service grade civil servant, rather than a political appointee, at the moment, who was hired as a civil servant many years ago, who is doing his (or her) best to follow the less than clear guidance he is receiving from his superiors and government lawyers (perhaps errantly). There could also be remedies in the form of declaratory judgment. The Court could declare as a matter of law on a case by case basis that, for example, Fatima Jones is not deportable and is lawfully within the United States and is entitled to be released from custody. This specific finding as to an individual would be very hard for the administration to escape sanction for. And, the Court could also declare that the entire executive order, at least as applied, is invalid (e.g. for failure to comply with the administrative procedures act, or for failing to include an exception for contrary court orders) or is unconstitutional.

Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface.

So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.

Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that "force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is "of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack." Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, "with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant," is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), "[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity." More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense.

Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.

Your question convolutes a number of different circumstances and legal questions. When is a person justified in using deadly force against a driver? When the person can convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that a reasonable person would consider it necessary to prevent grievous bodily harm (and other situation-dependent defenses – for more nuance see self-defense). When can a law enforcement officer assault people with his vehicle? When he his performing official duties, and is performing them in a manner reasonably consistent with his training and official obligations. When can a driver assault people with his vehicle? When the driver can convince an inquiry that a reasonable person would consider it either not an act of assault, or else a justified act of self-defense. When are pedestrians liable for collisions with vehicles? When they are obstructing or infringing a traffic right-of-way; or when a judicial inquiry determines that they are at fault. Pedestrians in such situations could also be cited for many other offenses (Disorderly Conduct, Jaywalking, etc.).

Some of this will vary by Jurisdiction, that is by country, and by state in the US, or by province in some other countries. This answer will be focused on the US. Other answers may address other countries. Why did they only arrest the attacker and not the victim? There is not enough information here to say, but stories from participants or witnesses could have made it clear who the attacker was. If the police believed that one party was only defending himself, they might well arrest only the attacker. Can the victim be subpoenaed to court? Yes, the victim can be subpoenaed just as any witness can be. In some areas a victim is routinely subpoenaed even if s/he si expected to attend voluntarily. Could they have actually done anything without the victim present? Yes, if there is enough evidence. The victim rarely takes the stand in murder cases, after all. However, in some cases there is simply not enough evidence aside from the testimony of the victim, so that becomes vital to the case. But if there were many other credible witnesses, the prosecutor might choose not to call the victim. The prosecutor has wide latitude on what witnesses to call and what evidence to presnent, and what charges to bring. Would the attacker have been put in a holding cell? S/he might have, that would depend on the policy of the local police, and the facilities the police had available. Could he have requested to see the victim? This seems like the "one phone call" thing to me, but is that possible here? S/he could ask, but the police would not be required to grant any such request. Indeed permitting this would be a bit unusual, but not unheard of. Usually a visitor would not see a person in a cell, but in some sort of room for the purpose. Details vary. (Edit Comment suggest this is even less plausible than I had thought, unless this is set several decades or more ago. It probably dosen't change the plot much if the attacker was brought to some sort of conference room or visitor's room instead.) Is the victim's testimony enough to actually reduce the sentence down to aggravated assault? Is six months too short of a time? If the judge or jury believed the testimony that there was no intent to kill, then a conviction of aggravated assault would be possible, as a lesser included offense. But this would depend on the totality of the evidence, and the way in which the finder of fact (judge or jury) interpreted it, and whether all the elements of aggravated assault had been proved, and whether any elements of attempted murder had not been proved. In those jurisdictions that I know about, intent to kill is an element of attempted murder. As for the sentence, 6 months is not, I think, outside the range of plausibility for aggravated assault, depending on the facts and the view taken by the judge. The Judge has wide discretion to choose a sentence up to the maximum allowed by law, or much lower. The "usual sentence" varies by jurisdiction, and does not bind the judge anyway. Would the attacker just go back to normal after his release? Would there be any further punishments or restrictions? The court could impose an additional term of probation, with various restrictions, depending on the local law, and the choice of the Judge. These might include staying employed, not getting into other fights, not owning a firearm, taking anger management courses, or other possibilities. Failure to comply with such conditions might lead to a person being sent back to jail/prison. The Judge does not have to impose any such restrictions however. Could the victim change his testimony afterward and reopen the case? Or would that be unreliable? It can happen, but reopening the case is far from automatic. Generally a court has to order the case reopened, and courts generally are reluctant to do so. How many years would the attacker have been facing for the original attempted murder? Probably quite a few, but this varies a good deal by jurisdiction. And the Judge would have considerable discretion up to the maximum sentence permitted by the law in that jurisdiction. Why did it take so long for the case to start? The question does not say how long it took, but it is not uncommon for major cases to take several years before the start of the trial, partly because of the time taken to investigate, and partly because of backlogs in the court system. There are cases on record where the trial took place decades after the crime. That is unusual.

Is there liablility if Alice startles Bob and Bob damages something? The other day I saw a random clip on YouTube, where Alice sneaks up to Bob, who is vacuuming, and scares Bob. Bob gets startled and swings the vacuum into (Bob's own) expensive television, breaking the TV in the process. It got me thinking if Alice could be liable for damages here and what the respective law would be. Supplemental: Would anything change, if the TV was actually owned by Alice?

I will assume that whatever Alice did to startle Bob was a breach of a duty that she owed to Bob, in order to get to what I see as the more interesting aspect of the question: whether Bob's intervening act removes Alice's liability for the breaking of the television. There are certainly scenarios where Alice might have startled Bob without even breaching a duty, but in that case the analysis would end there. A startle reaction will almost never sever the chain of legal causation In negligence, Alice is held liable for harm that is reasonably foreseeable as a result of Alice's breach of a duty. One of the elements of a successful negligence claim is causation: Alice is not liable for harm that is too remote from her breach. On its own, proof by an injured plaintiff that a defendant was negligent does not make that defendant liable for the loss. The plaintiff must also establish that the defendant’s negligence (breach of the standard of care) caused the injury. That link is causation.1 (Clements v. Clements, 2012 SCC 32, paragraph 6) Bob's startle response would almost certainly be considered a foreseeable reaction, and thus, not sufficient to separate Alice from the breaking of the television. An instinctive human reaction, or any non-negligent human action in the chain of causation will almost never break the chain of causation, because such reactions will be held foreseeable; and even if they are not, the precise chain of events leading to an accident need not be foreseeable. (Ken Cooper‑Stephenson, Personal Injury Damages in Canada (Carswell, 1996)) See also The Restatement of Torts (Second), § 447, which says that an intervening act does not remove the defendant's liability if: "(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent." "[I]t is the general nature of the intervening acts and the accompanying risk of harm that needs to be reasonably foreseeable. Legal causation does not require that the accused must objectively foresee the precise future consequences of their conduct." (R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24). Foreseeability does not require that the intervening action be probable; it only requires that it would not be brushed aside as "far-fetched." The degree of probability that would satisfy the reasonable foreseeability requirement was described in The Wagon Mound (No. 2) as a "real risk", i.e. "one which would occur to the mind of a reasonable man in the position of the defendan[t] ... and which he would not brush aside as far-fetched" (Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27, paragraph 13). Examples of intervening acts held to be reasonably foreseeable: Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 K.B. 146. A carriage owner had left a two-horse carriage unattended on a busy street. The judge accepted evidence from an independent observer that two boys had come along and one of them threw a stone at the horses and the horses bolted along the street (these boys were not before the court as co-defendants; nothing more is said of them). A constable managed to stop the horses, but was injured in the process. The carriage owner was liable in negligence: a reasonable person should have foreseen that the horses might get loose and someone be injured while trying to stop them. The court said, "it is not necessary to show that this particular accident and this particular damage were probable; it is sufficient if the accident is of a class that might well be anticipated as one of the reasonable and probable results of the wrongful act." Foreseeability here does not have its colloquial meaning Greendrake's answer says that "whereas Bob's shock is foreseeable, I pretty much doubt that him breaking the TV is." In my view, this takes too colloquial a view of foreseeability. As Hart and Honoré say in Causation in the Law, 2nd Ed. (1985): ... in one sense everything is foreseeable, in another nothing. The consequences of negligence are almost invariably surprises. All depends on the detail with which the harm is described. ... there will always be some details of the recoverable harm which are not foreseeable. ... the fact that harm described by reference to certain details is not foreseeable does not render the harm, more broadly described, unforeseeable. ... If we have learned from experience to expect a 'rainstorm' on seeing dark clouds, then the rainstorm was foreseeable even if, when it occurs, it has other characteristics (e.g. lasted two hours, covered an area of 40 sq. miles) which we could not foresee but which might appear, ex post facto, in a more specific description of it. Of course, foreseeability is a question of fact, and I acknowledge that a finder of fact might very well conclude that swinging a vacuum is not within a class of actions that might be anticipated by a reasonable person. While I disagree with Greendrake's analysis and conclusion, the contrast with my answer helps highlight precisely where the issue would be if this were to be litigated. 1. Note the terminology. The breach of the standard of care is the negligence. But liability only follows when the negligence causes harm. This is contrary to the framing in Dale M's answer, which says, "Alice was negligent if her actions caused damage to Bob’s TV," and that "[i]f we are talking about Alice’s TV then there is no negligence because Bob has suffered no damage." That language conflates negligence (the breach) with liability (breach plus causation).

Landlord or tenant responsible for the furnishing damaged after a flooding? This brief analysis of Scandinavian Contract Law explains the difficulty of addressing with certainty matters of Swedish contract law. Despite the legal and factual ambiguities, it seems to me that the contract terms and landlord's conduct preclude his entitlement to a reimbursement from you. (Disclaimers: I have never litigated in Sweden's courts; I do not purport to be knowledgeable about Swedish law; and it is unclear to me whether Swedish contract law has evolved since the date of the publication of Ramberg's criticism of Scandinavian contract law) First, it appears that the landlord was negligent by waiting several days to ask tenants to remove moldering furnishings (as these were starting to smell). If that was the landlord's earliest reaction to the flooding, then the delay might evidence [landlord's] failure to mitigate damages. In other legal systems, failure to mitigate damages is an obstacle to recovery from the sued party. Second, the landlord's unqualified instruction to throw everything away --in response to your proposal of checking for salvage-- might forfeit his entitlement to reimbursement. In this regard, page 4 of the aforementioned publication points out that [t]he Swedish Supreme court [...] generally stated that a contract containing the standard terms was deemed to have been concluded due to the parties' behaviour. Obviously, not all of the contract would be void, but only the application of the clause about tenant's financial responsibility for missing or damaged items in this particular context of landlord's delay and reckless response to your proposal. Third, in the clause regarding tenant's financial responsibility "to replace missing or damaged items", I would say that the qualifier "missing" is key. Here, the usage of "missing" connotes a deliberate act of taking items away in violation of the landlord's proprietorship, regardless of whether it was the tenant or a third party who removed/stole them. That same connotation of deliberate act should govern the very next qualifier, "damaged", absent any language that expands the latter's connotation of causality. Also a criterion of negligence would fail, because you were not notified that a flooding occurred. The contract's clarification that their "insurance doesn't cover [your] personal belongings" opens --albeit weakly-- the door to the possible interpretation that instead the policy covers the counterparty's (that is, the landlord's) belongings. On the other hand, the landlord could avail himself of arguments such as (1) tenant should have made arrangements prior to leaving for the holidays; and (2) landlord's bed & mattress were not intended to be stored in the basement, and instead should have been notified toward procuring an appropriate storage for them. It is hard to make a more precise assessment without knowing more about the terms of the contract and the circumstances. Therefore, the best thing to do is to look at the subtleties in the language of the contract (as I did above regarding the deliberate nature inherent to the adjective "missing" and its interpretative effect on the adjective "damaged").

Bob can certainly "engage" a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case... Let's take a look at the facts... In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). Bob did not do this In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. Bob did not do this But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company. Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined in writing in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability should be the deductible on the vehicle. Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed "project vehicle", meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual current value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition. Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a "personal injury") because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees. Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.

Typical in any of the several united-states No, this fails to meet two of the core elements of libel. The statement must be Adverse (fails) Stated by one party To a second party About a third party (fails) The case you're thinking of, where a company brags excessively about their company or products, are covered by a variety of securities and trade laws, such as false advertising. Many of these are applicable in the Federal domain, i.e. are Federal rather than state laws. Edit: Now I see you've changed the question a bit to claiming to be first. Yes, the injured party can sue for that, but they are more claiming false advertising than libel. Accusing someone of not being first-to-market is not a particularly powerful or damning claim. Oreo didn't invent the sandwich cookie nor did Apple invent the computer. So such a claim is really a lot more about the publicity than actual, provable damages; so the controversy is more likely to be aired outside the court system, or in the courts but mainly for the publicity. (an example of the latter being the "Taco Tuesday" trademark-busting action; IIRC Taco Bell even paid the other party's legal fees, despite prevailing.)

[if] the other driver is at fault then you can sue the other driver for the loss incurred. If the other driver was employed by a company [...] then that company is likely to pick up the bill... Not necessarily. I would say that losses are usually covered by the at-fault driver's insurance (or the MIB if uninsured). Either way, according to the OP's link "the shuttle is insured by Aviva" so they would seem to be liable under section 2 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018: Liability of insurers etc where accident caused by automated vehicle (1) Where— (a) an accident is caused by an automated vehicle when driving itself on a road or other public place in Great Britain, (b) the vehicle is insured at the time of the accident, and (c) an insured person or any other person suffers damage as a result of the accident, the insurer is liable for that damage.

There can be liability. 15 USC 52 says that "It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement". In the case Standard Oil v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, one of the petitioners was Batten, Barton, Durstine Osborn, an advertising agency. In this particular case, using a set of tests established by previous case law, the court find that "BBDO knew or should have known of the deceptive nature of the F-310 advertising". See p. 13ff of this FTC document regarding advertising agency liability, which summarizes the situation that An ad agency does not have to substantiate independently the claims or scientifically reexamine the advertiser’s substantiation. However, it cannot ignore obvious shortcomings or facial flaws in an advertiser’s substantiation. Cases also include catalog marketers, infomercial producers and even Home Shopping Network. Given the right knowledge, a broadcaster could therefore be liable, if they know they are broadcasting false advertising.

There are none. Damages against B’s clinic? A does not have a contract with B’s clinic. No duties nor rights without a contract. Damages against B? A does not have a contract with B. If there was a contract, we need details about it. Tort, § 823 Ⅰ BGB? No. B was neither negligent nor did he/she deliberately incur damage. Report B as criminal? A and B had consensual sexual intercourse. This consent (necessarily) comprises the risk of transmission. You cannot give “consent to facts” though. Yet here B had no knowledge of his/her contagiousness. He/she definitely did not deliberately infect A. Negligence is out of question, because there is no general expectation to get regularly tested before having sex with anyone.

No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability.

Is not disclosing your address a reason alone to be remanded into prison? What do you do if your duty solicitor recommended you to self represent but the judge / court basically ignores the testimony and continue to abuse, exploit and invert language and its meaning/origin backed up by "laws" to put pressure onto someone who is innocent. Why are so many laws designed to intentionally create "criminals"? Those who have the courage to speak out and expose abuse, corruption and crime seem to be more and more considered and labeled a danger or even a terrorist to public safety and health.

No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant.

§145d StGB makes it illegal to pretend that a crime did happen or will happen, but only if one deceives the police or a similar agency. It is also a crime to deceive about the participants of a crime. Pretending to have been sentenced and presumably to have been released after serving a sentence does not quite fit that law.

When it comes to the obligation to tell the truth, there isn't all that much difference between a lawyer's obligations and those of a pro se litigant -- at least as far objective truth. But not every question has a single truthful answer. Professionalism rules impose some higher standards on lawyers in cases that are a bit murkier than just asking, "Were you at the Capitol on January 6?" In the United States, the analogous rule lays out some bright-line rules. Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. Subsection (a)(1) gives a good example of where the duties of honesty diverge for lawyers and pro se parties. If a plaintiff tells the court honestly -- but mistakenly -- that he lost $1 million in profits, but later discovers that he only lost $100,000, his lawyer has a clear obligation to correct that statement for the court; the pro se plaintiff's obligation is not clear. Similarly, if a plaintiff tells the court that he is entitled to those lost profits if he can prove elements A, B, C, and D, but later learns that the Supreme Court has also imposed a requirement that he prove E, the lawyer has an obligation to notify the court of this development; the pro se plaintiff does not. On the "overriding" language: I don't read it as generally having any effect on a lawyer's duty to be honest to his client. Instead, it means that the lawyer's duty to the court overrides the lawyer's duty to the client. In either of the above hypotheticals, for example, the lawyer acted honestly and ethically in presenting his evidence and argument, even though his statements turned out to be false. Correcting the record on either point would reduce or possibly eliminate his client's likely recovery and be against his client's best interests. Once the lawyer discovers the error, he is therefore faced with a conflict of interest: he has a duty to act in his client's best interest, but he also has a duty of honesty to the court. Chapter 13 says that his duty to the court overrides his duty to his client.

The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.

The defence in a criminal case has no obligation to inform the prosecution of anything. The onus is on the prosecution to provide the evidence to convict and the defence doesn't have to and indeed shouldn't help them do it. The defence can and probably would use conflicting statements by a prosecution witness to discredit that witness in the eyes of the jury. These do not have to be material to the case: just showing the witness is inconsistent in general is helpful.

I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers

Yes It's not uncommon. In fact I am aware of at least one case where the trial judge referred it to appeal before he made his decision on the basis that whichever way he decided the law was so unsettled that grounds for appeal would occur. In that case the court of appeal called up the trial judge to sit on the 3 judge appeal a) because he knew the case and b) because you don't get to not make a decision because it's hard sonny-jim.

There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.

Which of these two possible readings of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is the correct one? The 27th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States stipulates that: No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. This was meant to restrict members of Congress from voting themselves free money, by forcing them to win reelection before they could take advantage of raises in pay, and is unambiguous in cases where a law simply changes, up front, the pay of members of Congress; once the law to change their pay has been passed, they have to wait until after the next general election before the change in pay can take effect. However, the text of the amendment does not specify whether the requirement for "an election of Representatives [to] have intervened" requires that changes in Congressional pay not come into effect until the next election of Representatives following the passage of the law that alters Congressional pay, or whether it instead requires that changes in Congressional pay not come into effect until the next election of Representatives following the event that triggers the law's alteration of Congressional pay. For laws that simply straight-up change the pay of members of Congress, there is no ambiguity, as the passage of the law is the event that causes it to alter Congressional pay, making the two readings equivalent. However, one could easily imagine a law where these two readings aren't equivalent. For example, a law might be passed saying that, if Congress can't agree on a budget in time to prevent a government shutdown, they forfeit their pay for the duration of the shutdown; in such a case... The first reading would merely prevent the law from coming into effect until after the first election of Representatives following its passage. After this point, the law could, without violating amendment #27, immediately forfeit Congressional pay right from the start of a government shutdown, without needing to wait for further elections. In contrast... The second reading would, for each shutdown, prevent Congressional pay from being forfeited until after the first election of Representatives following the start of the shutdown (as, for this hypothetical law, the triggering event for the loss of Congressmembers' pay - the event that actually causes their pay to be cut off - is the occurrence of a government shutdown), which would, as government shutdowns very rarely drag on all the way until the next election, render such a law effectively toothless. Which of these readings of the 27th Amendment is the correct one? Has this even been decided?

The amendment restricts when a change in law takes effect. The amendment does not restrict all laws, just those "varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives". A law could be passed this session automatically increasing (or decreasing) congressional pay by 5% per annum, and could take effect after the 2022 elections have taken place in November. Like all constitutional amendments, we do not get an authoritative interpretation of the meaning of the words until someone sues someone else and SCOTUS says what it means. Shaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1014 is a case almost on point, precisely over whether COLAs violate the 27th Amendment. The Executive branch (defendants) sought dismissal and certain Congressmen and citizens (plaintiffs) sought summary judgment, "asserting there is no genuine issue as to any material fact remaining in dispute and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law". The case was dismissed with prejudice without much mention of the merits the annual COLAs provided by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 are not independent laws under the Twenty-seventh Amendment and that Adjustments to congressional salaries under the Ethics Reform Act are not discretionary acts of Congress. The adjustments are calculations performed by nonlegislative administrative staff, following a specific formula provided by Congress in the Act This provides a good basis for thinking that a future court would reach the same "failure to state a claim" dead end, but in lieu of something above the level of U.S. District Court, Colorado would be necessary to make the conclusion "a matter of settled law". What you propose does not require making more than one law, and then a bunch of administrative calculations that does not involve Congress.

This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts.

Actually, the concept "right" means that it can be waived: you may exercise the right, but do not have to. If it is an obligation, you can't "waive" the obligation; but the right to free speech does not mean that you must speak, and the right to bear arms does not mean that you must bear arms. You may decline to exercise, or waive, a right. Sternlight 16 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 669 (2001) in "Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial" partially addresses this (the focus though is on binding arbitration). One thing to note is that the Seventh Amendment does not appear to apply to issues in state court (it is a separate and fascinating question to wonder what parts of The Constitution are incorporated against states, and why). All is not lost for the constitutional question, we just need a different constitution. By the agreement terms, "This Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of New York". Therefore, New York's Constitution (Article 1 Sect 2) is also applicable: Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law. Thus, the right may be waived. Waiver of a right to jury trial is not the same as waiver of the right to trial: what the agreement says is that litigants would have a civil bench trial, where the judge determines whether there was a breach. In New York, NY CPLR § 4102 allows parties to waive civil trial by jury (and unlike California), such waiver terms have been upheld, but the courts have recognized that there is a problem, so it's not always obvious whether such waivers in contracts are legal.

US constitutional law does not refer to "natural rights", it refers to "fundamental rights". This enters into the doctrine of strict scrutiny vs. lesser scrutinies. If the US Constitution specifically names it, it is a fundamental right: bearing arms, speaking and worshiping freely, protections against search and seizure and so on. The Supreme Court can also recognize a right as being fundamental, even if it is not directly protected in the Constitution; for example there is no explicit provision protecting the right to self defense, interstate travel, marriage, privacy and freedom of contract, but these are or have been treated as fundamental rights. Sometimes a fundamental right can be downgraded, such as the right to freedom of contract. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, the right to contract is taken to be a case of the right to liberty. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power. Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor. But later, in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, the court backpedaled a bit and said that it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 relied on this to essentially overturn Lochner (without expressly saying so). Parrish agred to work for less than state minimum wage, then sued for the difference. This court dismissed the supposed fundamental right to contract saying: In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Sometimes, a fundamental right is explicitly recognized and relied on in a court ruling, such as the right to privacy in Union Pacific v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, where the court said that No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley; "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone." Note that the ruling does not call it a "fundamental right", but the notion of fundamentality is clearly there in the ruling. Other examples are the right to marry (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1): The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival. Also, the right to chose to use contraceptives is a fundamental right (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 – note how this depends on and elaborates the right to privacy) If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Roe v. Wade also relies on the right to privacy. The court notes that "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy", and then lays out how it is implicit in the Constitution. There is a vast area of actions that might reasonably be taken to be fundamental rights, but have not been ruled on one way or the other. If (in some bizarre dystopian future scenario) a law were passed that made it a crime to grow and use plants, it would not be surprising if SCOTUS ruled that such a law violates a fundamental right, but it almost certainly would be something much more general than "growing plants". Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 already spells trouble for a supposed fundamental right to grow plants. In this case, appellee grew wheat, but the growing of wheat (and a few other crops) were subject to federal regulation. The court ruled that The effect of the Act is to restrict the amount of wheat which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing for his own needs. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress to limit interstate commerce. Even though Filburn was not selling the wheat to another state, he also was not buying it from another state, and he was thus (minutely) affecting interstate commerce: that the production of wheat for consumption on the farm may be trivial in the particular case is not enough to remove the grower from the scope of federal regulation where his contribution, taken with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. Another indication that there is no absolute fundamental right to grow plants is Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, which held (relying on Wickard) that "Congress' Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law".

The rule that all bills die when a Congress ends is an unwritten rule, based on precedent. It is part of a more general rule: All unfinished business dies when a Congress ends. The logic of this rule is simple: Because every member of the House is elected every term, every new Congress is considered a separate Congress. To require a new Congress to take up the unfinished business of the previous Congress would violate yet another, more general rule: “No Congress can bind its successors.” This rule came from England, where it was thought to be a direct implication of parliamentary supremacy. In the US, it is justified either as implied by the constitution, or by practical political realities. What the Congressional manuals say The rule “all business dies” is mentioned in several of the standard compilations of Congressional practice and precedent. These compilations, (available online from the GPO,) include House Practice: However, because past proceedings of one Congress do not bind its successor, business remaining at the end of one Congress does not carry over to the beginning of a new Congress (with the exception of impeachment). Precedents of the House, § 8. Legislative Business of a Prior Session: Each Congress is a separate parliamentary body that comes into being at assembly and terminates upon sine die adjournment. Thus, it is generally the case that business of one Congress does not continue as business of the next Congress. For example, bills and resolutions introduced in one Congress cannot be taken up in a subsequent Congress but must be formally reintroduced. Unfinished business pending at the close of one Congress does not remain unfinished business of a subsequent Congress. Decschler’s Precdents, Ch. 1 § 11, The vast majority of business remaining at the end of one Congress does not, however, carry over to the beginning of a new Congress, since Congress does not allow the past proceedings of one Congress to bind its successor. Few categories have carried over from one Congress to the next; impeachment proceedings pending on the last day of one Congress have been continued at the beginning of the succeeding one, and a Presidential veto message to the House was on one occasion read and received at the beginning of the next Congress. Legislative Entrenchment: Why Congress Can't Bind The idea that one legislature cannot bind a later legislature is known as the rule against ”legislative entrenchment.” This rule traces back to England, where it was first stated by Edward Coke, in his Institutes of the Laws of England, published in 1644. Acts against the power of the Parliament subsequent bind not. In England, the rule was seen as a direct implication of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone argued that to allow one parliament to bind another would be logically inconsistent with the idea of parliamentary supremacy: Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal…absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. Interestingly, during the Revolution, an American colonist, writing as Cassandra, used the rule against entrenchment to argue for independence. He quoted Coke to claim that because no Parliament could bind future Parliaments, any British promise to respect the rights of colonists was not, as the game theorists would say, credible. It is out of the power of the British Legislature to give us security for the future enjoyment of our rights and liberties…Is there safety in entering upon terms of accommodation with a power which cannot stipulate for the performance of its engagements? In reaction to such criticisms of the British system of Parliamentary supremacy, Americans decided to adopt a written constitution. The Americans argued that while a legislature might not be able to bind itself, the people, acting through the Constitution, could bind the legislature. Instead of invoking Parliamentary supremacy, Americans justified the “no Congress can bind” rule by appealing to the Constitution (ie, the electoral cycle + the vesting clause = every Congress is a new Congress, which alone is vested with the legislative power under Art. I, § 1), or to practical considerations (it is impossible for today’s Congress to enforce a binding clause on a later Congress, which could simply pass a new statute). (For fuller discussion of these arguments, see here.) Unwritten Rules in the House Here is what House Practice, Ch. 50. Rules and Precedents of the House, says about Rules Based on Precedent or Custom: Much of what is known as parliamentary law is not part of the formal written rules of the House but springs from precedent or long-standing custom. Such precedent may be invoked to resolve a procedural question in the absence of an express written rule on the subject. More frequently, the precedents of the House are used to show the scope and application of one of its formal rules… On the theory that a government of laws is preferable to a government of men, the House has repeatedly recognized the importance of following its precedents and obeying its well-established procedural rules. The House adheres to settled rulings, and will not lightly disturb procedures that have been established by prior decision of the Chair. However, the Speaker or Chairman may refuse to follow a precedent even though it is relevant to a pending question, where it is the only precedent on the point and was not carefully reasoned.

No. Reason: Taxes are not a contract for specific services, so even if the government did nothing for you in return for your taxes, you do not have recourse to a rebate for "breech of contract." The only recourse is political. Theoretically if the government failed to provide a service that was required by law or Constitution, there could be legal action to force the government to do that action but you still don't get your tax money back. It might be an interesting act of civil disobedience, but no not legal. That is the answer. But to address some of the other premises of your question (Note: these are irrelevant because see above answer): The U.S. government runs at a deficit anyway, meaning the amount spent each year is more than the amount of revenue collected. For example, in May, 2018 the CBO estimated that for FY2018: BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FY 2018 (As of May 24, 2018 ) OUTLAYS $4.1 Trillion REVENUES $3.3 Trillion DEFICIT $793 Billion DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC (End of Fiscal Year) $15.7 Trillion So even if in the partial shutdown, gov saved 20%, every cent of your taxes would still go to the expenditures; the deficit would just be a little less. The U.S. government is saving quite a bit of money by not paying some subset of its employees, etc. .... believe that many of those employees will not receive back-pay. Probably not true. In the past modern shutdowns, employees received the back pay, whether they worked as emergency employees or were home. A bill as already been proposed in Congress to ensure that all will be paid when this ends. Some contractors might not get paid because they get paid by their employers, not directly by the gov. So in some cases no work, no pay. There are bills proposed to get them paid also. Note- I do not at all mean to downplay the effect on people's finances and morale. Missing a paycheck today even if the money will/might come eventually is a real hardship.

The US Constitution (broadly) does three things: It defines how the government should operate It places certain powers in the hands of certain individuals (branches of government, federal government vs states, etc.) It restricts the actions and powers of government (originally the federal government, and thought the 14th amendment, the states, and through them, municipal governments). The main thing is that there is a distinction between a governmental organization (which is effectively a portion of the government) and an organization that is funded in whole or in part by the government (The difference being if the government controls the organization or appoints (some of) it's leads, such as the FBI or Federal Reserve). Generally, the latter is not bound by the Constitution; however, it may be bound by laws or grant stipulations. Elaborating on your three questions: Free Speech: Constitutionally, no one but the government is restricted from moderating someone else's speech. There may, however, be legal repercussions, but not constitutional issues. Discrimination on protected characteristics: This is not forbidden by the Constitution, at least not in the way it is is meant colloquially. The Constitution only prohibits discrimination in access to voting, and then only for race, color, sex, and prior servitude. However, such discrimination is illegal, due to laws, such as the Civil Rights Act. A non-governmental organization that receives funds from the government constitutionally is no different than one that does not. Legally, there may be differences.

There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France

Why "client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle"? Rather than AND "the law clearly supported the firm's client"? Why did Managing Partner tip Associate to "tell opposing counsel [MERELY] that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle"? What's wrong with Associate's first reply ("he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle") ? Why didn't Managing Partner tip Associate to proffer BOTH reasons, and improve the Associate's reply by name-dropping the Partner? To wit, why not "tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle" PLUS that BOTH Partner and Associate "had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle" ? Learning to work with opposing counsel takes practice. You need to be assertive, but not obnoxious, and respectful, but not fawning. It is also critical to think strategically: As an associate headed out to a meeting with opposing counsel with the goal of reaching a settlement, the managing partner asked, "So what are you going to tell opposing counsel?" The associate replied that he was going to tell opposing counsel that he had exhaustively researched the law and that the law clearly supported the firm's client, so the other party should settle. [Emphasis added] "No," the managing partner boomed, "You are going to tell opposing counsel that our client is best friends with the firm's managing partner and will never settle." [Gray highlight added] The case settled promptly thereafter—exactly the result the client wanted. Grover E. Cleveland, Swimming Lessons for Baby Sharks : The Essential Guide to Thriving as a New Lawyer (2016 2 edn), page 139.

Because when Lawyer A claims to have exhaustively researched the law and concluded that his client is right, Lawyer B will not credit that statement, even for a second.

In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.

In California, UPL has a flexible definition and is analyzed situationally, as is the formation of an attorney-client relationship. The shorthand definition for UPL is usually given as something like "doing what lawyers do." When your "help" goes beyond "studying law" and begins to deal with applying that law to a particular legal matter, you're definitely in the neighborhood. If you're encouraging people to compensate you monetarily, even on the sly (or perhaps especially on the sly) that's just going to make it shadier. There's no clear line that divides "assistance" from "advice" or "information" from "counsel." You're not going to find a statute or professional rule that helpfully explains just how close you can get to UPL through wink-wink-nudge-nudge "unofficial-but-maybe-you-should-still-pay-me" legal "information-but-not-advice" before liability attaches, which seems to be the drift of the question (although I understand it was edited). People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 209 P.363, 365 (1922) 'As the term is generally understood, the practice of the law is the doing or performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity to the adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured although such matter may or may not be depending in a court.' Quoting In the case of Eley v.Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836. Baron v. Los Angeles, 2 C.3d 535, 86 C.R. 673, 469 P.2d 353 (1970). "(T)he Legislature adopted the state bar act in 1927 and used the term 'practice law' without defining it. [FN7] The conclusion is obvious and inescapable that in so doing it accepted both the definition already judicially supplied for the term and the declaration of the Supreme Court (in 'Merchants') that it had a sufficiently definite meaning to need no further definition. The definition above quoted from People v. Merchants' Protective Corp. has been approved and accepted in the subsequent California decisions (citations), and must be regarded as definitely establishing, for the jurisprudence of this state, the meaning of the term 'practice law." (People v. Ring (1937) supra. 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 772, 70 P.2d 281, 283.) For comparison, the Texas Bar's UPL Committee has a digest of the applicable statutes and rules here (they also provide a few appellate decisions that might interest you). In terms of legitimately paid non-attorney help with preparing documents and the like, here's a long discussion on avoiding UPL from a Legal Document Assistant trade association site. Realistically, UPL is investigated in retrospect, mostly in response to complaints. The proper context to analyze this hypothetical is to envision the non-client furious at the non-lawyer after the case has been lost. If everything goes well the non-lawyer probably gets his "gift" and the State Bar is none the wiser. (Although I suppose there's the further wrinkle that if the non-client wins and doesn't provide the "gift" then the non-lawyer likely has no good remedy).

A Lawyer may hire paralegals, clerks, secretaries, and other assistants. The lawyer may hire as many as s/he pleases, and assign them whatever tasks s/he chooses. However, some kinds of documents may need to be signed by the lawyer (which ones will depend on the jurisdiction, in the US on the state). During the so-called "robo-signing scandal" it was held that, in some US states at least, a lawyer who signs certain kinds of documents without reviewing them has failed to perform the duties imposed on the lawyer by the law, and the documents may be invalid. Large numbers of mortgage foreclosure cases were dismissed when it became known that the lawyer signing relevant documents had not in fact reviewed them (or in some cases had not even signed them, but had permitted a non-lawyer to sign the lawyer's name). In addition, some functions in some jurisdictions must be performed by an actual lawyer. For example, paralegals and other non-lawyers cannot validly give legal advice. Only a lawyer can represent a client in court. And so on. I question whether one lawyer could in most kinds of practice keep up with the work of "hundreds" of non-lawyers, but that would depend on the kind of work done by the firm. In the US, some law firms are essentially collection agencies. There a single lawyer with many many assistants suffices, I understand, and that structure is not uncommon in the US.

In general you can dispute and negotiate any bill from a professional. The stronger your arguments for disputing it, and the more coherent your demands for adjustment, the more successful you will tend to be. This is like any business negotiation. One partner at a very large U.S. law firm once admitted to me that their corporate clients almost always ask for – and receive – billing adjustments. Of course, when push comes to shove, unless you're accusing the lawyer of fraudulent billing, then typically by contract you are liable for the bills. However, non-lawyers often assume that they will lose any dispute with their lawyers because it seems like lawyers have free access to the legal system. The reality is that there is a significant threshold that must be met before a law firm will sue a client for payment. That threshold will depend on the firm's opportunity costs, the costs of litigation, their assessment of reputational risks, how much they expect to actually collect, and sometimes just how ticked off they are.

Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement.

This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations.

Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.

Copyright for Speeding Photo If I get a ticket for speeding in Germany with a photo taken by an automatic camera, is there any copyright attached to that photo, or can I use it without asking the state for permission?

A flash photo (Blitzfoto/Beweisfoto) is a technical aid (Technische Hilfsmittel) for the speed limit enforcement (Geschwindigkeitsüberwachung). They are created for the sole purpose to be used as evidence for a fine notice (Bußgeldbescheid) and must originate from a responsible authority (i.e. not privat persons or companies) that is determined by state laws. It is an integral portion of the file (Akte) of the notice. The file belongs to the responsible authority (generally called Bußgeldstelle). Since it is a combination of technical data togeather with a photo, the copyright rules for a photo should not be assumed. flash photo of a culprit flying 15 km/h over the 30 km/h speed limit The responsible authority will not have any copyright, due to §5 UrhG, but it still belongs to them. Sources: Act on Copyright and Related Rights (Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG) §5 - Official works §10 - Presumption of authorship or ownership

An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?

Copyright is automatic - it starts to exist when you create a work of a type protected by law. Lyrics are such a work, and thus your lyrics are protected. Even the fact that the lyrics go with an existing (public domain) melody is protected. In addition, your recording is protected. However, the melody is probably not copyrighted, and does not become copyrighted merely because you re-used it. (Probably, because you didn't indicate how old, so I assumed old enough that nobody remembers the origin)

It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."

You probably own the copyright, since this wasn't an explicit part of your job. However, there may be other legal reasons which preclude you from using them anyway; copyright isn't all there is. Since you are in the middle of an active dispute, you should consult an actual lawyer (which I am certainly not) for legal advice.

In germany, you are likely charged if you actively interfere. Let's preface this with the fact, that in Germany, people have a duty to aid in case of accidents, as long as you don't endanger yourself. The absolute minimum is to call the emergency service and not obstruct those that render aid. However, just not rendering aid is rarely charged. However, since a few years, people that slow down to make videos of crash sites or who stop to look at an accident, and in doing so block emergency helpers, are now almost routinely charged with obstruction of emergency workers, together with possibly other charges like assault and insult. One of the most prominent cases was in 2017, where the person attacked emergency workers and police. He was sentenced to 4 months for the various assaults and bodily injury. Based on this case (where the person was just sentenced for resisting police and assault), it ultimately lead to a new law. One of many cases that started in 2023 had a similar pattern but the charge is based on the new law: § 323 c Abs. 2 StGB - not delivering aid and obstruction of aiding persons. This law allows up to one year of prison time for hindering any person rendering aid. Also, creating pictures at accident sites that depict people or corpses and sharing them in a manner that is humiliating to the victims in itself can be a breach of § 201 a StGB - injury of privacy by means of photography. This can get a sentence of up to two years, and would most likely be joined by a charge of not delivering aid and obstructing helpers. Do note that this is not covering photos that were made for example as evidence of the situation or not shared with third parties. Being in peril yourself... When you technically are in peril yourself, you don't have to render aid. Being stupid like grabbing your carry-on luggage isn't technically covered by the law, and because the person is in danger themselves, it will be very hard for the prosecution to decide if they want to prosecute. If Alice just grabs her carry-on in panic and nothing happens as she evacuates, charging will be extremely unlikely, as in, the chance is nigh nonexistent. Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen. But Charly, who blocks the path of everybody because he wants to go to the other end of the plane to get his luggage and does not let anybody pass and thus increasing the danger of the situation (or even cause death) might break the threshold that the prosecution is willing to prosecute to make an example out of him. The more egregious his behavior was, the more they might look into if other charges can become applicable. However, those other charges are usually not from the blocking or inaction, but from an action against someone that is in the same peril as the actor. If Dora during the building fire grabbed a fire axe and smacked it over someone's head while he was trying to evacuate her, so she could get her items from another room, that would be dangerous mayhem (§ 224 StGB, Gefährliche Körperverletzung).

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)

Maybe. In many but not all situations, the police have a certain latitude in how they charge an incident. In many but not all socieities, speeding is seen as less morally repugnant than, say, theft or tax evasion. "Can happen to anyone, oops," the excuse goes. So a credible expression of remorse might cause the police officer to issue a caution or verbal warning instead of a ticket. Unless you are in a place where there is a grossly antagonistic relationship between the police and the citizens, or where the police department relies on fines for funding.

Can you be arrested for not paying a vendor like a taxi driver or gas station? I have read conflicting information about police in the United States arresting people for not paying a bill from a retail vendor, like a taxi driver, auto mechanic or restaurant. On one hand my understanding is that in all states if you owe money to a vendor, then they have to sue you to collect it. It would seem unlikely to me that a vendor's complaint that you did not pay them would constitute the basis for a criminal arrest. For what? On the other hand I keep reading what are essentially rumors on the internet that the police can and will arrest you if a store keeper or other vendor complains that you have not paid them AFTER THE FACT. For example, I read one case where a guy left an auto mechanic's shop after the mechanic tried to add an unapproved "diagnostic" charge to a bill and later he got a phone call from the police who threatened to arrest him if he did not go back to the shop and pay the mechanic the disputed charge. Allegedly the cop told him, "You have to pay him or I will arrest you. You can sue him later if you want to." I have read similar things where it is claimed if you leave a cab and do not pay, the driver can chase after you and if he can somehow find you, then he can have you arrested. So, what is the reality here? Does this even happen and what are the laws involved here? I mean I guess if I could get somebody arrested by just saying to the police that they owed me money, there are a lot of people I could get arrested. UPDATE: I think Frederick's comment is very relevant in that the complex question seems to be whether there is "intent" to defraud, in other words, did the customer set out to obtain the services with no intention of paying in the beginning, or did they later refuse or fail to pay for some reason that had no relation to their original intent. So, there seems to be a psychological aspect to the problem.

Theft of service In Texas: [t]heft of service charges can also arise if you agree to make payment in exchange for a service, and then refuse to pay for the service once it’s rendered. Texas Penal Code Section 31.04: A person commits theft of service if, with intent to avoid payment for service that the actor knows is provided only for compensation... the actor intentionally or knowingly secures the performance of the service by agreeing to provide compensation and, after the service is rendered, fails to make full payment after receiving notice demanding payment. For purposes of this section, intent to avoid payment is presumed if any of the following occurs...the actor absconded without paying for the service or expressly refused to pay for the service in circumstances where payment is ordinarily made immediately upon rendering of the service, as in hotels, campgrounds, recreational vehicle parks, restaurants, and comparable establishments;... Probable cause Whether you "could get somebody arrested by just saying to the police that they owed me money", read the various Q&As on this site about the probable cause standard for arrest.

If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.

If you have a license and drive but forget your license and get pulled over what happens? You could receive a summons or citation (a.k.a. "ticket") for failing to carry a driver's license. Section § 46.2-104 of the Virginia Code states that it is a traffic infraction with a $10 fine to not have your license while driving. The operator of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer being operated on the highways in the Commonwealth, shall have in his possession: (i) the registration card issued by the Department or the registration card issued by the state or country in which the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is registered, and (ii) his driver's license, learner's permit, or temporary driver's permit. Every person licensed by the Department as a driver . . . who fails to carry his license. . . for the vehicle which he operates, shall be guilty of a traffic infraction and upon conviction punished by a fine of ten dollars. (Emphasis added.) Do you get a penalty for forgetting it at your house? Yes, if you have a valid license that you left at home, you can get the case dismissed by showing the license to the the court (presumably a clerk), but you will still have to pay "court costs." However, if any person summoned to appear before a court for failure to display his license . . . presents, before the return date of the summons, to the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . or appears pursuant to the summons and produces before the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . , he shall, upon payment of all applicable court costs, have complied with the provisions of this section. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-104 (2016).

They can charge you with anything they think you did. And yes, the circumstances play a large part in the decision to arrest, charge and prosecute. However, circumstances include you: Reputation is everything. If you are a 17 year old male troublemaker with a long juvie rap sheet, including 3 past instances of stealing golf carts, then expect to be charged with the theft. Honestly you would probably be charged with the theft if you had simply stayed away and called the cops to report it abandoned. If you came upon it in your vehicle and it's obviously blocking the road and your apparent motive is to figure out how to move it so you can get by, then you're probably in the clear. If you're a 44 year old owner of a golf cart business, PAL supporter, city councilwoman and know half the cops including one in the car that stopped you, then, they're going to pretty much listen to you as far as what's the deal with the cart. Probably ask you for help moving it safely, might even ask you to get your cart-hauler to take it to impound. You won't hear from the D.A. obviously; nobody will say "Sue Councilwoman stole a golf cart" because it would sound absurd and make the speaker appear to be a politically motivated liar. That's the power of reputation; no one would speak it even if you did steal it. (Of course if you got caught doing it on a Ring camera, well, the hero takes a fall!) Anything in between, they'll deal with it in proportion to both the facts about you and the fact about the situation. You do not have a right to get the same credibility as the councilwoman; that is earned. That's the power of reputation.

If, at the time of application for the loan, the borrower has no intention of repaying, it appears that it is a crime. From California Penal Code section 532: (a) Every person who knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any other person of money, labor, or property, whether real or personal, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character, and by thus imposing upon any person obtains credit, and thereby fraudulently gets possession of money or property, or obtains the labor or service of another, is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained. The false representation in this case is that you falsely represent your intention to repay the loan. Variations of your scenario invoke other sections of the law. If the false representation is instead about the ability to pay, then section 532a applies. If it's with regards to a secured loan, it's section 532f Deciding not to repay the loan after the fact appears to be a purely civil matter: nothing in Chapter 8 (false personation and cheats) looks like it applies.

Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer.

You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.

In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.

My child's name is "Robert'); drop table *;--" Is he in trouble? (Source: https://xkcd.com/327/) So with the upcoming birth of my first child, I suggested the name "Robert'); drop table *;--". While I was quickly told that wasn't going to happen, I have to wonder what could happen if he was actually named that. For the less technical, this name contains what is called a SQL injection attack. If the name is entered into a poorly designed SQL system, it could potentially execute a sql command and drop all tables (i.e. cause the organization's IT manager to have a somewhat bad day, depending on how good their backups are). So assuming I am able to get this name on his birth certificate and get his SSN assigned under that name (let us assume that the government has been able to build their system such that this name can be handled without issue), what would happen if his name fulfills its intended purpose when signing him up for day care? In that while signing little Bobby tables up for day care, his name wiped out all their data, and because of their lack of a good IT policy, they have no backups, causing no small amount of trouble for the day care. What would I be charged with or sued for in this case? I assume I am on the hook for some sort of malicious destruction of data or somehow liable for the loss of data. Would this being his name afford any sort of protection? Or would the fact that it was selected intentionally to cause damage be an issue? Jurisdiction: United States, pick any state you feel like.

Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences | Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.

In dealing with financial, medical, insurance and basically any other forms found in the U.S. do I have a legal responsibility to identify myself as Divorced? Or in other words, could identifying myself as Single as opposed to a divorcee incur any type of liability of which I should be aware? Since you specified the financial and medical contexts, yes, sometimes it is mandatory to disclose that you are divorced. Any time your signature is involved, be as accurate as the form allows. The worst consequence I can think of is actually pretty bad ("penalty of perjury" is no joke, and whether or not it should, divorce does impact a surprising number of especially financial considerations.) If possible, it would be better to simply not answer at all than to sign off on something other than the most accurate option available. In these contexts, the designation as having been divorced is often an archaic throwback predating no-fault. For example, divorce adversely impacts your credit (more than the loss of a partner's presumed earning power, the reasoning here is basically that marriage was a long-term commitment you entered into willingly that was not fulfilled.) Jobs or employment opportunities demanding a very high degree of personal integrity may be negatively impacted by having, or having had a divorce, by the same reasoning (the examples that pop to mind are officers the military, depending on the career field.) Divorce can be interpreted as an indication that the individual in question is currently not as stable in their personal life and affairs (moving, figuring out joint custody, jealous/vindictive ex, etc.) as a prospective lender or employer requires. As far as healthcare is concerned, it can have an impact on health care services and how providers interact with you, your ex, etc. (for example, your child's pediatrician.) Having had a divorce can be a flag to health care provider to screen for depression, anxiety, blood pressure, and so forth; likewise, insurance companies consider divorce a "major life event" that qualifies you to change your coverage out-of-season (I don't know, but wouldn't be surprised if divorce somehow impacted your rates because of statistical increased risk of specific ailments.) Furthermore, there can be far-reaching implications for others - how long you were married determines whether or not social security benefits are conferred to a surviving spouse, for example, or calculating your kid's FAFSA in five or ten or fifteen years.

My gut response without really analyzing it (which is honestly what a lot of these cases boil down to in the end) is that the proposed name would imply an affiliation with the company that does not exist. A case challenging that name could be expensive and come out either way. Instead, "The [Wife's Name] Toy Museum" with descriptive material in brochures and on a website saying that the exhibits were manufactured by "Toy Company", which is a nominative use that does not imply an affiliation with the Company would be a wiser move.

It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification.

See the answer to this question. It is remotely possible that it will show up, but the new S.C. law also says that an employer cannot use that information. On the other hand, that law is not yet effective (it becomes effective Dec. 27 2018), so for the rest of the year, the information could be used, if an employer obtains is. There is a law-enforcement exception that arrests can always be used against you if you apply for a law-enforcement related job. Under the current law (has been in effect for a while), the record is "under seal", so revealing the record in the course of a background check would be a violation of the relevant court order. The law specifies a punishment for illegal disclosure: A person who intentionally violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both. however, accidental disclosure is not a crime. You might think that you could at least sue them for accidental disclosure, but the law also says Unless there is an act of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, nothing in this section gives rise to a claim for damages against the State, a state employee, a political subdivision of the State, an employee of a political subdivision of the State, a public officer, or other persons. If the government person who releases the information intentionally does so, you can sue. Perhaps an accidental release could be found to be grossly negligent: that would depend on the circumstances.

I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.

First of all, a contract is valid without a signature and even without being in writing; all that is needed is consent by the parties. Therefore, the signature is merely evidence of that consent and is only relevant if a dispute arises over the general consent or the particular terms that were consented to. A digital signature would make it harder for Bob to argue that those were not the terms he signed but if I have Bob's signature on them then the onus of proving he didn't sign rests with Bob, I don't have to prove he did. All of the methods you suggest are valid as would an email saying "Got the contract. I agree. Bob."

Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.

Legal Considerations for Offering Rewards in Exchange for Tenant Selection in Germany My company and I are located in Germany and we intend to distribute flyers on the street. In the flyers, we offer a reward to those who are willing to rent out their homes in exchange for us being able to select the tenants (for example, offering 1500 euros). Subsequently, we plan to create a separate advertisement where we are seeking tenants for the house and asking for a higher amount of money (for example, 3000 euros). From a legal perspective, could such a practice be considered illegal? What aspects should we be mindful of? Thank you! Guten Tag, Ich und mein Unternehmen sind in Deutschland ansässig und beabsichtigen, Flyer auf der Straße zu verteilen. In den Flyern bieten wir eine Belohnung (zum Beispiel 1500 Euro) für diejenigen an, die ihr Haus vermieten möchten, im Gegenzug dafür, dass wir die Mieter auswählen dürfen. Anschließend planen wir, eine separate Anzeige zu schalten, in der wir Mieter für das Haus suchen und einen höheren Geldbetrag verlangen (zum Beispiel 3000 Euro). Aus rechtlicher Sicht könnte eine solche Vorgehensweise illegal sein? Auf welche Aspekte sollten wir achten? Vielen Dank!

As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.

Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.

A tenant has a right to "live in a property that’s safe and in a good state of repair". There are additional regulations possibly applicable in your situation if this is a "house in multiple occupation", summarized here. "Hazards" are explained here. However, these rules pertain to the condition of the building, not other tenants (except that "overcrowding" is also a hazard). They also say you should "report anti-social behaviour to your local council". It is legal to rent a room in the UK to a person convicted of a violent crime, so it would also be legal to rent a room to a person who hasn't committed a crime (assuming he is legally in the UK). If the person did not engage in actual anti-social behavior towards you, there is nothing to report to the local council. The landlord has no affirmative duty to disclose such a fact, and it might be illegal to do so under the Data Protection Act, since this is "sensitive personal data".

It will vary by jurisdiction. This is a complicated area of law, but usually an advertisement or a display of goods in a shop is not an "offer" (in the contract law sense of the term), but an invitation to treat (or "invitation to bargain" in the US). The "offer" is the shopper saying "I'd like one of those please" or putting the goods on the band for the till. The "acceptance" is the checkout girl saying "that'll be ..."

certain kinds of payments just are tax-free There are several kinds of tax-free special payments in germany, such as certain types of additional payments (for example "Vermögenswirksame Leistungen" and "Steuerfreibeträge"), or gifts within a certain value (e.g. goods/services up to 50 € a month). In this case, they most likely fully use the "Inflationsausgleichsprämie", which is tax-free up to 3000 €.

You are in a tough spot. The main risk is "civil forfeiture" of the duplex if you have sufficient knowledge that it is being used for purposes of drug dealing and take no action. See, e.g., a case from October 1, 2021 when a house was seized on this basis. But the tenant has property rights under a lease that you can't abridge unless you can prove that there is a violation of the law. And, it isn't obvious if you know enough to trigger civil forfeiture exposure based merely on uncorroborated statements from another tenant that observe only conduct often associated with drug dealing and not deals themselves. Still, the knowledge you do have might trigger a duty to inquire if you want to escape civil forfeiture liability. Under the statute, to defeat a civil forfeiture action (assuming it has been used for drug dealing), you must show: (e)(1) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section if the owner of such interest or interest holder establishes that the owner or interest holder: (A) Is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur; (B) Had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arm's length commercial transaction; (C) With respect to conveyances for transportation only, did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture; (D) Does not hold the property for the benefit of or as nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired the interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; and (E) Acquired the interest: (i) Before the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or (ii) After the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture: (I) As a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; (II) Before the filing of a lien on it and before the effective date of a notice of pending forfeiture relating to it and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this article; and (III) At the time the interest was acquired, was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this article. (2) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section for a violation involving only one gram or less of a mixture containing cocaine or four ounces or less of marijuana unless said property was used to facilitate a transaction in or a purchase of or sale of a controlled substance or marijuana. The language in bold is the most threatening part that effectively establishes a duty of inquiry and a duty to take action if your inquiry establishes that drug dealing is going on. If you can't establish that you were ignorant of wrongdoing, and reasonably so, under the circumstances of being told by one of your tenants that something is going on, you are at great risk of losing the duplex to civil forfeiture if the DA can prove that drug dealing is taking place by far less than a reasonable doubt standard. You might want to hire a private investigator to look into the situation carefully, and to try to evict the allegedly drug dealing tenant if the private investigator corroborates the fellow tenant's claims.

This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question.

You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company.

Is defending oneself from a sexual assult a defence for murder? A man forces himself on a woman with no threats of violence, no deadly weapon and he doesn't even hit her, he simply just physically overpowers her. This occurs in the kitchen and she is able to grab a knife and stab him during the assult, killing him. Let us assume she did not fear for her life, she acted only to end the assault, would that be murder, manslaughter, or simply self defense?

colorado Short Answer This woman was engaged in legally permitted self-defense when she killed the man with a knife in the kitchen under Colorado law, and she has not committed any crime. Her conduct would also not provide a basis for a valid lawsuit for money damages against her. Long Answer Applicable Law In Colorado's state criminal code, the relevant statutory section, Colorado Revised Statutes, § 18-1-704, states, in the pertinent parts (emphasis mine): Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions. (1) . . . a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself . . . and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: . . . (b) The other person is using . . . physical force against an occupant of a dwelling . . . while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit . . . sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000. The referenced definition of burglary as relevant to this fact pattern is that: A person commits . . . burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property. Note also that it doesn't matter for purposes of the burglary statute, if this is her kitchen, or someone else's, so long as it is not his kitchen. Also he need only be "attempting to commit burglary", so even if he was trying unsuccessfully to get into the house and assaulting her from just outside a door or window, her use of deadly force to prevent burglary would be justified. On the other hand, if he was lawfully present in the home (perhaps a husband or roommate), the burglary justification for the use of deadly force would no longer be present. The referenced sexual assault statute states in the pertinent part that it is committed if: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will . . . [which includes any case in which:] The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence[.] Even if he does not "reasonably appears about to commit" sexual penetration or intrusion (which are necessary for the crime to be sexual assault for purposes of the use of deadly force law in Colorado), unlawful sexual contact is a crime against a person in an occupied dwelling, so it constitutes burglary that justifies the use of deadly force, even if it doesn't constitute sexual assault. Under these circumstances, the woman may use deadly physical force if she reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate to cause the rapist to cease committing sexual assault, and any other crime against person or property in the home. Application Of Law To Facts There is no reasonable doubt that the man is, at a minimum, in the process of committing burglary, and very likely sexual assault as well, although the language of the question is somewhat coy on this point as relevant to the Colorado definition of sexual assault. He has proven himself capable of physically overpowering her efforts to resist him with non-deadly force without success. This demonstrates that non-deadly force was inadequate. She used a knife to kill him for the legally authorized purpose of ending a burglary and probably also a sexual assault. Therefore, her use of a knife to kill him is almost certain be a use of deadly force for purposes of self-defense which is permitted by Colorado law. As a result, she would not be legally guilty of any crime for killing him with a knife in these circumstances. Incidentally, she would also have no civil liability in tort for money damages in this situation in Colorado. Application To Other U.S. States The exact wording of self-defense statutes differ from one U.S. state to another and I don't personally know every fine statutory detail of every one of them. But, Colorado's statute is quite typical. A state where her actions did not constitute legally justified in these circumstances would be an extreme outlier in U.S. law. I would be surprised if there was any U.S. state in which her actions would not constitute legally justified self-defense. Historical Note Suppose that the man in the question were the woman's husband in their own home where they were both lawfully present. Prior to the 1970s, marital rape was legal in every US state. It was partially outlawed in Michigan and Delaware in 1974, then wholly outlawed in South Dakota and Nebraska in 1975. The court case Oregon v. Rideout in 1978 was the first in which someone stood trial for raping his spouse while they lived together. By 1993 marital rape was a crime nationwide. (Source) Under current U.S. law in every U.S. state, the sexual assault justification analysis would be no different because there is no marital immunity for the crimes of sexual assault, although the burglary justification would no longer be present, so an intent to commit unlawful sexual contact without penetration or intrusion would not justify the use of deadly force. But, when marital immunity to sexual assault was part of the law, as it was in every U.S. state prior to 1974, and as it was in some U.S. states until 1993, she would be guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. The distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter in that case would hinge upon whether she had an intent to kill or only intended to harm (as in a case cited by Jen in her answer). Also, she would have a good argument for manslaughter due to provocation by the victim that was not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force, even if jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she did intent to kill him. Colorado's self-defense statute (in a subsection omitted because it was not applicable to the facts in the question) also permits the grade of a criminal offense caused in the course of conduct intended as self-defense that does not meet the statutory standards for self-defense (e.g. because non-deadly force would have been sufficient) to downgrade the severity of the offense for which the person may be convicted, in a manner similar to the "heat of passion" defense. But, these facts present no plausible justification for a first degree murder, which is often a charge punishable by death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole, since it was not premeditated or committed in connection with a crime by the perpetrator. Realistically, under the circumstances of the question, if he was her husband and they were in their own home, during a time frame when there was marital immunity from sexual assault charges, she would most likely be convicted of manslaughter under these circumstances. Side Observation The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) that the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, directly and as incorporated against the states under the 14th Amendment, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a rape not resulting in death (even the rape of a child). The death penalty has been unconstitutional in cases involving the rape of an adult woman in the U.S. since U.S. Supreme Court case of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). There are many serious felonies (including some omitted from the Colorado statute above because they were not applicable to this fact pattern) for which the use of deadly force in self-defense is authorized even though the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of the death penalty upon a conviction of that offense which does not result in someone dying.

The General Rule In practice, the only time when self-defense against a police officer is legal is when you do not know and have no reasonable way that you could have known that the person attacking you is a police officer. (And arguably, a police officer acting in an official capacity in furtherance of his or her duties, rather than in a personal capacity as an individual.) For example, if the police do a no knock raid in the dark of night, and don't announce themselves, and you shoot police officers reasonably believing them to be home invasion burglars, you would not have criminal or civil liability for doing so. A similar valid self-defense claim might arise when someone has an objectively reasonable reason to think that someone claiming to be a police officer is really just a criminal impersonating a police officer, even if that belief is, in fact, mistaken. In almost all other circumstances, you need to submit to the officers, and you are pretty much required by law to bear the risk that excessive force by the officer will harm you. If you don't, you will probably be guilty of the crime of resisting arrest and will not be entitled to a self-defense defense. The fact that you are not actually guilty of a crime is irrelevant. This is often the case and police officers are not omniscient. If the officer lacked probable cause for an arrest (which there is often no way that the person being arrested or attacked can know at the time), the remedy is a civil rights suit after the fact, not self-defense. In theory, there might be other isolated circumstances where self-defense against a police officer is legal, but they involve fact patterns so quirky that they would almost never happen in real life, or would almost never be possible to prove in a manner that the courts would believe. Officer Liability For Harming Someone Legitimately Acting In Self Defense Whether the officers had civil liability to you if you were harmed by the officers while exercising your right to self-defense would depend upon their state of mind, even if you were rightfully using self-defense. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in January of 2017 (White v. Pauly) involved this fact pattern. In White v. Pauly an officer arrived late on the scene and had no reason to believe that the officers who arrived there before him and were being shot at by citizens in a house that they were approaching, lacked probable cause, or had not announced themselves. The court held that as a result, he had no civil liability to a citizen he shot, even if the person who the late arriving officer shot while that citizen was shooting back at the police officers on the scene was actually engaging in good faith self-defense. The citizen's self-defense in the case had a valid defense to criminal or civil liability for firing on the officers, because the citizen shooting back didn't actually know that the people approaching his house were police officers. But, because the late arriving officer reasonably believed under the circumstances that the citizen had no right to engage in self-defense, because he thought that the early arriving officers had probable cause and had announced themselves, the late arriving officer had no civil liability to the citizens he shot.

Self-Defense Law In A Nutshell Self-defense (or defense of others) with deadly force is generally authorized when a reasonable person would believe that the use of death force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person (i.e. there aren't non-deadly options that can accomplish this end) and a reasonable person would believe that the use of force will prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person, subject to exceptions that would not apply to a private individual using deadly force in a stampede situation. Incidentally, every state and every country absolves someone of liability for homicide when deadly force is used in self-defense, or in the defense of others (not necessarily family), although the exact details of when this is justified varies slightly. For example, in D.C. v. Heller, the right to self-defense is considered a natural or universal right. The analysis would be somewhat different if the shooter were in law enforcement, and would be different again in the case of a shooter who was in the military with more or less clear orders. But, that legal standard doesn't get you to an answer. The Complex Phenomena Called Stampedes The analysis would be extremely fact rich, in the sense of exactly who one would attempt to shoot, what that would be likely to accomplish, and what other alternatives would be available. And, to do that, you also need to understand the phenomena of deadly stampedes which are complex and often somewhat counter-intuitive phenomena. While there are circumstances where it could be legal self-defense or defense of others to shoot a stampeding individual to save someone's life, there are also many stampede circumstances where a use of force would not be justified. In practice, most stampedes, as a matter of physics, can only be stopped by removing a crush of bodies from the rear, where they do not know that they are causing a deadly stampede, while those at the front who end up directly harming others are frequently physically incapable of stopping. Essentially, in a typical stampede that causes death, the problem is an inability of the people at the front to communicate to the people at the back to slow down. And, when a stampede is caused by a genuine threat to the people at the back like a fire or a terrorist, there is nothing that would persuade the people at the back to slow down anyway. So, usually, shooting to kill someone at the front of a stampede would not achieve the intended result of protecting someone in its path. The person shot would either continue to surge forward while dead under the crush of bodies behind them, or would have their dead body trampled over by the next person in line who also has no physical ability to do anything other than to surge forward. So, usually, using deadly force to shoot someone at the front of a stampede will be futile and only cause an unnecessary death. Given that using deadly force in a stampede, if directly at people in the front, is almost always futile, the question for the judge or jury deciding the case becomes whether a reasonable person would know that at the time, which would have to be decided a case by case basis. Sometimes it is obvious from someone in a vantage point to shoot at the front of a stampede that this would be futile and sometimes it isn't. This question would be highly fact specific and depend a lot upon exactly what information about the situation was available to the person shooting a person in the stampede. The situation where deadly force might not be futile would be one in which there is no actual life threatening harm that people are fleeing in which the deadly force is directed at the people in the back who are driving the stampede (even though they don't know it), to shock them into ceasing to do so. But, in that situation, if the shooting is done by someone who understands the situation well enough to know that this is what is actually necessary, that person also may be capable of firing warning shots or shooting to injure with the same effect, so justification might also be in doubt. Protecting Targets of Mobs v. Protecting Targets of Stampedes A similar situation where the use of deadly force might be justified is something visually similar to a stampede, but quite different in what would work factually. This is a mob that is about to attack someone, possibly armed with pitchforks or knives or clubs or broken bottles or a noose. In the case of a mob, the use of deadly force to protect someone threatened by the mob would almost always be a justified use of force in self-defense or the defense of others, because shooting someone in the front is likely to be both necessary and effective.

"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.

First of all, to clarify some numbering, HR 4635 (107th Congress) was not actually passed. The language was passed as part of HR 5005, becoming Public Law 107-296, and this provision now appears at 49 USC 44921. The exact text of this provision is: A Federal flight deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The language makes it clear that this is only referring to civil liability. So, if the officer is defending the flight deck, and they are sued for damages resulting from their actions, the plaintiff will not win (assuming the law is correctly applied). But this law says nothing about whether or not they can be prosecuted for a crime. In any case, the officer in your example does not appear to have been defending the flight deck, so this law wouldn't apply at all. In your example, the officer's defense against a murder charge would probably be based on defense of others. There is a discussion on Justia. It seems that a key question would be whether shooting the unruly passenger was proportional - was there a reasonable fear that the passenger was actually going to kill someone?

Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that "force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is "of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack." Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, "with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant," is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), "[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity." More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense.

Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland.

No. Under Texas Penal Code Title 2 Subchapter A, one of three three conditions must be true to use the defense-of-others defense, that the person against whom force is used unlawfully and with force entered the person's residence, vehicle of business (not applicable), or attempted to forcibly remove the person from same (idem), or attempted aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Abortion is not statutorily murder in Texas, even if it is illegal.

Is there a place where adultery is a crime? Most countries I know of have regulations on marriage or partnership and there's a registration office for a change in marital status. But as far as I can tell, that's purely a civil matter. Getting married may change your tax quotes, or who inherits your stuff once you pass away, but it has no implications in criminal law. In former times, this was different, as e.g. the bible requests that a couple that is found during adultery shall be stoned. Now Bob finds his wife Alice in bed with Charles. Does he have any way of Alice getting a fine or a jail sentence? Or some other legal action against her (assuming he doesn't want to get divorced)? Or is it really true that the state doesn't care anything about a marriage except keeping a registry of it? Edit: The comments and the first answer suggest that there are US states that have such laws (which I didn't expect). However I'm particularly interested in European countries. And also in possible penalties. The linked question seems to indicate that even where such a law exists, it is not enforced.

united-states Criminal Consequences Of Adultery State Criminal Laws In a large majority of U.S. jurisdictions, adultery is no longer a crime (assuming the sexual act is consensual and not incestuous) including 35 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the several U.S. territories. "States which have decriminalised adultery in recent years include West Virginia (2010), Colorado (2013), New Hampshire (2014), Massachusetts (2018), Utah (2019), Idaho (2022), and Minnesota (2023)." Adultery is rarely enforced criminally in the 15 states and Puerto Rico, as of 2023, that still do have adultery laws on the books that have not been held unconstitutional by state courts. This is, in part, due to doubts about the constitutionality of these crimes under federal and state constitutions, in part, due to changing norms, and in part, due to the limited benefit of a misdemeanor or felony prosecution to all persons involved (and the state) in such cases. The birth of a child who is conceived with a father other than the mother's husband while the mother is married is not automatically conclusive proof of the crime of adultery under either state law or under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. For example, under South Carolina law adultery involves either "the living together and carnal intercourse with each other" or, if those involved do not live together "habitual carnal intercourse with each other" which is more difficult to prove. Similarly, in Florida, the crime is "Living in open adultery". Also, in the case of a prosecution of an unmarried man, knowledge that the woman is married would typically be an element of the crime of adultery, and it is similarly never a crime to be raped in the U.S., even if you are married. In 12 of the states where adultery is still a crime (Arizona, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Virginia), it is a petty offense (the maximum punishment in Maryland is a $10 fine), or is a misdemeanor. But it continues to be a felony in 3 states (Oklahoma, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and is punishable most severely among those states in Michigan who someone convicted of adultery faces up to four years in prison and in Oklahoma where the maximum sentence is five years in prison. Military Justice It is a crime that is actively enforced for active duty members of the U.S. military under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. In the U.S. military, adultery is a potential court-martial offense, falling under the General article (Art. 134). The Manual for Courts-Martial defines (para. 99) "Extramarital sexual conduct" as being: Elements.(1) That the accused wrongfully engaged in extramarital conduct as described in subparagraph c.(2) with a certain person; (2) That, at the time, the accused knew that the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and (3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces; (ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces; or (iii) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces and of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. U.S. military law on adultery was revised in 2019 in order to include same-sex encounters in the offense. Neither the U.S. military, nor any U.S. state, has penalties for adultery that differ depending upon whether or not the adultery results in the birth of child. Federal Constitutionality The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of adultery crimes since its ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) which decriminalized any kind of sex between consenting unmarried adults that does not constitute prostitution, as a matter of constitutional law (including sex between married adults with each other). The highest court of the State of Massachusetts declared its adultery statute unconstitutional as a violation of the U.S. Constitution in the case of Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 389 Mass. 171 (1983). But, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), holding that the U.S. Constitution did not invalidate a state sodomy statute in a case involving tow consenting men, largely discouraged constitutional challenges until Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick in 2003. See, e.g., Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1482 (D. Utah 1995) (holding that "The claim of the right to commit adultery cannot be considered “fundamental.", and denying a constitutional challenge to a police officer being disciplined for adultery while not on duty, in reliance on Bowers v. Hardwick). In the two decades prior to Lawrence, however, no state or federal court has declared an adultery statute unconstitutional on U.S. Constitutional grounds, despite the fact that there have been a handful of adultery prosecutions in this time period in some of the states where adultery remains a crime. For example, there was one prosecution in Virginia in 2004, and another one in New York State in 2010. On the other hand, the last time someone was prosecuted for adultery in Wisconsin was in 1990. I am not aware of any post-Lawrence adultery prosecution by a state government that has led to appeal that produced a published or binding precedents on the issue of the constitutionality of these state adultery statutes. This is, in part, because prosecutions for adultery in state courts are rare and are misdemeanor prosecutions in most cases. But, appeals of minor misdemeanor convictions are rare. Courts within the U.S. military justice system, at least, have expressly rejected constitutional challenges to the Uniform Code of Military Justice's adultery prohibition since Lawrence was decided. See, e.g., C. Scott Maravilla, "Prosecuting Adultery Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice After Lawrence V. Texas" (July 29, 2007). Other Criminal Law Considerations Giving birth itself, regardless of the circumstances, is never a crime in the United States. Some sexual acts which can sometimes result in the conception of a child are crimes (most obviously incest and rape, including statutory rape and abuse of a position of trust rape). But these offenses are not related to marital status unlike a true adultery charge. A murder of the spouse or the non-spouse with whom that spouse is engaged in adultery in the heat of passion immediately following the discovery of them "in the act" is a mitigating factor. This can reduce a murder charge to a manslaughter charge in many states. This incomplete defense to a murder charge is known as the "heat of passion" defense. Paternity The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the "other man" in an affair with a married woman who gives birth as a result does not have a constitutional right to seek to have his paternity of the child legally established. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Thus, the standing of the "other man" to bring suit to determine that he is the father of such a child is purely a matter of state law. The state laws addressing this question and some related questions are addressed in the article, "TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES: PART II: Questioning the Paternity of Marital Children" (2002) by Paula Roberts. Civil Liability In a handful of U.S. states a husband can bring a lawsuit for money damages (called alienation of affections or "criminal conversation" despite the fact that it is a civil lawsuit) against someone who has sex with his wife. The vast majority of U.S. states have abolished such lawsuits, however. In fiscal years 2000–2007, there were an average of 230 alienation of affections filings in North Carolina per year — a bit over 0.5% of the number of all divorces. The tort is also recognized in Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah, but it is frequently litigated only in North Carolina and in Mississippi. Many of the states where the tort is not commonly used impose restrictions on it that make it less attractive. In Illinois, Hawaii and New Mexico, these limitations make it exceedingly difficult to prevail in an alienation of affections case and recover substantial monetary damages. The standard of proof is lower in Utah and South Dakota, which continue to have actively litigated alienation of affections suits, although not used as often in these states as in North Carolina and Mississippi, for reasons that are presumably unrelated to the relevant legal standards that apply to these lawsuits. Also, in a rape case, a rape victim can bring a civil lawsuit for money damages against the rapist for assault and battery in most cases, and in those cases, many states allow a spouse of a rape victim to bring a parallel lawsuit against the person who committed the assault that is called a lawsuit for loss of consortium. The right to sue for loss of consortium is not specific to rape cases; it applies in all lawsuits for personal injury where it is available. Civil lawsuits involving rape cannot be subject to arbitration requirements by a pre-dispute contract between the parties to submit all disputes between them to arbitration (e.g. in a suit between an employee and an employer related to conduct that facilitated a co-worker's rape of the employee under sex discrimination laws) under a federal law enacted effective in the year 2022. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to grant petitions for certiorari seeking to have laws establishing civil liability in these cases declared unconstitutional. Divorce Implications In most U.S. state, divorce is granted without regard to marital fault and adultery is not considered in alimony awards or property divisions. While every U.S. state has some form of no fault divorce, and number of U.S. states also have fault based divorce, and a number of U.S. states, however, allow consideration of adultery as a form of marital fault in divorce proceedings, including how much, if any alimony is awarded and in property divisions. No state would consider being raped an act of marital fault, however, even if this caused a wife to give birth to a child whose biological father was not her husband, and even if the husband wanted her to have an abortion. Selected Non-U.S. Criminal Adultery Laws Adultery is no longer a crime in any European country, Turkey, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, or India. Adultery is no longer a crime in most or all of Latin America. Adultery is a crime in the Philippines (in a manner that punishes married women more severely than married men). It is notable that in this case, that the Philippines has a significant Muslim minority population. Adultery is also a crime in Indonesia and in Bangladesh. Adultery is also a crime according to Wikipedia at the first link in this answer, in "several sub-Saharan African Christian-majority countries." One of these countries is Rwanda. And, according to Wikipedia at the first link in this answer: In Muslim countries that follow Sharia law for criminal justice, the punishment for adultery may be stoning. There are fifteen countries in which stoning is authorized as lawful punishment, though in recent times it has been legally carried out only in Iran and Somalia. Countries which follow very strict versions of Sharia law in their criminal systems include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Brunei, Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, 12 of Nigeria's 36 states (in Northern Nigeria) and Qatar; although these laws are not necessarily enforced. Al-Shabaab, a jihadist fundamentalist group based in East Africa (mainly Somalia) and Yemen also implements an extreme form of Sharia. Obviously, this answer is not absolutely complete. It leaves the status of a number of particular countries unresolved.

This is a mixed bag of so-called "laws", often interpreted in an unfavorable or satirical light. Because of this, you might say that none (save one) of these laws are literally laws, but they are the effects of laws that do exist. I'll do my best to sort this out. A fine of $25 can be levied for flirting. Almost certainly an anti-prostitution law taken to the extreme. I only found one example of a bill, but it failed, and was only tangentially related. It's not hard to imagine that at some point, flirting was technically illegal. A license must be purchased before hanging clothes on a clothesline. This is most likely a satire of the actual law, which probably states that you cannot hang anything out your window or in your yard without a permit. Many cities and states have rules about what you can, and can't, put on your property. These are usually related to health and/or aesthetics. Carmel: A man can't go outside while wearing a jacket and pants that do not match. It's too hard to track this one down right now, but that sounds like a satire of something like a specific situation where a person must be wearing specific clothing. For example, I would imagine a firefighter or school crossing guard having these requirements for safety reasons. Citizens may not greet each other by "putting one's thumb to the nose and wiggling the fingers". Edited for clarity While we do have the First Amendment right to Free Speech, it is sometimes recognized in jurisdictions that certain actions and phrases may pass the "imminent lawless action" exception. It is likely some kind of ordinance that prohibits being unnecessarily rude to the point where the offender may end up being assaulted or worse as a result of the gesture. This gesture was known as early as Shakespeare, with the "I thumb my nose at thee" line, also known as the "cock-a-snook" gesture in some regions. Of course, the actual law is probably much more nuanced than that, and this is just a funny way of reducing this law down to the most absurd example that someone could think of. Thanks to some comments, I just realized that this is very likely § 240.20 Disorderly conduct. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: ... In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or ... Several states have some sort of statute like this that are technically First Amendment Free Speech violations, yet generally recognized by those jurisdictions as having legal force, since the purpose is to discourage violence that can be caused by "fighting words." Donkeys are not allowed to sleep in bathtubs in Brooklyn, N.Y. This is likely a structural integrity joke that doesn't hold up well (sorry, couldn't resist). Floors only have limited strength. If you look up the weight of a cast-iron bathtub and the maximum weight of a full-grown donkey, you'll find it weighs just less than a ton (about 1,800 pounds, assuming a heavy tub and large donkey). Someone probably saw a law about the maximum weight you can put on a floor, then looked up how much things weigh, and the joke practically writes itself. During a concert, it is illegal to eat peanuts and walk backwards on the sidewalks. Again, this is probably taken out of context, but I presume that someone was doing something stupid and got hurt or killed, so a law was written about not walking on the sidewalk without paying attention to where you were walking. For example, if a sidewalk had a open manhole cover or something, and a person fell in. This is just a hyperbole example of the actual law, whatever it may be. In New York, you can teach your pet parrot to speak, but not to squawk. Easy. Noise ordinance law somewhere. A parrot's squawk can exceed 105 dB, and is generally disruptive to living next door to you in a thin-walled apartment. This person just found something really loud, and translated this law to match that law's prohibition. It's unlikely you'll find a law this specific, but noise ordinance laws exist in many areas. My area is 75 dB during the day, 70 dB at night. In New York City it's illegal to shake a dust mop out a window. That's definitely still on the books. It's part of the littering law. Littering, sweeping, throwing, or casting any material such as ashes, garbage, paper, dust, or other garbage or rubbish into or upon any street or public place, vacant lot, air shaft, areaway, backyard, court, or alley is illegal. Throwing garbage out of windows (for example, from buildings or vehicles) is also a violation. In addition, no person may allow anyone under his/her control (agent or employee) to commit a littering, sweep- out, or throw-out violation. Merchants must put all sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pickup by a private carter. Residential units must put sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pick up by DSNY. Sanitation litter baskets may not be used for this purpose. It is against the law to throw a ball at someone's head for fun. As far as I can tell, this has a serious history. Carnival workers ("carnies") often had setups that involved heavy solid balls. The kind that could literally cause concussions if they were hit in the head. Dunk tanks, knock-stuff-over games, and so on. Presumably, people thought it would be funny to assault the carnies, so laws were written. Of course, assault is already illegal, but it was probably put there was a way to let people know it was a serious situation. Jaywalking is legal, as long as it's not diagonal. That is, you can cross the street out of the crosswalk, but you can't cross a street diagonally. This is really just saying that there's no law prohibiting jaywalking specifically, but there are laws about when you're allowed to cross an intersection diagonally. Again, making it sound weird or strange. It's just a loophole in the lawbooks. Presumably, if people started getting hit while crossing mid-street, they'd add a new law to address that. Slippers are not to be worn after 10:00 P.M. This is likely another oversimplification. It's probably something more like "you have to wear solid-soled shoes at night to protect your feet from broken debris and rats" or something like that. Staten Island: You may only water your lawn if the hose is held in your hand. This is likely a water conservation law. Automated sprinklers and lawn sprinklers waste water. In an effort to combat that problem, requiring hand-holding your hose makes you more likely to not overwater your lawn. While riding in an elevator, one must talk to no one, and fold his hands while looking toward the door. Of this list, this one is presumably a satire law that makes a statement about societal customs in some places of New York. It's highly unlikely this would be real law, but rather an expectation of how to behave in an elevator if you didn't want to have a bad experience. So, overall, I'd say that virtually none of the laws actually read like they do on this list, but some variant of the law in a more generalized form probably does exist.

Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.

Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.

Short Answer SIMPLIFIED AND UPDATED BASED ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE QUESTION: The marriage is valid, but their marriage will not allow the girlfriend to refuse to testify as a witness in the case. She can be compelled to testify against him under oath, but does not have to testify about the confidential communications that they have with each other after they get married (e.g. if he confesses to her while there are having a private conversation after they are married, while he is outside the jail, while he is meeting with his lawyer). All of her recorded statements made at any time, and everything that happens before they are married are available to be used as evidence at trial (assuming no other rule of evidence excludes it). Only confidential statements made between the wife and the criminal defendant while they are married can be excluded based upon their spousal status. END UPDATE Long Answer This question is about the marital privilege, which is created by statute or case law. There are actually two separate marital privileges that are analyzed separately. Also, I'm simplifying this answer to limit it to the "criminal case with a jury trial" situation. The rules are more complicated when it is not a criminal case, and in a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial, all references to the jury would instead be to the judge. But, almost everyone facing murder charges chooses a trial by jury instead of a bench trial, as is their right. The Husband-Wife Confidential Communications Privilege The stronger marital privilege applies to confidential communications made to a defendant's spouse during the marriage, which the defendant can insist not be presented to the jury. It doesn't matter if the spouse is still married to the defendant at the time of trial. The main exception to this privilege is for crimes committed against the spouse who is testifying, or to a crime committed against a child of either spouse. This privilege does not apply to anything that the defendant says to the girlfriend prior to getting married and does not apply to statements made by the defendant to the spouse when other people were present, and is similar to the attorney-client privilege or the parishioner-clergy privilege. In Florida this privilege, created by statute, reads as follows: Florida Evidence Code Section 90.504 Husband-wife privilege.— (1) A spouse has a privilege during and after the marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, communications which were intended to be made in confidence between the spouses while they were husband and wife. (2) The privilege may be claimed by either spouse or by the guardian or conservator of a spouse. The authority of a spouse, or guardian or conservator of a spouse, to claim the privilege is presumed in the absence of contrary evidence. (3) There is no privilege under this section: (a) In a proceeding brought by or on behalf of one spouse against the other spouse. (b) In a criminal proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime committed at any time against the person or property of the other spouse, or the person or property of a child of either. (c) In a criminal proceeding in which the communication is offered in evidence by a defendant-spouse who is one of the spouses between whom the communication was made. In many states (and in federal court), this Husband-Wife privilege for confidential communications has an exception for cases where the husband and wife jointly carry out a crime or fraud. But, Florida does not have this exception to the Husband-Wife privilege for confidential communications in state court criminal cases. In federal criminal cases, the case law under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 creates a substantially similar privilege for the purposes of this question. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is as follows: The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience — governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision. Since this is a criminal case, the last sentence of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 does not apply. There are also not any rules regarding this topic that have actually been prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court. And, neither the U.S. Constitution nor any federal statute creates a husband-wife or spousal testimonial privilege. So, this issue is governed in federal court by "The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience." The relevant common law rules apply nationwide, although different federal court of appeals circuits may apply them slightly differently when the U.S. Supreme Court hasn't supplied a clear rule. The Spousal Testimonial Privilege The weaker marital privilege (sometimes called the spousal testimonial privilege) in many states, which is similar to the 5th Amendment right of a criminal defendant not to testify at trial, is a criminal defendant's right to prevent his current wife (but not a former spouse) from testifying against him at trial on any matter whatsoever, regardless of whether it relates to something that happened during the marriage or not. This marital privilege often has many exceptions for serious crimes and domestic violence in jurisdictions where it applies. In the federal courts, however (pursuant to case law developed under Federal Rule of Evidence 501), this weaker privilege belongs to the spouse called as a witness rather than to the criminal defendant. The spouse of a criminal defendant isn't required to testify against a current spouse in federal criminal prosecutions, but the spouse and not the criminal defendant gets to decide if the spouse will refuse to testify. There may be exceptions to the federal spousal testimonial privilege in cases where one spouse is accuses of a crime against the spouse or a child of one of the spouses, where they are joint participants in a crime, or where the competency of the criminal defendant is at issue (see Wikipedia). The only exceptions which might plausibly apply in a federal criminal trial are if the criminal defendant is the father of your son, or if the criminal defendant and his girlfriend whom he marries were joint participants in the crime, neither of which seems likely to be the case here. In Florida, the weaker marital privilege also known as the spousal testimonial privilege cannot be asserted in state court criminal prosecutions but may be asserted in federal court criminal prosecutions. (See, e.g., here).

In many US states (and in the UK), statutory rape is a strict liability offense. This means that there is no intent requirement at all; the only allowable defenses are those that negate the actual act (there was no sex, the person was of age, or sometimes that the action was not a conscious or voluntary action), it falls within a statutory exception to the crime, or there is an applicable defense that has nothing to do with intent. Many general defenses do not apply to strict liability crimes; in particular, "I thought X when Y was true" tries to show there was to intent to commit the crime, which is irrelevant. In Michigan (where the crime took place), statutory rape is evidently such an offense. That throws some standard defenses into doubt, because anything based on negating criminal intent doesn't matter. However, Michigan does specifically say that it is not criminal to have sex with a person under 16 if they are your legal spouse; this is a very common exception to statutory rape laws. So, marriage is a way to not risk jail for statutory rape in Michigan. However, things do vary by state. In Indiana, it is specifically a defense that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was over the age of consent (unless it was a forcible rape).

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law.

Suspect's Right to Privacy in Court If no charges have been filed, do courts have any responsibility to protect a suspect's privacy during an investigation? Example below. Let's say this is in New Jersey, United States. Mrs. X is under investigation for an alleged crime (say, embezzling from her employer). Prosecutors have obtained a search warrant and seized her computer. X's attorney files a motion arguing against the validity of the computer search, and a court date is selected for a hearing before a judge. At that hearing, the prosecutor requests that the courtroom be closed to the public, to protect X's privacy since no charges have been filed. (Perhaps this is her office's policy in these circumstances; her motivation is not clear at this point.) The judge rejects the prosecutor's request and refuses to seal the courtroom. Members of the public witness the court proceedings and learn that X is under investigation for embezzling from her employer. Not only has X not been convicted of any crime; she hasn't even been charged yet (and indeed might never be). Have any of X's rights been violated? Did she have any right to not have her name tarnished before enough evidence was gathered to even charge her with a crime? (And: if her rights have indeed been violated, does she have any legal recourse?)

Mrs. X is under investigation for an alleged crime (say, embezzling from her employer). Prosecutors have obtained a search warrant and seized her computer. X's attorney files a motion arguing against the validity of the computer search, and a court date is selected for a hearing before a judge. At that hearing, the prosecutor requests that the courtroom be closed to the public Search warrants Search warrants are generally issued ex parte (i.e. without an adversarial hearing) and are routinely kept secret until they have been carried out. Targets of search warrants are often, but hardly always, the subject of criminal investigations. Search warrants can only be issued upon a showing a probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence pertinent to a crime that has been committed. If a search warrant is issued wrongfully, the remedies are a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence, and/or a civil lawsuit for money damages, after the search has been completed. Conceivably, a search warrant target could argue that the affidavit providing a basis for the search should continue to be kept under seal, but, unless this was necessary for a grand jury investigation to continue in secrecy, this request would usually be denied. Subpoenas A subpoena does not require a showing of probable cause to issue and can be contested before documents are turned over pursuant to it by the person to whom it is directed (and sometimes other people as well), but a subpoena is rarely issued to an actual target of a criminal investigation. A prosecutor can usually maintain secrecy by conducting an investigation through a grand jury which has subpoena power. Protecting the privacy of a subpoena target would not be a valid reason for closing the courtroom. But a prosecutor's desire to not tip off other subjects of the grand jury investigation, which a public hearing on quashing a grand jury subpoena might do, would be a basis for a valid request from the prosecutor to close the hearing to the public. Have any of X's rights been violated? No. There is a constitutional right of the public and the press to attend court hearings in most circumstances. There is no constitutional right to not have your reputation tarnished by criminal prosecutors in the course of a criminal investigation. Also, generally speaking, prosecutors have absolute immunity from liability for any conduct they commit in the course of a courtroom process. Did she have any right to not have her name tarnished before enough evidence was gathered to even charge her with a crime? No. Similar arguments were soundly rejected by an appellate court panel, for example, in the classified documents criminal investigation of former President Trump.

The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.

Nobody can say exactly what happens. I would assume that everyone in the house would be considered a witness. They might ask your friend "did you ever see your roommate carrying computers, monitors etc. into your apartment"; something like that would be likely. It's highly unlikely that she would be treated as a suspect since she doesn't work where things have been stolen. If the police comes with a search warrant, I would expect that the search warrant would extend to the roommate's room and all shared areas, like the kitchen, a common living room and so on. It's unlikely that a search warrant would allow searching your friend's room. She might want to move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like private photo albums) into her own room. She should definitely move anything that she doesn't want the police to see (like drugs, goods that she stole, illegal weapons) into her own room. And obviously they can search your room without warrant and without your permission; they are not allowed to, but unless you have a locked steel door, they can. That would be a violation of your privacy, and any results of the search couldn't be used as evidence against you , but I think they could be used as evidence against your friend.

The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case.

You are correct. A judge may only issue a warrant when it is supported by an affidavit, in which the officer seeking the warrant swears under oath to the facts supporting the warrant. Lying on the affidavit would constitute perjury. But judges very frequently just rubber-stamp the warrants without meaningfully reviewing the affidavits, so the primary form of oversight would be the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge asserting that the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause. If a judge does review the warrant application and finds the officer's statements not to be credible, he can refuse to sign the warrant, and he is free to also carry that credibility determination to subsequent warrants sought by the same officer or other officers in his department.

The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful.

The Google search is not itself a crime or any other kind of offense. It could be used as circumstantial evidence that you did something intentionally or with pre-mediation, rather than accidentally, or not at all. If you can provide an alternative explanation for the search that is plausible, such as the one in the question, and there isn't a close proximity of time, a jury is unlikely to give the search much weight as circumstantial evidence. But ultimately, the weight to give any piece of evidence is for the jury to decide in the context of all of the evidence in the case combined.

Since the incident was on private property (inside a building), a person does not have the same right to be there that you would have on the street outside the building. Yale police therefore can legally make a determination whether a person is trespassing (for example, by asking for identification), especially when there is an allegation that a person is trespassing. A law holding a person criminally or civilly liable for reporting their "suspicions" to the government without e.g. "reasonable suspicion" could easily run afoul of the First Amendment.

Meaning of 'Gift of Residue' section of a will This section is in a family member's will: Gift of Residue I give my Residuary Estate to the said [Full Name] absolutely and if [Name] shall fail to obtain a vested interest leaving issue who survive me then such issue shall take by substitution and if there shall be more than one of such issue they shall take in equal shares per stirpes but so that no issue shall take whose parent is alive and so capable of taking. What does this mean?

What does this paragraph mean? Line by line. I give my Residuary Estate This is a gift, effective when the person writing the Will dies, of everything that is left over after all debts and taxes are paid and after any other gifts already in the Will (e.g. leaving a car or a house or a Monet to someone in particular) have been given. to the said [Full Name] absolutely I'm going give [Full Name] a name so that it is easier to follow this explanation. [Full Name]'s name for purposes of this answer is "Luna". This says to give all that stuff to Luna when the person who wrote the Will dies, if Luna is still alive for whatever the required amount of time is after the person who wrote the Will dies. The required survival time period is either in the boilerplate provisions of the Will, or in the relevant statute if the Will is silent on the question. The Will says "absolutely" because historically, someone who received gifts of property in deed or wills in England only got to keep it for their lifetime, unless it clearly specified otherwise, after which someone else would get it. But in this case, if Luna survives this long, Luna gets all of this stuff with no strings attached. and if [Name] shall fail to obtain a vested interest leaving issue who survive me then such issue shall take by substitution If Luna dies before the person who wrote the Will does, or doesn't stay alive for the required number of days afterwards, then Luna isn't entitled to this stuff. Luna's descendants get it instead (i.e. Luna's descendants "take by substitution" what Luna would have gotten if Luna had lived, instead of Luna's probate estate getting the stuff). and if there shall be more than one of such issue they shall take in equal shares per stirpes but so that no issue shall take whose parent is alive and so capable of taking. If Luna predeceases and has exactly one living descendant who is alive when the person who wrote the Will dies, and that living descendant lives the required number of days after the person who wrote the Will dies, then the sole living descendant of Luna gets all of the stuff that is left over when the person who wrote the Will dies. If Luna has more than one living descendant, the stuff that is left over when the person who wrote the Will dies, then Luna's descendants gets broken up the way described below, which is called per stirpes: Create one share for each child of Luna who is alive and survives Luna by the required amount of time. If Luna has only one living child, that child gets everything even if Luna's child has children of their own. Create one share for each child of Luna who didn't live for long enough after the person who wrote the Will's death, if the predeceased child has descendants who are alive and remain alive after the person who wrote the Will dies by the required amount of time. This share is then broken up into one sub-share for each child of the predeceased child who is alive when the person who wrote the Will dies and is still alive after the person who wrote the Will dies by the required amount of time, and one sub-share for each predeceased child of the predeceased child who has living descendants who remain alive for the requisite number of days. Continue this process until 100% of the the residuary estate has been assigned to someone and give them their share of it once the estate is settled. If someone lives past the minimum number of days to outlive the person who wrote the Will, and then dies, that person's share goes that person's probate estate. For visual learners, a per stirpes distributions of assets looks like this: A per stirpes distribution to descendants is the plain vanilla ordinary way to giving stuff to the descendants of a dead person when you don't know in advance who will outlive you. What if Luna predeceases with no living descendants? Usually, this paragraph of a Will will be followed by another paragraph called the "ultimate contingent beneficiary" which says who gets the stuff that's left over in the residuary estate if Luna predeceases the person who wrote the Will and has no living descendants. Often, the ultimate contingent beneficiary will be one or more distant relatives, a list of friends, or a charity. If there is no ultimately contingent beneficiary in the Will, but Luna and all of Luna's descendants predecease the person who wrote the Will, then it goes to the next of kin (a.k.a. "heirs at law") of the person who wrote the Will, if there are any relatives of the person who wrote the Will who are close enough to qualify to inherit under English inheritances law. If there is no one closely enough related to the person who wrote the Will to qualify under English inheritance law, then the stuff "escheats" (i.e. is inherited by default) by the King (or Queen) of England, as the case may be. There are some circumstances when the Will can be ignored. Everything above explains what this language in the Will means. This isn't always what happens, however. There are several exceptions to the general rule that property goes to the people that the Will says it goes to. I won't list them all here, but it is important when a Will is being written to understand that this is the case. For example, if the person who wrote the Will leaves nothing in the Will to their spouse of thirty years as of the death of the person who wrote the Will, who has no assets of their own, then the Court will partially ignore what the Will says and give some of the residuary estate to the surviving spouse. Also, the Will only controls assets that are in the "probate estate". Some assets pass at death in what are called "non-probate transfers" that are not controlled by what the Will says. And, finally, of course, if the Will was written when the person signing the Will was of unsound mind, the Will can be invalidated in a "Will contest" in the appropriate court if the person contesting the Will's validity can prove that the person signing it was of unsound mind at the time. This is mediocre legal writing This paragraph gets the job done, but it is not very well written by modern legal Will drafting standards. It is adequate and probably meets the standard of care for a lawyer who hasn't committed malpractice. Lawyers in England have been writing paragraphs like this one for three or four hundred years. But it is not "best practices" legal writing in a Will. Good modern legal drafting for a Will would be much easier for a non-lawyer to understand, in addition to being clear and unambiguous.

Reading the examples from the ftc site what they mean is if someone sends you a good (intending for you to be the one who owns it) and asks you to pay for it, then it counts as a free gift If a good was accidentally sent to you but intended for someone else, then you keeping the good is theft.

An executor executes a will according to the wishes of the will. This involves disposition of the estate. Almost certainly the mental state of humans is not material to the disposition of the estate. I'm unclear what you even mean by executor. The named executor of a will only has power after a person dies. Was the will executed 19 years ago? If so, the executor's power is long long passed. The chance of challenging a will 19 years later is practically zero. Elder abuse will be managed by the state. An interested party may involve the state to create an investigation as to what is going on.

Your lawyer owes you a fiduciary duty A fiduciary duty[ is the highest standard of care in equity or law. A fiduciary is expected to be extremely loyal to the person to whom he owes the duty (the "principal") such that there must be no conflict of duty between fiduciary and principal, and the fiduciary must not profit from their position as a fiduciary (unless the principal consents). Legally, you can trust a fiduciary more than you can your own mother.

The default choice of law rule is that intestate succession is governed by the law of the place of domicile of the decedent at death (i.e. by the law of the state where someone resides in the U.S. in this case), if there is no will and if no other consideration applies. Incidentally, the citizenship of the decedent is pretty much irrelevant. You don't need to be a a citizen of a place to be domiciled there. Similarly, where you happen to be when you die is also irrelevant to succession although other post-mortem processes like inquests are affected. Real property, however, is generally governed by the laws of intestate succession in the place where it is located. This requires a separate Mexican succession process, which would be called an ancillary probate in U.S. practice, but probably has a different name in Mexico because Mexico has a civil law legal system that follows the Spanish tradition for succession at death rather than the common law procedural process concept of a probate proceeding, and is often handled by a legally trained Mexican notary outside the court system. At the same time, common law legal systems give near absolute discretion to the testator in how they make their bequests subject to minimum immediate family support rules, while civil law legal systems are usually more limiting. Intangible personal property (e.g. a bank account) is usually deemed to be governed by the law of the place of domicile. Whether tangible personal property is governed by the law of the place of domicile, or by the law of the place where it is located at death, isn't an issue that is resolved uniformly in all jurisdictions. It would depend upon how the issue presented itself and in what legal forum it presented itself. Often, the reality that "possession is 9/10th of the law" and that tangible personal property often has little significant economic value, means that these issues are resolved without resort to the courts or formal legal process. (In England, in the early modern era, succession to tangible personal property was vested in the clergy and courts only handled succession to real property and intangible property.) Also, in terms of choice of law, in the U.S., probate is a matter of state law and is subject to a case law exception to federal jurisdiction that prevents it from being litigated in federal courts. Mexico also has a federal system, but I don't know whether Mexico's laws on intestate succession are state laws or federal laws (I believe that it is governed by state law but that there isn't much interstate variation).

Note: All links in Spanish (sorry). Regardless or your father being or not the legal owner of the home, the issue at play is that of alimentos1. This is an obligation between some family relationships to help each other so if family member (the alimentista) is in dire need of help (i.e., needs the help to survive) the others have the obligation to provide the help. The relatives of the alimentista affected are, in order: The couple, always when married and only when expressly agreed upon for non-married couples. Descendants: sons/daughters and grandsons/granddaughters. Ascendants: parents and grandparents. Brothers: Only when indispensable and the minimum amount. The order determines who of all the family members is under obligation to provide the help; in case of multiple people in the same category the amount is to be divided between them in function of their income. The amount of the help is not fixed and will depend of the circunstances of the situation2; and it is possible to provide by providing the needs(shelter, food) directly. Now, until when does a father/grandfather need to provide alimentos to a son or daughter? Certainly until s/he is 183, as this is the date of full age in Spain, but it is usual to consider that the obligation exists while the alimentista is studying and lacks of his/her own means of subsistence. That is not a "free rider" situation, as alimentos may be denied by several reasons: Obviously, because the person that should provide the help does not have the means to do so without endangering his own subsistence. The alimentista gets his/her own means of subsistence. Any of the causes that would make the alimentista unable to inherit from the person providing the help4: attempted murder, coercion to change their will, and other grave crimes. The alimentista does not do enough to get his/her own means of subsistence. If a judge decides that the alimentista son/daughter is neither studying nor seriously trying to get a job, the help can be revoked. Judges seem to be progressively taking a harsher stance against descendants who refuse to do their part. The article quotes the case of a 19 years old guy whose claim to the pension was denied. As a side note, rejecting to pay alimentos is another of the causes that would cause the person doing it to lose any right to inheritance from the alimentista. If for whatever the reason you do not qualify for alimentos, the details of the agreement between your father and your grandfather for the home become relevant5: If your father has formally rented the house then your grandfather position is not relevant, as your father has all of the rights6. If your grandfather allows your father to live in the house without paying rent, then it is your grandfather rights as owner against your father rights as an occupant. No idea about the outcome of that situation. UPDATE: You still do not tell about your grandfather stance about the issue, which is important. If your grandfather agrees with your father7 then the only way to stay at home is that of alimentos. What you describe is a situation of either precario or comodato, where your grandfather allows the use of the home without compensation. The differences are: precario is for an undefined time. comodato is for a defined time/use (e.g. for X years). Now, I have to suppose that you are not part of the agreement so it is just between your father and grandfather. That makes it your father's dwelling, and beyond alimentos he cannot be forced to share his dwelling with you. But if this is a situation of precario (which is what most often happens) your grandfather has the "nuclear option"8 of threatening to evict your father, as it is a relatively easy (in the legal sense, not the personal one) procedure. In a situation of comodato your grandfather could not evict your father until the conditions of the cession expire, making threats somewhat weaker. As a final note, and given how specific this answer has become: I am not a lawyer, you have not provided enough specific info, and this is not legal advice. Talk to a lawyer. Maybe a lawyer will check the agreement and it will turn out that your father is paying rent by performing some service, voiding the precario aspect. Maybe with the details provided the lawyer can find a way to an agreement that is more amenable to all. Talk to a lawyer. Shut up. The issue at hand may be stressful, and sometimes it might be tempting to boast to your father about the issues of alimentos or precario. Don't. If there is something to be said about that, let your lawyer do the talking. Try to stay calm. Consider the effect of your actions before taking them. While there is nothing wrong with talking to a lawyer, going beyond that and beginning a legal battle with members of your own family is most of the times an ugly affair. It could easily have an effect for a very long time in your relationship with most of your family, even with those who are not directly implied. Try to stay calm. 1 Literally, "foodstuffs", but when used as a legal term it includes other basic needs. 2 There are some official guidelines but judges seem to have freedom to follow them or not. 3 I believe that there are some exceptional reasons to lose such right before becoming 18 (e.g., sons condemned of attacking their fathers and the like) but I have no specific data about those. 4 As a side note, in Spain last wills do not allow the "donor" to distribute the goods freely, as some porcentajes of the inheritance must obligatory be provided to descendants and widowers. 5 Of course, in the case that your grandfather wanted to oppose your father's decision. 6 Since one of the legal reasons to end a rent agreement is to provide a home for a first degree relative, your grandfather could expel you from your rented home to give it to your father, but not the other way around. 7 And "agree" does not mean "Is happy with the decision" but "Will not go to the court to challenge your father decision". 8 Which is a very relevant analogy, because it could be almost as damaging to your family as a literal nuclear bomb.

Estate is a rather old term for one of the three parts of parliament: Commons, Lords Temporal and Lords Spiritual (Bishops). I don't think it adds a lot to the context. The Press are commonly referred to as the Fourth Estate.

If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime.

Liable of sexual abuse in civil case and no prison time? It was reported a few minutes ago that Trump Is Found Liable for Sexual Abuse in Civil Case, but "Its findings are civil, not criminal, meaning Mr. Trump has not been convicted of any crime and faces no prison time." Why is this trial different to other trials where a person that's found guilty of sexual abuse is sentenced to prison? Is this different because he's an ex-president?

There are many different kinds of laws, and many different ways of violating them. The main two are (1) criminal law, which generally addresses violations that injure the government's interests; and (2) civil law, which largely addresses violations that injure private parties' interests. Some conduct can violate both sets of laws: If you steal something from a store, the government can put you in jail for theft, and the store can sue you for the value of the item you stole. If you punch someone in the face, the government can can put you in jail for assault, and the person you punched can sue you to pay for their hospital bills. If you grope a woman in a dressing room, the government can put you in jail for sexual assault, and the woman can sue you for battery. Donald Trump falls into that last category. Jean Carroll has sued him for battery, but the government cannot prosecute Trump for the crime because enough time has passed that the criminal statute of limitations has expired. Moreover, a civil trial cannot subject someone to jail time because such a deprivation of liberty requires greater procedural safeguards -- jury unanimity, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc. -- that do not always apply to civil trials like this. Trump's status as ex-president has no bearing on the penalties the court may legally impose on him.

Double jeopardy in its usual sense wouldn't attach because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding, which is the only thing double jeopardy applies to (esoteric estoppel matters not withstanding). You might recall that OJ Simpson was tried and acquitted of murder in a criminal court, and then subsequently tried and found liable in a civil court for those murders. There was no double jeopardy protections of which he could avail himself. But the constitution says that the Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments, so for the most part we can expect that whatever they say goes. So they can dismiss for any reason they desire, in principle. The impeachment of Senator Blount is one example: the House impeached him, and on the same day the Senate expelled him under their constitutional power to do so, and then dismissed the impeachment for lack of jurisdiction (arguing that Congress members cannot be impeached; the impeachment was otherwise still relevant after his expulsion because it could result in preventing him from gaining office again). The costs here are political: in your hypothetical situation with very strong evidence, if popular opinion turns too strongly in favor of conviction then refusal to do so may cost the Senators and their party in subsequent elections. Attempts to argue arcane technicalities might not save you at the ballot box. Under existing impeachment precedent (as well as Congressional rules precedents), the courts would be loathe to get involved by default. Though if the action was sufficiently egregious (not even superficially resembling what a judge might call a trial, say) maybe they would feel judicial intervention and action was warranted and justified. But that's purely speculative.

I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.

No Even if there were any evidence that any member of the US government were involved (there isn’t), that is a matter for the US justice system. The US is not a member of the International Criminal Court so no Supra-National body has jurisdiction.

Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.

Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law.

I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.

Following the links in the article you quoted, you find that it is indeed illegal in Germany to insult a foreign head of state. For a prosecution to happen, the foreign government has to ask for prosecution, and it would be a criminal case. It's not clear to me whether a TV station could be sued as well. Where Mr. Böhmermann lives would be irrelevant, what would be relevant is whether the insult happened in Germany.

Under which law is the police allowed to hold one's passport and phone after being in detention for 21 hrs? Is the UK police allowed to hold one's passport and phone for further "investigation" after he had been in detention for 21 hours? Further the police told him that he is not allowed to leave his flat.

england-and-wales The length of time a suspect is held in police custody before being released is unrelated to the police's power (and duty) to sieze potential evidence for further examination or to require e.g. the surrender of a passport as a condition of pre-charge bail (along with the requirement not to apply for international travel documents or tickets etc). If the suspect is assessed to be a flight risk, under section 50A(2)(a) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) they can retain a passport if they see... the need to secure that the person surrenders to custody The retention of property, such as a phone, is allowed under section 22 PACE: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above— (a) anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4) below— (i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or (ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and (b) anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence. (3) [...] (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. [...]

First of all, Mr X's refusal is in no way the end of the interaction, nor of your charges. If your report of Mr X's actions gives the police probable cause, they can arrest Mr X, even if he refuses to identify, and even if they do not know his name. The only difference is that if they do not know his name, they cannot use his record, if any, in deciding whether to arrest him. If they do arrest him, they can and usually will search him. If he carries ID, they will then know his name. Even if he doesn't, he can be lawfully required to provide his legal name once he has been arrested. So End of it. End of my charges. is not at all correct. Now let us look at the actual NH laws involved. Wikipedia links to two provisions: Section 644:6 and Section 594:2. What do they actually say? Section 644:6 provides that: 644:6 Loitering or Prowling. – I. A person commits a violation if he knowingly appears at a place, or at a time, under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted include, but are not limited to, when the actor: (a) Takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement official or upon questioning by such an official. (b) Manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. (c) Has in his possession tools or other property which would lead a reasonable person to believe a crime was about to be perpetrated. (d) Examines entrances to a structure which the actor has no authority or legitimate purpose to enter. II. Prior to any arrest under this section, unless flight or other circumstances make it impossible, a law enforcement official shall afford the actor the opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and give an account for his presence and conduct. Failure to identify or account for oneself, absent other circumstances, however, shall not be grounds for arrest. III. No person shall be convicted under this section if the law enforcement official did not comply with paragraph II or if it appears at trial that the explanation he gave of his conduct and purposes was true and, if believed by the law enforcement official at the time, would have dispelled the alarm. In such cases, any record of the arrest made under authority of paragraph I shall be expunged. IV. In this section, "entrances" means any part of a structure through which entry or egress could be made. Note first of all that Section 644:6 only applies when the person accused has appeared "under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property" more or less when the person has given a reasonable impression that s/he might be going to break in or commit some similar crime. "Loitering with intent" it is called in some jurisdictions. In those circumstances, a LEO must offer the accused a chance to explain his or her purpose to help dispel suspicion. That would include giving his or her name. The accused is under no obligation to give a name, or show ID. The only penalty for not doing so is that suspicion will not be dispelled, and if the officer thinks fit, the accused may be arrested. This section might well apply to the scenario in the question. Section 594:2 provides that: 594:2 Questioning and Detaining Suspects. – A peace officer may stop any person whom the officer has reason to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. An officer may request the person's name and address, but the officer shall not arrest the person based solely on the person's refusal to provide such information. This also applies only when an officer has "reason to suspect" the accused. The section permits the officer tho "request" (which the officer could probably do even if this section had not been passed). But it does not impose any duty on the accused to respond, nor impose any penalty for not responding. Again the only penalty is the failure to dispel any suspicion in the officer's mind. The officer may in any case act on any reasonable suspicion or probable cause that may appear. This section might also apply to the situation in the question. Neither section really gives an officer any power or authority the officer would not otherwise have. Both authorize the officer to request name and other identifying information. Neither makes it an offense to refuse to provide such information. Neither section describes what the officer may do as a "DEMAND". Whether either actually constitutes a "stop and identify" statue might be debated, but the statute itself is what matters, not the label attached to it. In the situation described inn the question, an officer might well request Mr X to identify himself, and explain what he is doing and why. The officer can take Mr X's response, if any, into account in deciding whether to detain Mr X for investigation, arrest him, warn him, or take other action, or take none. That is true whatever response Mr X may make, or if he ignores any request. So these sections will not greatly change what might happen, one way or another, in such a situation.

“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.

Is it illegal to open carry Hinged Handcuffs? england-and-wales No, but there use may constitute an assault or false imprisonment if one cannot justify their application was reasonable, proportionate and necessary in the circumstances. A civilian can lawfully use reasonable force if the conditions of s.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 are met: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.

Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".

Does the person being searched have the right to demand the computer be turned off before it is taken on the grounds that the warrant is only for the computer, not for the activity he is currently involved in? No. A warrant will often specify that both information (which they have a reasonable suspicion is on the computer) and the computer itself (as contraband) are in the scope of the warrant. Even if it only specified specific information as the target, they can seize the computer that it may be on. The seizure takes place as-is. You don't get to tidy anything up. Things that the officers see while seizing the device or upon waking it from hibernation mode would be admissible under the "plain view" doctrine (or even just simply within the scope of the warrant, if what is on the screen is the information they're looking for).

There is nothing preventing the OP's "subject" from making a Subject Access Request in these circumstances From the British Transport Police's Privacy Notice page, under the heading "How we use personal data": This privacy notice explains: ... the rights individuals have when we process their personal data. ... Right of Access: You can request access to the personal data we hold about you free of charge. You can request access to the personal data we hold about you using the contact details in this privacy notice. ... We collect personal data from a variety of sources, including: ... sound and visual images (e.g. from body worn cameras, CCTV, or facial recognition software); ... our own CCTV systems and body worn cameras. There's more detail in the link, which I have not replicated here to save space and avoid unnecessary "noise", but the above should cover the relevant points raised by the OP

This is going to depend on what you think or know is on the phone, why you want to keep it undisclosed, and why the officer says s/he wants it. If one knows or has good reason to think that there is evidence of a crime on the phone, then destroying or hiding that evidence may be criminal. If one gets a court order, such as a warrant or subpoena, to turn over evidence, destroying the evidence or otherwise failing to comply may well be criminal contempt of court, or another criminal offense. In most circumstances an officer must have probable cause, and usually a warrant, to conduct a lawful search. But border searches are different. That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustaining search of incoming mail). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (opening by customs inspector of locked container shipped from abroad). The Congressional Research Service wrote: in the March 2021 report "Searches and Seizures at the Border and the Fourth Amendment" (pdf): The Supreme Court has recognized that searches at the border are “qualitatively different” from those occurring in the interior of the United States, because persons entering the country have less robust expectations of privacy, given the federal government’s broad power to safeguard the nation by examining persons seeking to enter its territory. While law enforcement searches and seizures within the interior of the United States typically require a judicial warrant supported by probable cause, federal officers may conduct routine inspections and searches of persons attempting to cross the international border without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of unlawful activity. But a border search that extends beyond a routine search and inspection may require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Recent years have seen legal challenges to border searches of electronic devices such as cell phones and computers, which often contain more personal and sensitive information than other items frequently searched at the border, such as a wallet or briefcase. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. Lower courts have generally held that government officers may conduct relatively limited, manual searches of such devices without a warrant or any particularized suspicion. The courts, however, are split over whether more intrusive, forensic searches require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Federal statutes and implementing regulations confer designated law enforcement officers with broad authority to conduct searches and seizures at the border and surrounding areas without a warrant. These searches commonly occur at designated ports of entry along the border, such as border crossing points.[1] But searches may also occur in other places along or near the border.[2] To enforce U.S. customs laws, federal law enforcement officers may inspect and search individuals, merchandise, vehicles, and vessels arriving at the border, as well as further into the interior of the United States and within U.S. waters. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1496, a customs officer may examine “the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein” and whether those items are subject to taxes or otherwise prohibited. Similarly, 19 U.S.C. §1467 allows customs officers to inspect and search the persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving by vessel from a foreign port (including U.S. territories). If there is nothing that could be evidence on a phone, erasing it should not be criminal destruction of evidence, but this will be hard to prove after the fact, and border officials have authority to insist on a search with no warrant or particular suspicion. Notes [1]: See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a “border search” as one that occurs at ports of entry where there is an actual or attempted border crossing);see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Border Security: At Ports of Entry (last modified Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry (describing U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s functions at ports of entry). [2]: See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (recognizing the government’s interest in patrolling inland or coastal waters “where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (noting that the Border Patrol conducts inland surveillance activities “all in the asserted interest of detecting the illegal importation of aliens.”); See also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., "Border Security: Along U.S. Borders" (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (describing the Border Patrol’s responsibilities along the border

What is the Constitutional justification for Federal gun possession laws? The US Constitution reserves to the states all powers not expressly delegated to the Federal government. What is the Constitutional provision that allows for Federal laws such as the law that felons may not possess firearms? This appears to be 18 USC § 922(g). So, the argument is that because a gun was at one time transported across a state line, the federal government can make laws about who can possess it? What about a gun that was not transported across a state line, but manufactured in the same state that the felon, or stalker or whatever lives in?

The Interstate Commerce Clause effectively means all economic activity in the US is under Federal jurisdiction because even something that's not directly involved in interstate commerce, even something not involved in commerce at all, can have an indirect effect on interstate commerce. In Wilkard v. Filburn the government successfully argued that Federal limits on wheat production were enforceable on a farmer that grew his own wheat to feed his own animals even though the farmer never sold his wheat to anyone and the wheat never left the state. A similar more recent case, Gonzales v. Raich, confirmed that this same principle applied to someone growing medical marijuana for personal consumption in a state where medical marijuana was legal. In your example, the felon is buying a gun manufactured in the same state. While this doesn't have a direct immediate effect on interstate commerce, its indirect effects are more obvious than in the two cases mentioned above. If it were legal for felons to buy guns made in state, but not out-of-state, then it would have a fairly dramatic effect on interstate commerce. Gun manufacturers would set up local manufacturing operations in many states to make guns for the felon market. (In theory at least, in practice I think most if not all states also ban felons from owning guns.) Also since guns are durable items, unlike wheat and marijuana, it's all but impossible to show that the gun will never leave the state and participate in interstate commerce directly.

united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.

There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dismiss a state Governor for any reason. There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dissolve a state legislature. The US Federal Constitution requires the President to "take care that the laws be executed". Several relevant laws are contained in 10 U.S. Code Chapter 13 - INSURRECTION. Section 251 (renumbered from 240a) provides that: Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection. Section 252 provides that: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. Section 253 provides that: The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it— (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution. Section 254 provides that: Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time. Sections 251-254 of 10 USC in their current form all date from 1956, but are directly derived from the Insurrection Act of 1807. Under these laws the President has the right and duty to "take such measures as he considers necessary" to suppress any rebellion, which would include any proclaimed secession, including "using the militia or the armed forces" or any other available and effective methods. According to the Wikipedia article (linked above, citations omitted) the Insurrection Act: has been invoked throughout American history. In the 19th century, it was invoked during conflicts with Native Americans. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was invoked during labor conflicts. Later in the 20th century, it was used to enforce federally mandated desegregation, with Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy invoking the Act in opposition to the affected states' political leaders to enforce court-ordered desegregation. More recently, governors have requested and received support following looting in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. In addition 18 USC Chapter 115 deals with related issues, making rebellion, insurrection, or conspiracy to rebel crimes. Section 2383 provides that: Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Section 2384 provides that: If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. Under these various laws the President has power to use whatever means are required, including military force, to suppress and end any rebellion or insurrection, and arrest the perpetrators thereof. Anyone convicted by a court of insurrection is thereafter barred from elected office, federal ore state. The precedent of President Lincoln's actions at the start of the US Civil War is clear. However, the prospect of any current declaration of secession seems remote. Presumably a state could leave the US with consent of Congress, although this has never occurred and there is no specific Constitutional provision allowing it. Congress could pass further laws dealing with any actual or threatened secession, but the laws already existing seem sufficient, they give the President wide power to act in such cases. It was established by the US Supreme Court in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869) that secession is not legal, even if enacted by a state legislature, and specifically that the purported secession of Texas in 1861 did not legally remove it from the Union. No later court case or law has contradicted this, to the best of my knowledge.

39 CFR § 232.1(l) provides that: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, rule or regulation, no person while on postal property may carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, or store the same on postal property, except for official purposes. Police officers on active duty, enforcing the law at the request of post office employees, appear to be discharging "official purposes".

It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review.

There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says "Congress having occupied the field" it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.

The "crossing state lines" narrative originated from the false presumption that Kyle Rittenhouse illegally carried a rifle across state lines from Illinois into Wisconsin. If this had been the case, Rittenhouse could have potentially been charged with a federal crime. In the context of this case, it was never a relevant factor as he was charged by the District Attorney's office and not the Department of Justice.

The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

How could a nonprofit obtain consent to message relevant individuals at a company on LinkedIn under the ePrivacy Directive? Suppose a nonprofit wishes to contact some EU-based employees of an EU-based company in an effort to get that company to use a free service it is offering, and is considering doing so via LinkedIn. Per Article 13 of the ePrivacy Directive - i.e. Directive 2002/58/EC: The use of automated calling systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed in respect of subscribers who have given their prior consent. And, per Article 2(h), 'electronic mail' would include social media messages such as LinkedIn messages: "electronic mail" means any text, voice, sound or image message sent over a public communications network which can be stored in the network or in the recipient's terminal equipment until it is collected by the recipient 'Direct marketing' is not defined in the ePrivacy Directive, but the UK Information Commissioner's Office gives the following guidance (my emphasis): Direct marketing is defined in section 122(5) of the Data Protection Act 2018 as: “the communication (by whatever means) of advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals”. This covers all advertising or promotional material, including that promoting the aims or ideals of not-for-profit organisations – for example, it covers a charity or political party campaigning for support or funds. The marketing must be directed to particular individuals. In practice, all relevant electronic messages (eg calls, faxes, texts and emails) are directed to someone, so they fall within this definition. Genuine market research does not count as direct marketing. However, if a survey includes any promotional material or collects details to use in future marketing campaigns, the survey is for direct marketing purposes and the rules apply. From this, it seems that: (a) Prior consent would be required to send messages to specific individuals to promote the nonprofit's offering, including via LinkedIn. (b) A simple message asking if a person would be interested in learning more, or otherwise trying to obtain their consent, would itself be considered direct marketing, so itself require prior consent... If this is correct, how could the nonprofit legally contact the relevant stakeholders? I am confused about what should be done in this case. It seems very strange that a person at a company who might be interested in using the nonprofit's services cannot even be sent a one-line opt-in request to receive more details on LinkedIn. Any thoughts gratefully appreciated. Some solutions I have considered: Take advantage of the difference between 'corporate subscribers' and 'individual subscribers' in the UK's implementation of the ePrivacy Directive (PECR), which allows direct marketing to employees' corporate email addresses. Only applies to the UK and probably does not apply to LinkedIn. Phone the individual concerned to obtain consent prior to sending a message. Requires knowing the phone number and is time-consuming. Contact the company's official email address (e.g. info@company.com) instead. Impractical as reply rate is very low from such addresses.

You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.

Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe.

There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile.

If you have an agreement with a company that specifies "you agree to give me something of value, in case I give you something of value", you have a contract. In order for there to be a contract, there has to be actual acceptance of the offer. You can put out on a web page some contract stating those terms, and if you get positive acceptance of the contract (hence the standard click-through technology), then as long as you have done the thing promised, you can bill them for doing the thing promised. It's not clear what thing of value you are offering on the web page, since it's not "doing actual work". Them sending you an email isn't you doing something. One thing you could do is block all incoming emails, and for money you agree to unblock emails from registered subscribers. Just announcing that you will bill anyone for emailing you does not create a contract, because the emailer need not have even seen your announcement. This is why e-contracts need a click-through button. It's legal to request money, but there is no legal obligation for them to comply. That will be $10, please.

Legal framework Per Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the UK GDPR, your email address is most likely personal data (and certainly is once you notify the data controller that it belongs to you), and the storage and use of that data constitutes processing. In order to process your personal data, the data controller must establish at least one of the six lawful bases set out in Articles 6(1)(a) to 6(1)(f). It's quite clear that none of those lawful bases apply in this situation. Hence, the processing is unlawful. Next steps Start by making a request to the data controller under Articles 14(1) and 15(1) for the following: A copy of all personal data (including the email address) which they hold in relation to you. The purpose of them holding the data. The legal basis on which they hold the data. That they erase all personal data which they hold in relation to you, pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) (unlawful processing of data). Per Article 12(3), the data controller is required to respond "without undue delay", with an upper time limit of 1 month (or 2 months if they notify you of the time extension within 1 month). Sadly, most data controllers in my experience seem to interpret this to mean that 1 month is the standard time limit, even though technically this is incorrect and the standard limit is "without undue delay". Pursuant to Article 12(6) the data controller can pause the clock by asking you for additional information if they have "reasonable doubts concerning [your] identity". If you send your request from the email address in question then they can't really have "reasonable" doubts, but be aware of this possibility in any case and respond promptly to any requests to confirm your identity so that the clock resumes. Most likely they will be unable to (correctly) provide an answer to points 2 and 3 above, since they do not have a genuine purpose or legal basis. If, after the maximum deadline has expired, they have still not responded and/or erased the data, you have two options: Complain to the ICO under Article 77(1). The ICO has the power under Article 83(5) to fine the data controller up to the higher of 4% of their turnover or £17,500,000. Complaining to the ICO is free and easy and is usually recommended over option 2. Issue a claim in the County Court for a compliance order pursuant to Article 79(1) and Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. You also have the right to claim compensation for "material and non-material damage" (including distress) pursuant to Article 82(1) and Section 168, but this may be unrealistic in the case of a few unwanted emails. Option 2 is not free: you will need to pay a court fee and, unless you represent yourself, legal fees. There may also be additional cost risks if you lose the case. Mentioning the above two points in your request could be an effective way to persuade them to comply in the first place.

Art 13 GDPR is about information to be provided when data is collected directly from the data subject. This information can be provided directly during/before collection. It is not generally necessary or useful to send the data subject an email with this information. Usually, a SaaS website will provide the information under Art 13 as part of their privacy policy, and link it in easy to find places. Also consider the EDPB guidelines on transparency, which suggests a layered approach: in addition to a detailed privacy policy, summarize key information directly when the data is collected, e.g. next to an input form.

As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself.

I think you could count decline-events, but not track users who declined tracking. But I also think such information isn't useful for demonstrating compliance. Therefore, you should avoid storing extra data about people who do not give consent. When consent is required for analytics. The GDPR provides a general framework for processing personal data. The ePrivacy Directive (ePD) overrides this general framework when it comes to cookies and similar technologies related to accessing information on the end user's device. Per ePD, such access is only allowed when it is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by a user, otherwise consent is required. Thus, analytics cookies require consent and setting an analytics-declined cookie is strictly necessary. But this consent requirement relates specifically to storage cookies, not to collecting analytics data. Thus, you might have a legitimate interest in collecting data with cookie-less analytics, which could involve counting cookie-consent decline events. Unfortunately, most analytics systems collect very broad categories of data and cannot be limited to a necessary subset. Even such limited analytics (unless they are truly strictly necessary for operating the site) should support an opt-out. I don't think you could legitimately gather analytics about such opt-out events. GDPR audits. Your motivation for collecting statistics about consent-decline events is to be prepared for a GDPR audit. This is probably not necessary, but it depends. It might be useful to distinguish between internal/voluntary audits and data protection audits by the supervisory authority. You might voluntarily review your compliance to convince stakeholders that you're compliant, and such voluntary audits might be part of the appropriate technical and organizational measures a data controller has implemented in accordance with Art 24, Art 25, and Art 32 GDPR. You should collect any statistics you need for this purpose, e.g. to ensure that the opt-in rate looks realistic. But since you can set the parameters of this audit, it makes no sense to collect data “just in case”. Under Art 58(1), your supervisory authority can audit your data processing and can compel you to provide any information it requires. This is similar to how a tax authority can compel you to produce business records for auditing purposes. This is closely related with your general obligation to be able to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR (Art 5(2)). More specifically, the controller is required per Art 7(1) to be able to demonstrate that the data subjects have given valid consent, but does not prescribe how to demonstrate this. How to demonstrate that valid consent was given. For demonstrating that consent was given, there are no clear best practices. However, this topic is briefly discussed in EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent. They recommend that you retain records about the following: that a data subject in a given case has consented how consent was obtained when consent was obtained information provided to data subject at the time that the controller's workflow meets all relevant criteria for valid consent Some of these are process-level concerns about how you ask for consent. For example, you might record video walkthroughs of your consent management solution to demonstrate how consent can be declined, given, and revoked. You should definitely keep a version history of the text and information that was displayed to users when they were asked for consent. I think you should also be able to explain in your front-end code how the result from your consent management solution is used to load relevant features (and that they aren't loaded before consent is given). If a feature or service is made conditional on consent, it might be good to have a short written analysis that consent is still freely given under the requirements of Art 7(4). But other aspects relate to the individual data subject and the individual consent-giving event. Some consent management solutions send a small record about the consent to a backend server where it is stored with a timestamp, so that it can be later traced that and when consent was given. I've also seen consent management tools that show a timeline of events to the user (when consent was requested, and when consent for which purpose was given and revoked). I think such detailed insight into an pseudonymous individual's consent status is a very powerful way to demonstrate compliance. What is not relevant here is information about data subjects who declined consent in the first place. Consent means opt-in. The default is that no consent is given. To demonstrate that consent was obtained in a valid manner, information about data subjects who didn't consent isn't necessary or useful. So I expect that you would be fine in an audit without collecting such data. In fact, the lack of a clear purpose and necessity for collecting this data could be argued to be without legal basis and violate the GDPR's data minimization principle. And even when recording information about those data subjects who did consent, the EDPB guidelines remind us that this “should not in itself lead to excessive amounts of additional data processing”.

Can my will gift digital files to specific people? A specific bequest is defined as such: the gift in a will of a certain article to a certain person or persons Here it says: A specific bequest is a gift (bequest) or a specific item or asset to a named person or entity. Does a computer file count as an item? Can I say that person A should get file A from my laptop and person B should get file B? I imagine that I can, but it is not immediately clear to me that "item" or "article" includes digital files.

Wills are governed by state law, but yes you may. Almost anything that can be legally owned/possessed can be bequeathed. When a copyright holder dies their copyrights (intangible property) are transfer to the estate or heirs as proscribed in the will or state law if no will exists.

It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.

The Will Itself The two main points that are exceptional in this case would be: (1) to name a legal guardian for the child, and (2) possibly, depending upon the size of your estate, to name a conservator for the child (like a guardian but for a child's property), or a custodian of property inherited by the child (basically a trustee of a small, simplified trust) or a trustee of a protective trust for the benefit of the child. You might want to name a "trust protector" of the protective trust as well as a trustee, so that there is a designated person to supervise the trustee's conduct during the child's minority who isn't your ex-spouse. A protective trust will have provisions related to age and conditions and purposes of distributions. For example, it might say distributions according to need for health, education, maintenance and support until age 25, then distribute a third outright, then distribute half of what's left at age 35 outright then distribute the balance at age 45, and it might specify "safe harbor" acceptable purposes like higher education, apprenticeships, weddings, and investing in businesses with a reasonable prospect of success. You should also probably provide for any family pets. Many lawyers have standard clauses for that. You may want to identify specific items of tangible personal property that should be reserved for the child's future use at your death (e.g. an heirloom wedding dress), even though it won't be immediately useful. The guardian wouldn't supersede the parental rights of the other parent, but would have priority together with anyone named by your ex, to serve as guardian if your ex is incapacitated as well. There really isn't too much else that you can do in a will as there is a deliberate desire to prevent dead hand control of a child. Non-Legal Economic Options You should consider buying life insurance and making a trust for the benefit of the child the beneficiary of it to fund a trust for the child if you die. Talk to a financial planner or life insurance agent about it. Non-Legal Sentimental Options Of course, there are classic non-legal steps such as writing birthday letters or recording birthday audio/video tapes for the child, if you know that death is imminent and finding someone who will take responsibility for doling them out. Another thing that is sometimes done is to find a trustworthy person to entrust with secrets (e.g. your legal father isn't your biological father). One way to handle such matters is to have a safe deposit box with this kind of stuff in it and to entrust to trustee to deliver these items at appropriate times.

If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.

Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.

If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.

Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ...

FIRST: A last will and testament does not have to be disclosed to anyone [1] prior to death. But at death, notice of the commencement of a probate proceeding which is necessary for the will to be given effect must generally be given to: (1) everyone who takes under the will, and (2) everyone who would take if either that particular version of the will were invalid and a prior will that it revokes is valid, and (3) everyone who would take if there were no valid will, and (4) creditors whose claims are accepted as valid, but are not paid due to the insolvency of the probate estate. Everyone entitled to notice of the probate of a will is entitled to see the last will and testament submitted to the court in its entirety. The case could be placed under seal to prevent people other than interested parties and their lawyers from seeing the will, but not sons of a decedent who are interested parties by definition even if they get nothing under the will, because they would take if there was no will. SECOND: This said, it is easy to make a secret transfer effective upon death via a variety of non-probate transfers such as a beneficiary designation on an account, or the provisions of a trust, that don't require a court proceedings to take effect the way that a will does (people who think that they can avoid probate by having a will are fundamentally mistaken, probate is a court proceeding necessary to give a will legal effect). Only some of these methods of making a secret gift work if the estate is subject to estate taxes which requires disclosures to be made on gift and estate tax returns of all transfers taking effect at death (something that can be circumvented by making a transfer during life that is not reportable during life because it is within some exception to gift taxation). NOTES: [1] Usually a will has to be shown to the two witnesses to a will, unless it is executed under the recently repealed Louisiana law allowing for a "mystic will" which has seven people witness the envelope but no one witness the will itself prior to death. Of course, holographic wills, substantially in the handwriting of the person writing them, don't have to be witnessed at all.

Can I tell police to wait and call a lawyer when served with a search warrant? Somewhat influenced by this question. This is hypothetical question. Suppose the police turn up at my door with a search warrant. I know nothing about warrants and couldn't tell apart a search warrant from a supermarket receipt. But I do have a lawyer who knows these things. Can I somehow make the police wait until I call my lawyer, and the lawyer arrives and examines the warrant - before the search proceeds? Any jurisdiction is fine for this question. Added: Thank you to all those that replied and commented. So, it sounds like (just as I thought), I can ask - and they can ignore.

You cannot legally force police to wait to carry out the search. They can search even if you are not present. In fact, they are required to execute the warrant within a certain time frame, which precludes delaying the execution of the warrant. You can inspect the warrant to see if it is "proper" (has the judges name, correct address, is a search warrant and not a warrant of removal/deportation...). Calling a lawyer is always wise, but that does not stop the search.

Yes, your best bet for immediate relief is to call 911 and ask for a supervisor. Generally speaking the police are not legally obliged to explain themselves to you on the spot. They are obliged to explain themselves to the courts and their supervisors.

In general, you do not have civil recourse against the government for (lawful) legal process that you are the victim of. "Counterclaim" would only be applicable when A sues B, and B makes a counterclaim against A – the police don't sue you, they arrest you, and the prosecutor prosecutes you (or decides not to). If the police beat you up, you could sue them for violating your rights, under what is known as Section 1983. Given the scenario you describe, this comes closest to involving false arrest, meaning that there was no probable cause for arrest. Otherwise, the police have immunity for their actions. But if there is a legal arrest warrant, there is probable cause (existence of probable cause is the standard for issuing an arrest warrant), so no claim against the police will succeed. I am leaving out the anomalous concept of an unlawful arrest warrant, where a judge issued an arrest warrant but there is in fact no probable cause. Such a case would be covered by Section 1983, where either the judge or the swearing officer (or both) violated your rights.

Under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) in such a case the police may not lawfully enter without a warrant, and if they do enter, any evidence found will not be admissible. The court in Georgia v. Randolph said: [N]othing in social custom or its reflection in private law argues for placing a higher value on delving into private premises to search for evidence in the face of disputed consent, than on requiring clear justification before the government searches private living quarters over a resident’s objection. We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident. However, the police may talk to either or both occupants at the door, and this may provide sufficient reason to obtain a warrant. If police determine that someone in the residence is in danger, they can enter on that basis, and anything in plain view may be treated as evidence. Further consider Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. ___ (2014) In that case one occupant of an apartment denied consent for police to enter. But the police had probable cause to arrest him, and did so. An hour later police returned and got consent from the other occupant, who may also have been a victim of domestic assault by the first occupant. The consent search was upheld, as the objector was no longer present (being then detained) when the police asked to search. So the holding about divided consent applies ONLY if the objector is physically present. If only one occupant is present, that occupant may consent to a search, even if the police know very well that the other lawful occupant would have objected. Interestingly, in Fernandez it appears that police had ample probable cause and could easily have secured a warrant, but chose to proceed on the basis of consent instead.

Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions.

...in this case the officer has "definite cause." Why is probable used? "Probable cause" is a standard for when a property search can be conducted or a warrant issued. According to the Wikipedia article you linked to, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines probable cause as a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts are probably true We do not talk about "definite cause" because there is no such legal standard. Having "definite cause" as you suggest here simply means you have a very strong case to satisfy the legal standard of probable cause. Referring to the above definition, the officer whose drug-sniffing dog alerts at a traffic stop certainly has a "reasonable amount of suspicion." The officer may actually have an incredibly high amount of suspicion, but that's irrelevant to the probable cause standard. It is merely sufficient that the officer's level of suspicion is "reasonable" and backed by suitable evidentiary circumstances. It just seems like any way you try to interpret the word "probable" it doesn't make sense, you either have cause to search/arrest/etc. or you don't where is the probability? The probable cause standard is "probable" because it does not impose exacting requirements on law enforcement. (Note that the U.S. Constitution uses "probable" slightly differently from its modern meaning; see another answer.) It need not be blatantly obvious that a crime is being committed but likely that a crime is being committed. Of course, the exact standard of how likely is likely enough to satisfy the standard of probable cause (and what evidence constitutes a particular threshold of likelihood) is a test for the court to determine.

If you comply without protest, this will be taken as consent to a search, and make anything found admissible. One can verbally object. The ACLU suggests the form "I do not consent to searches" to any request to search your car, your house, your person or any other property of yours or under your control. There is no need to give any reason for your refusal. However, one is required to follow any "lawful orders" given by police officer during a traffic or pedestrian stop.[1] Failure to follow lawful orders may well be a separate crime. Even if the lawfulness is suspect, it is usually better to comply and challenge the order later, in court. One might make a second objection, such as "I don't see that you have probable cause for a search, and I do not give consent. Are you ordering me to permit a search?" If the officer clearly orders you to open the trunk, one might place the keys in reach of the officer, while not opening the trunk oneself. That might help establish that there was no consent to the search, and require probable cause to be established before anything found could be used in a trial. One might also repeat, as the officer opens the trunk "I am not consenting to any search." If it is possible for any person present to record video without obstructing the officer(s) that might hrlp to establish the absence of consent and other relevant facts, later. People in general have a right to make such recordings, but not to obstruct or interfere with police activity. Duty to Obey The Washington Post in an opinion article dated July 23, 2015 "Sandra Bland and the ‘lawful order’ problem" wrote: The Bland video brings up an overlooked problem with the law of police-citizen encounters. The police can back up their orders with force because it’s often a crime to disobey a lawful order from a police officer. But from a citizen’s perspective, it’s often impossible to know what is a lawful order. As a result, it’s often impossible for citizens to know what they can and can’t do during a police encounter. The first problem is knowing what counts as an “order.” If an officer approaches you and asks you to do something, that’s normally just a request and not an order. But if there’s a law on the books saying that you have to comply with the officer’s request, then the request is treated as an order. You can’t know what is an “order” unless you study the law first, which you’re unlikely to have done before the officer approached you. In the case of Oregon v Rose Mary ILLIG-RENN, 42 P.3d 62 (2006) The Supreme Court of Oregon held that ORS 162.247(1)(b), a statute that makes it a crime to "refuse[] to obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer." is constructional against challenges under the Oregon and US Federal constitutions. Sources [1]: Virginia Code section 18.2-464. Failure to obey order of conservator of the peace Virginia Code Section § 18.2-463. Refusal to aid officer in execution of his office. Florida Statutes 316.072(3) "*OBEDIENCE TO POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.—It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer, traffic crash investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, or member of the fire department at the scene of a fire, rescue operation, or other emergency. *" (Oregon) ORS 162.247(1)(b) Interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer A person commits the crime of interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer if the person, knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole and probation officer ... Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. California Vehicle Code - VEH § 2800 (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code. North Carolina § 20-114.1. Willful failure to obey law-enforcement or traffic-control officer (a) No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control officer invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic, which order or direction related to the control of traffic.

In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"

Does it constitute murder if the attempted murder fails but the victim dies anyway as a side effect of the attacker's actions? For example, suppose an attacker is chasing a victim with a knife and the intention to kill. While running away, the victim falls, hitting their head, and dies. Assuming there is clear evidence for the the attacker's intentions and how the victim died, can the attacker be charged with or convicted of murder? I could see them being charged with murder because their actions led to the person's death. But I could also see the charges being limited to attempted murder since the attacker didn't directly cause the victim to fall. Or maybe they would be charged with both attempted murder and manslaughter? If it varies by state, I will limit this to whether this would constitute murder in Utah or California.

california You intended to kill them, you killed them, that's murder California Penal Code Section 187(a): Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. California Penal Code Section 188(a)(1): Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature. If this weren't the case, one could nitpick the cause of death almost endlessly. For instance, what if you stabbed them nearly to death, they were almost saved by a surgeon, but then they died of an infection that they acquired in the hospital? The law's solution is simple: if you not only killed them, but you also intended to kill them before doing so, that's murder.

The above is not quite accurate. First, assault. The correct definition is "a threat or physical act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact." Therefore, no attempt at a battery is necessary. Rather, simply making someone subjectively believe that you are about to commit a battery against them is enough for an assault charge. Please note the following two points. One, that apprehension does not mean fear. Apprehension means that the victim has to believe that the actor's conduct will result in imminent harmful or offensive contact. Two, it's not necessary that the victim believes such conduct will actually be effective - rather, he only has to believe the conduct is "capable" of making the contact. I can't tell if by "other security personnel" you mean, in addition to bouncers, say, security at concerts or if you mean private security guards, such as ones who guard warehouses or other businesses. Nonetheless, for the warehouse/business "guards," they do not have a special privilege above or beyond what any random person may do. That is, you may use force to the extent you reasonably believe necessary to prevent a felony, riot, or serious breach of the peace. You may use deadly force only if it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a "dangerous felony" involving risk to human life, including, for example, robbery, arson, burglary. However, if the private security personnel are operating under authority vested to them by local ordinance or the state legislature, then their rights (and also any attendant restrictions, such as those provided to citizens under the Fourth Amendment) would apply instead. So where's the difference? It comes about at the standard a situation must meet to allow use of deadly force. A police officer can use deadly force to effectuate an arrest based on a reasonable belief that a suspect has committed a felony involving the risk of physical harm or death to others (murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape or burglary) or if there is substantial risk that the suspect was dangerous to the point that he may cause serious physical harm or death to someone if the arrest were delayed. On the other hand, as a private citizen, you may only use deadly force when attempting to effectuate an arrest if the suspect did indeed commit such a felony. Police can base their action on a reasonable belief and even if that belief is wrong, they will be safe from prosecution. A private citizen actually must be right about the suspect having committed the requisite crime. No matter how reasonable the belief was of a private citizen regarding a suspect, if that suspect did not actually commit the crime, the private citizen who used such force will be subject to prosecution. Bouncers are afforded no more rights than private citizens. They can issue verbal warnings, ask a patron to leave the establishment, check identification, refuse entry, call the cops, protect bystanders from violence, break up fights, and respond with equal force if necessary. They may not strike an individual with a punch or kick, push or physically toss someone out of the establishment, restrain them using chokeholds or other submission techniques, or use weapons or pepper spray.

Deadly self-defense is legal in Germany. The self-defense law (in particular Sect. 32 of the Criminal Code) makes no restrictions as far as the type of aggression and the type of defense is concerned. That means that - in principle - you can defend yourself against an attack by any means that is necessary to stop it. The principle behind that is "das Recht muss dem Unrecht nicht weichen", which translates to "the law does not have to yield to the unlawful". That particularily means that: You do not have to run. You do not have to yield. You do not have to wait for help from public authorities (notably the police). You can defend yourself (against any attack on you, be it life, limb or property), no matter if that would mean commiting a crime (even if that crime is killing a person). This is called "Trutzwehr" or "schneidiges Notwehrrecht", which can be translated to "active defense" or "aggressive defense" as opposed to passive defense. However... This regulation is not without pitfalls and limitations. There are quite a few, which means that in practice deadly force could be considered unlawful in self-defense. Books have been written about this subject alone, so it can not be exhaustively handled here. Some examples for corner cases are: Attackers that clearly can not understand the severity of their actions have to be spared from extreme effects of your self-defense. The classical book case is that you can't shoot little children stealing apples from your tree. If there is a massive discrepancy between what you want protect and the damage the attacker has to endure (called "qualitativer Notwehrexzess" - translating to "qualitatively eccessive self-defense"). If someone insults you, shooting him might go to far, since while your honour is attacked (which is protected by Sect. 185 Criminal Code), the attacker's life (protected by Sect. 212 Criminal Code) by far outweighs it. Note that, to ensure the effectiveness of the self-defense laws, the discrepancy must be extreme. And it does not mean you can't defend yourself. You just have to choose a less severe measure. So you might get away with knocking the insulter out. After the attack is over you hit the attacker once too often, which causes his death (called "quantitativer Notwehrexzess" - "quantitatively eccessive self-defense"). The attack was over at the time of the deadly blow, so your right for self-defense had ended. You might get away without punishment, if it was impossible for you to realize that the attack was over. If you only think an attack is happening, but it is not (for example someone attacking you with a rubber knife on Halloween). In this case there is no attack and so technically there is no right for self defense (called "Putativnotwehr"). Similar to the cases of excessive self-defense, it depends on your individual case (notable if you had a chance to realize the attack was false) if you are punished or not. To sum it up: You have the right to defend yourself by any means necessary, but you are held responsible if you go to far (not just a little, but really really to far).

General Question Having an intention is never enough for punishments (both Strafe and Bußgeld) of the German state. But having an intention and be right at the start of doing the offense (details are complicated) is sometimes punished as an attempt of the offense (Versuch). This is defined in § 13 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (Act on Regulatory Offences). § 13 OWiG (= §§ 22-24 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code)) (1) Whoever, in accordance with his understanding of the act, takes a direct step towards the realisation of the factual elements of the offence, shall be deemed to have attempted a regulatory offence. (2) The attempt may be sanctioned only if expressly provided by law. (3) If the perpetrator voluntarily renounces further execution of the act or prevents its completion, he shall not be sanctioned for attempt. If the act will not be completed without the contribution of the abandoning party, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent its completion shall be sufficient. (4) If more than one person participates in the act, the one who voluntarily prevents its completion shall not be sanctioned for an attempt. However, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent the completion of the act shall suffice if the act is not completed without his contribution or is committed independently of his earlier participation. If you started the offense but stopped, so you don't fulfill offense, you don't get sanctioned, if you stopped voluntarily (freiwillig), § 13 III OWiG. (The details are more complicated.) This may be the case in your example, but beeing seen by a police officer is no reason for Freiwilligkeit. So you may have attempted the offence. But an attempted offence gets only sanctioned if this is expressly provided by law, § 13 II OWiG. This is provided for no traffic violation. (But for some of the Straftaten in context of traffic, e.g. § 315b StGB Dangerous disruption of road traffic.) So the answer to your question is a clear: No Specific aspects of your case I have searched the norms for your case, a red light offence for cyclist: § 37 II Nr. 1, Nr. 2, Nr. 6 Straßenverkehrsordnung: the rules for traffic light § 49 III Nr. 2 StVO: declaring violations of § 37 StVO as regulatory offences (legal basis: § 24 I Straßenverkehrsgesetz) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 Bußgeldkatalog-Verordnung: sets 60 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists (legal basis: § 1 I BKatV) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 BKatV: sets 100 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists after at least one second Nr. 3.2.19 Anlage 13 Fahrerlaubnis-Verordnung: sets fine of one point in Fahreignungsregister (driving ability register) for these offences (legal basis: § 40 FeV) In none of these laws a sanction for attempt is defined. I'm not sure what you did after getting of your bike, you migth have violated the red ligth walking. For this you can get a 5 € fine (Nr. 130 Anlage 1 BKatV), strictly speaking not a Bußgeld (fine), but only a Verwarnungsgeld (warning fine). But the competent authority can but doesn't have to sanction the offence, § 47 I OWiG. So the officer just didn't gave you the warning and thought it is OK.

Crimes are prosecuted either where they were committed, or where the harm was intentionally caused, or both.[1] The statute of limitations that applies is the statute of limitations in the country where the crime is prosecuted. Other statutes of limitations for crimes are irrelevant. Generally speaking, if a crime is still prosecutable in the place where it is committed and is a serious felony, an extradition treaty will require the country where the suspect is located to be extradited to the country where the crime was committed and the country where the crime was committed (in this case Norway), goes through the proper channels under the extradition treaty. (There are exceptions in death penalty cases, but neither of these countries have the death penalty.) The statute of limitations for murder in Portugal would not protect someone who committed a murder in Norway. Also, even if there was a statute of limitations in Norway (say it was an armed robbery not resulting in serious bodily injury instead), most countries don't count time that a suspect spends outside the country fleeing law enforcement against the statute of limitations. [1] There is an obscure exception to this for what amount to crimes against humanity that is not applicable in the case presented by the question.

Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.

Murder carries certain penalties, and attempted murder is distinguished from murder only with respect to penalty. Without the circumstances allowing execution, the punishments are life without parole, life with possible parole after 20 years, or a definite term of 50 years with possible parole after 20. There are separate "enhancements" for crimes against elders or use of a deadly weapon, and if these circumstances exist, they are applicable to both murder and attempted murder. In all cases of enhancements, the enhancement cannot exceed the penalty for the crime (also, it runs consecutively). The punishment for attempted murder is not the same as the punishment for murder: since murder is a class A felony, attempted murder is defined as a class B felony, which has a penalty between 2 and 20 years. Compare that to actual murder which carries a minimum sentence of 50 years. In no case can a person committing actual murder serve less time than a person attempting murder, even with "enhancements".

The simple answer to the question you asked is that they are not mutually exclusive. Self-defense and “castle doctrine” are defenses. A person can be charged and tried for murder, and one or both of those can be their defense. But shooting someone in self defense does not guarantee immunity from a charge or trial. In the first place, you need to show that it was indeed justifiable self-defense. As a source for this answer, see Texas state law library. https://guides.sll.texas.gov/gun-laws/stand-your-ground That site itself says that the laws are complicated and refers readers to “plain English” from which I selected https://www.bhwlawfirm.com/deadly-force-self-defense-in-texas/ For self defense, the site says: Texas law provides for a justifiable defense at trial when using deadly force if the person claiming self defense: Reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary; Had a legal right to be on the property; Did not provoke the person against whom deadly force was used; and Was not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force was used. For protection of property, it says Under Texas Penal Code §9.42, a person may use deadly force against another to protect land or property if: He is the owner of the land; He reasonably believes using the force is immediately necessary to prevent arson, burglary, or robbery; and He reasonably believes that the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means. OK! To summarize the story linked by the OP, homeowner hears and then finds a man outside breaking into homeowner’s shed. He confronts intruder who then moves toward homeowner with a pickaxe. Homeowner shoots and intruder runs off. let us agree that the first shot was allowed under Texas law, preventing a robbery and perhaps an attack with a pickaxe. The homeowner says that he then shot again “into the night.” At this point he is shooting a fleeing person. We can even leave out all of the irregularities once he calls 911 two hours later to report an invasion in progress even though the intruder was dead. In any case, there is also the questions are: Is the homeowner’s version of events true in the first place? If we accept everything he said, was the shot the killed the man justifiable under Texas law? These are for the prosecutor to decide if it is worth trying and the jury to decide. Back to your question of how can they charge him if he had a right to stand his ground? Further, even if a person has a justification for using force, he may still be arrested and face trial. Self defense is a defense against a murder charge, not a get out of jail free card.

Bob dies because Eve chose not to be vaccinated, is this a crime? Bob is a clinically vulnerable adult that has a weak immune system. Eve is one of Bob's friends. Eve has been offered a vaccine for a widely spread and contagious disease that has the potential to kill Bob if he caught it from Eve. Eve does not take this vaccine, as she does not think it will affect her and it goes against her beliefs/morals. Unfortunately, Eve catches this disease and then passes it on (transmits) it to Bob. As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for murder, manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him?

As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for Murder, Manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him? There are basically two distinct issues here. What is the duty? And if a duty was breached, what intent is necessary to breach it? There is not a legal duty to be vaccinated. There is a duty to use reasonable care not to hurt others. The duty not to hurt others could be satisfied by not seeing Bob in person, by wearing a mask around Bob or by having other non-transmission means available, in addition to being vaccinated. But Eve didn't do any of these things. We don't know if Eve had any reason to think that she presented a risk of infection to Bob because she could have passed the virus to him while she was asymptomatic. We also know, by the assumption of the question, that Eve was the source of the infection. But, in real life, proving the source of an infection beyond a reasonable doubt is very challenging or impossible. This must be established for any homicide crime. There is no indication that Eve knew she was transmitting the virus to Bob, or that Eve intended to transmit the virus to Bob (if she intentionally spat in Bob's face intending to infect him that would be a different matter). At most, her conduct was reckless, but if she was asymptotic and has no idea that she was doing something that was actually putting Bob at risk, her intent could be as slight as negligent (for tort law purposes only) or criminally grossly negligent. Since she lacked the necessary intent to commit murder (i.e. either an intention to kill, or an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm), she could not be guilty of the offense of murder. There are three types of voluntary manslaughter in England, none of which apply here: "There are three types of voluntary manslaughter: that resulting from loss of self-control; that resulting from statutorily defined diminished responsibility; and killing in perseverance of a suicide pact." So, this leaves involuntary manslaughter as the most serious possible homicide offense. Involuntary manslaughter could encompass either reckless conduct (i.e. "the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as an act which must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm resulting therefrom albeit not serious harm") and is usually in furtherance of some other criminal offense, or in the case of "gross negligence manslaughter", negligent conduct that is a far greater level of wrongdoing than the negligence that would suffice for civil tort liability. Gross negligence manslaughter is the most plausible charge and is itself a hard call that involves judgement and discretion on the part of the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, and the jury in a jury trial) that is exercised on a case by case basis considering all of the circumstances. Also, to be clear, the wrongful act in a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter case would be transmitting the virus (which could have been prevented multiple ways) and not failing to get vaccinated itself.

If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.

If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.

Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft.

Probably murder. Because "victim 2 was then shot by this man in self defense" hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting. He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a "rightful death" call on his own, (is there such a thing?) and dispose of all the evidence. Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1. There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge.

There are, as far as I know, no "FDA-approved" vaccines against covid in the US. The FDA has given Emergency Use Authorization to some vaccines. This does not currently include the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. It is impossible for a person to get the J&J vaccine in the US, because it is not authorized, and J&J does not distribute it. One could imagine an unauthorized foreign vaccine being smuggled into the US, but it would be illegal to distribute it. I assume that you specifically mean, can a person refuse to get a vaccination on the grounds that it only has an emergency authorization and is not actually approved: and can one sue an employer for firing you because you refused to get vaccinated? In general, the employer can fire for anything they want, unless you have an employment contract that limits the grounds for termination. There are discrimination-based grounds that they cannot use, such as race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information at the federal level. Mississippi has no specific employment discrimination laws. Other that that, an employer can fire an employee for any reason, or no reason (Mississippi is what's known as an "employment at will" state). There are some state restrictions where it is prohibited for an employer to fire an employee for engaging in a specific required activity such as being called for jury duty or being called to military duty. An employer could not require an employee to break the law, but that is not applicable here.

It appears you want to go for a defense strategy based on a self-defense argument. This won't work in many jurisdictions, because self-defense usually doesn't apply when you intentionally caused a situation where you knew you would have to harm someone in self-defense. Similar case: Bob regularly mugs old women in the park by threatening them with a gun. Charlie finds out and wants to stop him. But instead of reporting it to the police, he wants to take care of this himself. Charlie get a gun, dresses up as an old woman and waits in the park. When Bob shows up and tries to mug Charlie, Charlie shoots first. Well, anyone else who would have found themselves in a park threatened by Bob with a deadly weapon might have had a self-defense argument. But Charlie knew that by dressing up as an old woman, he would provoke Bob to attempt to mug him. This of course doesn't exonerate Bob. But Charlie actively caused the situation which would give him the opportunity to kill Bob "in self defense". Charlie even made a complex plan to arrange this situation and put serious effort into setting it in motion. It's premeditated murder. Your situation is basically the same. You caused someone to make an attempt at your life, and then killed them to "defend yourself". And you had plenty of other options: There are lots of ways to end your life without requiring the help of a hitman. By getting them involved, you incited them to commit murder (killing someone who wants to die is still murder under most circumstances). By hiring the hitman, you created two possible options: Either you kill the hitman, or the hitman kills you and they would be guilty of murder. Both are the direct consequences of your actions. You could have tried to cancel the hit when you changed your mind (if you tried and failed, that might give you a slightly better legal argument) You could have called the police and ask them for protection. Further, when you hired the hitman you committed a crime: incitement to commit murder. The fact that you were also the victim of that crime doesn't really matter. It also doesn't matter that you wanted to die: Assisted suicide is only permitted in very few jurisdictions, and those only allow it if performed by medical professionals under very narrow circumstances. Those circumstances would certainly not have applied, so the hitman would have been guilty of murder if he had succeeded (he is at least guilty of attempted murder, but you can't put a dead person on trial), so you would too. When you commit a crime and cause someone to die in the process, then that falls under the felony murder rule in many jurisdictions. You will likely be convicted of manslaughter or murder of the hitman, depending on when you decided to kill the hitman before they kill you. When you can convince the court that you did not premeditate to kill the hitman but only panicked in the last minute, and no felony murder rule applies, then you might get away with manslaughter. You might also be found guilty of incitement of attempted murder (your own murder).

Amber Guyger was convicted of murder under Texas Penal Code section 19.02: A person commits the offense of murder if the person 1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or 2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits and act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. The Texas mistake-of-fact defense is codified at Penal Code section 8.02: It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense. To assert a mistake of fact defense, then, you need to demonstrate that you reasonably believed something that changes whether or not you met the mens rea requirement of intentionally or knowingly causing a death/serious bodily injury. An example would be firing a gun at what you reasonably thought was a corpse, or a mannequin, or Superman. In any of those circumstances, you would not have intended or known that you were going to cause someone's death. If you reasonably believed your gun was unloaded, you would not have known you were going to kill someone if you pulled the trigger. In Guyger's case, Whether she was in her apartment or someone else's, she still knew that putting two bullets in a man eating ice cream would cause his death or serious bodily harm. In the Guyger case, the defendant claimed she was mistaken about what apartment she was in, but that doesn't change whether she had the intent to kill Mr. Jean. That mistake does implicate the Texas "Castle doctrine" statute, Penal Code section 9.32: A person is justified in using deadly force against another ... when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary ... to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. ... The actor's belief ... that the deadly force was immediately necessary ... is presumed to be reasonable if the actor ... knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used ... unlawfully and with force entered ... the actor's occupied habitation If her mistake was reasonable, that would give her reason to believe Mr. Jean had unlawfully and with force entered her home, making it presumptively reasonable that she used deadly force. But the mistake of fact defense only looks at mistakes that change whether you committed the offense, not whether an affirmative defense is available to you, so it doesn't really change whether the defense is available. Nonetheless, it's generally accepted that a person can use self-defense doctrines like this even when they're mistaken about whether they're in danger. The question for the jury in those cases is whether the defendant's mistake was reasonable. Because the jury convicted her, it necessarily did not believe that she had made a reasonable mistake.

Contract Law: Sale by Auction; Undeclared Reserve Price What is the correct position: during an auction, the Auctioneer accepted a bid but when the client returned to pick up the sold item, the Auctioneer declined to get the money saying the accepted price was fall below the reserve price. Can the bidder who won sue for breach of contract? NB: The Auctioneer did not mention that there was a reserve price on the item.

Generally, the bids are the offer which the auctioneer may, but is not bound to, accept. (Chitty on Contracts, § 4-025). Many Sale of Goods Acts specify that the "sale is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of a hammer" (see Ontario's Sale of Goods Act; see also Chitty on Contracts, § 4-025). If the auctioneer is not going to accept the bid, the auctioneer may withdraw the lot. If the property is put up for auction subject to a reserve price, no contract is formed if the auctioneer mistakingly purports to accept a bid lower than the reserve price (Chitty on Contract, § 4-026). Any after-the-fact declaration of the existence of a reserve bid has no bearing on the formation of the contract. The only thing that matters is whether the property is put to auction subject to a reserve price. If it is not put up subject to a reserve price, then the contract for sale is formed with the highest bidder when the auctioneer announces the completion of the auction. If the property is put up subject to a reserve price, then no contract is formed, even where there is purported acceptance by the auctioneer.

You cannot In a conflict between written and oral terms of a contract, the written terms prevail. In any event, by you utterance you have not accepted the contract; you have made a counter-offer which the other party has not accepted and have then gone on to accept their original offer. You would need the written agreement of the other party that they accept your terms and that they understand that clicking the “I accept” is not an acceptance of their terms but merely a means of completing the technical procedure.

No (in almost all U.S. jurisdictions). Truth or falsity is evaluated when a statement is originally made and doesn't have to remain true forever. Also, generally the law treats an ad like that as an invitation for you to make any offer to them, not a binding offer to form a contract that is held open indefinitely. So you can't force them into a contract simply by accepting their offer. The default rule is that an ad is an invitation to make an offer rather than an offer that can be accepted. And, even if it really is an offer, when it does not state any termination date, the default rule is that it can be withdrawn at any time.

It's right in the contract In the event I fail to take delivery of the vehicle purchased by me within forty-eight (48) hours after I have been notified by you that it is ready for delivery and pay the total contract price in the manner indicated, my deposit in the amount of $300 may, at your option, be retained by you to compensate you in whole or in part for any loss sustained by you. Your right to retain my deposit shall be in addition to and not instead of any other right or remedy provided by applicable law including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the sale of the car or truck I agree to purchase. If the amount of my deposit exceeds actual damages sustained by you, you will promptly refund the difference to me. The car was ready on day 3. As a result, the Customer was obligated to pay and take delivery of the vehicle until day 5. Because the customer did not follow through with the purchase, the deposit is used to compensate the salesman in the amount that covers the costs of preparing the sale and having the car on the lot for those days that the salesman could not sell it to someone else. At the end of day 5, the contractual obligation to hold the car for the customers in exchange for the deposit ended, and the other clauses of the contract (car for rest of payment) become void. The car salesman is in his right to sell the car because the actual sales contract has fallen through and the holding fee/deposit expired, as the very quoted paragraph shows. Based on the final sentence of the quoted portion of the contract, to get a part of the deposit back, one would need to establish that the losses are less than the contractually fixed amount of 300 USD. When I had my car at the workshop and could not get it back on the day it was done with repairs, I was also informed that holding my car for more than a day would incur storage fees of up to 15 € per day. Similarly, the last time I bought a car, I was told that the sale included a fresh inspection and oil. Those are costs to the seller and can be accounted for in the deposit. The inspection costs about ~120 € for a new TÜV certificate and exhaust check and the materials for an oil change come for about 70 €. This leaves about 70 € cover for the mechanic and salesman's wages for about one hour. That's 300 €, or about 330 USD today. As such, costs to prepare a contract and transfer, inspect the car for roadworthiness as well as storage fees most likely are reasonably assessed to be in the 300 USD area.

Nope, the seller can't refuse "to sell". They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over.

You cannot pass on better title than you have The fraudster (B) in this scenario does not have good title in the car and so the thief (C) doesn't either: 1) because they are a thief and 2) because the person they stole it from didn't own it. If C had paid B for the car then C would still not own it because while they are no longer a thief, B still doesn't have good title. This is the case even if C didn't know that B didn't own the car. A is entitled to recover the car from whoever has it. There are 3 exceptions to this rule: Voidable title: If B acquires title through a contract that is voidable (e.g. A is a minor) and then sells it to C. C as an owner in good faith owns the goods even if A voids the contract with B. Entrustment: If B has been entrusted the goods by A and sells them (perhaps by mistake) to C in the ordinary course of B's business. C as a good-faith buyer owns the goods. A can seek recompense from B but cannot get the goods from C. This probably needs an example, I take antique jewellery to an antique jeweller for cleaning, the jeweller's assistant mistakenly sells them, I lose the goods and the jeweller must compensate me. Negotiable instruments: Certain things, notably cash, cheques, shares and bearer bonds are subject to different rules. If B steals, say cash, from A and then uses that cash to buy something from C, A cannot demand the return of the cash from C unless they can prove that C knew that B had stolen it. Negotiable interests belong to anyone who acquired them in good faith. In all cases, a good-faith actor who is out of pocket is owed compensation from the bad faith actor - whether it’s possible to collect this is a practical rather than a legal issue.

What would the implications be if an employee were to refuse signing an amendment and insist on what was stated in the original signed contract, even if he/she knows it's a mistake? The contract is voidable unless the employer's subsequent conduct reinforces its legitimacy. The employee's attempt to take advantage of something he knew was a mistake contravenes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on which contracts are premised. South African contract law is not an exception to this: The law of contract underpins private enterprise in South Africa and regulates it in the interest of fair dealing. The employer can resort to records of prior communications between the parties to prove that the stated compensation was intended as yearly, not monthly. Even if those records are not available in a judicial dispute, the employee would have a hard time persuading a court that the salary that was agreed upon is 12 times --or exceeds by a factor of 12-- the market rate for a job position of similar type.

There is no requirement that the terms of a contract be even-handed The common law position is that parties are free to contract on whatever terms they like: if you agree to sell me your late model car for $1 that's a matter between the two of us. The law allows you to make a bad bargain. Unconscionability There is an equitable doctrine that allows the court to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts or terms. The California Supreme Court has ruled that "the central idea (of the) unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain "… but with terms that are 'unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.'" In other words, courts will not enforce contracts that are "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." However, I would be extremely surprised if the terms you are upset about rising to the level of unconscionability. The basic test of unconscionability, as expressed in official comment 1 to section 2-302, is: whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. . . .The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. They seem to be dealing with risk allocation and moving risks that are normally on the lender to the buyer or requiring the buyer to waive statutory rights and warranties - there is nothing illegal in that unless the law has a "no contracting out" provision. Some laws do and some laws don't. Some laws may not allow contracting out in consumer transactions but may allow them in business transactions. You seem to be talking about some sort of equipment financing arrangement. As such, if you don't like the deal, there's a bank down the street with a different deal. US law recognises that once there is a contract, the parties have to act in good faith to ensure each party gets the benefit of the bargain they made but there is no such requirement in negotiating that bargain. If you can use your economic strength to get a better deal, that's called capitalism.

Home Self Defense: Sweden So I am reading a fictional book, that takes place in Sweden, and there is a situation presented that strike me as implausible. A female character is being "stalked" by another character, and received emails suggesting violence and also had her property damaged. Also she had proof that someone entered her home when she was not home and stole things. Presumably the stalker. In response, this character then sought to arm herself, in her home, with golf clubs in various parts of the house. The thought was in case of another forced entry she could bash the guy over the head with a golf club. Instead she was encouraged to have armed security because if she killed the intruder, under Swedish law, she could very well be charged with manslaughter, and possibly murder if it could be proved that she placed the golf clubs around the house ahead of time. Is this true in Sweden? Can a person be convicted of manslaughter or murder if they kill an intruder that they suspect of ill intent? The situation seemed implausible to me, and that the author kind of flubbed this one.

There are problems with the claims. In summary: someone that in Sweden acts to defend themselves while "in peril" when subjected to — or are in imminent risk of — a criminal attack, will not the convicted, unless the act is "blatantly unjustifiable". Context We have a problem here in Sweden with people being ill-informed about the right to self-defence, and this is compounded by people with opinions spreading myths about it. Often these myths err on the side of claiming you have less rights than you really have. So, two things before we go on... The characters may have been unreliable. Do not ever assume that just because a character says something in a work of fiction, that the character is meant to know what they are talking about. And even if they are meant to know what they are talking about... The author may have been unreliable, and done their homework poorly. Keep this in mind... That said, the right to self-defence is not infinite. The law According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2 and 6... If you intentionally kill someone, you get convicted of "murder" If you intentionally kill someone, but there were mitigating circumstances, you get convicted of "manslaughter" If you act in reckless disregard for the risk your actions are causing, and this leads to the death of someone, you get convicted of "causing the death of another", or what we here can call "reckless killing" And Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 24, § 1 states that an act performed in "peril" shall only lead to a conviction if the act was "blatantly unjustifiable". "Peril" is enumerated to exist in cases of... A commenced or imminent criminal attack on person or property A person has gained or trying to gain unauthorized access to a room, house, yard or ship A person refuses to leave a domicile after being told to If — when caught red-handed — a person uses violence or threats of violence to resist stolen property from being retaken When judging whether an act is "blatantly unjustifiable", the prosecutor must look at... the nature of the attack that caused the peril the significance of that which the attack was aimed at (such as a human life) other significant circumstances That last bit is interesting because it takes human psychology into consideration, and let the defendant's assessment of the peril be the standard by which the act is judged. The claim Let us start with the easy bit first... "if she killed the intruder, under Swedish law, she could very well be charged with manslaughter, and possibly murder if it could be proved that she placed the golf clubs around the house ahead of time." Murder? No. According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2, a person that kills an intruder in their home could at the most be charged with manslaughter, because there are mitigating circumstances, i.e. the person felt threatened and there was a home invasion in progress. In order for this to become murder, she would more or less have to have invited the assailant or in any other way drawn them in with the intent to kill them. Yes, she prepared to defend herself or a potential intrusion, but without knowing for certain that the assailant would come at certain time or at least a certain day, any kind of premeditation towards killing is more or less impossible to prove. With this, murder is off the table. That claim is simply wrong. Whether it is the author or the character that is erring, I cannot say. So, manslaughter then, or the even lesser degree, called "causing the death of another", or reckless killing. Manslaughter would come up of she — when whacking them with the club — did so with the intent of killing them. The operative word here being intent. The prosecutor has to prove that intent. Sure, we can dream up scenarios where this is the case; the classic reason for why people do get convicted even acting in peril is when they keep harming the assailant after the danger has passed. But — again — just preparing for a potential intrusion is not enough to prove that intent. Finally, reckless killing. This is where such cases usually ends up. And — again — this usually happens because the defendant did something when the danger has obviously passed; the criminal attack was no longer imminent but passed. Conclusion Unless the protagonist in question had set up lethal traps; unless they had foreknowledge of an attack; unless they invited the assailant in with the intent to kill them; unless they fend off the attack and gets themselves into a perfectly safe situation and then proceeds to beat the assailant to death; and unless all of this can be proved, then it cannot become murder. Manslaughter or reckless killing, yes, there will be an investigation for that, but from the description of the situation — the protagonist fearing the assailant is dangerous and means them harm — preparing a home defence with strategically placed golf clubs does not in any way preclude the prosecution being dismissed as justifiable self-defence. Only(!) if the home invasion was obviously harmless, and/or the protagonist keeps harming the assailant after the home invasion has been staved off / neutralised, can a conviction for manslaughter or reckless killing become a possibility. Summary Yes, in Sweden a prosecutor will look at the case when you kill someone. But — no — in the situation described, a home invasion by someone perceived as wanting to cause harm, this is very unlikely to become "murder", for lack of premeditation. The remaining possible charges — manslaughter or reckless killing — will only result in a conviction if the situation was obviously and provably harmless in the eyes of the defendant, and they still killed the assailant.

It's a bit of an oversimplification. You're correct that there is a federal law against murder, 18 USC 1111. However it applies only to a murder committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This covers situations like crimes committed on federal lands such as national parks or federal buildings, or crimes on US-flagged ships at sea, aircraft in flight, or in space. It does not apply to "ordinary" crimes committed at most locations within the US. 18 USC Chapter 51 covers a few other situations, such as murder of a federal officer, foreign diplomat, by incarcerated or escaped federal prisoners, US nationals murdering each other while abroad, and so forth. The idea is that these restrictions keep the laws within the enumerated powers of Congress as stated in Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution. A federal statute covering all murders throughout the US would probably be unconstitutional for this reason. So while what he says is not strictly correct, it is true that in the vast majority of cases, murders are covered by state laws and not by federal laws. Even if one was to agree with Ramaswamy that medical abortions are a form of murder, even still, no federal murder law currently on the books would apply to a typical abortion, except under very unusual circumstances.

This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list.

Although the assailant (or their estate if they are killed) could lodge a claim for damages it does not necessarily follow that they would win - they would have to show that the shooting was not legitimate self-defence but rather was unlawful by, for example, negligence or use of excessive force - say by shooting them when they didn't pose an immediate and unjustified threat. The Federation rules, as far as I can see, are not actual legislation. Although they should be adhered to in normal circumstances, this shooting would be, in the given circumstances, legitimate self-defence according to Article 122-5 of the Code Pénal which says: N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte. N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l'exécution d'un crime ou d'un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu'un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens employés sont proportionnés à la gravité de l'infraction. Which Google translates to English as: The person who, in the face of an unjustified attack on himself or others, performs, at the same time, an act ordered by the necessity of the self-defense of himself or of others, is not criminally liable, except 'there is a disproportion between the means of defense employed and the seriousness of the infringement. The person who, in order to interrupt the execution of a crime or an offense against property, performs an act of defense, other than intentional homicide, when this act is strictly necessary for the aim pursued, is not criminally liable. provided that the means employed are proportionate to the gravity of the offense.

It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.

united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.

Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her.

Despite comments in the Reddit thread you linked, I doubt it's the law in any US state, but it would be matter of policy in any state and in many other countries as well. It's not the emergency medical personnel's job, whether EMTs, paramedics or firefighters, to risk their lives giving emergency aid while a dangerous armed criminal is potentially in the area running around free. Instead they will wait for the police to let them know the area is clear and safe for them to do their job. It's easy to say that since the neighbours were giving aid, the EMTs should have been able to as well, but the EMTs wouldn't have seen the person armed with the knife leave the house and wouldn't have known that neighbours weren't themselves the ones who stabbed the victim. The neighbours also probably didn't fully appreciate the risk they were taking, that the "perp" could come back into the house at anytime. The EMTs on other hand would've heard plenty of horror stories about what has happened to EMTs that haven't waited for police to clear the scene. In other words, this could have happened in any US state, Canada, and in many other countries.

Does the guilt of the victim affect the validity of a crime of passion I just watched the movie 'A Time To Kill'. If you don't know it, it is about the trial of a man who kills the 2 men that violently raped and assulted his daughter. In the end, he was found innocent by reason of temporary insanity. My question is, in an almost identical case, where the same circumstances apply and the perpetrator is proven to have experienced a moment of temporary insanity due sheer rage and extreme emotional distress; would the outcome of the trial be affected if in the course of the trial it was proven that the person killed was not in fact the one that commited this rape? Or would it only matter that the perpetrator believed he did?

I assume you mean to ask whether the guilt of the victim affects the validity of a crime-of-passion defence. canada In Canada, the only crime-of-passion type defence is provocation, today codified at s. 232 of the Criminal Code. Provocation is only relevant to a count of murder. If the person who committed what would otherwise be murder "did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation," then the conviction is reduced to manslaughter. Current codified defence: victim must have done something that would be an indictable offence punishable by five or more years of imprisonment One of the statutory requirements for a successful provocation defence is that the victim must have conducted themselves in a way that "would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment." This is an objective element of the defence, not dependent on the perception of the accused. One court has found this limitation to the defence to be unconstitutional (R. v Simard, 2019 BCSC 531). However that court would still require that the "conduct of the victim [to be] of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control..." The common law and the previous codified defence also required provocative conduct by the victim Both the common law and the pre-2015 codification of the provcation defence required that the victim's provocative conduct be "of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control" (R. v. Cairney, 2013 SCC 55 at paragraphs 24-35). Burdens for establishing this defence The provocation defence is an "air of reality" defence (R. v. Cinous, 2002 SCC 29, paragraph 57). This means that there is an initial evidential burden on the accused. There must be evidence on the record that, if believed, could lead a reasonable properly instructed jury to acquit (or, in the case of provocation, to convict of manslaughter instead of murder). Once the accused meets this burden, then the defence is properly in play and will be successful unless the Crown disproves any element of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt.

(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.

It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.

In the USA, you must be found guilty "beyond reasonable doubt". As you describe it, I'd say there is an unreasonable suspicion of guilt, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the magician killed three people that way, then three unexplainable deaths following three spells might get him convicted. A jury might say that even though there is no way to explain how the killing worked, the correlation might be enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Yes, a person can be charged with the murder of person or persons unknown The reason that police are really keen to identify the victim include (in no particular order): It will probably clear up a missing persons case; So they can inform the next-of-kin; Being able to place a named person who loved and was loved before a jury rather than nameless corpse increases the chance of conviction - all else being equal.

If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.

The article seems to state the legal standard which I repeat here in a Google Translate version: The former Government delegate for Gender Violence, Miguel Lorente , defines vicarious violence as "violence that, when it seeks to hurt and harm women, instead of doing it directly, seeks to harm people who have special meaning for them." Harming a child or other person with special meaning to the true target of the violence is, of course, already a serious crime in Spanish law. A finding that the crime was a form of vicarious violence is a sentencing enhancing finding of fact by the court that makes a convicted defendant eligible for what U.S. lawyers would call "life in prison with possibility for parole" even though Google Translate provides a more literal translation from the Spanish of the words used to describe the enhanced sentence for which someone becomes eligible if this is established. Of course, there are other reasons why some people might hurt their children, such as part of a pattern of abuse toward the children unrelated to spousal abuse, for the purpose of collecting life insurance money, as part of sexual abuse, and so forth, so presumably there exist certain criteria in the Spanish legal system to distinguish these cases. Other than the legal definition set forth above, there does not appear to be any further legal guidance for the courts in determining if this sentence enhancing fact has been established. It is merely a question of fact for the judges on the court to determine based upon the evidence presented at trial by the prosecution and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Lawyers for the defendant can argue that this sentence enhancer should not apply because one of the different motives in the quoted material from the question was the actual or predominant motive, and the prosecution can argue that it was indeed vicarious violence, and then the judges have to decide whether they think that the prosecution has met its burden of proof to establish this motive and impose the enhanced sentence (which is authorized, but not required, even if it is established). This isn't going to be the easiest point to make in a typical case for the defendant. Usually, the defense is primarily going to be trying to cast doubt upon whether the prosecution has met its burden of showing that the defendant is guilty of the underlying crime at all, and, for example, having the defendant testify that he did it because he was a pedophile, rather than to hurt his wife is not going to help him all that much. Instead, I would expect that the usual approach of the defendant's lawyer would be to argue that the prosecution's evidence, if believed, supports a prosecution theory of the case that, for example, this murder was about insurance money and not about intimidating the defendant's wife. Another way the the defense could fight this sentencing enhancing claim at trial would be to argue that the specific evidence of the prosecution offer to show the defendant's alleged vicarious violence motive isn't credible in all of the ways the one generally casts doubt on the credibility of evidence in a court case. For example, the defense might offer evidence from a different witness than one offered by the prosecution that cast's doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's witness. Or, the defense might ask (or have the judges in the case ask) questions of the witness who is the key witness on the vicarious violence motive issue, that casts doubt on that witnesses' own testimony (perhaps by pointing out contradictions in the testimony or that the witnesses couldn't have been where the witness claimed to be in earlier testimony). Also, it doesn't appear that vicarious violence has to be an either/or question. Nothing in the definition of vicarious violence suggests, for example, that a defendant can't both have a motive to collect insurance money, and a motive to intimidate the child's mother, at the same time, "killing two birds with one stone" so to speak.

In the United States, prohibition against double jeopardy is a constitutional protection. As long as one was actually at jeopardy for an offence by a particular sovereign, that sovereign may not subsequently prosecute the accused for the same wrong. In other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., it has a less strict form, even though generally, special pleas of autrefois acquit would be available. It is also not the case that after an apparent "confession" in public that there is "no doubt" about a person's guilt. No evidence is "certain" in law without being tested in court. Also, you propose: you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person This does not put the acquittal into question. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. This means at law that one is deemed to be not guilty. Your scenario does not show that the trier of fact was "wrong" about the prosecution failing to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not an avenue by which the prosecution can challenge an acquittal. If a properly instructed trier of fact finds that that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, this conclusion is unassailable. You ask "where is the justice?" The justice of a system is assessed by its application across the totality of cases. Given that a system of prosecuting and judging that is run through humans will inevitably produce errors, the law has developed to promote a measure of "justice" across the entirety of the cases that are disposed of by the court rather than to futilely attempt to ensure the "correct" result in every particular case. The rule against double jeopardy has arisen out of this systemic concern for justice. It does not purport to secure the "correct" result in every case.

Is there a definition/test for "lack of merit" (legal arguments)? Say in Bob v Rob there is a legal argument about how the law applies to a certain factual situation. Bob interprets/applies the applicable law one way. Rob — a different way. Both sound reasonably serious and well-thought, not frivolous. Both require analysis to accept or reject. The judge has to make a choice and makes it, accepting Bob's interpretation and rejecting Rob's. Does that make up an objective ground to label Rob's argument meritless? Can the finding of lack of merit in situations like this be objective in principle? Or does "lack or merit" refer to something clearly fallacious i.e. straightforwardly identifiable as not holding water without analysis?

In england-and-wales, an illuminating judgement of the Court of Appeal explores the relationship between such terms as "bound to fail", "not arguable", "no rational basis", "unfounded", "misconcieved", "hopeless", "totally without merit", and "no realistic prospect of success"; Wasif v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 82. This arose in the context of a judicial review application, where procedural rules allow some claims to be rejected at an early stage, rather than proceeding to a full hearing. The normal course is that the claimant (the person who objects to a decision the government has made) will file papers with the court describing their claim. If the judge deems their case "arguable", then it can carry on, ultimately with the judge deciding who is right. If not, then there can be a "renewal hearing", where the applicant can explain their case orally, in the hope of persuading the judge that their case is arguable after all. But if the judge says the case, on the basis of the written material, is "totally without merit", then there is no renewal hearing, and we are done. The claimant could file a fresh case, if the judge's reasons for denial gave them enough clues about what might be arguable instead, or can appeal the finding. Evidently, then, some points can be not arguable, but also not totally without merit. In Wasif, the court differentiated between (paras 15ff): Cases where the judge "can see no rational basis on which the claim could succeed" are certainly bound to fail, and a hearing would be pointless; they are totally without merit. Cases which contain a rational argument, but the judge "is confident that, even taking the case at its highest, it is wrong". Notwithstanding the judge's confidence, it is possible that his mind could be changed if an oral hearing took place, so these should not be deemed to be totally without merit. They are described as "not arguable" at this stage, but the claimant gets to argue that they are arguable. The decision is one involving, well, judgement, and is not totally precise, but the experienced judges in Wasif felt that it was a realistic distinction in practice. The court points out (17(3) and (5)) that a hearing gives the claimant the chance to address specific issues the judge has noted, especially when they are self-represented and their documents are not well-prepared. In those instances, the judge might be able to spot an actual arguable claim lurking in the material, and "the correct course" could be to refuse permission but allow an oral hearing so that the real issue can be drawn out. What we can see from this is that a point might be "not arguable" (the judge thinks it is plainly wrong), but still have some level of merit at that stage (the judge is willing to let the claimant address his objections). When the judge comes to deliver his opinion at the very end, he might still say that a particular point is without merit (he has heard all about it and thinks it is completely wrong) even if he'd conceded earlier that the claimant deserved a chance to present it. Not all arguments that fail are described as "without merit". If Bob prevails in Bob v Rob it does not follow that all of Rob's points were hopeless. Judges can deploy colourful opprobrium but are just as likely to recognize that some arguments are strong, even when the opposing argument was stronger. Equally, a judge might decide that neither Bob nor Rob is completely correct, and the real answer is some other position - even when they both presented reasonable arguments that were worth hearing.

The need to prove a negative arises only from the way you've phrased the problem. In the UK, theft is defined as— dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving its legitimate owner of it. All five elements must be proved in order to secure a conviction for theft. In the case of an item removed from a store, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that— the defendant had a dishonest intent; the defendant appropriated the item (treated it as his own); the item was 'property' (straightforward in this case); the item belonged to someone else (ditto); and the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of it. Clearly proving that the defendant left the shop without paying would be an important element in proving (2) and (5) above. Note that the prosecution must prove that he left without paying, not that he did not pay. In this example, the prosecution might adduce CCTV or witness evidence of defendant leaving without paying. If the defendant did pay for the item but doesn't have a receipt, he can still give witness testimony in his own defence. The prosecution is unlikely to have strong evidence to the contrary if payment was in fact made. The totality of evidence, put before a jury or summary court, will be considered in the round when establishing guilt.

While less specific than the term mentioned by @DavidSiegel (i.e. an "Antinomy"), "impossibility", "impossibility of performance", and "impracticability" are more frequently used. If the obligation is imposed by contract rather than by a statute or regulation, the term "frustration of purpose" is also frequently used. Even more generally, a situation like this is called a "dilemma." More obscurely, sometimes this gets litigated in the frame of whether non-compliance with the law was a voluntary act, i.e. the actus reus necessary to establish a prima facie case of a violation of a law imposing a criminal or quasi-criminal penalty. The "choice of evils" doctrine could also apply although this is a much narrower doctrine excusing liability than many people believe it to be. There are also a couple of other possible outcomes. Sometimes a court would treat this situations as an implied ambiguity or inconsistency in the law that calls for the court to interpret the true meaning of the statute or regulation. For example, in this circumstance, it is implausible that the statute or regulation was intended to put good faith vaccine distributors in a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation where they would be fined no matter what they did because conforming to the law was impossible. So a court might conclude that the requirement that "If you don't use up your vaccine doses, you're getting a huge fine" contains an implied condition that this only applies if there are sufficient people who eligible to obtain the vaccination to use all of your vaccine doses (which as as matter of practicality is very likely to be true, so it is something of a false conflict as applied in most cases). But it isn't at all uncommon for people to put themselves in situations where their on ill advised or wrongful conduct puts them in a position in which now, after their prior bad acts, anything they do will be a crime or a civil offense, and they are indeed damned if they do and damned if they don't. For example, if you start to attempt to steal a car and see a baby in the back, you can either continue, and face kidnapping charges and car theft charges, or you can stop after you have already done enough to make you guilty of attempted car theft even if you abandon the crime at that point to prevent yourself for kidnapping the child. No matter what you do, you are stuck committing one crime or another. But you actions will determine which crime you will be guilty of committing. The fact that at the final moment of decision that determines which crime you will be guilty of, any choice you make will expose you to criminal liability, doesn't make these laws invalid, because this Hobson's choice (using the term only loosely) is one that you brought that on yourself.

To be valid, a point of order generally needs to be made at the time of the possible Rules violation Exceptions are where the Rules violation violates the law, where it conflicts with a previously adopted motion (other than a motion to rescind that earlier motion), or where it violates a fundamental principle. Assuming your example doesn’t do any of those things, then the point of order is moot once the vote has been taken.

There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.

This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer.

Against Bob: yes; Against Cindy: no I'm going to borrow @Trish's example because it's a good one although the conclusions they reach are wrong. Alice made a green box. Bob signs an NDA never to tell anyone that Alice made a green box, and there is a clause in it that if the NDA is breached, the box is red. Bob tells Cindy that Alice made a green box. Cindy has a patent on making green boxes. Cindy sues Alice and in the lawsuit puts Bob on the stand. Situation 1 So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. Bob is on the stand and is required to answer questions honestly and no contract can prevent him from doing so. He testifies that the box is green. This would be a breach of contract except that a clause that requires a breach of the law (perjury in this case) is void for public policy reasons so Bob cannot be sued for this. However, he can be sued for the initial breach - he may have a public policy defense here because Alice was breaking the law, however, it’s easy enough to construct a scenario where Alice was innocent but suffered loss from Bob’s disclosure. Cindy can say what she likes because she is not bound by the NDA. Cindy wins, Alice loses. Situation 2 Cindy dies - after a long and happy life so we won't grieve too much. To Bob's surprise, he inherits Cindy's green box patent of which he was previously in complete ignorance of. Bob sues Alice for breaching Cindy's now his, patent. So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. However, Bob agreed with Alice in the contract that the box is red and so, legally for matters between Alice and Bob the box is legally red (notwithstanding that everyone knows it's green) and is not in breach of Bob's patent. This sort of stuff has a name - a legal fiction. Adoption is a legal fiction - adoptive parents are (legally) parents; biological parents of adopted children are (legally) strangers. Alice wins, Bob loses.

Most of your examples don't seem to be so much self-contradictory, as limited to a subset of the obvious meaning for purposes of a particular law. When a term has a specific meaning within a particular field or context, it is often called a "term of art". For example "Fair use" is a term of art in US Copyright law, and "Under color of law" is a term of art in US civil rights law. "Standing" is a term of art in most common-law jurisdictions. But a term of art is usually somewhat broadly understood, and is not limited to one particular law or section of law. I would just call such a thing a "specially defined term" or just say "Q as defined for purposes of the XYZ law".

What is the Maximum Sentence for Contempt of Court? (USA) Is there a maximum sentence that a New Jersey Superior Court Judge can impose on someone for contempt of court? I understand that there are different types of contempt of court, so here's a made-up example to illustrate the question. Suppose person X (New Jersey resident) is ordered via subpoena to produce the key to a safe. (Suppose here that the safe is otherwise impenetrable without a key.) X admits that he has a key, but refuses to produce it. The judge threatens X with jail time until X produces the key. X continues to refuse. X is arrested and thrown in jail. At this point, would there be any limit on how long the judge could keep X in jail? I have looked through the NJ Statutes as well as other Stack Exchange questions, but I haven't found an answer on my own. In particular, this question is similar but isn't specific to New Jersey; it also isn't clear to me whether my example is one of civil, or criminal, contempt of court.

It's a maximum of 18 months imprisonment for disobeying a court order. Contempt of court is defined by the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice at section 2C:29-9.a, which includes: A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order... The sentencing for which may be found at section 2C:43-6.4: In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specific term which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.

Prosecutors have discretion The plea bargain that a prosecutor makes with an alleged criminal is up to the prosecutor subject to the limitations in Brady v United States 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Plea bargains are subject to the court’s approval but there’s nothing here that would obviously derail this deal. However, the FBI is not the only player here. The DA’s in each of the “7 [US] states” are going to want to prosecute as well.

As explained in the comments, a sentence is more than one year is the operational definition of a felony in many context concerning the collateral consequences of a sentence. For example, a sentence of more than one year causes a person to be deportable, while one of less than one year generally does not. Another consequence is that the offense will count as a prior felony in the event of a new conviction which can result in a much longer sentence for a subsequent offense. In many states, a prior felony means losing the right to vote and the ability to have or obtain a license in many professions. Sentences of more than one year are also generally served in a state prison rather than in a county jail. Both of these factors make a sentence of 366 days significantly more serious than one of 364 days.

The maximum determinate sentence for anything (outside of military law) was 21 years (in 2013 increased to 30 years for serious terrorism offenses). The law on penalties §43 says that In a sentence of detention, a time frame is set which should not normally exceed 15 years and cannot exceed 21 years. Breivik was tried once for the crime of intentional murder, and convicted -- 21 years is the sentence. I believe that Norwegian law does not have the "multiple counts" system that the US has whereby an act can be punished under multiple sections of the law or for each victim. He performed an act of killing with very many victims, so no penalty longer than 21 years is allowed.

Is there any precedent saying that a witness is immune to any crime he admits to while being a witness? Yes, there is precedent, but it unlikely to apply to your situation. The applicable type of immunity is called witness immunity. There are two types of witness immunity, transaction (aka blanket immunity) and use immunity. Both must be granted by the prosecution. Check out this article on Nolo-Legal for a description of the two: http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/immunity-exchange-testimony.html Immunity can apply to a civil case, but the prosecution's grant of immunity must specifically say so. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263–64 (1983). While there is authority for witness immunity in civil cases, the witness would be unlikely to get it. Generally, the prosecution provides immunity when they need testimony from a witness and that witness asserts their 5th amendment right against self incrimination. By providing immunity, the prosecution removes the 5th amendment concerns and the witness can then be compelled to answer the prosecution's question. This process is explained in more detail in this article. http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-prosecutors-grant-immunity-what-does-immunity-grant-mean-the-witness.html Given the way in which immunity is granted to witness, it is most likely to happen in civil cases where the government—not a private party—needs a witness's testimony. For example, a civil case brought by the government for a consumer protection, anti-trust, or securities law violations against a company. Also, the witness might want to know the statute of limitations for under-aged possession of alcohol. If it lapsed there would be no need for immunity.

The linked news story says that the journalist was detailed as a material witness. according to 18 USC § 3144 If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person ... Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. No specific time seems to be specified for which detention is allowed. What a court would consider "reasonable" would no doubt depend on the specific circumstances.

You do not automatically have the right to trial by jury in traffic court. The government only requires courts to allow trials by jury when it is not a petty offense. Refer to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968): Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). ... In the federal system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine. Since most traffic violations do not involve jail time and do not exceed a $500 fine, most traffic violations are also not eligible for jury trials as defined by the government. Presumably the law is built this way so as not clog the courts with a bunch of people demanding jury trials for very minor infractions that need not be tried by jury. The Washington State Civil Rules you reference do not grant any further rights to trial by jury not already granted otherwise. It can be quickly summed up as saying that trial by jury rights cannot be revoked, and outlines how one should go about requesting a trial by jury. If you were fined more than $500 and were denied a jury trial, consult an attorney in the area about the situation.

Your wife is legally obligated to attend the deposition. If she does not attend, the Court can summarily hold her in contempt of court, issue a warrant for her arrest, and hold her in jail until a deposition can be rescheduled and held. She can be required to answer questions under oath at the deposition for the duration shown on the subpoena, or if no duration is specified, typically for up to six or seven hours. It is not her job to decide if it is a waste of time or not.

GDPR and Storing Non-EU Citizen Data as an EU-based company I work for an EU company based in the UK and often work with clients in China and Africa (and some other non-EU countries). In the future, it may arise that we will be storing some personal information on citizens from these countries and was wondering what the GDPR laws were with reference to an EU company storing non-EU citizen data? I thought GDPR was to protect the data/information of EU citizens (from Wikipedia): General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 ("GDPR") is a regulation in EU law on data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). but wasn't sure if personal information outside of the EU was also protected. Short version: are there any GDPR considerations that must be in place when an EU company stores personal information from citizens outside of the EU?

are there any GDPR considerations that must be in place when an EU company stores personal information from citizens outside of the EU? Absolutely. The territorial scope of the GDPR is specified at Article 3: Article 3 Territorial scope This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law. As specified in point 1, the regulation applies to controllers and processors located in the EU. There is no exemption of personal data based on the data subject's nationality or location. In fact, GDPR Recitals 2 and 14 explicitly mention that nationality or residence shall not be a factor: The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence, in relation to the processing of their personal data. […]

Neither the GDPR, nor the CCPA, nor any other data protection law that I am aware of, requires that when information is deleted on request, that similar information not be collected and stored in future. Under the GDPR Article 6 there would have to be a lawful basis for any processing, including storage, assuming that the GDPR applies to the directory in question. There could be a claim that such processing was lawful under article 6(e) "performance of a task carried out in the public interest". I do not know if any such claim has been adjudicated. Thus there is no need to hold a database of previously erased records to determine if a new record should be blocked as "previously deleted". The Wikimedia Foundation, which runs Wikipedia, I believe takes the position that the GDPR does not apply to Wikipedia, I am not sure of their detailed arguments. But surely articles on well-known people, such as a former US president, would be covered under the same provisions as would cover news reports and historical books about such a person. Perhaps that would also come under article 6(e)

The ePrivacy Directive Cookies are governed in the EU by the ePrivacy Directive which was first passed in 2002, and revised in 2009. However, if a site places a cookie, and later reads the cookie and stores an indication of the cookie content, this may be personal information and thus also subject to GDPR rules. (Other privacy laws, such as the CCPA, may also impose requirements on cookie use, when they apply.) Note that the so-called "EU cookie law" is a directive and not a regulation. This means that it is up to the various EU countries to implement it in their national legislation, and different countries may implement it in different ways. It would be the actual laws in individual EU countries that would be binding on website operators, and I am not going to try to find and analyze all the various laws on the topic. Paragraph 25 of the directive (linked above) reads: However, such devices, for instance so-called "cookies", can be a legitimate and useful tool, for example, in analysing the effectiveness of website design and advertising, and in verifying the identity of users engaged in on-line transactions. Where such devices, for instance cookies, are intended for a legitimate purpose, such as to facilitate the provision of information society services, their use should be allowed on condition that users are provided with clear and precise information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC about the purposes of cookies or similar devices so as to ensure that users are made aware of information being placed on the terminal equipment they are using. Users should have the opportunity to refuse to have a cookie or similar device stored on their terminal equipment. This is particularly important where users other than the original user have access to the terminal equipment and thereby to any data containing privacy-sensitive information stored on such equipment. Information and the right to refuse may be offered once for the use of various devices to be installed on the user's terminal equipment during the same connection and also covering any further use that may be made of those devices during subsequent connections. The methods for giving information, offering a right to refuse or requesting consent should be made as user-friendly as possible. Access to specific website content may still be made conditional on the well-informed acceptance of a cookie or similar device, if it is used for a legitimate purpose. This should mean, if implemented straightforwardly, that cookies, beyond those absolutely essential to the operation of a site, can only be placed if a user is notified of the intention to place them, and freely consents. This can be done once per user, on an initial session. Users are supposed to be provided with provided with "clear and precise information". I do not think a simple statement that the site uses cookies fulfills this. At the very least the purposes for which cookies will be used should be provided. The directive does not make clear what level of detail about individual cookies such a notice must provide. The notice described in the question neither describes the purpose of cookie placement, nor does it offer any meaningful choice to accept or reject them. As such, I do not think it would be compliant with the directive. If cookies are read back (which is after all pretty much the point of having them) and can be potentially identified with an individual, then under the GDPR (article 6) there must be a lawful basis for processing them, and the interaction above would not be enough to establish consent as a lawful basis. There might be some other basis that does not require consent, however. Interpretations from others This page from cookiebot explains some of the history of the directive, and how it contrasts with the GDPR (which is a regulation, and so is directly applicable without the action of national legislatures). This page from The Verge discusses recent changes in the directive and the guidelines for applying it, and criticizes how it has been complied with, and ignored, by many sites. Cookies and the GDPR This page, "GDPR, and the ePrivacy Directive", from GDPR.EU says: ... cookies, insofar as they are used to identify users, qualify as personal data and are therefore subject to the GDPR. Companies do have a right to process their users’ data as long as they receive consent or if they have a legitimate interest. Passed in the 2002 and amended in 2009, the ePrivacy Directive (EPD) has become known as the “cookie law” since its most notable effect was the proliferation of cookie consent pop-ups after it was passed. It supplements (and in some cases, overrides) the GDPR, addressing crucial aspects about the confidentiality of electronic communications and the tracking of Internet users more broadly. To comply with the regulations governing cookies under the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive you must: Receive users’ consent before you use any cookies except strictly necessary cookies. Provide accurate and specific information about the data each cookie tracks and its purpose in plain language before consent is received. Document and store consent received from users. Allow users to access your service even if they refuse to allow the use of certain cookies Make it as easy for users to withdraw their consent as it was for them to give their consent in the first place. That page also describes the proposed ePrivacy Regulation which, if passed, will replace the current directive, and links to drafts of it. Conclusion The site described in the question probably does not comply with legislation implementing the ePrivacy directive. Depending on where it is hosted and targeted, and what it does with cookies that it sets, it may fail to comply with the GDPR as well. There has been very little enforcement of the directive so far. This may change in the future, particularly if it is replaced by a regulation, as has been proposed.

Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area.

GDPR killing genealogy websites? I could see GDPR totally killing genealogy websites if they follow the rules strictly, but would they really want to do that. Seems to me genealogy has an important historical role. Treat living persons with anonymization I assume you don't have data to identify a person or contact the living person. How would you contact to get consent to show personal information if you only have a name, impossible right? GDPR tries to stop abuse of personal data, yes, and your family tree certainly is personal data. However those who come to your website would mostly want to search and edit the non-living, search back in the history, thus the current generation follows the family tree and are not the point of entry. You can provide certain anonymization to those alive by not displaying the first names in full, maybe just the first letter. You may want to hide address, spouse, children for current generation. You could make those available for view/edit first by going through a secondary login, "not a robot". Further you may remove living people from search results and hide from search engines so they do not have ability to index the current generation. That would make it harder to abuse if you're going after an individual, but at the same time doesn't lock out the people providing information.

There are two relevant bodies of EU law to consider here. The GDPR covers processing of personal data. Personal data is any data where the data subject can be identified directly or indirectly. The ePrivacy directive is also relevant, and covers how you may access and store information on the user's device. Directives are not directly applicable law. Instead every member state translates the directive into national law. In the UK, ePrivacy is implemented by PECR. Is the data you collect personal data in the sense of the GDPR? Yes: that hashed unique device ID or a system-provided advertising ID likely is personal data, and any linked data would then be personal data as well. This is going to be the case in particular if you store user accounts on your server and can connect these bug reports to a user. Consider also whether the game save could include personal data, and whether the video clip could be analyzed to identify the data subject. Does this mean collecting this information in bug reports is forbidden? No, the GDPR doesn't forbid or allow anything outright. Instead, you should go through the compliance process. In a nutshell: determine the purpose of this processing, e.g. “fixing bugs” find an Art 6 legal basis for this purpose, e.g. “Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest” or “Art 6(1)(a) consent” if the legal basis is legitimate interest, you must balance that interest against the data subject's interests determine whether your compliance requirements include creating/updating your Records of Processing, or whether you have to write a Data Protection Impact Assessment implement the processing in a manner that respects GDPR principles such as Transparency and Data Minimization if the legal basis is legitimate interest you must implement an opt-out solution if the legal basis is consent, you must request consent first in a manner that satisfies the Art 7 conditions for consent – and allow consent to be revoked easily prepare to satisfy data subject rights: information requirements per Art 13, usually done in the privacy policy right to access, rectification, erasure, and data portability right to object (opt-out) and to restrict processing be aware of your general requirements a data controller to process this data securely, e.g. use HTTPS connections to transmit bug reports, take steps to protect your own accounts (e.g. 2FA), and ensure you have a suitable contract with any data processors that act on your behalf, e.g. cloud providers or contractors I would question whether your bug reports really need to include a device ID. That isn't forbidden, it just complicates compliance a bit. And what about ePrivacy? The ePrivacy directive is known for its cookie consent requirements. But these consent requirements apply when accessing any information on the user's device, or when applying equivalent fingerprinting techniques. Your game save is not an issue because it is necessary for the game. But that device ID and other system information is more difficult. So what to do? Compliance isn't trivial, but certainly possible. You will likely process the bug reports under your legitimate interest, but might still have to collect consent for accessing a system ID due to ePrivacy. Such a screen might look like this: Oh no, the game crashed! Do you want to send a bug report to the developers? Your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, collect system information and send bug report No, do not send bug report You could make an argument that a bug report can be sent in any case, and that you just need ePrivacy consent to collect useful system information. For example: Oh no, the game crashed! When sending a bug report to developers, do you want to include extra system information (link to details) that helps fixing the problem? In any case, your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, send bug report with extra system information No, send anonymous report

Does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list? tl;dr: No. I have never heard of this, and I don't see how this could follow from the GDPR. You should follow up with the Secretary to find out how she came to her conclusion. Detailed reasoning: The GDPR restricts the processing of personal data, so it does in principle cover reading email, since reading counts as "processing", and an email may contain personal data. However, Article 2 (emphasis mine) says that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. I would read this to mean that a human reading emails is only covered by GDPR if the emails are part of a "filing system" or intended to be. So reading the emails is ok, it's only problematic if you intend to systematically store them. Even filing them, while covered by GDPR, would presumably be allowed, because to actually act on the email, you would have to keep it, and Article 6 allows processing of personal data to "take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract" and when "processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller". One caveat: If the email contains data that falls under special categories of personal data (Article 9) you may need explicit consent for storage. That covers things like racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs and health information. So if someone discloses a health problem or their religious belief in their mail, you may need to ask them for permission to keep it. In summary: At most, GDPR would require you to promptly delete the email once you no longer need it (which could be immediately if the email is irrelevant to you). If the email contains data you legitimately need (e.g. a complaint you need to follow up on), you are allowed to keep it as required (based on Article 6 (f)). Note that in both cases no explicit consent is required from the email sender, unless the email contains particularly sensitive data, such as political/religious beliefs or health data.

If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.

Our company is based in the UK. We have users who are located in the USA, are these users protected by GDPR? Our company is based in the UK. We have users who are located in the USA, are these users protected by GDPR? Any help on this questions would be much appreciated!

Yes When personal data is processed in the context of an EU/EEA/UK establishment (for example, by a company with offices in the UK), then all these processing activities must fully comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the data subjects are located. For the UK GDPR: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the United Kingdom, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the United Kingdom or not. For the EU GDPR: The GDPR applies to: a company or entity which processes personal data as part of the activities of one of its branches established in the EU, regardless of where the data is processed; or …

GDPR does not require consent. It requires a legal basis. Consent is only one legal basis among many. Some other legal bases are: legitimate interest (implying an opt out solution) necessity for performance of a contract If your customers pay you to deliver email updates, that contract is the legal basis for sending email updates. The only wrinkle is that as you describe your service, the emails aren't an essential part of the service. Alternatively, you might assert that there's a legitimate interest to deliver updates via email so that updates aren't missed. In that case you must allow the users to object, e.g. via ab unsubscribe link in the email and via their account settings. Because a prior business relationship exists, there's a strong case for legitimate interest – even if this were marketing emails (!). Legitimate interest requires you to balance the legitimate interest with the data subject's rights and freedoms though. Your updates are most likely not marketing, so any advice you might read relating to marketing emailings is irrelevant. GDPR applies because you are established in the EU. The regulation applies in relation to all your users, not just EU users. If and when Brexit happens you will still be covered by the Data Protection Act, which transcribes the GDPR's requirements into UK law. However, processing data from EU users will then count as an international transfer which requires extra compliance work, at least until the EU issues an adequacy decision for the UK.

An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option.

You do not have to prove that you are an EU citizen, because EU citizenship is entirely irrelevant to the GDPR. Have a look at Article 3, which basically says that GDPR applies if you are in the EU or if the company is in the EU. If the company is in the EU, therefore, you do not need to send them anything or prove anything about yourself to invoke GDPR. If the company is outside the EU, you can send proof of address or other evidence that you are in the EU, which might be something that they already have, like your IP address.

In short, no. Article 20 of the GDPR covers the “Right to data portability”, which essentially says two main things: The data subject had the right to an exported copy of their personal data in a common format And The data subject has the right to have this data transmitted directly from one controller to another where technically feasible. Neither of these rights as stated in the GDPR require the data controller to provide a button to initiate either a data export or a transfer to another controller.

Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.

The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.

Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.

Are online file converters legal? Online file converter: Web-based tool or service that allows you to convert files from one format to another through the internet. Users upload a file in a specific format, it is converted on the site's server into a different format of their choice, without the need to install any software or applications on their device. Online file converters support a wide range of file types, including documents, images, videos, audio files, and more. Let's assume for the sake of simplicity that we're talking about ethical online converters that don't collect/sell/share any information about the files uploaded by the users, so the file really makes a private round trip. I'm wondering about the legal responsibility of these online converters, as they're essentially redistributing derivative work of pretty much anything you give them, whether or not you're allowed to modify them in the first place. The derivative work is downloaded from their servers at some point in time. This question is a bit related to the issue of uploading copyrighted material to social media (with the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act in the USA), except that the files here are only supposed to be downloaded by the same person who uploaded them (a private link is created and will expire quickly). Additional assumptions (bonus): What if a website detects that a lot of users upload the same files and implements a cache? The converted files would then be stored in the medium-long term, but still only privately accessible only by people who have the original file (and site owners). That would probably already be illegal in the UK but I don't know about EU or USA. What if we have a cache and the files are encrypted with a hash of the source file, rendering their access practically impossible without the original, even for site owners?

Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).

Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.

Recall the basic principle of copyright law, as detailed in 17 USC 106: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to make copies; prepare derivative works; or distribute copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending. Other people can legally do these things only if they are given permission by the copyright holder, typically via a license. (Remember, the literal meaning of the word license is permission.) Often, the copyright holder will require a prospective licensee to accept various terms and conditions before the license will be granted. If there is "no EULA", or if there is one but the purchaser has not agreed to its terms, then the purchaser has not been granted any such license, hence does not have permission to do any of the things listed above. If they do so anyway, it is illegal copyright infringement and they will be liable for damages. To use a firewall analogy, copyright law is "default deny". So let's take your questions one by one: Do they own the software? US law has no concept of literally owning software. The closest thing is owning the copyright, which the purchaser certainly does not. It still belongs to the vendor that wrote the software (or whoever they may have later transferred it to). Can they legally alter the code of the program they purchased? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. The copyright holder has not granted them a license to do that. (There are some exceptions for purposes such as reverse engineering and interoperability, see 17 USC 1201(f)). Can they legally redistribute it No; again, that is the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the purchaser has not received their permission. or transfer ownership? Maybe, if the first sale doctrine applies. Its application to software is complicated. The user has a better case for being able to sell the software if it exists as some tangible object which is transferred (physical media, pre-installed on hardware, etc). Can they legally modify the code of the program for others who have also purchased the same package? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. Can they take that software and install it on a secondary machine? No, that would be making a copy.

As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).

First of all there is no such thing as "fair use" in the UK, that is a specifically US legal concept, and it does not apply in the UK. The UK has a legal concept that is somewhat similar, known as "fair dealing" but it is much more limited than the US concept of fair use. See this Wikipedia article and this page from the British Library In general Fair Dealing is an exception to copyright that permits use for: purposes of research or private study; purposes of criticism, review or quotation; purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) None of those seem to apply to an image from a TV show or film modified to add two additional characters as if they had appeared in the original. Unless somehow this is being used for criticism of the original, but the question does not mention any such criticism. The Wikipedia article says: Under United Kingdom law, an infringer relying on fair dealing as a defence must show that their actions fall into a specific category of acceptable use, as opposed to the "illustrative open list of purposes" in US law.[4] The fair dealing exceptions had previously been formalised in case law as "fair use" forms, but this was eliminated by the Copyright Act 1911. The use as described in the question appears to be a case of copyright infringement by creating a derivative work. It does not seem to come under fair dealing in the UK, and might well not be a valid fair use under US law, either. Whether any profit is made by the infringer is not relevant. Whether the market for the original is harmed is relevant, but not decisive. However, when used for a small private circulation of less than 10 copies, it is unlikely that the copyright owner would sue, or indeed would ever learn of the existence of the infringement. if posted to the net, however, this is much less safe. Programs exist to make automated searches of the web or of images listed on search engines for images similar to a copyrighted work. If such a search finds a similar image, the copyright holder might choose to file an infringement suit. This is entirely up to the copyright holder. Such a suit might result in significant damages. It is not, however, likely to lead to criminal prosecution unless mass commercial infringement is discovered. One of the things copyright protects is the right to create, or authorize the creation of, derivative works. Thus it is never correct to say that something is "mine because it is derivative". If the derivative work is made without permission, and the original is protected by copyright, than simply making the derivative work is a copyright infringement, jsut like making an unauthorized copy of the original. Fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in the UK) is such an exception to copyright. Several of the EU nations have exceptions similar (but not identical) to the UK fair dealing. These are often called "fair dealing" when discussed in English. Most include exceptions for criticism and classroom instruction. None are as broad as the US fair use concept, to the best of my understanding. The only way to be fully lawful about this would be to contact the copyright holder and request permission for the derivative work, and get it. I cannot say if the holder would grant such permission, or on what terms. The holder has no duty to grant permission on any terms, or even to reply to a request. No reply must be treated the same as a reply of "No!", I am afraid.

If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.

There is no general prohibition against taking down material, even non-infringing material, which is posted by some person, but there is a risk to the service provider. Abstracting away from the specifics of github, a Provider has some agreement with the User whereby User rightfully makes Stuff available on Provider's site. Arbitrarily removing Stuff (in violation of the usage agreement) may cause damage to User, who may sue Provider, and Provider will avoid that if possible. DMCA protects Provider from copyright infringement suits by Victim, providing the proper DMCA procedure is followed, and it allows Provider to remove Stuff without fear of getting sued by User (17 USC 512(g)). This protection is not available if the takedown notice is not proper. (As a case in point, the entire series of Harry Potter books is still out there freely on the internet, because only the rights holder can demand a takedown, and the rights holder seems to not be concerned).

A frequent distinction between the two situations is that usually, you buy the actual physical thing (DVD, VHS, CD, book, etc.), but for a purely digital asset, you may be only buying a restricted licence to the asset (on iTunes, for example). In the case where you did buy the digital asset (not simply a restricted licence to it), another difference is that the transfer of a physical item does not implicate the reproduction right1 that is given exclusively to copyright owners. However, transfer of a digital asset often does implicate that reproduction right. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.: It is also undisputed that Capitol did not approve the reproduction or distribution of its copyrighted recordings on ReDigi’s website. Thus, if digital music files are “reproduce[d]” and “distribute[d]” on ReDigi’s website within the meaning of the Copyright Act, Capitol’s copyrights have been infringed. It is a different situation if you transfer the actual medium onto which you downloaded the digital content (ibid.): Section 109(a) still protects a lawful owner’s sale of her “particular” phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file was originally downloaded. Notes 1. 17 USC §106 (1) "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to [...] reproduce the copyrighted work..." This answer assumes US jurisdiction, but Canada's Copyright Act is fairly similar to 17 USC and similar holdings have been made in Canada.

Is it possible for there to be no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's own home (bought , not rented)? In privacy invasion torts, the act of privacy invasion needs to be carried out in a place where the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and it's often said by people that privacy invasion by someone outside one's house would always be a violation of law. Is this true ?

The assessment of a reasonable expectation of privacy is based on the totality of the circumstances. This applies in both the context of unreasonable searches and in the context of the tort of invasion of privacy. See generally: Heckert v. 5470 Investments Ltd., 2008 BCSC 1298 at para. 81-82 (a lower court decision, but summarizing Canada Supreme Court jurisprudence). One might have a reasonable expectation of privacy at a restaurant and one might not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a personal residence. When an insurance company was conducting surveillance from the street into a home via open windows, it was found in those circumstances that the privacy interest was low: Although her expectation of privacy may legitimately be higher while in her house, on the night in question the blinds were open and the lights were on. Therefore, anyone could have seen her helping her daughter while just passing by the house. Further, Ms. Milner ought to have reasonably known that Manulife was investigating her claim and that it was possible that video surveillance would be used. Thus, her entitlement to privacy on the evening in question was low. Milner v Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2005 BCSC 1661 (CanLII), at para 83, https://canlii.ca/t/1m4qx#par83, retrieved on 2023-04-12 On the other hand, when a neighbor installed cameras angled so as to capture surveillance of the interior of another neighbor's home, the surveilled neighbor had a high privacy interest: the Halls ... did, at all times, have a reasonable expectation of privacy when inside their own home. Unlike, the investigator in the Milner case, the dispute with Mr. Wasserman did not entitle him to any information that might be obtained as a result of surveillance of activities inside the Hall residence. Accordingly, the Halls’ expectation of privacy inside their home was very high throughout the entirety of the dispute. Wasserman v. Hall, 2009 BCSC 1318 (CanLII), at para 77, https://canlii.ca/t/25tgf#par77, retrieved on 2023-04-12

There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf

I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.

You must comply with the law even on your own property Things like handrails and fencing of potential falls are almost always subject to local building codes. "[S]ome netting" is unlikely to be compliant except as a temporary measure. In addition, materially changing the functionality so that it becomes less safe, even if it complies, may expose you to liability if someone gets injured. Such as if the new handrail is replacing one which had measures to prevent someone from slipping under them. Harassment I'm unfamiliar with Swiss harassment laws but they usually require unwanted behaviour that offends, humiliates, intimidates, or creates a hostile environment and must usually be directed at a protected characteristic. Offending someone because you don't like them is fine; offending them because they are a woman is not. A neighbour raising concerns with you, your contractors, or the authorities is not harassment. Nor is exercising his legal right to bring a lawsuit. If it persists beyond what is reasonable it may cross over into stalking, but that's not harassment either.

My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.

Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.

It turns out that there is no difference between the ethical answer and the legal answer, in this case. The law recognizes the property right which a person has when they create a thing, such as a font, and that right is encoded in the law of copyright. The relevant US federal code is contained in Title 17, which you can read (essentially identical laws exist in virtually or perhaps actually all countries). The important thing to understand is that there is not a distinction between "privately" trespassing on a person's property and "publicly" trespassing on a person's property. The violation of the owner's property rights comes from taking the material without consent. There is a legally-recognized exception to the owner's rights, in the form of "fair use", which is widely misunderstood to mean "if it's not for profit, the property owner has no legal protection". Simply taking and using someone else's IP non-commercially is not "fair use".

No it is not legal; it is trespassing. the common law definition of trespassing is to enter someone's land or property without their permission. By locking the door they have denied permission to everyone except those to whom they have given a key. If someone finds a key that happens to fit the lock, there is no longer a physical restriction but as they do not have permission, the legal restriction is still in force.

Onlyfans account leaked to my family I have an OnlyFans account which for obvious reasons I kept secret from everyone. But somehow someone has leaked its content (perhaps a friend or an ex-partner who wanted to take a revenge on me). He/she sent an anonymous email to my family with a link to my page. My family was shocked, my father almost had a heart attack. I went to the police (I live in the UK) and asked what could be done to investigate and potentially sue the person behind the mail. But they told me that since the link is public no law has been infringed. Is this really the case? Any help would be greatly appreciated!

What you do in public is public There is no crime in effectively saying to another person “Hey, look at this.”

It doesn't really require anything beyond your say-so that it is what you say it is; that would be enough to satisfy the requirement for authentication. From there though, as with any evidence, it's going to be up to a jury to decide how much weight to give the evidence. So the more you can show them to prove that the record is real -- and to knock down any questions the opposing party will raise -- the more likely they are to believe it. So if you just bring a printout that looks like it could easily have been forged, the jury may be thinking about that. If you can bring in a data forensics expert to say the document couldn't have been faked, that's probably going to help. Addendum: As a practical matter, I wouldn't expect this to be much of an issue. Unless you're dealing with a savvy opposing party, the authenticity of e-mails seems to be generally assumed. Courts (1) generally assume that parties aren't perpetrating frauds; and (2) are generally run by judges with little to no technical savvy, who don't realize that one could forge an e-mail, let alone all the different ways it could be done. I've personally entered countless e-mail printouts without them being questioned, even though either party could have just gone down into the e-mail thread and changed what the other side had said earlier in the conversation. To avoid the issue, though, it might be that sending the e-mail to a Gmail account would elimimate the question.

People running web servers are generally liable for contributory culpability, when some user breaks the law by putting the material on the server. There are legal mechanisms for relieving the server guy from this burden. The best-known mechanism is "DMCA takedown", where you publish contact information so that an offended person can serve up a proper legal claim that you are distributing material that they own copyright to. If you follow the rules, you may enjoy "safe harbor" protection against contributory liability: one of the requirements is that you have to take infringing material down. The specific requirements can depend on the nature of the liability and jurisdiction, but generally involves a "hands off" involvement where the person has no knowledge of what's going on on his server. So just disclaiming responsibility does not work. There are other more serious violations, such as distribution of child porn or transmission of top secret information. Jurisdiction is not totally central to internet questions, and I could sue you (the server guy) in US courts, or (depending on the offense: copyright infringement of a particular item) in UK courts. Nailing this down specifically to Sweden is harder, but recall that The Pirate Bay had a whopping judgment against them.

You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program & the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade.

The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%.

Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on.

A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.

There's a legal issue, and a practical issue. If you witness a crime, you can inform the police and something may happen. The FBI does actually investigate criminal copyright infringement, but they also don't respond to concerned-citizen complaints, only complaints of copyright holders (and not all of them). You cannot use DMCA takedown to get the service provider to remove the content (or shut down the site, or whatever would be necessary), since only the copyright holder can make the required sworn statements. So you have no legal recourse. A practical solution is to tell Google. This link could have been a way to inform them, but it seems to always resolve to identifying plausible DMCA takedown requests, and if you truthfully answer the "are you the copyright holder" question, you are told to go away. Even if you lie at the preliminary stage, the procedure ends with you making a sworn statement, and you can't lie on one of those. This information might allow you to send them a letter, which they might read. They might simply not consider it worth their time.

Are legislators ever asked to explain their intent in Supreme Court cases? I recently started to listen to recordings of arguments before the Supreme Court. I am not a lawyer so I don't completely follow everything, but I noticed right away that a lot of arguments deal with the intent of this or that law. Given that this is such an important focus, have arguments before the Supreme Court ever involved testimony of some sort from legislators who drafted the laws being debated, explaining what they really intended the law to mean? I noticed that attorneys even bring up how a certain word in a law is defined in the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary. Wouldn't it make more sense just to ask those who wrote a law to explain what was meant (assuming they are still alive)?

Many jurists do accept that it is appropriate to attempt to ascertain the "legislative intent" as part of the exercise of statutory interpretation, but legislative intent is not an aggregate of the subjective intentions of individual legislators. I am not aware of any question of statutory interpretation that was informed by testimony from staffers or legislators who drafted, debated, or enacted a law. For some rationale, see Judge Easterbrook's foreward to Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner's Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts: Legislative intent is a fiction, a back-formation from other and often undisclosed sources. Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it "intends" only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others say something else... how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? canada Even evidence of what was said in Parliamentary debate is treated cautiously (R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761): First, the intent of particular members of Parliament is not the same as the intent of the Parliament as a whole. Thus, it may be said that the corporate will of the legislature is only found in the text of provisions which are passed into law. Second, the political nature of Parliamentary debates brings into question the reliability of the statements made. Different members of the legislature may have different purposes in putting forward their positions. That is to say the statements of a member made in the heat of debate or in committee hearings may not reflect even that member's position at the time of the final vote on the legislation. Legislative intent is determined by looking at the words, the scheme, and the object of the provision (R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, paragraph 16).

Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.

Canada's local court systems and procedural rules vary, especially at the lowest level, by province. So, I'm just stating some general principals. General speaking legal arguments are limited to closing arguments of the parties after all of the evidence has been presented by both sides (because this limits legal arguments to those with evidentiary support rather than merely hypothetical arguments). Opening arguments are usually supposed to be limited to a recitation of what the facts in the case will show. Presentation of evidence and examination of witnesses is also not a time for this to be done. Some courts in some jurisdictions allow a defendant to make a "half-time motion" at the close of the prosecution's case, arguing that the prosecution has failed to meet their burden of proof to establish grounds for a conviction before the defense presents the defense's evidence. But, such formalities are often dispensed with in traffic court. Some courts allow post-trial motions to be made after a verdict within a certain number of days set by court rule asking the court to reconsider its decision or overturn a jury verdict, although these aren't always available in a traffic court case. Sometimes these issues are also raised in a pre-trial trial brief or in motion practice prior to trial. The amount of time allowed for closing, and discretion to consider arguments at times other than time usually allowed are in the discretion of the trial judge. Usually, courts are more lenient regarding formalities when a non-attorney is arguing a case. Usually, there is less opportunity to raise legal arguments following a trial if the traffic court is not a court of record and appeal is by trial de novo in a higher court, and there is more opportunity to do so if the trial is in a "court of record" in which a transcript is maintained and if the trial is a jury trial (although in a jury trial, the legal arguments are made out of the presence of the jury in a hearing over jury instructions, rather than before the jury). In a traffic case in a court of record, in front of a judge, five or ten minutes, at most, would be typical and trial briefs would rarely be considered, but the judge might listen longer or take the case under advisement and ask for further briefing, if the judge thinks that there is merit to a legal argument and wants to do further research (which would be extremely unusual in a traffic case).

Indian Constitution provides for a Federal government in which power of states and centres are clearly enunciated. If there is a dispute over any issue Supreme Court can decide whether State government is correct, or whether Central government is correct. Any law of Parliament affects the entire population of India, and so all states are affected by that law. If any state government considers that the law is not as per constitutional norms, it can easily go to the Supreme Court for decision. So, the observation of the Supreme Court that a state is bound by the law of Parliament, is incorrect. If an individual can file such a case, a state is also entitled to file it. The Supreme Court should decide it on the basis of merit. So I think the observation of Supreme Court in this case is not correct.

In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue.

As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.

In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.

That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.

Why did this US prosecutor keep asking whether documents would refresh a witness's memory? Background I served on a jury during a criminal trial in the United States several years ago. There was a strangely formal interaction that repeated itself a few times during the trial. The prosecutor, while holding some document, would ask a question which required the witness to recall some specific detail. The witness would reply "I don't remember." The prosecutor would then ask "Would looking at [some document] refresh your memory?", to which the witness would answer "Yes." The prosecutor would then hand the document to the witness, who would look at it and then answer the question. It's obvious that the prosecutor already knew the question wouldn't be answerable without reference to the report or document - that's why they were holding it. But then why perform the dance of "do you recall" / "no" / "would this refresh your memory" / "yes"? The Question It's clear the witness needs the document to answer the prosecutor's question, so what's the value in the prosecutor asking the witness the question the first time without the document? Disclaimer (it may be that this was simply this prosecutor's way of phrasing questions, rather than a feature of the United States criminal judicial system. If that's the case this question won't be answerable, since it calls for knowing the mindset of a specific individual. If so, let me know and I'll delete it) Further information In the real-life situation I found myself in, the witness was for the prosecution. However, I'm equally interested in answers (such as hszmv's) that explain why the adversarial lawyer might also use this technique, if relevant.

united-states Witnesses are generally confined to giving testimony from their own personal memory; most of the time, they can't read a statement into the record or just tell the jury to go look at some other piece of evidence. But this creates problems when a witness knows an important fact but doesn't remember it when she takes the stand. Maybe she counted exactly how much money she stuffed in the robber's bag as she was doing it, and she wrote it down as soon as he fled, but a year later, she can't remember that it was $93,736.45. But the prosecutor isn't allowed to just give the witness a stack of evidence and let her go hunting through the documents to answer each question. Instead,he goes through the "Do you remember" colloquy to lay the necessary foundation to refresh the witness's memory, as contemplated by Rule 612, which then also triggers certain rights for the opposing party with respect to the document used to refresh the witness's memory.

Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect.

united-states Perjury only applies to someone who actually does testify and is untruthful. A person who refuses to testify at all, when ordered to do so by a subpoena, is committing contempt of court. It is possible, in principle, for the court to order them jailed indefinitely until they do testify (civil contempt). It is also possible for them to be prosecuted criminally afterward (criminal contempt).

To what degree are such emails admissible in court as evidence, and what weight do they carry? Your own statement, when offered by you as evidence, is hearsay, unless it comes within an exception to that rule. Recorded recollection might be one of the better exceptions. There is also a chance that you could get it in as a business record of the company if you were using a company email account and the company stores all of its email communications. The documents also sometimes come in to provide fair context for a conversation with a party-opponent's statements that are admissible. It appears that Canada does not follow the modern British rule (which repealed the hearsay rule in civil cases in 1995), which if it were available, would come in without any difficulty at all. But, Canada does have what it calls a "principled exception" (which is somewhat broader than the parallel U.S. residual hearsay exception) that is generally available if the document can be shown to be reliable and there is an unavailable witness, or if there proponent of the document can show that it is reliable and necessary for other reasons. Even if the document itself is not admissible since it is hearsay, you could still testify as to what the boss said from your own recollection, and then have your lawyer ask you why you are sure that this is what was said. You would answer that you contemporaneously wrote a confirming letter to the boss spelling out what was said and you reviewed it to refresh your recollection before testifying at the hearing or trial. These kinds of confirming letters are used quite frequently in business and employment litigation. And, in my experience, these statements tend to be surprisingly effective and persuasive, because, while they do not foreclose the possibility that the person writing it was lying or inaccurate in the confirming email account, it does rule out the possibility that you forgot exactly what was said, and you provided the boss with an opportunity to dispute you which the boss didn't feel an obligation to correct. If one party has a coherent account in confirming emails of what was said, and the other party is trying to remember what happened a year or two earlier without notes from the witness stand, the person with the coherent, documented account is almost always going to come across as more credible unless the other side can show that your confirming emails are not infrequently gross misrepresentations of what really occurred. (I've also dealt with witnesses like that now and then.)

It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.

It doesn't really matter exactly what the judge says as long as it's clear whether the judge is sustaining or overruling the objection. With that said, in movies you'll rarely see the person asking the question get to respond to the objection, but you'll notice in the trial that happens in most cases. For example, if one party objects that a question calls for hearsay, the examiner may defend their question by pointing out that the statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, or that it falls into one of the hearsay exceptions. At that point the judge is responding to both parties and someone else or possibly multiple people have spoken since the objection was originally raised, so she might specify that she's "overruling the objection" as opposed to just saying overruled, so it just makes it clearer on the record what she's ruling about. It's worth noting as well that she might need to specify which objection she's sustaining if more than one objection is raised. In this trial both hearsay and relevance objections have been raised at the same time, and the judge might specify that she's sustaining e.g. only relevance. This can tell the examiner whether they are free to keep going down the same line of questioning with different questions, if the objection sustained was hearsay, or to move to another line of questioning, if the objection sustained was relevance.

Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare

Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected.

What does in between them mean? An applicant seeking registration to act as a trustee shall have in its employment a minimum of two persons who, between them, have atleast five years experience in activities related to securitisation and atleast one among them shall have a professional qualification in law from any university or institution recognised by the Central Government or any State Government or a foreign university. What does in between them mean in the above statement do both the employee should have 5 years experience each or the experience jointly be of 5 years.

What it means is that when you add together the total experience of both employees, it must be equal to or greater than 5 years. So Employee A and B can have experience such that one has 1 year and the other has 4 or one has 2 and the other 3 or one has Zero and the other has 5 (debatable... if both employees need experience this might be out of the question). They could work the same calendar years and count them as separate years of experience.

NO (mostly). Servitude means that the employer, or owner of the indenture, or whatever, can use physical force to make the indentee carry out the work given. If the indentee runs away they can be arrested and forcibly returned. This is distinct from the law of contracts. If Alice agrees to provide labour for Bob and subsequently fails to fulfil the contract then Alice may have to pay damages, but that is all. Even in cases of crminial fraud where Alice never meant to provide the labour in the first place, the penalty is defined by law, and would not be the provision of the contracted labour. As the OP notes, military service is generally an indenture-style contract; desertion is a crime. However the other party in that case is the government acting under law rather than a third party acting in their own self-interest. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits all forms of servitude.

Unfortunately your employer is right. The rule says that in order for FMLA to apply to you, you must work at a location with 50 or more employees within 75 miles. Your client is not your employer, even if your employer considers it a place of business. This is outlined in 29 USC 2611 (2)(B)(ii): (1) Commerce The terms “commerce” and “industry or activity affecting commerce” mean any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce, and include “commerce” and any “industry affecting commerce”, as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 142 of this title. (2) Eligible employee   (A) In general The term “eligible employee” means an employee who has been employed—      (i) for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this title; and      (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period. (B) Exclusions The term “eligible employee” does not include—      (i) any Federal officer or employee covered under subchapter V of chapter 63 of title 5; or      (ii) any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50. So if you had 50 workers within 75 miles of you (regardless of state borders), then you would be eligible, unfortunately since you do not have that, you are not eligible for FMLA. The number of workers at the office that are not employed by your employer do not count. You are right that the reason for the 50 employee rule is to lessen an undue burden on an employer without adequate resources to cover your absence, but you don't have a case since you are not defined as an "eligible employee" by law.

Generally the insurer appoints a solicitor from its panel and instructs the solicitor to defend the claim in the name of the insured on the basis of the insurance policy. In the circumstances the solicitor has two clients, the insured and the insurer - a 'joint retainer'. The solicitor must not behave as if there is a 'primary client' or preferred client. A conflict of interest may arise. The solicitor has a duty not to act in the matter if there is a conflict of interest or a significant risk of one. The solicitor should ensure the insurer is aware of its duty to have regard to its own interests and the insured's interests. If the solicitor gets this wrong the insured may have a cause of action against the solicitor for breach of contract; the solicitor may face disciplinary proceedings for breaching the solicitor's Code of Conduct; a complaint could be addressed to the Legal Ombudsman (which may award compensation).

It means that the agreement lasts for 6 months under which confidential information (CI) provided must be kept secret for 3 years. So lets say you signed this agreement on January 1, 2018. Any CI materials provided between Jan-1 2018 to Jun-30 2018 must be kept confidential up until January 1, 2021 (3 years from the effective date). However if you received a CI material on July 1, 2018 the NDA would have expired and you would not be obligated to keep it confidential at all. These types of short-term NDA's require careful oversight because it is easy to forget that the NDA has expired and start providing CI to third parties not obligated to keep them confidential because the NDA expired. So, in short, it means that anything provided as CI during the 6-month term of the NDA must be kept confidential for 3 years. After 6 months the NDA is no longer in effect and care must be taken in exchange of CI to third parties.

There is no requirement that a will, or a trust created by a will, be "fair". The will could have left $500,000 in trust for one set of siblings, and $5,000 to another set. It could specifically exclude one beneficiary from some of the benefits, or specify an unequal division. That is all the choice of the testator. As described in the question, the trust does seem likely to give greater benefits to one set of children than to their cousins. Unless there are grounds to upset the will, that is just how it is. However, the wide "absolute" discretion granted to the trustee might allow the trustee to modify this outcome, but the trustee is not allowed to simply rewrite the trust. How much the payments can be varied will depend on the exact terms of the trust. It does sound as if this trust was not worded as carefully as it might be, since it does not specify a ration when the trust is to be split. The designated relative can decline to serve as trustee, then any specified alternate would serve, or if there is none, or none who will serve, the court would appoint a trustee.

I can't help you with the UK but this would be 100% illegal in Australia. Unpaid trials are permitted of a reasonable duration sufficient to establish if the candidate has the requisite skills. For a hospitality worker 2-3 hours would be reasonable. Unpaid work experience is allowed if it is part of a program of education provided by a school or university. Unpaid internships are allowed provided the internship is for the education of the intern and their work output is incidental to that purpose. If the intern is doing work the company would otherwise have to pay someone to do it's not an internship. Other than that, all work including training must be paid.

Yes, maybe The legislation varies by state but s494 of the Victorian Children, Young Persons and Families Act is typical. A person who has the control or charge of a child must not leave the child without making reasonable provision for the child's supervision and care for a time which is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. If the child is 17 years old then the circumstances are such that it is not unreasonable to leave them, even for a period of days. If the child is 17 days old, even 30 seconds may be unreasonable.

Is Google legal? Google is indexing other people's websites across the planet. To some extents, the images on Google images search are also taken from websites contents. And all of that happens without owner's consent or any sort of agreement. (I saw some of my website content on google search image). So my questions is: To which extent someone can use other people's web content? What rules are regulating search engines?

The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it.

It's not a crime per se, but you're breaching contract if you're accessing it by normal means, that is, through a Web browser or through the API. Youtube Terms of Use 5B, emphasis added: Content is provided to you AS IS. You may access Content for your information and personal use solely as intended through the provided functionality of the Service and as permitted under these Terms of Service. You shall not download any Content unless you see a “download” or similar link displayed by YouTube on the Service for that Content. You shall not copy, reproduce, make available online or electronically transmit, publish, adapt, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content for any other purposes without the prior written consent of YouTube or the respective licensors of the Content. YouTube and its licensors reserve all rights not expressly granted in and to the Service and the Content. It is a breach of the Terms, which you agree to and are contractually bound by, to download Content unless Youtube allows it. Because Users license, the Content to Youtube, Youtube is entitled to recover loss of income from your breach of contract, including loss of advertising revenue, and possibly even punitive damages. Legally, whether you can download it depends on the jurisdiction. It is generally acceptable to make a copy of media you purchase, however these rights do not generally extend to media purchased online, where you become bound by the terms of the service provider - in this case, Youtube. The owner of the Content retains ownership rights and licenses derivation, reproduction and distribution rights to Youtube. That is, if the content owner made it available on some other website for viewing, then you would have the rights to download it for the purposes of viewing it. However, you would still not have distribution, adaptation or modification rights unless they were assigned to you by the content owner. You may have a a Fair Use/Dealing defense for the content, depending on the purpose and nature of your usage. 17 U.S.C. § 107 outlines the considerations in a US Fair Use defense, which essentially boils down to: Nature and purpose of the use Nature of the copyrighted work Amount of the copyrighted work used The effect of the use on the value of the copyrighted work In the absence of case law to the contrary¹, the Terms of Use, copyright law, and fair use law are only legal principles we can rely upon in determining the legality of downloading content from Youtube. 1. It's possible that there is case law, but I've just spent a bit of time searching and haven't found any cases where end users were sued for downloading content.

Stack Exchange questions are not public domain, they are protected by copyright. Authors have granted a license under Subscriber Content, specifically content is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC BY-SA 4.0) As long as you comply with the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 license, you may copy user content.

Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).

This is a complicated question because adblockers have grown increasingly complex in recent years. What it means to "block ads" from both a legal and technical perspective is more complex than it was just a few years ago. First the broad strokes: It's not illegal to block ads. Multiple court cases have defended users' rights to control the information that enters their computers / devices. You have the legal right to view or not view whatever you like. But... that doesn't mean your use of an adblocker isn't in violation of US law. The crucial issue with legality when it comes to adblockers is less about blocking ads, and more about circumventing a websites measures to defeat adblockers. The US DMCA has strict wording regarding 'circumvention of access controls'. If a website has taken active measures to prevent access by adblocking users, and your adblocker circumvents those measures -- this is very likely a violation of the DMCA. The important point here is that the legal transgression isn't blocking ads. It's the circumvention of access controls which in attempt to limit access to adblock users. There's a good write-up on this topic here: https://blockadblock.com/adblocking/adblockers-dont-break-the-law-except-when-they-do/ Additionally, a website's "Terms of Use" agreement may address adblocking. As we all know, website ToU's are not always legally binding on the site visitor. But sometimes they are. There's a good exploration of how to implement a ToU that addresses adblocking here: http://blockadblock.com/adblocking/addressing-adblocking-terms-use-agreement/

Not necessarily, but also possibly. Google Books may (or may not) have a license to distribute images of the book covers in question. This license would be between Google and the owner of the copyright of the book cover. Just because Google has a license to distribute the image of the book cover to you does not mean that you have a license to distribute the image of the book cover to your customers. However, depending on jurisdiction, using the book cover to identify a book might also be legal under relevant fair use statutes. It is also possible that the particular book cover is not protected by copyright. For example, a particular book cover might have entered public domain. If this question is not a hypothetical, you should probably consult a lawyer.

You have the right to request anything you want, but there is a very limited set of things that you can have a legal expectation of them doing. The service provider has no obligation to block a user. You can likewise request a report, and from a pirate site I would expect no response. There is no legal requirement that a pirate site block an offending user after a certain number of offenses. There is no direct way to compel a pirate site to ban a user. Indirectly you might accomplish that end if you take legal action against the site, which causes them to ban a user in order to protect themselves If a DMCA request was not "proper" (the correct legal form) they will not perform a takedown, and may not inform you that they won't. Make sure your takedown request is legally correct and actually delivered to the correct person. If they still ignore your request, they will have lost the "safe harbor" provisions, and you can theoretically sue them. Since the pirate site presumably only hosts a link to elsewhere, their making public such a link is not itself copyright infringement, so you need to be going after the ISPs who manage the actual host sites. The pirate site might still be a contributor to infringement, along MGM v. Grokster lines. A standard defense against infringement would be "We had no idea", and ignoring DMCA takedown notices is clear proof that they did have an idea. That's basically what DMCA takedown is about: saying what it takes to use the "We had no idea" defense.

The facts you describe are very likely an infringing derivative work which would provide a basis for a lawsuit against the person operating the website. But, nothing is certain, and these determinations are highly fact specific. It is highly unlikely that the government would enforce a violation of copyright alleged in these circumstances criminally.

Copyrighted Music, Personal Use, and not-for-profit Video Games? I am creating a video game that is open-source and will be distributed for free (i.e. not-for-profit) on itch.io. I would like to use a copyrighted song as part of the background music. My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? I am located in Australia, and itch.io operates out of the USA. Thanks.

My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee.

Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.

Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.

The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.

Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.

What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area.

In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.

It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright.

What happens if an insurance company does not mention a critical clause of a policy during a telephone purchase? Suppose one phones an insurance company and arrange and pays for car insurance. One then receives the documentation and there is an additional clause that was not mentioned that invalidates the insurance. Is this clause valid? The story that prompts this question is real, but I am not asking for advice as I have solved the problem with communication. I just wonder what would have happened had I said nothing. I just phoned my insurance company to arrange my car insurance for next year. We went through all the details and I was about to accept the offer when I mentioned that my brother was visiting from the US. At that point the salesperson informed me that the insurance would not cover my brother, as they must be resident in the UK. At no point prior to this had they mentioned such a requirement. I therefore declined their offer. I have done this many times before an it has not been an issue. However had I not mentioned this I would have accepted the offer. They may well have sent me a verbose contract with that term in there, but I may not have read it and my brother would have driven the car assuming they were insured. If this had occurred would my brother have been insured? From answers it seems it may be relevant how frequent such a clause is. I have two old car insurance contracts and neither mention such a residence requirement. I have found many more "Certificate of Insurance" with my brother as a named driver and they make no mention of the requirement. It is those that must be shown to the police on request to prove one has insurance. I have found a policy document online that does not appear to mention such a requirement.

In any sane jurisdiction, the clause would hold. By and large, the legal fiction is that one has read and agreed to execute the entirety of the contracts they signed. If it was otherwise, no contract of substantial length would ever be enforceable upon individuals; yet such contracts are routinely offered and enforced (look at the terms&conditions of any internet website that sells stuff). It is absolutely normal that a phone sale would gloss other minor details of the contract, and implicitly refer to the written text for the finer points. If the specific point had been raised in the phone call, and the salesperson erroneously told you X when in fact the contract read Y, you might have a case, but even then it is not necessarily a strong one (you signed the contract after having called; you might have changed your mind when reading the actual text, and you paying the insurance monthly bill is evidence that you agreed with the contract as-formed). There are some exceptions to that general principle: General conditions of validity of a contract. For instance, in france, a contract must have a "definite and legitimate content". If we sign a contract for "a few apples against a few euros", and then I give you five apples, you owe me zero euros because the contract was not specific enough to be enforceable. If the whole contract is unenforceable, the clause falls with it. General conditions of a validity of a clause. Specific clauses can be invalidated without bringing down the whole contract (for instance, "in case X fails to perform their obligations under clause 70Z, Y is allowed to take a pound of flesh from X"). Specific conditions on certain clauses. Consumer laws in some jurisdictions make certain clauses of certain contracts either invalid entirely, or only valid if they were read aloud to the prospective buyer, or only valid in certain forms. (For instance, in France, a sale of real estate between individuals must be notarized.) I would be extremely surprised if the rule in the OP’s example (residence condition to bring another driver on the insurance policy) would fail under any of those.

Depending on the circumstances, it may be irrelevant whether or not the the terms of service contain an express clause dealing with inaccurate information. For example, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, under section 2(1) of the Fraud Act 2006, if you dishonestly make a representation which is untrue or misleading with the intention to make a gain or cause someone a loss you will commit the offence of fraud. This could arise for example if you give a false name intending to obstruct the other party from being able to pursue you for any breach of your contractual obligations (e.g. non-payment for services). As for whether or not you would breach any clause in the contract requiring you to provide accurate information, it's very hard to say without seeing the exact wording and context of the clause.

A written agreement is not required to form legally binding obligations. The common law position is that you are bound by a contract to pay for the services rendered: The dentist asked if they could take out another cavity, with the reasonable expectation that you would pay a reasonable amount. (Offer) You agreed. (Acceptance) The dentist fulfilled their promise to remove the cavity. (Performance) You are now bound to pay a reasonable amount. If you do not, you will be in breach of the contract. However, whether you will be required to pay the entire amount will depend on whether or not $700 is deemed reasonable by a court, or by whatever statutes may govern healthcare in whichever jurisdiction you are in (at the time of writing you have not provided a jurisdiction). A court or statute may limit the amount you are required to pay.

Does an agreement in a chat count as a valid contract? In most jurisdictions (and for most transactions): yes. Usually the only thing that matters for a valid contract is that there is a mutual agreement – whether that is in writing, orally, via chat or via sign language does not matter. Of course, having things in writing makes it easier to prove in court if there is a problem, so it's still advisable. What steps could I take if they don't send the money? You can: remind them to pay if they still don't pay, you can sue them. Some juridictions have accelerated court proceedings for simple cases like this (e.g. Gerichtliches Mahnverfahren in Germany), otherwise you will have to sue in a regular court that deals with contract disputes. But I have no names and I am unsure what they can or have to do after they received the package. This is going to be the main problem. It's no good to enter into a contract if you do not know who the other party is :-). You definitely need to find out who exactly entered into an agreement with you. If the sale is to a private person, find out their name and address. If the sale is to a business (seems to be the case here), find the official name and legal type of the business, and make sure whoever you deal with is authorized to enter into contracts. Otherwise the contract will be hard to enforce in court if things go wrong.

You asked the rep about how to change some details on your account, and asked him about the cost. It is clear from the recording that you are not changing anything right now. I can't see anything where you state that you want to enter a contract right now, I can not see anything where the rep indicates they want to enter a contract right now. In other words, no contract has been formed. The rep did tell you that a name change will not increase the phone plan price. That was a promise. It was a verbal promise, and you have evidence that the promise was made. Your contract will determine whether the company is bound by such a verbal promise. If you change the name on the contract, with nobody mentioning a price increase, and the price increases, you can surely complain that you were misled and wouldn't have changed the name if you had known about the price increase. However, if you get told that the price will increase before the name change, and you quote the previous promise, I don't think that will force the company to allow a name change without price increase, because your phone conversation didn't create a contract.

Nothing prevents firms from putting clauses like that in the disclaimer. If you're talking about goods (rather than services), much contract formation is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which 49 states have adopted (and which Louisiana has adopted part). However, the real question relates to whether that kind of language will be enforceable in court. A common way to attempt to avoid litigation is to insert a clause that requires arbitration of disputes (instead of litigation). The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), so this can be successful. Contracts that have class-action arbitration provisions are a little dicier, but in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Conception, 563 US 333 (2011) , the court held the FAA preempts state laws that disallow class arbitration.

is this absolutely required to be considered a valid document in most jurisdictions, most notably, the European Union? Not at all. There is no legal requirement that contracts, terms of service, and so forth be drafted, devised, or even validated by a lawyer. Law requires that certain types of contract be notarized. That refers to the moment where the parties sign/formalize the contract, which is different from --and independent of-- whether its terms were written by a lawyer. A messaging service like the one you have in mind definitely is not subject to such requirement either.

The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.

Constitutional Race-Conscious Policies In 2021, the Biden administration created a loan forgiveness program that excluded white farmers. It was ruled unconstitutional and a violation of equal protection. (Wynn v. Vilsack et al) Washington (state) recently passed a law that gives low interest loans but bars applicants of certain races. (HB 1474) How did Washington try to change this law to avoid being struck down? Presumably Washington legislators are aware of the previous ruling and have modified the new law accordingly. Ideas: Reduction of loan principle v. loan interest? Federal law v. state law? Farm loans v. home loans? They seem to be aware that there is likely to be a constitutional challenge, since Sec 14-15 specify what to do in the case when it is held unconstitutional (it disperses the money without regard to race). EDIT: The law is explicit that it applies to anyone of a certain "race, national origin, or sex". The races, national origins, and sexes will be determined by a committee. Is there precedent for racial testing? Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ and Coral Construction Co. v. King County (1991) limit historical arguments about past discrimination to discrimination by the government in the recent past. Covenants were private and ceased in 1968. EDIT: Still haven't seen an answer that answers how this is consistent with Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ and Coral Construction Co. v. King County (1991). Can the government impose race tests based on claims on non-governmental action in the distant past?

Washington's HB 1474 actually does not give low interest loans to all but white borrowers. It initiates the process of creating a bureaucracy that will eventually provide loans for down payment and closing cost assistance for first-time home buyers (a loan that must be repaid when the house is sold). There are various qualifications that a program participant must meet, such as below-average income, being a resident, and also they must be a state resident before April 11, 1968 or a descendant of someone who was, and was or would have been excluded from homeownership in Washington state by a racially restrictive real estate covenant on or before April 11,28 1968 The "would have" part refers to the fact that a person may have been interested in buying a particular house but gave up when they were told that there is a racially restrictive covenant associated with the property. It is then the duty of the covenant homeownership program commission to determine what such covenants may have existed, and also to what extent existing programs and race-neutral approaches have been insufficient to remedy this discrimination and its impacts The law simply states that eligibility is based on a recorded covenant or deed restriction that includes or included racial restrictions on property ownership or use against protected classes that are unlawful under RCW 49.60.224 which would include any covenants against sale to Irish or any other anciently discriminated-against Europeans, if such are found to exist. Referring to Wynn v. Vilsack, it was noted that A strong basis in evidence cannot rest on an amorphous claim of societal discrimination, on simple legislative assurances of good intention, or on congressional findings of discrimination in the national economy. However, a governmental entity can justify affirmative action by demonstrating gross statistical disparities between the proportion of minorities hired and the proportion of minorities willing and able to do the work. Analogous reasoning would apply to government action that deprived individuals of the opportunity to purchase a home based on their race. If (when) this new law is challenged, one of the central questions would be what remedial actions the government(s) took to correct this past discrimination. While it is clear that such discrimination was ended in 1968, it is far from clear that there was any remedial action taken by the state. Of course there is always the possibility that SCOTUS will discover new law that changes the landscape, but as it stands, such corrective actions are legal.

I don't see the contradiction. The ACLU article you link to explains that the Supreme Court found against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in principle in the 2018 ruling. Instead they found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had taken a dismissive attitude to the religion of the bakery's owners, and that in itself was religious discrimation and a violation of their First Amendment rights. I would say the 2018 ruling paved the way for the more recent one, which is why the article you link is titled: "In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins the Battle but Loses the War"

Short Answer You can be prosecuted for lying about race on the census, but it takes some pretty specific and narrow conditions and isn't a concern for the vast majority of people. Long Answer There are two analytically distinct questions. The first is whether you can lie on the census about race. The answer is "yes", you can lie on the census about race. You would do so by providing an answer that is insincere, which is to say, an answer that is not consistent with how you self-identify. If you believe yourself to be and identify as African-American, for example, but answer "Alaska Native" not because you identify as an Alaska Native, but because you want to screw with the census, then you have lied about race on the census. Similar issues of sincerity have been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of the much higher stakes issue of conscientious objector status for someone seeking to avoid the draft. A 2014 law review article explores how courts test sincerity claims in practice. The second is whether you can be prosecuted about lying on the census. There is indeed a law that makes lying on a census form a crime. Refusing to answer either the short Census form or the longer American Community Survey form is a violation of federal law (Title 13, United States Code, Section 221). Refusing to answer is punishable by a fine of $100, while giving false answers carries a fine of up to $500. (As a practical matter, the Census says fines of up to $5,000 can be imposed under Title 18, Section 3571.) So, again, the answer is "yes" you can be prosecuted for lying on the census, but due to the obligation of the census to maintain confidentiality, knowing that a crime was committed or proving that you lied would be hard unless you did something to waive that right to confidentiality. Still, the person about whom the confidential information is maintained by the census can waive this confidentiality. 13 USC 9(a)(3). In practice, a prosecution for lying about race on the census would probably be most viable if, for example, you did a TV interview or posted a YouTube video in which you took video of yourself filling in the race item on your census form with an answer while stating that you didn't self-identify as this race but were just screwing with the government, and then showed yourself submitting that form. Thus, while the prohibition against lying on the census about race is virtually toothless, it does have enough teeth to make it possible to prosecuted someone who openly and publicly defies the requirement to be truthful on the census and admits to doing so, which can still have some utility in discouraging some kinds of open revolts calculated at undermining the integrity of the census. Also, even if you don't "admit" that you are insincere that isn't the end of the analysis. They can't dispute your self-identification with biological facts, but they can dispute that your answer is a sincere self-identification with either your own confession to the contrary or with circumstantial evidence that indicates you are lying (e.g. you fill out every other form before and after with a different answer and have a known animosity towards the census). If a jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt based upon circumstantial evidence that your answer was not sincere, it could find your testimony to be not credible and convict you anyway. If there are no lies, what purpose is served by having such a definition? The vast majority of people, facing no negative consequences for telling the truth, if they have cooperated enough to fill out the form at all, will try to fill it out consistently with the instructions. And, a significant share of all census responses are provided by government employees whose duty and purpose is to try to provide a correct answer. Also, most people comply with the laws even in the face of zero enforcement. For example, it has been more than 40 years since the last person was prosecuted for not filling out a census form, even though it is crime not to do so, in part, because most people try to obey the law. And, compliance with the burden of filling out a census form is quite high. What's the value (who benefits) in making what used to be a fuzzy but more or less factual item about national and ethnic origins into a belief-based one, in effect making race into a religion. Many countries (not the U.S.) have a religion question in their census as well, and this isn't problematic where it is done, or in surveys asking questions about religion, although being clear on definitions can be important (e.g. in the case of a religious v. ancestral or ethnic v. self-identified definition of who is a Jew). I strongly suspect that the differences in how people respond to the question arising from a national or ethnic origin definition, and a definition based upon self-identification, are negligible at the statistical level. A century or so from now, when census records are made public, it will be possible to confirm this definitively by examining how the same individual's race was reported on half a dozen or more successive census forms. In non-census contexts, this shift in the definition has not produced any statistically meaningful differences in how people respond. Also, if anything, the new definition based on self-identification may be more useful to researchers who are trying to examine socially coherent communities, and it makes the race data slightly more comparable to data, for example, on religion and on sexual orientation (from non-census sources).

You are correct that the federal law does not prohibit sex discrimination in "public accommodations", the category that includes your examples. State laws tend to be more restrictive, see for example Washington's RCW 49.60.215 which declares that It shall be an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an act which ... results in any distinction ... except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed... sexual orientation, sex... PROVIDED, That behavior or actions constituting a risk to property or other persons can be grounds for refusal and shall not constitute an unfair practice. The definitions allow for a few exceptions as to what kind of place is so restricted, most notably a facility "which is by its nature distinctly private", nor "any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution". Here is a paper that summarizes the situation with women'-only clubs. For example, New Jersey law has the exception that nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp or resort camp, bathhouse, dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex... So it depends on the state, but most states prohibit any sex discrimination in public accommodations.

The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%.

The question of whether they can ask these questions will be left to the trial judge. If the parties can make any kind of reasonable argument that consumers of one product or the other are likely to be partisans, the judge should allow the question, though it would not be error to refuse. For a good comparison, look at Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525–29 (1973). There, the defendant argued he was framed for a petty drug charge because of his involvement in the Civil Rights movement. He thought jurors might be prejudiced against him because he was black and because he had a beard, but the trial court refused to let him ask jurors about either possibility. The Supreme Court said it was an error to refuse to ask the questions about race, but not about the beard: The inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its constitutional stature from the firmly established precedent of Aldridge and the numerous state cases upon which it relied, and from a principal purpose as well as from the language of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial judge's refusal to inquire as to particular bias against beards, after his inquiries as to bias in general, does not reach the level of a constitutional violation. Assuming the question is permitted, the mere fact of using an iPhone would not be sufficient to obtain a "for cause" strike, which the court will only grant if the juror does not indicate that he would be able to fairly consider the case. "I like my iPhone" is not enough. "I like iPhones better than Android" is not enough. "I hate Google" is not enough. "I worship at the altar of Steve Jobs" is not enough. Instead, the question will be whether a juror indicates that they can set aside whatever prejudices they might have. The court is not required to strike them "as long as he or she ultimately asserts an ability to be fair and impartial." United States of America v. Abel Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1998). Batson prohibits peremptory strike based on "gender, ethnic origin, or race." United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000). Other than that, a lawyer is generally free to strike based on anything or nothing at all (though there remain some questions about whether Batson also applies to other protected classes, such as sexual orientation, disability, age, etc.). So peremptory strikes would be the only permissible means of eliminating iPhone users from the jury.

It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.

In fact, the immigration quotas do not discriminate. The described limit is that "No more than 7 percent of the visas may be issued to natives of any one independent country in a fiscal year; no more than 2 percent may issued to any one dependency of any independent country". All countries get the same upper limit. Additionally, anti-discrimination laws are subject matter specific: they exist because Congress passed a law that prohibits using race as a basis for employing a person (which Congress can do because of the Commerce Clause). Congress has not passed any such law pertaining to granting of visas. There is a path of reasoning that could lead to concluding that national quotas violate anti-discrimination laws, based on an "effects test" (disparate impact). It appears to be a fact that an applicant for a visa has a much higher probability of being denied a visa is their country of origin is China or India, as opposed to Sweden, which one could spin into a disparate impact argument. In order for this argument to become the law, there would have to be a case brought to the federal courts to the effect that national quotas are illegal, and as far as I know there has never been such a case. There are no provisions in anti-discrimination legislation that support a disparate impact doctrine in immigration, and pretty clear evidence that it was not congressionally intended since Title 8 Ch. 12 clearly calls for nation-based quotas. A final point: "national origin discrimination" is based on "an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group". A Swedish citizen of "Chinese national origin" is subject to the Swedish quota, not the Chinese quota, thus the discrimination is based on country of citizenship, not national origin.

How can I legally abandon property in Texas I inherited an empty lot in a residential neighborhood in Kingsville, Texas from my grandfather when he died several years ago. I have been paying taxes on this property since then, but I would like to stop paying taxes on this property and abandon it. Is there a legal way to go about this? The city has recently been sending me notices telling me that I need to have the yard maintained. They are threatening to fine me if I don't do this. I tried to sell this lot a few years ago, and that is when I discovered that the title on the property is not clear. My grandfather apparently paid cash for it when he bought it twenty years ago, and he didn't bother have the title transferred over in a legal way. The original owner has since died and his three children now have some claim on this property. The county lists me as the owner, so I'm responsible for upkeep and taxes, and yet I can't sell it because the title is not clear. I have consulted a real estate lawyer, and he wants to charge me more money to try to fix things than the property is worth, and without any guarantees that he can clear the title. Is there anyone versed in real estate law that can offer advice? Why can't I just abandon this lot? What can the county do to me if I just stop paying taxes? What can the city do to me if don't maintenance the yard and end up getting fines? I don't live anywhere near this town -- I'm 250 miles away in Houston. My poor grandfather thought he was doing me a favor, but it's ended up being a curse.

Sometimes you can't. In Washington, for example, it is possible to disclaim property, because RCW 11.86.021 says (1) A beneficiary may disclaim an interest in whole or in part, or with reference to specific parts, shares or assets, in the manner provided in RCW 11.86.031. and there is a procedure for writing up and filing that disclaimer. However, there is a time limit that you have to do it by nine months after the latest of: (a) The date the beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one years; (b) The date of the transfer; (c) The date that the beneficiary is finally ascertained and the beneficiary's interest is indefeasibly vested; or (d) December 17, 2010, if the date of the transfer is the date of the death of the creator of the interest and the creator dies after December 31, 2009, and before December 18, 2010 and RCW 11.86.051 gives a list of reasons why you cannot disclaim an interest. "Indefeasible" means "you can't get out of it". If you fail to pay taxes on real estate, it can be seized and sold by the county to satisfy the tax delinquency. The county will then attempt to sell the property, perhaps for exactly the amount of taxes owed. That sale "clears" the title so that the purchaser does not have to worry about a could over the title (Sec. 34.01.(n) of the Texas tax code). The city can also separately assess you for violation of whatever ordinance they are concerned with: there will be some procedure for the abatement of the nuisance (weeds, usually), an assessment which is made against the property. Notice is given to the owner (or, the person they think is the owner), but the "risk" is shouldered by the property.

You can do everything that follows the legal rules: It does follow the building allocation for the lot (which most likely reads: Parking lot of lot XYZ, preventing reallocation into other lots) It follows local laws (which might or might not prescribe that condos have to provide a parking space per condo, preventing tearing it up) AND you must find the other party that actually owns the lot willing to part with the lot and sign you over the lot with the rights to modify the land. So while technically you might be legally allowed to get ownership, it seems unlikely just from an economical standpoint: the condo leaser will most decidedly not want to make his condos unattractive (by not providing parking), break the law (by not providing parking) and he might not want to sell the condos together with the building and you have no legal leverage at all to force him to do that.

There are vendors providing software to facilitate this sort of task. Avalara is perhaps the best known, but I don't have any experience with it and couldn't say whether it's actually any good or not. But the bottom line is that in a destination-based sourcing regime, sales taxes must be computed based on the address of the destination, not city or ZIP code associated with that address. As Avalara has noted, this is a giant hassle, but it's nonetheless the current state of the law. Of course, this assumes the seller has sufficient nexus with Louisiana to trigger a duty to collect sales taxes in the first place. From the question, it is not clear whether this is true.

Much of "the woods" is owned by the US government, where your chances of any degree of success are highly variable. It is extremely unlikely that you can get away with it at all on a military base or in a national park. You may be able to get away with it for longer on Forest Service land (legally speaking, you're supposed to move along after 14 days), but if you're looking for a permanent legal claim to the land, that will not happen without an act of Congress. If public domain land has valuable minerals which you exploit, you may be able to chop down trees and build a cabin, but until Congress lifts the moratorium on mining claims patents, you cannot gain title to the land. (Public domain land is land not set aside for a specific purpose, such as a national park or wilderness area). Another possibility is to seize the land through adverse possession, as long as you satisfy the requirements for such an action in the state in question. Chopping down trees and building a cabin probably satisfy the requirements of actual possession, openness and notoriety. You would have to continuously live there for 5-30 years, depending on state, and have to have exclusive use of the land. If you get found and the owner tells you to leave (whether or not they get a court order), or if they say "I'll let you stay for a while", or they do a bit of landscaping, then you can't take the land (or, the clock restarts). There are a number of state-specific quirks such as whether you have to believe that the land is actually yours. Also, you can't dispossess a government. At some point, you will have to deal with the county, since you built the cabin without a permit.

One legal notion of "abandoned property" pertains to tenants leaving things behind after they leave – clearly not applicable. A second regards e.g. bank accounts that haven't been used for a while, again, clearly not relevant. The law regarding goods dropped in the street, and so on, is here. The law starts by saying Any person who finds a thing lost is not bound to take charge of it, unless the person is otherwise required to do so by contract or law, but when the person does take charge of it he or she is thenceforward a depositary for the owner, with the rights and obligations of a depositary for hire. Any person or any public or private entity that finds and takes possession of any money, goods, things in action, or other personal property, or saves any domestic animal from harm, neglect, drowning, or starvation, shall, within a reasonable time, inform the owner, if known, and make restitution without compensation, except a reasonable charge for saving and taking care of the property. Any person who takes possession of a live domestic animal shall provide for humane treatment of the animal. Also relevant is the fact that stealing lost property is a crime: One who finds lost property under circumstances which give him knowledge of or means of inquiry as to the true owner, and who appropriates such property to his own use, or to the use of another person not entitled thereto, without first making reasonable and just efforts to find the owner and to restore the property to him, is guilty of theft. There is no specific legal definition of "lost", so the courts would look at the facts and ask whether the property was indeed "lost" – clearly, it is not. Property that is intentionally placed somewhere and is unattended is not "lost", and there is no law declaring open season on unattended property. This is true of bicycles, as well as unofficial ballot boxes.

Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined.

Normally, a recorded deed is taken at face value. If Bob acquires a house and conveys the house to Bob and Clark, his cousin, a joint tenants with right of survivorship, or pays for 99% of the price of a house and directs that it will be deeded to Bob and Clark as joint tenants with right of survivorship, the normal interpretation of that transaction is that Bob made a gift of an undivided one half interest in the property with right of survivorship to Clark. It sounds like the fact pattern is that Bob dies before Clark, giving Clark 100% title of record to the house subject to the mortgage, and Bob's heirs are not cool about that fact and would like to escape that consequence. This is a tall order for Bob's heirs. Normally, at least two important rules of evidence will preclude admission of testimony to the contrary. One is the parole evidence rule. This excludes as a matter of law evidence of discussions entered into prior to execution of an unambiguous written instrument that is not on its face incomplete, even if other evidence, called "extrinsic evidence" is available. The other is the dead man's statute, which is quite tricky in its technical application, but is basically designed to prevent an interested party from offering self-serving testimony that economically benefits them about what a deceased person said. The classic examples would be "I'll sell you these gold bars for $10", or "I'm giving you this painting", or "I agree to let you live in my house after I die rent free for 11 months." A statement regarding an intended ownership interest in joint tenancy with right of survivorship real estate asserting that it is not 50-50 when nothing on the face of the deed suggests that this is case might be barred by the dead man's statute since these are statements of a dead man that favor the person offering the evidence. But, as I say, the application of the rule is quite technical. Also, to the extent that any third-party like a lender or a judgment creditor of the surviving joint tenant gets a lien or other property right in the property that is recorded, and that person had no knowledge of the claims of ownership outside real property records of the relative rights of the joint tenants, that evidence couldn't be used to impair or reduce the third-party's rights in the property by virtue of the recording statutes. If a dispute arose while the co-owners were alive at a time when there were no disputed claims of third-parties to the property, the joint tenancy would be easy to severed into a tenancy-in-common, and the actual relative contributions and right of the parties could be litigated in court with the testimony of those parties. But, usually, the four unities are in practice, a consequence of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship deed being prepared and recorded, rather than primarily being a condition precedent to it. If a single deed is executed that says that grantee are two or more people who are described as joint tenants with right of survivorship, then the legal consequence of that deed is that the co-owners become equal owners with a right of survivorship and unlimited right to possession of the whole. Also, even though it isn't standard, it isn't impossible for property to be in a tenancy-in-common which a side agreement to make a transfer upon death to the remaining tenant-in-common, even if it isn't a true joint tenancy with right of survivorship. So, if one proved by some competent and admissible evidence that a 50-50 ownership was not intended and that it wasn't a true canonical joint tenancy, this wouldn't necessarily invalidate the survivorship provisions on the face of the deed. A judge would be more likely to treat the deed as a non-standard non-probate transfer at death than to treat it as a tenancy-in-common without a right of survivorship, despite language of survivorship on the face of the recorded deed. Now, something other than equal co-ownership might be admissible for some purposes, like tax consequences, but that wouldn't go to who gets the property when a co-owner of the property dies. From an evidentiary standpoint, the case would [be based upon] . . . non-will ledgers, third party banking transactions, and letters of evidence that show the decedent undertook full responsibility for expenses related to the acquisition and maintenance of the property. The joint tenant was involved in the deed and mortgage issuance by the decedent for the sole purpose of mortgage qualification (i.e. credit requirements) This doesn't sound very convincing. First, there is nothing inconsistent with a joint tenancy with right of survivorship with one co-owner being the person who provides the funds for purchasing the home and handling all of the maintenance and expenses. This is more common than not in the case of a married couple or pair of unmarried domestic partners that own the real property as joint tenants with right of survivorship and it used to be even more common. Second, a lender would almost always require that all people obligated on the mortgage be owners of the property, and that all owners of the property be obligated on the mortgage. (Strictly speaking, in California, it would probably be a deed of trust rather than a mortgage, but that is functionally equivalent.) But, it wouldn't be very common as a commercial requirement to insist on joint tenancy with right of survivorship as opposed to tenancy-in-common ownership. Also since providing credit to a transaction is something of value, getting an ownership interest in the property in exchange isn't beyond the realm on possibility and plausibility in a deal that isn't entirely arms length but isn't entire a gift either. Providing credit is probably sufficient consideration to support the deal as a binding contractual agreement. Now, the best strategy might be a letter or exchange of letters that amount to an agreement. This wouldn't bind the mortgage company, but might have some relevant. Still, if the letters predate the execution of the joint tenancy deed, the parole evidence rule might keep the letters out of evidence. Some sort of express trust theory, treating the letters as a trust agreement, might if the language was right, be a stronger legal argument. I'm trying to wrap my head around how a court would interpret documentation vs. intent with regard to the joint tenancy ownership of real property. The key point being that the decedent didn't 'generally' pay for the property, but always paid for it. This is almost completely irrelevant. It is consistent with the alternative characterization of the transaction, but it is also consistent with the deed terms. In particular, if the decedent described the remaining joint tenant as a 'renter' during an interval of co-habitation, and no financial transactions between the two took place subsequent to that. I could imagine bringing a legal action to reform the deed, but the threshold of proof to win that action is pretty high. Absent some sort on undue influence or abuse of a confidential relationship, I have a hard time seeing a deed like this being reformed by a court to reflect a different kind of transaction, even if that was the original intent of the parties, but it isn't impossible if the right facts and evidence were available (which the dead man's statute, again, heavily constrains). If Bob was defrauded by Clark, I could also imagine some sort of legal remedy being available. But it is hard to think that Bob who was the primary mover in the deal would have been defrauded by Clark in this fact pattern. In California, the relevant case law seems to be Kershman v Kershman, Milian v DeLeon, and Cosler v Norwood Kershman v. Kershman is not on point. It is a divorce case dealing with the issues of marital v. separate property under California's community property regime which is an entirely different body of law that doesn't apply to unmarried co-owners of property. Milian v. De Leon is more on point, involving unmarried people with unequal contributions to the property who take title by a deed that says joint tenancy. it found that, “once the court in a partition action has determined that a true joint tenancy exists, it may not order reimbursement or contribution on account of differences in the amounts the parties have paid toward the initial acquisition of the property.” Milian v. De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1195. (Source) This holding is the standard common law rule. It isn't isn't really relevant here, however, because that case applies in the context of a partition action while the co-owners are alive, and not after death when the survivorship feature causes the surviving co-owner to be sole owner by operation of law. Cosler v. Norwood is a much older case, from 1950, and seems to stand for the proposition that the language of the deed regarding equal ownership that flows from calling the co-owners joint tenants can be overcome by extrinsic evidence in the context of a partition action, although it is arguably implicitly repealed by Milian v. De Leon. But it isn't on point for the same reason that Milian v. DeLeon in not on point - it considers the rights of two living parties in a partition action dispute (i.e. a lawsuit to untangle co-ownership of property), not concerning the validity of a survivorship provision in the deed in the presence of unequal contributions to the acquisition price. Changes to the survivorship rights do not obviously at all flow from the existence of unequal contributions.

The legality of the stop may be somewhat up in the air, but it would seem that the vehicle is not in the Texassure database, so it is reasonable to think that the person driving is not insured, and therefore is breaking the law. And that is all that is required: that the suspicion is reasonable. Until someone makes a sufficiently persuasive legal stink about this, it is probably a legal stop. This article gives some legal discussion. One applicable case is US v. Broca-Martinez, a Texas case where a person was pulled over for being "unconfirmed" w.r.t. the insurance database: the court held that this was a reasonable suspicion. Thereafter, a charitable interpretation is that you misunderstood the request in providing your sister's information when he asked for your license and insurance: but you are expected to understand that when they request your license and proofs of insurance, they mean you the driver, and not the car owner. That they is even more suspicious, although I understand your confusion. At your hearing you cane explain why you didn't comply with the first officer's request, and the judge may they chalk this up to a simple misunderstanding rather than intentional deception. The problem is that you are expected to know – whether or not you've ever been pulled over before – that you have to provide license, registration, and proof of insurance. You will have a hard time making it believable that you didn't understand what the officer told you and what the law requires.

In Texas is it legal for my employer to pay two separate wages I've been trying to find this answer for a minute, my question is in Texas is it illegal for my employer to pay two separate wages on the same stub? Example I have a CDL Class A they're giving me one wage while driving the CDL Vehicles then ask me to work another day not on the required CDL license truck and pay me a lower wage driving the other vehicle. Is that legal or illegal in Texas

First, Texas law requires the employer to give a written earnings statement to any employee which reports the rate of pay, the total amount of pay, deductions, and hours worked if the job is paid at an hourly rate. The law also says that an earnings statement may be in any form determined by the employer. Second, there is no law requiring there to be a single earnings statement or a combined statement, in case a person is paid at different rates, the requirement is simply that the information must be provided. It is legal to hire a person to work at different rates, as long as they have some mechanism for tracking what a person is doing. It is required that they pay you a different rate for working more than a certain number of hours, which will therefore be reflected in the earnings statement.

They can ask, but there is nothing in law - that I can find - which obligates an answer. (There may be some exceptions that require a previous employer to provide a reference which might include this detail, but that does not appear relevant here.) As an aside, there is an ongoing #EndSalaryHistory campaign by the Fawcett Society which is focused on equal pay and sexual equality in the workplace, and they are calling on employers to: stop asking salary history questions...

Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.

Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck

Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence.

You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.

In the US, code that you write in the course of employment is the property of your employer. Otherwise, anything that you create is your property. The gray area is things that you write during your employment but not in the course of your employment (hence the terms of the employment contract are vital). Something that you write before becoming an employee is not "in the course of employment". However, if you use that code in the in the course of employment, you invite the argument that in fact the code was written in the course of employment. That argument can be squelched if you have an agreement with the employer that acknowledges that you are licensing your code to the employer in exchange for ... some consideration. It could be $1, or a similar unit of currency.

Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..

Can a person *choose* to be a citizen? As a layman, it appears to me that citizenship is thrust upon an individual. This may happen by accident of birth, or choice. Can a person relinquish citizenship without becoming a citizen/permanent resident of another nation? What, if any, global legislation/accord makes it mandatory for an individual to be a citizen of atleast one nation? The bottom line is what forms the title of this question - Can a person be a citizen by choice?

@DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result.

The granting of citizenship is expressly recognized in multiple places in the US Constitution. It would be incoherent if the prohibition on titles of nobility meant that the US could not confer citizenship on people. It would also be totally out of sync with any public understanding of "titles of nobility" at the time of the framing or today. The US has conferred citizenship by parentage to children born abroad since 1790, which is further indication that the nobility clause was not understood to preclude citizenship by parentage. The concern behind the nobility clauses was the creation of "super-citizens." As Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution at Vol. 3, p. 215: [the nobility clause] seems scarcely to require even a passing notice. As a perfect equality is the basis of all our institutions, state and national, the prohibition against the creation of any titles of nobility seems proper, if not indespensible, to keep perpetually alive a just sense of this important truth. Distinctions between citizens, in regard to rank, would soon lay the foundation of odious claims and privileges, and silently subvert the spirit of independence and personal dignity, which are so often proclaimed to be the best security of a republican government. He cited Federalist No. 84, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote: Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people. The worry was that titles of nobility would undermine the republican system of government. I also question your premise that citizenship is "clearly hereditary in the U.S." As you say, the 14th Amendment guarantees citizenship to those merely born in the US and subject to its jurisdiction. For the vast majority of U.S. citizens, citizenship is based on their place of birth being in the U.S. Knowing that somebody is a citizen tells you nothing about their heritage.

I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely.

At least one such person was naturalized, according to Wikipedia, in 1868, a time at which I believe naturalization was conferred by district court judges. Although this doesn't perhaps constitute a court case, as asked by the question, it does show that formerly enslaved people who has been born outside the United States were not automatically granted US citizenship. Wikipedia says: Although native-born American former slaves became citizens upon the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in July 1868, this change in status did not apply to the members of the Clotilda group, who were foreign-born. Cudjo Kazoola Lewis became a naturalized American citizen on October 24, 1868. The passage cites Dreams of Africa in Alabama: The Slave Ship Clotilda and the Story of the Last Africans Brought to America by Sylviane A. Diouf

I assume the goal here is for nation A to prevent citizen A1 from travelling/emigrating to nation B. It can be done, but not in the way you're suggesting. It can be achieved by instituting exit visas. Wikipedia reference: Nepal requires citizens emigrating to the United States on an H-1B visa to present an exit permit issued by the Ministry of Labour. This document is called a work permit and needs to be presented to immigration to leave the country. Which is essentially what you're after, if I understand your question correctly. In short, nation A cannot tell nation B to not grant a particular visa. But nation A can require citizen A1 to get nation A's explicit permission to travel to nation B. However, as you can see in the list of examples on the Wikipedia page, exit visas are not all that common and are often linked to fascist or authoritarian regimes (which means that imposing an exit visa is liably going to raise a few eyebrows in western society, to say the least). I was genuinely surprised that Nepal still has an exit visa; I initially wrote my answer under the assumption that I would only find historical occurrences.

Skyborn are a known phenomenon. Country Citizenship? Generally, the kid automatically gets citizenship from his mom (and father) through bloodline, so our skyborn on that plane is likely that citizenship(s). There are cases that can't grant a citizenship that way (among them: Vatican is only granted ex officio) The sky is also treated as an extension of the land below. If the country you fly over has Jus Soli, it grants citizenship to the baby born above it. The USA has Jus Soli in its 14th amendment, our skyborn baby has dual citizenship to whatever country the mom is from. And in case the plane is over unclaimed water - think a nonstop flight Vancouver-Tokyo by Lufthansa - maritime law applies: The airplane is registered somewhere and treated as territory of that land while over international water. Lufthansa is in Germany, so the kid is, on paper, born in Berlin Germany (as that is what Germany prescribes for air- or seaborn). Germany does not use the unrestricted jus soli but the first test is the bloodline to determine what's the kid's citizenship is, unless the kid would have no citizenship through bloodline. So, if any one parent is German, the child is German. jus soli applies mostly to children of someone who has a permanent residence permit for at least 3 years and has been in Germany for the last 8 years: then the kid is (also) German, even if that grants dual citizenship - till the child is 23 and has to choose one of its citizenships. However, if all known parents are stateless or can't grant the kid citizenship through their bloodline (Yes, that happens!), then the kid born on this international flight has the right to become a German citizen - but some rules still apply. Which City/District/State is responsible? Now, which state's office is responsible? That is even more tricky. Technically, OP's kid that is born in Nebraskan Airspace is a Nebraskan, so it should be a Nebraskan birth-certificate. But the general rule in maritime practice would be to file the papers in the next port the ship lands, that would be Maryland if applied to planes. For a german registered ship or plane (my Lufthansa example), the responsible municipality would be Berlin, unless another municipality is responsible. US State citizenship? And then, I thank hszmv for this US Addendum: It should be pointed out that in the U.S. state citizenship is based on primary residency and can be changed over time. I've personally been a Maryland citizen, a Florida Citizen, and a Maryland citizen for a second time in my life. Usually state citizenship denotes exclusively where your vote is cast. No state can restrict a U.S. citizen from taking up residence in that state per constitution. So the Nebraska vs. MD distinction is academic only... the kid could move to California for the rest of his life without much fanfare. So, as a result, let's assume the parents of the Skyborn actually live in New York. Then te kid gets registered as a New York Citizen, his place of birth is "Above Nebraska" (or the state's equivalent rule) on OP's hypothetical. The couple on the Lufthansa flight could ask to have Berlin (Germany) written into the record, as that is where the interior of all Lufthansa planes is to be considered under the law over international waters.

In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization.

Losing your passport is fine, happens all the time But that’s not what you are talking about, is it? You’re intending to deliberately destroy it. While destroying a passport is not a specific offence under the Act or the Rules, your proposed course of action is still illegal. The passport doesn’t belong to you. It belongs to India and deliberately destroying other people’s stuff is illegal. To get a new passport you would necessarily be lying and giving false information on a passport application is an offence. Of course, one wonders why your family are looking at your passport; just don’t show it to them.

Legal implications of unsecure bluetooth device I have recently learned about a high-tech premium bed base that incorporates Bluetooth speakers, plus massage actuators and other features controllable via a smartphone app. Like many insecure Bluetooth speakers, the ones in the bed base will pair with any Bluetooth device without any form of authentication, not even a pairing button. This basically allows anyone with a smartphone to: Walk within Bluetooth range of the device (for example from the street) Open their phone and notice the device advertising itself on Bluetooth Click on it to select it as audio output device Play any kind of audio file on it There is no microphone, so it is not possible to remotely record audio. This is not like insecure Bluetooth headsets which allow anyone within range to connect and use the microphone to record. Neither hacking nor password is necessary to perform this feat, as the device advertises itself as available for connection, and simply accepts all incoming pairing requests. It may even be possible to control the bed position and massage features remotely. Now I'm wondering what the legal implications are: For someone who does not own the device, yet connects to it (perhaps by mistake) and plays audio on it without the owner's consent, or manages to remotely control the motors... For the manufacturer: is it legal to even sell this? Can the buyers sue the manufacturer after the neighbor's kids decide to make the bed speakers play heavy metal at 4AM every night, rendering the bed base features unusable? For the owner: I know if someone hosts an insecure WiFi and someone else connects to it and uses it for nefarious purposes, the owner of the insecure WiFi can face consequences. In this case the device uses Bluetooth not WiFi, and it is not connected to the internet, so this should not apply... unless maybe? I'm definitely not planning to buy one of these (nor prank it) anyway, so I'm not focusing on any particular jurisdiction.

It is legal for a manufacturer to sell a device which is capable of being misused. For example, a wifi-capable router can be sold even if it is "open" by default. A Bluetooth device has a shorter range than wifi, but in principle can connect to any other device. An owner's legal liability is not different given wifi vs. Bluetooth. Whether or not there is criminal liability for a third person who connects to the device also does not specifically depend on whether the device uses Bluetooth technology, as opposed to some other technology. 18 USC 1030 is the general federal law prohibiting "unauthorized access". In the case of a bed, two legal question arise: is it a "computer", and is it "protected"? It is an electronic high speed data processing device which performs logical, arithmetic, storage and communications facilities, i.e. it is a computer (in the legal sense). It probably is not protected, because it is not "used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication", that is, it is not connected to the internet (unless it is). State laws tend to be broader, not having the "interstate commerce" limitation, so accessing the bed would violate Washington's analog of the federal law. However, under Washington law, the access is probably not "without authorization". That term is defined as knowingly circumvent technological access barriers to a data system in order to obtain information without the express or implied permission of the owner, where such technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include white hat security research or circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer. The term "without the express or implied permission" does not include access in violation of a duty, agreement, or contractual obligation, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an internet service provider, internet website, or employer. The term "circumvent technological access barriers" may include unauthorized elevation of privileges, such as allowing a normal user to execute code as administrator, or allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code. One question is whether there is any technological access barrier that the user circumvents (I don't know if it is possible to circumvent "hidden mode"). Since the term "may include ... allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code", and since playing music on speakers involves running code, then the remote user may be criminally liable. On the third hand, the language of that paragraph ("technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include ... circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer") clearly indicates a legislative intent to address deliberately overcoming active access barriers and not accidentally connecting to an unprotected, open system. Plus, the law also says that you are accessing the computer "in order to obtain information", but that is not the purpose of transmitting sound to speakers.

As for the subject matter (what can be protected), amplitude, frequency, harmonic pattern, duration etc. are all physical facts, and there is no protection for physical facts. The basic requirement is that the thing protected must be "creative". Once you have a creative composition (assuming it is a composition, where infringement is harder to establish), the question arises whether a particular other composition infringes, or is an independent creation deserving its own protection. Again, the law does not deal in technical acoustic properties, and "similarity" is dealt with in an essentially subjective manner. The find of fact, who is an ordinary observer, has to weight all of the evidence and decide whether there is substantial similarity (or striking similarity) which could be evidence of infringement (substantial similarity is not against the law, copyright infringement is). Both parties to the litigation will present testimony supporting their contention and refuting the others' contention. At some point, one side is likely to introduce expert testimony to the effect that there are only so many possible melodies, which if persuasive can overcome a feeling that two compositions are rather similar. The law only addresses the logic of that judgment, and not the scientific facts. For example, in the case of Testa v. Janssen, the legal premise is set doen that "proof of direct access is unnecessary where striking similarities between two works are present". HOw then do you know if there are striking similarities? To prove that similarities are striking, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "such similarities are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source." Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.1973) citing a previous ruling on that point. Ultimately, the courts cannot not dictate a scientific procedure for making that determination.

That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.

These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.

GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.

In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.

The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.

It is hard to prove a negative, but no - there is not rule that an app cannot track a user while the app is in the background. Almost every GPS-function app on every smart phone does the very thing you are talking about.

Is there a reason not to use liability insurance? I was recently hit by a car while riding my bike home from work, and the police determined that the driver was at fault and wrote her a ticket. She is insured, and presumably has enough liability coverage to take care of my damages (mainly bike repair/damaged clothing, etc. and no serious injuries). However, she has insisted that she will just write me a check for the damages and doesn't want to go through insurance. Her exact quote from our email exchange was "I am not reporting to insurance. Long story." I'm conflicted about this because on the one hand, I'm getting reimbursed either way, but on the other, she seems to just want this problem to go away and may be affecting generosity to avoid higher premiums. Is there a legal, or at least ethical, obligation to report this to her insurance company?

She damaged you - your beef is with her. If she has insurance, the choice of is she wants to claim or not is up to her. She is not obliged to make a claim and probably not obliged to tell her insurer about it. Perhaps she has a $20,000 excess. Perhaps she is a person not covered by the policy (too young or otherwise excluded) Perhaps she is (legitimately) concerned that making claims will increase her premium. Now, her contract may have a clause requiring her to disclose all accidents either ongoing or on renewal. However, the doctrine of privity of contract means that whether she does or not is no one’s business but hers and her insurer.

Suing relatives or friends to trigger an insurance policy is sometimes necessary, particularly if the insurer is being recalcitrant. Apart from that it is pointless to sue someone who has no money! In common law jurisdictions you can of course sue anyone for negligence. One of the things that you have to prove to be successful is that the defendant owed a duty of care. It may be difficult to prove that a child had such a duty.

I've gone through this enough times in Pennsylvania to paraphrase the law in this state: If a tree falls it's nobody's fault, unless the tree's owner was given credible advance notice that the tree posed an exceptional risk of failure, in which case the owner is liable for damage it causes if it fails. (For purposes of liability, a tree is "owned" by the owner of the ground where the trunk of the tree enters earth.) In the scenario you describe: A tree owned by your neighbor has not yet caused significant damage, but has been so structurally compromised that it poses an exceptional risk to your property. The standard course of action in such a circumstance is to promptly and formally notify the owner of that fact, and for the owner to remedy the risk. (In this case, it sounds like the only practical remedy is removal of the tree.) As a practical matter, the owner might be able to get an insurer to cover the cost of removal before it does more damage. But that's their problem. As a matter of expedience, you might also notify your insurer, since if the tree does end up causing significant damage to your property, you could subrogate your claim through your insurer. As a further matter of expedience: The township may have codes requiring landowners to address hazardous trees. Thus, if the owner does not promptly remedy the peril you could also notify the township.

The underlying assumption in this question seems to be that because A received defective professional advice from V, F may be free of blame. I believe that assumption is wrong. The gist of the question is this: Suppose a fraudster's deception causes a person to take a course of action they wouldn't have otherwise taken. As part of that, they suffer losses due to a second person's tort. Is that loss recoverable from the fraudster as well? In the scenario given, there are clearly two parties that are to blame for the loss: The fraudster, who perpetrated the fraud. The professional attorney, who gave defective advice. The fact that there also exists a second party that may have contributed to the loss does not in any way absolve the first party from blame or from being liable for his actions. In a tort case, it is always the person that caused the loss in the first place (the tortfeasor) the victim (A) should seek relief from first. So F is in no way “safe from litigaton”. In the event that the tortfeasor is not being able make full restitution (e.g. he is already bankrupt), A may sue V for professional negligence to recover his loss. However, to prevail, A vould must be able to prove that V has made critical errors that no “reasonable attorney” would have made. That is sometimes pretty hard to prove (it obviously depends on how clever F's deception was, and whether the number of hours A allowed V to use for due diligence should have been sufficient to uncover the deception). As for legal precedent, I am not aware of a single case where a fraudster has not been held liable because the victim of the fraud has sought professional advice (but it is of course not easy to locate precedent for something has not occured).

If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.

Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence.

Colorado statute 42-6-206 imposes disclosure requirements on the sale of vehicles with salvage titles. That you didn't know it was a salvage does not seem to be of concern to this particular statute. This means that you are potentially entitled to redress against the people who sold you the car as well, provided the sale occurred in Colorado and they failed to disclose it to you (i.e., you didn't just forget about it in the intervening years). Given the presence of a law specifically covering your circumstances, it may be worth consulting with a local attorney to see what your obligations are. There may be mitigating circumstances, but they are not currently obvious to me if they're there. (conventional wisdom in the industry is that all private sales are "as-is" with no implied warranty of merchantibility and no recourse for a buyer who doesn't do due diligence -- I was shocked to find a statute specifically protecting buyers of salvage vehicles)

What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year.

What was the basis/reasoning for Pennsylvania's Supreme Court decision to declare the state old-age assistance program unconstitutional in the 1920s? I read that From 1918 to 1927 [Abe] Epstein served as research director of the Pennyslvania Commission on Old Age Pensions. In that capacity, he was instrumental in having the State adopt an old-age assistance law in 1923. The law, however, was declared unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court. What was the basis/reasoning invoked by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in finding that law unconstitutional?

The case is Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128 A. 80 (Pa. 1925). The law is cited as the "Old Age Assistance Act of May 10, 1923, P. L. 189", but I could not find the text of the act. The court case explains that it established a pension of up to one dollar per day for residents over the age of seventy having annual income below $365 and assets below $3000. The provision of the [Pennsylvania] Constitution under which the act was declared void [by the lower court] reads as follows: "No appropriations, except for pensions or gratuities for military services, shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person or community, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or association." And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed. They also distinguished it from other laws that remained constitutional: Laws to assist the poor and indigent were still constitutional. The state argued that the Old Age Assistance Act fell in that category, but the court held that the income and property limits were not a reasonable definition of "poor", especially since the law would pay pensions to people even if they were able to work. The state apparently had a retirement pension system for public employees. This was also held to be different in that it was delayed compensation for employees, in exchange for the service they performed, and thus not charitable or benevolent.

OK, I talked to a lawyer (in Massachusetts) and these are the answers I got. One can draft a confidential exclusion letter to state wishes regarding excluding certain people from being guardians. In the letter you can explain in detail why you think somebody is unfit to be a guardian. Execute this document as you do for your will and tell your family that it exists so that they can access it if you die (or give them a copy). The advantage of a stand-alone document is that it is not public, differently from the will which is public. The lawyer also suggested to also have a separate stand-alone guardianship document (and so to not include the guardian section in the will). The reason is that a will can be executed only if somebody is dead. But if somebody is e.g. in a coma (or missing), he won't be able to take care of his children and yet his will would not be able to executed. A separate guardianship document would instead apply also in these situations thereby minimizing the chances that somebody, whom you do not consider fit, becomes a guardian of your children.

You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.

This is a matter of state law, and so could in theory vary from state to state. But I think that in most, if not all, US states, a public utility like a water or electric company must take any customer unless they have a history of unpaid bills or the like. They don't have to lay new pipes or run new wires to bring service to you if it is at a location not previously served, however. In the Maryland code, § 7-307 ( Termination of service to low income customers) provides: (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Commission shall adopt regulations concerning the prohibition against or limitation of authority of a public service company to terminate service for gas or electricity to a low income residential customer during the heating season for nonpayment. (2) In adopting the regulations required under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Commission shall consider and may include provisions relating to: (i) the circumstances under which service may and may not be limited or terminated; (ii) the minimum heating levels required to maintain life, health, and safety; (iii) the medical, age, disabling, or other individual characteristics that are relevant to a prohibition against or limitation on the termination of service; (and other provisions) That the Public Service Commission is empowered, and indeed obliged, to issue binding regulations on when service may be terminated might imply a duty to provide service in the first place, but that is not as clear as I would like. I know that in practice a utility runs a credit check and may demand a deposit if the results are not satisfactory, but I do not see a law compelling that behavior. It may be in regulations adopted by the commission.

Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.

I do not know what actually happened to anyone in the aftermath of this incident, but it is unlikely that there is a basis for civil or criminal liability in this case. Criminal liability does not generally attach to negligent conduct except in cases of homicide or criminally negligent motor vehicle operation. But, this case appears to have involved mere negligence. It appears that somebody made an honest mistake rather than acting recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Governmental entities and officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacity have immunity from liability for negligence except in some vary narrowly defined areas (e.g. failure to maintain government buildings, medical mistakes in government hospitals, and car accidents) which seem unlikely to be implicated here. But, it seems likely that the responsible parties were all governmental entities or officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacities. So, it is unlikely that there would be civil liability either. Needless to say, however, this does not look good on the job performance record of any civil servant below the Governor (who doesn't get evaluated in that way) when being considered for promotion, demotion, unfavorable transfers or even termination of employment. Obviously, if new facts were uncovered and this was actually more nefarious than it seems, and this hidden truth was discovered, there could be a basis for civil or criminal liability. But, if this was the case, it would have made headlines.

You are referring to 32 CFR 47.4. The only reasonable interpretation of that list is that one must meet all of the 5 requirements. The alternative interpretation would make any group that "[has not] already received benefits from the Federal Government for the service in question" eligible to apply. Since this is a regulation, the interpretation of the agency that wrote the regulations is given great deference. An agency's interpretation of the regulations it writes itself is controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation". (Auer v. Robbins 1997) Regarding whether there is ambiguity at all, read King v. Burwell for several restatements of the principle that one must read words in context before deciding they are ambiguous: A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law. They refer to the "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme".

I guess the meat of your question is: If a city enacts an unconstitutional ordinance, can it evade judicial review by repealing the ordinance and arguing for mootness once the judicial proceeding reaches to a point of potential disadvantage, and reenacting the same or a very similar ordinance once the judicial proceeding is dismissed? I don't know where the bright line is (maybe SCOTUS hasn't drawn a clear line yet), but at least there has been a case in which the SCOTUS rejected the mootness argument by a city that repealed the ordinance at issue during appeal: City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982). Two parts of the city's ordinance were at issue: (1) the language of "connections with criminal elements" and (2) "the age restriction." On appeal, the Fifth Circuit declared (1) unconstitutional but upheld (2). The city then repealed (1) and, on appeal to the SCOTUS, argued that the issue of (1) was moot. The mootness argument was rejected. The rejection argument was very short as presented in section I of the majority opinion: It is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. Such abandonment is an important factor bearing on the question whether a court should exercise its power to enjoin the defendant from renewing the practice, but that is a matter relating to the exercise, rather than the existence, of judicial power. [Footnote 10] In this case, the city's repeal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court's judgment were vacated. [Footnote 11] The city followed that course with respect to the age restriction, which was first reduced for Aladdin from 17 to 7 and then, in obvious response to the state court's judgment, the exemption was eliminated. There is no certainty that a similar course would not be pursued if its most recent amendment were effective to defeat federal jurisdiction. We therefore must confront the merits of the vagueness holding. Footnote 11 might be a critical fact in rejecting the mootness argument: Indeed, the city has announced just such an intention. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-20. Therefore, I think, if a city repeatedly employs your proposed strategy, the SCOTUS is unlikely to declare the case moot. EDIT: As pointed out by "Just a guy", the mootness part of City of Mesquite is about voluntary cessation, which is a kind of strategy concomitant with mootness arguments. Voluntary cessation does not moot the case unless "subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199 (1968). But the point of this answer is not on voluntary cessation in general. It is in the context of intervening legislation. A voluntary intervening legislation is usually sufficient to moot a case (e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989)), but it was not so in City of Mesquite -- that's why it is different from most similar voluntary cessation cases, and resembles more closely to the NYC gun control case. Perhaps because it is a city (and was thus less burdened to reenact the same or a similar ordinance than a state legislature), perhaps because it had declared its intention to reenact, perhaps both. None of these might be controlling precedents. But, City of Mesquite and the state legislature cases like Oakes (because the NY state legislature also acted), are probably at least close ones in the jurisprudence of the SCOTUS at this point of time.

Is it legal to store gold at home in the USA? Is it legal to store physical gold at home in the US? If so, what taxes may be applied on the gold held at home, in form of both jewelry or raw gold?

Private ownership of gold has been legal in the US since the passage of Pub. L 93-373, which repealed the prohibition of private ownership of gold. You may therefore store it wherever you want. There is no tax on gold, kept as gold, though if you sell it there may be capital gains tax owed on the profits (just as there would be for many other things).

If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.

It might possibly be illegal. For criminal law, usually you need to obey the laws of three countries: The country you are a national of (by personality principle) The country from where you make the sale (by territoriality principle) The country that hosts the attacked interest (by territoriality principle) Then it depends on the jurisdiction (and other factors) whether the sale is legal or not. I'll use the example of my country, Czech Republic. There is a crime called "Unauthorized access to a computer system or data storage device". For example, you commit this crime by exploiting a vulnerability in a web application and copying the web owner's data on your computer. It is also codified that whoever wilfully facilitates the committing of a crime by providing the criminal with resources (such as the exploit) is considered to have also committed the crime. For this to apply, you must have known or expected that the exploit will be used to commit a crime. The courts would decide this.

First, there's no tax credit (at least on the Federal side), just a tax deduction (and even that isn't guaranteed - depends on your personal circumstances). Second, you get to claim the deduction (you should keep your receipt, just in case).

As indicated here, throwing away mail is the crime of obstructing mail. There is no exception for "junk mail" i.e. standard mail. It is possible (virtually guaranteed) that an individual postmaster or the USPS has a different disposition of the two kinds or mail when returned, but that is about USPS and not you. It is highly unlikely that you will find an official statement to the effect that it is "okay" to violate the law in the case of disposition of returned standard mail, even if in fact there is virtually no chance of being prosecuted for recycling. I assume that the junk mail is not addressed to "or current resident", or simply "Resident", because then the letter is addressed to you and you can do what you want.

If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.

On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).

Here is the state of California code regarding the question. I am sure a state by state inquiry could reveal other statutes. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-01000&file=565-566 In California there is no specific registry but registration is performed by marking the container with a registered brand.

Can I be subjected to physical punishment by the police in the US as long as it is outside criminal proceeding? In Ingraham v. Wright, the US Federal Supreme Court ruled that it had "limited the application of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual language to criminal punishment". Can I be subjected to a "cruel and unusual" punishment by the police, as long as it is done outside of a criminal proceeding? For example, suppose I jaywalk. A police officer catches me. Suppose the punishment is a result of a bargain. Suppose that me and the police officer agrees that the police officer will give me a slap in the hand, and in return the police officer will not press charges against me. Can we make out such a bargain? If yes to (1), suppose that after that I change my mind and sue the officer on Eight Amendment grounds. Can the officer defend himself/herself by saying that the punishment doesn't violate the Eight Amendment because this amendment only applies to "criminal punishment" (Ingraham v. Wright) and this was not a "criminal punishment", because it was outside of a criminal proceeding? After all, charges were never pressed and so I was not convicted of any crime How does the answer to number (1) change if the punishment is imposed against my will?

No. Police are not permitted to impose any punishment whatsoever. Their role in the American justice system is to prevent and investigate criminal offenses. What you're describing is a punishment for a criminal offense, even though it is imposed outside the criminal justice system. The same principles that prevent an officer from punching a suspect in the face or demanding a cash payment to not write a ticket prohibit a police officer from imposing a punishment of his own design, with or without your consent.

No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1).

Beating a person up is a crime in every jurisdiction. No privilege to commit assault is created if the person has offended someone, although self defense (or defense of others) is a defense, in case the person is beating someone up. It may be against the law to expose your genitalia in public in your location, and you may call the police to seek justice. In Washington, a first offense of indecent exposure to a person under 14 is a gross misdemeanor. However, the law only allows up to 364 day in prison, and not a beating, for violating the law.

Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.

How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small.

Is there a way to accept civil liability without admitting a criminal violation? Are you allowed to tell the police, “I accept full responsibility for the accident, but I don’t wish to discuss what happened”? You can allow a default judgment as to liability to enter in a civil case (and then possibly even have a contested adversarial hearing on damages), or you can reach a settlement dismissing the case with prejudice in exchange for payment of a certain settlement without admission of liability. Indeed, this is what actually happens in about 90%+ of car accident cases that aren't resolved at trial or in a motion for summary judgment (something that is quite rare in a car accident case). Likewise, you can plea "no contest" or even being convicted following a trial of a traffic violation in connection with an accident, without the outcome of the traffic case having a binding effect on the outcome of a civil case, even though this seems contrary to the logic of how results in one case determine issues in other cases (called "collateral estoppel"). Basically, this rule has been enacted in most U.S. jurisdictions (usually by statute but in some rare cases by judicial decision), in order to prevent local traffic trial cases from turning into expensive high stakes battles that are really about liability for huge economic damages, in a traffic court process designed to efficiently deal with disputes in the tens to thousands of dollars at stake, rather than the tens of thousands to millions of dollars that are at stake in a personal injury case where there have been serious injuries. However, while the outcome and plea in a traffic case in not binding in a civil lawsuit involving a related accident, any testimony given under oath in one case can be used in the other case in almost all circumstances.

Yes A person can be charged with and possibly convicted of both Federal and State crimes for the same set of events, if they involve violations of both Federal and State laws. Double jeopardy does not bar such a prosecution because they are considers two different crimes, and the double jeopardy clause reads: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. This is not considered the "same offense". This is true whether or not a plea bargain is involved. The Wikipedia article linked above says: The government of the United States and of each State therein may each enact their own laws and prosecute crimes pursuant thereto, provided there is no prohibition by the Constitution of the United States or of the state in question. Such is known as the "dual sovereignty" or "separate sovereigns" doctrine In United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) the US Supreme Court wrote: The defendants insist that two punishments for the same act, one under the National Prohibition Act and the other under a state law, constitute double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment, and, in support of this position, it is argued that both laws derive their force from the same authority -- the second section of the amendment -- and therefore that, in principle, it is as if both punishments were in prosecutions by the United States in its courts. ... It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both, and may be punished by each. The Fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the federal government, Barron v. City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, and the double jeopardy therein forbidden is a second prosecution under authority of the federal government after a first trial for the same offense under the same authority. Here, the same act was an offense against the state of Washington, because a violation of its law, and also an offense against the United States under the National Prohibition Act. The defendants thus committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense against that state is not a conviction of the different offense against the United States, and so is not double jeopardy It is interesting to note that as late as 1922 this court seemed to think that none of the bill of rights had been incorporated into the 14th amendment and thus made applicable to the states. But that would not have changed the decision in this case.

Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law.

Is it a crime to take out a loan with no intention to repay? This question on Money.SE concerned a person who had taken out a number of loans. He didn't intend to repay these loans in full, planning instead to default and leave the country. Several posters on Money.SE claimed that such actions would constitute fraud or theft or some similar crime. Would they? For the purposes of this question, let us assume: The borrower received a single unsecured loan in the amount of $10,000. The borrower did not misrepresent any facts (such as income, assets, etc) on his loan application. At the time of applying for the loan, the borrower had already made up his mind that he would not fully repay the loan; and there is evidence to establish this. (Perhaps he wrote a diary entry to that effect, or bragged about it to someone.) The borrower has sufficient assets and/or income that he could make the payments without undue burden, if he wanted to. The jurisdiction is California, USA (though if other jurisdictions are different, that would also be interesting). Followup: Suppose instead that at the time of applying for and receiving the loan, the borrower did sincerely intend to make his best efforts to repay it in full, but at some later time he changed his mind and decided that, although he had sufficient available funds to make the payments, he wasn't going to do so anymore; and did in fact stop paying. Would that constitute a crime of any kind? Obviously the borrower could be sued in civil court and have his assets seized, etc, - but the question here is whether he could be subject to criminal sanctions.

If, at the time of application for the loan, the borrower has no intention of repaying, it appears that it is a crime. From California Penal Code section 532: (a) Every person who knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any other person of money, labor, or property, whether real or personal, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character, and by thus imposing upon any person obtains credit, and thereby fraudulently gets possession of money or property, or obtains the labor or service of another, is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained. The false representation in this case is that you falsely represent your intention to repay the loan. Variations of your scenario invoke other sections of the law. If the false representation is instead about the ability to pay, then section 532a applies. If it's with regards to a secured loan, it's section 532f Deciding not to repay the loan after the fact appears to be a purely civil matter: nothing in Chapter 8 (false personation and cheats) looks like it applies.

Absent a specified jurisdiction, I'm going to assume the US state of New York. This conduct falls squarely within the definition of extortion under New York Penal Law section 155.05(2)(e): A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: [...] (iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; There is a defense under section 155.15(2): In any prosecution for larceny by extortion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened charge. However, in your hypothetical, the customer is just seeking a payout. This defense is meant for situations like a theft victim telling the thief "give me back my property or I'll call the cops;" unless paying the customer is actually a reasonable action to make up for the crime, the customer can't use this defense. If the crime is a federal one, this is also blackmail under 18 U.S. Code § 873: Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. If interstate communications are involved, 18 U.S. Code § 875(d) can also apply: Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

In general, the law seeks to make all parties whole. There is no mechanism for profit-sharing between thieves and their victims. Victims of theft are entitled to receive their money back plus the applicable rate of interest (called the judgment rate). They are not entitled to profits or windfalls above and beyond the statutory judgment rate of interest. What if the act of stealing the money has destroyed the owner's business and has left him with a lot of debt and bankrupt? Criminal statutes provide for the return of stolen funds plus interest. Recovery of damages, as you describe, is provided by civil statutes and common law. So, to recover damages, the victim would need to sue the thief in civil court.

That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.

In essence, Schwab is stating that they are not a law enforcement agency and they have neither the interest nor the legal right to pursue criminals. They state that they will assist law enforcement but also tell you that, from their experience, law enforcement while they have the legal right also don't have any interest in doing so. This is completely correct. I'm not going to comment on what you should do to protect yourself from identity theft. With respect to the reverse transfer: you are on very shaky legal ground here - you transferred funds without authorization and you are not legally allowed to do this even to recover your own losses. If you had limited this to just recovering your own funds then you would be extremely unlikely to be prosecuted but by taking more than was yours you have technically committed a theft of your own. That said, it seems unlikely that law enforcement will be interested - Schwab are not making a complaint and I doubt that the original thief will - for obvious reasons. However, its possible (even likely) that this was not the thief's bank account - this is likely to be an innocent third party's account that the thief was using to obfuscate their crime. If so, the money you took (both the original amount and the extra $50) you took actually belongs to that innocent party - your money had probably spent very little time in that account.

In my opinion, your question is no different from "If I steal money from a bank to pay off my credit card in the same bank, can I be held liable for stealing". I think the obvious answer is yes for both your question and the modified one, for exactly the same reason.

You don't need to have an existing relationship with a lawyer to refuse to talk to the police. You can tell the police you want a lawyer before answering questions. Generally speaking, this should result in the police leaving you alone, giving you time to reach out to an attorney on your own timeline. This is of course a bit more complicated if you've already been arrested, but in most cases, you'll still be able to make calls out of jail to try to find a lawyer. If you have serious concerns about this kind of situation, having an attorney on retainer would be a good idea. The business end of the transaction is fairly simple. You would likely sign an engagement agreement with the lawyer in which you agree to pay a modest sum -- $500 or $1,000, imagine, and the lawyer would agree to take your calls when they come in and swoop in to deal with the police as necessary. The lawyer would be required to place your money in a trust account and not touch it until you call him to use his services. If you're expecting the lawyer to go further by actually appearing in court for you, filing motions, defending you at trial, etc., the retainer would likely be substantially higher.

What would happen if this money was not returned? The former employee would, based on the given circumstances, be guilty of theft contrary to section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: (1) A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it... Section 5 defines "Belonging to another" to include: (4)Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration [...] an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds. Setion 4 states that: (1)“Property” includes money... Although there are statutory defences to theft, at section 2, to acting dishonestly they are not satisfied in this scenario: (1)A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— (a)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or (b)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or (c)(except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. A very similar set of circumstances arose in the case A-G Ref (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182 The defendant, a police woman, received an overpayment in her wages by mistake. She had noticed that she had received more than she was entitled to but did not say anything to her employer. She did not withdraw any of the money from her bank account. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit. The Attorney General referred a question to the Court of Appeal. Held: [by the Court of Appeal] It was possible for a theft conviction to arise where the defendant had not withdrawn the money. There was a legal obligation to return the money received by mistake.

Is lying in an application for a job at a private company, signed under penalty of perjury, prosecutable as perjury? A person applies for a job at the XYZ company. The XYZ company is a private company. As part of applying he fills out an application and signs it under penalty of perjury. The application has several lies in it. Can he be criminal prosecuted for perjury? If his signature had been notarized after he signed it, would that effect the answer?

united-states A "penalty of perjury" statement includes not just the warning about penalty of perjury, the person signing avows that the statements are true to the best of their knowledge. If you lie on such a statement, and if the "penalty of perjury" statement is legally allowed (typically, mandated), then the person can be prosecuted. However, XYZ cannot arbitrarily inject the risk of perjury, that requires some legal authorization. An example would be if XYZ is employing the person under a Defense Department contract that requires a sworn statement. The federal perjury statute characterises this as being when "a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered". The only effect of notarization is that it decreases the probability that the person could effectively argue "I never even signed this statement, that's a forgery".

Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.

Could the victim report this as fraud, theft or some other related crime? They could, but it's unclear whether they would be successful. A criminal conviction would require intent on the part of the company or an employee, and that will probably be difficult to prove. In a big system like this, individuals can usually claim misunderstandings and errors of omission, which makes such a proof difficult. They could try to establish criminal corporate liability, but again this is difficult to prove. So while possible, it's probably not worth it. Would the answer to the previous question differ based on whether the victim was eventually able to recover the money through litigation or by disputing the charge with their bank? Probably not. For a criminal conviction, it's necessary to prove that the company or an employee deliberately took money they knew was not theirs. Whether they later gave it back is not relevant for determining guilt (though it may reduce the sentence). Would the company itself or the specific employees involved be liable? In principle, both could be held liable. Again, this depends on what can be proved in court. Would a binding arbitration clause in the contract have any effect on criminal liability No, arbitration clauses cannot protect from criminal liability, only from civil liability (within limits). Off-topic: The fastest way to resolve such situations is usually to write one stern letter explaining why you are owed the money. If that does not work, sue them - if the situation is clear-cut, you will most likely win, or the company will settle. Many jurisdictions have simplified court proceedings for clear cases like this, for example the Mahnverfahren in Germany.

There are several forms of notarized documents, the most common of which are affidavits (which are written statements of a person made and signed under oath) and acknowledgements (which is a notarized statement that a document was signed before a notary, usually used for documents related to real property). There would be no legitimate reason I can think of to notarize an offer letter, and the fact that you want to do that probably means that you are confused about some other aspect of the law that would make you think that you would want to or need to do something like that. A more common thing to do, for example, in anticipation of a lawsuit, would be to prepare and execute an affidavit which states that the letter, attached as an exhibit, was signed by you, and anyone else that you have personal knowledge signed it, for your signature before a notary. A notary is not allowed to execute an affidavit (or a very similar document called a verification which is a very short document saying that the facts stated in a single document asserting a claim in a court case are true and correct in a form substantially similar to an affidavit) if it is signed outside the notary's physical presence (in theory because the notary administers an oath before you sign it). An acknowledgement can be executed by a notary if the person who signed the document comes before the notary in person and acknowledges that it was signed by him or her, even if the notary was not there when it was actually signed. The notary would state the date that you acknowledged it in person to the notary in the acknowledgement and would not make any statement regarding when it was actually signed. There is special formalized legal language that must accompany each kind of notarization, which is called the "jurat". Then the notary signs and dates the jurat in the appropriate place and applies a notary seal near the jurat in the indicated location (if any) mark "L.S." for "location of seal" in latin.

Not in jurisdictions I am familiar with. A "Power of attorney" is a power to act as an attorney-in-fact, not to act as an attorney-at-law. A layperson practicing law for someone other than herself is usually the unauthorized practice of law and is illegal in most jurisdictions. It would be permissible if a jurisdiction carved out an exception for a particular kind of case, but they generally don't and are very unlikely to do so in a criminal case. For example, in Washington State "Limited Practice Officers" can assist people with one of a very limited set of civil legal forms that do not need modification. There may be some exceptions, but they would be more likely to occur before a matter becomes criminal. For example, the accountant who represents a taxpayer before the IRS, or the agent who files a form containing perjury to a federal agency like the post office or homeland security on your behalf. So it is very unlikely, but if it is important to you you can ask someone familiar with your kind of case in your jurisdiction.

Yes P was standing in a hallway to which he had apparently been lawfully admitted Indeed. And what were the conditions imposed on P for that lawful admittance? If one of those was "no photography" then P would not have been lawfully on the premises once they started taking pictures; at that point, they would have been a trespasser. Similarly, if they were admitted under conditions of confidence. As a trespasser, the information they obtained would not have been obtained legitimately and would fall foul of protection on trade secrets. Of course, P's actions can be "wrong" without being unlawful.

Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.

You could bring a motion to compel for failing to respond substantively to a motion to admit which is objected to, just as you could for an interrogatory. The process is the same. Normally, a request to admit would not be deemed admitted if a substantive objection was filed by the deadline, even if there was no express admission or denial. Only if the objection were completely and utterly meritless would a judge be likely to order that the request to admit would be deemed admitted in that case since the response was a de facto non-answer and the objection was a mere sham. @Iñaki Viggers states in his answer: the purpose of a request for admissions is [to attempt] to stipulate --rather than to discover-- the facts on which plaintiff and defendant agree. This is not really true. A request to admit is a discovery tool to prevent you from having to prove up what should be non-controversial facts that might nonetheless take time or documentation to prove at trial and to gather evidence for in advance of trial. The questions in a request to admit are typically ones that the other side would not willingly stipulate to (for example, because they'd like to be able to offer testimony to explain a seemingly unfavorable fact) but may not be able to deny. If a party denies a request to admit and then offers nothing to support the denial in discovery practice or at trial, that party risks court sanctions for the groundless denial. Good litigation practice is also always to include some requests to admit that are effectively outcome determinative to give the opposing party a chance to screw up and essentially default the case by not responding on time.

Neighbor trees' shade impact solar panel production? Is there any case law or precedent or? regarding a neighbor's trees whose shadow covers another's roof for a good part of the day and thus block solar panels from working as efficiently as they might. The trees were there first if that makes a difference.

It isn't precisely clear which jurisdiction you are located in (recall that this website handles matters from everywhere in the world). But, generally speaking, in the United States, you have no right to limit someone's existing tree on their property merely because it casts a shadow on your solar panels. The installer should have known better. A minority of U.S. states, including California, consider new construction that blocks the view of existing structures a form of "nuisance" that can be abated if it unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of the existing property. But, that protects existing structures, rather than new ones. In Japan, there are building code requirements designed to insure that key portions of every home get natural sunlight daily. Again, this only applies to the construction of new buildings. I know of no law that gives someone who newly installs a solar panel a right to remove or trim a neighbor's tree simply by virtue of doing so. And, without knowing whose law is involved it would be impossible to determine with any reliability. The property with the solar panel could seek to buy the right to an unobstructed view from the property with the tree, in what would probably be called a "view easement", but that would only happen if the terms were such that both consented and it was written up in a legal document to that effect.

I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.

Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No

As Paul Johnson says, this is a planning permission thing. The parking places your landlord has leased you are real; they exist. They just don't have planning permission for all of them. It's no different to if the landlord got planning permission for a building of four flats, and built a block of six flats. Building those two additional flats would illegal, and the planning authority could take enforcement action against the landlord for it; however, letting those two additional flats out is perfectly legal. Similarly letting those parking places is legal; it's just that the planning authority may take action against the landlord to force two of the parking places to be removed. At that point the landlord would have to break the contract with the tenants of the parking places, and would be liable for damages. In practise, unless there are some activist neighbours, the planning authority won't take any enforcement action (spending money on legal action for two parking places is not high on their list of priorities). Even if there are some activist neighbours, they probably won't bother. Finally, any development becomes lawful after ten years, and if the development is used as dwellings, after four years. It is not clear to me whether the parking spaces would be considered as a separate development to the flats (and hence have a ten year limit), or whether they are ancillary to the dwellings (and hence have a four year limit). My suspicion is that the landlord was asked to sign an application for a Lawful Development Certificate (which essentially just certifies that the development is out of time for planning enforcement). If so, that means that ... the development is out of time for planning enforcement, so you have no need to worry. Incidentally, if I am right, your friend doesn't have any need to worry either, and is probably being put off the purchase by an overly cautious conveyancer. (Note: I am not a lawyer, and in particular, I am not your friend's lawyer.)

Interesting question! I believe all of the examples can be addressed by the following rules: A vehicle on a roadway has the right-of-way over a vehicle not on a roadway. Therefore, the vehicle leaving a parking lot always yields to a vehicle in a parallel road. Absent another rule, the vehicle on the right always has the right-of-way. So if two vehicles are leaving adjacent parking lots, the left one waits for the right one to go if there is any potential conflict. Of course, not enough people know these rules, so in practice if you can't get the vehicle with the legal right-of-way to take it I teach drivers to be as decisive and cautious as possible: I.e., take the right-of-way, but not so fast that you can't avoid the other vehicle if it decides to go after all, because legally you will be at fault in a collision. (Though it's anyone's guess how police and insurers would settle the tricky scenarios you illustrate.)

Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected.

I think you are very likely wrong in believing that if you return the water further downstream it doesn't count as illegal abstraction. Government guidance says: If you want to build a new hydropower scheme, you need to apply to the Environment Agency for: an abstraction licence - if you divert or take water from a river or watercourse Admittedly, guidance isn't law. However, your position is quite close to arguing that taking and borrowing are two different things, and I wouldn't want to try to argue it.

Let's put to bed the myth of privacy that is at the heart of your question: in R v Sotheren (2001) NSWSC 204 Justice Dowd said “A person, in our society, does not have a right not to be photographed" So they can ask you to stop; its bad manners if you don't but it is not illegal. If they are the controller of the property then they can stop you filming from their property but they cannot stop you filming into their property from outside (either public land or land where you do have permission). See How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame?

Does Romeo & Juliet (1968) constitue Child Porn? In Romeo and Juliet (1968), the actress playing Juliet (age 15 at the time), had her bare chest exposed for a bit after sleeping with Romeo. Romeo's actor (who was also underage) had his naked bottom exposed in the same scene. Basically, two underage actors were shown nude after a (presumed) sexual encounter. Would this make the film constitute child porn, and would possession of it be cause for arrest? It is a fairly celebrated film that's still openly on sale, so I'd imagine it isn't regarded as CP. I'm just not sure what the relevant standard is for why it wouldn't (or would) be considered CP.

From the justice.gov site Federal law defines child pornography as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (persons less than 18 years old). So no, the mere showing of a naked chest or bare bottom does not constitute child pornography.

In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible.

The issue is not exactly with minors, it is with FERPA and COPPA. This assumes that you have some indication of what students are connected to the web page. If you have students under 13 (surely you do), you need verifiable parental consent. The FTC approves or disapproves particular methods of verification, here is their page on that. One approved and patented method is ChildGuardOnline Technology (it;s a business, not a free service). The other concern is that you have to scrupulously protect "student records". You already know that you can't disseminate "student records" without parental consent, what this adds is possibly new concerns with online security. However, many schools are exempt from the COPPA requirements. Here are some "exceptions" to the rule, and nonprofit organizations are not subject to Section 5 of the FTC Act.

18 U.S. Code § 2252 defines a crime and punishment for knowingly transporting, or reproducing for distribution by any means, visual depictions involving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Here are some sample jury instructions that rephrase this and give definitions for each of these terms. Here are some others (at p. 469). This law review article discusses the knowledge requirement of this statute. It would be an easy argument that the operators of the intermediary nodes do not have the requisite knowledge of the material flowing over their networks and computers to be implicated by section 2252, especially when they are broken down into chunks that can only be re-assembled at the destination. United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006) is an example of a case where a defendant was found to not have the requisite knowledge of child pornography that was found in his browser's cache folders. These were complete files, no assembly required. However, the court said: where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files An IPFS user has no more knowledge of the pieces being passed through their computer than this defendant did of his cache (unless of course they are the source or destination).

Section 108(a) is the most useful for an infringer who posts an entire copy of a protected work in public. Subsections(b,c) require that the copy not be made available outside the premises, which precludes internet posting; (d) requires a user request to make a copy; (e) applies only to items that are off the market and transferred to a specific user; (h) allows more copying in the last 20 years of the period when a work is protected (not applicable here). Subsection (a) allows a library or archive to make one copy of a work, as long as there is no commercial advantage to making the copy, the library is relatively public (it might restrict access to bona fide researchers), and a copyright notice is included: this has the fewest restrictions on copying. The internet downloader is not a library or an archive, so the downloader is not granted any permission under 108 to make a copy. Under 108(a) a library can make no more than one copy available, but every uploading or downloading is "making a copy". A library would be contributorily liable for the illegal downloadings of their "customers". It is difficult to know exactly what one can get away with under 17 USC 107 a.k.a. "fair use". I am fairly sure that posting a copy of a contemporary book in the open is not "fair use" even if the intent is to make it possible for dummies to study chemistry: such copying is not at all transformative, totally unlimited, and provides a significant market substitute for the protected work.

In 2017 Illinois changed its law so that criminal charges for child abuse have no statute of limitations, and can be prosecuted as long as the accused is alive. This applies to all such crimes that occur after the new law was passed, and to all prior crimes on which the previous statute of limitations had not yet expired. See this news story on the change Previously, Illinois law allowed for prosecution for up to 20 years after the victim turned 18. Since the women Kelly is accused of having abused were 16 or younger in 1998 or later, the older statute of limitations would not have expired until at least 2020. More than 35 states now have no statute of limitations for child abuse. By the way, for civil actions, as opposed to criminal charges, the Illinois law now says: an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date [a person turns 18] or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse." (ILCS § 5/13-202.2(b)) Thus, a civil suit by one of the alleged victims might or might not be barred by time, depending on details of the date of the abuse and the victim's age. In short, do not take a drama as a source of legal advice. Look it up or ask a reliable source.

I think this relates to individual stores interpretation of California's "ABC Laws": § 25658. Sale to and consumption by person under 21 years of age; Use by peace officers to apprehend sellers of alcoholic beverages to minors (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic beverage to any person under 21 years of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in Section 25667 or 25668, any person under 21 years of age who purchases any alcoholic beverage, or any person under 21 years of age who consumes any alcoholic beverage in any on-sale premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (c) Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishing, giving, or giving away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age, and the person under 21 years of age thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The last part is the part that scares business owners. Some interpret it as "if they furnish alcohol to you (a person over 21) and have reasonable suspicion that the purchase will be given to the minor, the person furnishing the alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor". This is absolutely true in the case of bar owners/bartenders. If they sell somebody a drink, even if that person is over 21, and that drink is then given to a minor, they can be (probably not successfully) held responsible in some form for any injury that person sustains or commits as a result of alcohol consumption. Some stores take this much more seriously (because a violation can mean the loss/suspension of the liquor license) than others, and it is at the stores discretion to deny the sale based on any suspicion, whether based in reality or not.

I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well.

Is it legal to file two insurance claims for the same loss? Say my car started a fire and the fire caused damage to my house, resulting in a loss of $1000. Is it legal/ethical for me to file a claim with my car insurance while at the same time filing a claim with my house insurance? If yes, will I get $1000 (possibly minus any deductibles) from each insurance policy? If no, which insurance company should I file a claim from?

Assuming that both policies actually cover the loss, this is called “double insurance.” Generally speaking, you can claim against both insurers, but you can only recover the loss once. See my answer to another question about double recovery for more about the general principles that apply when a plaintiff attempts to recover the same loss from multiple defendants. In the specific context of insurance, there will normally be terms in the insurance contract as well as local statutes which require the claimant to notify the insurers of one another’s existence, and determine the extent to which the insurer who paid can recover contribution from the insurer who didn’t. This issue is particularly complex in the United States where insurance is separately regulated in each state. Some of the complexities that arise are reviewed in Russ, The double insurance problem – a proposal (1961) 13(2) Hastings Law Journal 183, although this is now rather outdated. In the context of health insurance, the adjustment of liability for doubly-insured risks is referred to as coordination of benefits and may be regulated by model laws promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissions. I am not aware of any model law or legal principles applicable throughout the United States that would determine the outcome in the case you describe of home and car insurance.

You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm.

Sure, you can sue; but who are you going to sue? You have to prove someone knew about the fact that one condo resident was going to be paying for the other condo's hot water. Mixed up plumbing and electrical systems are fairly common in apartment and condo complexes, especially ones that have been converted. Chances are high it's a mistake and was not done on purpose. If you can find the original general contractor, he's going to say it wasn't him, talk to the plumbing contractor. Who will say I didn't do it, and my work is only guaranteed for five years, so talk to the plumbing inspector. He'll say he didn't see it, and besides, all those inspection records were thrown out ten years ago. The condo association may or may not have had oversight of the construction. Can you prove the neighbor knew about it and didn't tell the condo association? Can you prove the realtor who your dad bought through knew about it? Was there a home/condo inspection done - paid for by your dad or the seller - before the sale that might have spotted it? The police aren't going to care; technically, it is a crime, in a way, but it's not like someone tapped into someone's cable TV or electrical power meter last week. This is a problem from years ago, more than likely from the original construction; so who is really responsible? The police aren't going to run that down. And, what are the damages? A few months of part of a power bill? Is it really worth a lawsuit and a lawyer? Against who? I can't see a lawyer jumping into it. If you want to do something for whatever comes next, yes, collect evidence. Tell the neighbor he/she's on your hot water. Take photos and get a licensed plumber to take a look at it and give you an estimate for separating the water systems. That will document that the two systems are not separate. (Either call your own plumber or ask the condo association for the name of someone). Then, start with the condo association. They may be responsible for the inspections before the sale. At very least, the condo association may have to check off on the repairs. And, they may know more about it (oh, yes, we've heard about that in a few other condos...) You could bring it to everyone's attention at a meeting; it may be a common issue in the complex, and other residents may not know about it. If, in fact, the neighbor doesn't have their own water heater, they may be more on the hook for expensive repairs than your dad. They may have more of a case against the condo association than your dad.

Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A.

There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.

One of the biggest problems here is in proof of injury attributable to an individual... With asbestos, you can prove that direct exposure in a certain instance caused a long-term harm. Just because you were around asbestos doesn't mean you get lung cancer, so if you don't actually suffer any harm (or any harm yet), you won't get awarded damages. Similarly with lead, you have to prove both the exposure, the entity which exposed you to it, and harm that you suffered. Just being around a lead pipe or paint doesn't mean you get damages, you need to have suffered harm. The problem with second-hand smoke is that you can be exposed to it from many different sources. Any problems you have (lung cancer) would need to be proven as a direct consequence of one specific (or prolonged) exposure. I could see this working if a non-smoking spouse developed cancer from a smoking spouse being exposed to it for years, but you can't just say "I walked by Joe Camel in the street while he was smoking now I have cancer and it is his fault". So the issue becomes who is responsible for your damages. You can't narrow it down to one smoker (or even cigarette smoke, as lung cancer can develop from other sources), so just proving that your cause-effect is directly related to smoke will be difficult. After that you can't say one single person caused it (unless they forcefully locked you in a room and chain-smoked for a year). So who do you sue? All of smoking society? You might just as well sue God for putting those people on earth, really the only recourse you would have is to sue the tobacco companies, the individual smokers are not going to be held liable as a group.

It may depend on the jurisdiction (although I can't readily think of one where this is not the case) but deliberately, recklessly or negligently putting a burning object next to someone else's property knowing that there is a real risk of it catching fire (and going ahead with it anyway) will almost definitely make one liable: especially if there is an ulterior motive. In england-and-wales This would be called arson - causing criminal damage by fire - an offence contrary to section 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 Cross posted with the jurisdiction defining comment

Tell your parents Given the circumstances it is a near certainty that the least he will do if you do not pay for the damage is make contact with them. It will be far, far better for you if they learn it from you rather than him. What could he do? He (or his insurance company) can contact your parents - he will almost certainly do this. He (or his insurance company) can sue you for negligence. Children are responsible for their own torts providing they have the capacity to recognize and avoid risk and harm - based on your question I have (and a court would have) no doubt that that you are. If you lose the case, and don't pay, he can have the government seize whatever you own in order to sell it to pay the debt you owe. If this happened in British Columbia or Manitoba he can sue your parents. He could report you to the police - they may or may not choose to prosecute if what you did was criminal: it probably wasn't but the police may investigate to determine this. If he is insured he may be required to notify the police.

What standard of evidence is used for a subpoena of documents in a criminal case? How does it compare to probable cause? A Website I use received subpoenas from the US Department of Justice for data related to certain specified usernames. What standard of evidence must that subpoena have met and how does it compare to the probable cause required for a search warrant?

Probable cause is not required to issue a subpoena. But, a recipient of a subpoena (or a party to a case in which a subpoena is issued, or a person whose records a subpoenaed), may file a motion to quash the subpoena in the court that issued it, before the information is disclosed pursuant to the subpoena. A claim that the subpoenaed material is privileged is always a legitimate reason to quash a subpoena. A subpoena can also be quashed on the grounds that the materials sought are unrelated to the matter for which it is issued, or that it is unduly burdensome in a manner unrelated to a legitimate interest in obtaining the information sought (this list of objections is not exhaustive). You can see an example of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum from a federal grand jury, together with the subpoena itself attached to the motion at the end of the linked file as an exhibit, at this link. The federal court rule governing subpoenas in federal criminal cases is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17. In federal court civil cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 applies. Short of actually quashing the subpoena, the court issuing it could also modify the obligation by imposing a protective order on the materials to be disclosed (e.g. trade secrets or private financial information). This would prevent the materials disclosed from being shared with people other than the recipient. Incidentally, the penalty for failing to respond to a subpoena is for the person to whom it is directed to hold the person in contempt of court, punishable by incarceration or a fine (often a fixed amount per day). Often, if testimony is part of what is required, a warrant for the arrest of the person who fails to appear is summarily issued by the court. Footnote regarding terminology Strictly speaking, the word "subpoena" unmodified, refers to a subpoena directing the person to whom it is addressed to testify under oath at a certain place and time, sometimes a grand jury, sometimes a trial in a court, sometimes a deposition, sometimes an arbitration, and sometimes an interview with a government official. When a subpoena is asking for the turnover of records or things or data it is strictly speaking called a "subpoena duces tecum" (from the Latin duces tecum, meaning "you shall bring with you"). Historically, in response to the subpoena duces tecum, the custodian of the records would appear personally at a deposition or grand jury proceeding or trial with the records or things and would testify under oath briefly at that time to authenticate them. These days, the federal rules of evidence and most state rules of evidence provide that the custodian of records can sign an affidavit, or a declaration (i.e. a statement made under penalty of perjury which is not notarized), regarding the authenticity of the records (and their status as "business records" or "public records" where appropriate). Then, this affidavit or declaration is delivered along with the records by a courier or mail, in lieu of actually providing live testimony regarding the authenticity and business records status of the records. Delivery of documents by courier or mail or electronically, accompanied by an affidavit or declaration is what is usually done these days, except in exceptional cases where the authenticity and/or business records status of the records is genuinely in dispute and complicated in some way. For example, in person testimony of the custodian of records might be required in a case where there are allegations of forgery of documents or that digital files were hacked.

These are different terms for initiating documents. What one court or jurisdiction calls a petition, another might call an application. "Complaint" may not have a technical meaning in some contexts or jurisdictions, but often it is used to refer to the initiating document at a specialist tribunal. There are other names for initiating documents: notice of civil claim, notice of action, etc. There is no way to know which terms have a technical meaning and what those meanings are without looking to the rules and practice in a particular jurisdiction. "Indictment" is an initiating document in a criminal prosecution. But there are also "informations" (generally implying lesser charges).

The standard of proof is "on the balance of probabilities", or, "preponderance of evidence", meaning that your claim must be more probable than the other guy's claim. Rules of evidence may preclude using certain kinds of evidence such as rule 403 The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence A supernatural alternative can, in fact, defeat all forms of evidence, including forensics and "I saw it directly" testimony. The courts do not exclude evidence (all evidence) on the grounds that you can imagine a sci-fi scenario where "it didn't really happen". The rules of evidence more or less encode the cases where evidence is generally found to not be reliable.

There is a lot of confusion over the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. They are not the same thing. Reasonable suspicion is any justifiable belief that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Probable cause requires an officer to have actual, tangible evidence that you have committed a crime. Only after probable cause has been established can an officer arrest you (with limited ability to search your immediate person and effects). Reasonable suspicion only requires some articulatable justification that you did something wrong. The police can detain you on reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you why. This is called a Terry stop (after Terry v. Ohio where the Supreme Court ruled this was legal). However, they can only detain you long enough to ascertain whether or not they have probable cause to arrest you. If after conducting a preliminary investigation they can't find probable cause to make an arrest, they have to let you go. In that video, we have a guy walking around in Texas with a shotgun and some shells. We never see what this guy looks like or how he's carrying himself, but he appears to be a troll. The cops received a call, so they investigated. They had all the reasonable suspicion they needed to detain him. Texas is an open carry state (a person can walk around openly with a gun), and it is not a stop-and-identify state (the police cannot demand that you ID yourself). Therefore the man did not break any laws. But neither did the police officers. They were doing their job by asking questions, and after failing to find any evidence, they let him go. If he had run before the officers had cleared him to leave, they could have chased him down and arrested him. That is, after all, what a detention is. You don't get to run away because you don't recognize a cop's authority to stop you. And fleeing a law enforcement officer is a crime. But you do have the right not to answer any questions, including (in some states) what your name is.

At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.

Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.

The Evidence Would be Admissible. Under the so-called "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule the evidence would probably be admitted over Bob's objections in both cases mentioned in the question. Recent US court decisions have limited the exclusionary rule when police officers reasonably but mistakenly believe that a valid warrant exists, and find evidence acting under such an apparent warrant. However, if there is good evidence of intentional falsification by the police, the exception will probably not apply. As to the second case, where Bob is home and protests that an error is being made, police are not required to, and often do not, accept much that suspects or subjects of warrants say in their own defense. If anyone could simply claim there was an error and delay a warrant, perhaps giving time to dispose of evidence, many problems would result. However, the "good faith" exception only applies where the police reasonably and honestly believe that the warrant is valid, or that probable cause exists. If Bob says something such as: This warrant is for 1020 Anne street, where Alice Crook lives. But I live at 1050 Albert street. See the house number is 1050 right here. There must be a mistake. then a reasonable officer would probably double check the warrant, and if the officer unreasonably fails to do so, the search might later be suppressed. But this is going to be a very fact-sensitive inquiry, and none of the cases that I know of on the "good faith exception" rule are exactly on point for this situation. I cannot be sure how a court might rule in such a case. Leon and Evans Cases In United States v. Leon 468 U. S. 897, the US Supreme Court created a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. In that case the Court held that when officers make an objectively reasonable, good faith decision to rely on a warrant later held to be invalid, the exclusionary rule does not apply, and evidence found during a search under such a warrant, or in the course of an arrest under such a warren, is admissible. The basic logic is that when the invalid warrant was the result of an honest mistake, suppressing the evidence would have no deterrent effect on future similar mistakes, as no one intended to make them in any case. In Arizona v. Evans 514 U. S. 1 (1995), this rule was extended to officer who rely in good faith on information mistakenly provided by Court employees. The underlying logic is much the same. Herring v. United States In Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) this exception was further extended to officers who acted in good faith on the mistaken information of other officers. Evidence found in a search incident to an arrest, although there was no valid arrest warrant or other probable cause, was not suppressed. In this case a warrant had been issued but later recalled. however this recall was somehow not properly entered into the database of warrants maintained by a sheriff's office. When a nearby jurisdiction called to ask if there was an outstanding warrant on Herring, they were told that there was one. Herring was arrested, and drugs and an unlawful firearm found. Minutes later the officers were told that the arrest warrant was not valid. Herring was convicted based on the evidence from the search, and the US Supreme court upheld the conviction. The court wrote in Herring: When a probable-cause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a constitutional violation. The very phrase “probable cause” confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision. And whether the error can be traced to a mistake by a state actor or some other source may bear on the analysis. For purposes of deciding this case, however, we accept the parties’ assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment violation. The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223 (1983). Indeed, exclusion “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 591 (2006), and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule. ... the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ... When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted “in objectively reasonable reliance” on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. 468 U. S., at 922 (Leon). We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance “good faith.” In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when a warrant was invalid because a judge forgot to make “clerical corrections” to it. ... in Evans, 514 U. S. 1, we applied this good-faith rule to police who reasonably relied on mistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant was outstanding. We held that a mistake made by a judicial employee could not give rise to exclusion for three reasons: The exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct; court employees were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and “most important, there [was] no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in [those] circumstances” would have any significant effect in deterring the errors ... the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional ... ... To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. ... In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978), ... we held that police negligence in obtaining a warrant did not even rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, let alone meet the more stringent test for triggering the exclusionary rule. ... We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. In Leon we held that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” 468 U. S., at 922. The same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant. If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. See the Wikipedia article on Herring and this Leagal Information Institute article on the case

A couple of SCOTUS decisions bearing on this are Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, where the courts took pains to deny that "probable cause" is related to a number. From Texas v. Brown, the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely required that the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 162 (1925), that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct, or more likely true than false. A "practical, nontechnical" probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 From Illinois v. Gates, The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. The question is framed in terms of probability that a certain individual is guilty, but that is not the basis for issuing a search warrant. Rather, a warrant may be issued if there is a fair probability that evidence bearing on a crime will be found. That would include evidence that exonerates a person (the system is not set up to only favor convictions). It would be highly impractical to assign a numeric value to probability of finding evidence, since there is more to the matter than just declaring "It must have been one of these three people".

What provisions existed in UK law for handling a tied Brexit vote? The UK left the European Union because of a public referendum where 51.8% of the votes were in favour in leaving the EU. Suppose it had resulted in an tie, i.e. 50% in favour of leaving the EU, 50% against leaving the EU. What legal framework existed at the time for handling such a tie? Would the government have been required to run the referendum a second time? Would they have settled it with a coin flip? Or was there no law about this possibility at all?

You can see the whole regulations on www.legislation.gov.uk. It is a referendum. There does not need to be a "winner". A referendum is meant to understand what the general populace wants. And "they are split exactly 50/50 between X and Y" is a valid result in that frame. The point that made this referendum special was that the ruling party had promised, that they would actually do what the referendums outcome would suggest, even if they were not legally bound by it and were not even in favor of it as a political party. So what the ruling party would have done when confronted by an absolute exact tie (not only percentages, but actual votes) is anybodies guess. I don't think anybody had a backup plan for what happens if the 33,577,342 votes came out exactly 16,788,671 to 16,788,671. The chance of that... was not real. You prepare for that about as much as for an alien invasion on election day.

What happens to someone who’s committed a murder in the UK? Considering the person will be caught. This is a basic and somewhat vague question so I will provide a basic and very general answer. The name of the court with proper jurisdiction, the relevant criminal procedural rules, and the substantive law that applies varies within the U.K. In particular in Scotland and the various dependencies of the U.K. differ significantly from England-Wales. There are some minor differences in Northern Ireland. England-and-Wales are treated as one for most purposes, but there are some slight differences at the very lowest levels but none materially impact a murder case. If they are caught in England and Wales they are arrested, interviewed, charged then brought before the next available Magistrates' Court who send the defendant to the Crown Court for trial. As a Magistrate has no power to grant bail for murder the defendant must be remanded in custody until he can make an application for bail before the Crown Court, but the default position is that bail should not be granted for murder unless in very exceptional circumstances. In other U.K. jurisdictions, the names of the courts will differ and there may be some other fine details that aren't the same in the pre-trial process but the same general outline applies. If they are outside of the U.K. they will be subject to either an International or European Arrest Warrant and extradited to the UK at the request of the U.K. Government under the terms of the relevant extradition treaties. On arrival in the UK they are arrested for murder and the process proceeds in the same manner. (If they are someplace that does not have an extradition treaty with the U.K., the trial may be deferred until U.K. officials have an opportunity to arrest him and are often dogged in attempting to accomplish, perhaps, for example, while the suspect is on holiday somewhere that there is an extradition treaty.) Prior to the trial, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the defence will prepare their cases and return to court at various times to settle any issues etc before going to the expense of a full trial. Also, at any time the CPS determine the case to be too weak for a realistic prospect of conviction or the suspect is innocent, they are supposed to dismiss or amend the indictment. The defendant is then tried for murder before a jury (almost always, but not in every single case, e.g., if the defendant admits guilt and the plea is accepted in appropriate proceedings before a judge). The CPS instruct a barrister to present their case with another barrister acting on behalf of the defendant. The process is for juvenile defendants is pretty much the same as for adults, apart from added safeguards to ensure the juvenile understands the proceedings and is not put at any disadvantage due to their age. All of the jurisdictions within the U.K., however, will have a trial that involves presentation of sworn evidence and exhibits and opening and closing arguments from both prosecution and defence counsels to a jury, procedural objections, cross-examination, and sometimes offering of additional evidence under the supervision of a single judge; normally with the defendant present. There will be some means of court reporting, and unless the judge orders otherwise (which is only done in relatively exceptional circumstances), the trial will be open to the public and the press to observe. If the defendant dies before the legal process to secure a conviction is not completed, the case is dismissed as moot. If the defendant is convicted of a homicide offense the trial/sentencing judge will impose a prison sentences, which is "fixed by law", with a life sentence in the case of the most serious homicide offense, murder (there are multiple homicide offenses that hinge largely on the intent of the defendant, often a murder prosecution will include less included homicide offenses as options for convictions). Only in exceptional cases this will be a whole-life term, in all others the judge will prescribe a minimum sentence according to the judicial sentencing guidelines after which the defendant may be released on licence, which is what an American would call parole. Any offences committed on licence will normally result in a recall to prison. The U.K. does not have a death penalty and does not authorise corporal punishment. The vast majority of people who are arrested and tried for murder are convicted, although there are sometimes acquittals or hung juries. This conviction may be appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeal (and again up to the Supreme Court) (the intermediate appellate court may not be the same in all U.K. jurisdictions) which reviews the proceedings to determine if the law was applied correctly and if there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. If the court finds that this was not the case, it can vacate the conviction and orders an appropriate revised disposition of the case depending upon the circumstances justifying the reversal of the trial court. If the appeal court affirm the trial verdict then the sentence continues to be carried out. Usually, but not always, the defendant will be in prison pursuant to the sentence imposed pending an outcome of any appeal. Eventually, if the sentence imposed upon a conviction is affirmed (and not a whole life term) the prisoner may be released on licence (which includes some post-release supervision) and is free and to about living their life again, subject to some collateral consequences based upon their criminal record (e.g. inability to work in certain occupations). If the defendant is acquitted, then they go free and cannot be tried again for the same offence, unless the exceptions under the double jeopardy provisions that apply in that jurisdiction apply. The main exception of double jeopardy is for newly discovered evidence of guilt in a case where there was an acquittal. If the person convicted is not a British citizen, they will usually be deported at the conclusion of their sentence if international law allows for it. There are a few exceptions to these rules that come up in a tiny percentage of all U.K. murders that apply (1) in the case of people subject to courts-martial such as active duty military service members, (2) in the case of foreign diplomats with diplomatic immunity, (3) when the murder is classified as an act of terrorism, and (4) in the case that the defendant has a title of nobility that calls for special treatment such as, e.g., Prince Charles (the current heir to the throne) or the Queen. These special cases are really too esoteric for the plain vanilla facts stated in the question and involve unique processes that are very different from the usual one described above. The fourth case is one that does not exist in my country (the U.S.) and in other countries that are republics rather than constitutional monarchies like the U.K., although most countries have some special rules for criminal trials of their very highest officials (like Presidents and Prime Ministers).

Parliament derives its power from Britain's unwritten constitution, not from delegated royal prerogative. This certainly dates to at latest the Glorious Revolution. The Bill of Rights 1688 explicitly confirmed that the King has no power to dispense with laws, and the Case of Proclamations in 1610 established that the King could not legislate without the consent of Parliament. The ultimate authority in the UK is not the Queen, it's the Queen in Parliament (in other words, Parliamentary action with royal assent).

Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).

Termination. The binding provisions may be terminated by mutual written consent of the parties; Provided, however, that the termination of the Binding Provisions shall not affect the liability of a party for breach of any of the Binding Provisions prior to termination. It basically says that you and the company can free each other from the contract or any part of it — by signing another agreement. This is limited though: if either of you have breached the original contract and become liable (e.g. one of you owes the other heaps of money for damages), then those liabilities will remain. ... which is nonsense of course — because you always can free each other from any liabilities to each other if you both want it.

It's the seller's responsibility. Note that in the UK you actually get much more than 2 years. The 2 year rule is the minimum required by the EU, but each country is free to implement that as they choose and the UK has much more. In the UK you are protected by the Consumer Rights Act. It states that products must last a "reasonable length of time". What counts as reasonable depends on the goods. For electronics 2 years is usually the absolute minimum, but for things like televisions the courts generally consider it to be 5 years even for cheap models. Under the Act the retailer is responsible. They can either replace the device or refund you, with the refund amount accounting for the 1.5 years use you had from it. As it was part of a phone contract it could be difficult to agree on a value for the speaker, but looking up the replacement cost for the same or a similar device is a good place to start. Which? has a lot more information and advice.

Election procedures are generally a matter of state law, so the process will be different from one state to the next. In Colorado, the law in question is Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-11-101: If at any general or congressional vacancy election ... any two or more persons tie for the highest number of votes ... for representative in congress ... the secretary of state shall proceed to determine by lot which of the candidates shall be declared elected. The question then becomes how the secretary of state will "determine by lot" who is the winner. As far as I can tell, this process is not established by statute, nor has the secretary of state promulgated any administrative regulations establishing a system for drawing lots. In other states, it typically comes down to something quite random: flipping coins, drawing names from a hat, dealing poker, etc; I assume the secretary of state could choose any of these. The answer could be different for other races, though. Both chambers of the General Assembly would vote on a joint ballot to decide a tie in a race for governor, secretary of state, treasurer, or attorney general. This also assumes that Bob and Alice are facing off in the general election, not the primary. In a primary, tying candidates get to choose their own tiebreaker. If they can't agree on one, the secretary of state chooses by lot.

In simple terms: Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, ... Whatever follows next is only limited by what the agreement clearly says is limited. ... the exercise by Company of any of its remedies under this Agreement ... A remedy is something that helps to fix a situation back to what it "should be" in legal terms. There is an implication that the agreement provides for a number of ways of fixing any problems that occur, related to following or breaching the contract. Whatever follows next is assuming that one of those remedies has been used or chosen for fixing a problem. ... shall be without prejudice to its other remedies under this Agreement or available at law or in equity. Having chosen to use one or some remedies, it still has the choice of using any of the others in the agreement and also those available generally under the law. The election by the Company to terminate this Agreement in accordance with its terms shall not be deemed an election of remedies, ... Ending the agreement doesn't count as choosing one of the remedies. ... and all other remedies provided by this Agreement or available at law or in equity shall survive any termination. It doesn't matter if the agreement is ended, regardless of why, the company still has the choice of any remedies as before.

Oregon decriminalized possession of certain drugs. Is the act of buying still illegal? Oregon decriminalized "the possession" of certain drugs. But the act of manufacturing and selling drugs is still illegal, according to this article: https://www.opb.org/article/2020/11/04/oregon-measure-110-decriminalize-drugs/ My question is: is the act of "purchasing" these legal drugs still an offense? The measure says: A "yes" vote supported making personal non-commercial possession of a controlled substance no more than a Class E violation (max fine of $100 fine) and establishing a drug addiction treatment and recovery program funded in part by the state's marijuana tax revenue and state prison savings. It says "possession" is now a minor violation. But what if you get caught in the act of "purchasing" it? Is that still a crime? I couldn't find any mention of it.

It's still illegal to sell most drugs like that in Oregon Oregon did not pass the law to make the state a haven for drug users. It’s still illegal to purchase, carry, and consume illicit substances in the state of Oregon. Measure 110 will change the laws around the possession of decriminalized substances. Under the new law, carrying small amounts of any of these drugs is a civil violation that is punishable by a fine. Before, having any quantity of illicit drugs was a misdemeanor and was automatically punishable by jail time. It is, however, legal to grow and sell marijuana, provided the seller is licensed to do so.

Theft in Oregon (and elsewhere, substantially the same) is defined statutorily: A person commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property to the person or to a third person, the person: (1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof... The car is James' property and it is not John's, even though James is dead. There is a legal process by which at some point in the future the car could become John's, but criminal acts are defined in terms of what is the case at the time of the act, not what might happen in the future. James' intent as expressed in the will notwithstanding, it is not guaranteed that John will become the car owner. So until John is actually the owner of the car, John is taking the property of another, and this is theft.

Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction.

If such conversations are reported, it can place the suspect in a dilemma. Consider a man who appears to have overdosed on illegal narcotics. He is taken to the hospital, and the doctor asks what kind of drugs he took, in order to plan his treatment. If the man thinks that what he says could be used to prosecute him, he might lie to the doctor. Then he would not receive proper medical treatment, putting his health at risk. Lawmakers or police authorities might decide that it is better for society for people to always be able to speak freely to their doctors and receive proper treatment, even if it means that it will sometimes be harder to prosecute criminals. That would be one possible rationale for a rule like this.

Your argument is: The 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of alcohol. Alcoholic drinks deliver one type of drug (alcohol) Therefore, the 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of all drugs. That is an logically invalid argument. It is equivalent to: If A then B If A then C Therefore, if C then B. Further, the court has never held that the government lacks the power to regulate and prohibit drugs. It is hard to prove a negative, but see Gonzales v. Raich 545 U.S. 1 (2005): Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. As this was a constitutional question, had the 21st amendment prevented Congress's prohibition, that would have likely come up in this case.

Possibly: remember that we have 50 different states and their laws plus the federal government. Alabama criminal code §13A-9-9 define the crime of "possession of a forgery device", which is when one makes or possesses with knowledge of its character any plate, die or other device, appliance, apparatus, equipment or article specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it himself, or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Selling is covered under the fact of possession. Arizona has a similar law, referring to the situation when a person Makes or possesses with knowledge of its character and with intent to commit fraud any plate, die, or other device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments. Makes or possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply adaptable for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Federal law would be covered here: §474 covers any plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, from which has been printed, or which may be prepared by direction of the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of printing, any obligation or other security of the United States, uses such plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, or... but this could not be reasonably interpreted to include a printing press, and would not cover a gadget that forges passports (Dept. of State, not Treasury). There isn't a federal statute with the breadth of the Alabama law. Any such law would have to include an "intent to forge" element.

The state can decriminalize all drugs under state law, no problem. They merely have to repeal their version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and all related legislation. However, the federal drug statutes, contained in 21 U.S.C. 13, still apply because of the principle of dual sovereignty (if a state tried to explicitly overrule them, the Supremacy Clause would come into play). Let's take a look at some of the statutes under Title 21, Chapter 13, of the U.S. Code. Section 801 of that chapter described Congress's findings in enacting the Controlled Substances Act. §801(3) through (6) provide the basis for federal authority to regulate intrastate affairs with respect to drug trafficking and possession. The section claims that intrastate drugs "contribute to swelling the interstate traffic," and concludes that "federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic." Thus, the federal government will continue to enforce the federal controlled substances laws regardless of state legalization. A notable exception is the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment, which bans DOJ from using federal funds to prosecute medical marijuana programs legal under state law. However, the federal government isn't always successful in (and doesn't always attempt) regulating intrastate behaviors using its interstate commerce authority. For example, the original Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (since amended and complemented by a 1994 law using the condition-of-funding approach), was struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The law, banning possession of handguns near schools, was found to be an overreach of the Commerce Clause authority. But it was amended by adding the additional interstate nexus of the gun having been moved interstate, which was a very minor limitation in practice. Since it only exempts individuals with a license issued by the state where the school is, it has significantly limited the ability of states to pass "constitutional carry" laws and allow for CCP reciprocity, because many highways and homes fall within its reach. So, if a state is willing to lose all of its federal funding, then Congress can't ever force it to create, maintain, or enforce a state law. But in many ways, the federal government can still enforce its will through criminal law on a number of intrastate activities.

California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.

Are global user account systems now illegal following the EU's May 2023 fine of Meta? The fine: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/22/facebook-fined-mishandling-user-information-ireland-eu-meta Like any website, we have an account system where people log in to access their orders and activate their software. So we have usernames, passwords, real names, recent IP addresses (for abuse protection), as well as the data of people's orders. This is stored in the AWS East-1 datacenter in N. Virginia. Our users are mainly EU and US, and being in N. Virginia gives users the best overall latency. We're about to incorporate in Europe, and I seem unable to interpret the recent rulings in any other way than that having a single account system is illegal, unless the account system in its entirety is hosted in the EU. The engineering challenge is unfathomable, and it seems it would be for any business from a WordPress blog to a Google account system. If an EU user has a Google login, and the account system contains their first name, and Google's account system is global, how is this not just as illegal? Aren't all account systems illegal now?

I assume this refers to the case covered here: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/22/facebook-fined-mishandling-user-information-ireland-eu-meta The gist is: Under GDPR you can only transfer personal data from inside the European Union to the outside if you have procedures in place that ensures it is still protected to European standards. Facebook was found to have failed in that regards, specifically when it came to access by US spy agencies. It seems indeed quite plausible that it is not possible to transfer personal data from the EU to the US in a way that is compatible with both EU and US law. The EU and the US are in negotiations to find a way to make this legally possible. But until then, it seems that if you do have a European subsidary and want to keep all of your account data in the same place, it needs to be a place with robust privacy protections. That doesn't require it to be in the EU, but something like US, Russia or China would be illegal.

It follows from case law from the ECJ, e.g. C‑70/10 (28 January 2010) and C-582/14 (19 October 2016), that IP-addresses are personal data. Since my interpretation of the case law differs from the interpretation offered by @Greendrake, I'll go into the relevant case law in a bit more detail than I did in my initial answer. TL;DR: Yes, IP-addresses in server logs are personal data and you need to declare IP-address logging in your privacy policy. As I said, we need to examine the case law I mentioned in the introduction to find out whether IP-addresses are personal data. The first of those are ECJ C-70/10. In this, the court concludes that all IP-addresses are "protected personal data": It is common ground, first, that the injunction requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified. (my emphasis) Then, in 2016, the ECJ ruled in a more narrow case ECJ C‑582/14 specifically ruling on dynamic IP-addresses: The court goes through a number of deliberations, then concludes: Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is very clear from this text that the court does not challenge or invalidate ECJ C-70/10 on static IP-addresses. The court is very careful, in its ruling to point out its ruling is specifically about dynamic IP-addresses. So the ruling of ECJ C-70/10 still stands for static IP-addresses, these are always protected personal data. I believe this case law is summarized in Recital 30 of the GDPR. This recital lists the identifiers that may make natural persons identifiable: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. (my emphasis). Since it follows from case law that static IP-addresses always makes the data subject identifiable, and dynamic IP-addresses may make the data subject identifiable, I will conclude, based on jurisprudence alone, that: Unless you are able to filter your logs to exclude static IP-addresses. I think you must consider IP-addresses protected personal data under the GDPR. However, in ECJ C‑582/14, the ruling about dynamic IP-addresses hinges on the controller having legal means to identify the data subject by connecting the IP address to some other data. The court seems to think that getting access to ISP logs is the only means of doing that. This is wrong. In 2015, the Norwegian computer scientist Einar Otto Stangvik identified 78 Norwegians who seem to have downloaded abuse material starting only with their IP-addresses. Stangvik did this while working as a consultant for Norway's larges newspaper VG. I know Stangvik and I am familiar with the methods he used. I've tried them myself, and they work. Stangvik did not have access to ISP logs, he did not do anything illagal, and the 78 natural persons identified only by means of their IP-address, combined with other data the Stangvik had legal access to. I will not go into details, I will just say this: If you know how to do this, getting to the natural person when you know the IP-address is not difficult or labour-consuming. To return to the question: It also follows from the GDPR that logging of IP-addresses falls under its definition of "processing". Your privacy policy should list all personal data personal data that is collected by yourself and third parties ("processors" in the terminology of the GDPR) that you rely on. Your hosting company is such a third party, and you need to declare the logging of IP-addresses in your privacy policy.

No GDPR applies to people (not just citizens) who are in the EU. It has no applicability if both parties are not in the EU.

The Facebook Pixel analytics solution does not seem to support access or erasure for data subjects. While there are some GDPR compliance features, these focus on collecting consent prior to collecting data. The relationship between the pixel user and Facebook is also murky. For certain kinds of data, Facebook acts as the data processor only, and the user has all the responsibility as the data controller. For other kinds of data, Facebook and the Pixel user are joint controllers, and therefore jointly responsible. This lack of features doesn't necessarily mean that Facebook Pixel is in violation of the GDPR, since the GDPR Right to Erasure only applies under certain circumstances. However, it is really difficult to argue that a website or app that integrates Facebook Pixel would be compliant. It is also rather dubious that Facebook could be compliant themselves, since their pixels will also collect data about persons who are not Facebook members. While these problems are most apparent with the Facebook Pixel since it's explicitly intended for tracking, this problem also applies to any other embeds provided by Facebook, such as like buttons. This was the subject of the Fashion ID case, in which the ECJ determined (in 2019) that the site operator is a joint controller with regards to data collection on the website by the Facebook embed. This effectively means that third party embeds can only be loaded after the website visitor has given consent for sharing data with Facebook. The tracking of non-users by Facebook was seen as especially problematic in Belgium, where Facebook had been banned from collecting such data already in 2015 (which was upheld in 2018). Since this was pre-GDPR, FB is currently litigating whether Belgium can continue enforcing their ban. I expect that Belgium will prevail with their ban. While this has no immediate consequences for Pixel users, this would make it more likely that Pixel users could be sued or fined successfully. From an advertiser perspective, Facebook does have valuable data that make the integration of Facebook Pixel an attractive proposition. However, other analytics solutions are much easier to bring into compliance. This is ultimately a business decision: will the better understanding of your ad spend on Facebook outweigh the risk and effort of integrating the Pixel?

Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.

The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.

No, it is not illegal in UK to use proxies. No, it is not like the tor concept. No, the ISP does not slow you down (they mostly throttle detectable p2p connections), but if you use public proxies, many of them will be unacceptably slow. Note: for things like facebook, a proxy is utterly useless. You already donated your private data to them, there's nothing to hide.

Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose?

What is the idea behind German courts having both professional judges and lay judges? In this wiki, it is mentioned that in trial courts there are both professional judges and lay judges involved. What is the basis behind this set up?

Lay Judges? The lay judges in Germany are called Schöffen. I will refer to them as such in the following because just calling them lay judges as a German feels kind of wrong, as they carry the full power of the court. Tracing the origin... The origin of the Schöffe goes back to the high medieval time, when a Schöffe, Schöppe or Schöpfe was a person tasked with judging and executing law on the lowest level. Before the Schöffen, all men of a region had to convene to make judgments. As a member of those, the word appears in 8th century. Under Charlemagne, the law was changed from all men to a group of 7, and Schöffen was the name applied to that group. The same edict also made them crown officers. They were to assist the judge (who could be a noble) by answering direct questions, for example by determining guilt. This institution then branched. Over time, in England this institution (traveling in the baggage of a certain William the Bastard) they would become the jurors. In Germany, the path was somewhat different. In the free cities, Schöffengerichte would appear in the high medieval time, going totally without a judge and staffed just with (wealthy) laymen that handled the whole law. However, when the 15th century came around, the common law was started to be replaced by Roman Law and recorded other laws, so pretty much a shift to written laws. In the wake, many Schöffenkammern were fully replaced by studied judges. For example, the Reichskammergericht was established in 1495 and only allowed people that had studied law to judge or even speak on behalf of a party. By the time of the neighboring French Revolution and Napoleon and the total disruption of the Roman Law tradition he brought in his wake, Schöffen as laymen giving judgments on their own were phased out but for the absolute lowest layers, such as the resolution of cases in villages. Then... Germany... took quite a few decades to re-invent itself between Napoleon's defeat in 1814 and the founding of the German Empire in 1871. First as a loose alliance with self-proclaimed enlightened rulers, then as a tighter alliance under Prussian hegemony, and finally as the German Empire under Prussian hegemony. With those re-inventions of themselves came sweeping re-constructions of the legal body over and over again, and with each step nobility was robbed of some influence. In effect, by the late 19th century, Germany finally had formed its own interpretation that was based in part on the French Code Civil - or rather Code Napoléon, bits and pieces of Roman Law and canonized laws from the Holy Roman Empire, the various legal codes from the lower layers that made up the German Empire and over that a very Prussian onlook, but in general, it was meant to be enlightened. In this environment, the Schöffen (and jurors) were meant as a means to limit the nobility's influence on court judgments and in part to bring a pragmatic non-jurist's view on problematic cases into the courts. Origin of the modern Schöffen: The Weimar Republic! Between 1879 and 1924 technically Jurors also existed in the Schwurgerichtskammer which had 12 Jurors and 3 professional Judges and was operating very similar to a common law court in that jurors decided on guilt and judges on punishment. This setup was created during the German Empire and just kept when the First World War ended with the loss of all nobility. In the so-called Weimar Republic times or the Interwar period, this part of the German judiciary was not touched for 6 years, as there were far more pressing matters. However, in 1924 a wide-sweeping justice reform took place. Erich Emminger, the German justice minister, is often blamed for this "Emminger-Novelle", or rather the Verordnung über Gerichtsverfassung und Strafrechtspflege. As a result, the Jurors were entirely removed and replaced with 6 layman judges - now called Schöffen - that had to assist the professional judges. Modern Schöffen - and where to find them After a few smaller reforms since the Emminger-Novelle, today a German Schwurgerichtskammer (or Große Strafkammer) is comprised of 3 professional judges and 2 Schöffen. In a similar fashion, the Landgerichte - or rather the chamber of appeals of the Landgericht - is comprised of one professional judge and 2 Schöffen, forming the Kleine Strafkammer, which is doing criminal appeals cases of the Amtsgericht. Both types are prescribed in § 76 (1) GVG. Amtsgerichte, the layer below the Landgericht, has specific matters that are to be given to the Schöffengericht under § 28 GVG and is set up with one professional judge as well as 2 Schöffen under § 29 GVG. The court may decide to double up the professional judges, if the prosecution (Staatsanwaltschaft) requests this and the court finds the case to be complicated enough. In that case, an appeal to the Kleine Strafkammer also doubles up the judges automatically. The general rule if a case gets to the Schöffengericht or a Straftrichter is based on the type of case and the estimated punishment: All civil cases in the first instance get you to just a professional judge in the shape of an Einzelrichter - which is the term §22 GVG uses to demark a professional judge. No way to get a Schöffen there. Civil cases in appeals or revision get seen by (up to) 3 professional judges and there are no Schöffen involved. In a criminal case that would commonly end in less than 2 years if guilty goes to just a professional judge in the shape of an Einzelrichter, who acts as the Strafrichter. He can however sentence up to 4 years, even without Schöffen. For a criminal case between 2 years and 4 years of estimated punishment, if the case ends with guilty, the Schöffengericht is to be consulted, set up of one professional Judge and two Schöffen. If the case brings up evidence that more than 4 years are warranted, the Amtsgericht gives the case to the Landesgericht. Criminal cases that have an estimated punishment of 4 years or more, the case will be handled by the Landesgericht in the first place. There are no Schöffen in any of the layers of Oberlandesgericht, which among others handles appeals cases of the Landgericht as well as revision cases of both Amtsgericht and Landgericht. How do Schöffen influence judgments? The Schöffen are deemed to have not only the same weight but also the same influence on the court case. Since Germany is an inquisitorial system, they can ask questions to witnesses and others during trial just as much as the professional judge and they get the same case file. However, there is a fine limit: Unlike judges, they are not allowed to request visitation to the crime scene and may not do further investigations outside of the courtroom. Besides this point, they are equal in all questions - or rather: the court speaks with a single voice that is made up of all the judges, professionals and Schöffen together. To decide on guilt, a 2/3 majority of the chamber is needed, so in the normal first-instance chamber, the Schöffen could decide on guilt alone, while an enlarged chamber allows them to block a conviction against their will. In mere procedural questions, a simple majority is sufficient, but it is often customary for the Schöffen to follow the opinion of the professional Judge in those administrative matters. Schöffen are called upon for 5 years for as many trials as needed

When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.

Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual.

Both civil law and common law have civil codes, so that isn't the difference. It is common in civil law jurisdictions for these to be called civil codes and consolidated into the great big book of law. In common law jurisdictions, the civil code is scattered through legislation, regulation, administrative and case law and often not consolidated although, each piece of legislation typically deals with only one (or a related number) of topics. Adversarial vs Inquisitorial In a common law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to decide the dispute that the parties have brought to the court based solely on the arguments and evidence that they make. A judge who seeks their own evidence or decides the case based on a law the parties have not argued is making a mistake. The judge is free to say to the parties "But what about xyz law?" and let them make an argument about that but they would be denying the parties natural justice if they decided the case on xyz law if that law was not argued. In civil law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to find out the truth. They have inquisitorial power and decide the case based on all the evidence, the law that was argued and their own knowledge of the law. Precedence In common law jurisdictions, the cases decided by the courts are just as much the law of the land as the acts passed by parliament. When a court hands down a decision on a certain fact pattern, then all courts lower in the hierarchy must make the same decision when presented by a similar fact pattern. These are binding precedents. In addition, decisions of same level or lower courts (where not actually the ones being appealed) as well as decisions in "parallel" jurisdictions are persuasive precedents. A parallel jurisdiction is anything where the law is close enough that it makes sense to use it: Australian courts will tend to look first to other Australian states, then to England & Wales, Canada, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries then the United States of America and then to civil law jurisdictions. There is nothing nativist in this, it is just that these are the jurisdictions where the laws are "closest" to one another: partly because the courts have historically done this (which tends to lock the common law together), partly because there has been governmental will in creating harmonized laws in Australia (i.e. enacted in each state and territory but essentially the same law - often word for word) and partly because parliaments, when drafting legislation, nick ideas from other parliaments. If the Supreme Court of Western Australia has made a decision on a similar fact pattern under a similar law, a District Court judge in New South Wales had better have some damn good reasons for deciding this case differently but they wouldn't automatically be wrong if they did. However, if the precedent had been set in the Supreme Court of New South Wales than the District Court judge would be wrong to decide differently. Naturally, a lot of argument in common law courts is about why the facts of this case are sufficiently similar/distinct that the precedent should/shouldn't apply. Also, common law judgments emphasize the reasoning that led the judge from the evidence to the conclusion and include detailed analysis of the case each party presented - this is because they need to be understandable to a wide audience. Court hierarchy can be quite complex, this is the one for NSW, Australia: In a civil law jurisdiction, courts are not bound by the rules of precedence - each judgement is a first principles analysis of the facts and the law. This is not to say that civil law judges do not use other judgments in their analysis but they are not required to do so. Broadly speaking, the common law approach promotes consistency, the civil law approach promotes individualized justice.

On an issue of pure law, an appellate court decides if the trial judge got it right or wrong from scratch, and if there is a case that is a better match than the one that the judge used that leads to a different outcome in the case, then an appellate court is likely to find that the trial court's ruling is a reversible error. On an issue of mixed fact and law, or on a legal issue where a judge has more discretion in how the law is applied (like many evidentiary issues), a judge is given more deference, and the judge will generally only be reversed if no reasonable judge could have applied the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them, and then, only if an application of the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them would have changed the outcome of the case. There are a couple of ways that this standard of review is described, one of which is called "abuse of discretion" review.

I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).

The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made (ratio decidendi) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different (obiter dicta). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions.

I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.

How would one protect one self from a suit while skiing? I am skiing and cause unintentional injury to another slope patron/client. How would I protect myself from being sued? Is there insurance if sued that could protect my assets if found negligent and cover legal costs of lawyer and trial, regardless if found negligent?

united-states I am skiing and cause unintentional injury to another slope patron/client. How would I protect myself from being sued? Use reasonable care to avoid harming others, and follow all applicable rules of the ski area. Keep your equipment in good repair. Don't ski when you are drunk or high or in circumstances you can't handle. Try not to collide with people. If you do collide with someone do what you can to mitigate their injuries, identify ways to document facts favorable to you, and promptly contact your insurance company. Is there insurance if sued that could protect my assets if found negligent and cover legal costs of lawyer and trial, regardless if found negligent? For this, you need liability insurance. In the United States, liability insurance is typically included in homeowner's or renter's insurance. These kinds of liability insurance typically cover the cost of a legal defense of a covered claim and any damages awarded or paid in a settlement of those claims (up to the policy limits). These kinds of liability insurance would typically cover liability arising from a skiing accident and most other claims for negligence, but would typically not cover claims related to intentional acts or a criminal prosecution. A homeowner's or renter's insurance policy would also not typically cover vehicle accidents (e.g. your liability while operating a snowmobile), claims related to a business or an occupation, or claims related to contractual liability.

If you are going to sue, and can prove they overcharged - consider going to the small claims court. It should cost you $15 + time - unless you loose quite badly - in which case its conceivable the court could award costs against you (I don't know if this is true of the small claims court in NY). You can represent yourself, so no heavy legal bills. It will take a a few hours of your time to prepare and have the hearing. Of-course, very often, just by filing you will get the opposing party to sort out the issue - and probably won't even need to go to court.

If the company makes a contract, and as a result of that contract it owes more money than it has, then the company goes bankrupt and the owners and directors can walk away from it. This covers the owners/directors in cases of ordinary business contracts. However if an employee (including an owner or director) does something sufficiently harmful then under the law of torts they can be personally liable as well as the company. Examples are negligence and fraud; if you build someone's new roof while acting as an employee and the roof leaks then its likely to be the company on the hook for damages. However if you misrepresented your qualifications or acted negligently then you might well be personally liable. This is all very general. Details are going to be specific to your jurisdiction. So the answer is that having a company is certainly better than making every contract in your own name, but its not complete cover. You can probably get insurance if this is a concern, but its likely to be expensive.

In some jurisdictions, California probably being the most well-known in the US, there are Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statutes, which allow a defendant to file an anti-SLAPP claim (for sake of clarity I'm going to keep calling that person the "defendant") when the plaintiff's suit appears to have been filed for the purpose of infringing upon the defendant's rights by forcing them to bear the costs of litigation or settle the claim in order to avoid them, and itself has little merit or the plaintiff clearly does not expect it to succeed. In California, if the Anti-SLAPP claim succeeds and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as a SLAPP, the defendant is normally awarded attorney's fees from the plaintiff. The Anti-SLAPP claim also halts discovery in order to reduce the costs on the defendant, so in effect it allows a defendant to challenge the plaintiff's right to sue them on the particular issue before the defendant has to bear the majority of costs.

Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.

If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.

Your problem is not just that you don't have a working stopcock, but that you now know that you don't have one. Of course it's not illegal by itself, the problem is what is going to happen if you have an insurance case. Your home insurance most likely has to pay for accidental damage. But any damage that would be caused by not being able to close the stopcock, when you knew it wasn't working, they could claim that this is due to gross negligence. Whether they would succeed with that claim or not, I don't know, but fixing the stopcock seems to be a much, much cheaper solution. PS. Seems I made a wrong assumption here - that it was your home, owned by you. The same reasons that would have made it a good idea for you to fix the stopcock obviously make it a good idea for the landlord as well. So I would make sure that you tell the landlord as soon as possible. If something goes wrong, and the insurance doesn't pay, your landlord would be responsible for the damage. Whether it's legal to not fix the stopcock - that's a different matter. I thought you were the owner. You would have endangered yourself and your property. Nothing illegal with that. But with the landlord it's different; he wouldn't be endangering himself but someone else's property.

The most important fact to bear in mind is that there's no way to predict whether a given individual will decide to file a suit against you, though we might say on what basis he might, if he so chooses. There are two basic grounds for a suit, one pertaining to trademarks and the other pertaining to use of names – misappropriation and violating the right of publicity. A word can be a trademark, but the scope of protection is somewhat narrow because the protection is in terms of use within a given business. So calling your computer company "Apple" is out, but calling you roofing service the same is okay (assuming that somebody didn't previously register "Apple Roofing"). The main consideration is the likelihood of confusion. Supposing your business were selling landline telephones and I don't think Apple computer company sells such phones, you might still be in trouble if you called your company "Apple Phone", since they certainly do sell phones. There are thousands of trademarks that include "Puff", including Cocopuffs and various pizza and cheese puffs. Since "Puff" is such a generic word, there is a higher bar to proving infringement (there are thousands of trademarks including "Puff"). "Puff Daddy" is, however, a registered trademark covering perfume, jewelry, clothing and certain online services, so there is a non-negligible chance of confusion. In the case of names (or apparent names), an additional concern is whether this is commercial exploitation without consent of a person's name (which causes harm to the subject). The underpinning of this tort is that such a use falsely implies an endorsement of the product. Again, with a fairly generic word like Puff, there isn't a clear implication that Sean Combs has endorsed a product that is called "Puff Communications", but "Puff Daddy Communications" would almost certainly cross that line. The main issues, then, are the extent to which the name is generic vs. unique, and whether it is likely that a person would interpret the product or service as being the same as another, or would constitute an endorsement.

Made aware of a utility easement a year on Assume that around 1911 a utility sewer is laid down on private land with an easement that was limited “until a public sewer pipe be built”, with the document being properly filed. Such a construction never happens and the easement eventually is forgotten to be put on the title documents to the house on the register. Now, the house is sold without notice of that easement. It comes back up when the water company actually comes along a year after the sale to do some work on the pipe they have the easement to. However, a copy of the easement document can be located, dated and filed in some old drawer of some registry. Can this easement be revoked or is it forever?

While this question was initially posed as a request for legal advice, I've stated some general principles of this kind of situation generically. You are deemed to have "constructive notice" for legal purposes of all documents filed in the public record pertaining to your property whether you know it or not. You are also on notice of anything that a reasonably informed person could assume to exist from observable facts (like that existence of municipal water and sewer service) upon an inspection of the property. In terms of reasonable expectations, almost every urban home is subject to multiple utility easements. If your home has (or most homes in your neighborhood have) municipal water service, municipal sewer service, electrical service, and cable or telephone lines, there are almost certainly easement in place for all of these things. Typically, in a contract for the purchase of real estate, there is a fixed deadline for you (or a title company on your behalf) to review the public record to find what is there. If you don't object by that deadline to any title issues, you can't get out of the real estate contract or undo it. Typically, the deed from the seller will contain an exclusion from the warranty of title for "all easement of record." If the title insurance policy contains an exclusion for easements, you can't make a claim against that title insurance policy. Even if there weren't an easement in the public real property records, anything that has been there since 1911 would benefit from a "prescriptive easement" which is the equivalent of adverse possession a.k.a. squatter's rights, for easements. In New Jersey, for example, the prescriptive easement time period is usually twenty years and never more than sixty years. Furthermore, utilities usually have the power, delegated to them by the government that grants them permission to operate or by the state, to create new easements at the very modest price associated with a reduction in fair market value caused by the easement. This is often estimated to be half of the fair market value of the unimproved land per square foot times the actual square footage occupied by the utility when it isn't working on its infrastructure. Easements, once established, run with the land, and generally can't be removed without the permission of the party for whose benefit the easement is granted a.k.a. the owner of the dominant estate (in legal terminology, the utility's rights in the easement are called the "dominant estate" and the home owner's rights in the property subject to the easement are called the "servient estate"). There may be implied in law duties of someone using an easement to restore damage caused after using it, but it wouldn't be worth suing over that for a bit of displaced grass and a rose bush.

It depends on what state this is. In Washington state, there is a form that sellers must fill out, and section 3 addresses sewer connections. This matter could have been disclosed – the allowed answers are "yes; no; don't know" (or NA). These are sellers disclosures, and Zillow / Redfin are free to be unreliable (I personally know that they are wrong about square footage). A real estate agent also doesn't become liable for being misinformed. Assuming your state has this or analogous question, "No" means that you were told (doesn't matter if you didn't notice it), and "Don't know" means you're gambling. Let's say that the answer was "Yes". Still, you can't necessarily sue (and win): you would have to prove misrepresentation (fraud or negligence) and not innocent error. You could do this by, for instance, proving that seller had the septic tank cleaned out some years earlier. Perhaps an action against buyer's inspector is possible, since that's nominally what they might have been hired to find out. But that is only true if checking the sewer connection can reasonably be considered part of the deal, so you have to look at the contract with the inspector (and the inspector's report).

New Jersey is not a community property state, but it is an equitable distribution state. This means that in a divorce marital property is divided, not automatically 50-50, but in a way that seems financially fair to the supervising judge, or according to an agreement entered into by both spouses. This also means that the state considers a car bought during the course of the marriage "marital property". There are also special rules for property bought before May 28 1980, which do not seem to apply in the case in the question. However, "marital property" mostly applies when a marriage ends which the question says is not in view here. NJ does allow for a car to be titled to only one, or to both. A title with both names may read "John Doe OR Mary Doe" or "John Doe AND Mary Doe". In the AND case both spouses must sign to sell or borrow against the car, in the OR case either signature will do. If only one name is on the title, that person must sign to sell or borrow. If it comes down to a dispute, the person whose name is on the title can decide where it is to be garaged, and who has permission to drive it. If the "sporty" car is in the name of both parents, either could move it to some other location, and either could move it back. Going back and forth could easily get ugly. If both names are on the 'sporty' car's title with an OR, the husband could sell it without consulting the wife. if there is an AND he would need her to agree. If the older car is in the husband's name alone, he could deny the wife or the son the right to drive it. The wife could, of course, buy a different older (used) car and allow the son to use it. Obviously it would be a good idea if the husband and wife came to a voluntary agreement about all this, but no law requires them to do so.

No. Just because some building is "owned by the public" or State, doesn't mean it's public property. A state's national guard installation comes to mind immediately. State workers' offices are not public places. Airport hangars/buildings/runways. You can't just go hang out in the DPW garages.

There are some consequences for you, under the Seattle Residential Code. Per R103.5 Any person violating or failing to comply with the provisions of this code shall be subject to a cumulative civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per day for each violation from the date the violation occurs or begins until compliance is achieved. $182,500 per year. Also under R103.4, Whenever any building or structure is being occupied contrary to the provisions of this code, the building official may order such occupancy discontinued and the building or structure, or portion thereof, vacated by notice. There should be a notation on your panel indicating permit number and approval, but if you have the permit number, you can check if the inspection was done and the work was approved (I think this will report status). The legal burden of assuring that the work was done correctly and paperwork is in order ultimately falls on the owner, though the city at least initially talks to the contractor. Insofar as a customer taking a picture doesn't count as an actual final inspection, I suspect that some cost- and time-saving short-cuts were taken. Following up on the new information about being a tenant, the primary legal question is whether you have a duty of care towards the landlord, since in engaging this company, the landlord's interest may be put at risk. The landlord may have protected his interest via a clause in the lease saying "you must get written permission to modify the property, and you assume full liability for resulting damages", so first thing to check is what the lease says (perhaps look for a "Tenant's duty of care" clause). In lieu of clear evidence that you caused damage to the owner (economic damage, by negligence w.r.t. his need to have proper permits and the whopping fines that follow), I don't see what the risk to you would be in just washing your hands of the problem.

We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances.

This is outside the scope of landlord-tenant law and the obligation of the landlord to make the premise habitable. Building codes are not imposed retroactively on existing housing, so while it is true that you cannot legally build a house without service grounding, you do not have to install service grounding when that becomes part of the electrical code (which was decades ago). The law is here; the state could have impose an obligation on landlords to always update plumbing, electrical etc. so that rental housing always conforms to current codes, but it did not. If the electric does not work properly, that has to be repaired, but if there is a functioning but less than ideal electric (knob and tube wiring; ungrounded; no GFI circuits in the bathroom, incorrect receptacle covers, overburdened or improperly placed service panel, too few receptacles), that's not something you can legally force a landlord to change.

In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it.

Can hypothesis-publishing make one liable for defamation? It is understandable that if Bob says "Rob murdered Alice", Bob will be liable for defamation unless he can prove that Rob indeed murdered Alice on the preponderance of evidence (this is true even if Rob has been acquitted of murdering Alice — because the standard of proof in the criminal trial would have been much higher than in the defamation case). But what if Bob instead publishes a hypothesis that Rob murdered Alice: he analyses the well known facts about Rob, Alice and the circumstances of her death, and concludes that those facts are consistent with Alice being murdered by Rob? Would Bob be still liable for defamation? Or does the form of hypothesis reasonably based on facts (vs outright accusation) save him from that trouble? (Any jurisdiction)

canada The aspects of a defamation claim that seem to be in issue are the following: is the publication defamatory in the sense that it tends to lower the reputation of the subject in the eyes of a reasonable person does the statement fall within a defence to defamation, specifically fair comment or truth Your statement of the scenario is somewhat ambiguous for the purposes of the above analysis: But what if Bob instead publishes a hypothesis that Rob murdered Alice: he analyses the well known facts about Rob, Alice and the circumstances of her death, and concludes that those facts are consistent with Alice being murdered by Rob? It matters whether Bob: simply publishes "Rob murdered Alice", Bob's hypothesis publishes "Rob murdered Alice" accompanied with language or context that communicates that it is merely a hypothesis publishes the underlying facts, the analysis, along with the conclusion of consistency Your description is ambiguous because despite talking about Bob's methodology in arriving at his conclusion, you don't clearly say that he publishes that along with the hypothesis. The plaintiff's threshold burden: Is the statement defamatory? Depending on the precise content of the published statement it may meet the low threshold of tending to lower the reputation of the subject in the eyes of a reasonable person. If it does, then the burden will flip to the defendant to establish a defence, such as truth or fair comment. Of these, based on the methodology you have described, I view fair comment as the more directly applicable defence, but it does really depend on what the content of the publication is. Fair comment defence The test for fair comment is: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any [person] honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was [subjectively] actuated by express malice. For a fair comment defence, the receivers of the impugned statement must be able to identify the underlying facts on which the statement is based. Therefore, it would not be enough for the hypothesis to be "reasonably based on facts"; those facts need to be also published to the listeners/readers and a reasonable listener/reader needs to be able to associate the impugned statement as being based on those. Another component of the fair comment defence is that the statement must be one of opinion, not fact. If the statement, considered in its full context, is not amenable to empirical verification or falsification, then it is a statement of opinion.

Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions.

If it was for a criminal case, the jury would have to decide if they believed the person who claimed he/she cracked the code. Really, any evidence is interpreted by the jury if it is regarding facts. 1) An issue of fact, not law. A question of fact is resolved by a trier of fact, i.e. a jury or, at a bench trial, a judge, weighing the strength of evidence and credibility of witnesses. Conversely, a question of law is always resolved by a judge. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/question_of_fact

Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.

Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft.

The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error.

There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.

Spoliation of evidence, once a suit is filed The reason Bob requests the video from Alice Corp is not that he is concerned about his GDPR rights, it is because he wants to file a lawsuit. In fact, it would be super helpful if Bob had filed the lawsuit and served it together with the GDPR request, so there is a pending case... and added a paragraph that he demands the preservation of all evidence at that point. In either case, the sudden deletion of the files by their DPO Charly, after Alice Corp was put on legal notice that they have to preserve evidence, is spoliation, indeed, it would be the very definition: The intentional destruction or alteration of relevant evidence in existing or pending litigation. 1 The main remedy for spoliation is the imposition of a rebuttable presumption of fact that the lost or destroyed evidence would have been unfavourable to the party that destroyed it. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing that the “spoliator” did not intend to affect the litigation by destroying the evidence (McDougall v. Black & Decker Canada Inc., 2008 CarswellAlta 1686 (Alta. C.A.)). So, we have the DPO performing spoliation, and thus the lawsuit for the beating will assume that the destroyed video showed exactly what Bob alleged that Alice Corp's security team did to him. in england-and-wales DPO Charly can be further sued for destroying evidence under Section 2 (16) Criminal Justice Act 1987. Spoliation might even happen before the case begins with filing & summons According to an article by Chris Dale, discussion spoliation in england-and-wales the case of Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500 (Mercantile) (08 October 2009) was named as one of the best descriptions of spoliation in English law. That case indeed is illustrative, as it might be explicitly applicable to the case as described (emphasis mine): 28 [I]n this jurisdiction [Bermingham/England] as in Australia, there is no duty to preserve documents prior to the commencement of proceedings: British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v. Cowell [2002] V.S.C.A. 197, a decision approved in this country by Morritt V.C. in Douglas v. Hello [2003] EWHC 55 at [86]. However, the leading text book in this area – Documentary Evidence by Charles Hollander QC- suggests in paragraph 10-06 of the 10th edition that "there might be cases where it was appropriate to draw adverse inferences from a party's conduct before the commencement of proceedings." In my judgment there would have to be some clear evidence of deliberate spoliation in anticipation of litigation before one could legitimately draw evidential "adverse inferences" in those circumstances. There is no such evidential basis in this case. 29 After the commencement of proceedings the situation is radically different. In Woods v. Martins Bank Ltd [1959] 1 Q.B. 55 at 60, Salmon J. said "It cannot be too clearly understood that solicitors owe a duty to the court, as officers of the court to make sure, as far as possible, that no relevant documents have been omitted from their client's list". 30 In the case of documents not preserved after the commencement of proceedings then the defaulting party risk "adverse inferences" being drawn for such "spoliation": Infabricks Ltd v. Jaytex Ltd [1985] FSR 75. So, yes, we got it in a judgment from the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, Birmingham District Registry, Mercantile Court: if it is extremely likely, that proceedings will begin shortly, destroying the video might be spoliation in anticipation of litigation, and thus be problematic even before proceedings started. As a remedy, an adverse inference might be drawn to the content of it. 1 - RESOURCE ID W-015-7809 © 2022 THOMSON REUTERS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Could the act of emailing publicly available information be deemed illegal? Andy and Mary are friends. Andy discovers that Mary is secretly working as an escort. Nobody knows about this activity beyond Andy. He tries to convince her that escorting is harmful and will have a serious impact on her mental well-being in the future. Mary disagrees and asserts that her activities are solely relevant to her private life. To stop her, Andy decides to send an anonymous email to her family in which he provides a link to the PUBLIC page she is using to promote her escort services. Does Andy commit any crime in revealing a PUBLIC website to her family? Could this in particular be considered a cyberstalking crime? I stress that all the information shared by Andy is PUBLIC and visible on the web.

In the united-states, those actions would be fully protected by the First Amendment. Andy has a constitutional right to speak freely about essentially whatever he wants -- including Mary's criminal conduct -- unless his speech falls into one of several narrowly defined categories, none of which would apply in this case. And because Mary has already put this information out on the Internet, it is likely not sufficiently private to support an invasion-of-privacy claim. However, the unfortunate reality is that complainants, police, prosecutors, and judges frequently ignore First Amendment protections. Indeed, many states have laws against "cyberstalking" and "telecommunications harassment" that are incredibly broad, and that clearly apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment. For instance, Ohio's telecommunications harassment statute makes it a crime to send an e-mail "with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person." This means that many people who engage in First Amendment-protected speech end up getting prosecuted anyway. If they pay for a good lawyer who knows how to properly raise a First Amendment defense, they may escape any penalties. But because most defendants do not have those resources, and because many lawyers are unaware of the First Amendment implications of such prosecutions, most defendants in such situations likely end up being convicted despite behaving perfectly legally. In the united-kingdom, though, the situation is very different. Even if Mary is breaking the law, and even if Andy limits himself to strictly factual information about what's he's learned about her conduct, he may still be held civilly liable. Mary may also be able to pursue Andy criminally for harassment if his e-mail causes her substantial emotional distress, and civilly for "harassment by publication." The fact that this information is already public is likely not going to go very far in changing the analysis. Andy's best course of action is therefore to play it safe by keeping his mouth shut. Doing so has both legal and nonlegal benefits: He avoids exposure to the hassles of defending himself from criminal charges and he gets some time to examine the resentment, jealousy, paranoia that makes him want to humiliate his "friend."

The recording is not illegal because you've been told it would happen, and by not hanging up, you've agreed to have a conversation that can be recorded. This was determined in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. applying the exception of Penal Code 632 that communications are not considered confidential if there is a reasonable expectation that the call will be overheard or recorded - being explicitly told that the call will be recorded makes this true. It would not be illegal for them to only record their own statements during the call, nor for you to record only your statements, either. In particular, the company is allowed to record the part of the call where they make this statement, as they are not recording a conversation, only their own (likely pre-recorded) statement (again?). Indeed, including their statement about the recording in the recording is common practise partly for protection against claims that the other party was not informed of the recording occurring.

The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings.

Yes. In the United Kingdom it is illegal under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. In other jurisdictions there may not be a law directly aimed at computer crime but if you sell it knowing that a crime is going to be committed with it that makes you an accomplice. Most computer crime is prosecuted under laws not directly aimed at computer misuse.

tl;dr- I don't see how you can "leak" a large organization's IP addresses given that they seem to be very public information. However, misusing an organization's network services or/and somehow being complicit in an attack could probably get someone into touble. Organization IP address allocations seem to be public information. I Google'd "Colorado university IP address". The first search result was this official webpage for the University of Colorado, Boulder. It says: IP Ranges for Server Administrators All public IP space for CU Boulder can be described by the following notation: 128.138.0.0/16 198.11.16.0/20 But, say that that university didn't publish its IP addresses online. Then this website shows them anyway. Additionally, seems like anyone at your school can get an IP address by Google'ing "what's my ip". Or you can use Bing. Or WolframAlpha. Or, heck, this website doesn't seem to do anything but show your IP address. Point being, I don't see how an organization's IP addresses could be considered information that could be "leaked". There're other things that might get someone into trouble though. However, this sounds like a potentially different matter: well someone at our school got our IP address banned from editing on Wikipedia Ideally that "someone" isn't you or a friend since such activities can easily be against an organization's acceptable-use policy (example) or/and the law.

In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so.

From the article: The FBI is investigating alleged computer intrusion and theft against an unidentified “victim corporation” involving “confidential or proprietary information,” including tests, test forms and internal emails, according to a search warrant issued in the case. The reference to "computer intrusion" is not precise, but may mean that they suspect a violation of some provision of 18 USC 1030, which makes it a federal crime to access a computer without authorization, or to exceed authorized access, under certain circumstances and for certain purposes. So it's not necessarily just a civil matter. Specifically, 18 USC 1030(a)(2) provides: Whoever [...] intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains [...] information from any protected computer [...] shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. Subsection (c) provides for fines and imprisonment for various terms, making a violation of (a)(2) a felony or misdemeanor, depending on circumstances. Subsection (e) defines "protected computer" as any computer "which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". It seems very likely that the computer in question was used in interstate communication, and that the SAT does affect interstate commerce. The fact that they got a search warrant means that they were able to satisfy a judge that there was probable cause to believe a crime was committed and the search would yield relevant evidence. We'd have to read the warrant, or the corresponding application, to know more.

I think that the question you are really asking is whether a contract not to disclose certain information (e.g. to authorities) might be void as contrary to public policy, or illegal. Sometimes it is illegal to do so. For example, often concealing personal information in connection to the transfer of funds constitutes money laundering, which is a crime, or securities fraud. The key question is whether there is a legal duty to disclose in a particular context and whether the concealment facilitates some sort of fraud.

Is an AI model considered a derivative work? Suppose an AI art model was trained exclusively on Mr. X's artwork. Suppose Mr. X managed to prove that the model was only capable of producing derivative works. He would then own the copyright to all the art produced by this model. But would Mr. X also own the AI model? Now, let's take this question one step further. Suppose an AI art model was trained on art generated by millions of different artists. And suppose these artists managed to prove that the model was only capable of producing derivative works of at least one of these artists. Would the model then become public domain? Whether AI-generated art is derivative has already been hotly debated, and that is not the point of my question. If the artwork is proven to be derivative, who owns the model?

There is no provision for automatically relicensing infringing works (for example, distributing a program that contains parts covered by the GNU GPL and that is therefore a derived work will not automatically place the infringing program under GPL, even if that is the expected way for derived works to comply with the license. Instead, the derived work becomes at the very least undistributable, as there are competing copyright holders that disagree.

The basic principle is that copyright never protects an idea, it only protects the expression of an idea. In the US, that rule is embodied in 17 USC 102(b) which provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. When significant, detailed, and specific plot elements are copied from a prior work, then that may make the new work a derivative work. Creation or distribution of a derivative work requires permission from the owner of the copyright (if any) on the prior work (source work). But the elements used must be significant and must be detailed. If all that is taken could be expressed in a summery contained in a single sentence or paragraph, this will not make the new work derivative. For example, such ideas as: Napoleon meets the Emperor of China and they form an alliance. [My idea] Sherlock Holmes helps to repel the Martian invasion described in The War of the Worlds. Conan Doyle's Professor Challenger is also involved. [Wellman's Sherlock Holmes's War of the Worlds] Aliens crash land on Earth in 1905, creating an alternate timeline. They seek to start WWI early, to stimulate technical development. [Benson's ...And Having Writ] would on their own not be enough to constitute a derivative work and thus infringement. But the more specific detail from the source work is used, the more likely it is that an infringement suit would win. By the way, the rule is the same whether the source work is a book, or a TV show, or an opera, or any other work subject to copyright protection. If the work is old enough, any copyright will have expired, but the format of the original does not matter, as long as it is "fixed in a tangible form" which includes video tape, DVD, computer file, or a script written on paper. About the only things that do not count as fixed would be an impromptu dance, song, speech, or story whch the creator performed or spoke without its ever having been written down or recorded in any way.

First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.

They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.

Not in US law, at least. Under the 1999 decision Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp (36 F. Supp. 2d 191) such images are not protected by copyright. As the Wikipedia article says, the court here ruled that exact photographic copies of public domain images could not be protected by copyright in the United States because the copies lack originality. Even though accurate reproductions might require a great deal of skill, experience and effort, the key element to determine whether a work is copyrightable under US law is originality. This decision has been generally followed in US copyright law thereafter. At the time it was claimed that UK law took a different view, but I understand that more recently the UK also follows the Bridgeman rule, although I cannot confirm that at the moment. See also this article about the Bridgeman case and its effects. The service probably puts that notice onto all its newspaper reproductions, not checking which ones are from originals still under copyright. EDIT: As some comments point out, the formatting used to present the digital version, if not a slavish copy of the original newspaper, might be original enough for copyright protection. Therefore one should copy only the digitized text, or elements obviously a direct copy of the original newspaper which is in the public domain. The digitizing service will not get any copyright on the original text or images, even if the formatting has enough originality for protection.

In considering whether a work is derivative, the key question is whether multiple, significant distinctive elements of the source work are used in the allegedly derivative work. It is also significant whether the two works display "substantial similarity". The amount of effort that goes into a work is not relevant. Nor is the market value of each work. A work need not be totslly distinct from previous works to be protectable by copyright. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) the 11th circuit court of appeals held that a mere stock figure was not enough to make a work derivative. This case is still considered the basic rule on derivative works. The opinion held that copying musty be "substantial" to make a work an infringement. Judge Learned Hand wrote: It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. ... ... the question is whether the part so taken is "substantial," and therefore not a "fair use" of the copyrighted work; it is the same question as arises in the case of any other copyrighted work. Marks v. Feist, 290 F. 959 (C. C. A. 2); -Emerson v. Davies*, Fed. Cas. No. 4436, 3 Story, 768, 795-797. But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but an abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome. Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86, 19 S. Ct. 606, 43 L. Ed. 904; Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.(2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2). Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. ... In such cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression and what is expressed. As respects plays, the controversy chiefly centers upon the characters and sequence of incident, these being the substance. ... It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly. ... ... granting that the plaintiff's play was wholly original, and assuming that novelty is not essential to a copyright, there is no monopoly in such a background. Though the plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not keep it to herself; so defined, the theme was too generalized an abstraction from what she wrote. It was only a part of her "ideas." ... The testimony of an expert upon such issues, especially his cross-examination, greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot be better heard after the evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be allowed at all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal, it cumbers the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is led into the intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon the firmer, if more naïve, ground of its considered impressions upon its own perusal. We hope that in this class of cases such evidence may in the future be entirely excluded, and the case confined to the actual issues; that is, whether the copyrighted work was original, and whether the defendant copied it, so far as the supposed infringement is identical. See also: "Open Source Copyright Casebook; Class 4: Derivative Works by Brian L. Frye, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. This discusses image copying and reproduction specifically. Frye writes: Notably, copyright only protects the original elements of a derivative work or compilation: "The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work." ... Notably, a work that copies the ideas expressed by a preexisting work is not a derivative work, because it is not a copy of that work. Copyright cannot protect ideas, so the author of the new work has not copied a protected element of the preexisting work. See further Frye's long discussion of Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) in which questions of whether a painting was a derivative work of a film, and what rights the painter had, are dealt with.

Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either.

Yes because the translated song is a derivative work. 17 U.S. Code § 103 (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works Derivative works is defined in § 101 A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation... FWIW, § 102 says (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories... (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;

Why don't alcoholic beverages have the ingredients list? Most alcoholic beverages (such as beers and wines) don't list the ingredients or nutritional information. Why is this? Is there a special exception for alcoholic beverages?

Is there a special exception for alcoholic beverages? Yes Standardized alcoholic beverages (those with compositional standards in Division 2 of the FDR such as beer, wine, rum and bourbon whiskey) are exempt from the requirement to show a list of ingredients on the label [B.01.008(2)(f), FDR]. This also applies to icewine which, in addition to meeting the prescribed standard in Volume 8 of the Canadian Standards of Identity document, also needs to meet the wine standard in Division 2 of the FDR. But this only applies to standardized alcohol (as laid out in B.02 of the Food and Drugs Regulations) They are also exempt from the nutrition facts if they have an alcohol content of more than 0.5% : Beverages with an alcohol content of more than 0.5% are usually exempt from carrying a Nutrition Facts table [B.01.401(2)(b)(i), FDR]. Except in the cases where this doesn't apply (Reasons for losing the exemption)

No However, there are laws against misrepresentation. If you use the expression ‘Houston Bar’ for something not made or associated with Houston you may be violating these. In addition, the World International Property Organisation recognises geographic identifications which have the effect of law in many jurisdictions. These are a subset of US trademark law.

There are a couple of indications that a bouncer may not confiscate an ID. This policy document adopting licensing policies to Require licensees with fake ID violations to temporarily or permanently hire on-site law enforcement or certified security guards who are properly trained to check IDs during regular or peak hours to deter the use of fake IDs and give gatekeepers the opportunity to pass suspected fakes to an officer or guard for a second opinion and potential confiscation. Where appropriate, jurisdictions could empower the gatekeeper to confiscate fake IDs so they are not returned to the underage drinker and sent back into circulation. To ensure compliance with legal issues (e.g., property rights, bailment issues), arrange for the on-call or on-site presence of local law enforcement. Local bar and restaurant associations, especially those in concentrated entertainment zones, can join together to share the expense of law enforcement resources. That implies that the bouncer does not already have that authority, and also indicates that the confiscation should be performed by the police. This bouncer training manual says that Even though you may consider the ID to be fake, it is not considered the server's property. Therefore servers and sellers should not confiscate IDs they suspect to be fake. Rather... follow up with a call to the police to verify suspected false IDs. However, a jurisdiction may grant servers that power, as in the case of Colorado. Washington doesn't do that, so bouncers would need to call the police (not that they always do, since passing a fake ID is somewhere between a misdemeanor and a felony). The general principle is that you may not confiscate another person's property, but the police can seize property if it is reasonable to do so. A state may pass a law authorizing a licensee to do likewise (though it does raise questions about the bouncer's understanding of "reasonable cause to believe"). The Colorado statute is restricted to licensee and their employees, and does not apply to "anyone who suspects an ID", nor does it allow civilian confiscation of other property such as an automobile that is suspected of being stolen.

united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app.

Custom is more important than the law AFAIK there is no legal requirement to provide concessional pricing for any goods or services. Custom dictates that this is more common for services than for goods but, for example, cinema’s often don’t provide concessional pricing for blockbuster movies.

The FDA promulgates regulations regarding what "cream cheese" etc. is, in 21 CFR Part 133 which covers cheese and related products. Cream cheese is described in §133.133, and there are sections on cottage cheese, cheddar, and so on. There is no general definition of "cheese" in this part, nor in related Part 131 covering milk and cream. Although there is no regulation defining the general term "cheese", by its regulatory inclusion with cottage cheese, cheddar and myriad other standard cheeses, one can argue that cream cheese is a kind of cheese (assuming there is no state regulation or contractual term that pins down what counts as "cheese"). By way of contrast, labne, often co-labeled "kefir cheese" (sometimes equated with "Greek yogurt"), is not included in any federal regulation, and at least one brand does not identify itself as a "type of yogurt", leaving the monolingual consumer with only "kefir cheese" to tell you what it is. Supplying labne as an instance of cheese would be in shaky legal ground, not so with cottage and cream cheese. If a person is contracted to supply "cheese" with no further specification, they can rely on ordinary usage of the term, and the evidence of ordinary usage would include cream cheese as a kind of cheese. If someone were to supply labne as an instance of cheese, that would be more problematic.

What’s the problem? Most likely the situation is 100% sure that he or she wouldn’t have performed the operation without anaesthesia. Therefore anaesthesia was not something his brain needed to remember, therefore it didn’t. He gave a truthful answer. He has no memory of it. He doesn’t need a memory of it, he just needed to make sure it’s done. Do you have any reason to believe it was not done? Operating without anaesthesia would be negligent. Not remembering it is done is not. On the other hand, he would have remembered the patient screaming if he started cutting without anaesthesia.

The government guidelines on naming food products states that if an ingredient is different to what consumers expect, it must be made clear by either: including the ingredient as part of the product’s name stating the ingredient close to the product’s name on the label For example, if a pesto sauce has been made with parsley instead of the traditional basil, the product must either be: called ‘parsley pesto sauce’ have the ingredient ‘parsley’ stated next to or directly under the product name So, it seems that the phrases like "our cheese is made of 100% plant ingredients" or "plant based cheese" (without quotation marks or asterisks) are compliant with these conditions. As an aside, the names of 15 cheeses are legally protected, but this relates to their geographical origins - not the product’s actual ingredients.

The nature of do not contact requests and crafting one that is irrevocable and permanently keeping away an ex Firstly, as a premise, what is the legal effect of expressly asking one not to contact them? Does it alter the nature of any future attempts to do so that are not of a legal-procedural nature? Off the cursory top of my head, I cannot think of any decisive way in which it would (such as a trespass warning in the United States would render future visits to a property a criminal offence) other than perhaps changing potential future police attitudes towards each party in future attendances of disputes, or perhaps in a less clear cut way it could render the future contact arguable harassment under the protection from harassment act. Onto the meat then, of the question… Alice is in an abusive relationship which she has left many times, always regretting previously again returning to it each time and wishing she wouldn’t be so desperate as to have gone back yet once more. All of her friends admonish her that the abusive relationship is destroying her and reducing her to sheer ruin over the course of several years. She begins seeing a therapist who urges her to leave it permanently, but her abusive predator partner always comes back to entice her when she is most desperate. On one occasion she reports the situation to the police but just knows inside that like so many times before she may succumb again to her desperation. The two pieces of the solution are discouraging her predatory ex from making future attempts at contact and enticing her to return to him, and obviously, reinforcing her own willpower to resist any temptations that are put forth. If she is sufficiently strong willed then simply giving a clear and firm do not contact notice would solve the problem but if she can always be tempted to waive and negate it subsequently to issuing one, then it is useless. When Alice is with her friends, or taking stock of the situation in a more sober setting such as with her therapist or the police, she always vows never to go back, and it is only when she is lonely, isolated and desperate that she succumbs to her ex’s demonic temptations. If while she is with the police she wishes to issue a notice to her ex never to contact her again (ideally that would have some actual fangs in repercussions for violating it) that is not possible for her to later override under temptation, at least insofar as removing the disincentive/repercussions for her ex to recontact her, what wording or device can she use to achieve this?

united-states Generally, the relief sought in a case like this is a "restraining order" or a "protective order". One might also pursue a criminal prosecution for stalking in the appropriate circumstances. Typically, if one can meet the high standard for issuance of such an order, a court issues a temporary order ex parte (i.e. based only upon what you have said and evidence you have provided) and then sets the matter for a hearing at which the person against whom the order is sought can defend themselves in court in a fairly short time period. If the judge finds that the high threshold to issue to order is met after considering the evidence at an adversarial evidentiary hearing, then the order becomes permanent or in force for a long period of time. The circumstances that can justify the issuance of such an order vary from state to state but usually must involve either a clear risk of serious physical harm or extreme harassment short of physical harm. Generally a court's restraining order or protective order cannot be waived by the protected person without another court order vacating it. Unlike most court orders, protection orders can usually be enforced directly by law enforcement rather than solely in an after the fact contempt of court proceeding in the court that issued the order originally. This said, even though the law may say that enforcing a protection order is mandatory, in practice, law enforcement discretion means that it is not. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). Also, as a matter of practical reality, law enforcement is often not able to stop someone who is violating a restraining order before it is too later, or because law enforcement is unable to confirm that a cyber stalker really is the person against whom a protection order has been issued. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering a case from Colorado regarding what kind of evidence that someone's communications amount to a "true threat" that is sufficient to justify legal consequences for this kind of contact. Simply continuing to contact you after you ask them to not contact you is rarely sufficient. But if someone who repeatedly contacts you in a way that you make clear is unwanted this is one factor among many used to consider if the conduct justifies issuance of an order or a criminal prosecution of some kind such as a stalking prosecution. Repeatedly contacting someone against their wishes can also get someone banned from an online platform outside the court process. Many online platforms have developed filters, blocking, and privacy controls in an attempt to make it harder to engage in this kind of conduct. The cycle of behavior of a victim in this case is a common one and it can make it very frustrating for lawyers, law enforcement, and other supportive people to help someone in this situation. I've certainly seen it play out first hand. In Colorado, the primary statutes are found at Colorado Revised Statutes, Sections 13-14-100.2 to 13-14.5-111. Colorado also imposes protection orders on a temporary basis during the divorce proceedings, many kinds of criminal cases, and certain other family law cases. Under the most common kind of case under these statutes, an order may be issued to: (I) To prevent assaults and threatened bodily harm; (II) To prevent domestic abuse; (III) To prevent emotional abuse of the elderly or of an at-risk adult; (IV) To prevent sexual assault or abuse; and (V) To prevent stalking. Some select definitions used include: “Abuse of the elderly or of an at-risk adult” means mistreatment of a person who is sixty years of age or older or who is an at-risk adult as defined in section 26-3.1-101(1.5), including but not limited to repeated acts that: (a) Constitute verbal threats or assaults; (b) Constitute verbal harassment; (c) Result in the inappropriate use or the threat of inappropriate use of medications; (d) Result in the inappropriate use of physical or chemical restraints; (e) Result in the misuse of power or authority granted to a person through a power of attorney or by a court in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding that results in unreasonable confinement or restriction of liberty; or (f) Constitute threats or acts of violence against, or the taking, transferring, concealing, harming, or disposing of, an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by the elderly or at-risk adult, which threats or acts are intended to coerce, control, punish, intimidate, or exact revenge upon the elderly or at-risk adult. “Domestic abuse” means any act, attempted act, or threatened act of violence, stalking, harassment, or coercion that is committed by any person against another person to whom the actor is currently or was formerly related, or with whom the actor is living or has lived in the same domicile, or with whom the actor is involved or has been involved in an intimate relationship. A sexual relationship may be an indicator of an intimate relationship but is never a necessary condition for finding an intimate relationship. For purposes of this subsection (2), “coercion” includes compelling a person by force, threat of force, or intimidation to engage in conduct from which the person has the right or privilege to abstain, or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right or privilege to engage. “Domestic abuse” may also include any act, attempted act, or threatened act of violence against: (a) The minor children of either of the parties; or (b) An animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either of the parties or by a minor child of either of the parties, which threat, act, or attempted act is intended to coerce, control, punish, intimidate, or exact revenge upon either of the parties or a minor child of either of the parties. “Sexual assault or abuse” means any act, attempted act, or threatened act of unlawful sexual behavior, as described in section 16-11.7-102(3), C.R.S., by any person against another person regardless of the relationship between the actor and the petitioner. “Stalking” means any act, attempted act, or threatened act of stalking as described in section 18-3-602, C.R.S. The referenced section defines stalking as follows: A person commits stalking if directly, or indirectly through another person, the person knowingly: (a) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with the threat, repeatedly follows, approaches, contacts, or places under surveillance that person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship; or (b) Makes a credible threat to another person and, in connection with the threat, repeatedly makes any form of communication with that person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship, regardless of whether a conversation ensues; or (c) Repeatedly follows, approaches, contacts, places under surveillance, or makes any form of communication with another person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person, a member of that person's immediate family, or someone with whom that person has or has had a continuing relationship to suffer serious emotional distress. For purposes of this paragraph (c), a victim need not show that he or she received professional treatment or counseling to show that he or she suffered serious emotional distress. (2) For the purposes of this part 6: (a) Conduct "in connection with" a credible threat means acts that further, advance, promote, or have a continuity of purpose, and may occur before, during, or after the credible threat. (b) "Credible threat" means a threat, physical action, or repeated conduct that would cause a reasonable person to be in fear for the person's safety or the safety of his or her immediate family or of someone with whom the person has or has had a continuing relationship. The threat need not be directly expressed if the totality of the conduct would cause a reasonable person such fear. (c) "Immediate family" includes the person's spouse and the person's parent, grandparent, sibling, or child. (d) "Repeated" or "repeatedly" means on more than one occasion.

So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent.

Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on.

What kind of recourse can OP pursue to swiftly clear their name? The OP's "recourse" is to prove the truth - that he is not a convicted or accused (by a prosecutor) sex offender - to those who defamed him, who are presumably the bar owner(s), who instructed the bouncer to remove the OP because he was a sex offender; and possibly the bouncer, who may have told Anne that the OP was a sex offender; and possibly others who later on social media said the OP is a sex offender, such as Anne herself. The facts of who may be a sex offender and who may have falsely asserted someone is must be sorted out, and that's usually done by lawyers before a lawsuit (with a possible settlement from "We're going to sue" threat letter by the OP's lawyer); or in the discovery process of an actual lawsuit; or in court by a jury. It's entirely up to the OP to take legal action, hopefully under the advice of a lawyer; and it's not a good idea for the OP to confront the bouncer, Anne or others and possibly complicate his own situation. As for anything happening "swiftly", that's another point entirely. The OP could sue for damages to his reputation and/or to require the defamers to retract their statements, or for other compensations. Many personal injury lawyers give free initial consultations. See Defamation | Legal Information Institute for definitions and the laws regarding defamation, libel and slander (which can vary due to jurisdiction; in some areas, defamation is criminal as well as civil). Libel is published defamation, as in defaming someone in messages on social media; slander is spoken defamation, such as what the bar bouncer may have done. Do they have a strong case for egregious defamation? The likelihood of "a strong case" is for the OP's legal counsel to determine; they will look at the evidence of defamatory statements, the likelihood of getting monetary damages from the bar and/or the individuals involved, and other factors.

I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.

In the third of your sources (Harassment act, section 5), near the end, it says: If the defendant breaches an order under section 5 or 5A of the PHA 1997 without reasonable excuse, she/he will be guilty of a criminal offence (section 5(5) PHA 1997). The penalty that may be imposed upon breach of the new section 5A restraining order is identical to that which can be imposed under section 5. (Emphasis added) In Item 2 of the first source (darlingtons.com) it says: If a person disobeys the terms of an Order of Court which carries a penal notice, he will have breached the Injunction. As to whether such a breach constitutes contempt, will be considered on a case-by case approach according to the particular facts of the given case. The seriousness of the breach, and the question as to whether such action undermined or ‘laughed in the face of the Court Order’ so as to be contemptuous, will be determined by the Court. In item three of this same source it says: If the Court considers that the breach was intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice, the Court has power to commit a person to prison, and/or impose a fine. In short it appears that the court is expected to use judgement on a case-by-case basis. Violation of a restraining order because the person subject to the order had to provide emergency medical or fire or rescue services, or otherwise provide needed assistance in an emergency, with no improper motive, would, I should think, not lead to any penalty for contempt. US practice also expects a court to exercise judgement when sentencing for contempt.

"Without prejudice" does not, of itself, create an obligation of confidentiality What it does do is prevent the contents being used against the author in any future proceedings - by this litigant or anyone else. The purpose of civil litigation is to resolve disputes. There is another, better, cheaper and more commonly used mechanism - parties agreeing on their own resolution through negotiation. The purpose of the without prejudice rule is to allow parties to have a full and frank negotiation without the risk that what they say will bite them on the ass in court. If they do not settle, then the court cannot and will not know about any concessions or negotiating positions that either party made or took. Adding "save as to costs" means that after the case is resolved, a party may introduce any offers they made that were better than what was won in order to show that costs should be mitigated - basically that because there was a better offer on the table the litigation was needless and the costs unnecessary. You can share it with whoever you like - they won't be able to use it in court.

The relevant bit of legislation — Human Rights Act 1993 s22 — protects applicants and employees: Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any description, it shall be unlawful .. to refuse ... offer .. terminate ... retire ... by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. So, if you never advertise but always invite people (i.e. offer them job straight away) then there are no applicants (as at no point does anybody apply for the job), and hence no employment discrimination. If you invite them for a "non-discriminatory screening interview" then there is no discrimination by definition of "non-discriminatory" :) behavioural / relational / mental / spiritual I'm pretty sure these criteria would be discriminatory in a advertised position. None of those criteria are prohibited grounds of discrimination (s21). However, it would be a good idea to clearly define them as "a genuine occupational qualification for the position" by drafting a job description and explaining why those traits are crucial for the business.

Does a US company moving its PII and web servers to the EU solve the Meta fine problem? As discussed in this question about the Meta fine it is a problem for companies that host websites with access to EU user registration data in US datacenters. This is based on the 'Schrems II' decision in 2020 that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield fails to protect Europeans' rights to data privacy when companies are transferring those data to the U.S. The details and requirements are discussed by the International Association of Privacy Professionals. Suppose Alice Inc. was in this situation, in that they are a US company with their websites running on the cloud in US datacenters, let us say in a single docker container with apache and MySQL and their simple site. They could with a simple purchase of alternative hosting and a few commands deploy their webserver on an EU host. This would however have little effect on the access to the data, in that if US law enforcement turned up at the offices of Alice Inc. they could be required to hand over the data and their access to the data will not be changed in any way by the location of the web hosting. If they did this, would this satisfy the particular aspect of the GDPR that was covered by the 'Schrems II' decision and the Meta fine?

Maybe this changes something, maybe not. But at first glance, yes, avoiding US-based vendors does help comply with Schrems II. They need not be EU-based. Definition of an international data transfer The GDPR unfortunately does not define what an international transfer is, and just explains when they may be lawful: Art 44: Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third country […] shall take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, the conditions laid down in this Chapter are complied with by the controller and processor, including for onward transfers of personal data from the third country […] to another third country […]. […] This has been interpreted, in particular by the official EU SCCs and by EDPB guidance, to imply two roles: the data exporter, and the data importer. Per those EDPB guidelines, a transfer occurs when three criteria are fulfilled together: The data exporter is subject to GDPR (e.g. as a controller via Art 3, or as a processor via an Art 28 data processing contract). The exporter discloses or makes available personal data to the importer. The importer is in a "third country" (for EU GDPR: anything outside the EU/EEA). Note that these importer/exporter aspects are independent from roles like "controller" or "processor". It also does not depend on where in the world the exporter is situated. Applying this to your scenario How does this apply to your scenario? I am assuming Alice Inc is subject to the GDPR (criterion #1). Now, Alice Inc can process personal data, and that's not an international transfer, even if Alice Inc is in the US (or any other third country). The general GDPR rules apply, such as the requirement to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of processing operations. If Alice Inc engages data processors to process personal data on Alice Inc's behalf, then this would fulfil criterion #2 (disclosure to a third party). For example, hosting providers generally act as data processors. Any other kind of data sharing (e.g. to other data processors) would also fall under this category. Tricky in an US context: while employees would be agents of Alice Inc and would not be separate recipients, contractors/freelancers would also be potential data importers. If those data importers are based in the EU/EEA, then criterion #3 is not fulfilled and there's no international transfer. For example, using an EU-based hosting providers would sidestep Chapter V of the GDPR completely. If those data importers are based outside of the EU/EEA, then criterion #3 is triggered and we have an international transfer. Lawfulness of international data transfers When there is an international transfer, it must be adequately protected. In order of decreasing priority: country has an EU adequacy decision appropriate safeguards for a group of companies: Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) Art 49 specific situations What SCCs and BCRs do is to translate enough of the GDPR from statutory law into a contract to ensure adequate protection. But to be effective, they must actually be enforceable, and the data importer must actually be able to comply with those rules. In Schrems II, the CJEU found that the US (at that time) did not offer an adequate level of data protection, and that SCCs are probably invalid as well since importers cannot comply with both the SCCs and with US surveillance laws. Before using SCCs, it is effectively necessary to perform a transfer impact assessment (TIA) analyzing, among other things, the legal context of the importer's country. It may be possible to defuse this, for example by using supplemental security measures like end-to-end that prevent unlawful use of the data even if it falls into the wrong hands. However, such measures also tend to prevent intended use, especially in a cloud context. In the DPC Ireland decision against Meta Ireland (PDF), the DPC finds: 7.202 In summary, therefore, I am satisfied (and I so find) that: (1) US law does not provide a level of protection that is essentially equivalent to that provided by EU law; (2) Neither the 2010 SCCs nor the 2021 SCCs can compensate for the inadequate protection provided by US law; and (3) Meta Ireland does not have in place any supplemental measures which would compensate for the inadequate protection provided by US law. 7.203 Accordingly, in making the Data Transfers, I find that, subject to the analysis contained at Section 8 below, Meta Ireland is infringing Article 46(1) GDPR. Implications of using non-US vendors As already mentioned, using EU-based data processors avoids the international transfer problem due to the way how international transfers are defined. Even if an international transfer occurs, that might not be a problem. Some countries have an EU adequacy decision, for example Canada, Israel, or South Korea. While there would nominally be an international data transfer that needs to be disclosed e.g. in a privacy notice, there is no additional bureaucracy required. In other countries, transfer tools like SCCs might work. A TIA might show that that the issues discussed in the Schrems II decision and the DPC decision wouldn't apply there. But isn't that a contradiction? You correctly point out a problem with the GDPR's approach to data transfers: This would however have little effect on the access to the data, in that if US law enforcement turned up at the offices of Alice Inc. they could be required to hand over the data and their access to the data will not be changed in any way by the location of the web hosting. Yes, this is arguably a loophole. However: If the US-based Alice Inc is a data processor in behalf of another controller, that controller would likely be violating the GDPR by transferring personal data to Alice. If Alice Inc is a data controller: while this might not be a violation of the Chapter V rules on international data transfers, such a scenario could be argued to be an Art 24 or Art 32 violation instead (requirement to ensure compliance and security). When Alice Inc transfers personal data to data importers, that is less visible to data subjects, and outside of their immediate control. However, when Alice Inc collects data on data subjects, that is more visible to data subjects, in particular through an Art 13 or Art 14 privacy notice. That notice must also contain the identity of the data controller, which would disclose that Alice is US-based, which may enable to data subjects to make more informed choices. This won't help Meta While moving to non-US data processors can be a sensible compliance approach for many companies, it is less useful for multinationals like Meta. In this context, Meta is an Irish data controller who engages platform and development services from an American company. Even if Meta Ireland tries to perform all GDPR-covered processing activities outside the US, it's actual corporate structure situates some processing activities such as administration tasks in the US and other third countries. If my above analysis is correct, it would have been easier for Meta to comply with GDPR if the US-based Meta company were the data controller.

The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.

GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.

I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations.

That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.

The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time.

That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.

It is not different. But one company can decide to approach compliance differently from another. Here, TomTom has chosen a fairly safe/conservative interpretation, whereas Google and Apple decided that more data collection is appropriate. A “find my device” style functionality appears to be entirely unproblematic if the user books that particular service (regardless of whether the service is paid or gratis) and provides consent for the location data collection. The legal basis for such a service could then be Art 6(1)(a) consent or Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract to which the data subject is party. Personally, I believe that Google is not sufficiently transparent about how Find My Device works, but that TomTom could provide a compliant service if they wanted to. That TomTom doesn't offer this service primarily shows that they don't think developing this service is worth it. Wiping a remote device is unrelated to this issue and doesn't seem to provide GDPR challenges. At least in a business context, remote wiping may be an appropriate security measure and may then even be mandated by the GDPR (e.g. see Art 24 or Art 32).

Is handing out bibles near school property a 1st amendment violation? Context: There was some random guy handing out pocket bibles on the road path leading out of the school a few weeks ago. I don't think they were on school property, but they were close if that is important. They were holding out bibles, but never forced or asked anyone to take it. They did not show up ever again. The next day, some kids were arguing that the bible guy was indoctrinating us into their religion. Given that this guy wasn't an employee of the school, wasn't in the school itself, and that the school was public rather than private, would this be a violation of the 1st amendment of the United States? Specifically the part that states that the government should not promote one religion over another.

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit people with no affiliation with the government from trying to convert people to their religion in a way not endorsed by a government official or agency. It could be that there is some content neutral prohibition on strangers accosting young school children if that person is so persistent that it amounts to content neutral harassment, or that the person might actually be a sex offender prohibited from contacting children. But, the facts of the question don't seem to compel this conclusion. Even if it violates any law to do this, it is not a violation of the U.S. Constitution.

Alternate explanation: Richard is saying that the witness has no "testimony that would assist in making a determination of guilt or innocence", and therefore should not be allowed to testify.

This is an important question that affects consumer advocacy, blog-based-journalism, political speech and spending, and probably other things. People disagree about what the answer is. This podcast episode features both sides of the argument. Professor Volokh holds the view that the freedom of the press is "freedom to print", "freedom to use the printing press". Freedom of the press is the freedom of everybody to use the printing press. Assessing the grammar of the clause, he argues that this points in the same direction. The text says "freedom of speech or of the press". He points out that speech is not a group of people. It would be odd to treat "speech" as an activity, but to treat "press" as a group of people given the parallel construction. This side of the argument is described more in this article by Prof. Volokh. Professor West argues that there is a defined group of people called "the press" that deserves protection under this clause. This article explains Prof. West's position in detail. The main point is that "An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause." If "press" means simply the right to publish speech, then it becomes redundant because courts have held the right to publish speech is given under that "speech" portion of the clause. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Citizens United also argued for "some kinds of identity-based distinctions" regarding whether a person is a member of the press. Each side can give examples of the term "the press" being used at the time of the First Amendment that is consistent with their favored interpretation. I think to get the best idea of the two sides to this question, you should read Citizens United (including all dissents and concurrences), read the two articles linked above, and listen to the podcast episode.

There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.

The First Amendment does not guarantee a right to not be offended. However, as held in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), it does prohibit compelled speech, and a person cannot be compelled to recite the pledge. The basis is not religion: this is a general prohibition on what the government can do. ("Parental consent" comes through the school informing parents of the right to not recite the pledge, and a parent who objects will tell their child to not recite the pledge, thus consent is implicit for those parents whose children do recite -- unless the child's actions don't reflect the parents' intent).

If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.

As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.

most likely The government can't compel people to some sort of speech under the 1st amendment. Forcing a company to host people is compelled speech by the company. It is well established that the government can't compel a newspaper to host its messages as it wants. The key case might be Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 418 US 241 (1974). In this case, it was deemed unconstitutional that a newspaper would need to host speech of a political candidate the newspaper didn't like in the same amount it had used to disparage that candidate. While the Miami Herald brought the newspaper into the line by the action of the newspaper, Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705 (1977) held that the state could not force any citizen to host its motto. Or for the matter, any message. The State may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. Pp. 71717. Forcing a public web page to host advertisement or speech from any government - or under the threat of the government action - is compelled speech and violates the rulings of Miami Herald, Wooley and other cases. However, there is a little light for the government under PruneYard, Turner Broadcasting and Rumsfeld. However, all of them don't cut here: Turner Broadcasting was about a service provider for radio that did not host its own speech. PruneYard is a shopping center that doesn't host its own speech and is only useful in California as there is a California constitution issue. And Rumsfeld dealt with military recruitment, which always is special. A similar Florida law was deemed to be very likely unconstitutional by the (federal) Northern District of Florida (Injunction Text) Addendum A joint lawsuit by NetChoice & CCIA was filed against Texas on 22nd September 2021 (Complaint), asking for a preliminary injunction. NetChoice puts its filings on their website. Further reading: Ken White - Make No Law podcast #11: Deplatformed Ken White - Section 230 Is The Subject of The Most Effective Legal Propaganda I've Ever Seen 01st December 2021 Update Indeed, the relevant parts of HB20 were put out of enforcement via injunction on December 1st, 2021, reasoning that: Social media platforms have a First Amendment right to moderate content disseminated on their platforms. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1932 (2019) (recognizing that “certain private entities[] have rights to exercise editorial control over speech and speakers on their properties or platforms”). Three Supreme Court cases provide guidance. First in Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to print a candidate’s reply if a 13 newspaper assailed her character or official record, a “right of reply” statute. 418 U.S. at 243. [...] In Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., the Supreme Court held that a private parade association had the right to exclude a gay rights group from having their own float in their planned parade without being compelled by a state statute to do otherwise. 515 U.S. 557, 572– 73 (1995). [...] Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that California could not require a private utility company to include a third party’s newsletters when it sent bills to customers in Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986). HB 20 compels social media platforms to significantly alter and distort their products. Moreover, “the targets of the statutes at issue are the editorial judgments themselves” and the “announced purpose of balancing the discussion—reining in the ideology of the large social-media providers—is precisely the kind of state action held unconstitutional in Tornillo, Hurley, and PG&E.” Id. HB 20 also impermissibly burdens social media platforms’ own speech. Id. at *9 (“[T]he statutes compel the platforms to change their own speech in other respects, including, for example, by dictating how the platforms may arrange speech on their sites.”). For example, if a platform appends its own speech to label a post as misinformation, the platform may be discriminating against that user’s viewpoint by adding its own disclaimer. HB 20 restricts social media platforms’ First Amendment right to engage in expression when they disagree with or object to content. For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the State’ s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 23), is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, (Dkt. 12), is GRANTED. Until the Court enters judgment in this case, the Texas Attorney General is ENJOINED from enforcing Section 2 and Section 7 of HB 20 against Plaintiffs and their members. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), Plaintiffs are required to post a $1,000.00 bond. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, (Dkt. 43), is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT.

Legality of an Ohio mariage if the ceremony was outside the state A friend of mine recently told me an interesting detail about her mariage ceremony. She got her mariage licence in Ohio but they had the ceremony just across the border in another state. Neither of them was a resident in Ohio at that time. As far as I understand, non residents need to marry in the county where they received their mariage licence. Using a mariage certificate in another state doesn't seem to be possible in most states. Does this make the mariage void or voidable? Is it legal now that they've lived together for 8 years? Is there any criminal liability in supplying this faulty information to the state?

The specific venue requirement is ORC 3101.05 which says that Each of the persons seeking a marriage license shall personally appear in the probate court within the county where either resides, or, if neither is a resident of this state, where the marriage is expected to be solemnized. If neither party is a resident of this state, the marriage may be solemnized only in the county where the license is obtained. To possibly make things worse, An applicant for a marriage license who knowingly makes a false statement in an application or affidavit prescribed by this section is guilty of falsification under section 2921.13 of the Revised Code. If they lied on the application regarding the venue, that's a large problem. Otherwise, violating 3101.05 is a minor misdemeanor, which could be a fine up to $150. There is no provision that would invalidate the marriage, other than specified prohibited marriages (not nearer of kin than second cousin, already married).

This appears to be very clear to me: "NPR does not allow other websites to post our content..." I cannot think of a more clear way to say "Do not reproduce our content on your site." Since you asked about licensing the right to reproduce their content, and they flatly ignored your request, I think it is safe to assume that they are not interested in licensing that right to you, even for a fee. This is also consistent with their "NPR does not allow [any] other websites to post..." language. It is always the copyright holder's right to refuse to offer any particular person (or all persons generally) a license, no matter what payment they might offer. (With the exception of statutory licenses, which in the U.S. exist only for recording covers of musical works.) They have also ignored your request to recompense them for infringement already performed. If in the future they decide to take legal action against you for your past infringement (hugely unlikely that such a hassle would be worthwhile for NPR) or seek any out of court settlement (again, quite unlikely they will care enough), I'm sure they will let you know. As they've said in their email, you are welcome to link to NPR's content. You are, of course, not welcome to spread misinformation or lies about NPR by claiming something like, "Look at this wonderful article that NPR wrote purely for us, at our personal request," or "NPR thinks that In Home Teaching Agency XXX is a great company, so we built a curriculum around their content," when NPR has never said any such thing. Any legal issue around linking would probably be a trademark offense, by wrongfully suggesting that NPR endorses you, or by misrepresenting yourself as an agent of NPR. If you don't do either of things, and just say, "Here's an article on [subject X] published by NPR," you're probably fine. If you want to be very thorough, you could include a disclaimer on your site like, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX is not a licencee or partner of NPR. Links to NPR articles are included for educational purposes only," or similar. This seems pretty excessive to me, since a reasonable person won't assume that linking to an article from a major news source suggests a partnership, but I suppose it couldn't hurt to include such a disclaimer.

If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.

It's not theft, but the donee (recipient) generally is not entitled to keep the ring. A number of states - not all - have so-called "Heart Balm" Laws, which abolish the ability to sue for a breach of a promise to marry. New York State is one of them. However, this does not bar actions for recovery of a chattel, money, or securities transferred in contemplation of marriage - including wedding rings. Consider Mancuso v Russo, 132 AD2d 533 [2nd Dept 1987]. In this case, the plaintiff entered a claim to recover a gift of real property conditional upon subsequent marriage. The Court, and the appeals court, entered judgement in favor of the plaintiff. The relevant law is found in N.Y. CVR. LAW § 80-b: NY Code - Section 80-B: Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to bar a right of action for the recovery of a chattel, the return of money or securities, or the value thereof at the time of such transfer, or the rescission of a deed to real property when the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel, money or securities or real property was a contemplated marriage which has not occurred, and the court may, if in its discretion justice so requires, (1) award the defendant a lien upon the chattel, securities or real property for monies expended in connection therewith or improvements made thereto, (2) deny judgment for the recovery of the chattel or securities or for rescission of the deed and award money damages in lieu thereof A search for Civil Rights Law § 80-b returns many more cases where claims for (primarily) engagement rings are disputed.

Finding S seems to be hard and I have not much hope, if her siblings cannot provide any information. I think the "inhabitants registry" (Einwohnermeldeamt) is not allowed to give you her first address in Spain ("Zuzugsanschrift im Ausland") (§§ 44 and 45 Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG)). The best option I see is a court auction (Zwangsversteigerung), more precise a "Teilungsversteigerung". If one of S's siblings want money for the land, he can ask for a court auction at the local court (Amtsgericht). The court will get S's first address in Spain (§ 34 BMG) and if it cannot deliver its letter to S, there will be a "public delivery" (öffentliche Zustellung) through a posting in court. It would take a while, but in the end the land could be yours. Be prepared that the cost for the court auction will be much higher than the 1000€. If you plan to take this way, ask a lawyer for detailed advice. Also you need one of S's siblings to participate in the process. If the trees are really a danger for your house, the heirs could also have an obligation to remove them. Maybe this could help you too.

It is illegal to marry while you are already married This is the crime of bigamy in all 50 states. A marriage ends with the death of one of the couple, a divorce or (in some very limited circumstances) an annulment. The US will recognise any of these wherever they happen so it’s your choice whether you get divorced in your home country or the US. By the way, don’t cause the death of your husband, that’s also illegal.

There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.

The default choice of law rule is that intestate succession is governed by the law of the place of domicile of the decedent at death (i.e. by the law of the state where someone resides in the U.S. in this case), if there is no will and if no other consideration applies. Incidentally, the citizenship of the decedent is pretty much irrelevant. You don't need to be a a citizen of a place to be domiciled there. Similarly, where you happen to be when you die is also irrelevant to succession although other post-mortem processes like inquests are affected. Real property, however, is generally governed by the laws of intestate succession in the place where it is located. This requires a separate Mexican succession process, which would be called an ancillary probate in U.S. practice, but probably has a different name in Mexico because Mexico has a civil law legal system that follows the Spanish tradition for succession at death rather than the common law procedural process concept of a probate proceeding, and is often handled by a legally trained Mexican notary outside the court system. At the same time, common law legal systems give near absolute discretion to the testator in how they make their bequests subject to minimum immediate family support rules, while civil law legal systems are usually more limiting. Intangible personal property (e.g. a bank account) is usually deemed to be governed by the law of the place of domicile. Whether tangible personal property is governed by the law of the place of domicile, or by the law of the place where it is located at death, isn't an issue that is resolved uniformly in all jurisdictions. It would depend upon how the issue presented itself and in what legal forum it presented itself. Often, the reality that "possession is 9/10th of the law" and that tangible personal property often has little significant economic value, means that these issues are resolved without resort to the courts or formal legal process. (In England, in the early modern era, succession to tangible personal property was vested in the clergy and courts only handled succession to real property and intangible property.) Also, in terms of choice of law, in the U.S., probate is a matter of state law and is subject to a case law exception to federal jurisdiction that prevents it from being litigated in federal courts. Mexico also has a federal system, but I don't know whether Mexico's laws on intestate succession are state laws or federal laws (I believe that it is governed by state law but that there isn't much interstate variation).

Are "Dry humping" and "Molesting" the same thing? My friend's ex-boyfriend got sentenced to four years in prison for "molesting" his girlfriend who is my friend and his ex-girlfriend only they were together when he "dry humped" her. I don't quite understand it because it's not that I don't believe her I just don't see how any harm was done. She said he was fully clothed and she was fully clothed and he humped her but she said stop and he held her down. But if they are clothed then his penis can't penetrate her. But he claimed she was lying about it after she reported it to the police and went to court and the jury ruled in her favor and the judge sentenced him to four years charge being molestation but how is "dry humping" her molesting her? And this was in Birmingham Alabama.

How is holding her down and dry-humping her not molesting her? "Molesting" doesn't imply that any penetration or rape took place - it's a much broader term covering pretty much any sort of unwanted sexual contact (although more often, but not exclusively, used when a minor is involved). The definition for Molestation in Legal Dictionary at law.com ends with: any unwanted sexual acts with adults short of rape and holding someone down (unwanted) and dry-humping them (sexual act) seems to fit this.

Jan Böhmermann faces prosecution in Germany for violating their penal code section 103 as discussed here. Lèse-majesté is not a crime in the UK, though apparently it was a common law crime in Scotland until 2010 (though not prosecuted since 1715). Though there is always the possibility of a defamation lawsuit, depending on what you say.

Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about.

We can start by looking at the text of the law. US federal law 18 USC § 2252A(a)(3)(B) says: Any person who... knowingly... advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains— (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). I'm not sure how much posting the name without the link would protect you, given that you posted it with the explicit intent that someone would go and look at it. On the other hand, your intent was not to "advertise" or "promote" it, and you didn't actually "distribute" the material.

There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office.

It is my understanding that he was charged under 18 USC § 1001 which gives a maximum sentence of 5 years under most circumstances. This is the absolute maximum; the judge is not allowed to give more than the law allows. Here are the federal sentencing guidelines. If you look in the guidelines, you'll see that the base offense level for this crime is 14. If there was a "substantial" interference with justice, the offense is increased by 3 levels. My guess is that they won't find this to be the case. There are several other adjustments that likely don't apply. Under the "Adjustments" section of the guidelines, it says: (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. It seems that the first one applies. The second one cannot apply in this particular case since the offense level was not 16 or greater. So the offense level would be reduced from 14 to 12. If you look at the Sentencing Table, you can see that an offense level of 12 has a recommended sentence of 10-16 months for someone with no prior criminal history. Also, this is in Zone C, meaning: the minimum term may be satisfied by... a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment. so it seems he would go to prison for at least half of that. But if the offense level was dropped just one more level, he would be in zone B, where probation with home confinement would be an acceptable sentence. But there's one more thing to consider: He's cooperating with investigations into other people. This allows a departure from the ordinary guidelines. Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. (a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: (1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance. I have no idea where the Guardian got 6 months from. It's certainly possible that's part of the plea deal (although nothing says the judge has to impose the sentence that the prosecutor recommends as part of the deal), and maybe there are adjustments I'm not taking into account that would reduce the offense level further. I just now found a copy of the plea agreement. It specifies that the parties agree he will be sentenced under guideline §2B1.1(a)(2). This ordinarily is for offenses such as theft, property damage, forgery, or fraud. As far as I can tell, the government is just using this to get the sentence down, because there's no real relation to the crime he's accused of. Under that guideline, the base offense level is 6. The two level decrease for accepting responsibility puts it at an offense level of 4, with a possibility of a downward departure for cooperation. Regardless of whether or not there's a downward departure, this would have a 0-6 month sentence recommendation, which is the lowest available in the guidelines. This is also in Zone A of the sentencing table, meaning a sentence of just probation with no imprisonment or home confinement is possible.

Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).

The "how" part is, get the legislature to pass a law. LA. REV. STAT. ANN 15:542.1 says Any adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to, has been convicted of, or where adjudication has been deferred or withheld for the perpetration or attempted perpetration of, or conspiracy to commit, a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 or a criminal offense against a minor as defined in R.S. 15:541 shall be required to provide the following notifications (1) Give notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his name, residential address, a description of his physical characteristics as provided in R.S. 15:542(C)(1), and a photograph or copy thereof to all of the following: (a) At least one person in every residence or business within a one-mile radius in a rural area and a three-tenths of a mile radius in an urban or suburban area of the address of the residence where the offender will reside upon release, including all adults residing in the residence of the offender Also, school superintendents, landlords, park superintendents. The law does not require ringing doorbells. The police do not actually follow convicts to make sure they do it. You would have to contact police and convicts who have some experience with this to know how it works practically: the law is what it is.

Am I legally obligated to let a store clerk see my receipt? For as long as I can recall, bulk stores in the area I live (e.g. Costco, BJs, etc.) have checked customers' receipts as they exit the store to verify that all items in their cart are what was purchased. In recent years, Walmart has substantially eliminated its cashiers in favor of self-checkout lines and started adding someone at the exit to check receipts. The bulk stores require a membership card to shop there, thus, I could envision a scenario where somewhere in the legalese for that card is a requirement to allow the store to check the receipt. However, I cannot see how there would be such an agreement between myself and Walmart. For this reason, could I refuse to permit a Walmart employee at the door to inspect my receipt? Or is there some sort of implied consent to search that I'm unaware of?

The 4th amendment protection against unreasonable searches is irrelevant, since it only relates to governmental searches. There may be "shopkeeper privilege" laws in your state that enable a detention. Ordinarily, you cannot be arrested by a person – that would be assault and false arrest. However, a state can enact an exception, such as Washington's RCW 4.24.220, which says In any civil action brought by reason of any person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense of such action that the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit such investigation or questioning by a peace officer or by the owner of the mercantile establishment, his or her authorized employee or agent, and that such peace officer, owner, employee, or agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was committing or attempting to commit larceny or shoplifting on such premises of such merchandise. As used in this section, "reasonable grounds" shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed possession of unpurchased merchandise of a mercantile establishment, and a "reasonable time" shall mean the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to examine employees and records of the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchandise. Speaking of Walmart, here is a petition regarding a lawsuit against Walmart over such an event, where a shopper failed to stop to respond to exit security, resulting in her being physically stopped. A lawsuit (assault, unlawful imprisonment, outrage) ensued. The bottom line was that the shopkeeper's privilege is a valid defense against a lawsuit to the effect that a shopper does not want to comply with a request to prove that they are not stealing goods.

Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.

Since they have allready given you a form to fill that you have sent back with the original receipts, I will assume that the major preconditions have been fulfilled (mainly that they have asked you to come in writing and have not exclude reimbursement). This a case of civil law based on §670 BGB. Since they have not fullfilled their obligation, you must send them a reminder (Mahnung) in the form of a registered letter, requiring them to do so within a reasonable timeframe (like 10 working days after receipt of the letter). look for standard letters on this topic (Mahnungen) The letter should be descriptive in nature (i.e. a Judge, after reading a copy of the letter, will understand the whole situation). Nowadays such a letter should be sent through your local Amsgericht, so that they can certify that your copy of the letter was included in the original letter. If they don't react to this, then you must charge them. This is a basic description of the needed method. Look up the details of the process and/or for someone to assist you. Section 670 Reimbursement of expenses If the mandatary, for the purpose of performing the mandate, incurs expenses that he may consider to be necessary in the circumstances, then the mandator is obliged to make reimbursement. Sources §670 - German Civil Code (BGB) Wer trägt die Reisekosten für das Vorstellungsgespräch? - ingenieur.de

The answer seems fairly simple. ANY item not belonging in the room and NOT found in a waste receptacle must be brought to management and logged. i.e. if the hotel guest threw a crumpled scrap of food wrapper at the bin and missed, that item must be presented to management and logged. Then, it's management's decision to toss it. I imagine that the twelfth time that management has to evaluate whether a used condom is personal property or trash, they will revise their ill-advised little letter. Additionally, how does the guest know for certain that an item was actually left in room, and how does management know that a particular staff was the only one who could have encountered it? They'd have to implement key card logging or video cameras. i.e. the staff could simply deny that any items were found in the room, or perhaps they could demand that a manager must clear a room of possible guest property before entering. Put simply, how to prove a particular person had access to the room and exercised that access, AND that they encountered the wayward guest item?

I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.

There is no intention to commit theft, so there is no criminal act on the part of the customer. Even if there was a criminal act, the ability of the restaurant to detain the cusomer (citizen's arrest) is very limited in most jurisdictions. The restaurant can ask the customer for his name and address, but there is no legal obligation on the customer to provide this. Refusal to do so, however, might be evidence of intention to avoid paying and at that point the restaurant might call the police. The customer can leave, and the restaurant can pursue the debt through the civil courts if they have means to do so - they may have CCTV of the customer and his car registration which can be traced. Petrol stations, where people often fill up and then realise they can't pay, usually have established "promise to pay" procedures where they take the customer's details and the customer has 48 hours to pay before police or civil enforcement action is taken.

Your question (when read with your follow-up comments) is somewhat complex, so I am going to make a few assumptions and break it down into several sub parts. Assumptions The conviction occurred in a state where the expungement statute allows you to tell employers that you were never arrested and convicted. When you say “public records websites” you’re asking about sites like atlaspublicrecords.com. That atlaspublicrecords.com is a US based company. They don’t list an address and the website used a private registration services, so can’t easily determine that they are US-based. Your questions and follow-up Considerations After I get it expunged, will it be removed from public records websites . . . . No. Websites like atlaspublicrecords.com do not link to actual public records. I searched a couple of common names and feel safe in assuming that it only collects and publishes the information—it does not actually link to court records. Nevertheless, it would not be available from the actual government agencies that keep those records. By getting your records expunged the convictions and arrest would no longer be available as public records that someone could request from the courthouse, police department, or whatever state agency does criminal history in your jurisdiction. do I have to show them proof of the expungement . . . . Yes, if you believe what the website claims. I can’t find a physical address for the website and don’t know if they are real or a scam, so understand that when you give them information about your expungement—or pay their silly fee, they might collect the money and do nothing. My opinion is that the company is shady and seems to operate in a gray area of the law that I will explain below. Options if they don’t remove the post: You could try to sue them for some type of secondary dignitary tort like defamation or false light. But these would have some significant legal hurdles. See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that commenting on an expunged criminal records was not defamation or invasion of privacy because it was the truth. You could try to argue that they are a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). If they're governed by the FCRA, you have some additional legal remedies (like civil penalties/fines) if they don't remove/clarify an expunged record. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to credit reporting agencies, like Experian & Equifax but also covers companies that compile and sell information for background checks. This includes criminal records. See the Federal Trade Commission’s Advisory Opinion to LeBlanc (06-09-98). But . . . this website is operating in a gray area that appears to comply with the law. The FCRA only applies to consumer reporting agencies, which are defined as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) Because they’re not charging money or a fee to access the reports and they’re not a nonprofit cooperative, they probably do not meet the definition of a CRA. Bottom-line is that you're best option is to give them the expungement documents once you obtain them.

It's true that you can't prove what was in the envelope. But assuming this ends in small claims court or some sort of collections action lets play out how it works. The company is going to claim that they never got notice of cancellation. They will plead ignorance so they won't have any evidence of what you didn't send. That's obvious, but more on this later. You are going to have a trove of evidence. The emails you sent, the webforms you filled out, the voicemails you left. And finally, the letters that you sent. Let's think about the weight of evidence! At the very least you can ask them, if they claim they didn't get a cancellation from you, what did they get in that certified envelope from you? They'll need to produce whatever was in the envelope. Unless they claim that it was empty. At this point the judge will see exactly what is going on and you won't need to prove what was in the envelope. Legally, the way this works is covered by Rule 901. (a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. (b) Examples. The following are examples only — not a complete list — of evidence that satisfies the requirement (1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be. It's that last piece that matters here. You will take the stand and testify that the letter you brought to court is a true copy of the letter in the envelope.

Illegal to renew cat's urinary food prescription if no yearly examination in WA State, USA? My friend's cat had emergency bladder stone surgery a couple of years ago. They put the cat on prescription urinary food my friend ordered online. The vet is refusing to renew the prescription because my friend hasn't brought cat in to see the doctor in the past year. My friend says the vet is claiming it would be illegal to renew the prescription without seeing the cat. Is this true?

This is true. Ch. 246-933-200 WAC (1)(b)(i) requires that the veterinarian Has examined the animal(s) within the last year, or sooner if medically appropriate in order to have a veterinary-client-patient relationship. Without that relationship, they cannot prescribe medication for an animal, because A veterinarian shall use or prescribe drugs only within the context of a veterinary-client-patient relationship.

There are prescription basic staple foods that must be in the prescribing formulary with restricted variety, which may be free or reimbursed, depending on your place of residence and circumstances. If the government did reimburse the cost difference, it would be very likely be on the information section of Coeliac UK. As no mention of such reimbursements can be found, it is likely what you have heard is false. In some countries, but not the United Kingdom, medical expenses are tax deductible. This does not mean the government reimburses the cost of medical expenses, but that medical expenses reduces the taxable income based on which a tax rate is determined and applied. Some jurisdictions (e.g. Canada) do accept the difference between gluten-free food and "normal" food as part of medical expenses, provided that documentations are meticulously available. In other jurisdictions (e.g. Switzerland), a lumpsum deduction is available to compensate.

Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.

Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred.

IANAL, and I don't live in America, but some of this depends on their intent. If they gave the drugs away by mistake, they probably have not broken any laws. If they were given away deliberately (and you would need to prove this – which might be hard) then yes, he has broken laws. Either way, I expect you have a right to compensation (i.e. $900) from the physician to "make you whole again." If required necessary you could file for that in your local small claims court: The physician will either come to the party pretty quickly and sort it out, or the court will award you the money you need to buy the replacement meds. (But you will need to evidence the replacement cost, for a start....)

You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes?

Parents have a legal obligation to care for their minor children: it is illegal to harm a child through action or inaction. State law and associated welfare programs are complex: you can start here. If surgery is medically necessary, her insurance should cover it. If her parent do not have medical insurance, they still have the obligation of care; though various governmental programs may alleviate the problem, such as the state medical assistance program. The parents may therefore be in violation of the law, and anyone may report this to DSHS (specifically through Child Protective Services). This obligation terminates when the child turns 18 (assuming that someone does not petition for adult guardianship). Legislation is not crystal clear as far as what constitutes "injury of a child ...under circumstances which cause harm to the child's health". CPS has no authority to compel parents to pay for a medical treatment, but they can go to the courts on behalf of the child. At that point, it's hard to say what the court would order. For example, if the parents are capable of providing medical insurance and just willfully chose to not cover their child, the court could order them to get insurance. It is virtually guaranteed that the courts would not order the immediate amputation of the child's feet, and there would be no legal basis for ordering the parents to pay for the procedure in a decade, after the child is an adult. However, if you are suggesting that there is an immediate treatment (which the parents have opted to not provide, hence the prospects of later amputation), then it is reasonably likely that the courts would order the parents to provide for the treatment (if it would be possible for them; otherwise, the state may intervene and provide for the treatment).

"Medical lawyer" is really the wrong focus, this is an issue of civil rights. The question would be, is it a violation of your civil rights to prevent you from taking your baby home; is it legal for the federal government to investigate people who refuse to take a covid test? You can take the question along with pertinent evidence to a civil rights attorney. To pick a non-random hospital's web page, they note that "Any person having surgery or a procedure, including birth, at a Texas Health hospital will be tested for COVID-19 to provide appropriate care for the patient, and for the protection of visitors and the care team", and "you will need to be tested at admission to help safeguard you and the care team". In answer to the question whether you can decline testing, they say "Testing is recommended to promote the health of you and your baby. Patients who have COVID-19 can have a weakened immune system and may have inflammatory symptoms that can compromise healing. We encourage you to speak with your provider about the best decision for you", which doesn't explicitly say "No you may not", nor "Yes, you may". However, they cannot literally force you to take the test: at most, they can refuse to treat you. In answer to the question "Will I be separated from my baby if I test positive for COVID-19?", they say "Texas Health will follow guidelines from the American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of OB/GYN and the Centers for Disease Control for how to keep you and your baby safe during your hospital stay. Ultimately, any decisions about care for you and your baby will be between you and your provider, based on what is best for you both". This is also not crystal clear. There are three primary legal issues, putting a worst spin on their policy. They say up front that you will be tested prior to admission: the question is whether you can decline to take the test but force them to admit you. Now we are closer to the realm of a medical negligence attorney – they can refuse to treat you, but that might leave them liable. The second question is whether they can temporarily take the infant away, against the mother's wishes (for example, hold the infant in a separate facility while the mother is in the hospital). The third question is whether they have direct authority to take the infant away when you leave the hospital. The third question gets a plain and simple no. The Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Services has some authority in such a matter, but taking a child requires an investigation and a court order.

Is it legal to coerce employees into undergoing lie detector tests? Someone has been stealing from my girlfriend's workplace (not her) and they're forcing everyone there to undergo a lie detector test or lose their jobs. Since such tests don't actually work, is this even legal? I have done some research but I can't get a straight answer under UK law, as the web mostly mentions US law.

From Private Investigators UK: Polygraph testing is 100 per cent, totally, completely legal in the United Kingdom. However, there are a few conditions. The person undergoing the polygraph exam must be cooperative and willing to take the polygraph. No one can be forced to take one. The person administering the polygraph test must be qualified to do so and must hold a relevant degree and license. These results however, are inadmissible in a court of law. This is because there is a fair chance of the results of a polygraph being inaccurate. Since physiological responses are measured, it is possible that the stress of the situation may cause the examinee to register many false positives. As the results are inadmissible in a court, I think there would be reasonable grounds to claim unfair dismissal if she were sacked because of the test's results.

This doesn't sound like fraud (against you, at least), but it does sound like an unfair or deceptive trade practice, which is outlawed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and perhaps the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, both of which prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. I don't know about Pennsylvania, but the FTC has on many occasions taken action against companies for engaging in just this kind of behavior. To find out whether you would be able to take action against the other company, you'd want to find a good competition lawyer in Pennsylvania. For some more basic background on the FTC's rules, check out this primer.

There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit.

I can’t think of any laws against pretending to commit a crime, per se. For example, undercover police officers often pretend to buy or sell illicit goods, to see who will take them up on the offer. However, pretending to commit some crimes could be a crime. if you intentionally pretend to be violent or unstable, and this “puts another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact,” that could be common assault.

Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.

The fact that it is possible to engage in fraud, doesn't mean that it is impossible to prove something. Usually, in a civil action, testimony that a business record says something and that it was not falsified is sufficient to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard (i.e. to establish to the satisfaction of a judge or jury that it is more likely that something is true than it is that it isn't true). It is easy to forge checks too (and hard to prove that a signature is fake), but that doesn't mean that you can't prove payment by check or that negotiable instruments are useless.

In the US, there are separate regulations pertaining to different forms of discrimination for employment, thus there is no one-size answer. For sex, 29 CFR 1604.7 states: A pre-employment inquiry may ask “Male........., Female.........”; or “Mr. Mrs. Miss,” provided that the inquiry is made in good faith for a nondiscriminatory purpose. Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. Let us take it for granted that sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification for an academic position. Thus the question is lawful only if there is a legal underlying interest. Suppose the question were "As a man, would you be able to able to effectively empathize with your nursing students?": this does not serve a legally allowed purpose, and only serves to indirectly restate a sexually discriminatory premise. This University of New Hampshire guidelines pages summarizes the basic interview prohibitions succinctly. Notice that the language of the regulation is stated purely in terms of the existence of such an inquiry – it does not restrict such inquiries "as made by the CEO", or "as made by the hiring committee". It simply says that such an inquiry is not to exist. It is thus the university's obligation to assure that all administrators, faculty members, graduate students, undergraduates, staff members, and members of the general public who are allowed to participate in pre-hiring interviews know what kinds of questions are legal versus illegal.

I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.

Overriding offered contract acceptance methods with express written declaration Bob would rather face the consequences of trespassing than pay for a license to occupy a privately owned parking spot. He pulls into the lot which says “by parking here you agree to pay £10/hour. Bob wishes to reject this offer to buy a license and so park his car without any license, ie as a trespasser. He makes this clear by displaying a sign in his windshield or by donning a bumper sticker that reads “I AM TRESPASSING,” or perhaps simply “TRESPASSER”. Has Bob accepted or rejected the proprietor’s contract?

The offeror has stipulated that acceptance is to be by conduct As explained in another answer, given that the offeror has stipulated that parking in the lot will constitute acceptance, and given that the offeror is master of the offer, then the question is whether the act of parking in the lot constitutes acceptance of the contract. I outlined the test in that other answer and will only summarize here: the question becomes "whether the offeror, acting reasonably, would understand that the offeree was assenting to the terms proposed." This is acceptance by conduct. This is an objective inquiry focusing on how the actions would be understood to a reasonable observer, not an inquiry into the actual states of mind of the offeror or offeree. An example of the above law being applied can be found in University of Edinburgh v. Onifade, 2005 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 63: The pursuers' notice made it plain that their position was that anyone who parked on their property without a permit would have to pay them a fee of £30 per day on that account. The defender, by parking his vehicle on their property without a permit, made it plain that he accepted that position. He signified his acceptance by his conduct in so doing. It is nothing to the purpose for him to maintain that he did not intend to pay because he considered that the pursuers were not entitled to make the charge specified. 'The judicial task is not to discover the actual intentions of each party; it is to decide what each was reasonably entitled to conclude from the attitude of the other.' See also Imperial Parking Canada Corporation v. Toronto (City), 2007 ONCA 649. The signs said: Impark is by this sign offering space for public parking. You accept this offer by parking on this lot. Do not park on this lot if you do not agree to these terms and conditions … If you park and do not display a valid ticket or pass the rate is $69.55 per day or portion thereof. The judge found: the signs posted on Impark’s lots expressly state that Impark consents to the parking of cars without payment in advance and held that the fees that Impark collects are sums owing to it in contract rather than damages for trespass In another parking lot example, Imperial Parking Ltd. v. Canada, 2000 CanLII 15612 (FCA), the Federal Court of Appeal said: In my view, the unequivocal conduct which constitutes acceptance of the appellant's offer to provide a parking space occurs when the driver leaves the lot after parking his or her vehicle. This interpretation is reinforced by the text of the large sign posed at the entrance to the appellant's lot. That is the point in time in which an owner can be deemed to have accepted the appellant's offer. Any time before that moment, a driver can demonstrate his rejection of the appellant's offer by driving away. Those who purchase a ticket must be deemed to have accepted the appellant"s contractual terms upon leaving their parked vehicle in the appellant's lot. As for those who park their vehicles but fail to pay, the act of non-payment is more consistent with the intention to breach a contract than a refusal to enter into one. Bob's sign/note/sticker is not likely an effective rejection of the offer I understand you to be asking whether Bob's sign constitutes rejection of the offer such that Bob's subsequent conduct no longer would be considered acceptance of the contract. A rejection would terminate the offer, such that it can no longer be accepted. However, rejection must be communicated to the offeror (Chitty on Contracts, § 4-124). In examples where apparent acceptance by conduct is negated by evidence of contrary intention, the offeror was in a position to be aware of the rejector's manifest expression of that contrary intention (see examples in Chitty on Contracts, § 4-035).

While it is true that cash is legal tender, this can still be overridden by mutual agreement (i.e. in a contract). So the legal tender status only matters if payment methods were not agreed upon before entering into an agreement. In other words: If a restaurant lets you eat without telling you they do not accept cash, they will have to accept cash. However, if they explicitly tell you they only accept card payments, they can insist on this later. This applies in both the United States, in Germany, and in Canada (see e.g. It may be legal tender, but more businesses are snubbing cash). So to address your points: As I understand the legality would work something like this: 1) I accept the the contract where I agree to pay with card in exchange for food Yes - however, in accepting the contract you also accept that the restaurant is "cashless" (assuming the restaurant clearly tells you so, e.g. by putting up a sign or by saying it in person). I attempt to fulfill the contract to the best of my ability, but am prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond my control Yes. Since you attempted to fulfill the contract, you did not commit the crime of theft (which requires intention not to pay). However, you still owe what you promised when entering into the agreement, which is to pay with a card. At this point I owe the restaurant the money, but since the original transaction failed, this is a debt, which I offer to settle with legal tender No. As explained above, if the agreement stipulates a specific payment method, this generally overrides the "legal tender" aspect. In short: You agreed to pay with a card, so you are required to pay with a card. If you cannot pay with a card, you have not fulfilled your part of the agreement. It is is arguable that it is not your fault, but this does not change your obligation. Now you must either negotiate a suitable alternative (cash, cheque, golden watch...), or come back to pay later with a card. Also, the business may be able to charge you additional costs, such as extra accounting work or interest because of your non-standard payment - that would depend on the details.

The date and location of the signature merely documents when/where the signature was made, and doesn't have a lot of legal significance for ordinary contracts. This information is probably only useful if you need to argue that you could't have signed the contract because you weren't in that town on that day. Despite this small lapse your contract is perfectly valid, in particular you are required to make any payments that are part of this contract. It doesn't make sense to get this corrected. However, if any actual information (for example, you address) changed, then you should notify the gym to update the information.

Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.

One possible reading of this clause is: The tenant is required to pay for the preparation of a forfeiture notice, even if ("notwithstanding that") the forfeiture doesn't actually happen ("forfeiture is avoided")--but the tenant doesn't have to pay for the notice if the forfeiture doesn't happen for the following reason ("avoided otherwise than by"): because the court said so ("by relief granted by the court"). In other words: if the Court says the forfeiture notice is bogus, the tenant doesn't have to pay for it. Otherwise, he or she does.

Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood.

Portable signs are legal and you have to obey then. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/27/section/65 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/482498/2-11.pdf

You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not.

Liability of products that are inherently risky (e.g. skateboard) How do manufacturers of products that necessarily imply risk deal with liability? Are they only liable if the product malfunctions in an unexpected and unpredictable way (e.g., the board breaks)? Does liability only apply when a product injures a user, but not when the users injures themselves using a product where harm cannot be excluded? Can they absolve themselves of liability by simply warning the user about risks?

united-states Theories Of Product Liability In Tort There are three basic theories of product liability in tort (setting aside breach of warranty claims) under state law in most U.S. states. Defective manufacturing. In this theory, there was a flaw in making the product that caused it not to conform to an otherwise good design, causing harm to the claimant. For example, if a fire alarm is designed to have a trigger that actives at a certain temperature, but the noise maker in the alarm melts and becomes inoperative at a temperature below the trigger temperature because the manufacturer uses plastic instead of the design requirement of metal for a part because of a temporary shortage of that metal, the manufacturer is liable for harm that results from the fire alarm's failure to activate at the trigger temperature. Defective design. In this theory, there was a flaw in the design of the product and that flaw caused harm to the claim and would have done so even if the product was perfectly manufactured consistently with the design. What constitutes a defective design? A company's liability for a design defect occurs when there was a foreseeable risk posed by the product when the product was manufactured as intended and used for its intended purposes. In many states, plaintiffs also have to show that the risk could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design, which was: Feasible, in other words, the manufacturer had the ability to produce it; Economically feasible, in other words, it would not cost too much to make the product with the modification; and Not in opposition to the product's intended purpose, in other words, the product would still perform the function for which it was created. (Source) For example, if a whiskey distilling vat generates high internal pressures that could cause it to explode if not alleviated, and the manufacturer does not include a pressure release valve in the design to prevent that explosion, the manufacturer would be liable for the harm caused by an explosion that occurs because there is not a pressure release valve in the design making it defective. Also, failure to comply with a regulatory standard intended to enhance safety in a design when that non-compliance causes harm (e.g. designing a car without seat belts), may be a design defect as a matter of law. Likewise, failure to comply with widely recognized non-legally adopted design standards in an industry intended to enhance safety in designs of particular kinds of products, when that non-compliance causes harm, will usually constitute open and shut proof of a design defect without further proof or analysis. Failure to warn. In this theory, the design of the product presents risks of harm to the user that are not obvious, which would be mitigated or eliminated if the user was given an adequate warming of the risk and followed that warning. For example, while the risk of harm from a knife is obvious and does not trigger a duty to warn, if a knife is made from a material that creates a toxic cloud of chlorine gas when exposed to bleach, the maker of a knife with this non-obvious risk needs to adequately warn potential users of the knife of the importance of not exposing it to bleach or the maker of the knife will have liability for bleach related harms to users that occur. Observations Product liability in tort is "strict" in the sense that there can be liability even if the manufacturer was not negligent. For example, in a defective manufacturing case, even if the manufacturer had the best quality control system in the world, if one item in a billion is defectively manufactured and causes harm as a result, the manufacturer is still liable. Similarly, in a defective design case, it is not a defense that a reasonable product designer took reasonable care to identify defects (e.g. holding brain storming sessions and reading any relevant studies) that didn't actually reveal the potential problem, if the design defect was foreseeable but the designer just didn't think of it anyway. And, in a failure to warn case, there can be liability even if the manufacturer was "reasonable" in the sense of providing the warnings customarily used by others in the industry but still fails to warn of a non-obvious risk that causes harm. Application Are they only liable if the product malfunctions in an unexpected and unpredictable way (e.g., the board breaks)? Not exactly. But if the product is causes harm while carrying out its intended purpose, that isn't a malfunction or defect. A gun isn't defective because it can be used to intentionally kill someone or commit suicide. Does liability only apply when a product injures a user, but not when the users injures themselves using a product where harm cannot be excluded? There is not liability if the user is not injured. If the user injures themselves using the product for the intended purpose this is also not a product liability issue unless the harm could have been avoided with a design change or warning of a non-obvious risk. Can they absolve themselves of liability by simply warning the user about risks? If a product has a design defect, merely warning a user of the design defect will usually not relieve the manufacturer from liability. For example, stating that the whiskey vat doesn't have a pressure relief valve and could explode, when it could have been designed with them with a $2 manufacturing cost change, won't relieve the manufacturer from liability if someone is harmed by the vat exploding because it doesn't have a pressure relief valve. In reality, there are gray areas where an alleged design defect that can be fully mitigated with a warning is really a design defect, but that's why we have judges, juries, and expert witnesses to resolve close cases where there are arguments to be made either way. A skateboard does have risks even when used for its intended purpose, most of which are obvious, but some of which (e.g. getting clothing entangled in a wheel) might not be. When there is no feasible way to eliminate the risks that are present, and warnings are provided when there are non-obvious risks, then there is no liability on the part of the manufacturer of the skateboard.

united-states The argument you are making, restated in legal terms, is roughly as follows: Users have a duty to not reuse passwords. When a user reuses a password, and their password is subsequently stolen and used to fraudulently access the plaintiff's system, that password reuse becomes the proximate cause of the plaintiff's business injury. Therefore, our storage of plaintext passwords cannot be the proximate cause, and so we cannot be liable. This argument is mostly wrong. Leaving aside the fact that you're going to have a tough time convincing a jury of #1, a tort may have more than one proximate cause. Both the password reuse and the plaintext storage were but-for causes of the injury (i.e. if either had not happened, then the injury would not have happened). The injury was foreseeable, because it is well known in the security industry that many users in fact do reuse their passwords, professional advice notwithstanding. In most US states, that's enough to establish proximate cause. In the minority of states using the "direct causation" test, you might be able to characterize the user's password reuse as an intervening cause, and thereby avoid liability. However, there are other elements of tort law which must be established aside from proximate cause, and so by itself this does not resolve the question of liability. Other defenses might be applicable; for example, the terms of service might contain an indemnification agreement, which (if upheld) would make the user(s) responsible. The defendant might also argue that there is no duty of care, that it was not breached, or that the injury was or should have been de minimis (i.e. that the plaintiff should have taken greater care to prevent damages arising from account hijacking).

If you have a contract with another party, you can in principle sue them for damages if they breach the contract. Since you mentioned Stackoverflow, we would look at that contract, here. There is a bunch of stuff you can't do, and a bunch of stuff you can do. One thing that you will note is that their liability is highly limited (big print §9 Limitation of Liability). Also note in §4: Stack Overflow reserves the right to refuse, suspend or terminate your access to the public Network if it determines, in its sole discretion, that you have in any way violated these Public Network Terms or are otherwise ineligible to access or use the Network or Services. If your actions are determined by us to violate these Public Network Terms, Stack Overflow may, in its sole discretion, try to remediate that violation by working with you individually, but is under no obligation to do so, and if any such remediation efforts are unsuccessful (in Stack Overflow’s sole discretion), then Stack Overflow may revoke your rights to the Network. So they get to ban you, if they decided that your actions warrant. If you try to sue them, they will win because of this clause.

The EULA is in most jurisdictions a legally binding contract; there is plenty of case law that supports this. You can only be liable under a contract for breaching its terms and only to the extent that the other party suffers harm from that breach. Clearly, if you haven't read the terms then you are greatly increasing the chance that you will inadvertently breach them but not reading them would not, of itself, be a breach and I can't see what harm could flow anyway.

In the US, due to free speech protections (i.e. the first amendment), it seems that the majority of lawsuits for negligent publication fail. It's worth noting that the author might be more liable than the publisher, since the publisher typically isn't expected to have the expertise to catch such errors. More cases and details can be found here. The only case I've found where a publisher was held liable for negligent publication of a textbook is the following. Note that it's somewhat old, and standards for products liability have likely changed since. D. Wallis, "Negligent publishing" Implications for University Publishers: On September 4, 1980, a jury in the U.S. District Court in Springfield, Massachusetts awarded C. Carter $100,000 in her suit against Rand McNally Publishing Company. C. Carter, an eighth grade chemistry student had been severely burned during a chemistry class while attempting an experiment described in a textbook published by Rand McNally. This experiment called for the use of methyl alcohol, a highly inflammable substance. The plaintiff argued, and the jury agreed, that her injuries were caused, in part, by the publishing company's negligent failure to adequately warn students and teachers about the dangerous qualities of these experiments. Rand McNally did not appeal the verdict. This case is of special interest to publishing companies because it is the first time a book had been considered a "product" and the first time products liability theory has been used to impose liability upon a publishing house for an injury caused by technical information contained within a textbook. In this case it's not clear whether the disclaimer was present or not. However, there is nothing magical about a disclaimer that would stop lawsuits from occurring, nor do they automatically protect against liability: The "disclaimer," although it will rarely be effective in shielding the publisher from liability if the court finds that the publisher breached its duty of care to the reader, is more likely to be effective by demonstrating that the publisher did not make any specific guarantees regarding the safety or reliability of the contents of the publication.

Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know.

What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.

First, lets look at the entire section: 4.4 IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN ISRG’S CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATE PRACTICE STATEMENT, LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED “AS-IS” AND ISRG DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY TYPE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING AND WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, IN CONNECTION WITH ANY ISRG SERVICE OR LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATE. BECAUSE LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES ARE ISSUED FREE-OF-CHARGE AS A PUBLIC SERVICE, ISRG CANNOT ACCEPT ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY LOSS, HARM, CLAIM, OR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH CERTIFICATES. ACCORDINGLY, YOU AGREE THAT ISRG WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES, OR RECOVERY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH DAMAGES ARE DIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE, OR COMPENSATORY, EVEN IF ISRG HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. THIS LIMITATION ON LIABILITY APPLIES IRRESPECTIVE OF THE THEORY OF LIABILITY, I.E., WHETHER THE THEORY OF LIABILITY IS BASED UPON CONTRACT, WARRANTY, INDEMNIFICATION, CONTRIBUTION, TORT, EQUITY, STATUTE OR REGULATION, COMMON LAW, OR ANY OTHER SOURCE OF LAW, STANDARD OF CARE, CATEGORY OF CLAIM, NOTION OF FAULT OR RESPONSIBILITY, OR THEORY OF RECOVERY. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THIS DISCLAIMER IS INTENDED TO BE CONSTRUED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. BY WAY OF FURTHER EXPLANATION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE DISCLAIMER, AND WITHOUT WAIVING OR LIMITING THE FOREGOING IN ANY WAY, ISRG DOES NOT MAKE, AND ISRG EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS, ANY WARRANTY REGARDING ITS RIGHT TO USE ANY TECHNOLOGY, INVENTION, TECHNICAL DESIGN, PROCESS, OR BUSINESS METHOD USED IN EITHER ISSUING LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES OR PROVIDING ANY OF ISRG’S SERVICES. YOU AFFIRMATIVELY AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HOLD ISRG RESPONSIBLE IN ANY WAY, OR SEEK INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST ISRG, FOR ANY INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCLUDING PATENT, TRADEMARK, TRADE SECRET, OR COPYRIGHT. The first part that you notice is that in the first section is this sentence: LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED “AS-IS” AND ISRG DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY TYPE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING AND WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, Which basically says that "we won't provide any statement to guarantee that our services/certificates don't infringe on another work, or that they are fit for your particular use". The real point of this indemnification section is in the second paragraph: BECAUSE LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES ARE ISSUED FREE-OF-CHARGE AS A PUBLIC SERVICE, ISRG CANNOT ACCEPT ANY [...] They are too poor to afford lawyers, so they are saying that you must agree not to sue them if you suffer any damages as a result of using the service/certificates. This is not a license granted by you to steal anything you don't expressly give them license to do so. Let's take an example: Let's Encrypt (LE) gives you (Customer) a certificate. That certificate, knowingly or unknowingly, infringes upon a patent owned by XYZ. XYZ sues LE and the judge orders LE to revoke all certificates using XYZ technology. Your site is now shown as unsafe and your payment process doesn't work. You lose $100k in revenue getting your site back up with another certificate company. According to this agreement, you cannot sue LE for that. XYZ could go even further and sue you, even though you unknowingly had been using that patent. Again you can't turn around and sue LE to recover anything XYZ recovers from you (or even the fees you spend to win). What you are not granting to LE is a right to "steal" any technology on any site/system that the certificate or service is used on. This agreement, in its entirety, is between LE and you for the use of LE services/certificates. Even if LE somehow steals from you, this would not indemnify them for that.

What options are there for executor when no close family member is available? What alternatives exist for finding and appointing an executor for one's will/estate for a person with no close family or qualified friend? Are there pros and cons?

Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job).

The agent/landlord responsibility is to ensure that the residents have "quiet enjoyment" of the property during the period it is let. As long as your friend has access to the flat he has that. He can ask, but the agent/landlord have no obligation to provide it. Could your friend appoint someone else to go and get their property? There is no reason why he has to do it in person. He should provide this person with a signed letter of authority (just "I, Joseph Bloggs, hereby authorise John Doe to collect my belongings from 123 Cherry Tree Crescent on my behalf", signed and dated) and also send a copy to the agent. Your friend must have a contract with somebody. If he paid a deposit then it should have been kept in a proper deposit protection scheme, and he should have paperwork to that effect. If that wasn't done, then he can sue the person he has the contract with for (in effect) punitive damages in addition to getting his deposit back. You say your friend was "not the lead tenant", so it sounds like one of the tenants was sub-letting, but its not clear; it may be that this "lead tenant" was just acting as a point of contact for stuff like rent collection. Your friend should have some kind of written tenancy agreement; he can sue the person or company named named on that. If the tenancy was a verbal contract then he can sue the person he handed the deposit to.

Not necessarily The laws of each country will apply to the assets held in that country. In some jurisdictions, inheritance is mandated by law and there is no freedom for a testator to determine who inherits what: Pakistan is one such jurisdiction. In Pakistan, if the deceased is a Muslim, then inheritance proceeds according to Islamic law and the will is irrelevant. If they are not a Muslim, then the law of their domicile jurisdiction applies - so for a resident of say, California, Californian succession law applies including following a will if one exists. South African law recognises freedom of testation (subject to certain limits) so a foreign will will generally be followed.

I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.

You may be interested in a recent New York Times article, "The Lonely Death of George Bell", which described in detail the case of a man who was found dead in his apartment (of natural causes). It took a long time for him to be positively identified, and no near relatives could be located. Affairs were handled by a city official called a "public administrator". Bell's valuable possessions were sold at public auction and the funds added to his estate. Items of no significant value were discarded (a junk removal business was hired to clean out his apartment; a few items were kept by the workers). They did eventually find his will, and at least some of his heirs, so his estate went to them. The public administrator had Bell cremated by a local crematorium, with the ashes stored permanently in their columbarium. The cost was paid out of Bell's estate. If he hadn't had any assets, or hadn't been positively identified, the article mentions that he would have been buried in a "potter's field" at the city's expense.

Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that.

This is going to depend very much on exactly what is in writing. Note that your father could, if he chose, directly leave both the house and the IRA to his partner. If you become the homeowner after your father's death, and the "3-year right to use" and the cost sharing provisions are not in writing, then neither is legally binding. You and the partner may choose to honor your father's wishes, but if he does not put them in the will or another legal document, neither of you is bound. The question says: I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. I do not know of any jurisdiction in which there is a general ban on evicting a senior citizen in all cases. There will be some restrictions no doubt, but they will depend on the local laws. And of course you may not wish to exercise all the legal rights you may have. You would ultimately, have the right as homeowner to evict the partner. I don't what procedures would need to be followed legally -- that will depend on the specific jurisdiction, which the question does not list. As the homeowner, you would be legally responsible for maintaining and paying taxes and other expenses on the house. The partner would be either your tenant or your guest. Once you have title (and that will take some time after your father's death, in all probability) if the "right to use" was never put in writing, you could ask the partner to sign a lease. The terms could be whatever the two of you choose to agree on. If she becomes a tenant under such a lease, she has both legal rights and legal responsibilities, and each of you has the protection of a clear agreement. You would be wise to consult a lawyer to learn exactly what the local law does and does not permit. Your father might well be wise to put his wishes more clearly in writing while he still can.

You were on a performance improvement plan, those often require special requirements of the employee. I'm sorry your mother died, but a year seems like a very long time to take, and your company was very kind to give you that long. I am not a lawyer but I sincerely doubt there is anything actionable here.

Can evidence that 100% proves guilt (but was obtained 100% illegally) sway a jury to convict? Raymond the Rapist raped Dan the Dad's child. Dan takes Raymond to court, but there's 0 evidence, and it's basically a he-said-she-said deal, and there's nothing Dan can do to convict Raymond. So Dan, not caring about what happens to him, takes matters into his own hands, and breaks into Raymond's home, and finds irrefutable evidence of Raymond's crime (e.g. photos on his phone of the incident, etc.). Knowing that it might be inadmissible in court (since there was no warrant or anything), Dan uploads it publicly online and sends it to news media outlets. Now Dan will obviously face some charges I assume. But that aside, regarding the case against Raymond, my main question is: will the evidence be allowed to sway the court? On one hand, evidence that was illegally obtained (such as by a cop without a warrant) is inadmissible in court (if I'm not mistaken). On the other hand, the irrefutable evidence of the crime is out there for the entire public, and the jury can't possibly be asked to ignore it and pretend like Raymond isn't guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. So yeah...what's the answer? Edits: In my example, I used Dan the civilian. But I'd appreciate it if you could address the case that Rob the Rogue Cop also ignores the law to just obtain the evidence and whistleblow it to the public. Imagine the evidence is literally an explicit video of Randy raping the child. Basically, as close to irrefutable as possible. Imagine the case becomes extremely high profile due to widespread media coverage (because it's such a horrible story that was sent to news media outlets, or because Raymond is very famous). Basically, it's impossible to find relevant jurors/judges unless they live under rocks.

The 4th Amendment exclusionary rule applies automatically in cases where law enforcement obtains evidence illegally (subject to exceptions not applicable here). In its 1920 decision in Burdeau vs. McDowell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 4th amendment is not applicable to searches by private parties, even when such searches are clearly illegal. This rule doesn't apply, however, if the private citizens was acting as an agent of the government. A more recent case reaffirming and clarifying Burdeau is United States v. Jacobsen 466 U.S. 109 (1984) in which a private courier finds drugs in a package and shows it to police who test the contents (the search was upheld as valid). If the defendant makes that argument, the defendant seeking to exclude the evidence bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the private citizen acted as an agent of the government. U.S. v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1987). Another case discussed here notes that: As it relates to computer files, states still differ on how broad the application of the Private Search Doctrine runs, but all seem to agree that if a document or photo has been opened by a private party, an officer can review that file or photo without a warrant. In People v. Wilson, 56 Cal. App. 5th 128 (2020), police opened 4 images they received from NCMEC (the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) who received the images in a CyberTip from Google. Neither NCMEC nor Google had opened these images in this case, but all 4 images had been reviewed by Google in the past and identified previously as child porn by their matching hash values. So here, the officer’s actions—consisting of opening the electronic files submitted to it by NCMEC and viewing the four images attached to Google’s Cybertip—did not exactly replicate Google’s private actions. The Wilson court set out to determine the degree to which the officer’s additional invasion of Wilson’s privacy exceeded the scope of Google’s private search (the search of his emails against known hash values). Before the officer even received Wilson’s photographs, Google had already reviewed identical images in the past; scanned all of Wilson’s electronic communications to search for content with matching hash values; flagged four of Wilson’s images as matching images Google had previously observed; classified the matching images as depictions of prepubescent minors engaged in sexual acts; forwarded all four images to NCMEC as part of a Cybertip report; and terminated Wilson’s account. The Jacobsen case above explained that, “[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.” Id. at 117. Because Google’s actions already frustrated any expectation of privacy Wilson possessed in the four photographs at issue, no privacy interest remained in the four images, so no expectation of privacy was violated. Wilson at 219. Because the assigned hash values, or “digital fingerprints,” are representative of the contents depicted in the photographs themselves, the government gained no new material information by viewing the images. The agent merely confirmed Google’s report that Wilson uploaded content constituting apparent child pornography. Id. at 220. When someone who is not law enforcement obtains evidence illegally, the court sometimes engages in a non-constitutional discretionary balancing test to determine if the evidence is admissible. Sometimes it comes in, sometimes it doesn't. I'll find a case setting forth the exact test if I have time. The fact that evidence is "irrefutable" (not that there is any such thing) and widely publicly known is absolutely irrelevant. The fact that a juror knows it would be grounds for excusing the juror for cause and for moving the venue of the trial where they can find enough jurors who aren't familiar with the evidence if they can't manage it in the usual venue.

No. A federal court may not vacate the conviction which the state court declined to vacate under these circumstances. On March 22, 2009, a jury found Luis Villavicencio‐Serna guilty of first‐degree murder of Armando Huerta Jr. Scant physical evidence linked him to the charge. The conviction instead was largely based on testimony from three of his friends, all of whom later recanted. Villavicencio‐Serna exhausted his state‐court appeals and then sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Throughout these proceedings, he consistently has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He emphasizes the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the murder, and he suggests that several factors - inconsistencies between the testimonies of his three friends, their subsequent recantations, and the interrogation tactics used by the police—reveal that the police pressured his friends to implicate him. Finally, he offers an alternative theory that links another group to the murder. In the face of these arguments, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld his conviction. The [federal] district court, applying the double‐layered deference required by section 2254(d), concluded that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable, and so it refused to issue the writ. See Villavicencio‐Serna v. Melvin, No. 17 C 5442, 2019 WL 2548688 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2019). Although we sympathize with the district court’s observation that “the lack of any physical evidence in this case is troubling,” we too conclude that Villavicencio‐Serna has not shown enough to entitle him to issuance of the writ. We therefore affirm.

In the United States, it does not matter how you save any evidence; the other side will essentially always be permitted to question its authenticity. Even if they don't question it, a judge or jury would still be free to do so. That said, the standard means of saving this kind of evidence would be to make a screengrab or print it to PDF, and to attach that to an affidavit in which you swear that the image is an authentic representation of the content of the web page as of whatever date and time. If you want something that is harder to question, you could also ask some independent third party to do so. There are, for instance, archiving services like archive.org and perma.cc that will copy a page and store it indefinitely, largely removing the question of whether you might have manipulated the page in any way.

First off, the concept of "the whole truth" is legally undefined. It cannot possibly mean "everything that you know that is connected to this question", since otherwise a witness would be required to drone on and on for hours. Second, there is no way to determine what percentage of witnesses are not "telling the whole truth". We can be fairly certain that when a guilty accused takes the stand, there is a good chance that he is not telling the whole truth, and the oath does not compel you to testify against yourself. Even if there was some clear legal definition of "the whole truth", there is typically no way to know what the actual facts are, to know if a witness failed to say something that was part of "the whole truth". The promise part of the oath is irrelevant, that is, the requirement is not to "keep your promise", it is to not perjure yourself. Every jurisdiction in the US has a statute that makes it a crime to commit perjury. At the federal level, the law is 18 USC 1621, which applies to anyone who has "taken an oath" promising to testify truly, and punishes the witness if he "willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true". The landmark ruling Bronston v. US, 409 US 352 clarified the obligation of witnesses vs. the duty of interrogators, when it comes to not providing information desired by the interrogator. The court ruled that the perjury statutes does not apply to a witness's answer that is literally true, but unresponsive, even assuming the witness intends to mislead his questioner by the answer, and even assuming the answer is arguably "false by negative implication." A perjury prosecution is not, in our adversary system, the primary safeguard against errant testimony; given the incongruity of an unresponsive answer, it is the questioner's burden to frame his interrogation acutely to elicit the precise information he seeks. This was a classical "not the whole truth" case. The exchange was as follows, where the accused was testifying in bankruptcy proceedings: Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever? A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich. The fact is that Bronston used to have a personal account in a Swiss Bank, which he did not reveal. His answer could be considered misleading because he only answered part of the question, as it pertained to the company (but not him personally). The crux of the court's ruling is that it is the responsibility of the attorney conducting the interrogation to notice that he did not answer the question asked, and to insist on a response that also covers personal accounts. This established the "literal truth" doctrine for perjury conviction: if what you say is literally true, the testimony is not perjurous. As a later court (DeZarn) commented, because a nonresponsive answer, by its nature, requires speculation by the fact-finder as to what the answer “implies”, there cannot be a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer is untruthful. Clinton successfully relied on this defense with respect to certain of his literally-true testimony. One tweak on this is US v. DeZarn, 157 F3d 1042, where a literal-truth defense was set forth but rejected by the court. The accused was asked about a party that was allegedly a fundraising event. His testimony was that it wasn't a fundraising event for the governor (in fact it was), and his defense came down to the fact that the prosecutor asked about a party in 1991, had earlier referred to it as a "Preakness Party" (which the governor had held previously), and asked about fundraising "at that activity". DeZarn's claim was that he thought the prosecutor was asking about a party in 1990 (which was a "Preakness Party", with no fundraising). The prosecutor was in error in previously calling it a "Preakness Party", but was correct in identifying that there was a party (with fundraising) at the governor's house, in 1991 time. The wording of DeZarn's testimony was, simply "I don't know... No... No": these are responses that have no literal truth value taken on their own, and can be judged only in relation to what question was asked (whereas Bronston's testimony was literally true on its own). DeZarn's conviction was upheld because he could not have been confused about which party was being referred to, and what the actual question was; moreover, in saying just "No", he gave no sign that his response was a partial answer to the question. The DeZarn court did not clarify matters, leaving it at the conclusion that a perjury inquiry which focuses only upon the precision of the question and ignores what the Defendant knew about the subject matter of the question at the time it was asked, misses the very point of perjury: that is, the Defendant's intent to testify falsely and, thereby, mislead his interrogators. This does not clearly distinguish DeZarn from Bronston, but that could be remedied by a more precise theory of the linguistic relationship between the question(s) asked and the literal answer – Bronston said enough that a reasonable person could detect that only part of the question was answered, whereas the testimony "No" gives no overt sign that the testifier had privately re-written the question to be something like "Was there fundraising at a Preakness Party in 1991", as opposed to "at that activity". The court relied on a subjective "sniff test" for distinguishing responsive from non-responsive testimony, so I would say that they simply did not draw the bright lines that could have been drawn (which would be based on better distinguishing "implies" versus "asserts").

The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.

In the US this is generally governed by state law: RCW 4.24.350 in Washington state. The criminal jury is not empowered to make such a decision, but a separate civil trial for malicious prosecution would be possible. Plaintif (ex defedant) would have to prove that the action was instituted with knowledge that the same was false, and unfounded, malicious and without probable cause in the filing of such action, or that the same was filed as a part of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by filing an action known to be false and unfounded The basis for the lawsuit would be the objective facts that prove that the prosecution was false and malicious, and not the fact of acquittal or the subjective opinion of a juror.

I think you're referring to this image: This is the prosecutor pointing the AR-15 at the jury. Evidence, including guns, is allowed in the courtroom, but the prosecutor was widely criticized for his dramatic antics: pointing it directly at the jury, with his finger on the trigger (the rifle should have been checked for being empty, but not having your finger on the trigger unless you intend to shoot, no matter what, is elementary gun safety).

Truth is a defense to defamation Bob must prove the truth of his statement if Rob sues - there is a reverse onus for this defense. Because this is a civil trial the burden is balance of probabilities. Provided Bob can prove Rob stole his bike he will win. A conviction for doing so is pretty good (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence. Absent that, Bob would need other evidence. Of course, if Bob has said that Rob was convicted of stealing the bike, he’s going to lose.

What if a previous US President was found ineligible to be President? Purely a hypothetical question: What if a previous US President was found ineligible to be President? Lets say we found Obama's "real" birth certificate and he was not born in the US. What would happen? Are there any provisions for this? Would laws be invalidated? Supreme Court justices be removed? Would he be subject to some sort or prosecution? What about treaties signed? Would we remove him from "history" and say the Vice President was elected (I doubt that, as he wasnt sworn in)? As I said, purely hypothetical.

What would happen? Nothing. The Courts would deem it to be a political question that was decisively and conclusively resolved when Congress ratified the electoral vote and the President was sworn in. To the extent that there was a possibility of challenging it, this would be considered untimely not later than the end of the President's term.

The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument.

No. There are few if any checks on any President for any Pardons issued (a general Impeachment may be the only check but there has never been a strong call for impeachment for a pardon.). Further more, the protection against Double Jeopardy is in effect meaning future Presidents cannot prosecute the pardon recipient for any crimes that were pardoned by a previous president, though they may prosecute any future criminal incidents perpetrated by the pardoned person that are not related to the events surrounding the pardoned crime.

The answer is as simple as the fact that the President of the US is a civilian and citizen, and keeps his/her full rights to free speech and free press as guaranteed under the First Amendment. The military necessity exception is a somewhat surprising exception to the general proposition that you have a protected right to express any viewpoint whatsoever, but also is not relevant to POTUS who is not subject to UCMJ. Just as a plain old citizen has the unfettered right to express ridiculous and fundamentally dangerous ideas, news media have the unfettered right to express ridiculous and fundamentally dangerous ideas, as do politicians including POTUS. Plain old citizens can be "punished" for their views by shunning, news media can be "punished" by customers unsubscribing, and politicians can be "punished" for their views by being voted out of office, or not being voted in. That is the only legal limit on expression of viewpoint possible in the US.

SHORT ANSWER Suppose a President can see that such a vote is coming and will pass, shortly before an election. Can that President resign just before the vote in order to effectively avoid the disqualification penalty? Probably yes. But, there is no historical precedent for this happening. Nixon resigned before the House voted to impeach him, not midway into the impeachment proceedings. Neither Andrew Jackson nor Bill Clinton resigned prior to not being convicted on the basis of a U.S. House impeachment. Several federal judges and one cabinet official, however, have resigned midway through impeachment proceedings prior to being convicted, and in those cases, the case was dismissed and no judgment was entered by the U.S. Senate, so they were not disqualified from holding future federal public offices. LONG ANSWER Relevant Constitutional Language The pertinent provisions of the U.S. Constitution include the following: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7: 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 7: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Article II, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Analysis The key language is in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution which states in the pertinent part that: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States[.] This means that a President who is impeached by the House and convicted by the U.S. Senate may be prohibited from holding any federal office from President to dogcatcher in the future. But, this can only be done in a "judgment" of the U.S. Senate in connection with an impeachment based upon a conviction in the U.S. Senate following a House impeachment, which has never happened. The history of the impeachment language and the limitation to removals from office, suggest that only a person who is current serving in office may be impeached. Otherwise, the proceeding would be invalid as moot, and would be dismissed (as it has been in the case of many judges who have resigned after investigations are initiated or after a House impeaches but prior to a conviction of impeachment). A U.S. Senate ruling that someone is disqualified from holding future office can only be entered in a judgment of conviction for impeachment, so cannot apply to a past President. If this were done it would probably be an invalid "Bill of Attainder" or "Ex Post Facto" law. See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"). And, the U.S. Senate can't pass a law unilaterally, or enter a judgment convicting someone on an impeachment unless the House initiates the proceeding. There is no precedent concerning whether if someone who was convicted by the U.S. Senate and removed from office based upon an impeachment initiated by the U.S. House, in which the judgment did not disqualify the person impeachment from holding future federal public offices, the U.S. Senate could amend its judgment later on to also disqualify the person so removed from office from holding further public office. I suspect that if the question were presented that the federal courts would hold that the amendment of the impeachment judgment was not valid because the word "judgment" implies an immediate ruling upon a case and not a perpetual right to hold the person subject to the judgment in limbo regarding the consequences of his impeachment conviction.

The consequences for the US are perhaps better addressed at Politics; if you're really interested in those consequences, you can re-post this question there. For the police officer shooting a diplomat, the officer may be charged under state law, whatever is normal for an incident of this type; it doesn't matter whether the person is a US citizen or a diplomat or any other kind of alien, regardless of immigration status or lack thereof. If the person is a diplomat, however, the officer is also liable to be prosecuted under federal law, namely 18 USC 1116, which makes it a crime to kill, among others, a "foreign official"; the definition of that term includes any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. The characterization of the response "just been revoked" as "clearly legal" is inaccurate; a police officer has no power to revoke diplomatic immunity. In fact, only the diplomat's own country can waive this immunity. The United States cannot do so; it can only expel the diplomat.

Your interpretation is correct. The constitution says that judges stay in office "until and unless they are impeached." That means that congress cannot impose a time limit on any judge's term of office. If it did so, it would be contrary to the constitution. The only grounds for removal are those to do with misbehavior. Therefore, judges have life tenure.

Most secret service details are protection for heads of government/state and thus their details would be afforded Sovereign Immunity (Such as POTUS, VPOTUS, and First and Second Families) OR Diplomatic Immunity (visiting dignitaries and leaders of other nations). Typically there are more diplomatic ways to handle the cases in the latter. In the former case, thus far, it has not been handled. During visits, the traditional Executives and Families are usually closely guarded by the Service with additional law enforcement form local jurisdictions called in to aid in the protection, usually to secure routes the Motorcade will take to a designation (I speak from personal experience, POTUS coming to town is a nightmare on traffic). If they are speeding, they are typically doing so down a completely empty highway with police escort. From this point, most under of the Service would be monitored and controlled so closely, at least one Agent would notice if any protected was committing a crime and would have to write it up in a report. There is also considerable debate in legal circles if the President and Vice President could be arrested for a crime while in office, with the general acceptance being that they could not and would need to be impeached by congress. Secret Service will continue to protect former Presidents and Vice Presidents for life, along with their spouses and children up to a certain age. With all that in mind, it would not so much be that the Secret Service would prevent arrest of an individual under their protection so much as the Secret Service would be the arresting authority. As they are law enforcement agents under the Federal Government, they can legally arrest people and then hand them to the proper law enforcement agency to effect the arrest. This would mostly happen with candidates for office OR former presidents OR family at any point in time as the scenario described is a bit harder to make a legitimate arrest. In fact, the Secret Service does have arrest authority with one of the highest conviction rates of any Law Enforcement Agency in the Country. It's just most crimes they arrest have nothing to do with threats to those under their protection. The Secret Service is also charged with investigation of counterfeiting of US currency and they are very good at it. This was actually their original sole function in the U.S. government and they still exist under the Treasury Department to this day. At this point, if you're wondering how they got the job of protecting important people in the executive branch from that, well, it's simple. At the time of his assasination, the legislation to create the USSS was on Licoln's desk. At the time of their creation, the only other Federal Police services were the U.S. Park Police, the Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Marshals. The first two had specific jurisdictions and the Marshals were undermanned so the USSS was tasked with investigating all sorts of financial crimes and quickly became the most successful U.S. Law Enforcement Service. They were also the first U.S. Intelligence and Counterintelligence agency (though they no longer are part of the Intelligence Community) until the FBI took on those duties. So following the Assassination of William McKinley in 1901, Congress authorized them to take up full time Presidential Protection because at the time, they were pretty much doing everything else.

Does Montana's law to ban TikTok violate Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution? The State of Montana has passed SB419 which bans TikTok within Montana. This Washington Post article indicates that TikTok could avoid the ban provided its ownership was not based in, "any country designated as a foreign adversary" by the bill's effective date of January 2024. This seems like this would constitute a bill of attainder which is expressly prohibited by Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution. Is this accurate or does the bill's contingency clause for voiding create a loophole to avoid becoming a bill of attainder?

There are potential constitutional challenges to the bill, but as noted by the answer from user6726, a bill of attainder challenge would not be a very strong one. Better arguments that the legislation is unconstitutional would include (in approximate order of legal strength) arguments that: it violates the "dormant commerce clause" by unduly regulating interstate commerce, it is pre-empted by federal statutes which have "occupied the field" of social media regulation (e.g. with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act), it purports to make foreign policy which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government (in connection with its "any country designated as a foreign adversary" provision), it is effectively regulating conduct outside the territorial scope of the state's authority to regulate conduct (a new SCOTUS case law doctrine from the California pork regulation case decided this month), and it unduly burdens free speech since TikTok is analogous to a modern magazine or newspaper and is regulated more heavily than non-expressive content on a non-content neutral basis.

No, such a restriction is not effective. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, and other sections as well, provides otherwise. This was settled early on in the history of US Jurisprudence In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) Justice Johnson wrote for the majority at 10 U. S. 136 (et seq) and 10 U. S. 139: The validity of this rescinding act, then, might well be doubted, were Georgia a single sovereign power. But Georgia cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, sovereign power, on whose legislature no other restrictions are imposed than may be found in its own Constitution. She is a part of a large empire; she is a member of the American Union; and that Union has a Constitution the supremacy of which all acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the legislatures of the several States which none claim a right to pass ... ... It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the Court that, in this case, the estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, the State of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institutions or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void. (See also the Wikipedia article on the case The court this case (for the first time in US history) held a state law unconstitutional, and nothing in the ruling suggested that this was a unique power of the Supreme Court: rather it was and is a power, in proper cases, of every general Federal court, whether a District Court, a Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. Indeed in Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme court in the passage just quoted was upholding a district court decision to the same effect, thus clearly indicating that the power to strike down state laws as contrary to the Federal Constitution is found at the district court level. In the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) Justice Story wrote for the Court (at 14 U. S. 328 et seq): The third article of the Constitution is that which must principally attract our attention. The 1st. section declares, The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such other inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The 2d section declares, that The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under the grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. It then proceeds to declare, that in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make. Such is the language of the article creating and defining the judicial power of the United States. It is the voice of the whole American people solemnly declared, in establishing one great department of that Government which was, in many respects, national, and in all, supreme. It is a part of the very same instrument which was to act not merely upon individuals, but upon States, and to deprive them altogether of the exercise of some powers of sovereignty and to restrain and regulate them in the exercise of others. ... ... it is manifest that the judicial power of the United States is unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all State authority, and in all others, may be made so at the election of Congress. ... ... ... The exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited by the terms of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate as well as original jurisdiction. The judicial power is delegated by the Constitution in the most general terms, and may therefore be exercised by Congress under every variety of form of appellate or original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the Constitution which restrains or limits this power, it must therefore, in all other cases, subsist in the utmost latitude of which, in its own nature, it is susceptible. As, then, by the terms of the Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction is not limited as to the Supreme Court, and as to this Court it may be exercised in all other cases than those of which it has original cognizance, what is there to restrain its exercise over State tribunals in the enumerated cases? The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third article to any particular Courts. The words are, "the judicial power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases," &c., and "in all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction." It is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to the case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of the Constitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it depends. ... (See also the Wikipedia article on the case This case makes it particularly clear that the "judicial power of the United States" extends to all general federal courts (as opposed to limited courts such as the Tax Court or the Court of Claims). If the Supreme Court can make a given ruling, so can any district or circuit court (aside from the limited class of cases where the Supreme court has original jurisdiction). Rulings by lower courts may be taken to the Supreme Court, but are binding until and unless overruled or modified by a higher court. A state may not validly hold in one of its laws that it will obey a judgement by the Supreme Court, but not by a lower Federal court that has proper jurisdiction of the case. I have quoted these two early cases from the Marshall Court because this is a matter that was settled early, and rarely if ever disputed afterwards.

Neither of the posters in question would constitute a "true threat" which can be subjected to legal sanctions consistent with the First Amendment. The nature of the communication, in the context provided in the question, is clearly metaphorical. The U.S. Supreme Court, incidentally, will be hearing arguments in the case of Counterman v. Colorado on April 19, 2023, pertinent to this question, in which the issue presented is: Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence. This would, however, be a far closer case under British law, as illustrated by a recent case in which a British teenager was sentenced to 11 year years in prison for inflammatory Internet postings that it was established were a major factor that pushed the people who carried out mass shootings at a Buffalo, New York grocery store and a Colorado Spring gay nightclub to carry out their attacks. As reported by CNN: Daniel Harris, 19, from Derbyshire in northern England, posted videos shared by Payton Gendron, who pleaded guilty to the shooting in Buffalo, as well as videos linked to Anderson Lee Aldrich, the suspect accused of killing five people in a mass shooting at an LGBTQ nightclub in Colorado Springs, Colorado, last November, the court heard, according to PA. Sentencing Harris in court in Manchester, northern England, Judge Patrick Field was quoted by PA as saying, “What they did was truly appalling but what they did was no more than you intended to encourage others to do when publishing this material online.” The postings made by Daniel Harris which led to his conviction would almost certainly not have been actionable under U.S. law which has much stronger First Amendment protections than the U.K.

In US Law, banning speech based on its content is called "Content-based" speech regulation (shocking, I know), as opposed to "Content-neutral" speech regulation like requiring all protests to end before a specific time. Content-based speech regulation can be constitutional if it passes strict scrutiny, but in the case of banning swastikas, it would fall under an even narrower subset of content-based speech regulation called "viewpoint regulation." I haven't found a case where the swastika or Nazi flag was banned in particular, but we can find reasoning that appears to safely protect the peaceful display of the Nazi flag and ideology from government restriction in Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), a case in which Chicago banned picketing within 150 feet of a school except in the case of labor disputes related to the school. The Supreme Court found that this amounted to viewpoint-based discrimination, writing in the majority opinion: But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. As with all rights restrictions, a particular restriction may be Constitutional if it passes "strict scrutiny," namely, it: is necessary to a "compelling state interest"; is "narrowly tailored" to achieving this compelling purpose; and uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve the purpose. In general, a ban on the peaceful display of Nazi imagery or promotion of Nazi ideas would fail the first test, as the government does not have a compelling interest to suppress ideas which might be distasteful to some or even the majority of people. I have seen an argument that because the Nazi regime's stated goal included genocide, that promoting that ideology amounts to advocating violence. Speech which advocates violence or criminality may be criminalized, but only under a specific "imminent lawless action" test expressed in Brandenburg v. Ohio: Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case was brought against a KKK member who advocated various violent acts at a rally. The main distinction is that his speech did not call for specific violence, but merely advocated for it in general. This almost exactly mirrors the rationale for banning the Nazi ideology based on its advocacy of violence, and shows that a ban on such grounds would be unconstitutional. "Imminent" was clarified in Hess v. Indiana to mean that the action must be intended to produce actual lawless action at a specific point in the future, not simply advocate for it in general. Hess was a protester who was being forced off a street by police, said "We'll take the fucking street later" and was convicted of disorderly conduct for it, which the court reversed as his statement "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time" and was therefore protected by the First Amendment.

Under Article VI of the US Constitution, the federal constitution and valid federal laws are the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound to apply them regardless of anything in the laws or constitution of any state.* If a state legislature passes a law banning same-sex marriage, a state court is required under the federal constitution to instead apply the federal constitution (as interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges) and rule as though same-sex marriage is legal. When it comes to a federal court, things are even easier: a state cannot command a federal court to do anything. A federal court’s authority is laid out in Article III of the federal constitution and in federal statute, which (per Article VI) is supreme over anything in the laws or constitution of any state. There have been times where states attempted to challenge federal supremacy. Normally, this is handled by going to federal court. Decisions in state courts can ultimately be appealed to the US Supreme Court, which can reverse them if they incorrectly applied federal law. Most of the time, that’s the end of matters: when a federal court rules, state officials comply. Occasionally, that’s not enough. If a state disobeys the orders of a federal court, they can be enforced by federal agents. If even that isn’t enough, the President can deploy the armed forces to uphold federal authority. * There are situations which are more complicated, like when something is a federal crime but not a state crime. I can do more research on that if you want, but for now I’m going to leave it at “it’s more complicated.”

How is banning such events constitutional with the freedom of assembly? The rights created by the First Amendment are not absolute. They are subject to reasonable restrictions as to time, place and manner, especially if those restrictions are content neutral. Restrictions narrowly tailored to protect against genuine threats public health and safety fall within the exception of the First Amendment even if they are not strictly content neutral, that is commonly described by the rubric that you don't have a right to falsely cry "fire" in a crowded theater (causing a riot that could harm people). For example, suppose that a rope bridge over a deep gorge can only support the weight of ten people, and three dozen people want to hold a protest there. A regulation that prohibited more than ten people from engaging in the protest would be constitutional. Even then, however, a lack of content neutrality (e.g., restricting punishment to false statements likely to incite a riot) can't also be a lack of ideological neutrality (e.g. restricting punishment to anti-Catholic but not anti-Jewish statements likely to incite a riot). If it were a political protest/gathering would this change? Generally speaking political protest/gatherings are still subject to content neutral regulations of time, place or manner, and those narrowly tailored to protect genuine threats public health and safety. So, for example, if there is a genuine COVID-19 risk that public health officials are trying to address, and the regulation of gatherings is not viewpoint or content based, it would be upheld as constitutional in the face of a First Amendment freedom of assembly limitation. But, if the regulation applied, for example, only to Republican and not Democratic party protests or gatherings, which is a viewpoint or content based restriction, it would not survive a First Amendment freedom of assembly challenge.

In English law during the late Medieval and early modern period (from 1321 to 1798), it was possible for Parliament to pass a "Bill Of Attainder". This declared a person guilty of a crime, often treason, by legislative act, without any trial or other legal process. See the Wikipedia article for more detail. Often a Bill of Attainder not only decreed that a person (or people) was guilty, but also confiscated the convicted person's property, preventing his (or rarely her) heirs from inheriting, and possibly rendering those heirs ineligible to hold public offices or peerages. The heir would also be prevented from inheriting through the attainted person. For example, property held by the father of the attainted person would not pass to the child of the attainted person. This was called "corruption of the blood", and was viewed with particular horror by many during the colonial period and before. It effectivly treated the heirs of the attainted person as illegitimate. Attainder was usually followed by execution, possibly by torture. The bill might specify the specific fate of the person attained. The US constitutional provision prohibits declaring people guilty of crimes by legislative act, and prohibits sentences for crimes that take property or rights from the family or heirs of the convicted person, even in cases of treason. At least that is how it has been interpreted. Fines may be levied, but may only fall on the actual property of the person convicted. The US Supreme Court has dealt with this clause in several cases: Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) (law requiring lawyers to swear that they had not supported the confederacy held unconstitutional); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (Law requiring an oath that the person had not supported the confederacy for a professional license held unconstitutional); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (a state law barring convicted felons from practicing medicine upheld); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), (a state law newly requiring that practising physicians must have graduated from a licensed medical school upheld); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (federal law which declared three specific persons "subversive" and barred them from federal employment overturned); American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (federal law which required elected labour leaders to take an oath that they were not and had never been members of the Communist Party USA, and that they did not advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. government upheld); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (law which made it a crime for a former communist to serve on a union's board overturned); and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (law seizing Nixon's presidential papers upheld).

It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.

Is a Denial of a Motion to Compel Arbitration reviewed de novo by the Appellate Division? Appeals of an arbitration award are reviewed de novo. Does the same apply to the denial of a Motion to Compel Arbitration? In other words, if the trial court denied a motion to compel arbitration, is the appealing party entitled to ask the Appellate Division to review matters of fact or only matters of law? Assuming it is reviewed de novo, is the appellant specifically required to ask for de novo review or it is done implicitly?

The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration." Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). "[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set "strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award." Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). "A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.

Article 14, Section 5 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. Your question, though, asks specifically about appealing the decision in a civil trial. I don't know of any treaties or principles of international law that require an appeal in civil cases.

According to rule 15a: (1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. (2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires. If you are still within 21 days of when you served your original pleading (or their response, if one was required) then you should still be able to amend your pleading. If you are outside that window, you may be able to use rule 12(c): (c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. According to rule 12(d), this is not the same as a motion for summary judgement under rule 56 (with all that entails) unless the court has already been presented with matters outside the pleadings. Your question was about rule 11. I don't think your scenario would violate it. Under rule 11b: By presenting to the court a pleading... an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances... (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. It doesn't actually say in there that the defense must investigate the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims (although that's obviously something the defense would ordinarily want to do.) The part about making sure "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted..." relates to the claims being made the party in question, not the ones being made by the other party. I can't think of any "pure purpose" one would have in filing an answer when a motion for dismissal is warranted. Depending on the circumstances, a party might have good reasons to not make every claim they think they're entitled to make. Perhaps they aren't sure about how the court will rule on their motion to dismiss but like their chances at trial. (Indeed, if it's a certainty the court will dismiss, then perhaps Rule 11 sanctions are in order for the plaintiff, for filing a case that was not at all warranted by the law.) Drafting a motion is time the attorney has to spend, which is an expense for their client, and it may or may not work. But maybe their motion to dismiss Count D uses the same theories as their motion to dismiss Count A, and it's now worth it to make the argument. And maybe now since the court ruled with them on Count C they're more optimistic that the court will also rule in their favor on counts A and D. If the defense delayed this motion solely to "harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation" then Rule 11 would be violated. But that seems unlikely. Look at the context. They're making a motion on the amended complaint. That's still rather early in the process. Given that a brand new count was added, an earlier motion to dismiss count A would not have resolved the litigation anyway, so there was no real delay caused. The costs for either side have not been significantly increased, either. Also note the phrases "to the best of the person's knowledge" and "reasonable under the circumstances". The defendant only has 21 days to file a response after being served, and they might not even have an attorney yet when that clock starts. How much inquiry is reasonable in that time frame, especially when responding to a multi-count complaint?

Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.

Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.

Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.

This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.

The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.

Is it legal to drive in reverse on a non-divided road that has a speed limit of more than 80 km/h? In "The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver’s Handbook", they said It is illegal to drive in reverse on a divided road that has a speed limit of more than 80 km/h. Is it legal to drive in reverse on a non-divided road that has a speed limit of more than 80 km/h?

The only specific prohibition of "backing" is at s. 157 of the Highway Traffic Act: 157 (1) No driver of a vehicle shall back the vehicle upon the roadway or shoulder of any highway divided by a median strip1 on which the speed limit is in excess of 80 kilometres per hour ... However, there is a careless driving prohibition: 130 (1) Every person is guilty of the offence of driving carelessly who drives a vehicle or street car on a highway without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway. And there is the Criminal Code's dangerous driving offence: 320.13 (1) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, is dangerous to the public. It would be misleading to say that it is absolutely "legal" or "allowed" to "drive in reverse on a non-divided road that has a speed limit of more than 80 km/h". It just isn't prohibited by s. 157(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. 1. Note that "divided" in the question was just a paraphrase of "divided by a median strip." There are many sections of road in Ontario that are not divided in that sense, with speed limits above 80 km/h, including much of the trans-Canada highway.

The national standard, found in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), indicates, in Section 2B.13 Speed Limit Sign: 03 Speed Limit signs, indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, shall be located at the points of change from one speed limit to another. It would not be legal to accelerate to the new speed before reaching the sign. All states were required to adopt the MUTCD no later than 2012. This standard is followed by all states.

Assuming you mean methamphetamine, then the answer is no. It is illegal to drive with any amount of methamphetamine in one's body. The main Minnesota law on driving while impaired (DWI) is Section 169A.20 subdivision 1: It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle, as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 15, except for motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, within this state or on any boundary water of this state when: [...] (7) the person's body contains any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II, or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols. The schedules of controlled substances are at Section 152.02. Methamphetamine is listed in Schedule II (subd. 3 (d) (3)). However, there is an exception if you were taking the substance as a prescription. Section 169A.49 subd. 2: If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative defense to a violation of section 169A.20, subdivision 1, clause (7) (presence of Schedule I or II controlled substance), that the defendant used the controlled substance according to the terms of a prescription issued for the defendant in accordance with sections 152.11 and 152.12. Note that since this is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof falls on you to prove that you had a prescription, and that you were using the substance according to its terms (e.g. taking only the prescribed dose). In particular, if your doctor or pharmacist told you not to drive while taking it, then that would seem to say that you were not using the substance as prescribed.

Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.

The rules about use of lights, and keeping hands on the steering wheel are not new, but they may have been rephrased. It has always been the case that you should be in proper control of the vehicle (both hands on the wheel), and not to use the lights for thanking, or for inviting. Here are two extracts from the 1999 edition of The Highway Code. Flashing headlights. Only flash your headlights to let other road users know that you are there. Do not flash your headlights in an attempt to intimidate other road users. If another driver flashes his headlights never assume that it is a signal to go. Use your own judgement and proceed carefully. Once moving you should keep to the left, unless road signs or markings indicate otherwise. The exceptions are when you want to overtake, turn right or pass parked vehicles or pedestrians in the road keep well to the left on right-hand bends. This will improve your view of the road and help avoid the risk of colliding with traffic approaching from the opposite direction keep both hands on the wheel, where possible. This will help you to remain in full control of the vehicle at all times The recent changes concern vulnerable road users, and their priority.

Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations.

No, they don't. Mass. General Law 85 Section 15: A vehicle, whether stationary or in motion, on a public way, shall have attached to it headlights and taillights which shall be turned on by the vehicle operator and so displayed as to be visible from the front and rear during the period of 1/2 hour after sunset to 1/2 hour before sunrise; provided, however, that such headlights and taillights shall be turned on by the vehicle operator at all other times when, due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, visibility is reduced such that persons or vehicles on the roadway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 500 feet or when the vehicle's windshield wipers are needed [...] On all cars I know of, having running lights on does not turn on the taillights, so using running lights would not comply with this law. This point is also emphasized in this MassDOT press release, which, while it is not law, does give some indication of how the government intends the law to be interpreted: Relying on daytime running lights for these conditions is not sufficient under the law.

I believe the answer you seek can be found by searching for the terms "(desired state name) statutes pedestrian crossing." In the case of the state of Florida, there are references to the situation you describe. Some of it appears slightly contradictory, but the ones that apply are not ambiguous: (10) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. (12) No pedestrian shall, except in a marked crosswalk, cross a roadway at any other place than by a route at right angles to the curb or by the shortest route to the opposite curb. The contradictory portion appears thus: (11) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. There appears to be no reference regarding distances between adjacent intersections. It's unreasonable for one to be expected to walk a half mile (0.8 km) if there's a mile between intersections. There's an area nearby in which the traffic control signals are spaced about that distance apart. Cities may have specific regulations regarding such activities.

Changing a Will Person XYZ goes to an attorney and hires to the attorney to draw up a will. The attorney produces the will and it is signed. After several years, the person goes back to the attorney and asks the attorney to change the will. The attorney believes that the XYZ person is no longer legally competent but the attorney is not sure. Should the attorney update the will? This question is being asked for educational purposes only. I am not looking for legal advice.

The attorney would consider RPC 1.14, which means that he "shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client". But if he reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity...and cannot adequately act in [his] own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. So... The testator must know the natural objects of their bounty (i.e., be aware of their spouse and children, if any). The testator must comprehend the kind and character of their property (i.e., know approximately their net worth and what kind of assets they own). The testator must understand the nature and effect of the act (i.e., realize that it is indeed a will they are signing and what that means). The testator must be able to make a disposition of their property according to a plan formed in their mind.

In general, one can dismiss a lawyer at any point by simply informing the lawyer that no further services are wanted or will be paid for. If the lawyr and client have a contract, then any provisions on the contract about termination would need to be followed, unless the lawyer was in materiel breech. It is probably best to make the notice of cancellation in writing, but this is not mandatory unless a contract calls for it. The lawyer can still bill for cervices performed before the cancellation. If the lawyer has already ordered and contracted for services (or goods) to be used in representing the client, and those orders cannot be cancelled, the lawyer may be able to bill for them. Whether discharging the lawyer is wise is a very different question. There might (or might not) be good reason for dealing with the father's estate before that of the brother. But the client can choose what legal services s/he wants, even if the choice is unwise.

Note that I am not a lawyer. All law code here is from the official Georgia Law at LexisNexis. In the case of Georgia, the law regarding a child’s election changed in 2008. Prior to 2008, a 14 year old child could choose with which parent to live, unless the judge determined that the chosen parent is unfit. As proving that a parent is unfit was not always easy, the Georgia General Assembly in 2008 replaced the unfit parent standard with a Best Interests of the Child Standard. This new standard provides more flexibility to the judge in determining custody. Some basic facts about how the law in relation to the child's selection of parent: A parent that wishes to modify an existing custody arrangement must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred that warrants a new decision by the court. If the child is 14 then the child's desire to select the parent may be considered as the "material change in circumstances". However the court will only consider the child's choice if at least two years have passed since the last custody determination. These aspects of the law can be seen in Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 5, which states: (5) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 14 years, the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless the parent so selected is determined not to be in the best interests of the child. The parental selection by a child who has reached the age of 14 may, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child; provided, however, that such selection may only be made once within a period of two years from the date of the previous selection and the best interests of the child standard shall apply. Note that the expression "The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless..." is the same as saying that "the child's selection shall be controlling (the decision) unless...". As to children that are between 11 and 14 the law states as follows (Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 6) (6) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years, the judge shall consider the desires and educational needs of the child in determining which parent shall have custody. The judge shall have complete discretion in making this determination, and the child's desires shall not be controlling. The judge shall further have broad discretion as to how the child's desires are to be considered, including through the report of a guardian ad litem. The best interests of the child standard shall be controlling. The parental selection of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years shall not, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child. The judge may issue an order granting temporary custody to the selected parent for a trial period not to exceed six months regarding the custody of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years where the judge hearing the case determines such a temporary order is appropriate. (Note that a "guardian ad litem" is the same as a "legal guardian".) If the child is younger than 11, there is no expectation for the judge to consider the child’s preference when awarding custody. Besides the desire of the child, the judge may consider following factors listed under Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 3: (3) In determining the best interests of the child, the judge may consider any relevant factor including, but not limited to: (A) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child; (B) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between the child and his or her siblings, half siblings, and stepsiblings and the residence of such other children; (C) The capacity and disposition of each parent to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child; (D) Each parent's knowledge and familiarity of the child and the child's needs; (E) The capacity and disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, day-to-day needs, and other necessary basic care, with consideration made for the potential payment of child support by the other parent; (F) The home environment of each parent considering the promotion of nurturance and safety of the child rather than superficial or material factors; (G) The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (H) The stability of the family unit of each of the parents and the presence or absence of each parent's support systems within the community to benefit the child; (I) The mental and physical health of each parent; (J) Each parent's involvement, or lack thereof, in the child's educational, social, and extracurricular activities; (K) Each parent's employment schedule and the related flexibility or limitations, if any, of a parent to care for the child; (L) The home, school, and community record and history of the child, as well as any health or educational special needs of the child; (M) Each parent's past performance and relative abilities for future performance of parenting responsibilities; (N) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, consistent with the best interest of the child; (O) Any recommendation by a court appointed custody evaluator or guardian ad litem; (P) Any evidence of family violence or sexual, mental, or physical child abuse or criminal history of either parent; and (Q) Any evidence of substance abuse by either parent.

What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.)

Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface.

As I understand the story, Black recused himself because the attorney was his cousin. I think the joke is that the attorney thought it wasn't necessary for Black to do so, perhaps because the attorney didn't understand how seriously conflicts of interest are taken. I don't think Kennedy misspoke; I think he's just used the generic you construct, in which "you" is used as an impersonal pronoun instead of "one". His sentence could be rephrased more formally as: Hugo Black stands up and stalks out of the room, which among Supreme Court justices is a polite way to say that one is recused. In other words, Black's action is equivalent to him saying "I am recused".

In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so.

The attorney's responsibility is framed in terms of the interest of the client, which is not always money. If the trust has some social agenda, that rather than the dollar amount would be the attorney's responsibility. I would want my property to not be subdivided into smaller lots, and I would communicate that interest to my attorney, but that's just me. Since we don't know all of the facts (about you and the trust), all we can say is that "interest" and "duty" are not always about dollar amounts.

Can political parties becoming public? Can political parties become public? For example, could the Democrat and Republican parties in the US carry out initial public offerings (IPOs), listing shares on NASDAQ and NYSE?

not in germany Germany has laws about founding, operating and financing political parties, the Parteiengesetz which demands certain organisatorial structures, and the Parteifinanzierungsgesetz, which is very explicit about how they can finance themselves and what a party needs to report. The only allowed gains are property proceeds (like from owning property or selling goods), membership fees, gifts to the party, and state sponsorship. Also, non-citizens are not allowed to give to a party unlimitedly. The parties also are also obligated under the basic law to report all financing they get, down to the cent. Their organisation form is strictly limited: Parteien sind frei gebildete Personenvereinigungen im Sinne des Artikels 9 Absatz 1 GG, die sich auf der Basis des privaten Rechts nach den vereinsrechtlichen Regelungen des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (§§ 21 bis 79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) gründen. Sie sind in der Regel nicht rechtsfähige Vereine This precludes them from being Aktiengesellschaften: they have to be organizations of people (Personenvereinigungen) that follow the BGB, and thus are not allowed to organize as an AG under the Aktiengesetz, which demands that an AG to not be an organization of people. So, a party can't be a stock company, and selling stock in a political party in Germany is not allowed under the framework and is thus neither possible nor legal.

Political risk insurance exists, but not in the format hypothesized. What the question is contemplating is more like a gambling bet, or a futures contract (which is a type of "derivative" contract), than insurance. What constitutes an insurable risk of harm to an insurable interest is mostly a matter of common law although there are some state statutes on point in the U.S. which is the level of federalism at which insurance is regulated. Basically, you can only insure against a loss to an "insurable interest" caused by an insurable risk. In practice, this means that insurance has to be linked to an individualized loss of an individual or business that is clearly and directly caused by a covered occurrence. A change in governing political party itself, doesn't give rise to such a loss. The mere fact that a party is elected or that the people elected take an oath of office, doesn't itself change any laws or regulations. It just puts in place people who might do such things in the future. Political risk insurance, when it exists, insures against the nationalization of one's business at a loss, or against the industry that one is engaged in becoming illegal, at a loss. It is the specific action taken by the newly elected regime towards the particular insured firm or individual, and not the actual new regime itself, that gives rise to a loss to an insurable interest in the case of political risk insurance. For example, you might be able to buy political risk insurance against the possibility that your marijuana business which is legal under state law but not federal law, will be seized in a civil forfeiture or shut down by a change in the practical effect of the relevant state law. If you are worried that your company's stock will decline in value due to an election result, the available financial instrument would be to short sell your company's stock, hedging against losses arising from a drop in stock price below a certain dollar value by a certain date for any reason. If your company is not publicly held, the risk of a decline in business due to an election result is not something that can be insured against.

Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have.

Politico, who published this most recent leak, also has an article about prior SOCTUS leaks. Most of them were very minor or speculative, along the lines of the following two examples given: In 1972, while Roe was under deliberation, an unbylined Washington Post story detailed the justices’ internal wrangling on that subject. The Post story — which appeared days after the justices ordered a second round of arguments in the case — was attributed to anonymous informed sources and did not quote any draft opinions or internal memoranda, but described them in significant detail. In 1979, ABC News Supreme Court correspondent Tim O’Brien went on air with reports predicting the outcome of two decisions that were days away from release. Chief Justice Warren Burger launched an inquiry into whether anyone at the court had breached protocol, and a Government Printing Office employee involved in setting type for the court’s rulings was transferred to a different division. The staffer denied leaking any information. A Business Insider article attributes the original Roe leak to a memo written by Justice William Douglas. The Politico article continues listing a few other examples of a similar vein, where convenient coincidences suggested someone had an inside line on how the court was leaning: a passionate Senate speech here, an article predicting case decisions there, etc. When a leak is strongly suspected, the fingers are usually pointed at one or more of the court's clerks. The aforementioned Business Insider article also mentions that a clerk leaked information to Vanity Fair about Bush v. Gore. Politico does mention the following as a more substantive example: The gravest violations of Supreme Court confidentiality came just over a century ago and led to a law clerk being accused of leaking the outcome of cases to Wall Street traders so he and they could turn a quick profit. The Justice Department fingered Ashton Embry, a longtime clerk to Justice Joseph McKenna, with being the source of leaks in business-related cases handed down in 1919 related to a wartime ban on liquor distilling and so-called patents allowing railroads to use particular lands. The case suffered a number of setbacks, including a lack of any insider trading laws at the time and a disappearing witness, and ultimately Embry was never convicted of anything, or even brought to trial. And it ends with an extremely recent example from a few months ago: During oral arguments on a Trump-era immigration policy this February, Justice Stephen Breyer mentioned that red states’ claim of standing to defend the policy was “pretty similar to what we had just allowed” in a case involving who could defend a Kentucky abortion statute. But the high court had not yet ruled in the Kentucky case. It did so eight days later, ruling 8-1, as Breyer and many less-informed others had predicted. A full leak of a decision does not appear to have occurred before now. Leaks that appear to have been based in substantial part on (draft) opinions do appear to have occurred before, just not as a complete document. But insofar as the Embry incident may have resulted in actual and intentional profiteering off of leaked information it stands as a rather serious and consequential breach.

If Party C amends their filing, does party A become a joint applicant, a third party or something else? A is a non-party. It is unclear from your description why C would need to amend the filing, but there is no need for A to become a joint applicant. By virtue of C's buyout of A, only C has standing to sue B. Your description does not specify B's reason for non-payment, but generally speaking that does not defeat's C's standing for suing B. Had B's contract with A reflected that B's intent is to not be in a contract relation with C, the matter might involve (1) rescinding B's contract with C; (2) a judgment on grounds of equity; (3) C's claim against A for the latter's omission; or (4) a combination of these. But the description has too many gaps in that regard, thereby precluding a more precise assessment. Does Party A need to make a demand from party C and restart the whole application? No. A has no viable claim against C. And A's sale to C implies that A can no longer have a viable claim against B either.

It’s not insider trading Insider trading refers to leveraging private information that you only know because of your “insider” position. Front running is using information that is publicly available, albeit for a fee. Buying information that anyone can buy is not insider trading.

No. Just because some building is "owned by the public" or State, doesn't mean it's public property. A state's national guard installation comes to mind immediately. State workers' offices are not public places. Airport hangars/buildings/runways. You can't just go hang out in the DPW garages.

What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech.

Virginia right turn arrow street markings In Virginia does a right turn arrow in white painted on the street require you to turn right? Or does it also have to say right turn only? Or perhaps there has to be a physical sign? Or can this be ignored and you can continue straight, if the lane continues? I guess the real question is what are the legal requirements to notify a driver that a lane is "right turn only" in Virginia?

virginia Virginia Driver's Manual, section 2 on page 11 states: White lane arrows are curved or straight. If you are in a lane marked with a curved arrow or a curved arrow and the word ONLY, you must turn in the direction of the arrow. If your lane is marked with both a curved and straight arrow, you may turn or go straight. The lane marking doesn't have to include the word only. A curved arrow is sufficient. The above is from the second paragraph of the section on solid white lines on page 11. The first paragraph includes: Arrows used with white lines indicate which turn may be made from the lane. Earlier in the document, it briefly mentions signs that sign lane turning directions but there's no information on whether signs are required in addition to lane markings.

The Kentucky restriction against "hit and run" is KRS 189.580, which says that The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle…is involved in an accident …shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance Notice that the legal requirement is for the operator to do something: the law requires nothing of the vehicle itself. Supposing that you are correct that the vehicle was operated by someone who hit and ran, then if the police gain suspicions that such is the case, and if those suspicions are reasonable, then then could obtain a warrant to obtain evidence from the vehicle, which could be used against the operator. The fact that you (might) now own the vehicle would not transfer legal responsibility to you – responsibbility goes with the actor, not the instrument.

While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance.

england-and-wales s161 Penalties for causing certain kinds of danger or annoyance, Highways Act 1980 ... (3) If a person plays at football or any other game on a highway to the annoyance of a user of the highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding [F3 level 1 on the standard scale]. ... (See also the s137 offence of wilful obstruction.) Some places may also have their own related bylaws, e.g. No person shall on any land adjoining a street play any game in a manner likely to cause obstruction to any traffic or to cause danger to any person in such a street Made under s235 of the Local Government Act 1972, for the prevention and suppression of nuisances. Traveling further back in time, the Highway Act 1835 provided for penalties on persons who "play at Football or any other Game on any Part of the said Highways, to the Annoyance of any Passenger or Passengers" and, in London, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 similarly made it an offence to "any Kite or play at any Game to the Annoyance of the Inhabitants or Passengers, or who shall make or use any Slide upon Ice or Snow in any Street or other Thoroughfare, to the common Danger of the Passengers." I find such a claim implausible, considering the large amount of my childhood that was spent playing in the street with no legal problems. It seems possible that the authorities turned a blind eye or your behaviour didn't come to their attention, or your street was designated as a 'play street' (introduced by the Street Playgrounds Act 1938, currently provided for by sections 29 to 31 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 as amended by the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991). Also, many alleged offenders might be younger than the criminal age of responsibility. According to TJ Miller MP (Colchester) in Hansard, speaking in 1860, in 1859 44 of London's children were sent to prison for playing games in the streets, and by April 1860 25 had been sent to prison - apparently Manchester had imprisoned none. In my youth we played in the street although we didn't put up basketball hoops, football goals or other such objects. These stories in the media seem to be rare and involve circumstances where the local authority received too many complaints, particularly when there is damage to homes, cars or flowerbeds - which may amount to criminal damage. Blackpool in 2006 Glenfield area of Leicester, 2007 Newark, Nottinghamshire, 2008 Manchester, 2010 - although this seems to be based on one complaint Hat-tip Pedestrian Liberation for the information about the older legislation and arrests of children.

Until it runs out of gas. With the caveat that I can't prove a negative: No, there is no such statute or case law restricting how long a police or law enforcement vehicle can follow someone on a road. However, law enforcement officers can be subject to investigation and sanction under "stalking" or "harassment" laws, which typically require a pattern of documented misbehavior in the absence of good cause for said behavior.

It's likely that you'll find similar statutes for your state. Florida's specifically considers the circumstances you've described: 316.081 Driving on right side of roadway; exceptions.— (1) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: (a) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement; (b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; provided any person so doing shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard; This last entry represents your stalled car. An obstruction exists and you've yielded the right of way to oncoming traffic. You're good to go.

The national standard, found in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), indicates, in Section 2B.13 Speed Limit Sign: 03 Speed Limit signs, indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, shall be located at the points of change from one speed limit to another. It would not be legal to accelerate to the new speed before reaching the sign. All states were required to adopt the MUTCD no later than 2012. This standard is followed by all states.

I believe the answer you seek can be found by searching for the terms "(desired state name) statutes pedestrian crossing." In the case of the state of Florida, there are references to the situation you describe. Some of it appears slightly contradictory, but the ones that apply are not ambiguous: (10) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. (12) No pedestrian shall, except in a marked crosswalk, cross a roadway at any other place than by a route at right angles to the curb or by the shortest route to the opposite curb. The contradictory portion appears thus: (11) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. There appears to be no reference regarding distances between adjacent intersections. It's unreasonable for one to be expected to walk a half mile (0.8 km) if there's a mile between intersections. There's an area nearby in which the traffic control signals are spaced about that distance apart. Cities may have specific regulations regarding such activities.

Administering a will in Mississippi Mississippi will situation. My father recently passed and has a now discovered will (we had no knowledge prior). My brother and I are named executors of the will but have only been provided copies by a no executor and her attorney. We have asked for the original will but they refuse to provide it. Do we have to administer the will without ever seeing and obtaining an original for our attorney? Do we even have a right to the original will?

Mississippi law says that (MS Code §91-7-5) The chancery court of the proper county, on being informed that any person has the last will and testament of a testator or testatrix, may compel such person to produce it You cannot administer a will without first filing it. The court will care about the original will, which will either be declared valid or invalid. An interested person could contest the validity of the will, and if the reasons are sufficient, the will could be set aside in which case (barring the later discovery of a valid will), the estate is divided according to Mississippi's intestate succession laws. When the will is filed in court, you can obtain a copy from the clerk for a small fee.

I believe non-probate assets are specific gifts you call out -- in the Will -- that are designated for specific beneficiaries. Little Jimmy gets the old pair of lucky Yankees socks, Little Suzie gets the old, decrepit, half-eaten turkey sandwich that Babe Ruth once took a bite out of, etc. This is incorrect. Every transfer arising from a will is a probate asset, because probate is the formal legal process of determining if there was a will, and if so, which will applies, and then distributing the assets of the person who died in accordance with that will (or with the determination that there was no will). I'm guessing things like: 401ks/Roth IRAs Life Insurance policies Savings accounts Stock market investments Houses, land & real property ...could all be probate assets if one does't specifically gift them to a Beneficiary? A 401k/Roth IRA with a beneficiary designation (other than the owner's estate), a life insurance policy with a beneficiary designation (other than the owner's estate), a savings account or stock account or investment with a joint owner or a pay on death beneficiary (other than the owner's estate), or real property with a transfer on death beneficiary or a joint ownership with right of survivorship is a non-probate asset. Any of those assets if there is no beneficiary designation, if there is no pay on death beneficiary, if there is no joint owner with right of survivorship, if it is not owner through a trust, and if there is a beneficiary designation that names the owner's estate, is a probate asset. The General Rule Anything subject to allocation and distribution in a will, or by intestate succession is a probate asset. Specifically devised property in a will is a probate asset. A non-probate assets is something transferred pursuant to a beneficiary designation, pay on death provision, joint ownership with right of survivorship, tenancy by entireties, or provision in a trust existing prior to the death of the decedent. These assets are not dealt with through the probate court process. However, if a will purports to specifically devise property that has a beneficiary designation or pay on death beneficiary or is owned by a trust or is in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, then the non-probate transfer prevails over the inconsistent language in the will. See also: Examples of Non-Probate Transfers Used in Estate Planning The following are examples of non-probate transfers commonly used in estate planning: Passing property to beneficiaries through a living trust. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on a pay on death account or transfer on death account. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on a life insurance policy. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on an IRA, 401k or other retirement account. See financial planning. Holding title to property as joint tenants or tenancy by the entirety. Leaving motor vehicles to a transfer on death beneficiary. Gifting assets to heirs during your lifetime so the assets do not pass as part of your estate. Executing and recording a transfer on death deed naming a beneficiary to inherit your real estate. (Source) The American Bar Association devotes a full chapter length treatment to discussing the difference. It begins: Upon death, a decedent’s estate includes both probate and nonprobate assets. Probate assets are those that pass to persons identified in a will (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of wills), whereas nonprobate assets pass outside an estate’s administration. Examples of traditional nonprobate assets include qualified and nonqualified retirement plans, individual retirement accounts, and life insurance policies. However, nonprobate assets can also include certain checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, investments, and even real property, but only if a beneficiary is designated and state law allows for such an asset to pass outside of an estate’s administration. Nonprobate assets are frequently referred to as “will substitutes.”

united-states You may be confusing the right to an attorney if you cannot afford one that is applicable only in CRIMINAL cases, not civil cases like you are discussing. You may be able to get an attorney to take your case on a contingency basis but there are two things to keep in mind: The attorney has to have some expectation that the case is winnable. The amount to be recovered must be worth the risk of taking on this case. In other words, for the attorney it's more of a business question that a legal one. Many attorneys will give you a free 30 minute, more or less, consultation. Perhaps you might give that a try.

Your father's probate estate is responsible for the repairs (assuming that your father owned the property outright and not through an entity, in which case the entity would be responsible). To the extent you accept rent, you are effectively acting as an agent of your father's estate in anticipation of being appointed to administer his estate. As his likely successor in the intestate estate, you have an interest in making the repairs, if urgent and if this mitigates the long term cost of the repairs and of the liability to the tenant for not making repairs promptly, that you would ultimately end up bearing. Often, it is possible to get appointed fairly quickly, at least on an emergency or temporary basis pending a formal permanent appointment to administer his estate. Doing so, if you could, would take you out of the shadows of acting in reliance on your future authority to act on behalf of your father's estate that you have not yet been granted. If you accept rents and make repairs and then someone else ends up being appointed to administer your father's estate (e.g. because a will you didn't know about is discovered and appoints someone else) and if the person ultimately appointed is displeased with the actions you took without formal authority to do so, rather than ratifying those actions, you are in a bit of a pickle and could incur some legal liability to your father's estate that could reduce your inheritance if there are also other heirs. You also have the option of simply walking away from his estate, not trying to be appointed to administer it, and not trying to claim an inheritance. If you do that, you have no personal liability to your father's tenants at all. If the situation that your father left behind is a truly troublesome mess and his estate is probably insolvent, it may even make rational sense for you to do that. You can't be held responsible for inaction in any way other than the depletion of your inheritance that arises naturally from your inaction. If this is the case, however, you should not accept rents from the tenants or have any other involvement in the management of your father's assets.

Question 1. In the trust that goes solely to my brother, in the event either my mother or father are dead, how is that asset split up? Can a trust dictate how an asset if split up if I am not on the trust. This is governed by the terms of the trust. The trust can say whatever the people who wrote it wanted. Question 2. How is the debt handled? The asset still has debt on it, who is responsible for the debt? I am thinking the answer to this question depends on the answer the Question 1. The trust owns the property subject to the mortgage. The people who originally signed the mortgage (presumably both of your parents) are also personally liable to pay the mortgage in the event that the debt is not fully satisfied in a foreclosure sale, or in the event that the mortgage creditor prefers to sue the mortgage debtors individually in the event of a default. After the death of the mortgage debtors, the mortgage company can file claims in their probate estates for repayment of the mortgage related debt if it does so in a timely fashion, although it would be more common to simply foreclose on the real property and obtain repayment of the debt that way. The death of the mortgage debtors is almost always an event of default under a mortgage, so if both mortgage debtors die, the mortgage creditor can usually force the trust to repay the debt, either by selling the house or by refinancing it. Question 3. They currently live in New York state, I found an article that New York state for nursing home care at more that 12k per year. If they were to move to a cheaper state like Alabama what are the laws or rules, ie. how long they have lived there, assets. This question verges on incoherent. But I think I understand what you are trying to ask. In every U.S. state, the joint federal-state program known at the federal level as Medicaid, although it has different names at the state level (California, for example, calls it "Medi-Cal"), will pay for nursing home care at approved nursing home facilities if the applicants meet state eligibility requirements. This generally involves an income test, an asset test, and a determination that the applicants have not made disqualifying gifts to trusts or to third-parties within the past five years. The income test is based upon state median or average income and is usually lower in a state like Alabama that has a lower median state income, than it is in New York, that has a higher median state income. For retirees, the main kinds of income considered are defined benefit pension plans payments, annuity payments, and investment income. The exact details of the asset test vary somewhat from state to state. Generally speaking, New York State is among the most strict in this regard. The basic outlines of the disqualification for gifts made within five years to others including trusts before applying for nursing home care are similar in broad outline, but the consequences for violating the rules are a function of the average cost of nursing home care in a state, which varies considerably. Generally, a gift of a fixed dollar amount gives rise to more months of disqualification of Medicaid in a state where the costs of nursing home care is low than it does where the costs of nursing home care are high, because the amount of the gift made in the past five years is divided by the average cost of nursing home care at the time the application is made, to determine the number of months that the applicants are disqualified from Medicaid. More generally, setting up trusts intended to qualify you for Medicaid is a highly technical matter with severe consequences if it is done incorrectly, and I would hope that your parents did so while conferring with a competent elder law lawyer. If they did it themselves, there is a high chance that this will have very severe negative consequences.

No Pennsylvania law § 2104 requires: (10) Requirement that heir survive decedent for five days.--Any person who fails to survive the decedent by five days shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of intestate succession and the decedent's heirs shall be determined accordingly. Now, a will can provide contingencies for if an heir predeceases the testator such as flowing to the heir's spouse or children but if it doesn't then the heir is treated as non-existent and what would have been their bequest is dealt with by the other provisions of the will. The life annuity is not a part of the grandfather's estate and the funds will be distributed in accordance with the terms of its own contract, not the will. Usually, this means at the discretion of the trustee and nominations of beneficiaries are usually non-binding on the trustee; that is, they can distribute the funds as they believe the decedent would want. Your aunt should seek proper legal advice quickly.

If this is Florida, then a will has to be written. If there is no written will, the estate falls under the law of intestate succession, part 1. Per § 732.502, every will must be in writing, signed, and witnessed (therefore a voice mail is not a will). If there are any relatives, they may be entitled to a share; otherwise, the estate goes to the state, where it is sold and the funds go into the state school fund (§732.107).

It's still under copyright, so you'd need to contact the publisher for permission, although if the artist (or in this case the executor of the estate Lynn Caponera) still retains the rights to the work sometimes going straight to the them can be a better option, especially in this case as it's for a non-profit and for a library in particular. The library also might have certain rights for reproduction, they generally pay a bulk fee to publishers but outside lending I'm not sure what that covers, so I'd check with the library manager (either branch or regional depending on who handles legal and licensing) as well.

Is it legal to use force against a person who is illegally trying to disconnect a hospital patient's life support with intent to kill the patient? Alice is visiting Bob, who is on life support in a hospital, when Mallory comes into the room and tries to disconnect Bob's life support with intent to kill Bob. Is Alice allowed to use force against Mallory to protect Bob? There is no euthanasia law or other law allowing Mallory to disconnect Bob's life support, and Bob is conscious and actively objects, but is not capable of stopping Mallory on his own.

england-and-wales It depends on Alice's belief about who Mallory is and what Mallory is doing and whether Alice's force was reasonable. If Alice is aware that Mallory's action is lawful, then Alice cannot use force to protect Bob. Is Mallory a doctor who is lawfully withdrawing treatment? (You say there is "no law allowing Mallory to disconnect Bob's life support" but I'm not aware of a jurisdiction that requires indefinite treatment regardless of the circumstances.) If Alice honestly believes Mallory is attempting to unlawfully kill Bob, Alice can use force to protect Bob. Is Bob on life support because of Mallory's previous attempt on his life; is Mallory a hitman, a vengeful spouse or some other person with no lawful reason to kill Bob? Crown Prosecution Service guidance: Self-Defence and the Prevention of Crime: Self-defence is available as a defence to crimes committed by use of force. The basic principles of self-defence are set out in Palmer v R, [1971] AC 814; approved in R v McInnes, 55 Cr App R 551: "It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but only do, what is reasonably necessary." The common law approach as expressed in Palmer v R is also relevant to the application of section 3 Criminal Law Act 1967: "A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large." ... In assessing the reasonableness of the force used, prosecutors should ask two questions: was the use of force necessary in the circumstances, i.e. Was there a need for any force at all?; and was the force used reasonable in the circumstances? The courts have indicated that both questions are to be answered on the basis of the facts as the accused honestly believed them to be (R v Williams (G) 78 Cr App R 276), (R. v Oatbridge, 94 Cr App R 367). To that extent it is a subjective test. There is, however, an objective element to the test. The jury must then go on to ask themselves whether, on the basis of the facts as the accused believed them to be, a reasonable person would regard the force used as reasonable or excessive.

I'll use California penal code 837 as an example, though most other states have similar statutes: A private person may arrest another: For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence... 839 says: Any person making an arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him therein. Generally, someone making an arrest is allowed to use "reasonable force" to effect the arrest. The question then becomes, is the act of interrupting a football game a public offense? Once a fan at a football game enters the field, assuming it is a violation of the license granted to the fan, they are trespassing. These fans are often drunk when performing their midfield dance so that is another public offense for which they could be arrested. Once arrested, the interloper must be turned over as soon as possible to a magistrate or peace officer. The person making the arrest is always subject to being sued. It is a question for a trier of fact to determine if unreasonable force was used in effecting the arrest. My guess is that in most of these cases security simply ejects the exuberant fan from the premises and the fan never looks back. If a lawsuit were to be filed it would be based on unreasonable force being applied during the arrest. California penal code 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Certainly, one could be charged with assault in effecting a citizen's or private arrest but it would go back to the definition of reasonable force and what force was necessary to effect the arrest. If someone resisted arrest I think it more likely that that person could face an assault charge.

An assault is carried out by a threat of bodily harm coupled with an apparent, present ability to cause the harm. There is no need for physical contact in an assault, all that is needed is the threat and the apparent, present ability. The drill sergeant was behaving in a threatening manner and had an apparent, present ability to cause harm; he was guilty of assault. Consensually engaging in a legal contact sport lacks the threat of bodily harm; that is to say that the bodily harm is a risk of the sport but it is not the object of it. Of course, an illegal sport where death or maiming is an inherent part would leave the participants open to assault (and battery) charges - you cannot agree to do illegal things. What is necessary to constitute the threat and the apparent means depends on the whole of the circumstances. A person throwing water when they had threatened the victim with acid is most certainly assault. Pointing a replica pistol at someone who doesn't know it is a replica constituted the threat and apparent means in one action.

No That is nothing but fiction. Assuming that this is in the US, the police would (probably, there are some exceptions) have had to deliver the well-known "Miranda" warnings, that the suspect has the right to silence, the right to consult a lawyer, and the right to have a free lawyer if unable to afford one, and that statements may be used against the subject. If, after those warnings, the suspect chooses to confess, or to make a statement, that confession or statement would be fully admissible, even if the suspect did not have a lawyer present, unless there was some other reason for the statement to be excluded. No such reason is mentioned in the question. It is simply not the case in the US that a confession is excluded just because no lawyer was present, nor is that the law anywhere that I know of. If the police failed to give the warnings when they were required, then any statements or confessions would be excluded. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) says: law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [Footnote 4] As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. That tells you exactly what the police are forbidden to do. Nowhere does it say that a lawyer must be present. Indeed it says the opposite: The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That means that s/he can confess after being warned, and such confession would be admissible, provided that s/he knew and understood those rights.

You may legally ask someone to shoot you, or do all sorts of other things to you. There are no laws against asking or various kinds of speech: laws restrict the doing. If you ask a person to shoot you and they do it, that person will probably be arrested for assault (or murder, depending on how it works out) – shooting a person is assault. A possible defense against an assault charge is consent, but that defense isn't freely available whenever a person says "I give my consent for you to assault me". You cannot consent to foreseeable serious bodily injury (more accurately, the law does not recognize such consent as valid consent). You can agree to be struck (in a boxing match) because such force is not serious bodily harm; and if unforeseeably serious bodily harm results, the consent defense is available. But if you ask a person to shoot you in the liver, they will be prosecuted for assault, because the resulting serious bodily harm is foreseeable.

Does any American state have a statute under which Joanne would be liable for her son's death? Probably not. None of the mother's conduct seems like a basis for a homicide prosecution. Suicide is only prosecuted, in states that allow it to be prosecuted at all, for conduct with a calculated purpose to cause a suicide, or encouragement of someone to commit suicide. These facts don't show that. There is no intent to cause suicide and there is no encouragement of the son to commit suicide by on the mother. A survey of selected laws on point by the Connecticut Legislative Research Service can be found here. The case law and related legal theory is reviewed and analyzed in this law review article with the following abstract: In 2017, a Massachusetts court convicted Michelle Carter of manslaughter for encouraging the suicide of Conrad Roy by text message, but imposed a sentence of only fifteen months. The conviction was unprecedented in imposing homicide liability for verbal encouragement of apparently voluntary suicide. Yet if Carter killed, her purpose that Roy die arguably merited liability for murder and a much longer sentence. This Article argues that our ambivalence about whether and how much to punish Carter reflects suicide’s dual character as both a harm to be prevented and a choice to be respected. As such, the Carter case requires us to choose between competing conceptions of criminal law, one utilitarian and one libertarian. A utilitarian criminal law seeks to punish inciting suicide to reduce harm. A libertarian criminal law, on the other hand, justifies voluntary suicide as an exercise of liberty, and incitement of suicide as valuable speech. Utilitarian values are implicit in the foreseeability standards prevailing in the law of causation, but libertarian values are implicit in the reluctance of prosecutors to seek, and legislatures to define, homicide liability for assisting suicide. The prevalence of statutes punishing assisting—but not encouraging—suicide as a nonhomicide offense reflects a compromise between these values. These statutes are best interpreted as imposing accomplice liability for conduct left unpunished for two antithetical reasons: it is justified in so far as the suicide is autonomous and excused in so far as the suicide is involuntary. This explains why aiding suicide is punished, but less severely than homicide. Yet even these statutes would not punish Carter’s conduct of encouragement alone. Her conviction although seemingly required by prevailing causation doctrine, is unprecedented. Guyora Binder and Luis Chiesa, "The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide" 56 American Criminal Law Review 65 (2019). In any jurisdiction, could anyone but Joanne, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, face liability for Jordan's death? Maybe the bullies could be prosecuted for homicide or some lesser charge like harassment intended to provoke a suicide or something like that. More facts would have to be developed on that point. Maybe teachers have civil liability for negligence, but not criminal liability for not intervening since they didn't intend to cause or encourage the suicide.

In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.

Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.

Equal protection, discrimination, and real estate I am curious about the apparent success of ethnically restrictive laws on residence or property ownership after the fourteenth amendment was ratified. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) ruled that a restrictive covenant violated due process. But that was a covenant, not a law, and the ruling only protected sellers, not buyers, and only those who had not signed the covenant. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) had similar limitations. Oregon for a time had laws prohibiting blacks from living in the territory, and I've heard rumors of laws prohibiting Chinese from owning property. What (if any) were the court challenges to such laws on the basis of “equal protection”? (Particularly interested in any prior to 1940.) In section one, ”no State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws“ would seem to me to prevent disallowing Chinese from applying for naturalization or buying property (unless they are outside the jurisdiction).

Prior to Shelley v. Kramer, racial covenants were considered to be outside the scope of the 14th Amendment, because as stated in Corrigan v. Buckley, "the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'have reference to state action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals'". Therefore, a private agreement to exclude blacks does not run afoul of the 14th Amendment. The Shelley court also noted: But here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive terms of the agreements. This leads to the primary holding of this case: We hold that, in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws, and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand. That is, the racially-restrictive agreements are not themselves forbidden by the 14th Amendment, but enforcement of such agreements is forbidden. An obvious question is, why had nobody advanced that argument before, but legal arguments often suffer from the forest / trees disability. As far as I have been able to determine, that part of the Oregon Constitution excluding blacks became a legal nullity when the 14th Amendment was ratified, though it remained in the Constitution until 1926. The various anti-Chinese laws which were enforced were not enforced against Chinese who were citizens, see US v. Wong Kim Ark.

There is a general EU anti-discrimination directive 2000/43 which in Article 3(1)(h) which applies the standards to housing. This document analyzes Czech anti-discrimination law. If you were discriminated against on the basis of being English, that could support legal action. There is no current EU or Czech legislation that guarantees a right to operate in the language of your choice. There have been calls to create some such legislation. Such legislation would be the implementation of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which says that Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. There is under Article 9 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages a right to use regional or minority languages in judicial proceedings, but there is no generic "right to use your own language". There are occasional cases where governments are sued because their actions linguistically discriminate. As observed here, there was a case in Belgium where the government was sued for not subsidizing French education in non-French territories, but the court said that "Art. 14 cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing children or parents a right to obtain instruction in a language of his choice".

Yes. American descendents of African slaves filed several lawsuits in the early 2000s seeking "monetary relief under both federal and state law for harms stemming from the enslavement of black people in America," i.e., reparations. Those cases were consolidated into a single case heard in Chicago, where the judge ruled there was no standing to bring the cases, given the many degrees of separation between the defendants' conduct in the 1800s and the 21st Century plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: If there were a legal wrong, it would not be a wrong to any living persons unless they were somehow the authorized representatives to bring suits on behalf of their enslaved ancestors. With some exceptions to be noted, the plaintiffs are suing to redress harms to third parties (their ancestors), without being authorized to sue on behalf of those parties. It is like a suit by a descendant of a Union soldier, killed in battle, against a Civil War era gun manufacturer still in business that sold guns to the Confederacy in violation of federal law. A federal court could not entertain the suit because the plaintiff would be unable to prove a harm to an interest of his (such as his bank account) that the law protects. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit permitted one very small portion of the case to proceed, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case.

Zoning laws can be used to preserve the character of an area Presumably, the semi-rural area you live in is not known for its distinctive high-rise skyline. A height limitation can be a reasonable and sensible way of preventing the construction of a building that doesn’t fit with the overall character. A typical 2 storey dwelling can easily fit under a 30 foot limit, a 3 storey can if you are clever with the design - are there many 4+ storey homes in your area? In addition, most zoning ordinances have procedures to allow the applicant to request and have approved deviations for the rules. So, if you wanted to construct a 33 foot high house that might be OK, a 66 foot one not so much. I can’t see any basis for calling the law arbitrary or capricious. The fact is that high-rise buildings are out of character for acreage living, so it’s not arbitrary. And it has been developed with thought as to what it will achieve so it’s not capricious. Whether a particular decision on an application for an exemption is arbitrary or capricious will depend on the content of the decision.

You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal.

WWII Supreme Court Cases During WWII, the Supreme Court dealt with three main issues in their cases on Executive Order 9066: curfews, exclusions, and internment of persons with Japanese ancestry. In the lesser-known Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States case, the court had to determine whether imposing a curfew on those of Japanese descent was valid. The main constitutional issue ended up being the effectiveness of the Fifth Amendment in providing for due process of law in times of war. In the end, the court decided that a curfew was indeed justified. Following this, the majority of the court found in Korematsu v. United States, that the exclusion of those with Japanese ancestry from certain military zones (in this case, the West coast) was also constitutional. In their decision, they heavily relied upon the Hirabayashi case. The question of internment of people with Japanese ancestry was not actually decided constitutionally. Another case, a habeas corpus case, Ex parte Endo might have resolved it, but the Court concluded this case in favor of Endo without going to the constitutional level. A day before this decision was announced, the government suspended Executive Order 9066, leaving the question unresolved. In these cases, Justice Frank Murphy's opinions stand out. In Hirabayashi, he sternly warned of the racism involved, but felt that the curfew was indeed justified. However, in Korematsu, he evidently felt that the exclusion was without basis and dissented, calling the majority opinion "legalization of racism." Current Law In theory, these cases still stand. This is because they haven't been explicitly overruled, and the changes to the constitution since Hirabayashi aren't relevant: Amendments XXII and XXV have to do with procedural issues with the office of the President, amendments XXIII, XIV, and XXVI are related to voting rights, and XXVII addresses Congressional salaries. The constitution for the purpose of a similar order is thus unchanged, and so should theoretically be covered under Korematsu & Hirabayashi. However, its effective status as precedent is shaky. For one, it has been widely condemned, and courts would likely avoid using Korematsu & Hirabayashi if possible, or attempt to make a distinction from them given a slightly different order. Second, the convictions against Korematsu and Hirabayashi were overturned in the 1980s based on evidence being possibly concealed by the government. This was confirmed by the Department of Justice in 2011. However, this is an error of fact, and as such the ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) used would still technically stand as precedent. Lengthy Update: The Supreme Court has since declared Korematsu incorrect in Trump v. Hawaii. However in doing so, the court explicitly distinguished the two cases. Thus, many consider the declaration to be obiter dictum, i.e. an aside that is non-precedential. I'll quote the relevant portion so that readers may decide for themselves: Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. [...] The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—"has no place in law under the Constitution." Additionally further muddying the issue is that the judgment directly moves from referencing Korematsu to referencing concentration camps. But as noted above, Korematsu dealt with exclusion, not internment in concentration camps as is often popularly believed (though Murphy's & Roberts's dissents dispute the distinction so the Trump v. Hawaii judgment may implicitly be validating this). Korematsu paragraph 20: It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. Future Challenges If another such order occurred, it would almost certainly reach the Supreme Court. The Court would then have to adhere to, reconcile with, or overrule Korematsu & Hirabayashi. In Hirabayashi, the following key piece of reasoning was given (and quoted in Korematsu): Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it. Regardless of personal beliefs, it is hard to argue the logic behind this particular statement (mainly because it is so broad, in my opinion). However, these "prompt and adequate measures" would still have to be weighed against the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, we now have a historical example of what may happen if race-based exclusion were allowed, and this could inform the justices' decision. A completely different way that such an order could be ruled unconstitutional could be through separation of powers violations. It could be ruled that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate the powers expressed in Executive Order 9066, but this is rare. It was mentioned in Hirabayashi, but the court did not consider this issue, saying that since Congress agreed with the order, this point was moot. Conclusion Though the letter of the law suggests that another order like Executive Order 9066 is possible, in practice it would face significant hurdles. Such an order would likely face challenges based on the Fifth Amendment and almost certainly make its way to SCOTUS. Then, it would be up to them to decide. I'll end with this quote from the late Justice Antonin Scalia: Well, of course, Korematsu was wrong [...] But you are kidding yourself if you think the same thing will not happen again.

tl;dr My assumption: the U.S. government is considering whether to accept refugees and immigrants (given your Syria comment). The background section talks about State attempts to restrict entry. The answer is nuanced since there are different standards for an entrance decision than there are for someone who is already in the U.S. This is because foreign nationals in their home nations aren't "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and so laws like the Civil Rights Act only apply in spirit. What does that mean? We wouldn't expect to see the federal government discriminate based on religion, but we might expect to see decisions made about groups that incidentally share an common religion. This is because the federal government has wide latitude when it comes to alienage---which is just a formal name for policies related to non-citizens. While religion is afforded a high degree of protection, the federal government's alienage policies are governed by the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This implies a practical challenge: things like religion and national origin can be very difficult to disentangle from questions that pertain to the alienage category. For example, a policy might restrict some group's entry "because of" a particular alienage reason and "in spite of" the fact that most of the affected people happen to share a common religion. Background The Equal Protection Clause U.S. Const. Am. XIV § 1 prohibits States from denying any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the laws." The Clause is often applied to the federal government as well, via the Due Process Clause U.S. Const. Am. V. See, e.g. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In relation to the clause, laws are reviewed for their constitutionality using either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would mean that in order to distinguish based on a particular trait, the government has to have a compelling, narrowly tailored interest, and no less restrictive alternative available. Rational basis just means the government's interest is subject to a lower level of scrutiny (e.g. benefits exceed costs, or don't let in felons). Things like, race, religion, national origin, and some forms of alienage are suspect classes that merit strict scrutiny. This bit about alienage is important. As we'd expect from the above, when States enact alienage statutes, they're subject to strict scrutiny, and when those statues cross the line, the courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In other words, the federal government, not the States, decides whether various "aliens" are admitted. Note: State scrutiny levels when dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967). As such, the courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to the federal government's immigration policy. One reason alienage is interesting is that it tends to encompass things like national origin and religion. This doesn't imply the federal government makes its decisions on the basis of religion. In fact, it'd be hard to make an argument that they do. However, since the categories can be so closely entwined, many scholars have argued for a change in standard. Edit In hindsight, this topic seems quite forward looking. A couple weeks after the OP's question a U.S. presidential candidate (Donald Trump) came out in favor of a ban on entry into the U.S. by Muslims. That led to a flurry of activity, and to this insightful blog post by Professor E. Posner.

In the United States, the government has, multiple times, destroyed homes while trying to catch a fugitive. And the homeowner sometimes makes a claim in federal court that this is an unconstitutional taking without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment. In Lech v. Jackson, the 10th Circuit decided that the police and city were not liable for destroying a house while trying to arrest a criminal who had fled there. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. But in Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas, less than 3 months ago, a district court declined to dismiss a case in which police destroyed a home to catch a fleeing criminal. Allegedly, in this case the police were given a key to the door, a garage door opener, and the code to the back gate by the homeowner - and instead of using those, they used explosives on the garage door and used a BearCat to knock down the fence and the front door. I'm not sure to what extent those facts, perhaps showing that the scale of the destruction was unnecessary, matter. To the best of my knowledge the case is still ongoing.

How is the 14th amendment relevant to the debt ceiling? My understanding is: The 14th amendment says that any debt the United States has taken on must be honored. Previous legislation by Congress prohibits the government from borrowing more than a certain amount of money. So far so good. I could probably understand the argument that the US government has the constitutional authority & duty to print any money needed to service the current debt. But I don't understand how the 14th amendment could possibly allow an increase of the debt ceiling as some are claiming. How could the obligation to service existing debt (by printing money, presumably) possibly confer the authority to take on new debt? What is the legal reasoning that would reach this conclusion from that premise?

Congress passes, and the President signs, a legal binding budget for the Federal Government that in broad strokes dictates "we will spend $6.2 Trillion dollars". They pass this budget, knowing full well that estimated Tax Receipts (how much money the Government takes in) will only be about $4.4 Trillion. The gap (deficit) of $1.8 Trillion must be borrowed, creating debt. The problem is that the Budget is legally passed and describes $1.8T to be financed, even though the Debt Ceiling limits that. The question is which one takes priority? The Constitutionally mandated Budget, or the Congressionally created Debt Ceiling? The 14th Amendment seems to indicate that the fulfilling the Budget has a higher priority than the Debt Ceiling construct.

It's essentially a legally enshrined incentive for high net worth investors to supply capital, which is consistent with the other entities that qualify in § 230.501. It tends to come with increased access to riskier offerings, where the risk ensues from exempted registration. While nominal dollar thresholds typically get eroded away by inflation, they needed a line in the sand to represent financial sophistication. Speculation: I suspect the initial number was a ballpark attempt to approximate the point at which individuals (at that time) tended to be involved in more complex projects (e.g. certain hedges and ventures).

An executive order is a way of memorializing in writing Presidential authority that is either expressly granted to the President by the constitution or statute, or is left to President by implication either from a lack of guidance or as a result of the structure of the constitution and historical precedent. Congress has wide discretion to legislate in a manner that limits the power to make executive orders and pass regulations, and can mandate that the administration issue regulations in a certain area or refrain from issuing regulations in a certain area where the Executive branch is denied discretion or denied the right to set overarching policies as opposed to deciding things on a case by case basis at a lower level in the bureaucracy. In principle, Congress could so micromanage the executive branch that it would be unconstitutional, but that is basically a hypothetical concept with no meaningfully well defined boundaries. The hard cases involve grants of regulatory authority subject to further approval by a subpart of Congress like a committee, as opposed to a full fledged act of law (something called a "legislative veto") which has dubious constitutional status despite being common. The main "meta-legislation" governing regulations in general in the federal government is the Administrative Procedures Act. Subject to the limitations imposed by Congress, a President can take any approach desired to making and changing regulations, but the APA does impose meaningful limits, in particular, on how and how fast, existing regulations can be changed, which may make it hard to eliminate two regulations for each new one that the administration wants to pass or is mandated by Congress to adopt to implement statutes it has passed. But, because a "regulation" is not a meaningfully defined unit, it is a pretty meaningless edict. You can satisfy it simply by cramming two sections of a bunch of regulations into one, essentially reformatting it for political cosmetics rather than making substantive changes, or by incorporating something else by reference. So, the 2 for 1 EO is basically an aspirational statement of policy and attitude more than it is a meaningful constraint. No one could sue the administration or invalidate a regulation it passed because it didn't comply with this EO.

Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.

The 24th Amendment states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. But, no one in incarcerated in prison (and hence loses the right to vote) merely for failing to pay taxes. Usually, one is incarcerated in prison on tax charges for fraud in connection with one's tax obligation which is different from failure to pay. (A misdemeanor conviction does not result in the loss of an ability to vote, even while in jail.) Refusal to pay, on grounds other than lacking the money (inability to pay isn't a criminal offense), when done without full compliance with other tax return filing obligations, is tantamount to tax litigation abuse and abuse of process, not mere failure to pay a debt.

Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.

Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.

No. Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution states The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them. Congress could include an increase to presidential compensation in the bill but it couldn't take effect until the next election.

Section 9 Criminal Justice Act applicable to family law? Nuanced, procedural thing. In the UK law system: Witness statement Position statement Statement of truth Statement under oath Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 Under section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, if the conditions specified in that section are met the written statement of a witness is admissible in evidence to the same extent as if that witness gave evidence in person. I would like to accomplish something similar to Section 9, but applicable to family law, not criminal law. Some google research about section 9, CJA means Criminal Justice Act: A s9 CJA statement is preferable because: s9 statements can, providing they have been accepted by the defence, be relied upon in court as evidence, without the witness attending court to give evidence; Section 20(2)(j) gives you the power to require a person to sign a declaration of truth. This is not the same as the perjury declaration required under s9 CJA; the latter includes an acknowledgement by the witness that they are liable to be prosecuted if they wilfully say anything that they know to be false or untrue; Or maybe procedures from criminal law are applicable to family law by cross-pollination? EDIT / UPDATE: Unfortunate wording "I would like to accomplish something similar to Section 9, but applicable to family law, not criminal law." I knew that I get the statement of truth but a breach here is "only" contempt of the court, not perjury, that's why enthusiastic towards Section 9 and CJA. EDIT / UPDATE: unfortunate context "gives you the power to require a person to sign a declaration of truth. This is not the same as the perjury declaration" I understand the different and I was hoping that by quoting this snippet I will highlight this knowledge. Now I've discovered yet another inconsistency: Statement of truth Declaration of truth Affidavit of truth "be produced on durable quality A4 paper with a 3.5 cm margin" 🤯 they are destroying court bundles anyway, what's the statutory definition of durable?

Section 9 CJA statements are for criminal proceedings, and there is no cross-pollination. For family law, see Rule 22.4, Family Procedure Rules 2010: 22.4.—(1) A witness statement is a written statement signed by a person which contains the evidence which that person would be allowed to give orally. (2) A witness statement must comply with the requirements set out in the Practice Direction 22A. (Part 17 requires a witness statement to be verified by a statement of truth.) Practice Direction 22A is quite long and difficult for me to reproduce in full here, but of particular note is Paragraph 4.1: Subject to paragraph 4.2 and rules 14.2 and 29.1, the affidavit/statement must, if practicable, be in the maker's own words, it should be expressed in the first person, and the maker should – (a) commence – (i) in an affidavit, ‘I (full name) of (residential address) state on oath .. ’; (ii) in a statement, by giving his or her full name and residential address; (b) if giving evidence in a professional, business or other occupational capacity, give the address at which he or she works in (a) above, the position held and the name of the firm or employer; (c) give his or her occupation or (if none) description; and (d) if it be the case that the maker is a party to the proceedings or is employed by a party to the proceedings, state that fact.

The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration." Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). "[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set "strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award." Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). "A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.

As the answer by Iñaki Viggers says, you should submit an affidavit, not simply a letter to the court. An unsworn letter will probably not be admissible at all. It is common for a witness to tell his or her story to the lawyer for the side that wishes to use the affidavit, and for the lawyer to then draft the actual affidavit in such a way that it will be acceptable to the court where it will be used. Then the lawyer sends it to the affiant (the person who would be a witness if s/he came to court, who is making the affidavit) with instructions. Generally an affidavit must be notarized or otherwise sworn to in front of an appropriate official. However, a person can draft his or her own affidavit. It is usual for it to be headed with the name and case number of the case where it will be used. It should include a statement that everything in it is true, and that the affiant swears (or affirms) this under penalty of perjury. It should include only relevant facts that the affiant has personally witnessed, not anything heard from anyone else, or guessed at or deduced. The facts should be stated clearly and simply. The affidavit should be signed in the presence of a notary, who will witness the signature and the oath that the contents are true. This WikiHow page describes the process in detail, with a template form.

Perjury is a crime in every state, and being a resident of a state is not a requirement for criminality. You can't lie in court just because you don't live in a state of the court. Compelling testimony of an out of state resident will require a court from the person's state.

Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).

This is allowed in Colorado. Colorado's version of the Uniform Probate Code authorizes such a document for tangible personal property which is usually called a "Personal Property Memorandum." This is authorized by Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. The section of Colorado's probate code states: Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. New York State Law NYS has a requirement that the Will is signed by 2 Witnesses and (I believe -- keep me honest) notarized. So I'm hoping this is a way for me to add items to the Appendix without needing to re-sign, re-witness and re-notarize every time I think of something else. Is this strategy valid & enforceable? This is generally not permitted in New York State The legal formalities for the execution of wills and trusts in New York States are among the most strict in the United States (Florida and Maine have been more strict from time to time). This cannot be done in a way that is valid and enforceable in New York State. One can determine this from a review of the relevant New York State Statute which is called the Estate, Powers, and Trusts Law (EPTL), that does not contain a parallel provision to the Colorado statutory section. Therefore, in New York States, all dispositive provisions of a Will related to tangible personal property must be executed with the same formalities as any other Will or Codicil (i.e. it must be signed by the testator and two witnesses, a notarization is not required). Oral and unwitnessed handwritten wills are rarely allowed in New York State New York State does recognize oral wills (called nuncupative wills) and wills in the handwriting of the person making them (called holographic wills) as well, but only in very limited circumstances. The pertinent provision of the EPTL state: (a) For the purposes of this section, and as used elsewhere in this chapter: (1) A will is nuncupative when it is unwritten, and the making thereof by the testator and its provisions are clearly established by at least two witnesses. (2) A will is holographic when it is written entirely in the handwriting of the testator, and is not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities prescribed by 3-2.1. (b) A nuncupative or holographic will is valid only if made by: (1) A member of the armed forces of the United States while in actual military or naval service during a war, declared or undeclared, or other armed conflict in which members of the armed forces are engaged. (2) A person who serves with or accompanies an armed force engaged in actual military or naval service during such war or other armed conflict. (3) A mariner while at sea. (c) A will authorized by this section becomes invalid: (1) If made by a member of the armed forces, upon the expiration of one year following his discharge from the armed forces. (2) If made by a person who serves with or accompanies an armed force engaged in actual military or naval service, upon the expiration of one year from the time he has ceased serving with or accompanying such armed force. (3) If made by a mariner while at sea, upon the expiration of three years from the time such will was made. Wills valid where executed will generally be honored If a Will accompanied by a Personal Property Memorandum were drafted and executed in Colorado while someone was domiciled there, and then was presented to a Surrogate's Court in New York State for probate, because the person who wrote it was domiciled in New York State when they died, however, the New York courts might honor the Personal Property Memorandum on the theory that the validity of the execution of a Will is usually governed by the law of the place where it is signed and not by the law of the place where it is probated. The alternative of a revocable trust in New York State A workaround somewhat similar to a personal property memorandum could be done with a revocable trust, but this has its own limitations. In New York State a trust or amendment to a trust not created by a last will and testament must be either (1) signed and notarized by the creator of the trust and also by the trustee if there is one separate from the creator of the trust, or (2) signed by the creator of the trust and witnessed by two witnesses in essentially the same way that a will would be witnessed. Unlike most U.S. states, New York State does not recognize trusts that are signed but are not notarized or witnessed, and unlike most U.S. States, New York State does not recognize orally created trusts. Trusts validly formed and amended outside of New York will generally be honored This is, of course, assuming in both cases that New York State law governs the formation of the trust. New York State choice of law rules, however, will generally recognize the validity of a trust formed with formalities that were valid in the place where it was executed if the person executing it was domiciled there.

It depends on the particular law in the particular jurisdiction in which you are charged. Most statute laws enumerate the defences that are available. In common law countries there is a general defence that (except in strict liability offences) the perpetrator must well ... perpetrate the criminal act; what you describe does not appear to meet that requirement. Other jurisdictions would not be so forgiving.

“Serious harm” is a requirement in the Defamation Act 2013 The Supreme Court interpreted it in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd & Anor [2019] UKSC 27 (12 June 2019) at [10-20]: ... it not only raises the threshold of seriousness above that envisaged in Jameel (Yousef) and Thornton, but requires its application to be determined by reference to the actual facts about its impact and not just to the meaning of the words. You, as the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that you have or are likely to suffer serious harm. That is harm that is greater than the previous common law threshold of substantial. In this case, the court agreed that serious harm had been done so it’s useful to consider what Lord Sumption said about the evidence that had (correctly) convinced the trial judge at [21] (my emphasis): On the footing that (as I would hold) Mr Lachaux must demonstrate as a fact that the harm caused by the publications complained of was serious, Warby J held that it was. He heard evidence from Mr Lachaux himself and three other witnesses of fact, and received written evidence from his solicitor. He also received agreed figures, some of them estimates, of the print runs and estimated readership of the publications complained of and the user numbers for online publications. He based his finding of serious harm on (i) the scale of the publications; (ii) the fact that the statements complained of had come to the attention of at least one identifiable person in the United Kingdom who knew Mr Lachaux and (iii) that they were likely to have come to the attention of others who either knew him or would come to know him in future; and (iv) the gravity of the statements themselves, according to the meaning attributed to them by Sir David Eady. Mr Lachaux would have been entitled to produce evidence from those who had read the statements about its impact on them. But I do not accept, any more than the judge did, that his case must necessarily fail for want of such evidence. The judge’s finding was based on a combination of the meaning of the words, the situation of Mr Lachaux, the circumstances of publication and the inherent probabilities. There is no reason why inferences of fact as to the seriousness of the harm done to Mr Lachaux’s reputation should not be drawn from considerations of this kind. Warby J’s task was to evaluate the material before him, and arrive at a conclusion on an issue on which precision will rarely be possible. A concurrent assessment of the facts was made by the Court of Appeal. Findings of this kind would only rarely be disturbed by this court, in the absence of some error of principle potentially critical to the outcome. So, you must prove that it is likely that prospective employers/schools will see the defamatory statements and that they are so grave that it is likely that you would be refused a position because of them.

When lords were tried by the House of Lords, where could they appeal to? If a lord was proceeded against then the HoL would be the venue of first instance. But where would the appeal go from there, and what was the venue of last resort? Or was it there be all and end all, ie at one and the same time the court of both first instance and last resort

Short Answer There were 30 House of Lords convictions of peers resulting in a punishment for the peer (in 29 cases a death sentence, and in the one final case, in 3 months of imprisonment) from 1499 until the practice was abolished in 1948, a time period covering all but the first 158 years of the 607 years during which House of Lords trials were available and the process was formalized. Of those convicted peers, 30% were pardoned or commuted by the monarch. There was no appeal from a House of Lords conviction other than a royal pardon or commutation. Modern criminal appeals did not exist in ordinary criminal cases either, in any part of the time period during which peers were convicted by the House of Lords of crimes for which we have good records (i.e. from 1499 to 1901). Ordinary criminal procedure compared This should also be viewed in the context of the history of ordinary criminal procedure in England (this link is the source applies to all of the discussion in this section). Prior to the year 1700, appeals consisted of a petition to the King or Queen resulting not in a pardon or commutation, but in a direction by the monarch for officials to determine if there were any serious errors in the process by issuing a discretionary writ of error, so it basically, another form of pardon type relief. The Writ of Error and some other procedural remedies short of an appeal existed from 1700 to 1907 in England but evolved over time. Initially, review other than discretionary review by the monarch was limited to a determination that the judge was really a judge in good standing with jurisdiction over the case, that the indictment described a crime, that a correct number of eligible jurors were seated and rendered a verdict, that the sentence was consistent with the sentence authorized by law. This kind of review of criminal convictions was similar to 18th and early 19th century habeas corpus review of convictions in the United States. Writs of error were also used discretionarily in the U.K. in this era in cases where the prosecution wanted to admit that it made a mistake and vacate a conviction. A detailed record of the proceeding that would make a more substantive review possible, however, was not available until 1886, and that was replaced, 21 years later, by the modern direct appeal of a criminal conviction based upon a trial court record include a transcript of the proceedings and all exhibits that had been admitted in the case. True formal direct appeals of criminal convictions in the modern sense, however, did not exist in England prior to 1907, after the last verdict of conviction was made by the House of Lords. So, there weren't true direct appeals in ordinary criminal cases either, in the time period when it would have been potentially relevant to appeals of House of Lords convictions. Of course, the monarch had the power to pardon or commute the sentences of people convicted of crimes in the U.K. in ordinary criminal cases, "since times immemorial", just as in House of Lords cases. But, people with ordinary criminal convictions, unlike peers convicted in the House of Lords, did not have the right to demand an audience with the monarch in the way that a peer did, which made the process of seeking pardons and commutations much less effective for commoners. Long Answer The right to be tried by other peers was established around the time of the Magna Carta, formalized in 1341, and formally abolished in 1948. Prior to 1695 it was before only a jury of nobles hand picked by the monarch to rule as the monarch desired, when parliament was not in session, but after that the entire House of Lords participated in each trial. From 1547 to 1841, there was no punishment after a first offense other than treason or murder, which was just a strike to open up the possibility of punishment for a second offense, and greatly reduced the need for an appeal. According to Wikipedia (references omitted): The right of peers to trial by their own order was formalized during the 14th century. A statute passed in 1341 provided: Whereas before this time the peers of the land have been arrested and imprisoned, and their temporalities, lands, and tenements, goods and cattels, asseized in the King's hands, and some put to death without judgment of their peers: It is accorded and assented, that no peer of the land ... shall be brought in judgment to lose his temporalities, lands, tenements, goods and cattels, nor to be arrested, imprisoned, outlawed, exiled, nor forejudged, nor put to answer, nor be judged, but by award of the said peers in Parliament. The privilege of trial by peers was still ill-defined, and the statute did not cover peeresses. In 1442, after an ecclesiastical court (which included King Henry VI of England, Henry Beaufort and John Kemp) found Eleanor, Duchess of Gloucester, guilty of witchcraft and banished her to the Isle of Man, a statute was enacted granting peeresses the right of trial by peers. By the reign of Henry VII of England [reigned 1485-1509], there were two methods of trial by peers of the realm: trial in the House of Lords (or, in proper terms, by the High Court of Parliament) and trial in the Court of the Lord High Steward. The House of Lords tried the case if Parliament was in session; otherwise, trial was by the Lord High Steward's Court. In the Lord High Steward's Court, a group of Lords Triers, sitting under the chairmanship of the Lord High Steward, acted as judge and jury. By custom, the number of Triers was not fewer than 23, so that a majority was a minimum of 12, but in fact, the number ranged from 20 to 35. The power to choose which peers served as Triers lay with the Crown and was sometimes subject to abuse, as only those peers who agreed with the monarch's position would be summoned to the Court of the Lord High Steward, thereby favoring the desired verdict. This practice was ended by the Treason Act 1695, passed during the reign of King William III. The Act required that all peers be summoned as Triers. All subsequent trials were held before the full House of Lords. In the House of Lords, the Lord High Steward was the President or Chairman of the Court, and the entire House determined both questions of fact and questions of law as well as the verdict. By convention, Bishops and Archbishops did not vote on the verdict, though they were expected to attend during the course of the trial. They sat until the conclusion of the deliberations, and withdrew from the chamber just prior to the final vote. At the end of the trial, peers voted on the question before them by standing and declaring their verdict by saying "guilty, upon my honour" or "not guilty, upon my honour", starting with the most junior baron and proceeding in order of precedence ending with the Lord High Steward. For a guilty verdict, a majority of twelve was necessary. The entire House also determined the punishment to be imposed, which had to accord with the law. For capital crimes the punishment was death; the last peer to be executed was Laurence Shirley, 4th Earl Ferrers, who was hanged for murder in 1760. From 1547, if a peer or peeress was convicted of a crime, except treason or murder, he or she could claim "privilege of peerage" to escape punishment if it was his or her first offence. In all, the privilege was exercised five times, until it was formally abolished in 1841 when James Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan, announced he would claim the privilege and avoid punishment if he was convicted of duelling. He was acquitted before the introduction of the bill. The last trial in the House of Lords was that of Edward Russell, 26th Baron de Clifford, in 1935 for manslaughter (he was acquitted); the following year the Lords passed a bill to abolish trial by peers but the Commons ignored it. The right to trial by peers was abolished when the Lords added an amendment to the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which the Commons accepted. Now peers are tried by juries composed of commoners, though peers were themselves excused from jury service until the House of Lords Act 1999 restricted this privilege to members of the House of Lords. The right to be excused was abolished on 5 April 2004 by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Peers were and still are, hypothetically, subject to impeachment. Impeachment was a procedure distinct from the aforementioned procedure of trial in the House of Lords, though the House of Lords is the court in both cases. Charges were brought by the House of Commons, not a grand jury. Additionally, while in normal cases the House of Lords tried peers only for felonies or treason, in impeachments the charges could include felonies, treason and misdemeanours. The case directly came before the House of Lords, rather than being referred to it by a writ of certiorari. The Lord High Steward presided only if a peer was charged with high treason; otherwise, the Lord Chancellor presided. Other procedures in trials of impeachment were similar, however, to trials before the House of Lords: at the conclusion of the trial, the spiritual peers withdrew, and the temporal Lords gave their votes on their honour. The last impeachment was that of Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville, in 1806 for misappropriating public money (he was acquitted). Since then, impeachment has become an obsolete procedure in the United Kingdom. The ultimate appeal was to the King or Queen personally, and the right to personally petition the sovereign called "access to the sovereign" is one of the traditional privileges of peerage that U.K. nobles held: according to Sir William Blackstone in 1765, "it is usually looked upon to be the right of each particular peer of the realm, to demand an audience of the King, and to lay before him, with decency and respect, such matters as he shall judge of importance to the public weal." The privilege of access is no longer exercised[.] In the time period from 1499 to 1901 there were 30 convictions of peers by the House of Lords that were not excused by peer privilege (there were no other convictions after 1901), all of which except a 3 month sentence in 1901, were death sentences. Seven of those convicted were pardoned by the monarch (most recently in 1746). Two peers had a death sentences commuted by the monarch to imprisonment in 1603. Two more escaped before being executed in 1716, and one died of other causes before he could be executed in 1589. Only three death sentences were carried out following House of Lords convictions since the last royal pardon in 1746. (There were five other House of Lords convictions for offenses other than murder or treason prior to 1841 and punishable by a sentence other than death, but in all five of those cases, the "privilege of peerage" was used to vacate any punishment for the crime of conviction because it was a first offense, so no appellate review or royal pardon or commutation was necessary.) Thus, 30% of peers convicted and sentenced to death by the House of Lords were pardoned or had their sentences commuted by the monarch. There was no forum outside of the House of Lords other than a royal pardon to which an appeal was available. Incidentally, 30 convictions of offenses limited to murder and treason in this time period isn't vanishingly low. Before the recent contraction of the House of Lords, it had about 730 peers at any one time, so in the 449 year period for which we have records, there were about 328,000 person years of potential defendants, with a conviction for murder or treason every 11,000 or so person years. This is quite high by modern standard for an exceedingly privileged and carefully socialized group of people who didn't have access to firearms for most of that time period.

The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case.

There is currently no means for the Earl to disclaim his title, if it has been longer than the permitted period since he inherited it. He also could not do so if he was the first holder, since the 1963 Act only applies to inheritance, and he cannot disclaim a life peerage. The reasoning from 1963 is that the Act was made for people who wanted to sit in the House of Commons, but could not do so due to an accident of birth - something they had no say in. For a life peerage, or peerage of the first creation, they should have refused the honour at the time it was offered. The situation is now a bit different thanks to the removal of all but 92 hereditary peers from the House of Lords in 1999, and the resignation provisions in the House of Lords Reform Act 2014. If the Earl were one of the 92, then he could not disclaim the peerage until he resigned, or was disqualified under other provisions of the 2014 Act. On resignation, he would become able to vote in general elections, stand as a candidate, and sit in the Commons if elected. (By the way, Church of England bishops who are members of the Lords can also resign, but do so in a different way.) So any hereditary or life peer who feels that they are disenfranchised by virtue of sitting in the Lords also has the means to leave that chamber. That makes it difficult to make a human rights claim on the basis of Article 3 of the First Protocol. The European Court of Human Rights has upheld other kinds of voting restrictions in parallel circumstances, such as Ahmed and others v United Kingdom [1998]. In that case, several local government officials were barred from certain political activities, including standing for election, and brought a claim against the UK concerning violation of Articles 10 (free expression), 11 (free association) and 3 of Protocol 1 (free elections). The Court found that the restrictions were justified, and in particular that the applicants could avoid them by resigning. An opposite case was X v United Kingdom [1978] in which the applicant claimed a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) because he claimed to have the right to sit in the Lords but his petition to the Queen was denied. The Commission found that participating in the legislature is part of public law as opposed to a "civil right" within the scope of Article 6. Also, granting or withholding an honour has traditionally been held to be immune from judicial review - cited for example in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 - although this conclusion may no longer be completely solid since the well-known 2019 Miller case. That would apply for aspects of a peerage which are purely ceremonial in nature. The Earl might want to argue that his free expression is impaired by having a hereditary title at all. But there is nothing stopping him from calling himself by an ordinary name. British law doesn't require him to be called the Earl in any context, and there are plenty of peers who use their normal names while working at normal jobs. He has a defined place in the order of precedence, but I am not convinced that the situation would arise where he insisted on going to a fancy dinner and had a contretemps with the host over the seating arrangement that amounted to a human rights violation. Equally, he has the right to wear an Earl's coronet at a royal coronation, but our newly republican Earl would probably just not go. In the case of the Earl Marshal - a hereditary office which goes along with being the Duke of Norfolk - there are non-trivial duties involved, and an Earl Marshal might justifiably want to stop doing them. The past procedure has been for the Crown to appoint a Deputy Earl Marshal instead, as was done in 2000 when the Duke at the time was unwell. It would seem that a similar manoeuvre would work for any other hereditary offices that were more than nominal. If the Crown refused to do this, then perhaps a claim could arise under Article 14 (discrimination on the grounds of birth), but it would require a particularly intransigent Crown. Hereditary peers may hold property in a variety of entertaining feudally-derived ways, in addition to more familiar modes. The most relevant scenario to imagine is that our Earl owns Exampleshire Castle in "fee tail", meaning that he can't dispose of it even though it is horribly expensive for him to keep paying for repairs to its leaky roof - it must pass to his eldest son, and so forth. Even if the Earl is able to disclaim his peerage, he may still be on the hook for the property, depending on how everything is structured. However, there are generally legal workarounds these days, beyond the scope of this question, unlike when entails were so important to the plots of historical stories featuring the aristocracy. There is a current campaign by daughters of some peers to change the inheritance laws away from male-preference primogeniture, including on human rights grounds. It remains to be seen how that will work out, but a key difference here is that they are losing out by not being able to inherit, while the Earl is able to divest himself of all the disadvantages of the title, by simply not using it.

An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to.

You have to distinguish between the Tory party and the UK parliament. The UK parliament just had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May and lost. Had they won, parliament would have had to come up with a different government (for example the same government except for a different PM, or a government formed by the current opposition) that would have a majority to rule, or there would be new elections. The Tory party could legally do lots of things, but they are bound by their party rules. They had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May maybe a month or so ago, and she won. According to the Tory party rules, there cannot be another such vote for one year, so right now and for the next eleven months, they can't replace her. If that vote a month ago had not happened, they could. But that is all not because of some law, but because of the rules this party set for itself.

I haven't found any cases where this defence has worked. I strongly suspect that that's because it never has. Every piece of advice I've read on this unsurprisingly suggests you'd be a fool to attempt to rely on this defence in court, including some cases in which defendants have attempted to rely on it and have failed. There are a couple of Freedom of Information requests to the government which state very clearly that it won't work: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statute_law_4 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/consent_of_the_governed The last link is particularly clear on the matter: every citizen of the UK tacitly consents to be governed, according to Blackstone. And this one makes it even clearer: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/18097/response/56511/attach/html/3/TO%20255452%20TO09%205866.doc.html Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Acts of Parliament override common law. So it simply wouldn't be possible to argue that you choose to live under the common law alone; no court in the land would allow it, as it's a cornerstone of our legal system that Parliament is sovereign, and therefore that statutes enacted by Parliament will 'trump' the common law. Parliament derives its sovereignty from the fact that the current government is elected and therefore represents the citizens of the UK, and for this reason, Acts of Parliament take priority over case law. On that basis, it wouldn't be possible for a citizen to argue that they choose not to abide by statute: their consent is tacitly assumed. Based on all the above, then, I would say no: the 'common law' defence will never hold water if relied on in court.

You file an appeal. In federal courts, the procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the process begins with filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4. The process is fairly similar in all the state courts, as far as I know. If you've identified a problem with a ruling other than the final decision of your case, you could also file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. You would typically not use this procedure to contest the court's final judgment, as it would likely take so long to decide that your opportunity to appeal would be expired.

The judicial rank of English judges is abbreviated to letters after their names, but not their personal titles. High Court judges always receive a knighthood or damehood on appointment, so, to take Tim's example, John Donaldson became Sir John Donaldson on his appointment to the High Court, but in court he was Mr Justice Donaldson, abbreviated in reports or written argument to Donaldson J, and on promotion to the Court of Appeal he was Lord Justice Donaldson or Donaldson LJ. (In person in court he would have been addressed as "My Lord", and in other settings as "Sir John".) Beyond that it becomes more complicated. For the time he was Master of the Rolls, the reports refer to him as "Sir John Donaldson, MR". The UK Supreme Court replace the House of Lords and the highest court for the UK (leaving aside the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) in 2009. The judges in the House of Lords were full members of the House, so they were peers, in fact, since 1887 as a special type of life baron (not hereditary) known as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. So they were always referred to by their titles, as in the case of Lord Donaldson (barons always being referred to as "Lord" unless it is necessary to make the rank explicit); however, letters after the the were used for the Lord Chancellor, as in Lord Hailsham, LC. (There was at one time a convention that the Lord Chancellor would get a promotion to viscount, the next higher rank in the peerage, as in the case of Viscount Cave, LC.) When the Supreme Court came into being in 2009, the existing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary became the first judges of the Supreme Court. Since they were already Lords, they were, of course, referred to by their titles. Subsequent appointments are given the courtesy title of Lord or Lady, though they are not made barons/baronesses, so they cannot sit in the House of Lords. (While the courtesy titles are comparable to the Scottish judges' titles, the immediate need was for parity between new appointments and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary: Courtesy titles for Justices of the Supreme Court.) The head of the Supreme Court is the President. This is abbreviated by letters after the name in the reports, so the current president (Baroness Hale of Richmond, having become a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in 2004) is referred to as Lady Hale, P.

Can artists file for plagiarism if their art is used in AI models to make AI art, given that there is proof they're the authors of their work? (I am an IT student writing a report proposing using blockchain technology to attribute "art" files, used in AI models, to their authors. I know next to nothing about copyright laws for creative works) Suppose metadata in the files used for AI models to generate new derivative art can be attributed to their original authors. Would it be enough for authors to file for plagiarism under lack of attribution and compensation for art generated this way? If not, what must be changed in the legal system so that artists get justice for supposed art theft?

"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.

Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.

It's still under copyright, so you'd need to contact the publisher for permission, although if the artist (or in this case the executor of the estate Lynn Caponera) still retains the rights to the work sometimes going straight to the them can be a better option, especially in this case as it's for a non-profit and for a library in particular. The library also might have certain rights for reproduction, they generally pay a bulk fee to publishers but outside lending I'm not sure what that covers, so I'd check with the library manager (either branch or regional depending on who handles legal and licensing) as well.

Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged.

Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.

Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation.

Under US law, and I believe under the laws of most countries, each of the various photographs of the apple would be protected by copyright. Thew initial owner would be the photographer, or perhaps the photographer's employer, in each case. Copyright protects expression, including both words and image. It does not protect ideas. The idea of an apple is not protected. The specific representation of a particular apple would be. If the painter imitates the specific feature of the apple shown in the photographs, to the extent that the painting is a derivative work of one or more of the photos, then the painter needs the permission of the copyright holder(s). Without that permission, creating the painting is infringement of copyright. However, if the painter merely took the general idea of an apple, and created a new expression of that idea, without using any of the specifics of the photos, there there would be no infringement. If the photos were instead images of an imaginary thing, perhaps a dragon, or some invented machine of building perhaps, with the images created by perhaps a compute animation program, or by photographing a model, the legal rules would be the same. If the painter simply used the idea from the photos, there is no infringement. If the painter used sufficient specific detail so that the painting is a derivative work, then permission is required. Exactly how much detail must be used for a work to be considered "derivative" is a matter of judgement -- ultimately the judgement of a court if the matter is disputed. There is no clear bright line making that distinction. That C has commissioned the painter T to create the painting is not relevant, unless C is the copyright owner of the photos, or has secured permission from the copyright owner(s). If C validly grants permission, then there is no copyright issue even if the painting is a derivative work. It does not matter what technique or technical means T uses to create the painting. T may use a brush, a pallet knife, a toy car, drips of paint, or a compute drafting program. If, by whatever means, T creates a derivative work, then permission is needed or else it is an act of infringement merely to create the work. If the work is not derivative, then no permission is needed. Copyright law applies no matter what specific technique the creator of an image uses, provided that human creativity is involved.

Copyright is for original pieces of work. What you have made, is essentially a derivative work. Copyright is automatic for all things, unless the author has explicitly waived their rights, normally through a license. What this means, is that you have created a piece of art, that has been derived from that of the original author. You made modifications to the original artwork to produce a new one. Your creation could not, and would not have effectively existed without the original. Your image has the same shape, and the same colour tones as the original, and would likely be considered a derivative work. Since the right to derivative works is an exclusive right to the copyright holder, you would be infringing their copyright.