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Are FBI agents eligible to be whistleblowers? According to this summary document on house.gov, they're not. I thought this was very interesting considering all the hubbub in the House of Representatives about the FBI agents being or not being whistleblowers. Who Is(n’t) Covered? Most executive branch employees, former employees, and applicants fall within the WPA’s protections because they are part of the merit system that governs the federal civil service under Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Employees of the Government Publishing Office, a Legislative Branch agency, are also covered. (5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)). However, some executive branch employees are excluded from the WPA’s protections, including (but not limited to): ❖ Political appointees (e.g. federal inspectors general) ❖ Uniformed military service members ❖ Noncareer Senior Executive Service employees ❖ Employees of the 17 different intelligence community “elements” and the FBI ❖ Members of the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps ❖ Officers of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) Commissioned Corps ❖ Employees of the U.S. Postal Service

This particular list of excluded branches seems to refer to those who are able to excercise whistleblowing protections through the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. It does not mean that employees excluded by these rules would be unable to whistleblow at all. Rather, the government channels through which they are able to seek protection are likely through a different office. In so far as I can tell, USOSC might restrict the FBI from protection services because they protect employees who go to the Media. FBI agents often handle classified material which would not be allowed to be disclosed to the media and many intel agency employees are required to submit any documents they intend to publish based off knowledge aquired from their employment for a pre-publishing review to make sure no classified material is leaked, and would thus limit the way the employee could whistleblow. Just because this particular office does not provide protection services to the listed employees, it does not mean there is an agency or department that does provide them (Usually the Office of General Inspector for the particular agency in question. While they are attached to the agency they cover, they are not within the chain of command of the agency itself and are independent to them.). For that reason, just because the rules that apply to most do not cover FBI Whistle Blowers, it does not mean an FBI employee cannot become a whistle blower. They just cannot use the services of USOSC in their whistleblowing efforts.

The various seals of the United States Government aren't governed by copyright but by 18 U.S. Code § 713. Section a covers the great seal of the United States (emphasis mine): Whoever knowingly displays any printed or other likeness of the great seal of the United States, or of the seals of the President or the Vice President of the United States, or the seal of the United States Senate, or the seal of the United States House of Representatives, or the seal of the United States Congress, or any facsimile thereof, in, or in connection with, any advertisement, poster, circular, book, pamphlet, or other publication, public meeting, play, motion picture, telecast, or other production, or on any building, monument, or stationery, for the purpose of conveying, or in a manner reasonably calculated to convey, a false impression of sponsorship or approval by the Government of the United States or by any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. Based on a plain reading of the law, it would seem that you are allowed to reproduce the seal so long as you do not do it in such a way that would convey approval by the government to do so. If you actually intend to do this, you may consider checking with a competent attorney to make sure your use does not "convey a false impression of sponsorship." Note that this only applies to the great seal, the rest of the section covers the seals of the President, Vice President and the houses of Congress and specifically requires approval by an appropriate entity before reproduction of those seals, depending on the context.

Perhaps. The relevant law is assembled into notes on 3 USC 102. The original act of 1963 defines President-elect in this manner: (c) The terms 'President-elect' and 'Vice-President-elect' as used in this Act shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the office of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained by the Administrator following the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. There is no specific statutory provision directing the Administrator of the GSA to ascertain who is that President-Elect. The administration is apparently taking a position similar to that taken by the Clinton administration, that states determine who has been elected, and the states have not officially determined who has been elected: nor has a candidate conceded. If a court orders the Administrator to make the ascertainment, I expect that the administration would appeal the ruling up to the Supreme Court. This letter, addressed to the Administrator, gives the legal rationale.

There is a legal doctrine of executive privilege, where the executive branch can resist subpoenas, but that privilege is limited (US v. Nixon). Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. SCOTUS pointed to the kinds of cases where such privilege would be valid Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the Constitution. But otherwise, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice Decades later, Harriet Miers claimed executive immunity (as White House counsel) to a subpoena to testify before the Committee on the Judiciary, and the district court ruled rebuffed that claim There are powerful reasons supporting the rejection of absolute immunity as asserted by the Executive here. If the Court held otherwise, the presumptive presidential privilege could be transformed into an absolute privilege and Congress's legitimate interest in inquiry could be easily thwarted. if the Executive's absolute immunity argument were to prevail, Congress could be left with no recourse to obtain information that is plainly not subject to any colorable claim of executive privilege. However, executive privilege has been invoked dozens of times since Nixon – there are no other SCOTUS decisions. We should set aside current political posturing. POTUS might claim executive privilege, and then the question is whether the courts would order Banon to testify. We don't know the basis for such privilege, but we can assume that it would involve national security issues (thus might be within the penumbra of the Nixon ruling). Traditionally, executive privilege has involved the person who is president, not the person who ended up becoming president, so it would be extremely surprising if the courts upheld immunity in a pre-election matter.

In the United States: Government law enforcement agencies have no specific duty to provide security to an individual. This was established in Warren v. DC: The duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists. Private security personnel don't have any special duties above those enumerated in their contract. The closest legal requirement to provide aid to another may be under the common law "duty to rescue" concept, but statutory law on that does not seem substantial in the United States.

The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question.

I will address only the legal issues. Prosecutors for very good public policy reasons are not required to prosecute every crime they have suspicions about. When exercising this discretion they consider: Is the act, in fact, criminal - many of the things you list, while reprehensible, unethical, and possibly immoral are not actually criminal. Do they have the resources (time, staff, money) to collect the evidence and run this case as opposed to the thousands of other crimes out there. There are always more crimes than can be prosecuted and these have to be prioritised in some way. Do they have enough evidence to gain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People can be fired or resign on suspicion, they can't be convicted on it.

The list is enormous. For example, if subpoenaed to appear in a legal case, you must appear pursuant to the order. If ordered to pay child support, you must pay child support. If you are an executive in a company, you may not act on the basis of non-private information regarding the company. Your comment that "If it's not detailed on this list, you'll probably never be concerned with it, eg, gun registration laws and other situations that don't apply to most residents" applies to a number of things on the list, for example most people are not called for jury duty, probably the majority of people are not subject to property tax requirements. most people do not have to register for the draft. By adding "If X...", you can make these into universal rules – everybody that meets the filing requirements must file federal income taxes. Non-citizens have a few additional requirements, but they are a drop in the bucket compared to the general case, obey the law which applies to everyone.

Can misrepresentation in a contract of professional credentials of an employee invalidate the contract? My question is somewhat like this one but involves a registered architect and an employee ... In a particular jurisdiction, a person is not permitted to describe themselves as an architect, unless they are registered with a relevant authority. A registered architect (Alice) employs another person (Belle) who is not a registered architect but who is (mis)represented by Alice as being a registered architect. Conrad enters into a contract with Alice for her to build a home. The contract states that there will be two architects, Alice and Belle, working on the project. They are each identified by name followed by 'Architect'. Conrad is unaware that there has been any misrepresentation. Alice is described as having a supervisory role over the whole project. Conrad doesn't know the extent to which Alice actually does, or does not, supervise work. Conrad receives regular invoices, on which the line items say things like: Alice (architect), 10 hours, $2000 Belle (architect), 10 hours, $1000 Things go seriously wrong with the project. Conrad is unsure of the extent to which the problems are attributable to Alice or Belle. As a result of a conversation with the registration authority regarding a possible complaint, Conrad discovers that Belle is not an architect, and that she has been misrepresented as such. Questions Would the misrepresentation be considered to be "material"? Would Conrad have to prove that he would not have entered into the contract if he had known that Belle was not an architect? Does Conrad have to show that the standard of work from Belle was not the standard of work that would have come from an architect? Conrad does not doubt that the hours attributed to Belle are honestly attributed, but is it material that the work is shown as having been done by "Belle (Architect)"? My question is hypothetical. I'm interested in what kind of view consumer and contract law take to the misrepresentations in the contract and the invoicing.

new-jersey I'm going to provide an answer based on my experience and obligations as a Professional Engineer (PE), which is generally similar to the obligations of an Registered Architect (RA). You do not state exactly what is meant by 'things go seriously wrong with the project,' but in general it doesn't matter. What truly matters is that Alice is the Registered Architect and Belle is not; this is reflected in the billings whereby Alice is charging $200 an hour and Belle is $100 an hour. The fact that things have gone seriously wrong with the project is now Alice's fault. Even if the fault is in an error that Belle made, it is still Alice's fault because of their obligation of 'Responsible Charge'. In NJ, the definition for Responsible Charge is detailed in Chapter 13:27 for RAs and 13:40 for PEs, but is generally the same to mean that the professional in responsible charge shall provide effective supervision over all aspects of the work. Would the misrepresentation be considered to be "material"? Probably not unless either the contract provided a clear definition on what is meant by the term 'architect' or there is relevant law that defines what that term is and how it may be used within business. In NJ, there is a definition for 'Engineer', but it's only applicable within the bounds of Chapter 13:40 and is not intended to limit how the word might be used throughout the State. As a whole, someone operating a train can still call themselves an 'Engineer'. Furthermore, we use the term to describe lots of different people within the engineering profession. For example, you might see billings for Engineer I, Engineer II, Engineer III, Engineer IV, etc. all attempting to provide more diverse billing structures to make hourly rates match experience levels. Furthermore, there are plenty of times in the United States as a whole, where someone might be fully registered and licensed in one state but not another. Would Conrad have to prove that he would not have entered into the contract if he had known that Belle was not an architect? It's likely not relevant. As I described above, there are a litany of reasons why both could be described as an Architect, but what truly matters is that one of them is a Registered Architect and thus has responsible charge over the issuance of plans. Does Conrad have to show that the standard of work from Belle was not the standard of work that would have come from an architect? No. Alice is the Registered Architect who signed the plans. The standard of work by Belle is by default the standard of work of Alice whom has responsible charge. If Alice has issued plans that are fundamentally flawed, the error is their fault. Conrad does not doubt that the hours attributed to Belle are honestly attributed, but is it material that the work is shown as having been done by "Belle (Architect)"? No. As a matter of resolution for this, I can say that you're more likely to get something done in a cost-effective manner by raising a complaint with Alice than anyone else. To exemplify, a few years back a friend of mine had hired an architect to design a building addition for their home. The architect's scope of work included completing a survey of the existing structure so they could base their design upon it. During construction, it was revealed partway through that the proposed expansion was going to conflict with the existing windows on the second floor. This is not acceptable for a litany of reasons, but it should've been discovered in design, not construction. Reviewing this issue with my friends, I encouraged my friends to document the issue in detail, meet with the Registered Architect on-site, and demand a solution. Thankfully, this went well and the RA accepted fault for the error. The costs of revising plans and additional construction costs was simply borne by the RA. Had the RA refused to accept fault, the next alternative would've been to make a claim against the RA's insurance carrier for Errors and Omissions. E&O insurance is stupidly expensive, but also absolutely necessary for an RA to operate. It's often much cheaper to just pay the cost of plan revisions and construction change orders than to have a lot of claims on your E&O.

Unless your lease clearly denies the possibility of prorating, the emails are binding (and yes, emails count as in writing). The landlord ought to honor the conditions outlined in the emails, and it is not your fault that the manager was ignorant about his or her employer's/landlord's policies at the time the manager computed the prorated amount. Additionally, if the lease only speaks in terms of 20-day notice, then it implies that prorating may apply. It is possible that the lease contains language in the sense of when the notice becomes "effective". If so, that would require a more detailed review of the language therein, since even in that scenario you might prevail on the basis of the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here the difficult part seems to be that you are not in the US. Because the amount at issue is not high enough, the grievance/complaint would have to be filed in Small Claims court. And, as far as I know, the parties cannot be represented by a lawyer in Small Claims court. You might have to file your grievance once you are back in the US.

Does an agreement in a chat count as a valid contract? In most jurisdictions (and for most transactions): yes. Usually the only thing that matters for a valid contract is that there is a mutual agreement – whether that is in writing, orally, via chat or via sign language does not matter. Of course, having things in writing makes it easier to prove in court if there is a problem, so it's still advisable. What steps could I take if they don't send the money? You can: remind them to pay if they still don't pay, you can sue them. Some juridictions have accelerated court proceedings for simple cases like this (e.g. Gerichtliches Mahnverfahren in Germany), otherwise you will have to sue in a regular court that deals with contract disputes. But I have no names and I am unsure what they can or have to do after they received the package. This is going to be the main problem. It's no good to enter into a contract if you do not know who the other party is :-). You definitely need to find out who exactly entered into an agreement with you. If the sale is to a private person, find out their name and address. If the sale is to a business (seems to be the case here), find the official name and legal type of the business, and make sure whoever you deal with is authorized to enter into contracts. Otherwise the contract will be hard to enforce in court if things go wrong.

Dale is right; here are the details from CA statutes: Since 1872, CA law has told CA courts to assume the parties to contracts in CA are reasonable, not crazy. If the literal reading of the contract is crazy, the California Civil Code's rules for the Interpretation of Contracts tells its courts: ignore the crazy reading. Here is what the statute says: § 1636 A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. To win under this section, you would need to claim that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. No judge would believe this. § 1637 For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, if otherwise doubtful, the rules given in this Chapter are to be applied. To win under this section, you would need to claim that there is no doubt that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1638 The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity. To win under this section, you would need to claim that it was reasonable that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1640 When, through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded. To win under this section, you would also need to claim that both you and the landlord really intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Since no judge would believe this, any judge would rule that the wording was a mistake, and should be disregarded. § 1643 A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties. Ditto.

Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.

The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature).

It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs.

Possibly. Under UCC 3-402, a representative can sign for a party. There are some conditions though. One is that the signature should show unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of the person identified in the instrument. If the signature is not clear that the signature is made in a representative capacity, the representative is liable. The only thing that a digital signature adds is the possibility that it is impossible to unambiguously show this because of the software. It seems from the internet that Docusign allows this.

Can an improper prosecution defeat the double jeopardy rule? If a case is brought under let's say murder and it is deemed the incorrect law to have charged the defendant with. Let's say due to an incompetent DA if the defendant is found not guilty because of the incorrect law he was charged with breaking, could new charges be brought for the correct offense, let's say manslaughter? Is double-jeopardy applied to cases brought under the same event? One death that the defendant is charged with or can an improper prosecution defeat the double jeopardy rule? I would hope an incompetent DA is not the accused's problem.

Typically at trial, the "Trier(s) of Fact" (usually the Jury, unless the defendant requests a bench trier, then it's the judge) will have instructions from the "Trier of Law" (always the Judge) that will allow them to find guilt for "Lesser and Included Charges". For example, in the U.S., unjustified homicide (legal definition used for manslaughter and murder) comes in three broad types: 1st Degree Murder, 2nd Degree Murder, and Manslaughter (ordered from worst to lesser offense). All the elements to convict on Manslaughter exist in 2nd degree murder, and all elements to convict on 2nd degree murder exist in 1st degree murder. This means that a jury can be given the option that if they don't think the evidence supports a 1st degree charge, they can see if it supports a 2nd degree or Manslaughter. However, they can only convict on the charge or the the most serious "Lesser and Included" charges. They cannot find guilt for all three for the same offense. This is not in violation of double-jeopardy as this is all presented at the same trial. Double-Jeopardy attaches once the jury is fully selected. If the jury acquits, the prosecutor cannot try for a lesser charge. They have one shot. The only time that you can be tried for the same crime a second time is if you are acquitted and it turns out that you were acquitted because the "trier of fact" was corruptly influenced by you or people acting on your direction to find you not guilty (the idea being since the fix was in, you were never in jeopardy to begin with). In all of American Law, this has happened exactly once, so it is very rare. Mistrials are another way to get a second trial but mistrials typically come about because of either lawyers misbehaving such that an impartial trial is no longer possible (if it's the prosecutor, they can't retry... if they could it would incentivize them to misbehave in front of a jury that is not favorable to them in the hopes of refiling and getting a more favorable jury). Mistrials rely on a legal fiction that the trial that was declared a Mistrial never happened in the first place. If the mistrial is declared on appeal, it is only to the benefit of the convicted, so it is essentially him waiving his right against Double-Jeopardy. Depending on the reason, the prosecution may not refile the case (usually because new exculpatory evidence was found) or cannot (if they did not reveal the exculpatory evidence prior to the trial). Edit: Since this is U.S. specific, it should be pointed out that in the United States, Double Jeopardy applies only to one jurisdiction. At any given time in the U.S., you are almost always under 2 jurisdictions (the state/territory's jurisdiction and the Federal government's jurisdiction) and as much as 7 (at the "Four Corners" you are under the Jurisdiction of four states, 2 tribal governments (which are independent of the states those reservations exist in) and the Federal Government). This means that if the state charges you with a crime and fails to properly prosecute you, the Feds can also charge you with a crime and prosecute you properly. Typically, the Federal government will prosecute you only if there are federal laws that you violated that the state has no equivalent of OR the state has done an optionally poor job of prosecuting you or properly punishing you (we're talking 30 days jail time for 1st degree murder). It is rare for the feds to go after common criminals and they only will go for them if the crime involves crossing state lines as an element of the crime OR the crime involves federal property. YOu are more likely to see federal kidnapping charges against non-custodial parents who take the kid to another state than you are Federal Murders. Typically, the Feds will be satisfied if the crime is tried in state court, no matter the result (it also helps them getting away with the Dual Jurisdiction rule. You can't challenge it if you aren't made a victim of it). To give an example of when they might come in, if a non-U.S. citizen enters the United States by way of illegal crossing of the Canada-U.S./Montana Border, and then proceeds to kill a U.S. border agent in the process and is caught by Montana State Police, who can prosecute him and for what? Montana can prosecute him for one count of 1st Degree Murder for the murder of a person under the jurisdiction of Montana (the border guard). The Federal Government can prosecute him for one count of 1st Degree Murder for the killing of a person under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Federal Government, an additional count of Murder under the Felony Murder rule (If someone dies as a result of your illegal criminal action, that death is a 1st degree Murder) or under the law against killing a federal employee while carrying out their duties (this second option might be rolled in with the killing someone under Federal Jurisdiction). Montana cannot prosecute the accused for the Felony murder because U.S. states cannot enforce immigration law. Therefore, in the eyes of Montana, the accused was not committing a crime that lead to someone's death. He just killed a man. The feds will likely have Montana take first crack at the case because Montana has more immediate access to labs and evidence than the Feds and because states tend to be quicker about this stuff. Once the case resolves, the Feds will then figure out if they want to charge him for both Murder charges and the Immigration violation, only the Felony Murder Charge and Immigration violation (and accept Montana's outcome of the similar murder charge), or just the Immigration violation (and accept the outcome of Montana's trial for both possible Federal murder charges). For academic purposes, the trial for the Immigration Charge will likely be held after the sentence for the Montana charges (if there are any) are carried out because deporting the suspect back to Canada (or his home country) will result in zero jail time because no element of the crime took place there.

Short Answer No. Double jeopardy of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits someone from being prosecuted more than once for the same factually specific crime (i.e. "the same offense"). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The original acquittal was correct, because it was for a crime that did not happen. The later trial is for a different crime that actually did happen at a different time. In the same way, an acquittal for a DUI committed on Tuesday does not bar prosecution of the same defendant for a different DUI committed on Thursday. So, double jeopardy does not apply in the scenario presented. A Similar But Harder Case The analysis would be trickier if: A shoots B. A is tried and acquitted for the murder of B. B was only presumed dead but was actually alive. After being acquitted for Bs murder, B dies of the gunshot wound from A in (1). A is later arrested and tried for Bs murder (a second time). This is a much trickier question, because A was actually tried and acquitted of a crime that hadn't been completed at the time of trial, but in which A's involvement had terminated at the time. (To make it even more complex if you are inclined, in a first degree kidnapping case, the death penalty applies unless the defendant can prove the affirmative defense that the victim didn't die, and a first degree kidnapping acquittal would probably not bar a later murder conviction because the offenses have elements sufficiently different from each other, even though the death penalty or life in prison without parole sentence for that offense is based on the conclusive presumption that the victim died in law, rather than in fact.) Issue Preclusion This might depend upon the nature of the evidence at trial - if A did not raise the failure of the prosecution to provide corpus delecti (i.e. a dead body) or the misidentification of an alleged victim's body as a defense and instead, for example, argued an alibi defense (e.g. he was in jail at the time of the alleged shooting). This narrow fact pattern would be a particularly close question and I wouldn't be surprised to see a court deviate from the usual precedents and general rules under these circumstances. There is a substantial body of case law on whether prosecution for a crime with elements A, B, and C bars prosecution for a crime with different elements arising from the same facts and circumstances (e.g. if acquittal of a lesser included offense whose elements must all be proved to convict on the more severe offense provides double jeopardy protection), that wouldn't be directly applicable in my alternative scenario because the offense tried the first time and the second would have exactly the same elements. This depends upon when a concept analogous to the principle of collateral estoppel (also known as "issue preclusion") in civil cases, in which facts previously litigated can bind a party in a later lawsuit, with or without constitutional double jeopardy dimensions, applies in criminal cases. As a general rule, there was historically no doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal cases as noted in a 1967 law review article. But, the U.S. Supreme Court has also adopted a limited version of the principle of collateral estoppel under the guise of the double jeopardy clause in criminal cases as it noted in Yeager (discused below) a few years after that article was written. [I]n Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970). . . we squarely held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial. The hard question is determining what a jury's acquittal "necessarily decided" in particular facts and circumstances, given that a jury verdict in a criminal case typically only determines if the jury convicted, acquitted, or hung on each of the charges presented to it in the indictment and not dismissed before tiral. This analysis requires the court to assume that the jury acted rationally, even if extraneous facts allow us to know that it did not act rationally, and to determine that a prior acquittal was logically inconsistent with a new conviction. In Yeager v. U.S. (2009), however, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Ash v. Swenson narrowly. It held that hung juries on counts should be ignored for constitutional purposes as if that the trial of that count never happened. When Is A Murder Committted? There would also be a question of when the crime of murder is committed (i.e. when the acts are taken or only once someone dies). Generally, murder is not a complete crime until someone dies. For example, if you were prosecuted for murder before someone died and acquitted because they were alive, you could be prosecuted again for murder later if they died of their injuries. (The more usual case is that someone is tried and convicted of assault, then the victim dies, and they are retried for murder, which is allowed since a conviction for assault is not logically inconsistent with a conviction for murder.) Similarly, if you were convicted of murder after a fair trial and presented the live body of the victim as newly discovered evidence, there is a good chance that you could have the original conviction vacated. If, however, you were convicted, and the Court found that you knew that the victim hadn't died at the time of trial, but you did not raise the fact that the victim wasn't dead, it isn't clear if you could have the original conviction vacated because it was a fair trial and you knew evidence sufficient to get yourself acquitted (which you may have refrained from presenting to avoid conviction on a lesser charge like kidnapping or aggravated assault), and the status of an "actual innocence" grounds for vacating a conviction after trial is hotly disputed, conservatives like the late Justice Scalia generally say "no", liberals generally say "yes", moderates like to say "yes" but make it almost impossible to establish except in rare cases like one where a live person walks in when there was a murder conviction for killing that actually living person. Obviously this doesn't come up all that often because usually prosecutors don't bring murder cases until they find a body and identify it and aren't in a rush to do so because there is usually no statute of limitations for murder. Conclusion In The Harder Case My overall conclusion is that double jeopardy would not apply even in the much closer case. This is because a belief that the victim was not dead could have been a basis for the original verdict notwithstanding a presumption to the contrary. The jury knows that a death is a element of murder and might have acquitted not based upon the reasons presented to it at trial but based upon their own personal view that the failure to present a body left them with reasonable doubt for some reason or another, which is a perfectly plausible scenario. If this happened, an acquittal the first time and conviction the second time wouldn't be inconsistent, even if no one argued about a lack of a body in their trial presentation. Ironically, if A was acquitted of aggravated assault of B in the first trial, that would be far more likely to bar a conviction when B later dies, than an acquittal from a charge of murdering B, because murder is logically inconsistent with an acquittal of aggravated assault in most circumstances, but a previous murder acquittal based upon lack of proof of a dead body is not inconsistent with proof of a later death. But, this would still be a close case that could come out either way on the double jeopardy issue. A court could conceivably argue that if the death of B was not contested at trial, that the first murder acquittal would be inconsistent with a murder conviction upon the death of B later on from the events that formed the basis of the first prosecution. Tactical Considerations Of course, even if prosecution of A for B's murder the second time was not be barred by double jeopardy, it is still likely that the prosecution would agree to lesser charges or not prosecute because the first acquittal showed it was a weak case, and the fact that A would now also be able to argue that the gunshot was not the proximate cause of B's death (and that it was instead, for example, due to medical malpractice or was a de facto suicide due to refusal of adequate treatment). Scope Of Analysis This reasoning would apply anywhere in the U.S. and is not specific to a particular state or territory as double jeopardy is a principle of U.S. Constitutional law that applies directly in federal courts (including the courts of territories and commonwealths) and indirectly through selective incorporation against the states via the 14th Amendment.

They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court.

How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.

Can a jury render a verdict that contravenes with binding precedent? Yes, but (if it is a guilty verdict) it will be overturned on appeal. The appeal court will say that the jury's verdict was not one which any reasonable jury could have made on the basis of the evidence and the instructions in the case. As explained in Dave D's answer, the trial judge will have explained the law, including the binding precedent, to the jury. So if we get to this stage then the jury is disregarding instructions. The above process is the remedy. You may notice a 'gap' where the jury can unlawfully acquit a person and there's nothing anyone can do about it, because of the rule against double jeopardy (that is, you can't appeal against an acquittal). This is called jury nullification, because the jury has nullified the relevant criminal law by acquitting an offender.

Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called "jury nullification." And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you "roll the dice" there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move.

Yes, this is plausible. To be doctrinally precise, "jeopardy" attaches when the jury is sworn in. Once jeopardy attaches, there can only be a second trial if: The defendant is convicted of a charge that is reversed on appeal or in a collateral attack on the conviction. There is a mistrial that is attributable to the defendant or the defendant's counsel's conduct (e.g. the defendant is observed by the bailiff trying to bribe a juror with cash in exchange for voting to acquit), or is requested by the defendant or his counsel (who has not been "goaded" into doing so by the government). There is a mistrial that is not attributable to the conduct of either the prosecution or the defendant. As explained here: Mistrials are generally not covered by the double jeopardy clause. If a judge dismisses the case or concludes the trial without deciding the facts in the defendant's favor (for example, by dismissing the case on procedural grounds), the case is a mistrial and may normally be retried. Furthermore, if a jury cannot reach a verdict, the judge may declare a mistrial and order a retrial as was addressed in United States v. Josef Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824). When the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial, even if the prosecutor or judge caused the error that forms the basis of the motion. An exception exists, however, where the prosecutor or judge has acted in bad faith. In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), the Supreme Court held that "only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion."

There is a legal concept of de minimis: the idea that some offenses, civil or criminal, are too small to be worth prosecuting. For example, a photograph of a city scene that incidentally captured part of a copyrighted billboard in one corner of the image infringes the copyright on that billboard. But if the copyright holder were to sue, it's virtually certain the suit would be thrown out due to the minimal nature of the infringement. Technically speaking, yes, what you describe is a crime. But any prosecutor who tried to bring charges to that effect is likely to be chewed out by the judge for wasting everyone's time. (Incidentally, assuming the reporter and property owner are US citizens, the crime is failure to cross at a designated crossing point (19 USC 1459, a customs offense) rather than improper entry (8 USC 1325, an immigration offense).)

Can a prosecutor challenge a gubenatorial pre-emptive pardon? In a state where the governor has power (Do (any) US State Governors have legal authority to preemptively pardon persons of a state crime?) to pardon a capital crime before prosecution, does a prosecutor who learns of the governor's intent to pardon have any way to force prosecution?

There is no recourse The Pardon results in the pardoned person having no liability for the act, no matter if it was a crime or not, and no matter whether the pardon pre-dates a prosecution. There is no legal or political way to appeal a pardon. There isn't even a way to take back a pardon! As a result, the prosecutor or the next governor can do nothing.

It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.

Is there something in the language of the act that makes sexual harassment a civil rather than a criminal offence? Yes. Laws that create criminal offenses have to have language to the effect of "violation of this law is punishable by up to X years of imprisonment or a fine of up to $Y", or "violation of this law is a Class Z felony." Sometimes it is not entirely clear if violation of a law can form a basis of a private civil lawsuit, or if it can only be enforced by government officials, from the language of the statute alone. When it is unclear the courts have to resolve that ambiguity. In rare instances, it may be clear that some parts of a statute have criminal penalties, but due to unclear wording and punctuation in the statute, it is hard to tell precisely which parts of the statute these criminal penalties apply to, and in those cases, courts also have to resolve that ambiguity. There is also some conduct that it is constitutional to punish with a civil penalty, but not as a crime that can result in incarceration. For example, it is unconstitutional in most states to incarcerate someone for failing to pay a debt, but there can be a civil penalty for failing to pay a debt. Courts decide if these constitutional limitations are violated. Similarly, while Congress can enact both crimes and civil penalties, there are some governmental bodies, like school districts or water boards, that have the power to enact certain civil penalties, but do not have the authority to create new crimes. Was that up to the lawmakers to decide, or is that just something that evolved out of the ways the courts and prosecutors responded to sexual harassment claims? And who decides such things in general? Generally, this is decided by lawmakers. Obviously, however, anyone can lobby legislators to take one position or another. Also, the fact that something has a civil penalty does not necessarily mean that prosecutors aren't the people who enforce the law. Sometimes violations of the law prosecuted by prosecutors have civil rather than criminal penalties. For example, many tax law violations are prosecuted by government lawyers with civil penalties, but only a small minority of tax law violations are prosecuted criminally. Further, it isn't uncommon for a type of offense, like securities fraud, to have both civil penalties and criminal charges available as remedies that can be enforced by prosecutors. And, when that happens, prosecutors get to decide which tool to use. For example, even if exactly the same conduct could be prosecuted with either a civil penalty or a criminal charge, prosecutors might prefer a civil penalty because the burden of proof is much lower, the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not apply (you can refuse to testify but that fact can be used against you in a civil penalty case), and a defendant in a civil penalty case doesn't have a right to a lawyer at government expense. Also, enforcing a civil penalty generates net revenue for the government most of the time, while criminal punishments normally cost the government more money to carry out than any revenue the government may receive from the person found guilty for fines and court costs. On the other hand, trying to enforce a significant enough civil penalty to discourage misconduct against someone who has no money or property may be a futile effort, while criminal sanctions could discourage misconduct from other similarly situated people in the future.

On the contrary, it is unethical for a prosecutor to bring a case where there is no reasonable prospect of conviction. The prosecutor is an officer of the court and as a representative of the state, their primary concern is the guilty are convicted and the not guilty are not.

He can, to the extent that there is a federal charge involved. There is no limit to the power to "grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States", but there is no power to grant reprieve or pardon against a US state or foreign country. In other words, a presidential pardon would prevent the person from being tried or punished by the US federal government. It would not prevent them from being tried or punished by a state or foreign government.

No. This is not a provision that the testator or testatrix (i.e. the person writing a will) may waive in advance. But, the slayer statute does not get invoked unless an interested person invokes it in a probate proceeding after a death, and if no interested party wishes to invoke it, the will would be given effect anyway (just as it would in a case where no one could prove that someone was a slayer). Some states apply the slayer statute to will substitutes, and some do not. Similar laws that revoke dispositions upon divorce are pre-empted for interests in employee benefit plans subject to ERISA, but the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to resolve the issue. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) (pre-empting divorce revocation statutes, but declining to decide whether ERISA preempts state statutes forbidding a murdering heir from receiving property as a result of the killing) (cited as good law in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) at footnote 14); Wasserman v. Schwartz, 364 N.J.Super. 399, 836 A.2d 828 (2001) (circumventing ERISA pre-emption). But see, Herinckx v. Sanelle, 281 Or.App. 869, (Oregon App. October 26, 2016) (Oregon slayer statute pre-empted by ERISA and reviewing variations in state slayer statutes). A notable comprehensive review of the California and common law rules regarding how the slayer statute applies in murder-suicide cases where the victim and suicidal killer own property in joint tenancy is found in In re Estate of Castiglioni, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, 40 Cal.App.4th (Cal. App. 1995). The murder-suicide scenario is also addressed in depth in the case In re Gleason, 947 N.Y.S.2d 761, 36 Misc.3d 486 (Surrogate's Court 2012). Also, the definition of homicide that qualifies under the slayer statute sometimes covers only certain forms of homicide. For example, it might apply in cases of murder or manslaughter, but not in cases of negligent homicide. Alaska, for example, takes the minority position that unintentional homicides suffice to invoke the slayer statute, subject to a manifest injustice exception. In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006).1 There is unsurprisingly little or no case law on an intentional waiver of these provisions, and assisted suicide would often not qualify as an eligible homicide although this would vary from state to state. But see, Colorado Proposition 106 (adopted by voters November 8, 2016) as it pertains to insurance benefits. A Sample Statute The currently effective section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (modeled on the Uniform Probate Code, which is highly influential to legislative drafters and in courts with common law rules, but is not actually adopted verbatim by a majority of states) which are applicable to this issue reads as follows: § 15-11-803. Effect of homicide on intestate succession, wills, trusts, joint assets, life insurance, and beneficiary designations (1) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument. (b) "Felonious killing", except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, is the killing of the decedent by an individual who, as a result thereof, is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or enters a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter, as said crimes are defined in sections 18-3-102 to 18-3-104, C.R.S. (c) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the decedent. (d) "Killer" is any individual who has committed a felonious killing. (e) "Revocable", with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the decedent, at the time of or immediately before death, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of the killer, whether or not the decedent was then empowered to designate himself or herself in place of his or her killer and or the decedent then had capacity to exercise the power. (2) Forfeiture of statutory benefits. An individual who feloniously kills the decedent forfeits all benefits with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective-share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, the decedent's homestead exemption under section 38-41-204, C.R.S., exempt property, and a family allowance. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed his or her intestate share. (3) Revocation of benefits under governing instruments. The felonious killing of the decedent: (a) Revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrument, (ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the killer, and (iii) nomination of the killer in a governing instrument, nominating or appointing the killer to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, or agent; and (b) Severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship or as community property with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common. (4) Effect of severance. A severance under paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the killer unless a writing declaring the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such property, as evidence of ownership. (5) Effect of revocation. Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the killer predeceased the decedent. (6) Wrongful acquisition of property. A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this section shall be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from his or her wrong. (7) Felonious killing; how determined - time limitations on civil proceedings. (a) Criminal proceedings. After all right to appeal has been waived or exhausted following the entry of a judgment of conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious killing of the decedent, such judgment conclusively establishes the convicted individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section. (b) Civil proceedings. Notwithstanding the status or disposition of a criminal proceeding, a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the petition of an interested person, shall determine whether, by a preponderance of evidence standard, each of the elements of felonious killing of the decedent has been established. If such elements have been so established, such determination conclusively establishes that individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section. (c) Time limitations on civil proceedings. (I) A petition brought under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) may not be filed more than three years after the date of the decedent's death. (II) Notwithstanding any provision of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) to the contrary, if a criminal proceeding is commenced in a court of this state or in another jurisdiction against an individual for the felonious killing of the decedent, a petition brought under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) may be filed so long as the petition is filed no later than one year after all right to appeal has been waived or exhausted following an entry of a judgment of conviction, or a dismissal, or an acquittal in the criminal proceeding. However, if the death and the possible culpability of the slayer for the felonious slaying of the decedent is not known to the petitioner within the three-year period of limitations established pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c), the accrual of the action under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) and the possibility of the tolling of the running of the three-year period of limitation under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) shall be determined according to the principles of accrual and tolling established by case law with respect to similar limitations established under section 13-80-108, C.R.S. (d) Judgment of conviction. For the purposes of this subsection (7), a "judgment of conviction" includes a judgment of conviction on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a judgment of conviction on a verdict of guilty by the court or by a jury. (8) Protection of payors and other third parties. (a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a felonious killing, or for having taken any other action in reliance on the beneficiary's apparent entitlement under the terms of the governing instrument, before the payor or other third party has received written notice as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8). A payor or other third party shall have no duty or obligation to make any determination as to whether or not the decedent was the victim of a felonious killing or to seek any evidence with respect to any such felonious killing even if the circumstances of the decedent's death are suspicious or questionable as to the beneficiary's participation in any such felonious killing. A payor or other third party is only liable for actions taken two or more business days after the payor or other third party has actual receipt of such written notice. Any form or service of notice other than that described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8) shall not be sufficient to impose liability on a payor or other third party for actions taken pursuant to the governing instrument. (b) The written notice shall indicate the name of the decedent, the name of the person asserting an interest, the nature of the payment or item of property or other benefit, and a statement that a claim of forfeiture or revocation is being made under this section. The written notice shall be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. (c) Upon receipt of the written notice described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8), a payor or other third party may pay to the court any amount owed or transfer to or deposit with the court any item of property held by it. The availability of such actions under this section shall not prevent the payor or other third party from taking any other action authorized by law or the governing instrument. The court is the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents' estates located in the county of the decedent's residence. If no probate proceedings have been commenced, the payor or other third party shall file with the court a copy of the written notice received by the payor or other third party, with the payment of funds or transfer or deposit of property. The court shall not charge a filing fee to the payor or other third party for the payment to the court of amounts owed or transfer to or deposit with the court of any item of property, even if no probate proceedings have been commenced before such payment, transfer, or deposit. Payment of amounts to the court or transfer to or deposit with the court of any item of property pursuant to this section by the payor or other third party discharges the payor or other third party from all claims under the governing instrument or applicable law for the value of amounts paid to the court or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court. (d) The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. A filing fee, if any, shall be charged upon disbursement either to the recipient or against the funds or property on deposit with the court, in the discretion of the court. (e) Upon petition to the court by the beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, the court may order that all or part of the property be paid to the beneficiary in an amount and subject to conditions consistent with this section. (9) Protection of bona fide purchasers; personal liability of recipient. (a) A person who purchases property for value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. However, a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section. (b) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted. 1 The other four states and District of Columbia arguably adopting the minority position that negligent homicide invokes the slayer statute are as follows, from footnote 5 of the dissent to the Alaska Supreme Court's decision cited above. The District of Columbia slayer statute covers homicide resulting from grossly negligent conduct. See Turner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 614, 615 (D.C.1985) (explaining that the slayer statute covers "unintentional killing derived from reckless or grossly negligent conduct"). Louisiana's slayer statute covers all criminal homicide. In re Hamilton, 446So.2d 463, 465 (La.App. 1984) (holding that slayer statute "was intended to include situations such as that presented by this case, where a beneficiary does not intentionally and feloniously cause the death of the insured but is nonetheless held criminally responsible for that death"). North Carolina's common law slayer rule prohibits inheritance after any wrongful homicide. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1975); Matter of Estate of Cox, 97 N.C.App. 312, 388 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1990). The continued application of this common law rule has been criticized in light of a slayer statute barring only intentional killers from inheriting. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-3; see also generally Julie Waller Hampton, The Need for a New Slayer Statute in North Carolina, 24CAMPBELL L. REV. 295 (2002). Kentucky Revised Statute § 381.280 bars inheritance from those convicted of any felonious homicide. "Reckless homicide" is a felony. KRS § 507.050. Kentucky defines "reckless" as "a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe." KRS § 501.020. Reckless homicide in Kentucky is therefore equivalent to criminal negligence in Alaska under AS 11.81.900(a)(4). Kansas Statute § 59-513 states that "[n]o person convicted of feloniously killing, or procuring the killing of, another person shall inherit." Involuntary homicide under Kansas law extends to "killing of a human being" committed recklessly, during a misdemeanor, or "during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner." KS ST§ 59-513. This arguably could extend to grossly negligent conduct, especially as KS ST§ 21-3201 explains that "[t]he terms 'gross negligence,' 'culpable negligence,' 'wanton negligence' and 'wantonness' are included within the term 'recklessness' as used in this code." A federal district court has held that Kansas's slayer statute does not apply to negligent homicide, and there appear to be no state cases interpreting the scope of the statute or applying it to negligent homicide. Rosenberger v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F.Supp. 379, 382–83 (D. Kan. 1959) (explaining that "the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute must have been to give effect to the common-law rule"). The Kansas slayer statute is essentially unchanged since Rosenberger.

I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions).

No. The Pardon Clause only extends the power to pardon "offenses against the United States," which essentially means that the president can only issue a pardon in a federal criminal case. A contract claim is civil rather than criminal, and governed by state law rather than federal, so the Pardon Clause would not affect the president's liability.

Can a founder of a non-profit company in Germany (gGmbH) receive a salary? Unlike a normal GmbH, a founder/partner (Gesellschafter) of a gemeinnützige GmbH (or a UG) may, according to the tax code, not receive any profits: Die Mitglieder oder Gesellschafter (Mitglieder im Sinne dieser Vorschriften) dürfen keine Gewinnanteile und in ihrer Eigenschaft als Mitglieder auch keine sonstigen Zuwendungen aus Mitteln der Körperschaft erhalten. -- § 55 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 Satz 2 AO Roughly translated: The members or partners (members within the meaning of these regulations) may not receive any portion of the profits and in their capacity as members, may not receive any other benefits from the funds of the corporation. However, people can be hired by a non-profit company and some websites indicate that Geschäftsführer (CEOs) can be paid, and even a Gesellschafter (partner) may be a CEO, for instance: Würde sich nun ein geschäftsführender Gesellschafter ein zu hohes Gehalt auszahlen, könnte das als verdeckte Gewinnausschüttung gewertet werden -- firma.de - Der Geschäftsführer einer gGmbH: Das müssen Sie wissen If a managing partner were to receive too high a salary, this could be interpreted as hidden profit distribution. Does the tax code above not explicitly exclude a partner from receiving a salary, even as a "CEO"?

The crucial phrase is "in ihrer Eigenschaft als Mitglieder". This restricts the prohibition on receiving benefits from the gGmbH to benefits you'd receive because you are a partner. It is common to have more than one legal relationship with a (g)GmbH, and being a CEO or otherwise employed by one is a typical situation. The snippet from the law does not restrict what benefits you may receive in your CEO role, just those in your partner role. The distinction is also relevant for regular GmbHs: If you are the CEO of a GmbH as well as a partner, then your salary as CEO is taxed differently than your share of the profits. But typically the tax on salary will be higher than the tax on profits, so there is little incentive here to overpay yourself.

Are the monetary donations collected by the recipient subject to federal taxation according to IRS law? Yes. Usually, money received from an activity from third-parties with no personal relationship to you (assuming that "you" are not a tax exempt organization), are taxable income under Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law, as a form of "compensation for services", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(1), or as "gross income derived from business", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (exactly which prong of I.R.C. § 61(a) it comes under isn't legally relevant for tax purposes in this situation). This is also informed by I.R.C. § 83(a) (which is a general rule even though the balance of the Code section applies mostly to equity compensation in entities), which states in the pertinent parts (material in brackets inserted for clarity): If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of the fair market value of such property . . . over the amount (if any) paid for such property [by the person who receives the property], shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services[.] But, gifts are expressly excluded from income under Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law. One point which the case law makes clear, however, is that an obligation to pay doesn't need to be a legally binding obligation to make a payment something that counts as income rather than a gift. The tax law instead looks at the substance of the interaction and the reality of how decent, well mannered people would act under circumstances in which they receive an uncompensated benefit. Ultimately, whether are voluntary payment made through a private individual or business's website is taxable income or is not taxable because it is a gift is a case by case determination to be made in light of all of the relevant facts. For example, if your mother donates $7,500 to your website on your birthday, even though all of your other "donations" are from third-parties whom you have never met in person in amounts from $5 to $100 and you have provided all of those other third-parties with some kind of service or benefit through your website (e.g. they were allowed to read free webcomics or listen to music you wrote and recorded without charge over the website), the donation from your mother probably counts as a gift, even though the other donations probably count as income taxable income. But, in the absence for any reason for the donation other than gratitude for the performance of the services provided by the website, or for the conduct of the business that the website belongs to, the donation will generally be treated as income under Sections 61 and 83, rather than as a gift under Section 102. The notion of a gift is normally limited by case law and suggestive related section of the Internal Revenue Code that illustrate its intended meaning in the case of gift loans and bargain sales made for donative purposes, to circumstances in which the person making the gift has received nothing in return for it. A donation to a website usually wouldn't meet this test to show a transfer's character as a gift. The most familiar example, upon which there is a great deal of case law and authoritative guidance, is that tips paid to restaurant and hospitality industry workers are income rather than gifts, and are subject not only to income taxation but also to FICA payroll taxation. These tipping situations are closely analogous to voluntary payments made through a website. There are a great many tax regulations, court cases interpreting tax law, and authoritative guidances from the IRS (such a revenue rulings) that address the basic concepts that I've set forth above. And, the income tax law authorities are further informed by the statutes and case law governing gift taxation, which is, as intended, interpreted to define a gift in a matter that dovetails more or less perfectly with the definition of a gift for purposes of Internal Revenue Code Section 102. As the IRS explains at its website discussing the gift tax for which the concept of a gift is defined consistently with the income tax concept of a gift: The gift tax is a tax on the transfer of property by one individual to another while receiving nothing, or less than full value, in return. The tax applies whether or not the donor intends the transfer to be a gift. The gift tax applies to the transfer by gift of any type of property. You make a gift if you give property (including money), or the use of or income from property, without expecting to receive something of at least equal value in return. If you sell something at less than its full value or if you make an interest-free or reduced-interest loan, you may be making a gift. Donations which are not income are gifts and there is a tax on gifts given (paid by the donor rather than the person receiving the gift). But, there is a $15,000 per donor per donee exception per year from gift taxation for gifts under the Internal Revenue Code, in addition to more than $12 million per lifetime per person exemption from gift and estate taxation for gifts in excess of this $15,000 amount (called the annual exclusion) and inheritances left at death. So, usually, if a transfer is treated as a gift rather than as income, no tax will be due. But this part of this answer's short summary of the law is the top level conceptual framework for all of those other subordinate tax law authorities. Also, this income is also subject to self-employment taxation, which is imposed in lieu of FICA on income which is not a wage, salary or employment-related tip. Often self-employment taxes are due on self-employment income even when no federal income tax is owed upon it. if there is a clear answer, do states with personal income taxes do the same regarding website donations? Most states and localities with a personal income tax start from the federal definition of income and modify that definition in ways that the taxing jurisdiction deems fit either to make sense (limiting the tax to income related to the state, for example, at least for non-residents), or to fit local policy preferences (e.g. exempting from income taxation, capital gains made in an investment in the state favored by state lawmakers). Almost no states or localities have chosen to deviate from the federal definition of income for income tax purposes with respect to donations made to websites that are not non-profit entities.

Do I have to pay taxes if I register the domain but the website income belongs to someone else? No. The person or company who runs, and/or profits from, the business is the entity under obligation to pay all the applicable taxes: Value Added Tax, income tax, corporate tax, and so forth. Unless you charge a significant amount therefor (see the comments), the mere registration of just one domain is unlikely to trigger tax obligations.

Yes, but maybe no. In many state universities that I am familiar with, there are contractual guarantees that exempt regular academic staff from the "we pwn all your stuff" rule, which does not extend to other staff. (I had to toss back a contract for subcontracted work once because they asserted automatic ownership of copyright). It depends on your contract, entirely. Which, if it is non-existent, is a bit problematic. Their claim would be based on "work for hire" law, 17 USC 101, where the central question is whether it is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment". If this is a work for hire, they have more than a right to the proceeds of the work, they own the work and can sue you for publishing without permission. Work for hire means they own the copyright, and only the copyright owner can authorize publication. You do not legally have to have an attorney to request a release, but you should have one, because if you request a release, you are admitting that this is a work for hire. Your lawyer would tell you not to admit to such a thing. Of course, if you are reasonably certain that this is a work for hire and don't intend to contend otherwise, that kind of foot-shooting is not a concern. If your lawyer delivers a formal letter to your boss, the boss will almost certainly hand it to the university attorneys, and both parties will then take the hardest line possible, in defense of the interests of their clients.

The "contract" (sometimes called a charitable pledge or a pledge to make a donation) is not enforceable under contact law because there is no consideration. From a contract law perspective, it isn't really a contract at all. This fact pattern is literally the "standard" example of a "contract" that is unenforceable for lack of consideration. The promises made in the charitable pledge might be enforceable under an equitable doctrine called promissory estoppel, if someone detrimentally relies upon the promise made in the contract and it is not inequitable to do so. As a practical matter, however, donees almost never sue to enforce a pledge to make a donation. A donative pledge should also be distinguished from a transfer document, which is also not a contract. In a transfer document, the donor is unilaterally giving something to someone, and the recipient is signing merely to affirm that they accept the transfer being made to them, rather than rejecting the donation and disclaiming it.

I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account.

This answer to a related question sums up the relevant concepts regarding work for hire. Since, according to your description of your relationship to A, you are not an employee (Commun. for Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid 490 U.S. 730), and you do not a written agreement, under US law, this would not be a work for hire: thus you hold copyright to something. I presume Company A gave you the source code and you are rewriting it to fit some technical requirement, so you have been given permission by the copyright holder to create a derivative work. You do not gain copyright to the original code: you only hold copyright to what you wrote. You would therefore need the permission of the copyright holder (of the original program) to sell copies of the modified program (currently A, company B in the future once the transfer is complete). There isn't a special "signing-over" ceremony for permission to copy, but the situation you describe is very messy. Even without a written agreement, you do understand that they intend to make multiple copies of the resulting program which includes your contribution, and you have received something of value in exchange for your contribution. So, one would argue, you have at least given permission to copy your stuff, even without a piece of signed paper -- in hiring you, you have given them an implied license to use what they paid you to create. The unclarity would be in whether you transferred your property rights, or simply licensed them to use it. Hence the recommendation to get an IP attorney.

The Code defines "Source of income" as: lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to a representative of a tenant. There's nothing to suggest that the occupation is a relevant consideration otherwise. What it would mean is that if the occupation of a person is relevant to their source of income, it would be illegal to discriminate on that basis. I would consider occupation distinct from source of income - I could (but don't) have a family trust that is my source of income, and my occupation is volunteer work. My occupation is very clearly not my source of income.

Property ownership of liquidated company Around a decade ago the company I was working for launched a new startup. It was owned by my company and I was tasked to work as a consultant helping them set up their IT infrastructure 50% of my time. As they were using completely different setups I was given an additional laptop. The startup was always its own legal entity so the laptop was owned by them. After a couple of months my work was done but they asked me to keep my laptop in case they have some follow up questions. Roughly 2 years later the startup was carved out of the company as a completely standalone entity (with a majority share from the company I was working for). Unfortunately a year later it became insolvent and was liquidated eventually (long time ago completed). All this time I was still having the laptop I was given to work with. Recently I was searching for something in my cellar and I found that laptop. I was curious, what is the ownership situation of this laptop now? I have no plans to actually find someone to give it back to, but legally speaking, what would be my obligation in this scenario? My jurisdiction (Switzerland) does not have a lot of people on here, so I am open to any countries, I am most interested in Western European laws, but also what would apply for example in the US.

The company continues to own all its assets australia The appointment of a liquidator to does not change what the company owns - it just changes who is in control (the liquidator rather than the directors) and the purpose for which it is being run (realisation of assets for the benefit of creditors rather than as a going concern for the benefit of shareholders). The laptop still belongs to the company. The liquidator's job is to sell all commercially realisable assets and distribute the proceeds to the creditors. When they have done that (which can take years), they get a release from the court, and the company is deregistered 3 months later. Any assets of a deregistered company belong to the shareholders. A 3-year-old laptop is not a commercially realisable asset, so it's not something a liquidator would be interested in. You could tell the liquidator you have it, and they are welcome to collect it at any reasonable time. They will probably say, "keep it."

When selling a residential property in the UK, you normally fill out a form called the TA10 Fittings and Contents Form, which outlines everything in the property included in the sale. This isn't a legal requirement, but your conveyancing solicitor will normally recommend it. Anything else left in the property after the completion of the sale is still, legally, a possession of the previous owner and the new owner is obliged to inform them of these possessions in writing. So, you do have to return it (and most people in such situations do return the possessions without question). However, if the presence of those possessions means you can't be reasonably expected to move into the property, then you can claim compensation from the previous owner for alternative accommodation (i.e. a hotel) until the situation is rectified. Or if the previous owner refuses to collect the possessions, you can likewise claim compensation for the costs of disposing of it. Alternatively, if they do want the possessions back, but take their time getting it, you can charge them fair storage costs.

You would not be required to do either of the things you state (unless you explicitly agreed to do so). What, strictly speaking, you need to do is to advise the seller that the original goods arrived and ask them if they want to collect them, have you return them at their expense or abandon the goods to you. (In all likelyhood they will give the goods to you because the cost of them recovering them is to high). Although I'm not in the UK, I believe the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies. Strictly speaking, as you have not paid for the goods, they still belong to the seller - but you do not have to pay to return them.

I assume the lease does not clarify what the effective date for cancellation of utilities should be: when you "officially abandon" the property, or when the 30-day notice elapses. Who is responsible for the damage? At least under a principle of equity, the landlord is responsible for the damages. That is because, once you have returned the keys and officially abandoned the property, you have no control on how or whether utilities are consumed or (ab-)used thereafter. For instance, if sometime after the 30th of July a person breaks in that rental unit and extracts tremendous quantities of power or gas, that would lead to the inequitable outcome that the utilities company would charge you if your name is still in the utilities company's records. Similarly, it would be unreasonable and inequitable to expect you to essentially insure the landlord (by keeping your name on the utilities) despite his full awareness that you no longer are there.

Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG.

You don’t need a company to run a business As an individual (sole-trader) you can operate a business, hire employees and contractors and do everything else a business does. The purpose of a company is to separate and protect your personal assets from your business assets. As a sole-trader you are personally responsible for all the liabilities of the business - if it goes bust, you go bust. If the business is operated by a company, then, providing you and the company follow the law, your personal assets are not at risk if the company becomes insolvent.

In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.

You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.

Does the Tesla act illegally at this pedestrian crossing in California? In this article reporting on a Tesla in Full Self Driving (FSD) mode in California, the car is shown approaching a pedestrian crossing when a person steps on to it from the opposite side of the road. The Tesla detects the pedestrian, but elects to continue through the crossing without stopping (presumably because the pedestrian was not on their side of the road). Various comments to that article state that what the Tesla did was illegal. But in my various googling attempts, I have not found any source that definitely states that the car has to stop. For example, the CA DMV Drivers handbook says: When there is a pedestrian crossing a roadway with or without a crosswalk, you must use caution, reduce your speed, or stop to allow the pedestrian to safely finish crossing. The use of "or" here seems to imply that stopping is optional (of course I assume that means only if you have taken due care/caution) But some of the commentators quote this from the same DMV handbook: Pedestrians have the right-of-way in marked or unmarked crosswalks. If there is a limit line before the crosswalk, stop at the limit line and allow pedestrians to cross the street. And take it to imply that the Tesla should have stopped because the crossing does have a "limit line". My question is pretty simple. Did the Tesla break an actual law in California? Or is it simply a dick move that technically is not illegal? Given the specificity of this video, I'm only really looking for answers that relate to California. I know that in other jurisdictions in the US and in other countries there may be other definitions of legality - which does make producing generic software for an automated car rather complex.

I am aware of a view of the California law that if a pedestrian looks like they might want to cross the street, any car must stop, but this is not supported by the law, which is about "yielding". The law incorporates both "yield" and "stop", the former being "and allow the other person to proceed". Ignoring the photo for a moment, the requirement to yield (not stop) allows a car to continue driving when the driver is e.g. 10 ft from the crosswalk and the pedestrian is three lanes over when they enter the crosswalk, remaining in compliance with the law. The pedestrian and the driven can continue with their journey because there is no conflict. The requirement to yield states whose right to proceed is subordinated to the other person's, in case of conflict. Turning to the video which shows what is in front but not behind, it is evident that the vehicle did not actually conflict with the pedestrian, who did not slow down in order to let the vehicle pass. The violation of social conventions is clear, in that the pedestrian enters the crosswalk while the car is 5 or so car lengths back, and can safely slow down so that there would be zero chance of hitting the pedestrian (it starts to slow but only trivially one the pedestrian is visibly 'crossing the street'). As far as I can determine, California case law has not established any numbers that constitute "not yielding". While I would stop in this circumstance, I don't see that there is a conflict between the pedestrian and the vehicle.

California Vehicle Code chapter 11, division 7, article 1, section 22350: No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property. Section 22358.5: It is the intent of the Legislature that physical conditions such as width, curvature, grade and surface conditions, or any other condition readily apparent to a driver, in the absence of other factors, would not require special downward speed zoning, as the basic rule of section 22350 is sufficient regulation as to such conditions. Without knowing exactly what questions the officer was asked, it's impossible to know why you were ticketed and why you were found guilty, but "reasonable or prudent" and "endangers the safety of [others]" covers a great deal of ground.

"Hit and run" isn't a precise legal term, but there are laws against what many people call "hit and run" in California. §20002 of the Vehicle code covers property damage without injury, and violation of the section is a misdemeanor possibly resulting in up to 6 months in prison and a $1000 fine. If you cause property damage either while driving or because it was parked and became a runaway vehicle, you are required to notify the property owner. If the owner cannot be located at the scene, you must leave your contact information and a description of the circumstances, and you must notify the police. It is irrelevant whether this was on the street or in a parking lot, because the law will "apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the State, unless expressly provided otherwise".

Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60.

Various US Federal laws, including the Clean Air act, identify air pollution as a matter of interstate commerce, and assert exclusive Federal control over it, except as specifically permitted by those laws. The Clean Air act specifically provides for the California exception to set higher standards, and for other states to follow the CA rules if they so choose. What is not clear, at least to me, is whether the law permits the President to cancel the CA waiver at will. But in the absence of such a waiver, I believe that no state may set different standards on auto or other emissions from the Federal standards. This is to avoid having many different state standards, and to facilitate a national market, which is something Congress is empowered to promote in this way. Of course, nothing prevents automakers from choosing to adhere to stricter standards than any law requires. They could even advertise "Buy X, the cleanest, greenest cars on the market". Whether this would pay I don't know. I gather that various states intend to sue, claiming that the action is unlawful. I am not clear what legal arguments they will advance for this. 42 USC §7543 (aka Clean Air Act section 209) provides: §7543. State standards (a) Prohibition No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment. (b) Waiver (1) The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that— (A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious, (B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or (C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 7521(a) of this title. (2) If each State standard is at least as stringent as the comparable applicable Federal standard, such State standard shall be deemed to be at least as protective of health and welfare as such Federal standards for purposes of paragraph (1). (3) In the case of any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine to which State standards apply pursuant to a waiver granted under paragraph (1), compliance with such State standards shall be treated as compliance with applicable Federal standards for purposes of this subchapter. The word "shall" near the start of 42 USC 7543 (b) (1) seems to require the issuance of a waiver whenever: a) a state adopted standards prior to March 30, 1966, b) the state standards are at least as strict as the federal standards, c) the state standards are not arbitrary and capricious d) the state needs the standards, and e) the state standards are consistent with section 7521(a). a) and b) clearly apply to the CA standards. I don't know if an argument can be sustained on any of the other issues, nor exactly what grounds the current administration has advanced for canceling the waiver.

If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail.

Pennsylvania is one state sometimes cited as having such a law, but the law does not refer to "keys in the ignition", instead, An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol... Similarly in Washington, A person is guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug if the person has actual physical control of a vehicle within this state... California law is narrower, since It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage to drive a vehicle and this does not include being in physical control. See Mercer v. DMV which affirms that the person must have been driving, but it is not necessary to witness the person driving. Keys in the ignition can be evidence that you were driving, likewise a warm engine or tires, car is in gear, you're in the middle of the road. I doubt that any law is stated in terms of "keys in the ignition", more likely it reduces to actual driving, or being in control of the vehicle.

Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence.

How can Crabs Adjust Humidity be legal? Crabs Adjust Humidity is, as its makers describe it, "a crappy little third-party, unofficial, unauthorized expansion card set" for the wildly-popular game known as Cards Against Humanity. Personally, I love the idea. I don't have the expansions myself yet, but I think it's great that people can create things like this to even further expand a game that I thoroughly enjoy. (Further, that is, beyond the existing, official 6 major expansions and dozen or so minor booster packs.) However, I am also wondering a bit as to how they can legally do what they're doing. Presumably, this is facilitated by the fact that Cards Against Humanity uses an unusually-permissive license for a commercially-sold product of its sort. The game, and all official expansions, are under a Creative Commons license which allows other people to do a number of things that they wouldn't be able to do under the typical copyright licenses attached other works. In particular, without needing to pay royalties or obtain special permission, other people can: Copy and redistribute Cards Against Humanity as-is. Make and distribute derivative works that are based upon, and may even partially or fully include, Cards Against Humanity. However, the particular license used for Cards Against Humanity is CC BY-NC-SA 2.0. This puts the following restrictions upon sharing and re-use of Cards Against Humanity: Attribution (BY): Appropriate credit must be given to Cards Against Humanity LLC, and changes from the original work must be noted. This should not imply any endorsement by Cards Against Humanity LLC. Non-Commercial (NC): Any copies of Cards Against Humanity, or derivative works, are not to be used for commercial purposes (e.g.: sold) without permission of Cards Against Humanity LLC. Share Alike (SA): All copies of Cards Against Humanity, or derivative works, must use the CC BY-NC-SA license or another Compatible License. Crabs Adjust Humidity clearly meets the BY requirement. They mention several times over on the site that their expansions are not official and they are in no way affiliated with Cards Against Humanity LLC. A notice on their website even specifically states that it is not the Cards Against Humanity website, provides a link to the official Cards Against Humanity site, and encourages people to "Go there and buy it now. We'll wait. Get all of the official expansions, too. They rock.". The NC requirement is where they most obviously appear to fall short. Crabs Adjust Humidity is being sold, both directly from their own website as well as through other vendors. (Personally, I first discovered the products by seeing them on a shelf at my favorite local gaming store.) Each individual expansion (each containing 112 cards) costs $14 USD, with a boxed set of all 5 for $50 USD ($10 per expansion/$4 off each pack/$20 off the set). For comparison, Cards Against Humanity sells their main game (550 cards) for $25, major expansions (100 cards each) for $10 each, and smaller expansions for varying prices. There is no official boxed set for Cards Against Humanity. (The Bigger, Blacker Box is - mostly - just a box.) So, Crabs Adjust Humidity expansions are being sold at about a 25% higher per-card cost than the official major expansions. When you compare the boxed set of Crabs Adjust Humidity to the official main game, the former has a nearly-double per-card price. (Arguably, this isn't an "apples-to-apples" comparison.* But it was a lot simpler than trying to differentiate costs between Black Cards and White Cards.) Crabs Adjust Humidity also seems to fall afoul of the SA requirement, as the product (as seen on their Counterfeit Crabs page) and the website have the standard "copyright ... All Rights Reserved" notices. Thus Crabs Adjust Humidity cannot be handled per CC BY-NC-SA, as the license on Cards Against Humanity would seem to require. Of course, infringement upon copyright (whether actual or simply perceived) tends to not carry consequences unless the copyright holder chooses to pursue them. However, it seems that the creators of Crabs Adjust Humidity (and, as I've discovered while writing this post, about a half-dozen other companies) have chosen to make and publicly sell these works in seeming violation of the CC BY-NC-SA license without much fear of such recourse. Is this all really legally defensible, or are these products only surviving because Cards Against Humanity LLC has not yet chosen to take action against them? *Pun not originally intended, but now it totally is.

The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.

You cannot safely rely on the US doctrine of Fair Use, except if the rights-holder sues you in US courts. In France, there are limited exceptions to the authors proprietary rights. Under Art. L-122-5, there are some relevant potential exceptions: 3ºa) analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated... 4º. parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre. Your description of the intended use does not fit these criteria. Consulting with a copyright attorney is advised, if you don't want to obtain a license.

Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts.

You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry.

It is unclear whether WINE is infringing copyright or if it can rely on a fair use defense. The CAFC held that: that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the API packages are entitled to copyright protection In that light, if WINE had original content in the structure, sequence, and organization of its API, the CAFC would likely also find that it is entitled to copyright protection. However, because this issue is outside the scope of the CAFC's exclusive jurisdiction (this is a copyright issue, not a patent issue), the holdings are not binding in any other circuit. Each circuit is free to review anew the copyrightability of APIs when such a case comes up. My guess is that this is the reason the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal on CAFC's Oracle v. Google opinion. To address your fair use question would be simply speculation, because fair use is always assessed case-by-case, and even in WINE's closest analogy (Oracle v. Google), the CAFC remanded the fair use question back to the trial court, and that question hasn't been decided yet: we remand for further consideration of Google’s fair use defense in light of this decision

As for plagiarism, that is not a legal concept, so he can define plagiarism however he wants. It certainly isn't, under any definition I have ever seen on Earth and I have seen many (it has to do with "claiming someone else's work as your own"). As for copyright, a set of questions is (potentially) protected by copyright. If they are copied from somebody else's book of questions, then the book author (or publisher) holds copyright. Let's say that QM invented the questions, such as "What is the Turkish word for Janissary?", "What is the most prominent feature of Jannissary garb?" and so on. Then that set of questions, when put down in fixed form, are protected by copyright, and cannot be copied without permission.

If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA?

This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.

If you try to charge someone for something and it doesn't stick, can a less severe charge be made as a follow-up? Say Mark is charged with A (let's say Murder), but the charges don't stick because e.g. he didn't do it on purpose. Can Mark then charged as a follow-up for B (e.g. involuntary manslaughter)? Or does getting exonerated from A mean you can't keep charging him with lesser crimes like B until something sticks? And if you can charge him with B, does that mean you have to do a whole nother trial?

It depends on what you mean by "doesn't stick." If Mark is acquitted of murder in state court, he can't be tried again in state court for the same act of homicide. If the charges are dropped or dismissed without prejudice before jeopardy "attaches" then Mark can be charged again and tried for manslaughter or even murder. From Wikipedia: The Double Jeopardy clause encompasses four distinct prohibitions: subsequent prosecution after acquittal, subsequent prosecution after conviction, subsequent prosecution after certain mistrials, and multiple punishment in the same indictment. Jeopardy "attaches" when the jury is impanelled, the first witness is sworn, or a plea is accepted. Any lesser crimes that could be charged for the same act (or acts) are instead considered concurrently with the main charge (or charges) at the original trial. See lesser included offense at Wikipedia. And if you can charge him with B, does that mean you have to do a whole nother trial? Yes. If you can charge Mark again, this means that jeopardy did not attach. In this case, if a new charge is to be brought, the entire process starts again from the beginning.

What you are describing is closely related to "acquitted conduct sentencing". On the first point, "Carl's" previous acquittal cannot be considered evidence that he committed a later crime; the subsequent crime must be tried on its own merits, in isolation. However, for your second question, once convicted of that crime, his previous acquittal (rather surprisingly) can be taken into account during his sentencing. Many legal minds have found the practice of "acquitted conduct sentencing" extremely troubling, and there are hopes the US Supreme Court could prohibit the practice in the near future. But for the moment, it is still an allowed practice. Summary article here "This practice allows judges to use conduct a defendant was acquitted of by a jury to increase a defendant’s sentence or punishment for a separate crime. This tool essentially allows judges to veto a jury’s decision when they merely disagreed with their conclusion." Another good article on the topic Of the seven charges, [he] was convicted on two. Under federal advisory sentencing guidelines, the two convictions generally warranted a sentence of 24 to 30 months in prison. The district court, however, calculated a range of 87 to 108 months, based on the charges on which [he] had been acquitted. [he] was then sentenced to 84 months (seven years) in prison. [He] was indicted on seven charges, convicted of two, and acquitted of five. But his sentence was exactly the same as it would have been had he been convicted by the jury of all seven charges — and three times as high as it would have been had the judge considered only the two charges of which the jury convicted [him].”

They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court.

When a person unlawfully kills someone else they have committed a crime against the state (murder, manslaughter etc.) and a civil wrong (a tort) against the victim (specifically, the tort of wrongful death). The state responds with charging the perpetrator with a crime and attempting to prove that they did the deed "beyond reasonable doubt". If convicted the criminal is "punished" by incarceration or death or a fine or community service etc. The victim (through their estate) or other affected people (family, dependents etc.) can respond by suing the perpetrator for compensation (money) for the damage they caused. If the plaintiff proves their case "on the balance of probabilities" the perpetrator will owe the plaintiffs whatever damages the court awards. There are many crime/tort mirrors (many have the same name): theft and conversion, trespass and trespass, fraud and fraud, kidnapping and false imprisonment etc. Because of the different threshold of proof between criminal and civil liability, it is much easier to win a civil case.

It's important to keep in mind that charges don't really tell us much about what crimes actually occurred. Sometimes cops file charges that aren't justified; sometimes they don't file charges that would be justified. There can be lots of reasons for the gaps between the evidence and the charges. My best guess is that the officers involved don't have quite as much information about his intent as they'd like to have when they go in front of a judge to argue for keeping this guy locked up. If they're going to hold him for attempted murder, they'll need to present evidence about what he was thinking and demonstrate that he intended to cause the officer's death (ARS 13-1104). That's possible, but it's a lot tougher than what they'd need to show for aggravated assault, which only requires a showing that he "intentionally [placed] another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury." (ARS 13-1204) They'll probably bring him up on murder charges, but they probably don't lose much by just booking him now on something easy to prove but serious enough to justify holding him, and then letting a grand jury indict him on the most serious charges.

If you are going to sue, and can prove they overcharged - consider going to the small claims court. It should cost you $15 + time - unless you loose quite badly - in which case its conceivable the court could award costs against you (I don't know if this is true of the small claims court in NY). You can represent yourself, so no heavy legal bills. It will take a a few hours of your time to prepare and have the hearing. Of-course, very often, just by filing you will get the opposing party to sort out the issue - and probably won't even need to go to court.

The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" which suggests that Crime B is still fair game under double jeopardy. However, if B is a lesser included offense under Blockburger, i.e. A is Aggravated Robbery and B is Robbery, then a prosecution could be barred by Double Jeopardy. Barring that, and jurisdiction specific law, the State isn't barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th (and 14th) amendment. That does not foreclose Person C from finding an ethical, equitable, statutory remedy or controlling case enforcing a plea bargain. As far as I can tell, commutation is the equivalent of a conviction while a pardon is equivalent to an acquittal. I also imagine if the prosecution isn't barred and tried C for B, the Executive may just pardon/commute C again. Edit to add: Under Santobello, it would appear C may have an additional remedy enforcing a plea bargain. Santobello didn't involve a case dismissed in a plea bargain, nor commutation or pardon. A court might find that commutation or pardon are essentially a breach of the agreement.

There is no requirement to interview the victim and/or the suspect prior to filing charges. Often statements are taken from the parties involved/witnesses by police and presented to the District Attorney's office as evidence. However charges can be filed without either party being interviewed, especially by the DA. This can often be the case in things like domestic violence cases, where the victim refuses to cooperate and the perpetrator refuses to talk ("lawyer up" or invoke 5th amendment rights). Charges can be filed based on circumstantial evidence of the crime (in the example, marks on the fist of the perpetrator and injuries to the victim, along with proximity). The police will try to interview the suspect and/or victim, but usually the prosecutor does not get involved at this point until charges are filed and the defendant has retained a lawyer (or declined one).

What is the law regarding playing in the street? It is being reported that claims are made that is can be against the law for children to play in the street. Liz Swift thought a basketball hoop on wheels pushed to the corner of her street on sunny afternoons would be a great way to keep her 13-year-old active. But the local authority did not agree. The family received letters from Waltham Forest council warning them that children playing in the street were “causing a nuisance to neighbours”. She said: “The council told me they were breaking the law with their games because they were obstructing the highway. They always move out of the way for cars and they are never out after dark.” Then in February, said Swift, the police arrived to investigate a report about her children playing. “The police took no action when they saw what was happening but the council asbo team are insistent the children can’t play there. They even came to examine a wall after a ball went over it, telling me it was unacceptable. I find such a claim implausible, considering the large amount of my childhood that was spent playing in the street with no legal problems. Is there any law that could prohibit children playing in the street?

england-and-wales s161 Penalties for causing certain kinds of danger or annoyance, Highways Act 1980 ... (3) If a person plays at football or any other game on a highway to the annoyance of a user of the highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding [F3 level 1 on the standard scale]. ... (See also the s137 offence of wilful obstruction.) Some places may also have their own related bylaws, e.g. No person shall on any land adjoining a street play any game in a manner likely to cause obstruction to any traffic or to cause danger to any person in such a street Made under s235 of the Local Government Act 1972, for the prevention and suppression of nuisances. Traveling further back in time, the Highway Act 1835 provided for penalties on persons who "play at Football or any other Game on any Part of the said Highways, to the Annoyance of any Passenger or Passengers" and, in London, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 similarly made it an offence to "any Kite or play at any Game to the Annoyance of the Inhabitants or Passengers, or who shall make or use any Slide upon Ice or Snow in any Street or other Thoroughfare, to the common Danger of the Passengers." I find such a claim implausible, considering the large amount of my childhood that was spent playing in the street with no legal problems. It seems possible that the authorities turned a blind eye or your behaviour didn't come to their attention, or your street was designated as a 'play street' (introduced by the Street Playgrounds Act 1938, currently provided for by sections 29 to 31 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 as amended by the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991). Also, many alleged offenders might be younger than the criminal age of responsibility. According to TJ Miller MP (Colchester) in Hansard, speaking in 1860, in 1859 44 of London's children were sent to prison for playing games in the streets, and by April 1860 25 had been sent to prison - apparently Manchester had imprisoned none. In my youth we played in the street although we didn't put up basketball hoops, football goals or other such objects. These stories in the media seem to be rare and involve circumstances where the local authority received too many complaints, particularly when there is damage to homes, cars or flowerbeds - which may amount to criminal damage. Blackpool in 2006 Glenfield area of Leicester, 2007 Newark, Nottinghamshire, 2008 Manchester, 2010 - although this seems to be based on one complaint Hat-tip Pedestrian Liberation for the information about the older legislation and arrests of children.

In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.

Yes, in Orange County, CA, in a residential zone or on residentially-developed property, this is a code violation. Specifically you are looking at Title 3, Division 13, Article 1, Sec 3-13-4(11): Sec. 3-13-4. - Prohibited Conduct. Except as provided in section 3-13-6, exemptions, it shall be unlawful for any responsible party having charge or possession of any real property in county territory to:... (11) Keep, store, or maintain upon any premises under his/her control any abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicle, or part thereof, except as permitted by Table 3-13-6(c). You may store/work on this vehicle from a building or location that is not visible from the street, but you cannot work on or store the vehicle on the street or driveway. You might also be able to erect a 6' tall opaque fence around the car, provided the fence meets standards. The code making this illegal is a county ordinance for Orange County, CA, which is not applicable to other counties in California (other counties/cities may have their own ordinances). Codes which cover this sort of activity are generally made at the county or city level. They vary dramatically from location to location, and are often different based on the zoning of the property within the county or city.

united-kingdom Assuming "editor" does not authorise the player to flood the game with bots then this would be an offence contrary to section 3 Computer Misuse Act 1990 (with relevant provisions emboldened by me): (1) A person is guilty of an offence if— (a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (a) to impair the operation of any computer; (b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; or (c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data; or (d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be done. (3) This subsection applies if the person is reckless as to whether the act will do any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) / to (c)of subsection (2) above. (4) The intention referred to in subsection (2) above, or the recklessness referred to in subsection (3) above, need not relate to— (a) any particular computer; (b)xany particular program or data; or (c) a program or data of any particular kind. (5) In this section— (a) a reference to doing an act includes a reference to causing an act to be done; (b) “act” includes a series of acts; (c) a reference to impairing, preventing or hindering something includes a reference to doing so temporarily. (6) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— (a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; (b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; (c) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or to a fine or to both Whether or not game cheating would be prosecuted is fact dependant.

No one can tell you how the facts are going to line up if you get sued. The attractive nuisance doctrine is alive and you can be found liable if you have, on your property, a dangerous condition which is attractive to children, especially if the danger is not appreciable to the child. Now, I'm a bit skeptical that a child would climb a fence to kick snow, especially if there is other snow outside the fence for them to kick, but stranger things have happened. What can you do? These are ideas, I don't think they are legal advice. Start with the premise that dangerous stuff happens everyday, and kids aren't getting hurt by most of it. Use a fence with barbed wire. In other words, injured the the child with a lesser injury to reduce your liability. Use an opaque fence. Granted, curiosity might be too great and a child will trespass to discover what you are hiding. Use a shed, just one of those thin aluminum structures. Include proximity sensors to set off alarms and lights and whatever. Get your project away from kids; find space in a commercial area.

There is no clear answer, and I suspect an argument could be made either way. The relevant regulations in this case are The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020. In particular, regulation 6(1) states that: 6.—(1) During the emergency period, no person may leave the place where they are living without reasonable excuse. In this case, you would be relying on the reasonable excuse given in regulation 6(2)(b): (2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), a reasonable excuse includes the need—[...] (b) to take exercise either alone or with other members of their household; The regulations do not explicitly state: how far you may travel for the purposes of exercise, how long you may exercise for even, in contrast with government advice, how many times a day you may leave your house for exercise. It would require the interpretation of the courts to decide whether travelling for long distances was reasonable in order to take exercise, and whether exercising for many hours is reasonable. Michael Gove stated in an interview that: I would have thought that for most people, a walk of up to an hour, or a run of 30 minutes or a cycle ride of between that, depending on their level of fitness is appropriate. This is of course not law, but opinion; yet it is worth keeping in mind that the courts may take a similar view to this. A strong argument could be made to say that this scenario is not in fact necessary exercise, but leisure, which is not considered a reasonable excuse in the regulations. Equally, it could be argued that the regulations do support travel for exercise in any form. I don't think anyone could answer with certainty whether this is legal or not, until the law is tested on this point.

user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says.

Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined.

Do reward-seekers have a duty to minimize loss or harm to a third party? Alice repeatedly commits some tortious act against Bob (say, defamation, or copyright infringement, or breach of contract). Under the principle of mitigation, Bob must take reasonable action to minimize the amount of harm or loss he suffers. That is, once he becomes aware of Alice's tortious activity, he cannot simply allow it to continue with the intention of accumulating loss and suing her for a much greater amount in the future. However, consider the situation in which Bob is not yet aware of Alice's tortious activity, but an uninvolved third party, Charles, does become aware of it. As I understand it, as a third party, Charles would generally have no legal obligation to minimize Bob's losses. But what if Charles intends to report Alice's activity to Bob in hopes of receiving a reward from Bob? (Note the wording "hopes" here; Charles would freely turn over his evidence to Bob without demanding anything in exchange.) Charles supposes that if Bob indeed offers a reward, then it will be proportional to Bob's losses. Can Charles delay reporting Alice's tortious activity with the expectation that she will repeat or continue it, thus causing Bob further loss, and thus increasing the expected value of the reward from Bob? If Charles does so delay his report, then does Bob (or indeed Alice, in the event Bob sues her) have a claim against Charles for the losses Bob incurred after Charles first became aware of Alice's tortious activity? (This question arises from reports I have heard that certain law firms in Germany are proactively gathering evidence of serial copyright infringement and then presenting this evidence to the copyright holders in hopes that those copyright holders will retain the law firms to sue the infringers for damages. I don't know or care whether these reports are actually true, though I am interested in knowing about the legality of this general sort of scenario, for any sort of tort in any jurisdiction.)

Given that Bob has no obligation to pay anything to Charles, who has no legal duty to do anything, I don't see how Charles could have liability to Bob. If Charles wants to, he can decline to pay a reward to Bob or can pay an amount smaller than Charles hoped for as a reflection of Charles' delay.

The party providing the computer, ISp connecting the computer to the internet, or manufacturer of the computer would not be liable. A person wishing to sue for damages would have to establish that the defendant was negligent in their action. The underlying premise is that all parties have some obligation to all other parties to care, to some extent. The inquiry ask haw a reasonable prudent person would behave in this context when pursuing their goals to avoid harming others. A reasonably prudent person would not provide a rack of sharp carving knives on the floor of a daycare center. A reasonably prudent person would provide a rack of sharp carving knives on a work-table at a fish-cleaning business. In both cases, it is possible that a person might cut themselves. In the daycare center, the toddlers on the floor are not assumed to share any of the burden of care, in the fish-store, the employees are assumed to share some of the burden of care. The ISP knows that it is possible that a person will harm themselves when they surf the web, but that does not make them liable for damages when an irresponsible party deliberately and knowingly connects to a nest of viruses, likewise the computer maker. The alternative is that providing an internet connection always makes you liable, or building a computer: that would be the end of SE. Two parties can significantly and reasonably mitigate the risk: the bank, and the customer. The customer can either decline to use this unsafe computer, or they can take precautions, in particular remembering to log out. The bank can also do certain things without harming their interest: providing ample warnings (which they do), or automatically logging a customer out after a period of inactivity (a metric of the fact that the customer just up and left). Banks do that too. The only control that could be reasonably be expected from the company, short of simply not providing a computer in the break room, would be filtering to prevent any access to certain kinds of web sites, such as porn sites, banks, or SE. Filtering for the first type of site is overall consistent with reasonable company objectives (which is to accommodate reasonable employee interests in accessing or transmitting information during the work day). Given the reasonable goals of the company, the jury would not likely find that the company had breached their duty to the employee. The jury balances these interests of the parties, and would determine that the company could not be expected to filter out connection requests to banks, and that they can reasonably rely on prudent actions by the employee and bank to prevent whatever happened.

I am just a foreign patent attorney who is studying common law to pass the California Bar Exam, but I will present my personal view. (I cannot guarantee the validity of my theory) There is an equitable theory called Constructive Trust. If it is established, the victim is entitled to benefit of any increase in value of defendant's (thief) property, meaning in this example victim (plaintiff) can recover $100 million. In order to assert CT, the following must be met: Wrongful appropriation; Here, D stole lottery ticket. Met. D has title; Here, D has title to $100 million. Met. P can trace his property to D's property; P can trace from P's $1 lottery ticket to its possession by D and collection by D of $100 million. Met. Unjust enrichment by D; D was enriched by stealing P's property (the lottery ticket). Met. Thus, it is highly possible that a court will order D to hold the property ($100 million) in constructive trust for P. This means, in plain language, that P will recover $100 million.

Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.

In the US, there are many possible sanctions A frivolous case, or pattern of cases, can result in a number of punishments: Paying the other side's legal fees -- Mind you, in the U.S, it is normal for each party to pay their own fees, and that will happen in "honest disagreement" type cases in which both parties have a valid perspective. "Loser pays" only happens when a) the loser has filed a ridiculous lawsuit, or greatly burdened the other side with frivolous filings; and b) the winner asks for fees. Transferring other costs to the plaintiff as the court sees fit. Again, winner must ask. Barring a plaintiff from filing future cases, without advance permission from the court. Again, winner must ask! Barring attorneys or firms from practicing in certain areas of law. Disbarment of the attorneys. That is decided by the state's Bar Association, typically a nonprofit trade association who in effect regulates lawyers in this manner. For instance, California is one of only four states allowing cash awards for ADA violations. A clever person named Mr. Molski went around to different restaurants and checked their bathrooms for ADA compliance. If a toilet paper roll was 1/2" out of position from where ADA required, Molski would take notes. Molski checked dozens of restaurants every day, and passed these notes onto a San Francisco law office. The law office filed hundreds if not thousands of these lawsuits against the various restaurants. The lawsuits all claimed that Molski was injured as a result of the ADA noncompliance. Mind you, this was in the age before easy merging of databases and MS-Word documents. Since these hundreds of cases were so similar, they simply made Xerox copies of the relevant paperwork, only leaving a few fields blank to be typed in by hand. To reduce secretarial workload, they didn't bother customizing the date of injury: so all cases claimed Molski was injured on the same day. Hundreds of defendants simply settled for amounts in the $5000 range (about half the cost of hiring a lawyer to grind through a trial). However, one defendant, a Chinese restaurant, fought. Their counsel discovered the hundreds of other same cases, and pointed out to the court that Molski was claiming to have suffered the same injury at dozens of restaurants on the same day. What an unlucky fellow! The defendant then claimed Molski and attorneys were Vexatious Litigants, and the court wholeheartedly agreed. Molski was barred for life from filing any lawsuit without advance court approval (in which Molski would need to show a body of evidence to the court that yeah, a real and valid case was there). The law firm was barred for life from filing any ADA related cases. The law firm folded up, and is no more. The lawyers involved in the case quit practicing law. Then we have Righthaven, who purchased from newspapers the "right to sue and collect damages" for copyright violations. Many bulletin boards, chatrooms, forums and Q&A sites allow/rely on "User Generated Content" (UGC), such as this here answer. They used search engines to find forums where users had copy-pasted newspaper articles. Generally, forums are protected from user behavior by the DMCA. Then, like Molski, they sued the forums, offering a settlement number below the cost of litigation itself. Again, hundreds paid; but a few fought on principle, with support from EFF. Again, Righthaven got destroyed in court - the right to sue cannot be sold. Courts ordered them to pay their victims' legal fees, bankrupting the operation. Prenda tried a similar thing against people who BitTorrent porn. I was in a case where we asked for fees. I got them, with such ease that I am kicking myself for not asking that the plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant (which would have saved many others from this person). Further, the judge laid a heavy hint to the 3 other co-parties that if they asked for fees, they'd get them too. They did not ask. Amusingly, one of the lawyers who should have asked, was unable to collect from the client. Should have asked...

No. The Creative Commons license seeks to promote recognition of the original author's work through attribution, but does not provide the same framework for enforcement that the DMCA would. The proper approach in cases such as the deleted Wikipedia article and subsequent reuse would be to provide a courteous notice to Wikipedia of your original publication and ask to be listed as the original author or be provided attribution. In the absence of relief there, then what rights you have would be determined by the Wikipedia Terms of Service. Since, and I am assuming here, that you are not generating billions of dollars on the original publication in royalties, seeking to bring a DMCA type enforcement on a Wikipedia article dispute would be like trying to swat a fly with a sledgehammer. (or more commonly in divorce, two people having hearing and spending thousands of dollars on attorney's fees fighting over a blender -- they are free to do it, but they would have been much better off buying 500 new blenders...) Keeping perspective and providing a courteous letter is probably your most cost efficient first step in situations like this. And in all areas of law, just remember, you catch more flies with honey than you do with salt. (meaning taking the courteous approach usually affords better results than a scalding letter breathing hell-fire and brimstone) In followup to earlier comment: Presuming you would be covered by the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Copyright of 1996 (as a U.S. Citizen you would be), and your copyright is on file with the United States Copyright Offices (same presumption) as prerequisite to suit, then there is nothing that prevents you from invoking the protections under general copyright law and under the DMCA (inlcuding the Takedown provisions). Note: these are not the only prerequisites to taking action, but instead the minimum critera to qualify, and note this does not pass on the wisdom of doing so (there are often significant consequences to improperly invoking previsions of certain acts).

Seems unlikely that it will "forestall copyright infringement suits". Some jurisdictions, e.g the USA, say that "Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable". On the face of it, in such a jurisdiction copyright can't exist in a randomly generated work. Which the TED talk doesn't mention. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtm0MoOgiU Let's imagine a case in a jurisdiction where copyright can exist in such a work. There is a dispute between two artists or labels. The plaintiff produced a well known tune and accuses the defendant of copying this work. The defendant says the plaintiff didn't have copyright in that work because it wasn't original in the first place, there is a 1200GB TAR file (compressed file) on GitHub that contains all possible single octave, 8-note, 12-beat melody combos, which were produced before the plaintiff's work. The plaintiff says, "like the majority of the population I never heard of GitHub, let alone downloaded, uncompressed a 1200GB file and listened to every melody." That's all aside from plaintiffs or lawyers deciding they have a case or believing the mere threat of civil proceedings will cause the alleged infringer to acquiesce to their demands. I think they are making a point about the law rather than a realistic means of thwarting copyright disputes. It's reasonable of the creators to say there is a finite set of melodies and the likelihood of inadvertently 'creating' the same melody as someone else may be smaller than we think, maybe copyright law has led to some unjust outcomes and led to a chilling effect on music-making.

If a statement is true, it cannot be defamatory. In your hypothetical, the credit bureau calculates a score based on correct information. There is no false statement anywhere, so there can be no defamation. Can you add some explanation of how giving someone a credit score lower than what his credit history merits is different from simply lying about that person's credit history? When I say "merits" I mean a score that would result in treatment by lenders that is significantly more consistent with what people with similar histories typically get. I presume that credit bureaus use a deterministic algorithm to calculate credit scores, in which case it wouldn't be possible to "give someone a credit score lower than what his credit history merits." More accurately, it wouldn't be possible to do that without bypassing the algorithm in some way. You might be able to argue defamation if you could prove that the credit bureau did in fact bypass its algorithm when it assigned your credit rating. You would probably have to show that your reputation was damaged because someone (i.e., a lender) knew that the ratings were deterministic and drew incorrect conclusions about you based on your incorrect score. The problem here will be to show that the credit rating was erroneous given the credit bureau's algorithm. To do that, you'd have to get your hands on the algorithm, which seems like it would be impossible to do, so you could do the calculation yourself. Even if you can do that, a more likely strategy would be to pursue the credit bureau under the Fair Credit Reporting Act or some other consumer protection law.

Use of copyrighted material for creating a commercial product In a hypothetical scenario, Mr. Peter writes a book about tree types in a certain geographical area. He creates a commercial products. Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? jurisdiction: EU country

Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.

Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected.

Legal unless you violate copyright. Screenshots will probably be fair use. The manuals/how-tos need to be your originals, not copies from anywhere.

If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact streetview-academic@google.com to request specific permission.

You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime.

Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this.

I'm assuming that you are in the UK, as you are talking about the British Standards Institue. In general the truth cannot be copyrighted but an expression of that truth can be, provided that it is creative or original to at least some extent. In this case the equations and constants you want to use are descriptions of scientific truths. If you translate them into another form (e.g. a computer program) then you are not copying the creative bit (the layout and arrangement of those equations and explanatory text), so you are not violating the copyright. Edit: I should also have said for (3) that their descriptions of the constants and variables will be copyright. You would have to avoid copying their words. However given that these are going to be terse descriptions of facts your words can still be pretty similar without infringing on copyright, because there are only so many ways of describing the acceleration due to gravity, or whatever. Take a look at some alternative references to see what words they use.

Someone similar say While it is quite true that no one can have a copyright that excludes all others from preparing their own unique copy of the Bible or other public domain works for copyright protection, our Bibles and other materials are not exactly like any others and are fully protected by copyright laws in all countries So for example, I could theoretically take an ancient public-domain texts and republish it in some modified form. Copyright does not protect the original, but it does protect my modifications. To the extent that Mechon Mamre does include protected material (of their own creation), and Snunit redistributed that material with permission, Mechon Mamre might sue you for copyright infringement. Since they don't say what their creative contribution is, it's hard to evaluate the merits of their claim.

Car and Med Insurance? If somebody were to get into a bad car accident, the med costs can rack up, and it'd be best to have insurance burgeon a portion of the debt. But let's say that due to financial straits, said person figured suicide in such a scenario so as to escape debt and the bill. But what happens if he/she survived and unconsciously underwent ER? Then if he/she suicided, there would normally be the debt from the operation. If he/she suicided, then perhaps friends or family would have to inherit the debt? - in which case, all of this seems like an awkward debt generation hole in the economy. Is there law or insurance policy compensating for this?

Any debts that a person has are to be paid by their estate. Whoever administers the estate must, in all states, publish an announcement to the effect that Smith is deceased and all claims must be made by such and such date, probably within 90 days. If (this is a small if) the hospital takes 6 months to make their claim, it is too late for them (provided that notice was properly given). There are also limits on how much can be collected, the simplest case being that you can't collect more than what is in the estate. There can also be complexities regarding order of priority – as you would expect, you must pay debts to the government first. That could include the Medicaid clawback (officially "estate recovery"), however, in the circumstance that you describe it doesn't sound like that would be applicable. There may also be exemptions in a state, for example in Florida, your registered homestead (property of a certain size that you have been living in and have filed the paperwork for) cannot be seized to pay debts, even after death.

Liability The concept of liability for damages is to place the wronged party in the same position that they would have been in but for the wrongful act. If restoring their car costs $300,000 then you are liable for $300,000. If the car is a total write off then you are liable for the cost of them getting an equivalent replacement, usually assessed at market value of the asset. Insurance Insurance is a different concept. An insurance company agrees to indemnify you for liability for your negligence within the limits of your policy: these usually include a deductable and a limit and sometimes a co-payment. You are liable to the wronged party - your insurer indemnifies you. If your insurance doen't cover all of your liability, you are responsible for the balance.

I do not know what actually happened to anyone in the aftermath of this incident, but it is unlikely that there is a basis for civil or criminal liability in this case. Criminal liability does not generally attach to negligent conduct except in cases of homicide or criminally negligent motor vehicle operation. But, this case appears to have involved mere negligence. It appears that somebody made an honest mistake rather than acting recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Governmental entities and officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacity have immunity from liability for negligence except in some vary narrowly defined areas (e.g. failure to maintain government buildings, medical mistakes in government hospitals, and car accidents) which seem unlikely to be implicated here. But, it seems likely that the responsible parties were all governmental entities or officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacities. So, it is unlikely that there would be civil liability either. Needless to say, however, this does not look good on the job performance record of any civil servant below the Governor (who doesn't get evaluated in that way) when being considered for promotion, demotion, unfavorable transfers or even termination of employment. Obviously, if new facts were uncovered and this was actually more nefarious than it seems, and this hidden truth was discovered, there could be a basis for civil or criminal liability. But, if this was the case, it would have made headlines.

Whether or not the estate has an obligation to pay the mortgage is really dependent on the terms of the estate plan and the solvency of the estate. The fact that someone is on the deed to a property (whether a deed of gift or a transfer on death instrument) that automatically passes upon death of the original owner to a relative has little or nothing, really, to do with the estate plan. While it may have been part of the person's ultimate plan for the disposal of their assets in life and at death, that is different than being part of the actual estate plan, which deals with the disposition of assets upon death, setting out the wishes of the deceased as it pertains to all property. There are lots of people who end up in this position, even though the original person on the deed did not intend to purchase or leave the other any property. It happens a lot when say a child does not have adequate credit to secure a mortgage to buy a home, but has the money to pay a mortgage. So, in that scenario usually a parent or grandparent will put the mortgage in their name (the other will live there and pay the mortgage) and then in the event the "helper" dies, they have it pass to the other at death, either thru a "TOD" or a "joint tenancy", so that in the event they die intestate, or if the will is challenged, there will be no question who owns the house...the equity in it, anyway. It (the instrument) is its own separate entity, not subject to the will except to the extent the deceased makes it subject (I'm getting to that part). Like a life insurance policy, that pays on death but is not subject to any terms of the will, it can stand alone since deed is its own instrument, separate from any wills or trusts. Under federal law, the mortgage must be allowed to remain in effect without changes when it passes from one person to another because of a death. This negates any due-on-sale clause in the mortgage. Who pays for the remainder of what is owed, however, generally depends on the deceased's will. The will might stipulate, for example, that the heir receive the home, free and clear, with the estate to pay all monies due. In this case, the executor will either use liquid assets, or sell other non-liquid assets in the estate to pay off the mortgage. Other times, it will say that the heir get the equity, plus X amount of dollars, which the heir can put toward the home's mortgage or not. If the will is silent on the issue, it is the responsibility of the heir/person to whom the property transfers (they needn't even be an heir) to pay the mortgage upon its normal term due, or sell the property to satisfy the debt. In the event the property is worth less than the remaining mortgage, the bank will usually take the house in "deed in lieu of foreclosure" rather than seek overage from the estate.

You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.

The common law rule was that to inherit you have to outlive the decedent from whom you are inheriting, and that the inheritance would pass to your estate if you died before distribution was made. Statutes in some jurisdictions provide that someone must survive for a longer period than that to be eligible to inherit, often five days, in order to simplify the factual issues in the common situation of a joint accident. Pennsylvania is one such state. But a will or trust can deviate from the default rule, and in U.S. practice, driven by federal estate tax laws, it isn't uncommon to require someone to survive the decedent by at least six months to inherit from them under an instrument. In this case, where more than a year has passed since the death, the inheritance would not lapse for these reasons. It also isn't uncommon for a trust, either established during life, or established at death, to provide that distributions from the trust are made at the discretion of the trustee and to require in those cases that the person receiving the distribution also be living at the time of the distribution. These trusts also typically contain specific provisions that spell out the rights of a beneficiary who dies before the trust is fully distributed.

Barring manufacturer negligence (and even this is a dubious theory, given that recovery would be for pure economic loss), there is probably no legal theory that would allow recovery of any loss of resale value. I am assuming that the promise to replace/repair the engine if it fails is part of the contract of sale. This is typical for a warranty that the manufacturer will repair certain failures. Assuming the manufacturer fulfils what it agreed to in the warranty, then the buyer is getting exactly what they contracted for and there is no contractual theory that would support any further recovery: there is no breach. The buyer bought a car that included a warranty to repair. I cannot imagine that they bought a car that included a promise that it would not fail.

Taking the stated facts at face value (i.e. you can prove them in court). Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-102 § 20-102. Driver to remain at scene -- Accidents resulting in bodily injury or death (a) Bodily injury. -- (1) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall stop the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident, without obstructing traffic more than necessary. (2) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall return to and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has complied with § 20-104 of this title. So, you must stay there until you have complied with § 20-104. Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-104 § 20-104. Duty to give information and render aid (a) Rendering assistance. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident and, if the person requests medical treatment or it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary, arrange for the transportation of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical treatment. (b) Duty to give certain information. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give his name, his address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to: (1) Any person injured in the accident; and (2) The driver, occupant of, or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident. (c) Exhibiting license. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give the same information described in subsection (b) of this section and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to any police officer who is at the scene of or otherwise is investigating the accident. (d) If no one able to receive information. -- If a police officer is not present and none of the specified persons is in condition to receive the information to which the person otherwise would be entitled under this section, the driver, after fulfilling to the extent possible every other requirement of § 20-102 of this title and subsection (a) of this section, immediately shall report the accident to the nearest office of an authorized police authority and give the information specified in subsection (b) of this section. So, not only is it legal to leave to seek aid, its required.

Are old school logos under copyright? I wanted to use a school logo on my website. This is an example of one (which is a private school) and here is another (a public school). Wikipedia says that they are both no longer in copyright. But when on the government website, it says this about the copyright: Material on this website not available under a Creative Commons licence includes: the Department of Education logo, other logos and trademark-protected material Is this statement the Department of Education made true? It seems to me that the copyright has indeed expired. Is the Department of Education just making a blanket statement that may not be true if the logo is very old?

I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.)

Copyright is automatic - it starts to exist when you create a work of a type protected by law. Lyrics are such a work, and thus your lyrics are protected. Even the fact that the lyrics go with an existing (public domain) melody is protected. In addition, your recording is protected. However, the melody is probably not copyrighted, and does not become copyrighted merely because you re-used it. (Probably, because you didn't indicate how old, so I assumed old enough that nobody remembers the origin)

Copyright is for original pieces of work. What you have made, is essentially a derivative work. Copyright is automatic for all things, unless the author has explicitly waived their rights, normally through a license. What this means, is that you have created a piece of art, that has been derived from that of the original author. You made modifications to the original artwork to produce a new one. Your creation could not, and would not have effectively existed without the original. Your image has the same shape, and the same colour tones as the original, and would likely be considered a derivative work. Since the right to derivative works is an exclusive right to the copyright holder, you would be infringing their copyright.

This appears to be very clear to me: "NPR does not allow other websites to post our content..." I cannot think of a more clear way to say "Do not reproduce our content on your site." Since you asked about licensing the right to reproduce their content, and they flatly ignored your request, I think it is safe to assume that they are not interested in licensing that right to you, even for a fee. This is also consistent with their "NPR does not allow [any] other websites to post..." language. It is always the copyright holder's right to refuse to offer any particular person (or all persons generally) a license, no matter what payment they might offer. (With the exception of statutory licenses, which in the U.S. exist only for recording covers of musical works.) They have also ignored your request to recompense them for infringement already performed. If in the future they decide to take legal action against you for your past infringement (hugely unlikely that such a hassle would be worthwhile for NPR) or seek any out of court settlement (again, quite unlikely they will care enough), I'm sure they will let you know. As they've said in their email, you are welcome to link to NPR's content. You are, of course, not welcome to spread misinformation or lies about NPR by claiming something like, "Look at this wonderful article that NPR wrote purely for us, at our personal request," or "NPR thinks that In Home Teaching Agency XXX is a great company, so we built a curriculum around their content," when NPR has never said any such thing. Any legal issue around linking would probably be a trademark offense, by wrongfully suggesting that NPR endorses you, or by misrepresenting yourself as an agent of NPR. If you don't do either of things, and just say, "Here's an article on [subject X] published by NPR," you're probably fine. If you want to be very thorough, you could include a disclaimer on your site like, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX is not a licencee or partner of NPR. Links to NPR articles are included for educational purposes only," or similar. This seems pretty excessive to me, since a reasonable person won't assume that linking to an article from a major news source suggests a partnership, but I suppose it couldn't hurt to include such a disclaimer.

You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data.

If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens.

The copyright office for the government of India contains the information that you want. You should consult a local copyright attorney. copyright office contact information Dr. V.P.Srivastav Dy. Registrar of Copyrights Copyright Division. Department of Higher Education Ministry of Human Resource Development 4th Floor, Jeevan Deep Building Parliament Street New Delhi : 110001 Email Address: mailto:copyright@nic.in Office Telephone No.: 91-11-23362436 FAQ Questions : Ques: What is copyright? Ques: What is the scope of protection in the Copyright Act, 1957? Ques: Does copyright apply to titles and names? Ques: Is it necessary to register a work to claim copyright? Ans: No. Acquisition of copyright is automatic and it does not require any formality. Copyright comes into existence as soon as a work is created and no formality is required to be completed for acquiring copyright. However, certificate of registration of copyright and the entries made therein serve as prima facie evidence in a court of law with reference to dispute relating to ownership of copyright. Ques: Where I can file application for registration of copyright for a work? Ans: The Copyright Office has been set up to provide registration facilities to all types of works and is headed by a Registrar of Copyrights and is located at 4th Floor Jeevan Deep Building , New Delhi- 110 001. The applications for registration of works can be filled at the counter provided at the Copyright Office from 2.30 P.M. to 4.30. P.M. from Monday to Friday. The applications are also accepted by post. On-line registration through “E-filing facility “ has been provided from 14th February 2014, which facilitates the applicants to file applications at the time and place chosen by them. Ques: What is the procedure for registration of a work under the Copyright Act, 1957? Ans: The procedure for registration is as follows: a) Application for registration is to be made on Form IV ( Including Statement of Particulars and Statement of Further Particulars) as prescribed in the first schedule to the Rules ; b) Separate applications should be made for registration of each work; c) Each application should be accompanied by the requisite fee prescribed in the second schedule to the Rules ; and d) The applications should be signed by the applicant or the advocate in whose favor a Vakalatnama or Power of Attorney has been executed. The Power of Attorney signed by the party and accepted by the advocate should also be enclosed. e) The fee is either in the form of Demand Draft,Indian Postal Order favoring "Registrar Of Copyright Payable At New Delhi" or through E payment Each and every column of the Statement of Particulars and Statement of Further Particulars should be replied specifically. Ques: What is the fee for registration of a work under the Copyright Act, 1957? Ques: Can I myself file an application for registration of copyright of a work directly? Ans: Yes. Any individual who is an author or rights owner or assignee or legal heir can file application for copyright of a work either at the copyright office or by post or by e-filing facility from the copyright Office web-site "www.copyright.gov.in" Ques: What are the guidelines regarding registration of a work under the Copyright Act? Ans: Chapter XIII of the Copyright Rules, 2013, as amended, sets out the procedure for the registration of a work. Copies of the Act and Rules can be obtained from the Manager of Publications, Publication Branch, Civil Lines, Delhi or his authorized dealers on payment or download from the Copyright Office web-site "www.copyright.gov.in" Ques: Whether unpublished works are registered? Ans: Yes. Both published and unpublished works can be registered. Copyright in works published before 21st January, 1958, i.e., before the Copyright Act, 1957 came in force, can also be registered, provided the works still enjoy copyright. Three copies of published work may be sent along with the application. If the work to be registered is unpublished, a copy of the manuscript has to be sent along with the application for affixing the stamp of the Copyright Office in proof of the work having been registered. In case two copies of the manuscript are sent, one copy of the same duly stamped will be returned, while the other will be retained, as far as possible, in the Copyright Office for record and will be kept confidential. It would also be open to the applicant to send only extracts from the unpublished work instead of the whole manuscript and ask for the return of the extracts after being stamped with the seal of the Copyright Office. When a work has been registered as unpublished and subsequently it is published, the applicant may apply for changes in particulars entered in the Register of Copyright in Form V with prescribed fee. The process of registration and fee for registration of copyright is same. Ques: Whether computer Software or Computer Programme can be registered? Ans: Yes. Computer Software or programme can be registered as a ‘literary work’. As per Section 2 (o) of the Copyright Act, 1957 “literary work” includes computer programmes, tables and compilations, including computer databases. ‘Source Code’ has also to be supplied along with the application for registration of copyright for software products. Ques: How can I get copyright registration for my Web-site? A web-site contains several works such as literary works, artistic works (photographs etc.), sound recordings, video clips, cinematograph films and broadcastings and computer software too. Therefore, a separate application has to be filed for registration of all these works. Ques: How long I have to wait to get my work to get registered by the Copyright office? Ans: After you file your application and receive diary number you have to wait for a mandatory period of 30 days so that no objection is filed in the Copyright office against your claim that particular work is created by you. If such objection is filed it may take another one month time to decide as to whether the work could be registered by the Registrar of Copyrights after giving an opportunity of hearing the matter from both the parties. If no objection is filed the application goes for scrutiny from the examiners. If any discrepancy is found the applicant is given 30 days time to remove the same. Therefore, it may take 2 to 3 months time for registration of any work in the normal course. The cooperation of the applicant in providing necessary information is the key for speedy disposal the matter. Ques: Is an opportunity for hearing given in all the cases pertain to rejection of registration?

The text and content (including all diagrams and illustrations) of the 1847 work (and of any other work published in 1847) are in the public domain in the US and everywhere in the world. You may freely use them verbatim or in any modified form that you wish. You are not even legally required to credit your source, although not to do so would be unethical, in my view. The version by Nicholas Rougeux that is linked to in the question has the licensing statement: Posters and website design are copyright Nicholas Rougeux. All other content and diagrams are under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0). This will not apply to any content copied from the 1847 version, of course. You may use any of the new content and diagrams so released, or make and use derivative works based on those elements, provided that you comply with the CC BY-SA 4.0 license. This has a number of provisions, but the major ones are that you must release your work under the same license, must acknowledge your source work, and must not impose any additional conditions or restrictions on users of your derived work. These are spelled out in sections 3.a and 3.b of the license (linked above). Please read the full terms if you intend to use this license. If this procedure will satisfy your purpose, you do not need any further permission from Nicholas Rougeux, nor to pay any fees or royalties to him. If you do not choose to place your work under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, then you must not use the diagrams from Rougeux's version, nor modified versions directly based on them, nor an overall design clearly and directly based on the original design of that version, unless you secure permission from Rougeux (or the current copyright holder of Rougeux's version, whoever that may be). Given that Rougeux chose to release under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, he may well be unwilling to grant permission under a different license, but that is his choice to make. Exception: in the US, you may use content from the Rougeux version to the limited extent permitted by fair use. This is not likely to cover the use of all or a large number of diagrams, particularly for a competing version of the same base work. Without specific information on how much content you would be using from that version, and how similar it would be to the original, no one can reliably determine if fair use would apply or not, but fair use is most likely to apply when a strictly limited amount of content is reused, and particularly when it is used for a different purpose than the original. Also, fair use is a strictly US legal content, and a work that might be held to be fair use by a US court might be considered an infringement by the courts of some other counties. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright which are different in scope and terms from fair use. Many of them are significantly narrower. Note that a work posted to the internet is in effect published in all countries, and a copyright holder might choose to sue in any country s/he pleases. US courts might well enforce such a judgement even if it would not have been the judgement of a US court. Rogeux (or any other creator of a new edition) can have no copyright in elements already present in Byrne's 1847 work. Any similarity to Rogeux's work that is because of a similarity to Byrne's 1847 work is not copyright infringement. But any new elements introduced by Rogeux (or anyone else), including the manner of adding interactivity to a diagram, may well be protected by copyright (although the idea of having an interactive version of the diagram will not be). Any new or significantly modified text or diagrams introduced in a later version will be protected. As to any other versions of the 1847 "Byrne's Euclid" that may have been published, the publishers gain no copyright over the original 1847 work or any of its elements, including text, diagrams, or color scheme. Provided you do not use any original content newly introduced in such editions, you do not need to secure any permission from, or pay any fee to, the copyright holders of such editions. However, you may not use any such original content, or modified versions clearly based on such original content, without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use, applies. All that I said above about fair use would then apply. A copyright holder may grant or refuse permission to use a protected work or create a derivative work on any terms that s/he chooses, and charge any fee or royalty rate s/he thinks proper. Lack of response to a request for permission must be treated as if the response was "No".

is mistake of fact a defence in various laws relating to protected classes? If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism , if the person doesn't know that the person is suffering from dwarfism or what dwarfism is but makes fun of the person anyway , would they still be liable ?

canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin"). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, "If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism..."), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. "Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence..." This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. "Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence..." Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional.

It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.

In general, ignorance of a law is an excuse only when the law specifically says it is. There are extreme cases where a law has been found invalid because it did not give people enough notice. Actually, only one case I know of -- Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The city of Los Angeles passed a law making it illegal for anyone who had ever been convicted of a felony to remain in the city for five days without registering as a felon. Lambert was arrested on suspicion of doing something else, but convicted for being an unregistered felon. The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of Lambert's due process rights to convict her of a crime she had no way of knowing about, or even suspecting. This is a very rare, extreme case, and does not apply to things where people might be expected to suspect that there might be a law. Otherwise, notice of a law is only required if the statute says so; for example, if a speed limit law requires the posting of signs, but the signs aren't posted, the law may not be in effect. However, ignorance still isn't an excuse--if the sign is posted, but you just didn't notice it, you're still on the hook.

Is it legal to redefine a term against common sense in a contract? Generally speaking, yes. What matters is that the contract be clear enough for the parties to be aware of the terms and conditions to which they are committing. Both of the scenarios you outline seem lawful. They are binding to the extent that the definitions & language therein duly inform the parties of the substance of the contract. Definitions in a contract are most pertinent where the meaning of a term is intended to supersede and replace the commonplace meaning thereof. A contract would become null and void if the substance of that contract contravenes legislation. If legislation outlaws not only the effect of a clause but also its meaning, then the [un-]lawfulness of that clause is not altered simply by crafting definitions of terms. In other words, laws or legislative intent cannot be elluded by relabeling concepts in a contract. Whenever lawful, the attempt to trick a party with tactics (such as the use of uppercase you mention) is likely to be voidable by that party. The rationale is the same: The draftsman's attempt to confuse the user contravenes the contract law tenet that the parties knowingly enter the contract at issue. Notice that in the preceding paragraph I wrote "whenever lawful" rather than "although lawful". The reason for that choice is that, in some contexts, the draftsman's tricky attempts might constitute a deceptive practice and thus be in violation of the law (for instance, consumer protection laws).

In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue.

Indirectly, no the wording of the caution is "You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." It is illegal to question someone if they have asked for legal advice. so if you ask for a solicitor they are not allowed to question you, and you cannot (by definition) fail to answer their questions if they're not allowed to ask them. Reference from https://www.gov.uk/arrested-your-rights/legal-advice-at-the-police-station "Once you’ve asked for legal advice, the police can’t question you until you’ve got it - with some exceptions."

In Guam, Any person who is an expert in the art of karate or judo, or any similar physical are in which the hands and feet are used as deadly weapons, is required to register with the Department of Revenue and Taxation but This Chapter shall not apply to duly authorized and appointed peace and law enforcement officers, nor to members of the Armed Forces of the United States However, in general, a person is not at a legal disadvantage for a self-defense defense by dint of the fact of knowing or using martial arts. You are allowed to use necessary and proportionate force to defend yourself or another from harm. The specifics vary by state, so you may be required to retreat and use force only if there is no alternative other than death. Jurors would be given some kind of instructions such as this one and this, the crucial part of which is that one may employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they appeared to the person, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time of [and prior to] the incident It is possible that jurors would think that lesser force is required in the case of a martial-arts based self-defense. There would probably be expert testimony addressing the question of whether a less energetic response would be obviously effective, given the defendant's expertise.

what if it is established in court that you knowingly or through gross negligence included a falsehood, or a claim you have no evidence for, just to clear that initial hurdle? What would the consequences be for that? The case proceeds and if it goes to trial, the finder of fact determines if the case prevails or not. Also, note that except in the case of a verified complaint, a complaint in a civil case is not made under oath or under penalty of perjury. In the rare and unlikely event that it is established that you knew that your case had no factual basis at the outset, you (and your attorney in many cases), can be sanctioned by the court, usually in the form of the attorney fees incurred by other side as a result of the knowingly false statement.

Does art. 12(1) of the German Basic Law require students to be automatically graduated regardless of grades? In this post, it notes that art. 12(1) of the basic law (the constitution) says: All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work and their place of training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a law. Has art. 12(1) been interpreted to require that all students should be automatically graduated regardless of grades?

No What it means is that no German can be forced by the government into a job, education or place of work. So for example, the Government cannot come and say "we are short on railroad workers, the next 200 graduates of this school will report to Hamburg Station for training and become rail workers in Munich". That might be blindingly obvious today, but when this was written, the government that had just ceased to exist had heavily dictated who was allowed into which profession, not on personal qualification, but on things like faith, nationality, heritage and skin color. And other governments forming from the ashes right next door were indeed not capitalistic and their socialist central planning meant that they would direct at least parts of their workforce which jobs to take and sometimes even where. In contrast, in Western Germany, whether or not one becomes a rail worker, which company educates them and where they work in the end is their choice. Obviously choices are limited by reality. I can choose to be a railworker on an island in the North Sea, but I will be unemployed, because there is no rail line there and I won't get a permit to build my private one. I can choose to study philosophy, but if I cannot find an employer in need of philosophers, I will have to fall back on making money driving an Uber. I can choose to become a Pilot. But I will have a hard time finding a spare 747 to train on if I don't train with one of the big airlines. The may have their own, totally capitalistic goals. For example, contracts that say "if we train you, you have to stay for X years and work for us or pay X amount of money" are totally normal and legal in those businesses. And if their training center with the big 747 simulators is in city A, I can choose to train in city B, but I will obviously fail their program. So no, this law does not imply any kind of automatic success on a personal level. You still need to qualify for the training you want, be able to pay rent in the city you want to live in and find an employer that employs you, or customers to become a successful freelancer. Maybe you cannot do that for personal reasons. But the government will not dictate instead. You are then free to choose the next alternative.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures.

I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.

It is the duty of the witness to give the testimony, no matter what their nationality is. As a witness, a German citizen is not different from a French, Uruguayan, or even a stateless. The only letter the judge will usually give them in addition to a verbal thanks is a formal letter recognizing that they have, on suchandsuch day(s), been called as a witness to the court and appeared. This is usually given to any witness and pretty much a form. It does serve as evidence for example in cases of absence from work - and you are entitled to the losses you incurred for appearing in court if you formally request them. It isn't forbidden to request a different letter from a judge, but they might not give such an extraordinary letter of appreciation, because that might taint the case: it could raise the question if the testimony was bought with or made to gain such a letter.

A teacher could not instruct students in how to build explosives for use in Federal crimes: It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction [...] with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence (source) This Federal statute creates a law preventing the teaching (in any context, including schools) of bombmaking for the purpose of committing a federal crime. So "bombmaking" is one subject that cannot be taught, although I don't think that there have been any prosecutions of regular K12 teachers under this law.

If the school is a private school, then definitely yes: the school can also mandate clothing and grooming standards, and so forth – attending private school is optional, and they can even require the parents to provide the computer. (Mandatory) public schools have less power, but they still have the right to require students to do things that the parents do not like. For example, a parent might not like the particular history curriculum, or the might not like the fact that the child has to study music, but that is a power granted to public school districts. If the requirement were "unreasonable" in some sense, parental prerogative might win out over the school's rational of educational necessity. But it is no more unreasonable to require a student to learn how to use a computer that it is to require them to learn how to read a book. You might argue that reading is "more necessary" than developing computer skills, but the school district's curricular judgment is placed above that of a parent, so you would have to establish that giving a child access to a computer is objectively unreasonable.

Almost no constitutional right, for the most part, applies or gives rise to an all-encompassing right at all times. Schools can determine that certain times are off limits as activity during those times may interrupt the environment most conducive to learning, or for other articulable reasons; this is fine so long as it is applied evenly. Schools may say you may not hand out literature at certain times, only before or after classes, weekends, or put limits on the place or manner of distribution. There are examples of this premise that exist, pertaining to nearly every right, otherwise considered absolute. This is no different than the principle that while Americans enjoy the right to free speech, not all speech is protected at all times, or that the right to bear arms does not apply to all people, places, or environs.

There isn't to the best of my knowledge, any single document that tells courts to follow precedant or when and how to do so. Each State, and the Federal government, has a set of court rules of procedure. These will indicate, among many other things, the form that should be used in citing previous cases, but that is about form, not content -- about how to cite a case, not about when a court should or should not cite one. Some precedents are what are called persuasive. These are from other court systems: say a different state, or even another country. These also include rulings from other courts at the same level, say from a different district, or even from lower courts. Other precedents are binding. These are from a superior court to the one where the case is cited. In a state's lower court, rulings of that state's supream court are binding. In Federal district courts, rulings of the Court of Appeals for the same Circuit, and of the US Supreme Court are binding. In Federal appeals courts, rulings of the US Supreme Court are binding. They are also binding in state courts on matters where the US constitution is involved, or where Federal law supersedes state law. Prior rulings of the same court are strongly persuasive, but not strictly binding -- a court can overrule its own precedents when it thinks the law or justice requires this, although most courts are reluctant to do so. Or more often it can distinguish a previous ruling, saying, in effect: "that previous ruling is still valid, but this is a different case in such and such a specific way, so the result is different". Students in law school spend a good deal of time learning how precedents are cited, and how they should be used, learning what sorts of things are controlled by precedents, and how to find the precedents that apply to a particular case. When they become lawyers and then judges, they taken this body of learning with them, and use it in writing decisions, and opinions that explain those decisions. New law from the legislature can reverse previous court decisions, except in the case of decisions interpreting the constitution (federal or state). Amendments can change the constitution. Judges must adapt to such changes in the law. To a significant extent our system of precedent is a matter of tradition, going back largely to the common-law courts of England, although it has been modified by specific legislation in many ways, as well as by more recent court decision and practice. It is passed on in law schools, in legal apprenticeships of various kinds, and in individual court decisions.

If a man is raped, resulting in pregnancy, and the woman chooses to carry the child to term, is the man still responsible for child support? Inspired by Is it true that men are forced to pay child support for children they didn't consent to have? Let's say Alice rapes Bob and becomes pregnant. She then carries the child to term, against Bob's wishes. Can she then compel Bob to pay child support? Compared to the linked question, here Bob did not consent to sex. ohwilleke's answer to the linked question says that if Bob rapes Alice and Alice carries the child to term, then she is required to care for the child. On the other hand, presumably Alice can choose to abort the child if she doesn't want to care for the child. In the case where Alice rapes Bob, Bob presumably can't compel Alice to terminate the pregnancy. Some Googling led me to Hermesmann v. Seyer, which asserts that in Kansas, "a woman is entitled to sue the father of her child for child support even if conception occurred as a result of a criminal act committed by the woman". However, the text of the article seems to say that although Seyer (the man in the relationship) was underage and therefore incapable of providing consent under statutory rape law, he had actually given consent to the acts under civil law since he didn't complain to his parents. In the hypothetical scenario described above, Bob did not consent to the acts since he was raped. I'm interested in all jurisdictions.

united-states The treatment of how paternity is handled in cases of rape, from which child support and child custody determinations flow, varies by U.S. state in the United States as a result of an ongoing and recent wave of legislative innovation, prompted by cases in which convicted male rapists sought child custody in connection with children conceived in acts of rape for which they were convicted. A state by state summary of the applicable laws as of January 2020 (which oversimplifies the situation in which there are additional distinctions not noted, some of which are differences in wording that could be relevant to how these statutes apply in the OP case) can be found here. All of these laws are targeted at the case of a woman raped by a man who becomes pregnant, which is factually predominant, something that happens many thousands of times each year in the United States as a whole, and not at the case of a man who, in the course of being raped by a female, causes the female to become pregnant as a result. Cases of men being raped that are handled by the legal system, and do not involve statutory rape, predominantly involve sexual interaction that is not reproductive, i.e. something other than a man involuntarily having vaginal sex with a woman, often prison rape by a same sex inmate or rape with an object, and also, as in other cases of rape, often doesn't result in a conception of a child due to random chance. Likewise, many women convicted of rape are convicted as co-participants in a crime that involves physical penetration of a victim by a man or an object, rather than sexual intercourse with the woman convicted of the crime. So, the number of cases that could potentially be litigated with respect to this issue is much smaller. It is also worth noting that under U.S. criminal law, sexual intercourse procured by deception (other than deception regarding the person with whom one is having sex, for example, because of a blindfold or darkness, or deception regarding one's status as a medical practitioner making a medical examination, or as a law enforcement officer making a legally authorized cavity search) is not a crime and does not constitute rape. Also, generally speaking, having sex consensually in a manner not intended to lead to conception, which, in fact, does result in conception with consent to the sex giving rise to conception (e.g. where there is an agreement to "pull out" that isn't performed due to the acts of one or both parties involved), will almost never be prosecuted criminally as rape, whether or not a jury with perfect knowledge of the facts of the interaction could convict under the law of the minority of U.S. states where this might be possible. As @user6726 notes, the primary fact pattern related to the OP historically has involved instances of intercourse that are consensual in fact, but constitute statutory rape due to the age of the father which makes it impossible for him to legally consent, and in those cases, the default rule that the biological father of a child is recognized as the father for custody and child support purposes has been the predominant rule. But much of that case law predates modern rapist-paternity statutes and there is an equal protection argument that those statutes should have a parallel construction, although to the best of my knowledge, there are no reported appellate cases that have tested that issue. It remains an open issue of first impression in most, if not all, jurisdictions that have adopted rape-paternity statutes. In Minnesota, which had not adopted such a statute as of January 2020, being raped would not be a defense to a paternity, child custody, or child support claim.

For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that.

It would appear the answer is "it depends", based on where the abortion takes place. It's possible that France has a domestic law that prohibits aborting children with Down's syndrome — which would make such an act illegal if performed in France. I am not familiar with French law so do not know and cannot comment on that. More generally speaking, there is no EU-wide law that prohibits such abortions. For example, in the UK, such abortions are considered somewhat routine and there is no specific law prohibiting them. Indeed, they are explicitly permitted under the Abortion Act 1967. While there is a prohibition on eugenics in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), that would only seem to be engaged in the event some EU or domestic law was passed that mandated some form of eugenics. The European Convention on Human Rights has Article 2—the "Right to Life"—however, the rights established by this Article typically only apply to living beings and have not yet been held to firmly apply to foetuses (Vo v. France [2004] ECtHR, para 80.) and an unborn child can be held not to possess these rights until the moment of birth (Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979]) although it varies from Member State to Member State. Some Member States (e.g. Ireland) constitutionally guarantee unborn children the right to live, in which case such abortions would presumably be illegal, but unless there's a specific law that prohibits such abortions, in almost all Member States of the European Union, such abortions would not be illegal. In conclusion, are such abortions prohibited in the EU? Not as far as my research suggests.

Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult.

In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.

Yes. The principle caselaw is R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox 692 A husband and wife had an argument that led to the husband chasing his wife out into the street. The wife collapsed during this altercation and died. Whist the husband did not physically touch her, he did shout threats at her. The wife was found to have been suffering from an abnormality of the thyroid gland that neither was aware of that meant that fright or shock could cause death if combined with physical exertion. The husband was charged with manslaughter. [...] The husband was found guilty of manslaughter. No actual proof of violence was necessary as long as the defendant’s unlawful act, which was the threat of violence, caused her fright leading to her death. The criminal law acknowledges that an assailant must take their victim as they find them... Source And... The defendant chased his wife out of the house shouting threats at her. She collapsed and died. He did not physically touch her. She was suffering from a rare thyroid condition which could lead to death where physical exertion was accompanied by fright and panic. Both the defendant and his wife were unaware she had this condition. Held: The defendant was liable for constructive manslaughter as his unlawful act (assault) caused death. The egg shell (thin) skull rule applied. He was therefore fully liable despite the fact an ordinary person of reasonable fortitude would not have died in such circumstances... Source

Like a lot of Scottish criminal law, there's no specific legislation, but it is illegal through common law. This was also true in the rest of the UK until the 1800s, when statutes were passed with the aim of making abortion law clearer (generally forbidding it). This didn't extend to Scotland leaving much of its abortion law unclear. The 24 weeks limit that the Scotsman article references is from Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended). This act did apply to Scotland. The act specifies conditions under which abortion within the first 24 weeks is legal, and that it is always legal when there is grave risk to the woman's health. When the circumstances of the pregnancy fall outside the provisions of the act, the existing Scottish common law prevails. For further information, this UN document provides a good summary of abortion law in the UK.

I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").

Can someone be charged with the murder of unidentified victims? I've been watching "Des", ITV's dramatisation of the arrest and trial of serial killer Dennis Nielsen. The police seem desperate to identify the names of the victims, despite having the bodies of the victims and ample evidence of Nielsen's guilt. Is there a particular reason for this (besides a desire to follow protocol properly and identify the victims' families, etc?) I'm not a lawyer, but the show makes it seem like the police need to identify the victims in order to charge him with murder - like him being caught with multiple unidentified dead bodies in his house and admitting to guilt isn't enough. (For those wondering, Nielsen claimed not to know the identities of his victims as they were predominantly homeless young men and, prior to murdering them, he had only had (in most cases) brief, consensual homosexual encounters with them and spoken to them on first-name terms, which was actually quite plausible). And it seems logical to me to believe that crimes require identified victims for charges to be brought. Can someone be charged with murder of an unidentified victim?

Yes, a person can be charged with the murder of person or persons unknown The reason that police are really keen to identify the victim include (in no particular order): It will probably clear up a missing persons case; So they can inform the next-of-kin; Being able to place a named person who loved and was loved before a jury rather than nameless corpse increases the chance of conviction - all else being equal.

These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges.

Once a case has been commenced, you can definitely lose, or you can probably lose. If you decline to proceed, you definitely lose. If you proceed, the jury (or judge as the case might be), might find some witnesses more believable than others and might find that the forensic evidence is not as convincing as it seems. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal trials reach the correct conclusion in about 90% of cases that aren't resolved on an uncontested basis. Generally speaking, the Crown is only going to press a case where the prosecutor subjectively believes that they are correct that the defendant is, at least, guilty of something. So, a Crown prosecutor can also justify "rolling the dice" in a case with a low probability of winning, because at a minimum, a factually guilty defendant (whether it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not in a particular trial with a particular finder of fact) has to suffer through a trial which is a form of punishment (particularly if the defendant can't secure pre-trial release). Also, while the Crown prosecutor ultimately represents the state and not the victim, the victim of a crime is a quasi-client and sometimes a victim who often has personal knowledge of a defendant's factual guilt, really wants to have their "day in court" and a chance to present their case to the public for all to hear. Law enforcement officers working on the case may want it to go to trial for similar reasons. Strategically, bringing even weak cases to trial also makes a Crown prosecutors threat to go forward with a trial even in a seemingly weak case more credible and that can increase the prosecutor's negotiating power. Also, a trial always reveals information, and sometimes the information revealed in a trial that is lost can provide value in future law enforcement efforts. Finally, prosecutors are humans and people, in general, don't like to admit their own mistakes. So, they may go forward even when their case is weak because they don't want to admit that they were mistaken and would prefer to have somebody else say they were wrong than to admit error. The personality type that doesn't admit mistakes is pretty common in this area.

There is no crime of "police misconduct" in the US, but murder or theft are certainly crimes which would qualify as "police misconduct". To take a real case, an officer in Georgia was convicted of aggravated assault, violating oath of office, and making a false statement (not murder, though he did kill the victim). In principle, he would also be liable in a lawsuit by the victim's family. However, these would be separate legal processes, the criminal prosecution being conducted by and at the discretion of the government prosecutor, and the monetary lawsuit being conducted by and at the discretion of the victim's family (on behalf of the victim). It is possible that an officer will be convicted yet not found civilly liable, or vice versa; or both, or neither. The victim (or family) doesn't necessarily have any connection to the criminal case, although they typically can testify during the sentencing phase. In some jurisdictions (e.g. California), the victim has a right to testify at a sentencing hearing. The result of a lawsuit can never be imprisonment – that has to come from criminal prosecution, and criminal prosecution does not result in a monetary reward to the victim (any criminal fine goes to the government).

Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one).

Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about.

The defence in a criminal case has no obligation to inform the prosecution of anything. The onus is on the prosecution to provide the evidence to convict and the defence doesn't have to and indeed shouldn't help them do it. The defence can and probably would use conflicting statements by a prosecution witness to discredit that witness in the eyes of the jury. These do not have to be material to the case: just showing the witness is inconsistent in general is helpful.

Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law.

Is it legal to read or distribute the DeCSS Haiku? TL;DR: Is it legal to download and read the DeCSS Haiku in the US? Is it legal to share it? I now ask about The DeCSS haiku A poem written As an exercise Of the First Amendment right To speak of one's views. This particular view was that the DVD CCA cannot Use their copyright Or, perhaps, trade secret right, To stop a coder From decrypting His legally acquired, Yet encrypted, discs, And telling others What he found would decode The encrypted discs. To show computer code is speech, Protected under the law, He wrote a poem. Four hundred sixty, Oh, and five more, stanzas Of geeky haiku. From these many stanzas, Another coder, who knows C, can write their own Program to decode Encrypted video discs, And thus, he proved that Code is, in fact, speech. Or so it was thought by some; Others may argue, Particularly the DVD CCA, that He did not succeed; Even if code is speech, This code is unprotected, And thus illegal. Who is right, O Muse? (Or rather, SE users), Please do inform me, May I read this poem Legally in USA? Or does it infringe Other rights, which are Held above free speech in court? May I read those words, And also share them, Written to protest against IP tyranny?

The “decss haiku” consists, in primary part, of a long string of numbers, split up into lines by syllables. It was a clever joke, but anyone who feels that encryption keys are stripped of any legal protection by making them into “poetry” fundamentally misunderstands the difference between telling a computer to do something and telling a judge to do something. In any case, however, the finding that the encryption key was covered by trade secret protections was reversed on appeal.

There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.

Recall the basic principle of copyright law, as detailed in 17 USC 106: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to make copies; prepare derivative works; or distribute copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending. Other people can legally do these things only if they are given permission by the copyright holder, typically via a license. (Remember, the literal meaning of the word license is permission.) Often, the copyright holder will require a prospective licensee to accept various terms and conditions before the license will be granted. If there is "no EULA", or if there is one but the purchaser has not agreed to its terms, then the purchaser has not been granted any such license, hence does not have permission to do any of the things listed above. If they do so anyway, it is illegal copyright infringement and they will be liable for damages. To use a firewall analogy, copyright law is "default deny". So let's take your questions one by one: Do they own the software? US law has no concept of literally owning software. The closest thing is owning the copyright, which the purchaser certainly does not. It still belongs to the vendor that wrote the software (or whoever they may have later transferred it to). Can they legally alter the code of the program they purchased? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. The copyright holder has not granted them a license to do that. (There are some exceptions for purposes such as reverse engineering and interoperability, see 17 USC 1201(f)). Can they legally redistribute it No; again, that is the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the purchaser has not received their permission. or transfer ownership? Maybe, if the first sale doctrine applies. Its application to software is complicated. The user has a better case for being able to sell the software if it exists as some tangible object which is transferred (physical media, pre-installed on hardware, etc). Can they legally modify the code of the program for others who have also purchased the same package? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. Can they take that software and install it on a secondary machine? No, that would be making a copy.

Making and sharing and using subtitles for movies is not legal. It is copyright infringement. I paint this statement with a very broad brush. The movies are copyrighted (they are original and fixed in tangible form). (17 U.S. Code § 102(a)) 17 U.S. Code § 106(2) provides that the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to prepare and to authorize to preparation of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S. Code § 101 defines derivative work as a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.... So we have established that the copyright holder has exclusive rights to authorize translations, but this exclusive right is limited by fair use. 17 U.S. Code § 107 provides some examples of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research If these subtitle files are not used for a fair use purpose (the examples cited are examples only, not an exhaustive list) then translation is infringement. If the files are used for one of the fair use purposes then § 107 also gives us the factors to determine whether that particular use is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

You can't own a database; you might, however, own (have) the copyright to a database if you created it or the creator transferred that right to you. You can also possess a copy of a database: the question is whether it is legal. "Leaked" implies that it is taken without permission, so you might be in violation of copyright law by possessing a copy. The only databases that would escape copyright protection would be those US government works, things put in the public domain, and things publically licensed to allow copying. Plus, any database whose content fails to exhibit a modicum of creativity (Feist). A database might be inherently illegal (at least in your hands), so it would depend on what the content is. The first thing that comes to mind is a database from a child-porn website, which contains numerous illegal images: see section 110 of Title 18. "Leaked" information might involve violation of 18 USC 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act), which prohibits unauthorized hacking. It does not directly prohibit being in possession of a hacked database: but you might still be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact. (That is one of those ad libitum areas of the law where there's no way to know for sure what is and is not "okay"). If they do prosecute you, you might rely on Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, where because it was a matter of "public interest", propagation of illegally obtained material was held to be protected by the First Amendment. Also there is the case of the Pentagon Papers. At the federal level, there are no controls over storing credit card information so if you get a copy of the Target or Home Depot hacked database, there's no federal law against that (if we discount "accessory after the fact"), but there are circumstances in Minnesota where retaining such information could be illegal.

It depends where you and your friend are and where the copyright was created. Ripping music for personal use is considered fair use/fair dealing in most jurisdictions. Having multiple copies/devices for personal use is OK too - practically, you can't watch more than one at a time unless you have a very unusual brain. If the intention is that both you and he would have and use copies then that is a violation.

A more general version of the question, as far as I can see, is "Is Google Drive legal?". I can create an account and upload files to Google Drive, and I can open them from the cloud using various interfaces. I can directly open only certain files types, others I have to download to the device that I'm using in order to open the file. There are various file storage systems that allow this, most or all of which seem to use some sort of system of password access, file-access permissions and encryption to block access by unauthorized individuals. All systems seems to allow "sharing" of a specified file. Google and colleague escape liability by complying with 17 USC 512 aka the DMCA safe harbor provisions. Basically, they don't know, they don't select uploads, they have a removal procedure, they don't know that the material is infringing, and they "are not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". There is a chance that you would be sued for inducing copyright infringement, see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, specifically We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties You describe a situation that is unlikely to be found to constitute inducement to infringing, instead it is "enabling possible infringing", and mere possibilty of doing something bad with a tool does not make you liable for selling a tool, under current US law. An eyebrow would be raised, though, as to why this service only allows ebooks to be deposited.

You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing.

idea behind the concept of alibi; people are innocent until proven guilty What is the idea behind the concept of alibi in a legal system in which people are innocent until proven guilty?

An alibi is a particular kind of defense strategy bearing on the burden of proof: here is the alibi jury instruction for California. The defendant contends (he/she) did not commit (this/these) crime[s] and that (he/she) was somewhere else when the crime[s] (was/were) committed. The People must prove that the defendant was present and committed the crime[s] with which (he/she) is charged. The defendant does not need to prove (he/she) was elsewhere at the time of the crime. "I had put the gun down" is not an alibi defense, "I was not in my right mind at the time" is not an alibi defense. The alibi defense is essentially a formality that clarifies the logic of "reasonable doubt" for the jury. If the defendant could not have committed the crime because they weren't there, then that is the end of the discussion. The prosecution will introduce various facts that suggest that the defendant may have committed the crime. The "reasonable doubt" instruction is widely interpreted by jurors to involve a defense obligation to disprove that evidence, which is a reason why a number of jurisdictions have adopted a different instruction based on "being firmly convinced". Reasons to doubt prosecution evidence can be weak and highly speculative, and the courts have struggled for years to find a good way to convey exactly what "reasonable doubt" is. An alibi goes way beyond merely detracting from the prosecution's case. An alibi is not an affirmative defense where you have to prove the claim by a preponderance of evidence. If you can establish that you were somewhere else when the crime happened, had no opportunity to have committed the crime and could not have committed the crime by another means, you have defended yourself against the charge (assuming that the prosecution does not successfully challenge the credibility of the alibi witness). And in California, you have to give notice that you intend to use the alibi defense.

There is no crime of "police misconduct" in the US, but murder or theft are certainly crimes which would qualify as "police misconduct". To take a real case, an officer in Georgia was convicted of aggravated assault, violating oath of office, and making a false statement (not murder, though he did kill the victim). In principle, he would also be liable in a lawsuit by the victim's family. However, these would be separate legal processes, the criminal prosecution being conducted by and at the discretion of the government prosecutor, and the monetary lawsuit being conducted by and at the discretion of the victim's family (on behalf of the victim). It is possible that an officer will be convicted yet not found civilly liable, or vice versa; or both, or neither. The victim (or family) doesn't necessarily have any connection to the criminal case, although they typically can testify during the sentencing phase. In some jurisdictions (e.g. California), the victim has a right to testify at a sentencing hearing. The result of a lawsuit can never be imprisonment – that has to come from criminal prosecution, and criminal prosecution does not result in a monetary reward to the victim (any criminal fine goes to the government).

Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.

No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412

Yes, but ... How can you know for sure? Let's say I'm charged with, and acquitted of, murder. Immediately after my acquittal, I confess to the crime describing how I did it and producing tangible and material evidence like the murder weapon, etc. So, did I commit murder? Well, we can't say. All we can say is that if I were tried again with all this new evidence, I'd probably be convicted but we can never know for sure because that trial isn't going to happen. Examples of people who (possibly) evaded justice due to double jeopardy Isaac Turnbaugh, O J Simpson, Fong Foo, Mel Ignatow This Unnamed Queensland man (double jeopardy can be waived under Queensland law when there is new "clear and compelling evidence" - the court found the evidence was neither clear nor compelling), Sharone Sylvester Brown. On the other side of the ledger, Michael Weir was the first person convicted after the UK changed its double jeopardy laws in 2005 allowing the Court of Appeal to grant a retrial if "new, compelling, reliable and substantial evidence" had emerged.

Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice.

Your premise that "the law did not exist previously" is, from the perspective of how courts work, mistaken. The law always existed, it's just that some people (maybe even judges) mistakenly thought the law didn't exist (actually, "meant something else"). Many people have wrong ideas about what the law says, but ignorance of misunderstanding of the law is no excuse. Even having an understandable wrong belief is no excuse. There is an area in which ignorance of the law is excused. Violation of a person's civil rights under color of law is a civil wrong for which the officer can be sued. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 and citations therein: Respondents may nevertheless be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Thus an officer may not use a qualified immunity defense if the court finds that an action is a civil rights violation and this "clarification" of the law is new.

The jury never finds there was “no crime” They either find that the state has proven that this particular defendant committed this particular crime (guilty) or they have not proven it (not guilty). Another jury at another time may find the opposite - this does sometimes happen where a guilty verdict is appealed and the appeals court orders a retrial. For another defendant charged with a different crime (e.g. accessory to the first crime) before another jury, the result of another trial is both irrelevant and inadmissible.

Is assault resulting in PTSD considered as causing serious harm? Is Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (or Complex PTSD) treated as an injury, serious injury or life-changing injury in cases of assault ? I am interested in answers from any jurisdiction. In response to a comment : I am interested in whether or not, or to what extent, the effect of PTSD can be included as an injury due to the assault, not if it would be an additional charge (although if that's the case anywhere I'd like to know). I am primarily interested in criminal law, although points of note in civil law would be of interest as well. Motivation I'm trying to gather information on how PTSD/C-PTSD is viewed in terms of injury to a victim in different jurisdictions. From my perspective causing PTSD/C-PTSD is equivalent to causing a permanent disability. Many years ago I was a victim of an assault and break-in which resulted in (thankfully) minor physical injuries but caused severe Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (C-PTSD). PTSD and C-PTSD are life changing disorders which have an impact similar to a severe disability in many ways. In Ireland they're treated as a disability for the purposes of Welfare allowance. However the court case, long past, did not mention my C-PTSD and while there was a guilty verdict, it is clear that, in my case, PTSD was not considered as equivalent to e.g. the effect of gross bodily harm or causing a disability to the victim. My C-PTSD was diagnosed long before the court case and within a month of the assault. There would have been ample time to list it as a result of the assault on e.g. a formal charge document. I'm Irish and the assault I describe happened in Ireland, so a similar legal system to the UK. I am, however, interested in how this is treated in jurisdictions.

france Yes, both for civil and criminal law, but in different ways. The general principle of civil law in France (and I believe every civil-legal-system jurisdiction) is that one is liable for any damage they cause through fault. Of course, details differ greatly between what is considered a damage, what are the standards to prove causation or fault, etc. Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 2, 18 janvier 2018, 16-28.392 specifically endorsed a lower court reasoning that distinguished between préjudice moral (moral damage) and préjudice psychologique (psychological damage). The latter is about quantifiable medical damage (even if mental rather than physical), while the former covers grave breaches of wellbeing. In the case at hand, a couple was assassinated when their child was two years old; the child later developed severe psychic disorders as a result of the trauma; it was found that a compensation for the préjudice moral of losing his parents at a young age did not foreclose a later suit for the préjudice psychologique of developing mental troubles (which became visible much later in his life). To be honest, I would be extremely surprised if any jurisdiction recognized no cause of action for any type of psychological damage. There might be issues of burden of proof etc. such that in practice suing for psychological damage is unviable, but a complete bar on any civil action predicated on psychic damage seems unthinkable. Regarding criminal law, many assault-type crimes are scaled by gravity. That gravity is evaluated by days of "complete inability to work" (search incapacité totale de travail through that section of the penal code). While the notion has been standardized by work law cases, it also applies outside a work context when the damage prevents one from doing basic life actions (children, retirees or the unemployed can be subject to a "complete inability to work"). Whether the damage that caused it was physical or mental is irrelevant. Two notes though: physical damage resulting from assault is more easily quantified by that scale than mental damage. If a mob boss breaks your bones, you spend one month in the hospital, and then you get out roughly healed; it’s easy to say that it cost you one month of your life. If the same mob boss kills your wife in a gruesome manner, you might be haunted for life, but still be able to work, feed yourself etc., past one or two days of shock. "Low-level", long-lasting damage is not well-measured that way. quantifying the duration of a "complete inability to work" depends on the victim’s active cooperation with the prosecution (such as going to see a doctor to get a certificate). That is possible because the civil and criminal causes of actions are usually joined in a single trial, during which the victim will try to prove injury. (It is possible for the victim to open a separate civil trial, but that’s usually not a good idea. The same exact remedies are available by joining in the criminal trial; usually the prosecutor has the same goals as you in proving the facts, so why not let them do it and save some lawyer fees?) It would probably not be reasonable in a common-law system with separate trials. It also breaks down in certain cases (e.g.: in a good fraction of spousal abuse cases, the victim refuses to testify against the accused).

There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.

Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.

Your question is about "Would it be kidnapping if I was injured and someone took me to a hospital without my consent", so I don't understand these other answers which say "it depends on the situation". The key point is what you mean by "without my consent". Good Samaritan laws are also relevant, which offer defenses to people who do things that would otherwise be unlawful when they are doing it with good intentions to help someone who they believe is injured or would become injured without their intervention. The main things to consider are the degree of injury, which is a spectrum ranging from no injury at all to being dead, and whether the injured person is conscious. Are you so injured that you are unconscious? In most jurisdictions, being unconscious is considered as you consenting to any actions which are done with the intent of giving you medical assistance, which is on a spectrum of saying "hey are you ok?" or shaking you in order to wake you up, all the way up to treatment including major surgery. So by being unconscious it is usually automatically consent, but if you are awake and are refusing help or treatment, even if you could die if you didn't receive treatment, it would be easy to argue that you were not consenting and that any treatment/assistance etc was unlawful. This situation sometimes happens, and EMTs are often trained to wait until the person goes unconscious to then give them medical assistance/transport etc, but assisting someone before they go unconscious could still be argued as permissible, if the injured person was so distressed that they were unable to give/refuse consent, or at least if the assistor believed that to be the case. This is why if someone has a major medical problem and is unconscious, hospitals can resuscitate them and even perform surgery without them signing a consent form. By being unconscious, it is considered that they are consenting to any necessary surgery to help them, even including amputation or other negative consequences. Conversely, if someone has a valid Advance healthcare directive on file which forbids measures such as resuscitation, they will be considered not to consent, and will usually be left alone without life-saving assistance. Resuscitating/performing surgery on someone in this case can be cause for damages to the injured person, because it would have been clear that they did not consent to such assistance.

In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force.

The language is worded broader: "A victim of [list of crimes] or that victim's representative shall have the following rights as provided by law:" The list is seemingly alphabetically, and covers besides arson injuring people, also aggravated arson & battery, misuse of explosives, negligent use of a deadly weapon, murder, [two other types of homicide], kidnapping, [various types of sexual misconduct], [two types of hit and run], [two types of child endangerment]. That is a closed list, that gives the victim or his representative (estate or legal guardian) the rights enumerated after.

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

At least one court has found that unnecessary surgeries are child abuse. Quoting from Is Circumcision Legal? by Peter W Adler (I recommend this article to you, it goes into common law and Constitutional law around surgeries). I think that we should not be distracted by the definition of abuse adopted by the court (risk of death, impairment of function etc) because even with your caveats about wonderful bionic legs, the replacements are not members of the body. Arguably. A 2010 Tex as appellate case, Williamson v. State , confirms that any unnecessary surgery on children constitutes statutory child abuse. The Williamson court held a mother criminally liable for unnecessary surgery that caused serious bodily injury to her son, defined in Texas as “an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” A physician testified that unnecessary surgery does not constitute reasonable medical care. The court also found a scalpel to meet the definition of a “deadly weapon” as it can cause death or serious bodily injury. Circumcision, whether male or female, is thus criminal child abuse.

What does the lawful sanctions clause in international convention on torture mean? In Article 1 of international convention on torture. It states the following It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions How is this interpreted and is this interpreted broadly ? To include torture , cruel and inhuman treatment itself as a legal punishment ?

It excludes pain and suffering incidental to lawful capital and corporal punishment Many countries around the world still execute people. As far as is known, no form of capital punishment is totally painless - even lethal injection involves a needle. In any event, the anticipation of capital punishment is likely to cause suffering. Similarly, corporal punishment such as caning is still a lawful sanction in many jurisdictions. This clearly causes pain - that’s the point - but it isn’t torture. It would also exclude lawful corporal punishment of students by teachers where this is still legal. Or of military personnel by their superiors, again, where that is legal. Now, organisations like Amnesty International consider all of those things to be torture. I don’t think they are wrong in taking that position but, under the convention, they aren’t legally torture.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

Germany If we actually talk about criminal law, your question is answered by §§ 1 and 2 StGB (the German penal code) – official but of course not binding translation: § 1 [No punishment without law] An act may only be punished if criminal liability had been established by law before the act was committed. § 2 [Jurisdiction ratione temporis; lex mitior] (1) The penalty and any ancillary measures shall be determined by the law which is in force at the time of the act. (2) If the penalty is amended during the commission of the act, the law in force at the time the act is completed shall be applied. (3) If the law in force at the time of the completion of the act is amended before judgment, the most lenient law shall be applied. (4) A law intended to be in force only for a determinate time shall be continued to be applied to acts committed while it was in force even after it ceases to be in force, unless otherwise provided by law. (5) Subsections (1) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to confiscation, deprivation and destruction. (6) Unless otherwise provided by law, measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation shall be determined according to the law in force at the time of the decision. (Note that the last section has been voided in part by the Federal Constitutional Court but this is not relevant here.) which is a legal principle given by the German constitution, in particular by Article 103 para. 2: An act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal offence before the act was committed. To answer your specific questions with the above rules in mind: The law you are sued for is deleted while your process is going In that case you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted before a case is raised against you (what you did was illegal while you did it) Same answer, you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) You are out of luck. Only if there would be a new decision for an unrelated reason, your punishment would be taken back. There is a new law while your process is going The new law has no relevance at all. There is a new law after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) Again, no relevance to your case. In another areas of the law the answers to your questions could actually be different but there would be too many cases to consider for a comprehensive answer.

No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.

2019 Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 916(h): (h) Coercion or duress. It is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person that the accused’s participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit the act. The apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commission of the act. If the accused has any reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the act without subjecting the accused or another innocent person to the harm threatened, this defense shall not apply. So, if your hypothetical soldier asserts they had a reasonable apprehension that they would have immediately suffered serious bodily injury if they didn't reveal the intelligence, then they should not be convicted by a court-martial, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was not the case (Rule 916 (b)(1)).

If Tratatoria has anti-discrimination laws, or provisions in its constitution forbidding discrimination, the Minister's actions might be illegal under them. But if it does not, or if it does not enforce whatever laws it may have, there is no international authority that can enforce any rule against discrimination. People and groups in other countries could denounce such actions as biased and discriminatory, if they chose. There is no legal standard for such announcements. This might bring pressure on Tratatoria. But that would be a diplomatic and political matter, not a legal one. There really is no effective international law on discrimination unless it amounts to genocide, and even then it is essentially a matter of diplomatic pressure or potentially war to enforce regime change, not a true legal process.

Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to.

In simple terms: Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, ... Whatever follows next is only limited by what the agreement clearly says is limited. ... the exercise by Company of any of its remedies under this Agreement ... A remedy is something that helps to fix a situation back to what it "should be" in legal terms. There is an implication that the agreement provides for a number of ways of fixing any problems that occur, related to following or breaching the contract. Whatever follows next is assuming that one of those remedies has been used or chosen for fixing a problem. ... shall be without prejudice to its other remedies under this Agreement or available at law or in equity. Having chosen to use one or some remedies, it still has the choice of using any of the others in the agreement and also those available generally under the law. The election by the Company to terminate this Agreement in accordance with its terms shall not be deemed an election of remedies, ... Ending the agreement doesn't count as choosing one of the remedies. ... and all other remedies provided by this Agreement or available at law or in equity shall survive any termination. It doesn't matter if the agreement is ended, regardless of why, the company still has the choice of any remedies as before.

Legality and license choice for reverse-engineered project I reverse engineered (by sniffing+x32dbg) part of the protocol for a board game client in order to build an alternative client on top of it while still using the official servers. I open-sourced the work so that others can contribute to it as well. I'm based in the EU and the product owners are based in China. Is this legal? And if so, what license is appropriate for it? Note: I'm not benefiting commercially from this work.

Check your license! By operating the original client, you might have agreed to a license, the EULA. Check that license for what it says about you being allowed to do with the product. In a recent case of Bungie vs. Elite Boss Tech, a US court found in a default judgment that a certain cheat software that would interact with both the game's client and the company's servers among other things did... constitute copyright infringement [as a derivative work] was a breach of contract [formed by the EULA and agreeing to the Terms of Service for the game] was interference with Contractual allegations [of other users that obtained the software] However, not all internet games or experiences are locked down like that. Other companies do offer an open API set or terms under which a client's software may be modified. As a very generous example, LindenLabs does for its SecondLife Virtual World, for which they provide not just the framework, but also the terms under which you are allowed to make a third party Viewer Sometimes, the Terms of service are rather hidden. For example, the Chinese Go platform Fox Weiqi operates in china. To get to the terms of service, you need to download the free client, go to Settings (via the cog), then choose 野狐围棋用户协议, which is Chinese for Wild Fox Go User Agreement. This links to https://edu.foxwq.com/complex/useragreement.html. The user agreement is of course in Chinese, but Google Translate manages to get that to English. It contains the following clause: 7.2 Unless permitted by law or with the written permission of Yehu, you shall not engage in the following acts during the use of this software: ( 1 ) Delete the copyright information on the software and its copies; ( 2 ) Reverse engineer, reverse assemble, reverse compile the software, or try to find the source code of the software in other ways; ( 6 ) Log in or use Yehu Go and its services through third-party software, plug-ins, plug-ins, systems not authorized by Yehu, or make, publish, and disseminate the above tools; ( 7 ) Interfering with the software and its components, modules, and data by itself or authorizing others or third-party software While it takes a court to see if the terms hold water and are actually enforceable because of how the EULA is offered, the face value of those clauses is, that it is forbidden unless you have a specific law that allows such or you obtain written permission. With that kind of possible liability that might cost millions, there might be serious legal problems. Read your license agreement and terms of service and consult a lawyer.

The legal issues are too black and white to have any meaningful impact on an ethics discussion. The IP belongs to A and B can't use it. A's not planning to build a product around the patent is irrelevant to the law and I do not see it bring up any ethical issue, but some people who do not understand patent law might. There might be ethics issues if A hired Josh with the specific plan to fire him as soon as the application was filed and intentionally misled him about these plans. Another issue might be Josh's duty to not disclose A's confidential information (the application does not become public right away), and Josh's duty to not draw B into developing an infringing product.

Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible.

Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.

Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.

Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.

This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement.

I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.

Can someone who does not consider himself a US citizen be extradited and punished for a US felony crime due to a US citizenship? based off of the answer to this question: If one leaves the US to commit an act illegal in the US but legal in the country they travel to are they guilty of a crime? My first bizarre loophole question has to do with situations when someone is a US citizen, but consider themselves to be citizens of a different country with different laws.. Lets say you have two Individuals Bob, age 17, and Alice, who just turned 18, who live in, and are citizens of, some non-US country X, who are dating and have a sexual relationship. Say country X considers the age of consent 16, recognizes dual citizenship, and has an extradition treaty with the US... However, Alice happened to have been born on a cruise while the cruise ship was sailing through US territorial waters, thus making her a US citizen. She has never done any of the things which can cause someone to officially lose their US citizenship. Federal law states it is illegal for a US citizen to have sex with an individual under the age of 18 in a 'foreign place' I'm wondering what, of any of these scenarios, would be illegal due to the above law and could theoretically lead to either extrication, or to arrest when/if they ever visited the US at some later date (and if one is possible but not the later). Alice never realizing she was born actually born in US waters and never thinking of herself as a US citizen, and she never visited the US or engaged in any of the activities that cause her to lose citizenship If the above would not be sufficient would any of the below situations potentially lead to prosecution: Knew she was also a US citizen and had once claimed some minor right or privileged due to being a US citizen. Occasionally visits a friend or relative within the US for brief periods, using her US citizenship to allow easier entry to the US, without going through the steps of the VWP. Once stayed in the US with said friend/relative for slightly more then 90 days (beyond the length a regular tourist can stay) many years ago Had just spent spent 91 day summer vacation with her family relative before returning to her home country and having sexual relations with Bob. Alice and Bob both live in and were citizens of X but originally met when both were on a vacation to the US, ultimately having a sexual relationship in their home country. Would Alice potentially face prosecution, if not would this change if: The couple had (legally) engaged in sexual activity in the US prior to traveling back home The couple originally met in a state where sexual intercourse would have been illegal and so waited until returning home before having a sexual relationship? Alice bought bob plan ticket home, so she is officially 'transporting' bob? (section a of the above law applies) Alice and bob did have a relationship prior to their visit to the US which continued during their US visit. I realize that prosecutor discretion would usually result in no one choosing to prosecutor most if not all of the above cases, despite any legal right, but I'm asking rather they could face charges if a prosecutor did choose to move forward for some reason. I don't know why they would, maybe they are angry at Alice for some other legal act and this is their way of bending the laws to punish Alice in some way, maybe someone is putting pressure on Alice as some political maneuver to pressure her important father into something, maybe some prosecutor is just really gung-ho in prosecuting crimes for some reason whatever... *Edit: Looking back at the law I linked I realized that the definition of illicit sexual encounter, when outside of US territories, is effectively defined as a commercial sexual act, which negates all my examples since no one was being payed. However, I'm not interested in the specific law so much as how any law making activities on foreign territory illegal would be applied to citizens, and only used this law because it was the only one I knew of to reliable reference. For now umm...just pretend that illicit sexual act part of the law was not limited only to commercial acts when answering this question? I think the heart of what I'm trying to understand wouldn't change if that law were slightly different and that's easier then my rewriting all of the above. ps. A US citizen can travel to Angola and have sex with a 12 year old without any repercussion so long as he doesn't pay anyone if I'm reading the law right? That's something I really didn't need to know about. I knew I shouldn't have used that particular law as my example for this... pps. Also the definition of "any person can be charged with a criminal offense" seems extremely vague since it doesn't specify what country/state laws would apply for deciding if the person could be charged with a criminal offense, and I'm sure if you look far enough countries have outlawed all kind of things as sexual offenses, like being in the presence of a women who isn't wearing a hijab.

Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence.

Immigration and naturalization is pretty far out of my comfort zone, but I'm confident that the answer is yes. Although people often believe that a foreign embassy is considered the territory of that country, I don't know of any law that supports that belief. Instead, through the Vienna Convention, the embassy grounds remain the territory of the host state but are provided a variety of protections and immunities because of their diplomatic status. With the embassy on U.S. soil, the child would therefore satisfy the "born ... in the United States" prong of the 14th Amendment's Citizenship Clause.* But that would not be the end of the analysis, as birthright citizenship also requires not just that the child is born in the United States, but also that the child be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." So if the child were born to an American citizen who had entered the Indian embassy to get a travel visa, the child would be both born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, making it eligible for birthright citizenship. But if the child were born to Indian ambassador or to diplomatic staff, who would generally be able to claim diplomatic immunity, that child would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and would not be able to claim birthright citizenship. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73, (1872) ("The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."). * I haven't been able to find any cases saying this explicitly, but all the cases involving children born in foreign embassies sort of skip over the question as though they just assume that the child was born in the United States. See, e.g., Raya v. Clinton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2010); Nikoi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 939 F.2d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1991) These cases also go on to conclude that those children are not citizens of the United States, because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).

When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent.

Legally, they cannot just nab you. The usual (?) option is that authorities in the US request extradition pursuant to the US-Mexico extradition treaty via the Department of Justice, and if the paperwork is in order, this can result in a Provisional Arrest Warrant (and arrest) in Mexico, which will be carried out by the Mexican federal police. This is true whether or not you go to the US consulate. After a hearing in the Mexican courts you might be extradited (or not, but DoJ presumably doesn't proceed with cases that they will lose). Extradition is not possible for every offense, so you would have to look at the offenses listed in the treaty, and whatever the Arizona warrant is about. You can't be extradited for parking tickets, you can be extradited for murder: whatever it is, it has to be a crime in both places, and has to be subject to a minimum one year imprisonment. Also, if you are a Mexican citizen as well, you cannot be extradited unless the Mexican authorities agree to (whereas there is no choice if you are only a US citizen). An alternative is deportation, which would overcome limitations related to extradition, but it's not clear what the requirements for deportation from Mexico are (typically illegal presence, unclear whether Mexican authorities can or would try an end-run around official extradition procedure). Although consulates enjoy a degree of immunity from local law, a consulate in Mexico is still Mexican territory, subject to Mexican law. If you are in the consulate, Mexican authorities cannot enter without permission to arrest you. They also cannot arrest you without a warrant (see Art. 16 of the Mexican constitution). Consular staff also cannot arrest you (if you are not caught flagrante delicto). Nor are they authorized to execute a US warrant in Mexico (thus they have to go through the process of judicial review to send you back to the US, and why a Mexican warrant is required). See this Q&A, relevant to the status of embassies: what is relevant to us is that both the US and Mexico operate under the rule of law, so the issues surrounding Syrian refugees in the Syrian embassy do not arise here.

Extradition is done for specific charges. A principle found in virtually all extradition treaties called the "rule of specialty" says that the country requesting extradition may not prosecute the defendant for any crimes except the ones for which extradition was granted without the permission of the extraditing country, except for crimes committed after the defendant is extradited. This protection expires once the defendant has been released from jail and had a fair chance to leave the country. The rule of specialty doesn't necessarily mean the other charge needs to be dropped, but the defendant can't be tried for it as long as the rule applies. If they're later in the country for another reason (or don't leave when they have the chance), they can potentially be rearrested for the other crime. But as long as they're only in the country because they were extradited, they can't be tried for any other past crimes without the extraditing country's permission.

I assume that you were not born in the United States, and that your mother was/is not a US citizen. If these assumptions are incorrect, the answer below does not apply. A child born outside the United States to a US citizen and a non-US citizen will be a US citizen so long as the parent spent a certain amount of time physically present in the United States. For a child born before 1986 to gain US citizenship through a single parent, that parent would have had to spend 10 years total in the USA, of which at least 5 years were after the parent’s 14th birthday. So if your father was a citizen and lived in the US until at least 1966 or his 19th birthday (whichever was later), you would be a US citizen. However, the document you describe does not prove that your father was a US citizen. Instead, it only proves that your father was admitted to the US as an permanent resident (a so-called “green card”). If your father did become a citizen, he would have received a Certificate of Naturalization. This would be necessary to prove your father’s US citizenship and, by extension, yours.

Short Answer Is unlawful entry into Mexico a crime? In the U.S. there is a federal law making unauthorized entry into the country illegal. Does Mexico have similar law? Yes. Illegal entry into Mexico is illegal but, it is not a crime. The form of the question suggest that the person asking it may not be familiar with the distinction between something being "illegal" and something being a "crime". The notion that they are the same is a common misconception. If so, does anyone know of English translations? An English translation of Mexico's immigration law can be found here. Long Answer Illegal entry into Mexico is illegal and has legally authorized consequences, although it is not a crime. Civil Consequences For Immigration Law Violations In Mexico Civil detention of unlawful entrants into Mexico is authorized by Articles 99-105 of Mexico's Migration Act of 2011. Deportation is authorized by Articles 114-125. There are civil fines for violating immigration laws in Mexico based on a multiple of the minimum wage, ranging from 20 days of minimum wage to 10,000 days of minimum wage, depending upon the offense and its severity (one day's minimum wage is 88.36 pesos). Articles 143-158. So fines range from 1767.2 pesos to 883,600 pesos for immigration violations. Today's exchange rate is 19.4 pesos to $1. So, these fines range from $91 USD to $45,546 USD. Immigration Related Crimes In Mexico Immigration crimes are found at Articles 159-162. According to the linked translation, these crimes are as follows: Article 159. A term of eight to 16 years in prison and a fine ranging from 5,000 to 15,000 days of the general minimum wage in effect in the Federal District will be imposed upon an individual who: I. Traffics one or more individuals in order to enter another country without the corresponding documentation and for the purpose of directly or indirectly obtaining a profit; II. Introduces one or more foreigners into Mexico without the corresponding documentation and for the purpose of directly or indirectly obtaining a profit; or III. Lodges or transports one or more foreigners in or through Mexico for the purpose of avoiding migratory inspection and in order to directly or indirectly obtain a profit. In order to actualize the crime provided for in this article, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the offender's intent is to obtain an indisputable, current, or impending economic benefit in cash or in kind. Penalties will not be imposed upon individuals of renowned moral rectitude who, for strictly humanitarian reasons and without seeking any benefit, assist an individual who has entered the country in an unlawful manner, even when such individuals [of renowned moral rectitude] receive donations or resources for continuing their humanitarian work. Article 160. The penalties indicated in the foregoing article will be doubled when the aforementioned conducts are carried out: I. With respect to children and adolescents, or when a child or adolescent who is not able to comprehend the significance of the action is induced to, motivated to, assisted in, or obligated to conduct any of the behaviors described in the previous article; II. Under conditions or using means that place or could place health, integrity, safety, or life at risk or that allow for inhumane or degrading treatment of the individuals affected by such conduct; or III. When the perpetrator or orchestrator is a public servant. Article 161. A public servant who assists, conceals, or prompts any person to violate the provisions of this Law in order to obtain a direct or indirect profit in cash or in kind will be sentenced to a term of four to eight years in prison and a fine ranging from 500 to 1,000 days of the general minimum wage in effect in the Federal District. Article 162. In regard to the crimes indicated in this Law, the Federal Office of the Public Prosecutor will exercise the criminal action on its own initiative. The Institute is obligated to provide the Federal Office of the Public Prosecutor with all elements necessary for prosecuting these crimes. So basically, the only immigration crimes in Mexico are human trafficking and immigration related bribery. Illegal entry into Mexico, per se, even if it is intentional, while it is illegal and may justify civil immigration detention, deportation and/or a civil fine, is not a crime. Of course, one could conceivably commit other crimes in connection with the immigration process (e.g. assaulting a government official, forging official documents), but illegal entry into Mexico, per se is never a crime, unlike the situation in U.S. immigration law, where illegal entry is both illegal and also a crime in many (but not all) circumstances.

Can a non-profit organization record attendance by name without permission? I have a GDPR question concerning a small non-profit organization. The organization is quite informal. Although it has many regular meetings, all these meetings are open to the public. As such, most of those who attend, even many regular attendees, are not officially registered members of the organization. The organization would like to keep track of those who attend for follow-up purposes. I have three related questions about what the GDPR permits. In the first two cases, the organization does not make any formal announcement that it is tracking the attendance of whom attends. (However, attendance numbers are occasionally mentioned informally, so it is not a secret, either.) First, is it legal under the GDPR for the organization to take a count of how many people attend without recording any names? In this case, the organization groups the counts by the general age (child, teenager, or adult) and gender (male or female) of the attendees, but no names are recorded. These attendance numbers are shared among the organization members and are occasionally announced to all meeting attendees. (I would think that this is authorized.) Second, is it legal under the GDPR for the organization to record the attendees by name, including their general age and gender as mentioned above? The names are obtained through informal contact with the attendees during meetings; attendees are never explicitly asked if they want their attendance recorded. These attendance lists with names are shared only among organization members on follow-up committees. (This is the main case that I have questions about under the GDPR.) Third, in case either or both of the above cases are not authorized under the GDPR, is there any legal way that attendance by name can be recorded and shared among designated organization members? The primary hesitation to formally requesting authorization is that the organization wants attendance records to be as accurate as possible and if some attendees do not grant authorization, then the records will never be accurate. I have heard that one way to accomplish this would be to verbally announce at the beginning of each meeting that attendance is recorded, or to conspicuously post a written notice to this effect at the entrance. Would either of these fulfill GDPR obligations? Or is there an alternative solution? In any answer, I would appreciate it if you could cite specific relevant sections of the GDPR so that I can learn the law better.

The scope of the GDPR is entered when personal data is being processed in a structured manner. Personal data is any information relating to identifiable data subjects (definition in Art 4(1)). "Peter attended the meeting on the 14th" is personal data. "That woman with the blue handbag said she wanted to return on the 25th" is personal data. However, aggregate statistics do not relate to individuals, and are typically not personal data. "On the 14th, we had 25 attendees" is not personal data. Not all use of personal data is within the scope of the GDPR. For example, the GDPR would not apply if two organizers talk about who attended the meeting. However, Art 2(1) says the GDPR applies when personal data is processed wholly or partially with automated means (e.g. computers, smartphones), or forms a filing system or is intended for a filing system (e.g. keeping notes on attendees, keeping attendance lists) If GDPR applies, the organization would be responsible for ensuring compliance with its rules and principles, summarized in Art 5. Primarily, this means: having a clear purpose for processing selecting a suitable Art 6 legal basis for that purpose (e.g. consent or a legitimate interest) only processing the minimum data necessary for achieving that purpose determining and implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of the processing activities preparing for data subject rights, in particular by providing an Art 13 privacy notice when collecting data from the data subjects There are of course some complexities in the details. When the legal basis is "consent" (opt-in), the organization would have to ensure that this consent was freely given and sufficiently informed. Per Art 7(4), consent would not be freely given if that consent was a condition for access to the meeting. Using "legitimate interest" (opt-out) can be more flexible, but it requires performing a balancing test to show that the legitimate interest isn't outweighed by the data subjects' interests, rights, and freedoms. Roughly, relying on a legitimate interest is appropriate when the data subjects can reasonably expect the processing activity to occur. Regarding point 1, keeping general counts and aggregate statistics about attendees is probably OK since it wouldn't be personal data. If you are very conscientious about this, you could round all counts and use categories like "0-4 attendees, 5-9 attendees" for each facet, which makes it more difficult to make inferences about individuals. But the fundamental point is that all your data should relate to attendees as a whole, never to individuals. Regarding point 2 and 3, this is a question of legal basis. Since you gather names through informal conversations, I think that attendees would be weirded out if they learned that you kept detailed records on their attendance. So I think that you probably wouldn't have a legitimate interest here. However, being upfront with this and offering an opt-out could change this. On the aspect of keeping detailed notes on data from informal conversations, I'd like to point out H&M's EUR 35 million fine back in 2020 (summary on GDPRHub.eu). In a callcenter, managers used to have conversations with employees. These conversations touched on anything from vacation experiences to health problems, marriage problems, and religious beliefs. All of that is fine. What was not fine is that the managers went full Stasi and kept detailed notes about all of this on a shared drive and used that information for management decisions. This went on until a configuration error made those files accessible to all employees. This violated all the points in the basic compliance process outlined above: the records had no clear purpose, no suitable legal basis, contained way more data than necessary (and even Art 9 special categories of data like information on health or religious beliefs which have extra protection), did not have appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access, and did not fulfill data subject rights like the Art 13 right to be informed. In case this non-profit is a church or religious organization that had its own comprehensive data protection rules before the GDPR came into force in 2018, those can continue to apply per Art 91. This could probably address some issues of legal basis, but cannot circumvent the GDPR's general principles.

No, you do not need to show a privacy policy just for running a publicly accessible server, as long as any traffic data such as IP addresses is only used as strictly necessary for providing the service requested by the user. The background here is that while GDPR is a very general law, the ePrivacy directive (ePD) provides more details for telecommunication and information society services, which also includes SSH servers. Per ePD Art 6, traffic data may be used (1) for the purpose of the transmission/service or when the data has been anonymized, (2) for billing purposes, or (3) for marketing or value added services, when the user has given their consent. Information about the processing is only required under ePrivacy for cases (2) and (3), but not for processing that is strictly necessary. Now the tricky question is under what circumstances you can log (failed) log-in attempts or use tools like fail2ban. One argument is that such measures are strictly necessary to ensure the security of the communication, but these measures are evidently not necessary for performing the transmission in the sense of ePD. There are a few ways to resolve this: necessity has to be interpreted more broadly, and security measures are indeed necessary. For example, ePD Art 6(5) mentions fraud detection, without authorizing it explicitly. an IP address is effectively anonymized in the sense of the ePD since you do not realistically have means for linking the IP address to any particular person. This is a fairly weak argument, but could be supported by GDPR Recital 26 which defines anonymous data. Counterpoint: IP addresses are online identifiers which are explicitly included in the definition of personal data in GDPR Art 4(1). an IP address is not just traffic data that falls under the ePD, but also personal data that falls under the GDPR. When the IP address is merely used to make a transmission, it is not processed as personal data and only ePD concerns apply. But when we process it to ban the IP, it is processed as personal data under a legitimate interest. This processing does not fall under any of the categories from ePD Art 6, so that only GDPR concerns apply. These include a requirement to inform the data subject about the processing at the time in accordance with GDPR Art 13, which could be satisfied by displaying a link to a privacy policy in the course of the login process. For a legitimate interest argument, it also depends on the expectations of the typical data subject. Since some security measures such as security logs are normal and should be expected, a legitimate interest argument is likely to be strong. I think this is the correct conclusion, even though the “it's not traffic data, or at least doesn't fall under the ePD” argument is quite weak. It hinges on the assumption that security measures are not “value added services”. This fits the intent of the ePD, but not the actual definition of value added services. In any case, you do not need to ask for consent unless you're required to obtain consent e.g. under ePD Art 6(3) or because your processing of personal data relies on consent as the legal basis per GDPR Art 6. It also has to be noted that ePD has no immediate effect, but has to be implemented by each EU member state in national law. These laws can provide more specific guidance.

It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK.

I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.

Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people.

Don't collect or process personal data Many (though of course not all) websites can easily be run without collecting or otherwise processing any personal data. The position of GDPR is that if you are not able to fulfil the basic, simplest core conditions for processing personal data (understanding what you're processing and why and why it's allowed, describing it in a privacy policy, having a non-underage person who's responsible for that) then you are not allowed to process personal data of other people. So don't. Build your website so that any personal data are not collected.

You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.

There are a few different grounds under which PII can be handled. Perhaps the most discussed at the moment of GDRP introduction is consent, because of the wave of consent-seeking. But there are a number of other grounds. "Necessary for contract execution" is a trivial one, to deliver a pizza you'll need an address. The relevant ground for sanctions lists is also pretty obvious in hindsight, you may process PII in order to comply with legal obligations. Note that this is still an integral part of the GDPR, not an exception to the GDPR. That means you need to apply all the basic GDPR rules. You need to explicitly store where you got the PII from, for which purpose, and you need to document how you're using it. Note that this might be hard - why do you need to store this data? Why can't you just check the list as the moment it's relevant? The GDPR for a large part depends on you justifying your actions, not just in hindsight but already up front.

Which law spells out judicial immunity? I am trying to find the exact piece of New Zealand legislation that defines the immunity of judges from civil claims resulting from doing their job (or any immunities they may have). Section 23 of the District Court Act 2016 simply equates DC judges immunity to that of HC judges: A Judge has the same immunities as a High Court Judge. The Senior Courts Act 2016 (which one would expect to spell out the immunities of HC judges) only says that associate HC judges enjoy the same immumities as regular HC judges (s 28), and so do acting judges (s 118). But just where the HC judges' immunities are defined in the first place?

new-zealand The New Zealand Supreme Court describes judicial immunity as "common law doctrine": Judicial immunity is common law doctrine [citing to the English line of case law, including Sirros]. Although its existence is now acknowledged in statute, its scope remains a matter of common law. Attorney-General v Chapman [2011] NZSC 110 canada The immunity of superior court judges in Canada, including judges of the Quebec Superior Court, is inherited from English law. (Morier and Boily v. Rivard, [1985] 2 SCR 716, at paragraph 85) That judgment goes on to cite English cases dating back to 1607, and a doctrinal text (H. Brun and G. Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel) also agreeing that the immunity stems from common law (translation): This absolute immunity is a rule of the common law applicable to superior court judges even where bad faith has been alleged. Courts in Canada have also recognized that judicial immunity is now constitutionalized, through the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence. See e.g. Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 3 FC 298 (C.A.) at paragraphs 58-60.

There is a special type of law enforcement officer, called a "bailiff" who is charged with maintaining order in a courtroom, and often, a bailiff is a direct subordinate of a judge who must follow the judge's orders. Judges can also issue special kinds of court orders, called "writs" which are a direction to a law enforcement agency generally to take certain action. But, in these cases, the law enforcement agency is effectively an "independent contractor" in relationship to the judge with considerable discretion regarding precisely how and when a writ is carried out. Somebody in the law enforcement agency to which a writ is directed is required to take action, but no individual law enforcement officer is personally compelled to comply with this order. The quote in question is not a statement about the legal authority of a judge, however. It is a statement of "realpolitik". The judge can't physically force or threaten law enforcement to do what they are told to do by a judge. The cops have the guns, not the judges. Instead, the judge relies upon law enforcement obeying the judge's orders because that is what law enforcement officers do. It's right in the job title. But, if law enforcement chose to ignore judges, in general, there is very little that judges could do about that (and in some countries, law enforcement does routinely ignore judicial directions). Some forms of executive branch authority to defy judicial orders is even legally codified, most starkly in the case of the pardon power.

In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.

Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair.

There is currently no difference, but there have been substantial differences in the past. Since the Courts Act 1971 (specifically s.42), the City of London has had its own county court that is on the same basis as other county courts. It is called "The Mayor's and City of London Court" for historical reasons, as that was the name of the court that was the previous closest equivalent. The 1971 Act establishes that the new version of the court has the same jurisdiction as any other county court, thus taking away any special privileges which the old version had. It was already almost like a county court by virtue of the City of London (Courts) Act 1964. Moreover, since the Crime and Courts Act 2013, there are no longer separate county courts, but one enormous one that sits in several places. That includes the City of London location. In criminal matters, the Crown Court (established under the same 1971 Act) is logically also one enormous court. When it sits in the City of London, it is known as the "Central Criminal Court" (Senior Courts Act 1981, s.8(3)), but is still the same court. It does not have any special status with respect to the City, being meant to handle cases from all of Greater London as well. Formerly, it had to operate a complex system of separate juries for City cases, but nowadays that is all uniform. For magistrates' courts, the Courts Act 2003 created a single jurisdiction for all of England and Wales. That is divided into "local justice areas", one of which is the City of London - these replace the old "petty sessional divisions". There are no special rules for the City. Applying the general rules for a particular criminal case would result in it being dealt with in the place where the offence is alleged to have happened, or where the accused lives, or where the witnesses mostly live, or "where other cases raising similar issues are being dealt with" (s.30(5)(d)). Perhaps soon, powers under the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 will be exercised to abolish local justice areas (s.45), enabling even more flexibility with the assignment of cases to courts. In particular, this is meant to make it easer to shift cases around depending on local workload, or on which court location is genuinely most convenient in all the circumstances. The Act also removes (ss. 46 and 47) the current special rules about the City of London court premises being provided by the City authorities, rather than by the Ministry of Justice which handles all the other ones. Formerly, there have been plenty of law courts for the City, or its livery companies, or St Paul's Cathedral (the consistory court had criminal jurisdiction over clergy), or the "compters" (debtors' prisons). Some of these still exist in a ceremonial capacity but do not function as courts. For example, the aldermen of the City can meet as the "Court of Husting", which was formerly a functioning law court but nowadays has the sole purpose of enrolling certain deeds, and hasn't done that since 1978. There are still two Sherriffs, nominally associated with the Poultry Compter and Wood Street Compter, but their courts have not existed since 1867. Some of the City's officers have residual ceremonial connections with the Old Bailey or other institutions, but these have no practical impact on the work of the courts.

The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.")

They have the same standard of proof but different onus The legal system places the onus of proving an allegation on the person making the allegation. For your example, this is A if they are suing B or the government prosecutor if B is being prosecuted. The standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt” if B is defending a criminal prosecution and “balance of probabilities” if B is defending a civil prosecution or a lawsuit. Courts have historically been reluctant to define these terms further because doing so can lay grounds for an appeal if the judge oversteps so they mean what their plain English formulation means and what they mean precisely in any given case is one of the things the trier of fact has to decide. For A or the prosecutor to win, they have to meet this burden for each and every element of the offence or cause of action; if they don’t, then B wins. So, B doesn’t have to offer a defence at all and will still win if A doesn’t meet their burden. If B does offer a defence then the trier of fact compares the evidence of each side and decides which they prefer and therefore whether A has met their burden. A jury doesn’t have to give reasons for their decision; a judge does. In general, the decisions of the trier of fact are not appealable unless there was no reasonable basis in evidence to support the decision. For example, the evidence of B might not be believed - this is fine, unless the reason for not believing it is that B has a beard and everyone with beards are liars. Options 2 and 3 are simple matters of comparing evidence and deciding which is preferred. Option 1 is different; it is what’s called an affirmative defence. Here, A has met their burden because B conceded. Now B is relying on the position that they had a legal excuse, that is B is alleging a position and B has the burden of proving it. Now, the burden on B is always “balance of probabilities” because B is not alleging that anyone committed a crime so they don’t have to reach the criminal standard.

A judge can ask any question of anyone in their courtroom. A judge can make any comments they like in their courtroom. They're a judge! What they can't do is exhibit bias or the apprehension of bias or take irrelevant matters into account in making judicial decisions. The judge may have a wide and deep knowledge of driving conditions in India, however, that is irrelevant to an alleged speeding offence in the United States. If it appears that the judge took this into account in their decision then there are grounds for an appeal. Similarly, if it appears that the fact that you are Indian and the judge displays bias against (or towards) Indians then that is also grounds for an appeal. An appeal court will look at the entire circumstances of the case to determine if the decision should be overturned including what was said, what the judge decided and the reasons for the decision in the written judgement (if any).

Is AI child virtual porn illegal in the US? With the rise of AI art generators capable of making explicit and nsfw content free of charge, I worry about the ethical and moral boundaries that come along with it. In particular, it is possible to create obscene virtual porn depicting children. I have read this "Virtual Child" Pornography on the Internet: A "Virtual" Victim? and this... Citizen's Guide To U.S. Federal Law On Child Pornography I am particularly interested in this particular example: Bob uses such a service to indulge in a fantasy. He uses a list of known child actresses to generate obscene sexual 'art' featuring one of them. Is a law being broken? In the case of yes, who is responsible? Is the owner of the site providing the service committing an offense because they host the service and presumably train the AI, or is it Bob because he entered the tags being used to generate the 'art' which used the likeness of an actual child film star? Is this AI generated form considered to be featuring a depiction of a real child?

Let's clarify the point: the material is most likely illegal per se In the laws of many jurisdictions, the definition of child pornography extends from depicting sexual acts with a minor to depicting sexual acts with an apparent minor. As an extreme example: in Australia, drawn sexual comics with Anime aesthetics are banned wholesale, and England and Wales similarly made photorealistic and even more abstract styles of such material illegal. AI art would fall somewhere under those. In other countries, like the US or Japan, legality is based on the material not being obscene. Obscenity often is a somewhat subjective test, like in the US the standard for a time was "I know it when I see it" (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)), but was refined into the Miller Test in 1973: Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , reaffirmed. A work may be subject to state regulation where that work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; portrays, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and, taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Pp. 23-24. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, at 489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when necessary. Pp. 24-25. The test of "utterly without redeeming social value" articulated in Memoirs, supra, is rejected as a constitutional standard. Pp. 24-25. The jury may measure the essentially factual issues of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness by the standard that prevails in the forum community, and need not employ a "national standard." Pp. 30-34. In a totally different definition, japan has its Penal Code of Japan Section 175 reads (in translation) much more like a subjective test, which is often called out to demand conformity (and censor bars): Chapter XXII, Article 175. Distribution of Obscene Objects: A person who distributes, sells or displays in public an obscene document, drawing or other objects shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 2 years, a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen or a petty fine. The same shall apply to a person who possess the same for the purpose of the sale. Who is in possession of illegal material? This depends: IF the AI was trained on illegal material, the makers of the AI had in their possession material of which possession is illegal. IF the hosting company stores the material generated by the user, and it is of the banned type once evaluated, then the company where the image is hosted might be in possession. In the US, due to Section 230 (of Title 47), the hosting company however is blameless for user-generated and user-stored content. The User is fully to blame. The User, by properly downloading the file actively gets into possession of illegal material, which would make them liable for that Just having the file in the browser cache does not always suffice in the US but courts might evaluate the evidence differently

In the U.S. Those stories could constitute "obscenity," in which case they could violate all sorts of federal and state laws. I was surprised to discover on this DoJ page: 18 U.S.C. § 1465 and § 1466: It is illegal to sell and distribute obscene material on the Internet. Convicted offenders face fines and up to 5 years in prison. It is illegal for an individual to knowingly use interactive computer services to display obscenity in a manner that makes it available to a minor less than 18 years of age (See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) –Communications Decency Act of 1996, as amended by the PROTECT Act of 2003). It is also illegal to knowingly make a commercial communication via the Internet that includes obscenity and is available to any minor less than 17 years of age (See 47 U.S.C. § 231 –Child Online Protection Act of 1998). Under some state laws merely authoring or possessing obscene material is a felony. However, if the material is not obscene then it is actually protected by the first amendment. In fact many public schools (at least when I was growing up) required us to read "literature" (e.g., The Color Purple) that included descriptions of child rape and sexual abuse. Descriptions of purportedly actual sexual abuse of minors are also common in the testimony and published biographies of abuse victims. In the U.K. Such obscene stories are also illegal in the U.K. The relevant law is the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The Crown Prosecution Service provides information on the specific application of that and related laws.

england-and-wales There is nothing in the criminal law to compel Party X to identify Party Y in this scenario - they are under no legal obligation to contact the police or anyone else, and a witness summons, for example, cannot be served as there is no trial. That said, one option is for the victim to make a complaint to the police for an alleged offence of what is colloquially referred to as "revenge porn" contrary to s.33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015: (1) It is an offence for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made — (a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and (b) with the intention of causing that individual distress. ... The definitions of "private" and "sexual" may be found at s.35: (2) A photograph or film is “private” if it shows something that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public. (3) A photograph or film is “sexual” if — (a) it shows all or part of an individual's exposed genitals or pubic area, (b) it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature, or (c) its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual. The police can then ask Party X to either provide a witness statement identifying Party Y or, if Party X is concerned about unwarranted repercussions etc, to provide this information in confidence and their involvement will be protected as Sensitive Material as per para 2.1(9) and 6.14 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice.

Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.

Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.

It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK.

Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.

1. Is Bob's usage considered a derivative work under US copyright law? Possibly. Under US law, a derivative work is: … a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. Lee v. A.R.T. Co. - 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) is on point here. There the court held that originality was essential to a derivative work. The selection of a particular frame out of the many available is an editorial choice that possibly meets the threshold for originality and is, therefore, a derivative work. Or it isn't and it is merely an abridged reproduction of the original. It depends on the facts. These include how much editorial originality the selection of the particular frame requires (e.g. the choice of a single frame from a highly dynamic video like a fight sequence requires more originality than the choice of a frame from a pan across a static landscape) and the circumstances surrounding its use. 2. Is Bob's usage considered an "adaptation" under the CC-BY-ND license? Maybe. If it’s a derivative work under applicable work then it is ipso facto an adaptation because that’s how the licence defines adaptation. If it isn't, then it isn't.

Is is illegal to hack websites in a country considered to be an enemy of my country? I know that Hacking is illegal in any country. my question is this "is it illegal to hack enemy country website ?" e.g i lived in Pakistan, let say i hacked Indian Govt websites. is this illegal ? if this is illegal what will be fine and prison charge?

This question really depends on the specific countries involved, as all law depends on jurisdiction. However, there are essentially two ways that breaking into foreign computer systems could be illegal: 1) Your own country has laws against hacking that include hacking into foreign computers or 2) The country you're breaking into has laws about hacking that are not limited to citizens. In the first case, your own country would find such "hacking" illegal; in the second, your target country would find such "hacking" illegal. If you violate the first, which is the less likely option, you could be traced, located and prosecuted by your own country. If you violate the second, which is the more likely option, the target country would target you for extradition and prosecution. Depending on the amount of political power your target country has, this could result in you being shipped off to another country to face their courts, without the protection of your own country. In other words, it could very well be illegal, though the specific sentence resulting from such a crime is far too specific to even attempt to address in the general case.

Generally speaking, you are only linking to other resources on the web, and generally that's not illegal. But that could be different depending on the country that hosts the site and the country of the user's access. This site seems to have no problem: http://thehiddenwiki.org/hidden-wiki/ Read their TOS, too: http://thehiddenwiki.org/2013/06/26/terms-of-service-and-privacy-policy/ That site is hosted in Romania (the domain is privately registered in Malaysia), but Germany and Romania are both EU. Now, what users may use those links for may be illegal. And that's still in legal flux in some jurisdictions, i.e. the hosting of a site of BitTorrent links that allow downloading of copyrighted material while the link itself does not contain the material themselves. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_issues_with_BitTorrent Besides, a list of .onion links on the regular web is useless unless you know how to use the links; you're linking to resources on the "dark" that are not even directly accessible from those links on the "bright" web. Someone who wants to go to an .onion link needs to install Tor https://www.torproject.org/ to enable the DNS changes to access the .onion TLD (Top Level Domain). .onion is not even in the Internet's Root Domain; it's a special case TLD. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion Installing and using TOR is one more step that someone has to take to make use of a link in the "bright" web to reach a link in the "dark" web. So your links are "isolated" in one more sense from usefullness, and that could be a legal defense, if it even comes down to it. Like anything, do your own research and draft a good TOS for your site. And, at the same time, using TOR is not illegal itself (but could be in some countries), but can result in illegal activity: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silk_Road_(marketplace) Read TOR's own legal FAQ: https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en

As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).

I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.

This is wire fraud and punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. It is not relevant that the victims of this fraud are people who support a cause that the US government opposes. Nor is it relevant what your friend chooses to do with the ill-gotten money. It is still just as illegal. Whether your friend would be prosecuted would be at the discretion of federal prosecutors, and political motivations could come into play. That is beyond the scope of Law.SE to address. What is certain is that he could be prosecuted. Giving information to the FBI probably won't help, as from your description, the victims of this fraud aren't doing anything illegal. "Donating money to support Russia", while vague, does not sound like it violates any of the current sanctions.

Some jurisdictions have laws which make it illegal to create a software which is intended to commit crimes (usually computer-related crimes). For example, the German criminal law §202c StGB makes it illegal to create (or sell, convey, etc.) a program which has the purpose to commit crimes against the previous paragraphs 202a (stealing data) or 202b (intercepting data). The constitutional court later clarified that this law is only to be used against programs which serve no other purpose than to commit crimes and not against "dual use" tools which can also be used for legitimate purposes. So if one were accused of committing the crime of creating such a program, then a possible defense strategy could be to convince the court that they never intended for their program to be used to commit crimes.

Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems.

Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries.

Usury---What Constitutes It in the United States? Some years ago, I recall a professor who announced that (in the United States) charging someone an annual interest rate of 24% or more was considered usury. The other day, someone I know in the United States received an unsolicited offer for a Toyota credit card that specified a 31.74% annual APR interest rate for cash advances and interest rates for "Toyota Rewards Visa Card Purchases" raging between 20.74% and 29.74% depending upon cred "worthiness." QUESTION: Does this not constitute usury anymore in the U. S.? Does the United States have usury laws anymore; if so, what might they be? I ask this because, for example, if someone borrowed, say, $100,000 at 31.74% and paid virtually nothing on the balance, the debt would rise to $200,000 in a little over two years. This seems to me, that without just usury laws, Americans are subjected to a "legal" form of gouging.

There is no usury on Credit Cards in the USA Legally, usury is charging interest rates above the mandated maximum. Due to ongoing successful lobbying by card providers, there is no maximum on credit cards. Some protections around disclosure and transparency were passed in 2009, which is why you can so easily quote the figures. However, even in jurisdictions where there are caps, the rates you quote may not exceed them. For example, in Australia, the maximum rate is 48%.

Yes You have a contract and, while I don't know what it says, its a fair bet that not making payments the contract requires you to make would be a breach of that contract. This would allow the other party to sue you for the unpaid fees as well as interest on them and the consts of collection (collection agency fees, legal fees etc.). In addition they can report you as a defaulter (which you would be) to any and all credit reporting agencies which would wreck your ability to get credit in the future. If the do sue you and succeed (as the probably would) they can seize your assets to sell them to recover their debt - since the time-share appears to have limited value they would probably seize your savings or your car instead. You need to read the contract to find out how you can end it legally.

This would be wire fraud, which is any type of fraud committed using electronic communications (the term originally comes from the use of telegrams to commit fraud... just like how "wiring" money devised from paying the bill at one telegram station and having the bill collector take an equal amount of money from a different station.). Wire Fraud is basically a fraud crime over electronic communications, so it doesn't matter how you defraud someone, the fact that you did it in this manner is guilty... using a bank system to fraudulently create more money in your digit account would qualify. The bank would be the victim since it does have a set amount of money in assets that it owes to its customers (account holders) and Federal Insurance (which prevents the Bank Run scene in "It's a Wonderful Life" from happening) requires the bank to carefully keep books. Additionally, Wire Fraud comes with a $100,000 fine against the perpetrator for committing the crime where a financial institution is a victim, so it's in the Bank's interest to report a sudden income surge of fake dollars to the authorities lest they have to pay the fine out of their own pocket, risk their federal insurance, or lose their consumer confidence with account holders (who will pull their money and go to a more honest bank).

Fraud is fraud From what you say, the US company has had no revenue, no expenses, and no profit/loss. To say otherwise is what is colloquially known as a “lie”. A lie is also the term for it legally. To lie in order to receive a benefit like, say, a good credit rating, is called fraud. That’s illegal in the USA; I’m not familiar with Dutch law but I suspect it’s illegal there too.

Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).

Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.

Under U.S. law, a U.S. court can assert jurisdiction sufficient to enter a binding judgment (called "long arm personal jurisdiction") if the events giving rise to the lawsuit took place in the state where the state or federal court in which the suit is brought is located. Generally speaking, modern U.S. law allows the service of the summons and complaint that gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant if the events giving rise to the suit took place in the state, to be served anywhere in the world (or even in outer space, for that matter). But, the practical reality is that serving someone with process from a U.S. court in another country would be difficult and expensive, and enforcing the judgment if you win could likewise be difficult. There are also a couple of other problems specific to small claims court: Many small claims courts do not have the full jurisdiction that the U.S. Constitution allows them to have by virtue of the statutes that authorize them and their contemplation that proceedings take place predominantly or entirely in person. It isn't uncommon for the statute authorizing a small claims court to limit its jurisdiction to defendants that live in the same county. Most small claims courts are only allowed to enter money judgments subject to some very narrow and idiosyncratic exceptions. Most small claims courts do not have jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract to sell a car, even though they could award money damages for breaching the contract to sell the car if those money damage could be demonstrated convincingly. These barriers particular to small claims court could be solved by filing suit in another state court that has broader jurisdiction. (The federal courts would probably not have jurisdiction over this case even if there was "diversity of citizenship" between the parties because the amount in controversy would probably be less than $75,000 unless it was a very fancy car indeed to be worth that much used.) Different consideration would apply if these facts and circumstances arose outside the United States, depending upon the jurisdiction in question.

The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures.

Are licenses on "source available" products binding? There are a number of companies which make their source code available in various public forums like Github or Gitlab. These products are not open source, but the source is available for public commentary or research purposes, or simply for the appearance of transparency. Of particular note, Gitlab themselves makes their enterprise edition source code available.The code in this repository has a license located here. I have usually assumed that source code licenses are only relevant in the event that you attempt to prepare a copy of the software, not if you build/otherwise use it for personal (or even organizational) purposes. Thus, my question is: can you acquire a copy of the source code for a "source available" product without binding yourself to the terms of the license that is distributed with that source? If you do, can you build/run it without being bound by said license?

If you do, can you build/run it without being bound by said license? No, you cannot. Because there is no way to "build/run" it without making a copy. You copy the sourcecode, before you can run your compiler. That is the copy you are making, not copying the file that results from this process. A valid question might be, are you bound by the license? Well, that is up for lawyers and a court to decide, but in all countries I know, copyright is automatic for anything worth copying. And the copyright holder can grant licenses to people to allow things. So arguing you are not bound by a specific license would mean you would argue that you are bound by the legal default, which in most countries is "You cannot copy that. At all. Unless you have explicit permission". That argument would sound like "I stole all 10, because the offer of buy-one-get-one-free was not legally binding". Maybe it wasn't. But that doesn't mean you get to do something unrelated illegal instead. Now, there are many exceptions for "personal use". You can sing any song in the shower. I would assume you can compile any program there, too. You just cannot use that program for anything worthwhile, the same way you cannot record your song in the shower and sell it.

Udemy claims that all the videos and course content are copyrighted, but does that also hold for the material of the course? Yes, all the material is copyrighted. Ideas are not, material and content is. it would be really useful to me if I could take a large part of that code ... I want to know if I am allowed, by the law, to use this code for commercial purposes, or is it protected as the intellectual property? Yes, it is protected, specifically it has copyright applied and you may only use it if the license it is distributed under allows you to - in some cases this may be a permissive license, or the code may be obtainable legitimately from another source under a permissive license, in which case its usable. But in many cases, it may not be distributed under a permissive license or indeed any license, and in such cases you will not be permitted to use it. The license under which the code is released depends on the individual course, and in many cases the source code repository or download site for the code for the course. Check their for a license.

may require that you obtain license rights from third-party owners or licensors of content that you include in your text inputs (Emphasis mine). Based solely on the excerpt above, yes, you have the copyright on the audio files if you created the source material, as you are the creator, using Amazon Polly as/to generate a "tangible medium". One of the central rights granted by copyright is to control translation into a different medium (in this case, from text into audio), as is the right to control distribution, which is what this excerpt is talking about. "Third party" in this case means neither you nor Amazon. Basically, Amazon is informing you that using their software on someone else's copyrighted material does not grant you copyright on the audio recording.

The MIT license is non-exclusive. If S is the sole copyright holder, S can issue any other non-exclusive license in parallel, and can also stop offering the software under the MIT license. However, open source licenses such the MIT license are generally understood to be irrevocable, so S cannot prevent other people from using the software who already received it under the MIT license terms. But: only if S is the sole copyright holder. There is no particular reason to believe that S would be the sole copyright holder. One does not gain a copyright ownership just by supervising other people, although an employer might gain copyright ownership over works created by employees (e.g. the US “work for hire” doctrine). That the copyright notices only mention S's name is an indication that S might be a copyright holder, but that's neither sufficient nor necessary for showing that S holds sole or joint copyright in the software. This leaves three relevant scenarios: S might be the sole copyright holder, in which case, yes, S can effectively discard the MIT license. This might be the case e.g. if there was some other copyright assignment, outside of the MIT license. What copyright transfers or assignments are valid depends on the local laws, e.g. some jurisdiction do not recognize copyright as transferable and at most allow the assignment of economic aspects of copyright. S might not be the sole copyright holder, but have additional permissions to the work. For example, there might have been extra licensing agreements, outside of the MIT license. Or S might have special rights for a work of joint authorship, if and only if the jurisdiction recognizes such additional rights. S might not be the sole copyright holder and not have any agreements outside of the MIT license. Then S has no additional rights, and is bound by the terms of the MIT license. This doesn't have to be a problem: S can still pretty much do whatever S wants with the code, as long as S fulfils the license terms. These are pretty simple: just keep a copy of the copyright+license notice with any copies of the software the students created.

Yes. This is a frequently asked question on the foundation's homepage, and answered without ambiguity (source): Can I use a Raspberry Pi in a commercial product? This is a very common question, and the answer is yes! Once you have bought a Raspberry Pi, it's yours to do with as you wish. You would be in good company too, as in fact the Raspberry Pi is regularly used and sold for commercial applications third parties. Note that this the default consequence of a contract of sale in all jurisdiction I know of (but I am not a lawyer): The seller does not retain property rights in the particular item, and by the mere selling of the item implies there are no other rights that might prevent the buyer from using it as they wish. Apart from the particular computer now in your property, there are other legal requirements: "Copyleft" softweare: Large parts of the Raspbian software are licensed under "copyleft" licenses (importantly, versions of the General Public License, GPL). These licenses are meant to provide your customers with the means of reproduciing and building upon the "copylefted" software. You will need to provide your customers with the source code to those software items, the tools and documentation needed for building, and a written notice. Your own programs need not be licensed under a "copyleft" license, provided that you don't build on (distribute "derative works" of) "copyleft" software. The open source licenses involved are not meant to exclude commercial use, and there are helpful compliance guides available ( a, b ). Non-free software: Make sure to not include non-free software, like Mathematica or Oracle Java, which are not licensed for commercial redistribution. Trademarks: Your use of the words "Raspberry PI" or the raspberry logo is subject to restrictions, as is usual with trademarks. Speaking of the logos: You can request permission to use their "powered by Raspberry Pi" logo. Market regulations: You need to abide by regulations, for example safety and electromagnetic interference. Repackaging the Pi might mean you'll need to test and recertify your product, I'm not an expert. Video codecs: Some Raspberry Pis (up to 3) include specialised video decoding hardware. If you want to use it with the MPEG2 codec, you'll have to buy an activation key for small one-time fee per device - £2.40 for MPEG2, £1.20 for VC-1; other codecs are already activated. I don't think you'll need a license even for commercial, for-sale devices, but I am not your lawyer. Just to be clear, nothing prevents your buyers from cloning your software. (This is not a consequence of you providing the Raspbian source code - they can just clone the contents of your SD card.) While you can retain copyright in your own code, you'll probably have no effective means of detecting infringement. However, the physical design of the rest of your device will not be affected. Your business model needs to account for this fact.

Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need.

How can you get in trouble? If they see any code you wrote for them show up in your open source project. They own the code you write on company time. Even if your code goes into an open source project owned by the company, you still don't own that code. The only way you can own it is if they directly tell you that you may put it into your open source project. If you make your open source project private so nobody else can see the source code, but they see your side business has the same features you wrote for them. You can try to get around problem #1 by hiding your open source project. But if they see the same features in it that they told you to write for them, they can become suspicious. They might force you to reveal the source to them in court. If you don't want them to see it, they may force you to share it with a third party who is bound by an NDA. The third party can compare your code to theirs and report if you copied any code. Even if your work is not directly related to the company products, your work for them can be a company secret. You reveal that, and you are in trouble. You say your work improves internal procedures, but is not directly related the company products. If a company can reduce its cost, it can lower its prices and still make more money than their competition. That gives them a competitive edge over other businesses. By revealing how your employer does its internal work, you give that competitive edge to their competition. Although you say your open source project does not violate rule #4 - "does not reveal company secrets" - all three explanations mentioned above say it does. What can you do? Quit and start your own company based on your open source project. If you quit, you should do it before you write any code related to your project for your employer. Ask your company to fund your project. Talk to your boss and anybody else there who might be a stakeholder. Tell them what you can do. Make a deal with them that you get to work on your project during work hours. Maybe they could turn it into an additional source of revenue for the company. That changes you from a potential loss into a valuable asset. Their competitors might end up buying products based on your code. Many companies would love for their competition to pay them. Ask your employer to allow you to turn your work into your open source project. Some companies require employees who work on open source projects to give their employers a royalty-free license to use and modify the work as they wish. Ask your employer if they would use a product based on your project. You can start a side business (with your employer's blessing), and turn them into your first customer. They get access to a beta product before their competitors do. Promise them they get it free or at a hefty discount for a year or two before the competition even knows what you have. The first option is win/lose. You win and your employer loses. The other three options are win/win. Good luck!

The law itself wouldn't specify what origin of code can be retrieved and then executed. The terms of service of Google would be what would restrict you from doing this or not, including what consequences you would have if Google discovered this. I can say that as a developer, I have created assemblies in C#, sent them to a server and my application downloaded them and executed them. In my case the assemblies were compiled from script code that the user created themselves and so they knew this was happening. There is no law that dictates that a particular block of code must go through a vetting process by Google prior to running. A quick check of Google's terms of service say that they do not allow this kind of updates. Here is a quote: An app distributed via Google Play may not modify, replace, or update itself using any method other than Google Play’s update mechanism. Likewise, an app may not download executable code (e.g. dex, JAR, .so files) from a source other than Google Play. This restriction does not apply to code that runs in a virtual machine and has limited access to Android APIs (such as JavaScript in a webview or browser).

How does copyrights work for mobile/web applications? If a mobile/web developer creates an application like Uber, then sells it to a company, and the company also wants the copyrights for the application, what happens if after few months another company comes to developer and asks for a new similar application like Uber, then the developer creates a new application like Lyft and give it to the new customer/company? I mean a developer may use 90% of similar codes that he used while creating Uber application for the Lyft application. In this case, can Uber company sue against the developer because they have also bought copyrights for the Uber application? It's a little bit confusing for me as a developer because most of the time we use similar codes to create similar behaviors in an application. Also the way you code is like your handwritten and you can not code similar applications in different ways, it's kinda meaningless! Because most of the time we just copy and paste similar codes that we already use in another application if we want to build something similar. So how does copyrights law work for the applications?

A fundamental principle of copyright law is that protection is only afforded to the concrete expression, and not the abstract idea. Therefore, if you write a sort program, what is protected is "that specific program", and not the general idea of a sort program. There are many kinds of sort algorithms: if you write a bubble sort program, you don't "own" all bubble sort programs, you only own the one that you wrote. If you sell your right to a particular bubble sort program, you don't thereby prevent yourself from writing another bubble sort program. But, technically, you do prevent yourself from copying that program, changing some variable names or maybe manually recoding a couple of lines, and re-licensing the code (assuming that you fully transferred copyright, or gave the customer exclusive rights to the code). The basic question that the courts will ask is "did you copy that program", which they answer by looking at the similarity between the two programs. All bubble sorts have a necessary similarity. To prove infringement, the plaintiff would (ultimately) have to prove that the similarity had to have come from copying rather than independent coincidental re-creation. Functional considerations and general programmer practice would tend to weigh against an allegation of infringement in certain cases, where "counter" is a common name for a counter variable, and bubble sort is a well known algorithm with limited practical differences in lines of code. The hard part is establishing that it would be natural for such similarities to exist even when independently coded by a single person. It may be common practice to take a program that you've sold and tweak it in some fashion, but that is copyright infringement, whereas "applying the lessons that you learned in writing X to a new program" is not infringement, it is using the same ideas, and the ideas are not what is protected.

The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work.

Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need.

The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use.

Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.

A GPS trace of a car's path, on its own, is unlikely to be covered by copyright in the first place. It is primarily made up of facts (the locations of roads and lanes), and there is no creativity involved in its creation. A database of facts may be protected by copyright as a compilation if there is some amount of creativity in how it is assembled, but this does not extend any protection to the individual contents of the database (cf. Feist v. Rural).

Any use of the song snippets in your App can be copyright infringement (in the US), Fair Use (U.S. Copyright Office) not withstanding. Not distributing the App and/or using the App only in a limited group for the study, or not making money from the App doesn't usually matter when it comes to copyright infringement. Fair Use does have some educational exceptions; read the link above and see if your case may fit. But the final assessment of educational use would be made by a court if you were sued for infringement. If the use in your App doesn't fall under the education exception, you still probably run little risk of the copyright holders finding out if the App use is private and within a small group, but that's your choice to make. You can always Google the name of the music/recording company; most provide ways online to request licensing of samples, but the cost may be prohibitive, or permission may simply not be available for popular songs.

No. (Therefore no). Not necessarily. Yes. Is there a fair use for patents? No. "Fair use" is a affirmative defense for copyright infringement. The issue is that patents cover an design, idea or methodology, while copyright covers an "artistic" work. For example, if he were alive and working today, van Gogh would have copyright over his collection of paintings. If he developed a special paintbrush to make his distinctive style, he could patent the design for that brush. There is no obligation to make a patent available, much less at a "fair rate". And there is no obligation for a patent holder to make their patent available (so yes, they can block you directly or indirectly). There are various rationales for this. One is that a patent holder's historical reward for producing a new invention, a furtherance of common knowledge, is that that individual would receive an exclusive monopoly on the manufacture and sale of that invention. Often, this would serve as a way to recoup investment in new development and an incentive to experiment and expand the knowledge base of a country. This arrangement in the modern day is most closely represented by the exclusive license agreement, in which the licensor (in this case the patent holder) agrees to not only give the licensee the legal right to use the patent holder the legal ability to use their patent, but also agrees to limitations in what other people are granted that legal ability, in exchange for compensation.

Why do some licenses have a clause stating that one can't violate the law? Example of such a clause in the Creative MLOpen RAIL-M dated August 22, 2022 used by runwayml/stable-diffusion-v1-5: You agree not to use the Model or Derivatives of the Model: In any way that violates any applicable national, federal, state, local or international law or regulation. I don't see the point of that clause. I.e., I don't see what would change if the clause were to be deleted. Why do some licenses have a clause stating that one can't violate the law?

Because breaking the law is not breach of contract (Necessarily). Were you to use the model to 3D-print a gun and rob banks with it, without this clause, you have not broken the contract. That would mean that the provider could neither sue you for any damages the use of their model in your crime spree might have caused them, nor can they legally terminate the licence with you.

Choice of law A contract can include a choice of law clause that states the laws that apply to the contract. For the USA this would usually be the laws of a particular state. Most courts in most jurisdictions respect the choice of law clause - that is, if say a suit is brought in a new-south-wales court on a contract with a choice of law of californina, the court will (probably) apply Californian law to the contract. However, a choice of law clause does not affect non-contract law like torts, equity, criminal law, consumer protection law, and "no contracting out" laws. So, for the above example, while the contract will be interpreted using California/USA law, other claims will be assessed under New South Wales/Australian law. For an example of how this works in practice, see ACCC v Valve Software. It was never in doubt that the contract was under Washington, USA law, however, the "no refund" term, while valid in Washington violated Australian Law and was unenforcable and, more critically for valve, was misleading and deceptive, costing them AUD 3 million in fines (plus legal costs). Choice of Forum In addition to specifying the relevant law, a contract can also suggest the appropriate forum: "disputes shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of Californian courts". A clause that oversteps the suggestion and states the forum categorically is likely to be void on public policy grounds: a contract cannot exclude courts that have jurisdiction. A choice of forum clause is one of the factors a court will consider if one of the parties petitions that it is the wrong forum and the case should be transferred to the right forum. They are influential but not determinative and go into the mix with all the other relevant factors. Arbitration A well-drafted binding arbitration agreement will almost always be effective if it complies with local law. Courts have a very strong bias in favour of enforcing arbitration clauses.

The artist and collager have a contract that states that the artist retains the copyright to the final collective work. To arrive at any other outcome, they both must agree to a new contract. One could argue that no new contract was agreed to for two separate reasons: Firstly, the request to "approve by signing next to the copyright statement" is not very specific, understandable contract language that unambiguously is intended to transfer the copyright to the collager. Whether the specific language the collager used to make the new proposal is indeed a contract is debatable. A contract requires "mutual assent", which is tested legally by how a "reasonable person" would interpret the contract - it's far from guaranteed that most reasonable people would interpret the correspondence as a mutual decision intended to transfer copyright. Secondly, a contract requires consideration - one cannot enter into a contract where one side gets unilateral benefit and the other side gets nothing whatsoever. Even if the language used would constitute terms specific enough for a contract, there is certainly no consideration involved - the collager is proposing that they get the copyright to the collective work, while the artist gets nothing. Because there is no consideration for the artist, it is not a valid contract. For these two reasons (especially the second one), the artist has a strong case that they have not entered into any other contract or contract amendment other than what they originally agreed to, which states that the artist owns the copyrights to both the original and collective works. The legal argument is that collager never proposed a valid new contract, because they used ambiguous language that did not result in mutual assent, and did not offer anything in return.

Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of.

Ballot photos Anti-ballot-photo laws may not be constitutional. Two of them have been struck down for violating the 1st Amendment. Rideout v Gardner Case 1:14-cv-00489-PB Indiana Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., d/b/a American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana v. Indiana Secretary of State, et al., Case 1:15-cv-1356-SEB-DML California's has been amended by the legislature to allow disclosure of a filled-in ballot as long as it isn't part of violating some other law (like vote buying). Open container laws Open-container laws have never been held to be unconstitutional. These are state laws, and states have broad freedom to legislate as long as they don't violate their constitution or elements of the Federal Constitution that have been incorporated by the 14th Amendment. My guess is that they would be upheld because they would pass rational basis review: they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Here is an example of an open-container law surviving a constitutional challenge. State are encouraged to pass open-container laws by 23 USC 154. If a state does not have an open container law, they receive less federal highway funding. This kind of condition was upheld by South Dakota v. Dole.

The user gains the use of the software, the EULA issuer gains the limitations on how the user of the freeware will use it, that for example, prevent the freeware user from exploiting the issuer's labor by reusing it for profit. Consideration doesn't have to be monetary. As a practical matter, sometimes the business model is to give the software away as a loss leader and to have the issuer make their money with training and consulting on how to use it. Also, even in the absence of consideration, a promise upon which the person benefiting from the promise reasonably relies is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Further, EULA stands for "end user license agreement" and there are many times that license agreements aren't full fledged contracts. They are merely limited grants of permission to use something, often not even amounting to a full fledged property right or contract right. For example, if I let my neighbor walk into my living room while we talk and have tea, the right of the neighbor to be in my living room is called a license, even though it is not a contract. A license can be embedded in a contract, but it doesn't have to be.

Among other things, GDPR regulates what you may do with the data within your systems. You can use it for the contracted purpose, or in accordance to law, or with informed and revokable consent, or for some other enumerated purposes. Even with consent, you have to take security measures to avoid the misuse of the data. Remember the software shrink-wrap licenses? "By opening the package, you agree to the terms inside." GDPR makes the equivalent in the cloud world impossible. You have to document exactly what you do with the data, and for any use that is not necessary to perform the service the customer can opt out. In the scenario you describe, it is possible that you are not the data controller under GDPR but the data processor, and that you have a duty to keep the data from separate controllers apart. And delete any batch at the end of contract. If you want to do this professionally, you need to consult a lawyer for your specific plans.

It is unclear whether WINE is infringing copyright or if it can rely on a fair use defense. The CAFC held that: that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the API packages are entitled to copyright protection In that light, if WINE had original content in the structure, sequence, and organization of its API, the CAFC would likely also find that it is entitled to copyright protection. However, because this issue is outside the scope of the CAFC's exclusive jurisdiction (this is a copyright issue, not a patent issue), the holdings are not binding in any other circuit. Each circuit is free to review anew the copyrightability of APIs when such a case comes up. My guess is that this is the reason the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal on CAFC's Oracle v. Google opinion. To address your fair use question would be simply speculation, because fair use is always assessed case-by-case, and even in WINE's closest analogy (Oracle v. Google), the CAFC remanded the fair use question back to the trial court, and that question hasn't been decided yet: we remand for further consideration of Google’s fair use defense in light of this decision

Can a song be used in a presentation for work? Does it fall under that Fair Use Act of 1976 to include a song as the intro to a presentation for work if the presentation is being given for educational/teaching purposes?

The educational/teaching purposes do not apply to any copyrighted work that you chose to include in the educative material that you might produce. The educational/teaching purposes means education refering to or related to the work being used. If your presentation is about the musical styles of the 70s, you can use a 70s song to show how it matches those styles, its impact, relevance... But you cannot use the same song as soundtrack in a presentation about how to properly fill the X-520 form. It also usually requires some depth. So, your presentation being just "These are some songs from the 70s" and playing a few hours would not cut it, even if it serves for some in your public to listen (learn) new songs.

In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.

The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.

Making and sharing and using subtitles for movies is not legal. It is copyright infringement. I paint this statement with a very broad brush. The movies are copyrighted (they are original and fixed in tangible form). (17 U.S. Code § 102(a)) 17 U.S. Code § 106(2) provides that the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to prepare and to authorize to preparation of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S. Code § 101 defines derivative work as a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.... So we have established that the copyright holder has exclusive rights to authorize translations, but this exclusive right is limited by fair use. 17 U.S. Code § 107 provides some examples of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research If these subtitle files are not used for a fair use purpose (the examples cited are examples only, not an exhaustive list) then translation is infringement. If the files are used for one of the fair use purposes then § 107 also gives us the factors to determine whether that particular use is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

"public performance" is a term used in copyright law mostly for music, dance, drama, and audio-visual works, where it means to actually perform the work in front of an audience. For a book it could mean to read the book aloud in front of an audience. It is not largely used for software. I suppose that demonstrating or running the software in front of an audience would be a public performance. Running the software and using its output in a publication would not be a "public performance" as I understand it. As long as the user has the right to access the software, which normally includes the right to run it, the output may be used with no further or special permission.

You are absolutely allowed to discuss or describe or criticizes software (or books or other copyrighted or trademarked things) without any permission from the copyright holder or trademark holder. This includes teaching people how to use those things. You may not, however, copy protected software without permission. For example you could not include a CD with a copy of Windows 10 as part of a course you taught on using Windows 10, without permission from Microsoft. Also, you may not use a trademark in such a way as to imply that your course is approved or endorsed by the trade mark holder, or by the maker of the trademarked item. If reasonable people could think that your Windows course was approved by Microsoft, you are probably infringing their trademark. Use of screenshots is more of a grey area. Such use, for purposes of teaching or of commentary, is probably covered by fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in any of several other countries). But that is always a case-by-case determination, and depends on the exact facts, such as how extensive the use is, and whether it in any way harms the market for the original. If in doubt consulting a lawyer experienced in IP issues is wise. But aside from the issues of screenshots, the makers or copyright or trademark holders of software have no right to grant or withhold permission to one who teaches about the softrware, nor to demand any fee from any such person.

On the face of it, transcripts are derivative work covered by copyright (even if automagically generated). You are allowed to use them if the use is fair use or if you comply with YouTube's terms of service.

The current version of copyright law in the PRC is here. Art. 10 states what is protected, which includes the standard rights of distribution, copying, modification and so on (which makes software cracking illegal). Article 22 gives the equivalent of the Fair Use limitation on copyright protection: a work may be exploited without the permission from, and without payment of remuneration to, the copyright owner, provided that the name of the author and the title of the work are mentioned and the other rights enjoyed by the copyright owner by virtue of this Law are not infringed upon for 12 specific reasons (translation into Braille or a minority national language, free public performances, quotation to make a point end so on), which includes some potentially applicable reasons (1) use of a published work for the purposes of the user's own private study, research or self-entertainment (6) translation or reproduction, in a small quality of copies, of a published work for use by teachers or scientific researchers in classroom teaching or scientific research, provided that the translation or reproduction is not published or distributed (7) use of a published work by a State organ within the reasonable scope for the purpose of fulfilling its official duties It is unclear what "State organ" refers to and it is unlikely that a university is a "State organ". It is unlikely that (1) and (6) are interpreted as an across-the-board "education exception" to copyright, but that could be an avenue for legality. The standard misconception of copyright law is that anything done for educational purposes is allowed, and the PRC law seems to have at least the seeds of such a misunderstanding. However... software protection is subject to separate regulation in Decree No.339 of the State Council, an English version being here. The regulations recapitulate the basics of copyright protection; software cracking is regulated under Art. 23, which says that anyone who commits any of the following acts of infringement shall, in light of the circumstances, bear civil liability by means of ceasing infringements, eliminating ill effects, making an apology, or compensating for losses:... (5)to alter or translate a piece of software without the authorization Art. 24 continues, saying that it is forbidden (3) to knowingly circumvent or sabotage technological measures used by the copyright owner for protecting the software copyright; (4) to knowingly remove or alter any electronic rights management information attached to a copy of a piece of software That covers cracking. Article 30 covers the situation of someone using pre-cracked software: A holder of copies of a piece of software that neither knows nor has reasonable grounds to know that such copies are infringing ones does not bear liability of compensation but shall cease the use of, and destroy, the infringing copies. Nevertheless, if the cease of use or the destruction of such copies is likely to cause heavy losses to him, the holder of such copies may, after paying reasonable remuneration to the software copyright owner, continue to use such copies. A mere user who is discovered simply has to stop, unless they should have known that the copy was illegal in which case they would be responsible for compensating the rights holder – I have no idea what the standards are for having reasonable grounds to know.

Does contract formation require subjective "meeting of the minds"? For a contract to be formed, it is said there must be a "meeting of the minds." Does this mean that the fact-finder attempts to ascertain the actual subjective intentions and understanding of the parties?

No: "meeting of the minds" (also known as consensus ad idem) is not about what the parties actually subjectively understood or wanted. For contract formation, consensus ad idem only requires that it appears to an objective reasonable person that the two parties were assenting to the terms of the agreement. See generally, Westlaw Canada, "Contract: I.2: Consensus Ad Idem"; see also Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, "Meeting of the Minds." "[I]n contractual interpretation, the goal of the exercise is to ascertain the objective intent of the parties (Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53 at para. 49). "Evidence of one party’s subjective intention has no independent place in this determination" (Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 129 at para. 54). It is important to note that consensus ad idem is an objective, not a subjective test. As noted by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Ron Ghitter Property Consultants Ltd. v. Beaver Lumber Company Limited, 2003 ABCA 221, at para. 9, the test is whether “it is clear to the objective reasonable bystander, in light of all the material facts, that the parties intended to contract and the essential terms of that contract can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty.” (Silver Eagle Management Inc. v. Onoway (Town), 2011 ABQB 139 at para. 60). Though the courts now have clearly adopted an objective approach to the analysis of contract, they occasionally use language that suggests that what is subjectively in the minds of the parties is important. It is sometimes said that there has to be a consensus ad idem (in Latin, literally “agreement to the same thing”) or that the parties “minds have to be at one”. Statements like this are misleading. No legal system can require that there be an actual “meeting of the minds”, for that would provide too much of an incentive to those who would like to contract with their “fingers crossed”. The requirement that a subjective agreement exist would permit one party to stay with a contract only so long as it suited its convenience; when it did not, the party could claim that it had never really agreed to the other’s terms. (MacNeil v. Dana Canada Corporation, 2008 CanLII 35689 (ON SC), at para 13, quoting Swan, Reiter & Bala, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials).

Yes Written contracts do not have to be written in any particular language or character set. Purely visual contracts are used and are legally binding. If a pictorial term is ambiguous it is resolved by the court the same way as a textual term would be.

Does an agreement in a chat count as a valid contract? In most jurisdictions (and for most transactions): yes. Usually the only thing that matters for a valid contract is that there is a mutual agreement – whether that is in writing, orally, via chat or via sign language does not matter. Of course, having things in writing makes it easier to prove in court if there is a problem, so it's still advisable. What steps could I take if they don't send the money? You can: remind them to pay if they still don't pay, you can sue them. Some juridictions have accelerated court proceedings for simple cases like this (e.g. Gerichtliches Mahnverfahren in Germany), otherwise you will have to sue in a regular court that deals with contract disputes. But I have no names and I am unsure what they can or have to do after they received the package. This is going to be the main problem. It's no good to enter into a contract if you do not know who the other party is :-). You definitely need to find out who exactly entered into an agreement with you. If the sale is to a private person, find out their name and address. If the sale is to a business (seems to be the case here), find the official name and legal type of the business, and make sure whoever you deal with is authorized to enter into contracts. Otherwise the contract will be hard to enforce in court if things go wrong.

No (in almost all U.S. jurisdictions). Truth or falsity is evaluated when a statement is originally made and doesn't have to remain true forever. Also, generally the law treats an ad like that as an invitation for you to make any offer to them, not a binding offer to form a contract that is held open indefinitely. So you can't force them into a contract simply by accepting their offer. The default rule is that an ad is an invitation to make an offer rather than an offer that can be accepted. And, even if it really is an offer, when it does not state any termination date, the default rule is that it can be withdrawn at any time.

Yes, that would, or at least could, be a legal contract. The key thing that makes a contract between two parties is the agreement, the intention to enter into a binding contract. The written words are only evidence of their agreement, and the specifics of what is agreed to. An oral (spoken) contract can be valid and binding (although in some cases the law requires a written contract). Electronic contracts do not need to be done through a site such as docusign, although there are advantages to using such a process. A typed signature will be legally binding if it is intended to represent agreement to the contract. The US federal e-sign law says that no specific technology is required to make a valid electronic signature. See What gives e-signatures legal standing/force in the United States? and https://law.stackexchange.com/a/79670/17500 for more details. That the contract words are copied will also not impair the validity of a contract. Many bushiness use form contracts. Many lawyers create new contracts by putting together parts of old contracts that served their purpose. The person sending the offer and proposed contract must make sure that the other party understands that this is to be a binding contract, and agrees to the use of an electronic signature, and agrees to the contract as a whole. It would be a good idea if a bit more detail were included than in your example. Must the agency find people acceptable to the client? Haw soon must it find them? How much must the client pay? How soon must it pay? A good contract will specify such details.

If the party to whom the offer letter is issued fails to take any step towards fulfilling its end, can it be argued that there was no meaningful acceptance as for all intents and purposes, no part of the offer that was 'accepted' has been performed? There was acceptance — the successful bidder communicated its acceptance to the government body and therefore made a promise to pay the deposit. All the elements of a legally binding contract are met: 1. Offer The offer letter from the government body. 2. Acceptance Self-evident in your question. The successful bidder communicated that it had accepted the offer from the government body. 3. Consideration Ordinarily, this would be the deposit. In this case, since the deposit was never sent, the consideration is both the promise (from the bidder) to submit the deposit and the counter promise (from the government party) to give whatever the contract stipulates the bidder will get from the government party. 4. Intent to create legal relations Not evidenced in the question, but we can generally assume this based on the evidence that both sides are commercial parties. Therefore, can the government body 'rescind' the offer and argue that there was no contract to begin with because there was no 'acceptance'? No. The offer was accepted by the bidder so there was 'acceptance', and all the other elements of the contract stand too (there was consideration, etc.). Conclusion The bidder likely breached the terms of the contract. This could potentially be a repudiatory breach allowing the government body to choose to end the contract if they wanted (by "withdrawing"). At the very least, the government body would be entitled to sue the bidder for breaching the terms, but there is no legal position of "the contract doesn't exist" from my perspective.

If I enter into a contract that a previous contract I entered into says cannot be entered, what happens next? Your question is unclear on whether both contracts are entered by the same parties. Generally speaking, it is valid for parties A and B to enter both contracts unless the formation of the subsequent contract contravenes the rights of another entity who also is a party to the initial contract. If the initial contract only binds A and B, a subsequent contract between A and B is tantamount to mutually agreeing to modify the initial contract. If the initial contract between A and B prohibits entering a contract with C, A's formation of a contract with C constitutes A's breach of the initial contract. The specifics of both contracts and the circumstances would help determining whether the subsequent contract is void and null; whether it is valid at law or in equity for A to have indulged in forming a contract with C (for instance, if B breached the initial contract in a way that frustrates its purpose); or whether compelled performance of the [initial] contract between A and B results in A breaching his contract with C (or in the alternative, whether rescission of the subsequent contract is permissible). If both B and C an "innocent" parties, the court supposedly would look for a solution that preserved their rights to the extent possible, leaving A to carry the cost.

That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.

What are some exceptions to the principle of "lex specialis" that aren't "lex superior" and "lex posterior"? The legal principle of lex specialis is that the special law derogates the general law in case of inconsistency. The primary alternatives to it are: Lex superior - the effect originating from the highest priority legal source (e.g. constitutions) derogates. Lex posterior - the effect originating from the most recently enacted legislation derogates. So, a future general law can override the current special law. Are there any other principles whereby a past general law can override the present special law, even if it's not derived from a superior legal instrument such as a constitution?

One of the principles of statutory interpretation in common law countries is that statutes are not deemed to displace common law rules unless this intent is clearly indicated by the statute. This is often phrased in the form: "a statute in derogation of the common law is to be strictly construed." This preserves an inferior and older law of general application, in favor of a newer, superior in authority, and more specific law. For example, a law regarding federal government employee life insurance policy beneficiaries does not expressly provide that the designation of someone as a beneficiary is invalidated in the event that the beneficiary murders the person insured by the life insurance policy. Notwithstanding the language in the statute that says that a designated beneficiary of the life insurance policy is entitled to the benefits upon the insured's death, the courts have held that the common law rule that a beneficiary of a life insurance policy who kills the insured is not entitled to the benefits of the policy overrides the express statutory statement that the designated beneficiary of a federal government employee life insurance policy is entitled to the benefits when the insured dies. This result was reached based upon the rule that the common law is not displaced by a statute unless an intent to do so is clearly indicated by the statute. There may be other exceptions to the rules of lex specialis, lex superior, and lex posterior, but this one is the first that came to mind. Some states, such as Utah, however, have overruled this interpretative provision. Utah Code § 68-3-2(1) states that: The rule of the common law that a statute in derogation of the common law is to be strictly construed does not apply to the Utah Code.

You are correct that "narrow tailoring" and "least restrictive means" are often treated as synonyms.1 For example, Professor Volokh describes narrow tailoring as having four components: advancement of the compelling governmental interest, no over-inclusiveness, the least restrictive alternative, and no under-inclusiveness.2 However, he says that the first "three components are closely related, and all of them could be subsumed within the 'least restrictive alternative' inquiry."3 The Supreme Court has sometimes equated strict scrutiny with the "least restrictive alternative" formulation, saying, "Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available."4 The court has also distinguished between narrow tailoring and a "least restrictive alternative" test, at least with respect to laws that infringe on speech: "Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests, but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so."5. The dissent in that same case described the majority's view as a "serious distortion of the narrow tailoring requirement", and said, "Our cases have not, as the majority asserts, 'clearly' rejected a less-restrictive-alternative test. [...] The Court's past concern for the extent to which a regulation burdens speech more than would a satisfactory alternative is noticeably absent from today's decision. The majority requires only that government show that its interest cannot be served as effectively without the challenged restriction."6. Some statutes remove any ambiguity, prescribing the "least restrictive alternative" test.7. In summary, certain areas of law (free speech, religious freedoms, affirmative action) have their own idiosyncratic treatment of strict scrutiny, narrow tailoring, and the "least restrictive alternative" test. It is always best to read the particular line of case law in the field you are interested in to see exactly what formula the court has established in that area. 1. Winkler, Adam, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts. Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 59, p. 793, 2006; UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 06-14. At 800: "Narrow tailoring requires that the law capture within its reach no more activity (or less) than is necessary to advance those compelling ends. An alternative phrasing is that the law must be the “least restrictive alternative” available to pursue those ends." 2. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. Pennsylvania L. Rev. 2417 (1997). 3. Ibid. 4. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Opinion of Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.) 5. Ward v. Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781 (1989) 6. Ibid. 7. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, implemented in part in 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b): "Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."

That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.

The Wikipedia article Rule of law favorably quotes the Encyclopedia Britannica defining the rule as: the mechanism, process, institution, practice, or norm that supports the equality of all citizens before the law, secures a nonarbitrary form of government, and more generally prevents the arbitrary use of power. In general the rule of law requires that written laws, as interpreted by the courts, be applied to all, and there there be no special exemptions that apply only to particular persons, nor special laws that only affect some people or groups. The rule is a statement of an ideal which is not always achieved. "when people say that judges uphold the rule of law" that means that the judge applies the appropriate previously enacted law, and does not make a decision based on the judge's own personal view of what the law ought to be. This includes the rule of Stare decesis that things once decided shall normally remain decided, that existing rules are not arbitrarily reversed or altered by a court. This would include the judge not deciding a case or issue on the basis of personal bias or prejudice, but it means more than that. It means that the law should not,change depend on what judge presides over a case. Again, this is an ideal not always achieved.

1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.

The literal translation of nulidad de pleno derecho is "null act of full right" or more ideomatically "fully null" but the phrase of equivalent meaning in English language legal terminology is void ab initio, literally "invalid from the beginning". This is an act that, because it was particularly seriously defective, should not produce any effect and, if it does, can be annulled at any time without the correction of the defect or the passage of time being opposed. ex tunc means in a legal context, "from the beginning, from the outset. Used to describe certain legal effects that can affect situations prior to this point in time and therefore can affect past actions." It is more commonly used in canon law, Italian law and the law of other countries that speak Romance languages, than in the English speaking world. You are correct that something that is nulidad de pleno derecho does cause effects ex tunc. The phase ex tunc is rarely used in English terminology although the related term, nunc pro tunc which means having retroactive effect to some relevant date (often the date of the filing of a motion) is commonly used in cases where something is given effect retroactively, but not where something is invalidated retroactively, in which case the term void ab initio is used in English jurisprudence instead. If an action is nulidad de pleno derecho then any legal effect it was given is treated as though it never happened and the remedy of restitution is often available to undo changes in position that occurred as a result of a void act. Some of the common situations where this might come up are (1) an annulment of a marriage of someone who was not eligible to marry (for example, due to an existing marriage or lack of age to marry or mental incapacity) as opposed to a divorce, (2) a determination that a court order or actions are void because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matters before it, or (3) a determination that a deed to property and subsequent deeds in the chain of title derived from it are void because there was some serious defect in the original deed (e.g. it was a "wild deed" purporting to transfer say, the Brooklyn Bridge from someone who never owned it in the first place).

You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court.

A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law.

Avoiding agreeing to, or amending, digital contracts Say you are presented with a digital checkbox or a pin pad, a contract with some terms you do not genuinely consent to, and a business process of the counterparty that cannot proceed unless the box is ticked or something is scribbled on the pad. Is it possible to scribble on the pin pad or check the online checkbox or do whatever so that the other party's business flow can proceed, but without allowing that action to form a contract? Or at least that particular contract? If I yell "I do not agree to this contract!" or "I agree only on this condition!" while pressing the button, and the employees of the business see this, and the business opts to serve me anyway, have I avoided forming a contract or successfully amended the contract? If the business performs and I perform, and we have both stated our conflicting terms, whose terms win and why?

You cannot In a conflict between written and oral terms of a contract, the written terms prevail. In any event, by you utterance you have not accepted the contract; you have made a counter-offer which the other party has not accepted and have then gone on to accept their original offer. You would need the written agreement of the other party that they accept your terms and that they understand that clicking the “I accept” is not an acceptance of their terms but merely a means of completing the technical procedure.

Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract.

OK, so you understand that clickwraps do create enforceable contracts. the person "agreeing" to the dialog can arbitrarily manipulate the contents of the agreement terms So what? I can do a similar thing with a pen and paper agreement. You send me an agreement, I tell you I accept but secretly I have changed it. Well, guess what, when this ends up in court the judge won't care if I wiped my ass with it - I communicated my acceptance of your terms; therefore that is what I accepted. Under the hood, Google can show what the HTML was that their server sent to you and the http response that you sent back. They said "Do you accept?" you sent back "yes", deal done. What you did with the html in your computer does not matter one iota; just like what you did with pen and ink terms would.

None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.

Sorry, what did I agree to? NDA means New Drug Application, right? Or is it Notre Dame Academy? Maybe it's Nebraska Dressage Association - don't want to cross those guys, their horses are mean. When you are trying to form a contract with someone, it's very important that you and they are talking about the same thing. What can't I disclose? That I had a phone call? What I said? What you said? Only the confidential bits? If so, what are they? Can I tell my business partner? My lawyer? My secretary? The IRS? Another important thing about making a contract is to agree on the terms. Post-facto contracts are not a thing After you paint my fence, you can't demand payment. We have to enter into a contract before the thing that happened happens. Elements of the call might be confidential anyway I am bound to respect confidences that were entrusted to me where a) the information is confidential b) it was imparted to me in a situation of confidence and c) disclosing it would cause harm. We don't need a Non-Destructive Analysis to document that.

It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention "around $70AUD" which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly "do business in" Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC.

It's saying if part of the contract is found to be void or unenforceable, that the rest of it is still a contract. It's called severability.

Simply being confusing is not enough to make a contract unenforceable. The law generally operates on the premise that people can understand statutes, regulations and contracts, and that if they don't understand a contract, they won't agree to it. Therefore, if they agreed, they understood: this is a fundamental premise of contract law. However, there are a couple of loopholes, "unconscionability" and "public policy", which could provide an escape. In the proposed scenario, we would assume that there is a huge difference in bargaining power between the customer and company, that some term is unfair (a highly subjective matter reduced to expressions like "shocks the conscience"), and the language of the contract is clearly confusing. "Public policy" generally involves a requirement in a contract that is statutorily prohibited: either the required action is itself illegal, or the law has banned any such clauses in a contract (very commonly, residential leases are statutorily prohibited from including clauses waiving statutory protections of rights). I think that if a contract for some internet thing (e.g. an ISP) had a clause that "unahitaji kukulipa $1 kwa kila siku unayotumia huduma zetu" (you must pay $1 for every day you use the service) that this is not a shocking price, so the contract would be enforceable, even if it ought to be a bit confusing.

Contract says all information must be kept confidential. Does this mean I cannot outsource? Let's say there's something like this in the contract: "Without the prior written consent of the other party, no party shall disclose any Confidential Information to any third party" Does this mean I cannot outsource to a ghostworker? I know that independent contractors should have the freedom to complete the work in whatever way they want, and that outsourcing is a somewhat common thing to do. Plus that many contract templates will have that clause so I need to make sure. If not, what sort of clauses in an independent contract will ban outsourcing?

No You can outsource if you don't disclose Confidential Information (as defined in the agreement), or if you have the principal's permission to disclose it to the third-party contractor. The clause only applies to confidential information - a subset of all information. I know that independent contractors should have the freedom to complete the work in whatever way they want Not at all. George Clooney, the actor, is an independent contractor - he can't outsource. Of course, this is an example of a personal services contract but, more generally, while the starting position in contracting is that either party may delegate their obligations (although they remain responsible for them) the parties are free to structure their contract however they like. If they want to prohibit outsourcing, they can. If they want to specify that certain personnel must be used (or not used), they can.

it's not illegal to sign a contract that demands illegal things, however, such a contract, in general, is called an illegal contract. Illegal contracts are null and void. Contracts that violate public policy never have force in the first place. A contract can't force people to declare lies under oath or demand them to murder someone. Thus, a contract demanding such is illegal. As a result, such a clause would not just be unenforceable, it might void the entire contract wholesale if it is not severable. In the least, any clause demanding illegal acts was null and void ab initio, and never was valid. void contracts in law germany explicitly makes contracts void that are "Sittenwidrig" in § 138 BGB and also illegal ones in § 134 BGB Declarations to the Agentur für Arbeit are made under threat of perjury, and thus lying is illegal. It is also Sittenwidrig. This makes the provision void. Murder is illegal, inciting to murder someone is illegal, and so a contract to murder someone for pay is void. Such a contract also is Sittenwidrig. Selling the right to ask to marry your daughter per see isn't illegal, but it is Sittenwidrig and as such the contract is void. california judges refer to such contracts as illegal contracts, defining this as a test where making non-enforcement of such a contract something of public interest: It is in the public interest that people tell the truth to the unemployment office, so a contract demanding you to lie is illegal. It is illegal to lie on the stand (perjury), and thus the contract is illegal. Conspiracy However, the contract can also be evidence of criminal activity in itself: It manifests the will of two parties to commit an illegal act. That is the core of a conspiracy charge. Conspiracy is illegal and usually a felony. germany: Conspiracy to commit a crime is §30 STGB

"Backlogged" has no legal status. Under usual contract terms, all intellectual property you generate as part of your employment belongs to your employer. But "intellectual property" is a category of rights, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights. An idea by itself is not intellectual property. "Wouldn't it be great if ..." cannot be owned by a company. However, specific ideas can be trade secrets, and trade secrets are protected. It's likely that your idea is a trade secret, if the idea applies to the sort of business that your ex-employer is involved in. The fact that it's called promising by the company reiterates that.

Yes, independent contractors are liable for their acts and omissions The contract between the contractor and the principal should set out what the contractor is expected to do and the standard to which they are expected to do it. If the contract does not set this out then they will be required to perform to the standard of a reasonable person doing that sort of work plus any statutory requirements. So, if they are a plumber, then they are required to install the plumbing to the applicable building codes and to the standard that a reasonably competent plumber would do so. If they fail to do the work or fail to do it to the required standard then they are liable for any damages the principal suffers as a result. Further, an independent contractor is liable for any tort that they may commit against a third party. So, to continue the plumber example, if the plumber negligently installs pipe for a builder and that pipe breaks damaging a tenant's goods (i.e someone outside the contractual chain), then that tenant can sue the plumber for negligence but cannot sue the builder or landlord. Employees are the same but also different Employers are vicariously liable to third parties for the acts and omissions of their employees except where they are on a frolic of their own (i.e. doing something that is clearly outside the scope of their employment). At common law, the employee is also liable to the third party and the employer, however, such claims are rarely pursued because a) where there is insurance, the employee is also covered b) the employee may lack the assets to meet the damages and so be "judgement proof" c) it's really bad PR and d) many jurisdictions prohibit it by statute (e.g. new-south-wales). Protection for an independent contractor Insurance Public & product liability certainly. Motor vehicle insurance if applicable. Professional indemnity insurance if the work is of a "professional" nature, that is, involves providing advice rather than just goods and services. Protection for an employee Insurance Check that your employer has the right insurance and that it covers their employees. Is it better to be an employee or an IC of said company to avoid this type of liability? Like you have a choice. The nature of the relationship will determine if you are an IC or an employee. If you are clearly running an independent business then you are an independent contractor. If you are clearly a wage or salary earner then you are an employee. If it's unclear, you are still one or the other and you don't get to choose. See Indepdendent/Contractor vs Regular Employee

I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.

Presumably you consented to have an x-ray. It is a reasonable assumption that it was not your intention to simply be given the films without interpretation by a radiologist. If that was your intention then the obligation would be on you to make that clear since it is so far from ordinary practice that no reasonable person could know that. To use your analogy it would be like you asking to have your window washed but not wanting to have the soapy water rinsed off afterwards (assuming these were separately billable services). Further, rights and obligations under contracts are transferable by default. So it is perfectly legitimate for the lab to outsource the radiography without having to ask you.

Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret.

There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one.

NBA data for commercial purposes I'm planning to create a paid subscription service with some data gathered from nba.com. There are public APIs from nba.com where I'm gathering the data but there is one specific from https://www.nba.com/stats/teams/transition which I'm not really sure if I can use it for commercial purposes. I know there was a lawsuit nba v motorola where nba tried to have copyright rights over match scores but it was lost because anyone can get such data by just watching the game. For this data points I'm not really sure that's the case but does anyone know if they also fall under the same category as normal match stats? Just to clarify, this data is available for free when either calling their API or gathering from the page source.

In reviewing the NBA.COM site Terms of Use at: NBA.COM Terms of Use It appears that your proposed usage violates the site's and the API's terms of use. Specifically this: The Operator maintains the Services for your personal entertainment, information, education, and communication. Where the function is available, you may download material displayed on the Services to any single computer only for your personal, noncommercial use, provided you also maintain all intellectual property, including copyright and other proprietary notices contained on or associated with the materials. You may not, however, distribute, reproduce, republish, upload, display, modify, transmit, reuse, repost, link to, or use any materials of the Services for public or commercial purposes on any other Website, social media platform, or otherwise without the written permission of the Operator. Modification of any materials displayed on the Services is a violation of the Operator’s intellectual property, including copyright and other proprietary rights. This appears to me to preclude you from using their site or APIs as a data source for your service. You may, however, wish to try to obtain permission from the "operator". Keep in mind that while the factual information may not be copyrightable, the use of their service is controlled by the terms of use license.

I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.

Using software generally does not entail any legal requirement to acknowledge the use of that software, and would only arise as a licensing condition. Google services, including Translate, are subject to certain terms of use especial the part about what they expect of you. They do not impose any requirement regarding acknowledgment, therefore they cannot later demand any royalties. If a translation program imposes any demands on your usage of the program, that has to be part of the original agreement whereby you were allowed to use the software at all.

This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.

The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation.

Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ...

united-states The license won't let you sell the .stl file. Probably you have created a derivative work, which means you can't sell it without a copyright license (and the CC-A-NC won't do). If it were licensed under CC-A you could sell it without problems (you'd have to give attribution, of course). You could also sell it under the CC-A-SA, but once you do you have no control over the result -- anyone you sold it to could give it to someone else under the terms of the license. This could work, though, if it were (say) a commission and you only expected to sell one copy. I don't know what the situation would be with the physical objects printed under any of these licenses.

"I am accessing the data through various API's that I have found through my research. All of the API's are free to use." The API's you "found" and are using may be "free" in a monetary sense - i.e., you don't pay for them and they appear to be public information - but those APIs will have a Terms of Service (TOS) attached to the use of the APIs and the data by the company which provides the APIs. A Terms of service (TOS) (Wikipedia) outlines the legal and acceptable use of the API and is a legally binding contract. Those TOSs may very well restrict the access and end usage of the data, so read the TOS for each API. A TOS is a contract; break the contract - by accessing the data without permission, without a license, by selling the data, or by any other activity expressly restricted - and you open yourself up to possible legal action, which could include copyright and trademark violations, among others. At very least, the companies that run the APIs can deny you access if you break the TOS; at very most, they can sue you. A company being "publicly traded" doesn't mean all the data about those companies is free and publicly accessible. Some may be; other data is compiled by the company which provides the API, and they can restrict access to that data through their TOS. If certain types of data are indeed factual - facts can't be copyrighted - the TOS may still legally restrict usage, because the company developed and owns the format that the data is presented in and the API the data is accessed by. It's possible that you could enter into a licensing agreement with the company that provides the API so you can access the data and monetize it, but that's up to the company, you and your lawyer.

Can a breach of privacy occur when surveilling a public space through which 3rd parties have no choice but to pass? In an article on doorbell cameras, it is noted that a breach of privacy was deemed to have occurred through the use of a video doorbell that recorded a neighbour "every time she entered or exited her property". In the judgment (Fairhurst v Woodard), point 135 mentions ... the Claimant's right to privacy in her own home, to leave from and return to her house and entertain visitors without her video personal data being captured In this case, it seems that the camera in question was pointing at the neighbour's property. However, I'm curious about where this right "to leave from and return to her house" comes from, and how broadly it might be construed. The scenario N.B. This is not the scenario in the aforementioned case. If a camera is pointed out into a public street on a cul-de-sac, and the field of view covers a line right across the road, so that anybody living at the end of the cul-de-sac has no option but to pass through it when leaving or returning, would that infringe on the same right? Is that right likely to outweigh the right of the camera owner to make recordings for the legitimate purpose of protecting their property? The scenario, illustrated The owner of the yellow house has installed the camera. The blue waves show the camera's field of view, covering the whole street. The owner of the green house can only reach the main road by passing through the camera's field of view. The only reasonable way for them not to be recorded, is for them to stay confined to their home (or at least, to the end of the street). Are the rights of the owner of the green house being infringed?

Yes, that might be a violation of data protection law such as the DPA 2018 / UKGDPR, but not necessarily so. It depends on the details, for example on the purpose this camera serves. Background on Fairhurst v Woodard and on legitimate interests Fairhurst v Woodard is a significant case discussing implications of use of video surveillance outside of a commercial context, but it is a complex case due to the multitude of cameras involved and due to the somewhat unrelated privacy and harassment issues. Point 135 is about the Driveway Camera, which only surveilled public property and the claimant's property, but did not view any part of the defendants property. People are free to surveil their own property, and would then be covered by the UKGDPR household exception. But for surveillance outside of their own property, defendant would have to comply with the DPA 2018 and the UKGDPR, for which defendant would have needed a legal basis. The defendant argued that they had a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR): 134. […] The Defendant submits that all his data collection and processing was necessary for the purposes of crime prevention at his property and in the car park However, a legitimate interest always require as balancing test. The legitimate interest can be “overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject” (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR). It is not necessary here that these interests, rights, and freedoms are explicitly enumerated in statutory law. Here, a right is claimed without supporting legal basis: 134. […] Claimant submits that her right to privacy in and around her home overrides that purpose. However, a possible basis for this claim would be Art 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is part of UK constitutional law: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” The court balances these rights and interests very differently for the different cameras. The Ring Doorbell is mainly focused on people who would ring the defendant's doorbell, and only incidentally captures passer-bys. Here, the legitimate interest was found to be valid. On the other hand, the Driveway Camera was mostly trained on claimant's property. Here, claimant's interests, rights, and freedoms override the claimed legitimate interests. Your scenario If the camera records the people living in the Green House when they go to or from their property, then yes, it seems like their rights would be affected. But in your scenario, the context of the camera is not clear: Why was it installed? If the purpose is crime prevention, is there evidence of such crimes in the neighbourhood, or are the cameras intended to counter a speculative threat? What is its field of view? Is it mainly trained on the Yellow House's doorstep and only captures the street as a background, or does it focus on the street? Is the camera's field of view masked off as far as possible to exclude public spaces? Does the camera record continuously, or is it only activated for certain events like when a doorbell is rung or when someone enters the Yellow House property? Does the camera also record audio? All of this is important because it factors into a legitimate interest balancing test. Maybe the Yellow House camera is more like the Ring Doorbell in the above case where the incidental capture of passer-bys was found to be acceptable, maybe it is more like the Driveway Camera that served no legitimate interest. There is no absolute right to be free of all surveillance. Instead, the interests and rights of the Green and Yellow house residents must be balanced appropriately. Where there is surveillance, it must be limited to what is necessary.

With respect to 4th Amendment protections, which guard against unreasonable searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 held that "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not". Cat burglar consent may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances, as could guest consent. The difference between the two is that with the cat burglar, you (as owner) can't overcome the reasonableness of the police assuming that the owner gives consent since you're not there, but with the party guest consenting, you can contradict the impression of control that the guest gave, and you can deny consent (if you are there and can contradict the guest). Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 addresses that point: "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". As far as I can tell, there is no specific obligation for police to verify that the person ostensibly consenting is authorized. They don't have to ask, and they don't have to independently verify implications (e.g. if the third party says 'our apartment', they don't have to ask 'does that mean that you live here?'). A third party could say something that would make the "occupant" assumption unreasonable.

A tenant has a right to "live in a property that’s safe and in a good state of repair". There are additional regulations possibly applicable in your situation if this is a "house in multiple occupation", summarized here. "Hazards" are explained here. However, these rules pertain to the condition of the building, not other tenants (except that "overcrowding" is also a hazard). They also say you should "report anti-social behaviour to your local council". It is legal to rent a room in the UK to a person convicted of a violent crime, so it would also be legal to rent a room to a person who hasn't committed a crime (assuming he is legally in the UK). If the person did not engage in actual anti-social behavior towards you, there is nothing to report to the local council. The landlord has no affirmative duty to disclose such a fact, and it might be illegal to do so under the Data Protection Act, since this is "sensitive personal data".

According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application.

This would probably constitute illegal wiretapping and would certainly constitute a 4th Amendment search if conducted by law enforcement. Normally, the definition of whether something is "public" for purposes of an expectation of privacy is whether it could be detected by a human being unaided by technological enhancements from a place where someone could lawfully be to make that kind of observation. Some of the relevant cases are Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. (1967) (tape recorder outside a public telephone booth was a search violating the expectation of privacy) and U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. (1984) (tracking device placed in barrel by authorities violated expectation of privacy). RFID signals are not "public" even if they are not encrypted with a private code because a device, such as the ones identified in the question, is necessary to receive them. The Wiretap Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 2511, is a federal law aimed at protecting privacy in communications with other persons. Typically, when you think of a "wiretap," the first thing that comes to mind is someone listening to your telephone calls. But the Act protects more than that. Under the Act, it is illegal to: intentionally or purposefully intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a "device." The Act provides criminal and civil penalties for violations, although it creates various exceptions to when interceptions and disclosures are illegal. From here. In this circumstance, despite being passive, one is intentionally intercepting the contents of electronic communications through the use of a device. The fact that there was not in all cases an intent to communicate through, for example, an RFID chip, on a specific occasion probably does not suffice to render it not a communication.

Yes, you can use it as evidence Canada clearly requires what is called a one-party consent for recordings. Section 184(1) of the criminal code makes it a crime to "knowingly intercept a private communication." However, Section 184(2)(a), the "Saving Provision," says the prohibition "does not apply to": (a) a person who has the consent to intercept...of the originator of the private communication or of the person intended by the originator thereof to receive it." Because you: a) either originated the conversation or were the person your landlord intended to talk to; and b) gave your consent by making the recording; therefore, c) you are covered by this clause. For more details, you can read nice summaries by lawyers here and here.

No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads "There should be more detail and complex lines over here" What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?

A reasonably analogous case is State v. Kipp, 179 Wn.2d 718. The court held that a secret recording was illegal, and the recording was of a face to face recording, using a cassette recorder. The court provides an analysis of the meaning of "private" under RCW 9.73.030, and concludes that "A communication is private (1) when parties manifest a subjective intention that it be private and (2) where that expectation is reasonable" (with appropriate in-state citations). They say that Factors bearing on the reasonableness of the privacy expectation include the duration and subject matter of the communication, the location of the communication and the presence or potential presence of third parties, and the role of the nonconsenting party and his or her relationship to the consenting party. Ultimately, the intent or reasonable expectations of the participants as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each case controls as to whether a conversation is private but in this case, Kipp manifested a subjective intention that the conversation be private. We have found subjective intent that a conversation be private even though the party does not explicitly state such an intention The court in fact rejects the state's contention that a person who confesses to child molestation should expect this information to be reported to the authorities, and therefore it is unreasonable to expect the conversation to remain private and the court reaffirms that the subject matter of the conversation in this case was not one that is normally intended to be public, demonstrating Kipp's reasonable expectation of privacy.

International Validity of Power of Attorney Document requiring multiple signatures, individuals sign asynchronously with asynchronous notarization Is it legally permissible for co-inventors to sign a Power of Attorney (PoA) document at separate locations with only their own signatures in the witness of independent notaries, leaving everyone else's signature blank, and then return the original hand signed inked individual documents to the law firm, if they are unable to meet at the same location due to time or financial constraints? N parties, 1 Document, N parties signing 1 Document with N-notaries asynchronously

Yes. This is legal and it is done routinely. It is called executing a document in counterparts. To be clear, however, as the language of the question is ambiguous on this point, each signature would have to be contemporaneously notarized by the person notarizing that particular signature. In each case that a notarization took place outside the country where the Power of Attorney is to be utilized, normally, it would be necessary to also obtain an apostille for that notarization. An apostille is an official declaration of a designated official in the country of notarization that the notary of the signature in question was, in fact, a notary in good standing at the time that the notarization was done.

The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts.

Other Authorities You are missing at least several important sources of authority, which include: (1) The United States Constitution; (2) the set of regulations issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations at Title 37, Chapter I; (3) applicable international treaties; (4) case law with the most important being the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, followed by U.S. District Court cases on point; and (5) case law from the administrative bodies of the PTO. All of the above and the sources you mention are "primary sources". These are interpreted collectively in "Treatises" on patent law which are often cited on issues where primary authority is either too thin, or so numerous that it is not easily summarized merely by resort to primary authority. A number of them are listed here. Chisum on Patents is the leading treatise in the field and should usually be your first destination. It will mention most of the relevant primary source authority in the subject area you are researching. Priority of Authorities The CFR is superior to the MPEP but inferior to Title 35. Treaties are co-equal with Title 35 with conflicts resolved by the date of enactment. Case law of the U.S. Supreme Court trumps everything (even, in practice, the language of the United States Constitution). Case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Federal Circuit trumps everything except the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the very long string of recent reversals of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by the U.S. Supreme Court (almost one or two a year for the last decade or so), however, every Federal Circuit case should be analyzed to determine if it has been implicitly overturned or limited by the applicable U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. The United States Constitution trumps everything except U.S. Supreme Court cases and cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (these cases impliedly provide definitive interpretations of the United States Constitution). Case law from a U.S. District Court is not binding on anyone but the parties to the case, but is highly persuasive and in practice is about on a par with the MPEP, but subordinate to the CFR and administrative case law of PTO bodies. One complicated aspect of case law is that it is only binding when it resolves a question of law necessary to resolve to decide the case before it. Sometimes opinions go off on tangents which discuss other questions of law not before the court and that is called "dicta" which is persuasive on that point of law, but not binding and not as authoritative. It is not always obvious what constitutes the binding portion of a court decision and what constitutes dicta. Another complexity in case law involves concurring or dissenting opinions in cases. Dissenting opinions, obviously, are not binding on anyone but sometimes clarify the scope of the majority opinion. If there is a plurality opinion and a concurring opinion in a case, they have equal weight and neither opinion's rule is definitive except to the extent that they agree. Generally speaking a majority opinion will be binding relative to a concurring opinion in the same case, but that status isn't really definitive and a concurring opinion should be considered even when it accompanies a majority opinion even though the concurring opinion shouldn't be considered binding in that situation. Of course, all case law (and for that matter all other authority) can be made obsolete by subsequent amendments to Title 35 or by the adoption of new treaties. A treatise isn't binding on anyone, but a well reasoned passage from a leading treatise like Chisum will, in practice, be given weight a little below a U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit case, but often greater than any lesser source of authority on a topic. A well reasoned passage in a lesser treatise is typically given a weight comparable to a U.S. District Court case that is on point. Loose Ends One of the important sources for prior art is the compendium of all patents ever issued by the United States (the vast majority of which have expired and entered the public domain). You can get them all for a very reasonable cost in electronic form. The compendium of patents which have not expired is obviously relevant when attempting to determine if a potential patent or technique or process of a client infringes on any existing patent. There are also some patent issues (e.g. jurisdiction and venue in patent disputes) which depend upon other Titles of the United States Code and have the same priority as Title 35 of the United States Code. There are circumstances in which the procedural rules of various courts which issue relevant case law are relevant. Each type of court has its own rules of procedure, and each particular court has its own local rules. (This is not hypothetical, I've had a case involving patent law in which three-quarters of the motion practice in the heavily litigated case depended upon the local rules of practice in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.) Precedents of U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, and precedents from U.S. Court of Appeal for Circuits other than the Federal Circuit, are sometimes relevant as well (e.g. interpreting procedural court rules, rules of evidence, or very general principles of law that aren't restricted to patent law such as the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution). But, for the most part, patent case law arises in U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court and the administrative tribunals of the PTO. Issues related to the relationship between an attorney and a client in patent law cases (e.g. attorney malpractice law in patent cases) is a question of state law rather than federal law.

Possibly. Under UCC 3-402, a representative can sign for a party. There are some conditions though. One is that the signature should show unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of the person identified in the instrument. If the signature is not clear that the signature is made in a representative capacity, the representative is liable. The only thing that a digital signature adds is the possibility that it is impossible to unambiguously show this because of the software. It seems from the internet that Docusign allows this.

No, Specific Ink Colors are not Required That is not correct. If the purple will not photocopy well, the other party might reasonably ask for a color that will. But a signature is normally only evidence of agreement to the provisions, and it is the agreement that is legally important. The color of the ink used does not change the agreement. It is normal to expect a signature to be in a permanent ink. A signature in pencil or erasable ink might be legal, but the other party will not want to accept it, and it would be reasonable to comply.

The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).

A POA (power of attorney) does not allow one to represent someone in court. The name is confusing, it dates from a period when "attorney" meant one who acted for another, not just in court. That hasn't been a current meaning for hundreds of years except in this one expression. A POA might now be better called a "power of agency" but the inertia of terminology applies. According to Section Section 2C:21-22 of the NJ code: a. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person knowingly engages in the unauthorized practice of law. b. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if the person knowingly engages in the unauthorized practice of law and: (1) Creates or reinforces, by any means, a false impression that the person is licensed to engage in the practice of law. As used in this paragraph, "by any means" includes but is not limited to using or advertising the title of lawyer or attorney-at-law, or equivalent terms, in the English language or any other language, which mean or imply that the person is licensed as an attorney-at-law in the State of New Jersey or in any other jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) Derives a benefit; or (3) In fact causes injury to another. c. For the purposes of this section, the phrase "in fact" indicates strict liability. Accoding to the NJ courts: A person is considered to be practicing law when that person's conduct whenever and wherever it takes place is of such a nature that legal knowledge, training, skill and ability are required. This definition of the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Source: www.njcourts.gov › assets › criminalcharges › unprlaw) This rule is, if anything, more strictly enforced in criminal cases than in civil cases. In some states non-lawyers may assist a party in small-claims courts, I believe, but not in NJ.

Before the AIA in 2012 both companies could apply for a patent and if one of the applicants thought they were both trying to patent the same thing they could initiate an interference proceeding. In that proceeding before the board, they each present their evidence as to date of conception and diligent effort from that point to the date of the first filing. The board decided which application went forward. Now the U.S. is with the rest of the world in first-to-file. It doesn’t matter who conceived first unless one actually stole the idea from the other. There is a new derivation procedure to try to prove that. I don’t think it has ever yet happened. One of the "simultaneous" inventors could publish the invention, putting into the public domain. If published before the other's filing date, it would theoretically prevent the other from getting a patent. In any case a patent owner can stop the other from making their product or charge a royalty. There is a narrow case under the AIA where one company has been using a process that another later patents and can retain a limited right to keep using that process but can’t move or expand operations. This is called Prior User Rights.

Creating an application to streamline Dungeons and Dragons I've been working on an application that would streamline the average Dungeons and Dragons 5e tabletop experience, and it only recently occurred to me that doing so may infringe on copyrights. Basically, the goal is to help players and DMs track action economy, initiative, spells, etc., by listing options and showing descriptions, many of which would come from Wizards of the Coast-published materials. I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend.

I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer.

The GCIDE dictionary itself is licensed under GPL-3.0. It consists of a bunch of files with markup, no software involved. Indeed, the GPL can also be applied to non-software works, though it is unusual. When you use material under some license, you must comply with the terms of the license. In case of the GPL, there are two highly relevant conditions: Everyone who receives a copy of the covered work (original or modified, in whole or in part) must receive the complete corresponding source code of the work, under the terms of the GPL-3.0. If you create a derivative work of the covered work, the derivative work can only be distributed under the GPL-3.0. However, selling the covered material is perfectly fine. The GPL does not forbid you to make money, however you must not profit from your requirement to provide the corresponding source code. Here, the core question is whether your mobile game would be a derivative work of the GPL-licensed dictionary. If your game merely loads the dictionary as a data file, I don't think they would form a single derived work. However, if you compile the dictionary into your app, this would be more difficult to argue. Ultimately, what is a derivative work will depend on a court. It could therefore be helpful to keep your app as clearly non-derivative as possible. I would avoid baking the dictionary into the app's binary but store it separately as a data file, would show attribution notices in reasonable places (e.g. a screen with attribution notices and the complete license text), and would make it possible for users to export a copy of the dictionary files. Furthermore, the GPL-3.0 may require you to allow users to modify this file, for example by making it possible to import a modified dictionary into your app.

Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money.

One cannot use the works of others unless one of the following applies: The copyright holder has given permission, usually in the form of a license, often explicit, but sometimes implied. The work is not protected by copyright. This can happen in several ways, but the most common is that the work is old enough that copyright has expired. In the US, works older than 1927 are currently out of copyright. So are some others, the rules are a bit complex. In many countries, if the author or creator died more than 70 years ago, the work is out of copyright. In some countries this is a different number, between 50 and 100 years. This is not likely to apply to a file distributed with current software. If an exception to copyright applies. In the US this would most likely be fair use. In the UK it would probably be fair dealing. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions that might apply, including personal use in some. AS a comment by Jen points out "use" here refers only to those rights protected by copyright, such as making and distributing copied, making nd distributing derivative works, and the like. (Displaying and publicly performing seem unlikely to apply.) Now lets consider the specific situation, and which if any of the reasons for lawful use might apply. License or other permission. There is no explicit license. Since the program is distributed to be run, there is an implicit license to make the sort of use of the file needed to run the program. If the documentation describes how to employ the file as part of running the program, there is almost surely an implied license to employ it in that way. There is not, however, permission to make copies unless that is needed to run the program. There is surely not permission to make derivative works of the file or distribute copies to others, even if you do not charge anything. Expired copyright This pretty clearly will not apply. Fair use This might apply, or might not. There isn't enough info in the question to tell, not even to make a good guess. If any use would be non commercial, that helps fair use a bit. If the use would be for a different purpose than the one the developers used it for, that helps fair use a lot. If the use of the file harmed the market for the program, or served as a substitute, that lean against fair use. without knowing what the file is, what it does, and how it might be used, one really cannot weven guess.

In general this kind of brief literary reference is not unlawful, and such things occur in both novels and commercial games with some frequency. Making such a reference a major part of the plot, such as by using a name from a previous work as a major character, particularly if other aspects of that character are also used, is far more likely to cause a problem. In the united-states this would be a matter of fair use. In general, when only a very small part of the source work is used, such a a single name; where the use is "transformative", that is used for a rather different purpose than in the source work; where the use does not harm the market for the original work; and where the use does not serve as a replacement for the original, it is likely to be held to be fair use. But fair use decisions are always fact-dependent, and are made case-by-case, so it is hard to be absolutely sure of one in advance. But the kind of literary reference described in the question is very unlikely to be held to be copyright infringement.

Recipe books can be, and often are, protected by copyright. If the individual recipes are by others, this would constitute a collective work or compilation. See this recent answer for more on the rights protected for a collective work. The selection of which recipes to include would be a creative element, protected by copyright, and could not be copied or closely imitated without permission. However, division into groups by type of dish would be a "natural and obvious" arrangement, and not protected. So would alphabetical or chronological arrangement within a group, or over all. A "non-obvious" order of recipes would however be a protectable element. An individual recipe may be protected by copyright, but this protects less than one might think. Copyright does not protect facts or methods. This means that the list of ingredients is not protected, nor is the general list of steps of preparation. Only the exact wording of the recipe will be protected. Creating a new collection of recipes based on several different previously published collections of recipes (whether from the web, books, magazines, or other media) and making one's own selections of which ones to include that is significantly different from any of the previous collections would not violate the collection copyrights of any of the previous collections. If the actual recipes were rewritten so that any creative expression from the originals was not copied, then it seems that no copyright infringement has occurred. Most recipes, after all, are not fully original but are modified from older ones. There is no set figure for how many recipes could be copied from a given source before this becomes infringement. That would be, if a suit was field, a matter for the judgement of the count as to whether the new book was "based on" the alleged source. The more the list in the new work resembles a particular source, the more like a derivative work it seems and the more likely that it would be held to be an infringement. One could always ask for a license from the older source, to avoid any risk of suit, but it might not be available or the copyright holder might demand an excessive fee. Asking for a license risks drawing attention to the new work, as well, and might cause a holder to file suit who otherwise would not.

united-states Under US copyright law blank forms generally do not have copyright protection, because they do not have sufficient originality to quslify for copyright under the doctrine of Feist vs Rural. According to the US Copyright Office Circular 33: "Works Not Protected by Copyright" (pages 3-4): Blank forms typically contain empty fields or lined spaces as well as words or short phrases that identify the content that should be recorded in each field or space. Blank forms that are designed for recording information and do not themselves convey information are uncopyrightable. Similarly, the ideas or principles behind a blank form, the systems or methods implemented by a form, or the form’s functional layout are not protected by copyright. A blank form may incorporate images or text that is sufficiently creative to be protected by copyright. For example, bank checks may be registered if they contain pictorial decoration that is sufficiently creative. Contracts, insurance policies, and other documents with “fill-in” spaces may also be registered if there is sufficient literary authorship that is not standard or functional. In all cases, the registration covers only the original textual or pictorial expression that the author contributed to the work, but does not cover the blank form or other uncopyrightable elements that the form may contain. A trademarekd name or logo could be used nominally to show compatibility with the trademarked product, such as: This character sheet is compatible with the game "GreatRPG"(tm) and is suitable for recording characters to be used in that game. However these sheets are not made, approved, authorized, or sponsored by Heartland Mages, who own the trademark "GreatRPG". They are a product of "MySheets" which is in no way affiliated with Heartland Mages. Used with that sort of disclaimer, there will be no trademark infringement. And of course if the name and/or logo of the RPG is not used at all, there wiull also be no infringement. However, if the name of the game is used in advertising the sheets, or on the packaging of the sheets, it should be made clear to any consumer that the sheets are not authorized by the maker of the game. A disclaimer similar to the above serves this purpose. If reasonable people could be confused into thinking that the sheets came from the makers of the game, or were approved by the makers, there might be a valid action for trademark infringement.

Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.

Has New Jersey v. Andrews ever been successfully challenged? New Jersey v. Andrews is relatively new case law. Has it ever been successfully challenged at the district court level? I'm aware of several cases where the state has seized a citizen's smartphone with a search warrant; then, citing State v. Andrews, has compelled said citizen to reveal their phone's password so that the phone's contents may be searched. What I'm wondering is: have there been any cases where the State's motion to compel a password under Andrews has been successfully challenged?

The question is ill framed, but I'll try to reframe it and answer it. New Jersey v. Andrews is a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court (its highest appellate court), which held that you do not have a 5th Amendment right to refuse to disclose a password that if disclosed might reveal incriminating password protected information. Andrews attempted to appeal this to the U.S. Supreme Court with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Freedom Foundation. But, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Andrews' petition for certiorari (i.e. refused to take up the case, leaving it in force in New Jersey) on May 17, 2021. As explained in an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in support of granting Andrews' Petition for Certiorari: In an opinion dated, August 10, 2020, the New Jersey Supreme Court, based on Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), extended the “foregone conclusion” doctrine to cellphones and held that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not protect an individual from being compelled to recall and truthfully disclose a password to his cellphone under circumstances where that disclosure may lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence. State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1274-75 (N.J. 2020). The basic issue is that the 5th Amendment does not protect documents written by a potential criminal defendant from disclosure (and such a person can be forced to turn over those records or provide, for example, a physical key to a file cabinet to allow them to be obtained by authorities), but the 5th Amendment does protect a potential criminal defendant from having to testify in a way that would be self-incriminating. It isn't clear on which side of this divide a forced disclosure of a password lies. The same amicus brief notes a law review article which stated that: the Fifth Amendment law of compelled access to encrypted data as a “fundamental question bedeviling courts and scholars” and “that has split and confused the courts” citing Laurent Sacharoff, "Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices", 87 Fordham L. Rev. 203, 203, 207 (2018). Neither the federal courts below the U.S. Supreme Court, nor the courts of another state can overturn a ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court, and all state courts in the state of New Jersey are required to follow the precedents of the New Jersey Supreme Court including New Jersey v. Andrews. There is an unresolved split of authority on this legal issue at the national level. Three courts one step below the U.S. Supreme Court (including the New Jersey Supreme Court) have resolved it as New Jersey did, four courts one step below the U.S. Supreme Court have taken the opposite position, and at least one state (Florida) has an internal split of authority over the issue. Forty-five states (including Florida which is split at the intermediate appellate court level), the District of Columbia's local courts, and eleven intermediate federal appellate courts, however, have not yet definitively ruled on this emerging 5th Amendment interpretation issue. Massachusetts reached the same conclusion as New Jersey did in Andrews. Commonwealth v. Gelfatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 615 (Mass. 2014). So did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit. United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2017). Indiana has held that the 5th Amendment privilege prohibits the government from demanding that someone disclose a password that if disclosed might reveal incriminating information. Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 958 (Ind. 2020). So did Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 550 (Pa. 2019). Utah's Supreme Court held that the 5th Amendment prohibits forced disclosures of passwords in October of 2021. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit also took this position. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2012). The Florida Supreme Court had not addressed the issue (as of early 2021) and there was a split of authority over this issue in Florida's intermediate appellate courts at that time. Compare Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 651 (Fla. App. 2019) and G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1062-63 (Fla. App. 2018) with State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (Fla. App. 2016). What often happens when there is a split of authority between a small number of state supreme courts and intermediate federal appellate courts, like the one present here, but not all that many states and intermediate federal appellate courts (often called "circuits) have chimed in, is that the U.S. Supreme Court declines to resolve the split until more jurisdictions have considered the issue. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court allows the law regarding that issue to "develop" and guide it in some future case in which the issue will be resolved. If the lower appellate courts tend to clearly favor one resolution or the other, the U.S. Supreme Court will often take a case to ratify the clear majority view (although sometimes it contradicts that majority position instead). And, if the split remains fairly even after a large number of jurisdictions of taken a position, the U.S. Supreme Court may then step in an resolve the issue one way or the other. But, there are many splits of authority on legal issues in U.S. federal law including constitutional law (probably hundreds) that have remained unresolved for a very long period of time, sometimes for decades, including some which are quite well developed. Also, since this issue involves the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in a very direct way, there is really nothing that Congress can do to resolve the split.

The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.

Short answer: Maybe. Long answer: The answer here varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Normally, the process goes like this: The application for the warrant is usually made under seal or otherwise in secret to prevent the target from trying to hide evidence. So before it's been executed, you can pretty much forget about accessing it. After the warrant is executed, though, there are differing answers to this question. The Supreme Court gave us a test for this kind of question in Press-Enterprise II, which held that the First Amendment gives us a qualified right to access court proceedings and records. The right applies when public access makes sense using the "experience and logic" test: Has the Anglo-Saxon experience typically been to provide access, and does logic tell us that access has beneficial effects for the judicial process? But lower courts have disagreed about how to apply the test. The Eighth Circuit allowed access to warrants in a defense-industry corruption investigation in In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, but the Ninth Circuit denied access in to warrants in the same investigation in Times Mirror Co. v. U.S. I think, though, that the Ninth Circuit decision would have come out differently if the investigation had already ended. Just to mix things up further, the Fourth Circuit has also allowed access, but based on common law principles of access, rather than the First Amendment. That was Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz. Same in the Second Circuit: In re Application of Newsday, Inc. Individual states also have their own rules, but those are of course subject to limits under the First Amendment. When I wanted a copy of a warrant, I would go first to the clerk of the court whose judge signed the warrant. I would tell them what I was looking for, and I pretty much always got it. I would rarely submit a FOIA request, especially if the warrant was issued by a federal agency. Those requests sit in a queue for months or years without being reviewed, and the agency virtually always denies the request anyway. When law enforcement agencies and courts have copies of the same record, you're almost always going to have better luck getting access from the courts, which are set to open by default. If the court denies the request, try again after there's an indictment, and again after the trial.

I'm confident that there has been no successful breach of contract lawsuit on that basis: that is not the right legal basis. Actions against a shoplifter would either be under tort law or, much more likely, criminal law. Put simply, theft is a crime, encoded in the laws of all nations, and the government will shoulder the burden of punishing a shoplifter. Since the goal of criminal law is to guarantee a well-ordered society (not to restore the victim of the crime), a victim of theft may have to pursue their own legal case against the criminal, if they want to be restored for their loss (let us say that the criminal also ate the evidence).

No Federal law and most states have an notice of alibi rule that requires a defendant to identify witnesses who will testify as to their alibi and where the defendant claims to have been. The validity of these rules was upheld by the Supreme Court in Williams v Florida: The Fifth Amendment would not be violated if, after the alibi witness had given evidence, the court granted a continuance to allow the prosecution to seek rebuttal evidence (this point was conceded by Williams's lawyers). Consequently, all the notice-of-alibi law did was allow the prosecution to do so before the trial, instead of having to interrupt the trial. It did not provide the prosecution with more information to use against a defendant than they would eventually get in any event.

Yes, certainly. A prominent example was Lawrence v. Texas. The defendants were charged in state court with "deviate sexual intercourse". They moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. Their motion was denied and they were convicted and fined; the denial was upheld by the state's court of appeals. They then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the statute was indeed unconstitutional. A defendant likely wouldn't have standing to sue the state for enforcing the law in general, only for enforcing it on the defendant himself.

It appears that Plummer v. State is still valid, but only in a very limited fact pattern. It is often quoted on the internet to justify the idea that a person may resist any unlawful arrest with force. That may have been true when Plummer was decided, and it was the clear holding of Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900) But Bad Elk is bad law today -- the wide adoption of the Model Penal Code starting in 1962 removed the right to resist a merely unlawful arrest. The right to use self-defense against excessive force by an officer remains, but is narrowly limited, and courts rarely find such resistance justified. In State v. Mulvihill 57 N.J. 151 (1970) The Supreme Court of New Jersey held: If, in effectuating the arrest or the temporary detention, the officer employs excessive and unnecessary force, the citizen may respond or counter with the use of reasonable force to protect himself, and if in so doing the officer is injured no criminal offense has been committed. However, the Mulvihill court cautioned: State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1965) held that "a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal under the circumstances obtaining." (89 N.J. Super. at 184.) The opinion put to rest the notion that the common law rule existing in some jurisdictions, which permits a citizen to resist, even with reasonable force, an unlawful arrest by a police officer, was applicable in New Jersey. ... Accordingly, in our State when an officer makes an arrest, legal or illegal, it is the duty of the citizen to submit and, in the event the seizure is illegal, to seek recourse in the courts for the invasion of his right of freedom. The Mulvihill court explained the difference in the two csase by saying: Despite his duty to submit quietly without physical resistance to an arrest made by an officer acting in the course of his duty, even though the arrest is illegal, his right to freedom from unreasonable seizure and confinement can be protected, restored and vindicated through legal processes. However, the rule permitting reasonable resistance to excessive force of the officer, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, is designed to protect a person's bodily integrity and health and so permits resort to self-defense. Simply stated, the law recognizes that liberty can be restored through legal processes but life or limb cannot be repaired in a courtroom. And so it holds that the reason for outlawing resistance to an unlawful arrest and requiring disputes over its legality to be resolved in the courts has no controlling application on the right to resist an officer's excessive force. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The Mulvihill court further warned that: [A citizen] cannot use greater force in protecting himself against the officer's unlawful force than reasonably appears to be necessary. If he employs such greater force, then he becomes the aggressor and forfeits the right to claim self-defense ... Furthermore, if he knows that if he desists from his physically defensive measures and submits to arrest the officer's unlawfully excessive force would cease, the arrestee must desist or lose his privilege of self-defense. The court said that the duty to desist and submit if that would stop the excessive force is analogous to the duty to retreat rather than use force in self defense when this is feasible. The Nolo Press page "Resisting Arrest When Police Use Excessive Force" says: It’s rare that someone being placed under arrest has the right to forcefully resist. But in most states, if the arresting officer uses excessive force that could cause “great bodily harm,” the arrestee has the right to defend him or herself. That’s because most states hold that an officer’s use of excessive force amounts to assault or battery, which a victim has a right to defend against. ... An officer’s use of force is “excessive” if it is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm (serious injury). Most states consider whether a “reasonable person” under the circumstances would have believed that the officer’s use of force was likely to cause great physical harm (including death). If the answer is “yes”—if a reasonable person would have felt it necessary to resist in self-defense, and if that person used a reasonable degree of force when resisting, then the resistance is typically justified. But this is a very high standard to meet, such that courts hardly ever find that an arrestee’s forceful resistance was defensible. This article from policeone.com citing California law, says that forceful resistance to an arrest is almost never justified. It does agree that resistance to excessive force can be used; Section 693 requires that even if the officer were committing a public offense (crime), only that "self-defense" force that is sufficient to prevent the offense may be used. In other words, the subject may only use force to simply stop the assault/battery under color of authority and never any more than that. and says that: It is a rare circumstance when this assault/battery under color of authority actually occurs and an officer is charged, not because of some great law enforcement driven conspiracy but because it rarely happens. In short, Plummer is still valid, but limited to the fact pattern when the person being arrested is actually being subjected to excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm, or death, and only justifies sufficient force to prevent such harm. The lawfulness of the arrest does not matter, it the the danger caused by the excess force that justifies possible resistance. As a practical matter, if resistance is likely to escalate rather than prevent harm, it is highly unwise. When Plummer is cited, often with Bad Elk, to justify resistance to an unlawful arrest because of its unlawfulness, that is no longer valid law and has not been for decades. Note that is a person who is not a law enforcement officer (LEO) but who is pretending to be one, tries to make an "arrest" this would not be an arrest at all, but an assault or an attempted abduction, and the victim would be justified in using reasonable force in self-defense, although not excessive force. This is not the Plummer rule, but the normal law of self-defense. However any arrestee should be careful. Claiming that the arresters are impersonators when they are in fact plainclothes LEOs will not go well. If a reasonable person should have known that they were LEOs, there is no right to resist unless excessive force is used. Note further that if non-LEOs attempt to make a "citizen's arrest", not impersonating officers, the right to self-defence only applies if excessive force is used, or there is a reasonable fear of excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm or death. Basically the Plummer rule still applies. Also, all of this is a matter of state law, and while Plummer should be good law in most if not all states, the exact rule may vary by state. In 2012 a few US states retained the common-law rule that any unlawful arrest justified resistance, according to the Nolo page linked above. That may have changed, or may change when a case arises. The question does not specify a state, and a precise answer depends on the specific state.

This case was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, meaning that it’s a lawsuit between citizens of different states. In most cases, diversity jurisdiction requires “complete” diversity: every plaintiff has to be a citizen of a different state than every defendant. If one of 12 plaintiffs is a Maryland resident and one of 15 defendants is also a Maryland resident, that tiny overlap means the entire lawsuit is kicked back to state court. In this case, the defendants are an Ohio fraternity, an Illinois resident, a Wyoming company, and a person whose residence is unclear. Defendant Smith might be a Wyoming resident, a Utah resident, or a Washington resident. The plaintiffs aren’t sure. However, as long as the plaintiffs aren’t residents of any of those states, there’s complete diversity of citizenship. It doesn’t matter whether Doe II is from Alaska or Florida, just that she isn’t from the same state as any defendant.

What is the age of consent in Indonesia? 15 or 18? I found this question on a forum https://www.livinginindonesiaforum.org/forum/general/laws-visas-money-matters-and-documents/52502-age-of-consent Wikipedia says 15. However, Article 82 child protection law says the following: Every one who deliberately commits violence, or threat of violence, forces, does tricks, tells a series of lies, or persuades a child to do, or let obscene acts be done, is subject to penalty of 15 (fifteen) years at most and 3 (three) years at least and fine of Rp. 300.000.000 (three hundreds millions) at most and Rp. 60.000.000 at least. https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/E67F49F7CC441622052580330075862B/$FILE/ANNEX-3-Laws-of-child_protection.pdf I found the law a bit weird. It prohibits some nonconsensual stuffs like "deliberately commits violence, or threat of violence, forces, does tricks, tells a series of lies", however, later it adds a phrase 'persuade'. Persuading someone is not necessarily nonconsensual. All the words describe nonconsensual activity except 'persuade'. Also, one interpretation of this article is that all sex with girls under 18 is illegal. However, if that's the case, why not just make it simple and don't have sex with girls under 18 ? If all obscene acts with a girl under 18 are illegal, why doesn't the law simply say don't do obscene acts with a girl under 18? If some obscene acts are legal, why does it say "coerce, trick, bla bla bla, persuade" girls to have sex with you if she is under 18? Why does the law prohibit persuading girls to do obscene acts but does not prohibit the actual doing of the obscene act itself? Kind of weird. Of course the law says do obscene acts instead of having sex. I am not even sure what obscene acts include. What am I missing here? Actually, due to this, is age of consent in Indonesia 18 or 15? Any actual court cases will be great. In the forum I sent someone actually asked this: "The exploitation" and "persuasion" angle is not very clear to me. So sex with a girl above 15 is legal unless you "exploit" or "persuade" her to do so. Can anyone shows actual court cases? It seems that actual court cases for this sort of thing is very few. So if the law is to be read literally, it looks like having sex with a girl above 15 is legal unless you "exploit" or "persuade". Which is absurd.

Content Warning: this post mentions rape / non-consensual sex and discusses (in some non-explicit detail) coercion of minors. As of Tuesday, March 1st, 2016, according to the Indonesian Penal Code (translated version; I cannot read Indonesian), Indonesia's age of consent is 16 years old (18 for homosexual acts). Indonesia also does not have close-in-age exemptions (for example, in Canada, the age of consent is 16 years old, but a 14-year-old can consent to a partner less than 5 years older, and a 12-year-old can consent within 2 years). I cannot verify this source but according to Wikipedia, which cites this PDF, the age of consent could be raised to 18 years under the Child Protection Act arguing that sexual acts can cause bodily or mental harm and "child" is defined as anyone under 18 years of age. As an example, according to Wikipedia, a court case in 2009 (Sydney Morning Herald) saw this used to convict an Australian man. There is nothing weird about this law. I left this as a comment, but let me elaborate in an answer. Your misconception is that persuasion is an innocent and ethical thing. The harsh reality is that children are, on average, more ignorant than adults and lack judgement, foresight, and rationality at times, and there are disgusting individuals that will exploit this fact to get children to do things they otherwise wouldn't such as sex, or drugs. Additionally, age comes with a power imbalance - think a teacher using their power over a student to convince or coerce them into having sex with them. That is not strictly violence, nor telling lies, or "forcing" in the strict sense, nor trickery, but a reasonable individual would still consider that to be not real consent. The fact is that children can only consent if it is entirely of their own accord and judgement and there is no extrinsic pressure forcing or persuading them to. In fact, I argue that adults are subject to this too and persuading or coercing an adult into having sex is also disgusting (but doing this to children is far more abhorrent). But since children are considered by law to lack the judgement to protect themselves against coercion and realize they should reject and get away from their persuader, the law instead protects them. Persuading someone is not necessarily non-consensual. It holds a high chance of being non-consensual, and consent is only considered real when it is a) not coerced, and b) the subject is legally capable; that is, not intoxicated, not a minor (by whatever the age of cosnent is), etc. If all obscene acts with a girl under 18 are illegal, why doesn't the law simply say don't do obscene acts with a girl under 18? Because sex with people between 16 and 18 is legal (in Indonesia) under the right conditions. Although I must say, since you word it as "obscene acts", then of course they're illegal. Obscene acts are, by definition, morally reprehensible and/or legally incriminating, so illegal things are illegal, is basically what you're saying. Just say "having sex" if you mean "having sex". Why does the law prohibit persuading girls to do obscene acts but does not prohibit the actual doing of the obscene act itself? Kind of weird. This makes no sense at all, and hopefully after reading my answer you understand why this makes absolutely no sense. How in the earth anyone can have sex with someone without persuading? He walks the street and accidentally plug his penis in? ... Rape? There are many ways to have sex with someone without persuading them that I don't think I have to list. Your main mistake is still conflating persuaded / coerced consent as real consent. In summary, persuasion is not some innocent matter of convincing someone in a friendly manner to have sex. It includes coercion, abusing one's power, exploiting a child's ignorance and limited judgement or foresight, and other reprehensible factors. Consent cannot be given if the individual is too young, impaired, unable to legally give consent, or coerced into it.

england-and-wales Usually, and assuming the smoker is aged 18 or over and there are no aggravating features, an arrest is not always necessary as what's referred to as "simple possession" is dealt with proportionately either by a: Cannabis Warning Which is: a non-statutory disposal. It can be used as a proportionate response to dealing with offenders found in possession of small amounts of cannabis. It is an informal warning, administered by a police officer, to adults found in possession of small amounts of Cannabis, consistent with personal use. ... First offence, no aggravating factors - Cannabis Warning; Second offence, no aggravating factors – PND (see below); Third offence – arrest. Or, a: Penalty Notices for Disorder (PND): You’ll be asked to sign the penalty notice ticket. You won’t get a criminal conviction if you pay the penalty (usually £60, but may be £90) You can ask for a trial if you disagree with the penalty notice. You’ll get a bigger fine if you don’t ask for a trial but don’t pay the fine.

germany Is there any act of husband or wife which can be considered as rape? The paragraph for sexual offences is §177 StGb. Obviously there are nuances between those offences, not everything is "rape", but all of it is illegal. To answer your question, yes, the same acts that are considered rape when they are not husband and wife. While marriage had been an exception, this was considered archaic by many and this exception was removed in 1997: Vergewaltigung in der Ehe ist seit Juli 1997 strafbar. Mit dem 33. Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz wurde das Merkmal außerehelich aus dem Tatbestand der Vergewaltigung, § 177 StGB, gestrichen, sodass seitdem auch die eheliche Vergewaltigung als ein Verbrechen geahndet wird. Translation: Marital rape has been punishable since July 1997. With the 33rd Criminal Law Amendment Act, the characteristic "extramarital" was removed from the definition of rape, § Section 177 of the Criminal Code, so that since then marital rape has also been punished as a crime. There is no mention of how consent is to be expressed or even that it needs to be expressed explicitely.

Only Parliament has the power to define crimes in law (well, also in the UK there are common law crimes, where ages ago the courts defined punishable wrongs). The police have the power to enforce existing law, but not the power to create new crimes. Part of police power is the power to use force to enforce laws. If a person is trying to kill another (which is a crime), the police can use force to stop the person from committing this crime. Police power can be statutorily encoded (Parliament passes a law saying what police can and cannot do), or it could be part of common law. As for laws regulating a suspect, there may be a specific statutory prohibition – "you may not reach into your pocket" – or there is a common law inference to be made, that if the police have the power to order you to not reach into your pocket you may be forced to comply. The subtle distinction here is that if it is a crime to reach into your pocket when told not to, you can be prosecuted and imprisoned. If there is no such crime, you just have the consequence that you can be roughed up to some extent for disobeying the police order. One act of Parliament is the Offences against the Person Act 1861 §38 which says Whosoever . . . shall assault any person with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of himself or of any other person for any offence, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, NB "assault" does not require physical contact: creating apprehension suffices. Another law is the Police Act 1996 §89 which says Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both These laws do not exhaustively list all of the things that are forbidden (e.g. they do not say "may not bite. nor scratch, nor kick..."), instead, the prohibitions fall under the general rubric of assault and resisting. Under the circumstances, it is possible that the person could be criminally prosecuted, but even in lieu of a prosecution, it is strongly probable that the police use of force in this instance was lawful. One would have to await the outcome of investigations and litigation to know for sure.

Aiden4's answer about Winconsin's statute 948.60 is correct, but incomplete and the complete reason is interesting/funny, so I'll expand on it: The statute reads: 948.60 Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18. (1) In this section, “dangerous weapon" means any firearm, loaded or unloaded; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295 (1c) (a); metallic knuckles or knuckles of any substance which could be put to the same use with the same or similar effect as metallic knuckles; a nunchaku or any similar weapon consisting of 2 sticks of wood, plastic or metal connected at one end by a length of rope, chain, wire or leather; a cestus or similar material weighted with metal or other substance and worn on the hand; a shuriken or any similar pointed star-like object intended to injure a person when thrown; or a manrikigusari or similar length of chain having weighted ends. (2) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in par. (c), any person who intentionally sells, loans or gives a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age is guilty of a Class I felony. (c) Whoever violates par. (b) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person under 18 years of age under par. (b) discharges the firearm and the discharge causes death to himself, herself or another. (d) A person under 17 years of age who has violated this subsection is subject to the provisions of ch. 938 unless jurisdiction is waived under s. 938.18 or the person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of criminal jurisdiction under s. 938.183. (3) (a) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon when the dangerous weapon is being used in target practice under the supervision of an adult or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the supervision of an adult. This section does not apply to an adult who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age for use only in target practice under the adult's supervision or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the adult's supervision. (b) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon in the line of duty. This section does not apply to an adult who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age in the line of duty. (c) This section applies only to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is in violation of s. 941.28 or is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593. This section applies only to an adult who transfers a firearm to a person under 18 years of age if the person under 18 years of age is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593 or to an adult who is in violation of s. 941.28. 2 things to note: (1) takes care to include, in the list of dangerous weapons: nunchaku, shuriken and manrikigusari. While the first 2 are more or less familiar to everyone knows anything about Japanese martial arts, the last one had to be looked up by everyone following the case to discover that it's the "secret weapon of the Ninja"(even more than the shuriken). (3.c) says that the whole of this entire section applies[adding the brackets to make following the formal logic easier] only if (the person under 18 is in violation of 941.28[barrel length under 16 inches]) or (is not in compliance with ss. 29.304[Restrictions on hunting and use of firearms by persons under 16 years of age] and 29.593[Requirement for certificate of accomplishment to obtain hunting approval]). In programming terms(for those so inclined), 3.C could be written as: IF ((barrelLengthInches < 16) OR (huntingUnder16Applies AND huntingCertificateApplies)) THEN statute948.60Applies ELSE statute948.60DoesNotApply Since the barrel length is over 16'' and Rittenhouse is over 16 and no hunting permit was required for his activities, the whole section of the law did not apply. Assistant District Attorney James Kraus argued that the exception renders the state’s prohibition on minors possessing dangerous weapons meaningless. In essence, that the legislators drafting that law spent too much time watching cheesy early 90's action movies and thinking of how to save Wisconsinites from the Ninja threat, to draft the law properly, so it should be read according to its intent from the title of the section. However, there is a binding Common Law precedent, dating back from the 16th century called the "Rule of Lenity", also called "Strict Constructionism" in the US, whereby if the legislature screws up, it's the legislature's problem. In the original case, the law in England forbade "felonious stealing of Horses, Geldings or Mares". A thief was caught, but argued that since he only stole one horse and the law specified horses, the law didn't apply to him. He was let off and the law hastily rectified. Pre-revolutionary Common Law precedent is binding in the US and it was re-affirmed multiple times, e.g. United States v. Wiltberger, where a US sailor got off with killing another US sailor in a Chinese estuary, because the law only applied on the "high seas". So, the charge was tossed and the defense didn't press the issue further. However, the really interesting bit is that even though it didn't get to be argued since Rittenhouse was 17, the way the law is actually written, this section only applies if (huntingUnder16Applies AND huntingCertificateApplies). That means that there is literally nothing in Wisconsin barring a 12 year old(under 12 is separately forbidden in the 29.304/huntingUnder16Applies section) from possessing and using an AR-15(or AK-47), as long as the barrel is >16'' and a hunting license isn't required for the activity. I think that the legislature will amend the law with haste, before it can be tested on 12 year olds. P.S. the other guy who gave him the gun will get off with this precedent too, since the statute for his charge is: This section applies only to an adult who transfers a firearm to a person under 18 years of age if the person under 18 years of age is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593 or to an adult who is in violation of s. 941.28. i.e. the same 3 sub-sections as for Rittenhouse.

england-and-wales Yes As well as the general offence of comtempt of court by publishing facts in breach of a court order, there are also two statutory provisions making it an offence if those facts reveal a person's identity (maliciously or not): section 1, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992: (1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where a person is accused of an offence to which this Act applies, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed (“the complainant”) shall during the complainant’s lifetime be included in any publication. [...] The relevant offences are listed in section 2 (being rape and a number of other serious sexual offences). section 49, Children and Young Persons Act 1933: (1) No matter relating to any child or young person concerned in proceedings to which this section applies shall while he is under the age of 18 be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him as someone concerned in the proceedings. (2) The proceedings to which this section applies are— (a) proceedings in a youth court; (b) proceedings on appeal from a youth court (including proceedings by way of case stated); (c) proceedings in a magistrates' court under Schedule 7 to the Sentencing Code (proceedings for breach, revocation or amendment of youth rehabilitation orders); (d) proceedings on appeal from a magistrates' court arising out of any proceedings mentioned in paragraph (c) (including proceedings by way of case stated). [...]

It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).

Under Albanian law, the situation is somewhat open to interpretation. Law No. 7850 of July 29, 1994 (English translation) Part 1 Title 1 spells out the law of capacity. Article 6 sets 18 as the age of full majority: The person who reaches eighteen years old wins the full rights so that by his acts he gains rights and holds civil obligations. Articles 7-9 place limits on capacity for those who are younger. Those under 14 can act with approval of their legal representative, but unconditionally can be member of social organization, posses everything he gains by his work, to deposit his savings and to posses these deposits himself. Article 8 says say that he "who has not reached fourteen years old, has no capacity to act", and Article addresses 14-16 in the special case of fourteen to eighteen years who is unable to carry out his own affairs because of psychic diseases or mental illness is deprived of the capacity to perform legal transactions a court decision. These transactions can be performed through his legal representative. There is no law covering mentally-fit people between 14 and 18. The capacity to contract is neither affirmed (as for 18+) nor denied (as for 14-). Albanian Supreme Court decisions could be accessed and searched here to see if there have been any court rulings on disaffirmation of contract when one is between 16 and 18 years old. (Better translations here, Albanian original here).

In the US, why are companies giving big "let go" package to people they want to let go? It is shown in movies and is probably true, such as in the movie Jobs about Steve Jobs, that when he came back to Apple as the CEO, he found out who was not productive or who were probably not inline with his operating style, and gave them a big envelope, with an offer to leave that they found hard to refuse. But the thing is, we often hear, the boss could let a person go because they don't like the color of their hair (or dyed hair), and it is "employment at will". So the company can just tell you that you don't have to come back the next day. They may give the person some severance, but they don't have to, not to mention that they don't have to give the person a "big package" that they find hard to refuse. So what is the reason companies give them a big package to leave?

There are really about three tiers of employees for these purposes. Also, the reasons are a mix of legal and business considerations. At the bottom, severance payments can be made in lieu of unemployment insurance claims being made by the laid off employees. Severance payments for workers at the very bottom are often modest. At the top, "golden parachutes" are often written into the individually negotiated employment contracts of senior executives. Someone like a Steve Jobs will have negotiated a contract very favorable to him in the event of his termination with the board of directors when he is hired with attorneys on both sides heavily involved in its drafting. In between, one of the reasons is to get a waiver of claims, for example, due to allegations of employment discrimination, harassment, and past work place related injuries that weren't properly processed through the worker's compensation system, and to reaffirm the existence of non-competition, non-solicitation, non-disclosure, non-disparagement, and assignment of intellectual property rights of the terminated employees. Being able to "dot i's and cross t's" and definitively foreclose litigation from laid off employees also looks good to stockholders and prospective investors. If severance agreements cutting off liability and ruling out the possibility that sloppy paperwork could compromise the firm's intellectual property to be compromised by disgruntled former employees who no longer have a stake in the firm's well being were entered into, a larger layoff would often be followed by a stock price lag reflecting unknown contingent liabilities and intellectual property risks from former employees. Closing off residual liability is particularly important in firms with stock or stock option compensation for a large group of employees and for firms with defined benefit pension plans. But, it goes beyond that. There is also just a sense of moral obligation on the part of senior managers establishing the severance terms to good, loyal employees who are losing their jobs of often many years through no fault of their own. Most of those senior managers were once in the same position, worked with the employees who were laid off personally, and can related to their plight. In a publicly held firm, even for insider members of the board of directors, the shareholders are an impersonal abstraction, while the laid off employees are genuine people whom the executives implementing the plan know a sample of personally. Of course, institutionally, this economy wide practice of big businesses also helps to fend off pressures from governments to impose bigger severance payment requirements as a matter of law. Substantial severance payments also discourage unionization by the employees who aren't laid off since it makes the employer look trustworthy despite not having its feet held to the fire by the law or a union. Finally, it is a given that many of the laid off employees will land on their feet finding mid- to senior level jobs in the same industry or a related industry, or starting their own firms that may do business with the firm that laid them off, either as consultants providing institutional knowledge that was lost in the layoff to due carelessness, or as vendors or joint venture partners. A stingy severance package could sow ill will towards the former employer that could come back to bite that firm later, while a generous package will rarely leave significant ill will from the former employees who find new positions whom the firm will end up dealing with later on.

A special case is not paying the income tax that the company is supposed to be paying on behalf of its employees. If an employee makes £4,000 a month, and the employer is supposed to pay £1,000 tax and doesn't, that's not the employer's money, that's the employee's money. Not paying the employee's money is a much more serious matter than not paying your own taxes. A google search found this article http://www.gaebler.com/Not-Paying-Payroll-Taxes.htm which says that a person not paying taxes for employees is personally liable, that this liability does not go away with bankruptcy, and that jail is possible. So their advice is: Whatever other debt you have, paying taxes for your employees' payroll is the absolutely highest priority (higher priority than paying wages, paying the rent, paying company taxes and so on).

These offer letters typically state explicitly that the offer is contingent on approval by the relevant governing board. This is sufficient to thwart promissory estoppel. Such highest-level overturning are frequent enough in the US that a reasonable person would know that the principal (for instance) does not have final authority to make a contract. There is no requirement that the board justify their decision to you. If you file a lawsuit alleging racial or religious discrimination, and if you can make a prima facie case for discrimination,you might survive the motion for dismissal, and the board might be required to say why they didn't hire you.

You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.

Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status.

I'm not going to comment on what your manager is doing specifically, since I don't know all the facts. But in general: As a general rule, businesses have freedom of contract. This means they can choose to do business with, or not do business with, anyone they want. There are specific laws that create exceptions to this freedom of contract. The most important are federal and state civil rights laws, which prohibit many businesses from discriminating on the basis of certain protected classes, such as race, sex, religion, etc. In general, "locals vs. out-of-towners" is not a protected class, and therefore no law explicitly prohibits this type of discrimination. However, it's possible a court could find that "locals" is a proxy for some actual protected class--for example, if the hotel is in a city and the "locals" are predominantly Black.

You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".

In general, in the US, Bob may do this. If the second company is a competitor of the first and Bob has access to confidential information from his first employer, then there could be an issue. Some employers require their employees, or some of them, to agree to "exclusive employment", that is to agree not to accept any other employment while employed by the company. If Bob has agreed to such a contract, he would be in breach of it if he took a second job and could be fired if his main employer learns of this. This is not a problem if Bob gets permission for the vacation work from his usual employer. In any case, Bob is not committing a crime, even if he is violating his contract.

What happens if a witness invokes the 5th and is forced to answer? Follow up question to this one. What would happen if a witness invokes his right not to self-incriminate the judge deems it unreasonable and tells the witness to answer the question and by doing so it he does end up incriminating himself?

canada Canada has a similar protection. Section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms says that: A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence. The person is protected against the use of their compelled testimony or any evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal proceedings (other than for perjury).

There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process.

This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe.

Yes, you may call a defendant as a witness and compel the defendant to testify in a civil case. If you need this testimony to prove your case, you should have the clerk issue a subpoena for trial to the defendant and have that subpoena personally served by a process server upon that defendant (sometimes a witness fee, a mileage allowance, and a copy of the relevant statute must also be included in the package). There should be a standard court form available to do this. The subpoena to appear and testify at trial must be delivered to the defendant by the process server a certain amount of time in advance (usually two days, but court rules vary). Also, when you call a defendant as a witness you may generally examine the witness with leading questions, which is something that you are not usually allowed to do with witnesses that you call in your own case. Forcing a defendant to testify to the indisputable facts is a good way to meet your burden of proof towards establishing those facts. But, when you call a defendant as a witness, you should limit your questions to those you know the answer to and can ideally prove with other evidence if the defendant lies. Don't try to tell the entire story of the case with the defendant, just the undisputed facts. The one narrow exception to this would be a criminal contempt of court proceeding (i.e. one seeking the remedy of throwing the offending party in jail where there is no way to obtain relief by taking the action requested) prosecuted by a party within a civil case, to which 5th Amendment protections would apply. But, this would not apply to the kind of case described in the original post.

No That is nothing but fiction. Assuming that this is in the US, the police would (probably, there are some exceptions) have had to deliver the well-known "Miranda" warnings, that the suspect has the right to silence, the right to consult a lawyer, and the right to have a free lawyer if unable to afford one, and that statements may be used against the subject. If, after those warnings, the suspect chooses to confess, or to make a statement, that confession or statement would be fully admissible, even if the suspect did not have a lawyer present, unless there was some other reason for the statement to be excluded. No such reason is mentioned in the question. It is simply not the case in the US that a confession is excluded just because no lawyer was present, nor is that the law anywhere that I know of. If the police failed to give the warnings when they were required, then any statements or confessions would be excluded. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) says: law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [Footnote 4] As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. That tells you exactly what the police are forbidden to do. Nowhere does it say that a lawyer must be present. Indeed it says the opposite: The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That means that s/he can confess after being warned, and such confession would be admissible, provided that s/he knew and understood those rights.

Yes. This is very common. A persnickety lawyer or judge could insist on an actual "yes," but generally speaking, everyone expects witnesses to talk like normal people.

How exactly would the court determine this to be the cause of divorce? 99.99% of the time, this would be purely a "he said she said" situation, for how can someone prove refusal to engage? You can prove the opposite if there are children born to both parents, but how can one prove a negative? Or is the statement by the divorce initiator considered sufficient for the judge? Testimony under oath is evidence. Judges resolve "he said she said" situations every day on a routine basis with witness testimony alone by judging the credibility of each witness before them. See also an answer by @Jen about the subject of how things are proved in court in general. In the appropriate case, testimony under oath with no other corroborating evidence can even support a murder conviction as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It can certainly suffice to prove marital fault in a civil lawsuit for a divorce. If the judge finds that witness testimony under oath between more than one witness is irreconcilably different, and each witness is equally credible, and that it is impossible to tell which person is telling the truth, then the person seeking relief from the court has failed to meet their burden of proof to obtain relief from the court. But, this is rare. Usually, when witnesses are both testifying under oath and disagree about what happened, the judge will find that one witness is more credible than the other. And, in truth, while people certainly do lie in open court under oath, and probably are more likely to lie in that situation than when speaking to someone not under oath outside of a courtroom, most of the time, people don't lie and the testimony of all of the witnesses are consistent with each other subject to limitations based upon what they could perceive from their perspective and the limitations of imperfect memories. This could come down to demeanor in court, hesitation in answering, "tells", inconsistencies in their testimony, corroboration from other evidence and other witnesses (e.g. what someone said to a friend or wrote in a diary at the time), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime of deceit in the past, use of language that suggests coaching about their testimony, or common sense judgments about whose story seems more plausible under the circumstances of the parties in front of the judge.

Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that.

Is it Illegal for me to refuse to hire a white child actor because the already selected parent is black and the child isn't adopted? Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reads: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" However, there is an exception made for BFOQs (Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications). Specifically the law states "It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." Race and color are included in the first section, making it illegal to refuse to hire someone on those basis; However, the BFOQ exception does not apply to race or color. Thus it would appear there is never a situation where one can choose an individual based off of their race. So consider a situation where I'm casting for some play or movie and I've already picked the a black man and women for the main married couple. I'm now trying to pick a child to play the biological son of these characters. This would seem a clear case of a BFOQ if race were included in the exception, The audience is clearly going to notice if the child and parents were a different race and that is going to lead to either confusion or expectation that the child was adopted that could mess with the narrative, so the race of the child seems relevant. However, as I said, BFOQ exception doesn't appear to apply to race or color. Does that mean that it would be illegal in the USA to refuse to hire a white child in this situation? Assuming that it would be how does the TV and Movie industry manage to keep race of family members consistent without constantly having to pay out settlements to people who were excluded due to their race?

Courts have not yet reached a final answer on whether the practice you've described would be illegal. On its face, this practice seems to be a straightforward violation of the laws you've quoted. Refusing to hire someone because he is white is discrimination on the basis of race or color, and neither of those criteria can be bona fide occupational qualification. Nonetheless, it seems to be generally accepted that this practice remains legal, though there remains some disagreement as to why it is legal. As noted in Just A Guy's answer, lawmakers appeared to believe that this practice would be legal because casting directors could limit their choices to people who "appear" to be of a certain race, rather than limiting themselves to people who actually are members of a race. But legislative commentary isn't actually controlling when it runs contrary to the text of the law, as this commentary is. After all, one cannot generally appear to be black without the color of his skin being black. Arthur Larson, a professor at Duke Law, offered a similar approach: Perhaps the only way an employer could deal with this type of problem would be to cast his requirements in neutral terms so as to come within Griggs and its business necessity rule. The employer might, let us say, announce that he will consider applicants for the part of Henry VIII only if they bear a sufficient likeness to Henry VIII so that, with suitable make-up, they would present a convincing representation of the well-known monarch. This would rule out women, and many men too thin to be successfully padded out or too short to be adequately regal, as well as most blacks. As to black applicants, the employer could quite possibly contend persuasively that no amount of white make-up would do an adequate job of transformation, just as no amount of padding would save the day for a 110-pound white aspirant. Therefore, the neutral test of rough similarity to Henry might be successfully backed up by the business necessity rule. A. Larsen, Employment Discrimination, § 72.10. Although this issue seems like it might pop up all the time, I was only able to find one case where it was actually litigated. And in that case, there was no real discussion of whether race was or was not a BFOQ, or whether there was some "business necessity" for limiting casting to white candidates. Instead, the producers argued -- and the court agreed -- that casting decisions are protected by the First Amendment because they have expressive consequences and "are a necessary component of any entertainment show's creative content": The producers of a television program, a movie, or a play could not effectuate their creative vision, as embodied in the end product marketed to the public, without signing cast members. The plaintiffs seek to drive an artificial wedge between casting decisions and the end product, which itself is indisputably protected as speech by the First Amendment. Thus, regulating the casting process necessarily regulates the end product. In this respect, casting and the resulting work of entertainment are inseparable and must both be protected to ensure that the producers' freedom of speech is not abridged. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 999 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).

tl;dr The community service is unlikely to be valid consideration. Background While the father seemingly intends to induce performance via the offer, as in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81, judge-ordered community service is an exception. In particular, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 says performing a preexisting legal duty does not constitute consideration. For example, in McDevitt v. Stokes, 192 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1917), a breeder who had promised a horse jockey money if he won a race was allowed to renege on the promise because the jockey already had a professional duty to try to win. Likewise, if you promise the police a reward if they bring the person who burgled your house to justice, they already have a preexisting duty to bring the criminal to justice. There's a small window here to argue the opposite if the dad was trying to induce something above and beyond what the judge ordered. united-states

Some are, some aren't. For instance, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits all employment discrimination on the basis of race, including discrimination against whites. On the other hand, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act explicitly only protects people who are at least 40, and the Supreme Court held that it only applies to discrimination against older workers in favor of younger workers in General Dynamics v. Cline. While both laws forbid discrimination on the basis of X, the Supreme Court held that Congress clearly meant to limit ADEA to discrimination against older workers. You specifically use veteran status as an example. Veteran status is protected by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. The point of the law is explicitly to make it easier for people to serve in uniform without messing up their career. The law specifically bans discrimination against veterans (or a couple other service-related categories) on the basis of service. It does not ban discrimination in favor of veterans. In fact, the federal government (which is supposed to be a model employer under USERRA) gives veterans a preference in hiring decisions. Congress's goal in enacting Title VII was to make race a non-factor in employment; their goal with USERRA was to encourage military service.

A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.

No this is not a violation of discrimination law as there is no official language (de jure) in the United States at the Federal Level even though English, as the most common language is considered the National Language (de facto). Language is not a Federally recognized basis of discrimination for private business (your local state may require it though). Compared to Canada, where all services must be in English or French to comply with their Official Languages being English and French. It could be argued that, given America's very liberal Freedom of Speech laws, that requiring catering to a specific language by law could be challenged as a violation of your First Amendment Rights (after all, if you have freedom of speech, then you should have freedom of speech that others do not understand). Since there is nothing stopping an English Speaking American from learning the language you wish to do business in, nor is it confined to any race or religion (I, as a predominotly European descent, am perfectly capable of learning Arabic... or Japanese... or Navajo...). Where the confusion comes from is that in the United States, courts will often provide a linguistic interpreter for those who are not native English Speakers (even if they are conversational, given how technical legal terms can be, it may people who speak English as a Second Language will avail themselves of this service for the sake of making sure the nuance is properly translated).

Lying is protected in the United States You can make films (or write books etc.) denying the Holocaust, or stating that UFOs are alien spacecraft, or that one race/ethnicity/gender is smarter/stronger/better than another without fear of government sanction. Further, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that hate speech is protected in the United States - if you want to advocate that the members of [group] should be sterilized/deported/euthanased/violently murdered etc., feel free. What isn't protected is: "advocacy of the use of force" when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and is "likely to incite or produce such action". Broadly, "kill all [blanks]" is OK, "kill these [blanks] now" isn't. This also means that inciting a suicide is illegal, some types of false statements of fact, counterfeiting is not protected speech, obscenity/indecency, child pornography, fighting words, threatening the President, speech owned by others (i.e. copyrights and trademarks), commercial speech (e.g. false advertising). There are also limitations that the government may impose when it is acting in specific roles. For example, as an employer, the government can restrict the speech of its employees in ways that it can't for general citizens. Private individuals and organisations can sanction or ostracize you however they want. Holocaust denial is reasonably common among white supremacists and other anti-Semitic groups and they produce films and literature on the subject. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum devotes this web page to it. Of course, while it's legal to make these things in the United States, distribution of them in Portugal is against Portuguese law.

It is discrimination. However, it is legal, and generally not grounds for a lawsuit. Discrimination is legal, except when it is based upon certain specific categories, such as race, sex, and religion. For example, it is perfectly legal to discriminate for a position based on the possession of education degrees, skill certification or availability to work specific hours or days of the week. Immigration status (and specifically, needing a H1B sponsor in the future) is not a protected category, and as such it is legal to discriminate against this as a factor. Additionally, there are several downsides for hiring a H1B candidate, and foremost of which is sponsoring someone for an H1B visa is not a sure thing, since the H1B system is run as a lottery; as such, you may not receive a visa or extension, and thus be ineligible to legally work.

Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence).

Who can publish GPLv4? I was thinking about the or later part that is often used in licensing software. When reading https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html, I've found this: The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of the GNU General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to address new problems or concerns. However, nowhere in the text of the license is specified what is "The Free Software Foundation". The wording would be satisfied if I registered entity called "The Free Software Foundation" in Uruguay or somewhere and released something called GPLv4. Would that actually be legal? Reading the text of the license, it should be enough, but since I have no legal background I'm not sure.

In practice, it is abundantly clear to which entity the “Free Software Foundation” refers, even if the FSF were to change its name, even if there are unaffiliated organizations with the same name. Version 3 of the GPL also contains a link to the FSF website, making it clear which organization this referred to in 2007 when the license text was published. If there are doubts about the identity of the FSF in the future, it will be possible to trace the identity back to the 2007 FSF e.g. through public filings that the FSF is required to make available as a non-profit. Previous versions of the GPL contained an address for the FSF, which similarly disambiguates the identity of this entity at the time of writing. The FSF also holds a trademark for the brand "Free Software Foundation" in the US and EU, preventing an unaffiliated organization from using this name in an international context. Of course this doesn't affect an organization in Uruguay, but it's very clear that such an Uruguyan entity is not the FSF that wrote the GPL. The interesting questions is what happens if the FSF is dissolved. Can it assign its responsibilities and rights as the GPL license steward to someone else? I assume it can, and that the subsequent license steward would be able to produce sufficient documentation to substantiate this claim. If not, those are likely to be some interesting court cases.

Each country has its own copyright law, but the majority of countries have signed the Berne Copyright Convention, and most of those that have not, have joined the TRIPS agreement, which includes most of the same provisions. See Wikipedia for a list of those countries that do not adhere to Berne. Bangladesh is not on the list. The Berne Copyright Convention specifies the basics of copyright protection, requires a minimum term of protection, requires that copyright be granted without any formalities such as a copyright notice or registration, and requires that authors from other signatory countries be given at least as much protection as authors from the current country. It leaves many details to local law, however, including what exceptions to copyright are allowed. However, the Berne Convention does not require that buying a work that infringes copyright be treated as infringement, and I do not know of any country where it is, although I do not know the details of copyright law in Bangladesh In the united-states the copyright owner has the right to make or authorize the making of copies and to distribute or authorize the distribution of such copies. But once an authorized copy has been sold, the owner of the copy may re-sell it, lend it, or give it away to anyone, and no permission from the copyright owner is required. In the US this is called the "First Sale Doctrine". The laws of many other countries, including the EU countries and the UK, are similar in this regard. That means that it is perfectly legal to take lawfully created and purchased copies into another country and resell them there. Moreover, if someone makes a copy without permission, or knowingly distributes such a copy, that person commits copyright infringement, and could in theory be sued, but the buyer does not. It should be noted that under US law the First Sale Doctrine does not apply to unauthorized (pirated) copies. It is copyright infringement to knowingly sell (but not to buy) unauthorized copies under US law, and it is an infringement to re-sell such copies if the seller knows that they are unauthorized, although at a private sale this is not likely to be enforced. The Copyright law of Bangladesh is somewhat different. Section 71 (in chapter 13) provides that infringement occurs: (a) when any person, without a license ... or in contravention of the conditions of a license ... (a)(i) does anything, the exclusive right to do which is by this Act conferred upon the owner of the copyright; ... (b) When any person- (b)(i) makes for sale or hire, or sells or lets for hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or hire, or (b)(iv) imports into Bangladesh, any infringing copies of the work. The "exclusive rights" are given in section 14(1) of the same act (part of chapter 3) The relevant ones are: (a) to reproduce the work in any material form including the storing of it in any medium by electronic means; (b) to issue copies of the work to the public except copies already in circulation; At the end of section 14, it is noted that: For the purposes of this section, the copy which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation. This seems to be the Bangladesh version of the First Sale Doctrine, and it does not, at least not explicitly, contain the same rule as US law does, that to see or rent an unauthorized copy is infringement, even if there was a previous sale. But such a rule may have been imposed by caselaw. So a copy of a book (or any other protected work) purchased in Bangladesh might or might not have been properly authorized, but the purchaser is not committing infringement in either case. Section 74 of the Bangladesh copyright act does provide that ⎯(1) The Registrar, [may] ... order that copies made out of Bangladesh of the work which if made in Bangladesh would infringe copyright shall not be imported. (2) ... the Registrar or any person authorized by him in this behalf may enter into any air-craft, ship, vehicle, dock or premises where any such copies ... may be found and may examine such copies. (3) All copies to which any order made under sub-section (1) applies shall be deemed to be goods of which the bringing into Bangladesh has been prohibited or restricted under section 16 of the Customs Act, 1969, (Act IV of 1969) and all the provisions of said Act shall have effect accordingly This appears to permit the seizure of improperly imported copies, but not prosecution of a purchaser of such copies. Whether it would be likely to be enforced in the case of copies sold in a street market I could not guess. Moreover, it is unlikely that a publisher will find it worth its while to sue a street market seller, even if that person sells a clearly pirated copy of a book, particularly in a foreign country (foreign to the publisher, that is). The publisher or copyright owner probably could sue, depending on the details of the law in the country where the sale occurs. But the suit would have to be brought in the courts of that country, and might well cost more to bring than any plausible damage award would yield. Still some copyright owners might sue if they learn of such a sale. But the buyer is not at risk unless the law in the country where the sale takes place is different from that of most countries in this matter.

Yes. The license itself is really just one sentence long, and states explicitly that this is allowed. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.

I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions.

I cannot speak for civil law systems (Germany) but in Common Law (UK, USA) systems the law looks at substance rather than form. So: Am I allowed to undo the word-wrapping of all the texts and unindent them, as well as performing a new word-wrap on them? Yes Do I have to make sure that it is readable for everyone on every device, and do I have to make sure that accessibility interfaces are used (e.g. for blind persons, which aren't even the target group of my software)? If they are licences (rather than contracts) they must simply be available; this does not mean universally available. Do I have to make sure, that if my application wouldn't even start correctly on a device, that the user is able to start the application in an impossible, absurd, magic or religious way to ensure that he can read the legal texts or is it enough to state it on the website then? It depends if you want the licences to be enforceable by you on the users or if you are simply complying with your disclosure obligations. See What if the user disagreed with the Terms of Service, but still registered on a website?. Do I have to make sure that the rendering of the licenses/privacy policy/impressum is performant (e.g. text rendering and refresh after scrolling takes less than a second)? I already have to include two external libraries with my software to display the texts, otherwise it would not be possible to display texts at all. No - make them wait if you want.

Disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. This advice may be materially inaccurate. What does redistribution mean? Redistribution means you have somehow caused the software to make its way to another person. Things that probably count as distribution: Placing the file on a public website. Printing the binary in hex onto paper and giving that paper to someone else. Putting the file onto a USB drive and handing it to someone. Putting the file onto your own computer, then giving that computer to someone else. Putting the file onto a shared network drive. Things that probably don't count as distribution: Copying the files onto your own computer(s) Compiling the program Placing the program on your phone. Printing out the source code on paper, but not sharing it. As a practical matter, I recommend ensuring that BSD license accompanies any instances of the software, even if you don't intend to distribute those instances. If you don't distribute it, then nobody will see it. If you "inadvertently" distribute the software, then including the license means you are in compliance. Should you include the license in the exe or in the same folder: The specific clause is: Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Including the license in the exe (e.g., via some sort of credits menu) is typically fine. I'll note that this is the approach used by Chrome (help->about chrome has a link to "other open source software" which includes these licenses). This approach works well for software which makes use of an installer, since users probably won't be looking in the install folder. Including the license in the folder adjacent to the exe is also typically fine. If your application does not have an install process (e.g., installed via xcopy deployment), then this approach works well, since users will easily be able to find the license. If your software is sold in a physical box, then printing out the license and including that license inside the box also works. What if I violate the license by not including the BSD terms? If you violate the license, you are subject to a lawsuit for copyright violation. What happens next depends on how the copyright owners wishes to proceed: Some copyright owners will sue. The actual results/penalties for such a violation will depend on a variety of factors. Some copyright owners will ask you to comply with the license. If you respond by apologizing and then complying, that's as far as it will go. Some copyright owners will ask you for money (with threat of lawsuit). I would expect this result if the copyright owners offers a dual-licensing scheme (i.e., where you can pay the copyright owner to exclude the acknowledgement).

The copyright holder is free to release the work under whatever licenses the copyright holder wants, in the absence of a contract saying otherwise. A copyright holder could sign a contract not to release under another license, but otherwise I don't see why he or she would waive the rights. The copyright holder can always decide not to reissue under a different license. The copyright holder basically retains all rights not specifically signed away. Everyone else is limited to what copyright law allows and to what license terms they have.

It is unclear whether WINE is infringing copyright or if it can rely on a fair use defense. The CAFC held that: that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the API packages are entitled to copyright protection In that light, if WINE had original content in the structure, sequence, and organization of its API, the CAFC would likely also find that it is entitled to copyright protection. However, because this issue is outside the scope of the CAFC's exclusive jurisdiction (this is a copyright issue, not a patent issue), the holdings are not binding in any other circuit. Each circuit is free to review anew the copyrightability of APIs when such a case comes up. My guess is that this is the reason the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal on CAFC's Oracle v. Google opinion. To address your fair use question would be simply speculation, because fair use is always assessed case-by-case, and even in WINE's closest analogy (Oracle v. Google), the CAFC remanded the fair use question back to the trial court, and that question hasn't been decided yet: we remand for further consideration of Google’s fair use defense in light of this decision

Compensation for custody awaiting trial resulting in acquittal? I was accused of a crime and held in custody for 8 months then acquitted at court, I missed the first 8 months of my only child's life, and lost both my job and my partner. Could I be entitled to compensation?

In all but a few U.S. states the answer is that you are not entitled to any compensation. This is grossly unfair, but is the dominant rule by far in most jurisdictions in the U.S. As a matter of legal doctrine this is justified on the grounds that a criminal prosecution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and many people who are actually guilty may be acquitted anyway because the standard of proof in a criminal case is so high. The classic example of that distinction is the O.J. Simpson murder case, in which O.J. Simpson was acquitted of murdering his wife in a criminal prosecution, but was found liable for murdering her by the lower civil action preponderance of the evidence standard in a wrongful death lawsuit brought by her family. (In reality, most acquittals involve juries who think that the defendant was innocent, but that isn't reflected in the choice before them to convict or acquit a defendant.) The only compensation to which you are entitled as a matter of law if you are acquitted of a crime, per the U.S. Supreme Court, is a refund of any fines or costs payable only upon conviction of a crime, which you paid or had taken from your assets, prior to your acquittal. See Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. ___ (2017). There would an exception if you can show that a law enforcement officer intentionally brought charges without probable cause in a civil lawsuit you bring against the law enforcement officer, which is realistically impossible in almost all cases. (Prosecutors and judges and jurors (see, e.g. here)) have absolute immunity from liability for their official acts related to the court process.) There are a few jurisdictions where you could bring a civil lawsuit for compensation based upon "actual innocence", rather than law enforcement misconduct. In those places, you could receive compensation if you could prove by a preponderance of the evidence (or with a prosecutor's affirmation) that you were actually factually innocent, so you could get some compensation even in the absence of an intentional violation of your civil rights. Texas is one state that has such a scheme, with important limitations, as explained in this linked case. You would probably have to hire a lawyer with your own funds to bring either kind of lawsuit, and realistically, you wouldn't have been incarcerated for eight months pending trial if you had enough money to do that, because you would have posted bond and been released pending trial. There may be one or two states (I can't recall any from memory) where there might be a right to compensation merely because you are acquitted, but this would be an extreme outlier in terms of U.S. law. Outside the United States, outcomes could vary dramatically from one country to another. They relevant law in England and Wales is discussed in an answer to this question at Law.SE. International human rights law does not recognize a right to compensation in these circumstances.

As far as I understand, no one can jail anyone as a result of a civil matter. I can't just say, hey! You did this! I'm taking you to jail. You simply don't have the reason and authority to do so - and I doubt the jails would want random people coming in for random reasons. Courts also don't send people to jail for this. As far as I understand, you can only be jailed by a judge for a criminal matter. However, you can go to jail as a result of a civil matter. When this happens, you need to found guilty of a criminal offence, most notably Contempt of Court. You can be found guilty of that offence if you don't respond/comply to the court's instructions - such as failing to repay debts. In order to be found in contempt, the court needs to find that you also intended to refuse the court's instruction (this is known as mens rea). If you were found liable, the court would not send you to jail. They would instead tell you to repay the damages that you owed the creditor (the person who filed suit). Inability to do this does not result in contempt of court, however, you should generally let the court know of this. In terms of this, the court can allow the creditor to garnish wages, have scheduled payments... etc of the debtor. To answer the main question, the only time that the court will jail a person will be upon conviction of a criminal offence (such as contempt of court), and not a civil matter (such as liability).

Your boss is totally wrong. Legally, there is no such thing as a "probation period" in the UK. You have the right to your holiday payment, according to the days that you worked. What can happen: The legal minimum is I think 28 days per year including bank holidays, but most companies give 23 or 24 days PLUS eight days bank holiday. Your contract may say that the first three months are called probation period, and during that time you only get the legal minimum, and after that the much more common higher amount. That would be legal. But even so, you would be entitled to seven days, minus any bank holidays where you didn't work.

It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.

Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.

Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult.

I can’t speak for Indonesia but if you did this in Australia you would be a criminal. You either committed fraud or are an accessory to fraud. You would probably be considered an accessory at and after the fact which means you are subject to the same maximum penalty as if you had committed the fraud yourself - 10 years in jail. In addition, you are liable to repay the money taken, jointly and severally with your ‘friend’. However, if they can only find you, you cannot recover from your ‘friend’ as you were engaged in a joint criminal enterprise. Scams such as you describe are distressingly common and many people fall for them. As such, assuming the court accepted your story (because you might actually be the fraudster and have just made it up) you would be unlikely to get close to the full sentence and if you caught the judge on a good day, might even escape jail. If you are lucky, the jury might acquit, even though, on the facts, they shouldn’t - juries do what juries do. If you’re really lucky the police might decide not to prosecute.

Not necessarily. Your own statements and the statements of the officer would be legally sufficient to convict you. Also, your statement that you don't believe you are at fault is strongly at odds with a widely held interpretation of the traffic laws (not stated in the formal language of these statutes). The prevailing interpretation of the traffic laws is that you are always at fault if you rear end someone because you failed to maintain a safe distance, pretty much as a matter of strict liability and regardless of the circumstances, because a safe distance is almost by definition a distance that it is possible for you to come to a full stop from if the care in front of you suddenly comes to a stop for any reason. The only situation I can imagine where there wouldn't be liability for rear ending someone would be if you were at rest behind them at a stop light and they actively backed up into you. In practice, almost any judge and almost any jury, would convict you of failure to maintain a safe distance if you rear ended someone absent the most extraordinary of circumstances. I honestly don't know any lawyer or likely potential juror who wouldn't convict you under these circumstances with only the testimony of the police officer and your own testimony (which you would have to offer to have any shot at avoiding a conviction) to establish that you did indeed rear end someone. Police are allowed to lie to suspects of crimes, and often simply do not have an accurate understanding of how the legal system works. So, you are not entitled to rely on a statement made by a police officer. Of course, it is also certainly possible that his statement is consistent with local practice in your neighborhood traffic court. So, showing up to contest the charge might still make sense, and it wouldn't be uncommon to receive a plea bargain with fewer points against your license, just for showing up to court.

Can messenger chat be used as evidence in courts? My roommate agreed that I don't need to pay rent for the days I am not in apartment. I have to go to Texas for a 6 month period. I informed my roommate before adding him as roommate. We had this communication in WhatsApp chat. Can I use this chat in court in case if he harasses me to pay half rent?

Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context.

My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have.

You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.

You say that you have a joint lease. This means that you and your roommate are jointly (together) and severally (individually) responsible for fulfilling the terms of the lease. From the landlord's position there is only one tenant - both of you together constitute the tenant. If you want to change this so that the tenant from date X is your roommate and someone else you have 2 options: Jointly give notice, ending the current lease and triggering the return of the deposit. Your roommate and your replacement are then free to negotiate a new lease with its own deposit. The landlord would conduct a final inspection on your lease and an initial inspection on the new lease. With the landlord's permission, substitute the new person for you on the existing lease. This does not end the lease and does not trigger the return of the deposit. The landlord is not obliged to do anything. You can negotiate whatever deal you like about the security deposit with whoever you like.

There are several questions in the OP. The answers to all of them depend on the lease terms. If Person A wants out of the lease, is the only option to just try to negotiate a way out of their portion of the lease with the landlord, presumably by payment or other means? Yes, usually. Regardless of who is on the lease, Person A is on the lease. In order to terminate or break the lease, Person A will have to negotiate termination. Most residential leases provide for joint and several liability for lease obligations. That means the co-signed lease is like three non-exclusive leases, one each between landlord and Persons A, B, and C. So Person A has to find a way to break the Person A lease. Other than a breach by either party, that likely can only be done by negotiation with landlord. What rights do Person B and C have if Person A does stop paying? Absent some other relationship or understanding between them (that is, other than the lease,) likely none. Persons B and C are each fully responsible to pay all of the rent. In other words, as far as the landlord is concerned it does not matter who pays the rent as long as it gets paid. If it doesn't get paid, the landlord can evict and sue all 3 for non-payment of rent. But the lease likely does not discuss the relationships between A, B, and C - whether they pay pro rata by time in the unit, by space used, per capita, or whatever. Landlord doesn't care, and is not the counterparty to those decisions. That said, if there is a relationship between A, B, & C (for instance, if A & B had a contract describing who would pay what, and B entered into another contract with C,) that will determine their relative obligations. The landlord agrees to allow the lease to be amended for another person, person C to be on the lease. Person B negotiated this with the landlord without consent of person A. This may create liability between B to A, C to A, or B & C to A. It is even conceivable that it creates a liability from landlord to A, if A had a reasonable expectation that the lease would not be amended absent A's consent. And the amendment may not be enforceable against A. So, for instance, A may be able to kick C out of the unit and bar C from reentry. It will not effect A's liability to pay rent.

In California, all parties to a conversation (people being recorded) have to agree to a recording. There are no special rules pertaining to husbands and wives. It is sufficient that the parties are aware that the recording is being made and they continue to talk, knowing that fact. There are exceptions, under Cal. Penal 633.5, in that surreptitious recordings are allowed in order to gather evidence of "extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the person, or a violation of Section 653m". To be used as evidence, there are also "predicate rules" to the effect that you have to prove who the voices are from, that the recording hasn't been altered, and that the recording is reliable (e.g., there isn't a mysterious 18 minute gap).

Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.

This is a very difficult situation. Discrimination is not the right frame within which to view this as your roommate doesn't have authority over you the way that an employer or landlord would. The basic legal issue would be whether your roommate is constructively evicting you from you residence without valid justification for doing so. And, the answer might very well be yes. But, even if that is the case, since the roommate is not an agent of the landlord, your roommate's actions probably don't relieve you from your duties under the lease. So, your relief might be to vacate the premises and then to sue the roommate for the rent you have to pay without receiving anything in return. This is expensive relative to the likely returns, and there is no certainty that you would win or that you would get your attorneys' fees if you prevailed. This would also be a slow solution taking several months at a minimum. Or, in the alternative, you could leave and cease paying the rent, forcing the roommates who remain to pay it if they don't want to be evicted as they are probably jointly and severally liable for the rent. (If they sued you for your share of the rent, constructive eviction by one of them would probably be a good defense.) The landlord could sue all of the roommates if they don't pay, causing them to be evicted and you to be on the hook for any rent or other amounts that they owe, including the landlord's attorneys' fees (and hurting your credit). You could probably cross-claim for indemnification of any amounts you were required to pay in that lawsuit against your roommate. But, this too would be an expensive, complex and slow solution if the remaining roommates don't decide to simply keep paying the rent. It would be very hard for you to evict your problem roommate for breaching the lease by denying you your equal rights to the premises, since you are not the landlord, although it isn't impossible that a court would allow this relief and it would be relatively quick. It would also leave open the question of who was responsible for the evicted roommate's rent. The remaining roommates would be liable vis-a-vis the landlord, and would face eviction if they don't pay, and probably couldn't get a new roommate without the landlord's permission. And, the evicted tenant would probably remain on the hook vis-a-vis the landlord, but might not have a duty to indemnify the roommates who stayed. Also, in any lawsuit where you sue the roommate, the roommate would likely counterclaim against you for non-disclosure of HSV2, and while that would probably not prevail in the end, it would make the legal process hellish for you. The trouble is that there are really no good solutions that you could easily impose on them. A mutual agreement between the landlord and the other tenants to release you from the lease so you could find somewhere else, or to release the problem tenant from the lease so that you and your other roommate could replace that person, is probably the best solution, but that takes mutual agreement of multiple parties.

On what basis could the Federal Government legalize abortions? Now that Roe vs. Wade is expected to be overturned, many politicians are calling for legislation to protect the right to an abortion to be passed on the federal level. But on what grounds could the federal government legalize abortions in all 50 states? Would they be forced to open federal "abortion clinics" to prevent state jurisdiction? Are there similar precedents of the Federal government legalizing something against the wishes of the states?

The federal government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the current definition is incredibly broad -- certainly broad enough to include the provision of abortions. If it were challenged, the government would likely rely on Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). In Gonzales, two patients who used medical marijuana as authorized by state law challenged the federal government's laws prohibiting the use of medical marijuana. They argued that because they were growing their own marijuana, because it never left the state, and because it was for personal, noncommercial use, it was outside Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. But the Supreme Court rejected their arguments, holding that Congress could use its Commerce Clause authority to enact health-care laws regulating access to marijuana and pre-empt contradictory state health-care laws. The federal government's case for regulating abortions would be event stronger than its case in Gonzales: First, because obtaining an abortion is typically a commercial enterprise; it is likely covered by insurance, and even if it patient isn't charged, someone is likely paying the doctor money to perform it. Also, abortions more obviously implicate interstate commerce because patients frequently travel from state to another to obtain one, because clinics order supplies and services from outside the state, and because they rely on instrumentalities of interstate commerce (highways, telephone lines, the Internet) to do their job. Indeed, as far as I know, every court to consider the issue has concluded that regulating access to abortion is a straightforward application of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Violent and obstructive activity outside abortion clinics adversely affects interstate commerce in reproductive health services. In enacting the Access Act, Congress did not exceed its Commerce Clause power.”); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Congress found that doctors and patients often travel across state lines to provide and receive services, id.; in other words, there is an interstate market both with respect to patients and doctors. In addition, the clinics receive supplies through interstate commerce. ... Congress' findings are plausible and provide a rational basis for concluding that the Access Act regulates activity which "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Thus, the Access Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.”); U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 688 (7th Cir. 1995) (“the Access Act may be viewed as a direct regulation of interstate commerce and confirms once again that the Act is well within Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause.”). Reacting to Dobbs, then, Congress could write a law finding that existing state laws pose a threat to the interstate markets for providing and receiving reproductive services, and then rely on those findings to say that the only limits on abortion are X, Y, and Z, and that states may not impose any additional restrictions.

In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.

Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.

There are no feasible legal actions that you can take. The implausible action is to sue the state on some constitutional grounds and have the order overturned in part. The order contains no appeals process, so you would have to attack the order itself. There are, here and there, lawsuits on Free Expression Clause grounds regarding the shuttering of churches, which stand the greatest chance of prevailing at the level of SCOTUS. Even if the court were to rule that under these circumstances the right to attend mass church meetings cannot be restricted, it is significantly less likely that application of the emergency powers acts to weddings would be found to violate a fundamental right.

I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.

The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), majority opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia: Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited ... Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. (emphasis mine)

It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.

Avoiding agreeing to, or amending, digital contracts (redux) A recent question asks whether one can escape the terms of an adhesion contract by orally rejecting the terms while making a confirmation in writing. It seems likely the answer is no, as the written confirmation is an objective manifestation of assent to the bargain. But what if the customer doesn't actually provide written confirmation? For instance, UPS stores ask customers to sign a digital contract as part of each transaction. It includes standard business-friendly terms for arbitration, class-action waiver, etc., and presents the customer with a signature box before proceeding to complete the transaction. So imagine the following: Buyer asks UPS deliver a package overnight. UPS offers overnight delivery for $50. Buyer agrees. Clerk processes the transaction and asks Buyer to agree to sign the agreement to standard UPS terms. Buyer reviews the terms and does not like them. Instead of signing in the signature box, Buyer takes the pen and writes something like: "No." "Decline." "These terms are unacceptable." "I reject the arbitration clause." Or "I agree only to pay $50 in exchange for overnight delivery." The clerk either does not notice or does not care that Customer has not actually signed his name to the contract and completes the transaction. UPS loses the package. Buyer sues. UPS moves to compel arbitration. Must Customer arbitrate?

Option 1: The contract is not formed By writing a non-confirmation and explicitly denying the contract, the contract does not fulfil the meeting of the minds. There is no renegotiation, as the agent of the company is not allowed to negotiate. In a strange fashion, UPS would not be entitled to $50, but the customer is not entitled to any delivery, storage of the parcel or even to leave it at the company - and can't sue for the loss of more than the $50 because that is the total extent of their damages: the unjustly paid fees. Option 2: The contract is still formed as offered by UPS In the alternative, the contract has to be followed as written originally. In that case, the customer is obligated to arbitrate. In fact, the signing (or marking) of the terms of service might be simply acknowledgment of the standard contract, which was formed moments prior to the moment the customer handed over the package and paid. The customer did not get any verification of the altered terms of service from the clerk - who couldn't negotiate those deals to begin with - and instead accepted the terms by not taking back the parcel. Would the customer truly want to deny the offered terms, he'd have canceled the transaction and taken the parcel. Instead, he left it with the clerk and paid the transaction, which in itself makes a contract formation by action, very much akin to how you form a contract under the standard terms of the store by paying at the cashier for a bottle of soda. Non-Option: altered deal The clerk is not tasked with negotiating or accepting different terms from those that UPS declares. If the clerk just failed to notice the attempted altered deal, we are back to the two options above: either there is no deal, or the deal is as originally offered. Would the clerk has actively agreed to a deal that fall outside of his tasks, the whole situation collapses to a variation of Option 1, where there is no valid contract between UPS and the customer. However, in this case, the clerk is liable for the damage to the parcel and the damage to UPS.

If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract.

Typically the landlord will have a preexisting clause in the lease that says the landlord may choose to amend the lease at a later date. While that may be in contracts, I don't see that holding up in court. You can't unilaterally amend contracts to add new terms without acceptance on part of the lessee. Any clause in the contract like that will require notification of the lessee of the change and a chance for the lessee to terminate the contract without recourse on part of the lessor. Generally this must be done in the same format as the original lease (written). Most jurisdictions don't allow for a verbal amendment to a written lease. So in a way, yes, it is legal for a landlord to require payment via a certain method (like a direct debit from a bank account). They cannot however change the payment terms unilaterally without notification and acceptance. They can use language such as sending the notification (via registered mail) and then saying that a failure to respond is acceptance (because you are, by actions, accepting the terms by continuing to live there).

When I signed up over 5 years ago, I signed a contract agreeing to a specific service at a specific price and I was locked-in for 24 months, lest I be charged a penalty for early breach of contract As the original 24-month fixed term has expired long ago, the service provider is no longer obliged to provide the service at the original terms. They may terminate the contract at any time, and equally you are allowed to quit any time as well. The notice you have now got is essentially a termination notice combined with an offer for a new contract. You can accept it, or give them a counteroffer, or walk away to another ISP.

TL;DR: You have to do something to accept a document; a signature is often used because it is simple and permanent; signature alone is often not enough (e.g. wills); claiming a false signature annuls the contract for both parties and you cannot keep the accrued benefits. Signing something means you accept it and it becomes legally binding. Many things can become binding without signature (including your usage of this website) and signatures alone are not considered trustworthy in many circumstances. Important documents (e.g. wills, marriages, real estate transactions) in many jurisdictions require a public official (notaries, marriage commissioners etc.) or a trustworthy person (lawyers, doctors, professional engineers, etc.), who will often require rigourous identification documents, and/or witnesses to be involved for the documents to be legally effective. Some high-value commercial transactions will also involve witnesses for signature, or require witnesses for executions of certain articles. Otherwise I can always claim that I didn't really sign that document when it becomes convenient for me. You can and people do. Then the parties go to court or other dispute resolution mechanism, and the judge will consider all relevant evidences to decide (often on a balance of probabilities, i.e. more likely than not) if you consented to a document. Particularly, "when it becomes convenient for me" is often after some elements of the contract having been executed, which is evidence in favour of the existence of the contract and nonexistence of a contract removes obligations and rights for both supposed parties, as such the executed part could be undone. If for a sales contract the other party has sent you a computer, you cannot claim that you did not sign that contract and keep the computer they sent. Without the contract, the computer is not rightfully yours. Also, claiming false statements for benefit or under oath is fraud/perjury and can be criminally prosecuted. So, why are they used everywhere? You have to do something to affirm your consent to a document. It is symbolic but symbolic does not mean meaningless and a symbol of your consent is often desirable. A signature is simple and: affirmative of your intention, unlike a simple visual inspection of document (perhaps eventually someone will argue your eye movement can be used, e.g. for VR) permanent, unlike oral declarations (which can still be legally valid, even if hard to prove)1 which is enough for most purposes. As a bonus, it is also somewhat unique and can be compared to certain extent. For purposes demanding higher level of confidence, ID documents can be demanded and more complex procedures (e.g. with notaries and witnesses) can be undertaken. Of course, you could make an audio recording for oral declarations, but audio recorders were not commonly available and it would be too complicated if the entire contract is not read aloud in that recording.

A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company.

The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).

You mean like this? Of course, a website can charge you to access its pages; many do. And yes, clicking on an "I agree" button can form a valid contract (just visiting the website can't). Historically, the law has adopted the position that if you sign it (including by clicking "I agree") you read it, you understood it and you agreed to it. It's hard to imaging how it could be otherwise because allowing people to get out of contracts by saying "I never read it" is problematical as well. However, there are two things that mitigate against the type of term you suggest; one practical and one legal. Practical: How do they get your money? They can ask for your credits card details and, if they do and you give them a court will probably come to the conclusion that you knowingly and willingly agreed to pay for the service. However, if they don't have any method of getting money from you, they would have to take you to court to do so. There are a number of practical problems with this like: who are you? where are you? Which court can they sue you in etc. Legal: At common law, there exists the doctrine of unconscionability that describes terms that are so extremely unjust, or overwhelmingly one-sided in favour of the party who has the superior bargaining power, that they are contrary to good conscience. Such terms are legally unenforcable. Further, in many jurisdictions, consumer protection law often give additional protections up to and including not enforcing terms that are merely unfair not just unconscionable.

How freely can counsel interpret instructions given by their client? I have been reading about Frank Harris's trial for contempt of court in February, 1914, and while there are a number of aspects that may strike us as odd now, such as that Harris was committed to prison for an "indefinite period" for the seemingly minor offence of printing comments about an ongoing divorce case in his magazine Modern Society, and then failing to offer a sufficiently abject apology, there is one thing that struck me in particular. In court, Harris was represented by his barrister, Cecil Hayes, who, rather than apologising outright for the offence chose to seek to minimise it, offering an apology only for "the little bits that had got in in a slipshod manner" which would reflect on the character of Earl Fitzwilliam, one of the co-respondents named in the case. The Judge, Mr. Justice Horridge, was evidently not persuaded that this was an apology at all. My question is about where to place the blame for how Hayes conducted the case. If we assume he was following instructions from Harris, was he obliged to do so to the letter, or might he have decided, seeing how Horridge was inclined, to have interpreted his instructions in such a way that he apologised completely and unreservedly? Or was he absolutely obliged to follow his client's instructions as literally as possible, even if they were very unwise?

Barristers must represent their client as they see best A barrister who is working for you must always think about what is best for you and do their job in a way that reflects that. This does not mean that a barrister can lie on your behalf, or that they must do everything you tell them. Their duty to the court comes above even their duty to you as their client and barristers must act with independence, honesty and integrity. This means, for example, that they cannot do anything for you that would go against their duty to the court. The barrister, not the client, is in charge of strategy and tactics. For the example you give, it’s quite likely that the barrister might have preferred to be more apologetic but they have a duty to the court that supervenes their duty to their client. If the client was not apologetic, the barrister can’t say they are.

In the US, there are many possible sanctions A frivolous case, or pattern of cases, can result in a number of punishments: Paying the other side's legal fees -- Mind you, in the U.S, it is normal for each party to pay their own fees, and that will happen in "honest disagreement" type cases in which both parties have a valid perspective. "Loser pays" only happens when a) the loser has filed a ridiculous lawsuit, or greatly burdened the other side with frivolous filings; and b) the winner asks for fees. Transferring other costs to the plaintiff as the court sees fit. Again, winner must ask. Barring a plaintiff from filing future cases, without advance permission from the court. Again, winner must ask! Barring attorneys or firms from practicing in certain areas of law. Disbarment of the attorneys. That is decided by the state's Bar Association, typically a nonprofit trade association who in effect regulates lawyers in this manner. For instance, California is one of only four states allowing cash awards for ADA violations. A clever person named Mr. Molski went around to different restaurants and checked their bathrooms for ADA compliance. If a toilet paper roll was 1/2" out of position from where ADA required, Molski would take notes. Molski checked dozens of restaurants every day, and passed these notes onto a San Francisco law office. The law office filed hundreds if not thousands of these lawsuits against the various restaurants. The lawsuits all claimed that Molski was injured as a result of the ADA noncompliance. Mind you, this was in the age before easy merging of databases and MS-Word documents. Since these hundreds of cases were so similar, they simply made Xerox copies of the relevant paperwork, only leaving a few fields blank to be typed in by hand. To reduce secretarial workload, they didn't bother customizing the date of injury: so all cases claimed Molski was injured on the same day. Hundreds of defendants simply settled for amounts in the $5000 range (about half the cost of hiring a lawyer to grind through a trial). However, one defendant, a Chinese restaurant, fought. Their counsel discovered the hundreds of other same cases, and pointed out to the court that Molski was claiming to have suffered the same injury at dozens of restaurants on the same day. What an unlucky fellow! The defendant then claimed Molski and attorneys were Vexatious Litigants, and the court wholeheartedly agreed. Molski was barred for life from filing any lawsuit without advance court approval (in which Molski would need to show a body of evidence to the court that yeah, a real and valid case was there). The law firm was barred for life from filing any ADA related cases. The law firm folded up, and is no more. The lawyers involved in the case quit practicing law. Then we have Righthaven, who purchased from newspapers the "right to sue and collect damages" for copyright violations. Many bulletin boards, chatrooms, forums and Q&A sites allow/rely on "User Generated Content" (UGC), such as this here answer. They used search engines to find forums where users had copy-pasted newspaper articles. Generally, forums are protected from user behavior by the DMCA. Then, like Molski, they sued the forums, offering a settlement number below the cost of litigation itself. Again, hundreds paid; but a few fought on principle, with support from EFF. Again, Righthaven got destroyed in court - the right to sue cannot be sold. Courts ordered them to pay their victims' legal fees, bankrupting the operation. Prenda tried a similar thing against people who BitTorrent porn. I was in a case where we asked for fees. I got them, with such ease that I am kicking myself for not asking that the plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant (which would have saved many others from this person). Further, the judge laid a heavy hint to the 3 other co-parties that if they asked for fees, they'd get them too. They did not ask. Amusingly, one of the lawyers who should have asked, was unable to collect from the client. Should have asked...

when is it a good idea to get a lawyer? Only when you are not confident that you can put enough dedication to the matter & learning curve, or when you are not confident of your ability to cope with the emotional/frustrating toll of judicial proceedings. I do not mean this in an ironic way or to challenge you. It is just important to avoid a false sense of confidence. However, if you decide to represent yourself in court, you will have much more control of your case than if you delegate it to some lawyer whose attention is split with many other unrelated cases. Also, never get intimidated by pedantic or wasted phrases such as "he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client". In the XXI century, most urban people can read and write, Canadian laws are written in your own language, and the Internet provides many informative resources for free. Furthermore, even knowledgeable attorneys happen to be clearly wrong about the law, as I pointed out here. I feel like the bulk of the work is carefully detailing what happened which feels more like the job of a news paper editor. It involves more than that. A newspaper editor does not get entangled with subtleties of a story or of the law, and subtleties are often decisive in judicial proceedings. Litigation also involves intensive legal research so as to find case law (that is, binding court decisions) and statutes that support your position. The application of these laws to a particular case are often premised on subtleties. Hence my remark in the previous paragraph. A newspaper editor hardly ever knows what questions or evidence are required or would suffice for proving a case. This knowledge only comes through (self-)education and experience. What options exist if I don't want to pay a lawyer a bunch of money and am willing to do most of the work myself, for example would pro bono be a good option? Start by searching for "pro se" and "Canada" on the Internet. Some of the results might actually provide guidance on what procedural law(s) apply in your jurisdiction, the legislation, and so forth. As for searching case law, there should be a Canadian equivalent of http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch (sorry I am not knowledgeable of the specifics of Canadian litigation/resources). Based on your other post, I presume you are or will be getting acquainted with the Tenancy Act. I recently addressed here a question about the Act, showcasing the combination of that legislation and contract law (interestingly, many tenants presume their issue with the landlord is strictly about landlord-tenant legislation when in fact it has to do with contract law). I am sure in a library will find plenty of useful books covering the basics of the legal system as well as the rules of civil procedure. Find out whether the public has access to case files in Canadian courts. If so, go to a courthouse and study those files. Get acquainted with the drafting and format of pleadings, motions, responses, briefs, and so forth (although in Small Claims court much of this would be unnecessary, for small claims proceedings are much more simple). This will show you the practice aspect of what you learn from books. When using a term that you consider essential to your case, be sure to consult its meaning in a legal dictionary (I do not know whether Black's Law Dictionary is applicable in Canadian litigation). The meaning of many words are much more specific in litigation compared to their common usage. Or would getting a real lawyer and spending only one hour of his time be better? I highly doubt it, especially if you have not gained any background in law. A lawyer will not explain things from scratch, let alone the intricacies you need to know. The most you could get from speaking with a lawyer for an hour would be notions which are too generic to be of any use at all. Moreover, I doubt that a lawyer in a phone interview will give you any legal references for you to verify on your own. In the very beginning of my litigation, I spoke with a law firm as assigned by a lawyer referral company. By then I already had some background in law and therefore I had specific questions. The guy from that law firm just kept babbling ambiguities very quickly. At the end of the phone call, I thought "nah, I will do this by myself". You might end up making that decision in your current or future matters.

Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.

There is a firm difference between giving advice on "what the best decision is likely to be" and "what decision to make". The former is what lawyers must do, which comes from: Conduct and Client Care Rules: Whatever legal services your lawyer is providing, he or she must— discuss with you your objectives and how they should best be achieved: give you clear information and advice: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006: legal work includes— advice in relation to any legal or equitable rights or obligations: So, there is nothing in the law that requires lawyers to advise you on "what decision to make". Instead, they explain to you the range of possible decisions and what ramifications / implications / consequences they have. They won't make the choice for you — it's always yours. Is it legally correct that a lawyer is not permitted to provide advice on what decision to make It is not strictly true that a lawyer "is not permitted". Rather, they are not obliged to do so. And they have a damn good reason not to: there is a huge difference between being responsible for legal facts based on which you make decisions, and being responsible for decisions themselves.

If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.

Your question isn't quite as simple as it sounds; some civil cases are tried before juries, and though a judge can give directions to a jury to give a particular verdict, they are not always required to obey; there are eighteenth-century English cases on the point that established that principle for most related jurisdictions. But your last sentence does have a simple answer: No. A judge usually takes an oath on assuming office, to administer the law without fear or favour. That means he will investigate the relevant law (with the assistance of the parties' lawyers), and enforce what it says. "This law would be unfair to the customer, so I will ignore it" would be just as bad as "The mechanic threatened to hit me with a wrench, so I find for him". Of course, most jurisdictions do have overriding principles of fairness; it may be that this contract term was not shown to the customer, so is not enforceable, or it may be that it is contrary to public policy to be uncertain what repairs will cost. But unless there is an explicit legal reason, the judge will have to find for the mechanic. It would be neither improper nor unusual for the judgment to include the sentence "This result is clearly unfair to the customer, and I urge the legislature to look at closing the loophole; nevertheless, the law is clear, and I find the customer must pay the increased price."

No. There are almost no constitutional lawyers (at least, that I have seen make pronunciations on the subject) who seem to think that this is a serious means of forcing a no deal Brexit; such an attempt would be obviously unconstitutional and would almost certainly be injuncted in court within hours of such an order being issued. Orders of council cannot stymie an Act of Parliament, this is a well established constitutional principle. See https://davidallengreen.com/2019/09/brexit-padfield-and-the-benn-act/

Can an adult sponsor a minor to enable emancipation without adopting them? I've tried googling this, but I'm not sure how to phrase it in a way that would catch the right legal terms. As I understand it, in some states in the US, a minor (i.e. younger than 18) who is at least 16 years old, can petition the state for emancipation; i.e. legal separation from their parents, and allowed to enter the world as a legal adult, despite being younger than 18. However, in order to be granted this, the minor must prove that they are capable of supporting themselves financially, that they have somewhere to live, and a few other things. My question is about the degree to which an unrelated adult could assist the minor in satisfying these requirements, in order to achieve emancipation. Obviously, the adult could adopt the minor. But, if either party did not want to go with full adoption, could the adult "sponsor" the minor in some way that would satisfy the legal requirements. So, the minor is still an independent legal adult, but has a guaranteed support network just in case. For example, could the adult sign a contract sponsoring the minor until the age of 18; guaranteeing the minor room & board in the adult's home, and/or will financially subsidize the minor's income up to a certain level if they wish to live on their own, etc. Is there a mechanism like this, or is this a custom situation that a judge might approve? or is something like this totally off the table?

What is emancipation of a minor? As I understand it, in some states in the US, a minor (i.e. younger than 18) who is at least 16 years old, can petition the state for emancipation; i.e. legal separation from their parents, and allowed to enter the world as a legal adult, despite being younger than 18. However, in order to be granted this, the minor must prove that they are capable of supporting themselves financially, that they have somewhere to live, and a few other things. This is true in some places, but not others. There are two different concepts for emancipation under U.S. law, and most states follow one or the other. One concept is that emancipation is a factual reality that exists when a minor is self-supporting or supported by a spouse or significant other, and not living in the household of a parent. In states that follow this concept, such as Colorado, a court ruling that a minor is emancipated is simply a finding of fact about what is, rather than a grant of permission. Another concept is that a minor is, as a matter of law, not emancipated until a court grants minor permission to deviate from the status implied by their age. My understanding that this is the concept used in California. In these jurisdictions, emancipation is granted only after an good faith attempt to give notice to the parents and a hearing, and involves an assessment of the capacity of the minor to be self-supporting without parental assistance and involvement. The question is focused on this concept, but it is not the only one and it is probably a close call as to which approach is the majority rule in U.S. states. Even in "permission" states, however, entering military service or marriage usually results in emancipation as a matter of law without any formal court proceeding. Common fact patterns There are certainly cases in which the fact that a minor is married or living in the household of a significant other as a stay at home parent would establish emancipation. Another fairly common fact pattern would be a employee whose employer also provides housing. Another fairly common fact pattern is a situation in which the whereabouts of the minor's parents are unknown and the minor has, somehow, been managing. Sometimes you see this when a minor's parents die and the minor goes on in an isolated wilderness area, for example. Adoption is indeed not an option Adoption is not possible without a termination of the rights of the parents (or at least one of them in the case of a stepparent adoption). The legal guardianship option The preferred arrangement when living basically as a child in a supportive adult's household would usually be a guardianship, to the detriment of the parent's role in most decision-making for the minor, rather than emancipation. Here are some quotes from a recent case from Colorado (In re Interest of A.D., 2023 COA 6 (January 19, 2023)), with that fact pattern: ¶ 2 L.D. is the sole living parent of A.D., one of her three children. A.D. was sixteen at the time of the guardianship proceeding. Although L.D. and A.D. once shared a healthy relationship, it deteriorated dramatically during the summer and fall of 2021. This deterioration gave rise to Petitioners’ request for — and the district court’s grant of — an unlimited guardianship over A.D. We turn to that history now. ¶ 3 In June 2021, A.D.’s car was vandalized while parked in front of the family home. A.D. and his mother had a heated argument about why it happened and who was responsible for cleaning it. Upset by this conversation, A.D. went to stay at his girlfriend’s house. Although he soon returned home, A.D. ran away from home five more times following disagreements with L.D. ¶ 4 In early July 2021, L.D. gave A.D. an ultimatum: he could (1) go to military school, (2) attend therapeutic boarding school, or (3) abide by her house rules. A.D. ran away again that night, but this 2 time he spent over a month away from home, staying with his girlfriend, couch surfing at friends’ homes, or sleeping in public parks. ¶ 5 On August 7, 2021, A.D. was taken to the emergency room after appearing to overdose while partying with friends at a park. The hospital made a mandatory report to the Department of Human Services (DHS). Once A.D. was stable, L.D. and V.T. (L.D.’s longtime colleague and family friend) met with a DHS representative to discuss next steps. L.D. agreed that, given the hostility between A.D. and herself, and between A.D. and his two siblings (who both lived with L.D.), it was in his best interest to stay with Petitioners. ¶ 6 On September 8, 2021, A.D. drove Petitioners’ car to L.D.’s house for his first night back since early July. When he arrived, L.D. became extremely upset that he had driven there. In her mind, A.D.’s operation of a car — and Petitioners’ facilitation of it — violated their agreement that he not drive until certain conditions were met. The next morning, without notice to Petitioners or her son, L.D. called the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and withdrew her permission for A.D.’s driver’s license. The DMV revoked his license the next day. ¶ 7 A.D. became enraged when he learned that his mother had revoked her consent and subsequently sent a series of angry texts to her. L.D. then blocked A.D.’s number, thus preventing A.D.’s calls or texts from coming through to L.D.’s phone (though texts came through on her computer). ¶ 8 On September 24, 2021, DHS facilitated an “adults only” meeting with L.D., Petitioners, and DHS representatives. That meeting resulted in three shared priorities: (1) Petitioners were to provide regular updates about A.D. to L.D., who would, in turn, communicate with Petitioners before making decisions affecting A.D.; (2) A.D.’s license would be reauthorized within thirty days once to-be-defined conditions were met; and (3) A.D. would be allowed to be on the high school wrestling team, which all parties agreed was good for him. ¶ 9 Over the next month, Petitioners regularly emailed L.D. updates on A.D. L.D. provided few, if any, responses to these updates. Petitioners also sent L.D. a proposed plan for A.D. to get his license back, but L.D. did not respond. ¶ 10 On October 20, 2021, Petitioners filed their petition for appointment as A.D.’s guardians. L.D. objected to the petition, sought dismissal of the action, and requested attorney fees. ¶ 11 On November 8, 2021, Petitioners requested that the court appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent A.D.’s interests. Over L.D.’s objection, the court appointed a GAL pursuant to section 15-14-115, C.R.S. 2022, after concluding that, owing to their disagreement over the guardianship, the parties could not represent A.D.’s best interest in the guardianship proceedings. The GAL represented A.D.’s best interest throughout the litigation, and the court also instructed the GAL to provide a report about whether L.D. was “unable to exercise her parental rights.” ¶ 12 On November 14, 2021, before Petitioners filed their reply, L.D. — without consulting Petitioners or A.D. — revoked her permission for A.D. to wrestle the day before the first day of practice. Why she took this sudden action is unclear: L.D. testified it was because A.D. was not maintaining passing grades, while another witness testified that she wanted “leverage” over him to participate in family therapy. Regardless, A.D. was devastated by the timing and nature of this action. ¶ 13 While these motions were pending, Petitioners continued to care for A.D. Petitioners asked L.D. for permission to talk to A.D.’s teachers, coaches, and doctors about how to better care for him. Yet from August to early December 2021, L.D. refused to grant Petitioners permission to engage with these individuals. She ignored or outright refused to allow such communications until December 8, 2021, when, after repeated requests from a DHS representative, she allowed Petitioners to attend — but not participate in — a meeting with A.D.’s teachers. ¶ 14 L.D. also resisted Petitioners’ requests for financial support for A.D.’s care. To her credit, L.D. provided A.D. with $25 per week for groceries. These funds came from A.D.’s $1,800 monthly survivorship benefit, which was established following the death of A.D.’s father when A.D. was three. Petitioners knew the benefit existed and requested more financial support. L.D. did not respond to these requests. ¶ 15 Except for the text exchange between L.D. and A.D. following the revocation of L.D.’s consent for A.D.’s license, L.D. and A.D. never communicated directly. Instead, all such communications went through Petitioners or DHS. ¶ 16 Consistent with section 15-14-205(1), C.R.S. 2022, the district court conducted a hearing on Petitioners’ guardianship motion. The hearing spanned two days, with both sides calling numerous witnesses. ¶ 17 In a written order, the court granted Petitioners an unlimited guardianship over A.D. In so doing, the court concluded that Petitioners had proved by clear and convincing evidence that L.D. was, consistent with section 15-14-204(2)(c), “unwilling or unable” to care for A.D. and that the guardianship was in A.D.’s best interest notwithstanding his mother’s opposition to it. The linked appellate court decision then goes on to conduct legal analysis and affirms the trial court's ruling as correct. The official syllabus of the case summarizes that part of the opinion as follows: A division of the court of appeals reviews the guardianship appointment for a minor under section 15-14-204(2)(c), C.R.S. 2022. In so doing, the division adopts the analytical framework outlined in In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2010). Applying that framework to section 15-14- 204(2)(c), the division concludes that the moving party must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is (1) “unable or unwilling” to exercise their parental rights, and (2) the guardianship is in the best interest of the minor notwithstanding the parent(s)’ opposition to the guardianship. Moreover, in entering such an order, the court must articulate the “special factors” it relies upon to justify this interference with parental rights. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Utilizing that framework here, the division concludes that the court did not err in appointing a guardian for the minor.

Adults are bound to contracts with minors The technical term is that a contract with a minor is that it is voidable by the minor unless it is subject to the exemptions - a contract for necessities or a contract of benefit to the minor (e.g. a reasonable mobile phone contract). Until the minor chooses to void it, it is binding on everyone involved. They can do this anytime before they reach majority or within a reasonable time after that providing the contract is not complete. That means, for one and done transactions, the contract cannot effectively be voided because the contract is complete - think of a child buying an ice cream, riding a bus or going to the movies. If it is voided, the minor is obliged to return whatever consideration they received and that is still in their possession. So, for the mobile phone contract, if it included a handset, they must return that providing they still have it.

Generally speaking, you have to disclose that the defendant is a minor in the complaint and their deadline to respond is tolled until the court has appointed a guardian ad litem for them. So, while it is possible, it is arduous. Also, since someone below the age of eighteen can claim minority as a defense to an executory contract (as opposed to a contemporaneous exchange of goods or services for cash), and in some cases, to other contracts, you have a better shot at suing for malperformance and nonperformance of work. Finally, even if you can sue, collecting a judgment from a minor, who is likely to lack both employment and any significant assets, is very challenging. A minor's legal guardians or parents would not be responsible for a judgment entered against a minor in these circumstances. there was no written contract for the job and the only information I have of them is their phone numbers. The lack of a written contract isn't a serious problem in a short job that was performed by both sides. You will need to be able to locate them to physically serve them with process to sue them. If you have their names, approximate ages, and the general vicinity of where they live or work, this isn't an insurmountable burden, but it is a bit of extra work that could turn out to be easy or could turn out to be a major obstacle.

There are various ways in which a minor cannot assist a police investigation, and it might be useful to say in what ways any civilian could do so (TV shows notwithstanding). A civilian cannot conduct a custodial interrogation, nor can most of them gather physical evidence (so that a proper evidence log is maintained including relevant information on method of collection, the evidence isn't contaminated etc. – stuff that requires a modicum of training). They cannot execute a search warrant. On the other hand, anyone can provide information that is useful to the police, and it can be done without giving your name or indicating that you are a minor. A minor can serve as a witness at a trial, and it can be helpful to police to know that they have a witness to a crime. A minor can also be used the same way an adult is used, as a confidential informant. There is not a lot of data on that practice given the confidentiality of juvenile records, but there is an article to read ("Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense". The article does suggest that parental consent may be necessary in some cases (such as wearing a wire to a drug transaction). There is a law in Washington requiring every county's prosecutor to have a local protocol for using informants, and there should be guidelines developed by a work group, however the results (if any) of that group's meetings are not available on the internet. It is possible that there are specific restrictions on the use of minors as informants in some jurisdiction. The article explores the subtle distinction between "informant" and "friend", applied to minors. California has a law that limits the use of minors – none under 15, those above with approval of a judicial officer and parent, though those 13 and older can be used as bait in a cigarette or alcohol sales case. New York does not have a blanket prohibition against using a minor as an informant, but there may be relevant guidelines for a particular department.

This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up.

Unfortunately, it looks like the answer is yes. There was a bill passed around 2007 called the "Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007". You should track down official information as I am going by newspaper articles. If an employed, adult child isn't supporting their parents or step-parents, 60 or older, their parents or step-parents can go to a tribunal and ask for an enforcement order. The upper limit was 10000 rupees per month or a possible jail term. The Times of India has an article from December 2019 that the government plans to expand the law to include son- and daughter-in-laws as responsible besides children, step-children, and adoptive children. The new bill also includes grandparents and they do not have to be over 60. The plan is also to remove the 10000 cap.

As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception.

This means that you have the right to make arrangements to do things like arrange for the child to travel to your home (possibly as an unaccompanied minor on a plane or train or bus), to enroll the child in a school of your choice near your home and to sign permission slips on behalf of the child as necessary for school activities, to arrange to have the child's possessions moved to your home, to locate a local pediatrician and dentist for the child and consent to the child's medical treatment by those health professionals, etc. Basically you have whatever parental authority you need to have that is incident to being able to do what is necessary to have the child live with you. You might not have parental authority in matters that are not related to something necessary to having the child live with you, for example, consenting to the child's marriage under the age of majority, or to the child enrolling in military service where parental permission is required, or to representing the child as guardian in connection with an inheritance case.

Adverse possession between new owners I purchased my property in 2016. My current neighbor purchased his in 2019. The current fence between our properties had been installed some time ago, presumably by the respective previous owners. I want to install a new fence along the correct property line, which would allow me to slightly expand my lot. I had a survey done confirming the location of the property line. Current owner is opposed to moving the fence, since it would disadvantage him. Adverse possession in my area is 15 years. Can the current owner make a successful claim of adverse possession on the fact that the fence likely existing like this for more than 15 years between the previous owners?

united-states Can the current owner make a successful claim of adverse possession on the fact that the fence likely existing like this for more than 15 years between the previous owners? Yes. This is called "tacking". Everyone in the current owners' chain of title is considered for purposes of an adverse possession period. If a preponderance of the evidence (or other burden of proof established under state law which varies from state to state) establishes that the fence is more than fifteen years old when the adverse possession/quiet title lawsuit is commenced, the adverse possession claim will probably prevail.

on behalf means that the party of the agreement is the landlord, not the property manager. The contract both entitles and obliges the landlord, not the property manager. The property manager is not a party of the contract. So the fact that the property manager is fired completely unrelated to the existing contract. Additionally, in most jurisdictions that I know of, even if the property changed ownership (the landlord sold or gifted it, or the landlord died and it was inherited by someone) the contract would still be in force, as the change of situations would not invalidated the rights and obligations of the other parties.

It is not forgery to modify a signed document if you clearly indicate the date and nature of the changes, but the landlord could retain and rely on the original version, whoch would be to your disadvantage. I would suggest writing and signing a letter in which you acknowledge receipt of the condition from, and indicate that you know that it must be filled out, signed and returned within 15 days after your move-in date. That should deal with the landlord's legitimate concerns. Or you could write on the condition form "no inspection has been made as of {date}" and return it with that notation, which should protect you, retaining an unsigned copy for later use.

The question for trespassing is whether the trespasser has been adequately notified of the possession interest that another person has in the property. Although it is legal to evangelize door-to-door without a permit, most jurisdictions will require you to leave promptly if the owner asks you to leave. In the absence of such verbal requests, you have a legally protected interest in engaging in conversation with your neighbors. Based on the law as I understand it, it is likely that your jurisdiction will recognize a right to proselytize to your neighbors door-to-door regardless of a no trespassing or private property sign. However, for the sake of certainty, here’s a little bit about trespass law. Typically, states have statutes that define what it takes to make a sign “conspicuous” enough to create grounds for prosecution. Such laws include specifications for the thickness of markings and the sign’s distance from the ground. Arkansas statutes have established that a person who enters or remains unlawfully on property has committed trespass, which means that the person must enter or remain in or upon the premises when not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon the premises. Communication is key. Arkansas law provides that if the property is unimproved and apparently unused, and is not fenced or otherwise “enclosed in a manner designed to exclude an intruder,” the person entering the property does so with license and privilege. Generally, however, if a person unlawfully enters property that has been improved, he has trespassed regardless of a sign on the premises devoid of some religious purpose for his visit. Thus, there really is not a significant difference between the “No Trespassing” sign and the “Private Property” sign. Both would communicate to any potential intruder that the property he is about to enter is presently being possessed by another person and thus would likely be sufficient to provide grounds for claiming notice in court if a property owner should choose to bring a suit.

Unfortunately for you, the insurance company is right. Even with the rise of modern consumer protection law, caveat emptor ("Let the buyer beware") still largely applies to real estate transactions. Exceptions are where the building is new (not applicable), the seller gave a specific warranty (unlikely) or the seller deliberately concealed the defect (not applicable). If, as you say, the damage was "completely hidden" it is unlikely that your building inspector was negligent or breached their contract so you cannot recover from them. Sadly, this is at your cost. Your insurer may be liable but that would depend on the terms of your insurance policy.

I don't have enough to comment but I know where I live it's the landlords responsibility to take care of mold. That being said, if it is mold caused by negligence of the tenant e.g. always leaving the window open in the rain or something, then the landlord can claim compensation. Where I live the landlord keeps some of the damage deposit he must prove to the tenant why he did so within a months time of when he was supposed to return the damage deposit. For example if it cost him $200 to repair damage done by the mold, he must return the rest of the damage deposit and a letter explaining why $200 was kept, and the receipts. Where do you live? The laws really do very greatly from region to region. It has been my observation that it's not that uncommon for landlords to try and sneak something into the lease that isn't really allowed by law.

The term originated in Anglo-Norman legal usage in the 14th C., and advers (that spelling) has the meaning "acting against or in opposition (to someone or something); opposing, antagonistic, actively hostile". It is often used in "adverse party" (and related spellings) meaning "the opposing party". The specific collocation "adverse possession" meaning "possession against (the interest of a person)" seems to be attested from 1776 in Contin. Comyn's Digest Laws Eng. "Twenty years adverse possession in defendant, takes away plantiff's right of possession".

user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says.

What are some potential legal options when noise ordinances are not enforced for a particular local business (in Texas)? I live in a mixed use zone in the downtown area of a major metropolitan area in Texas. A recent city ordinance requires bars and restaurants to maintain noise levels below a certain level at different times of the night. The exact levels specified for our zone, which is "Commercial/Mixed Use" are: 70 dBA or 10 dB above the background noise level, whichever is lower, from 7 AM to 10 PM 60 dBA or 5 dB above the background noise level, which ever is lower, from 10 PM to 7 AM. 5 dB shall be subtracted from the maximum Noise Level where the Noise Level includes "impulsive noise" The most restrictive maximum Noise Level shall apply at the property where the noise level is audible. Using different Android applications, I believe that a bar near our apartment is routinely skirting this ordinance by playing music that is audible beyond their property. I have called the police at various times, but they either can't verify that the business is, in fact, violating the ordinance, or (more frequently) choose not to take any action, or sometimes just don't arrive to investigate in time. I understand that Android apps are not a professional instrument, but neither does the ordinance specify the accuracy of whatever is measuring the noise level. The ordinance in question is Plano City Ordinance 2021-12-6. I am considering purchasing professional equipment, but I also don't feel like I should have to bear unreasonable expenses to get some relief from this problem. What might be my legal options? Sue the business? Sue the police? What sort of evidence might I consider to prepare and what sort of remedies might I request?

You have verified nothing Your phone is not a calibrated decibel meter operated by a competent acoustic technician (unless you have qualifications you aren’t telling us about). It’s also clear that you don’t understand what the ordinance says in a technical sense. You have measured “decibels” but you have not explained whether you have measured A, B, or C weighted readings and which of those the ordinance addresses. Before you engage in any legal process you will need real expert evidence, which you can get by hiring a professional acoustic consultant to conduct a proper noise survey using calibrated equipment in accordance with the requirements of the ordinance. What are your legal options? If you can verify a breach of the ordinance you have several options: You could sue under the tort of nuisance to recover your losses. The evidence you have will help prove the nuisance but failing to comply with an ordinance does not ipso facto mean that the bar breached any duty of care it has to you. In any event, you would have to prove they owed a duty of care and prove your losses. You could seek an injunction requiring the bar to comply with the ordinance. However, the ordinance itself may not give you standing to do this. You could seek a writ of mandamus requiring the person responsible for enforcing the ordinance to do so.

It is usual for a lease to specify for what purposes and on what notice the landlord is entitled to access. Often there is a provision allowing the landlord access on no notice in an "emergency" which is often not specifically defined. Access for purposes of repair, and for purposes of inspection may be on 24 hours notice, or 48 hours, or some other period, or on "reasonable notice" with no specific period specified. Access for a reasonable purpose (such as inspection) on reasonable notice that does not actually inconvenience the tenant, and that is not demanded with unreasonable frequency will probably not constitute such a breach as to justify ending the tenancy, and may well not justify sizable damages in the absence of other breaches. Much will depend on the wording of the lease or rental agreement, and on the practice of the local courts. One might well ask oneself "what actual harm will an inspection with insufficient notice do me" because a court might ask a similar question if an action is brought. If the inspection does cause a problem, then that should be addressed.

In the U.S. this is a notoriously perilous area of the law, particularly because the laws regarding recording vary so much between the states. A good source for this question is the RCFP. To give you an example: In Pennsylvania it is a felony to record "oral communication" in any circumstance in which the speaker would be justified in expecting it to not be recorded. Legally, as soon as you turn on an audio recorder in PA, you had better make sure nobody unaware that you're recording wanders within range of your microphone!

Your lawyer friend is misguided Casual conversation and writing are not subject to any maxims of interpretation - the words mean what the speaker/writer says and what the listener/reader understands and these may be different things. In a conversation about restaurants, there is no implication that the places not mentioned are not restaurants or don't exist. Even if I were to write a published magazine article called "The 10 best restaurants in the world", there is no implication that no other restaurant can possibly be better than those 10. This applies even in business settings. For example, this is the Petbarn logo: It has images of dogs, fish, cats, and birds. By your friend's argument, it would be unlawful for them to sell products for the care of pet snakes or lizards since they aren't on the sign? Or, for that matter, to operate from a building that is not a "barn"? Finally, your friend is wrong even in legal interpretation. There are many ways of contract and legislative interpretation that are or have been in use in every jurisdiction. "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius" is one maxim of interpretation but it may be in conflict with others. For example, if a regulation on aircraft listed various types of aircraft but didn't mention helicopters but nevertheless had an entire section devoted to rotor maintenance the "Rule against surplusage" would require that helicopters be included. In any event, modern courts tend to take a more holistic view to interpretation and the use of individual maxims is optional.

Can't park within 30 ft of a stop sign. Tex Tn Code 545.302 b4. If this is the law they don't need to post a sign. http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/txstatutes/TN/7/C/545/G/545.302

This question is controlled almost entirely by local municipal and county ordinances. It is not a question of federal law that is uniform across the U.S. and in most cases it is not even a question of state law. So, there is no single answer to your question. Most localities regulate this with some combination of hotel specific building codes (usually incorporated by reference from a uniform building code promulgated by a private non-profit organization as a model building code provision) and hotel specific local zoning ordinances.

Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.

The legal position You are quite clearly not running a business and if the matter went to court you could easily prove this be e.g. getting testimony from the people at the party, your testimony etc. In any event, your landlord can’t “fine” you. Fines are a punishment and only government can punish people. They can sue you for breach of contract for damages (which are restitution not punishment) or to seek specific performance. The practical position Take the listing down. Rightly or wrongly, it's souring your relationship with your landlord and their relationship with their HOA. Is having this mildly amusing joke worth damaging these relationships, particularly if you might want to renew your lease? The landlord might feel that they are better off with a tenant who doesn't cause them grief with their HOA. Even if your landlord understands, the HOA might not. If they sue your landlord, they will have very little choice but to join you. Yes, you will almost certainly win your day in court but you will not get reimbursed for the time and effort you had to go to. this includes taking the day off work, subpoenaing all your friends to give testimony etc. Who has time for that crap? Further, whenever you go in front of judge or arbitrator who has the power to force a resolution of your dispute, you are rolling the dice. Sure, you may think you have great evidence and the other sides' is completely bogus but if they present theirs with skill and confidence and you screw yours up then they can walk away with a win. Real court cases depend on who the judge believes. If they believe your landlord's reasonable story about running an illegal bar and they don't believe your crazy tale of it all being a joke - you lose. Remember: free speech can't be restricted but it does have consequences. Further, anyone who bases relationships on legal rights and responsibilities is going to have very shallow relationships.

Why wasn't Trump criminally charged for sexually assaulting E. Jean Carroll? E. Jean Carroll has sued Donald Trump for battery. But battery is also a crime. Is anything known, or can we make any reasonable inferences, about why New York State hasn't charged him for battery?

E. Jean Carroll first sued Donald Trump in 2019 for defamation in connection with his statements in 2019 denying a prior assault upon her in the 1990s in response to her 2019 memoire asserted that he had done so in the 1990s. The statute of limitations in that case ran from the time that Trump made the statement. The first lawsuit is still pending because of issues over whether Presidential immunity from lawsuits applies to it: The Justice Department has argued Trump was acting as the president while responding to Carroll’s allegations and said the United States, rather than Trump himself, should be the defendant. If the courts agree, it would probably torpedo Carroll’s claim because the government cannot be sued for defamation. The issue remains unresolved. The D.C. Court of Appeals heard arguments on the case but essentially punted on the issue this month, sending it to another court. The criminal statute of limitations on this underlying conduct in the 1990s expired long before the lawsuit was filed. She did not press criminal charges at the time. Last year [i.e in 2022], Carroll filed a second lawsuit, this one accusing Trump of battery and defaming her again after he left office. That lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, is the one scheduled to go to trial on Tuesday [i.e. last week]. The suit was filed in November 2022 as a New York law known as the Adult Survivors Act took effect. That law allowed sexual assault victims to sue years later, which proponents said was necessary because it can take considerable time for survivors to feel ready to speak out. All of the factual statements in this answer, including all quotes material, are from an April 24, 2023 article in the Washington Post. As a practical matter, a final resolution of the second lawsuit will resolve essentially all issues in the first lawsuit except Presidential immunity (and arguably a slight amount of damages), under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). A defense verdict from the jury in the pending case would render the Presidential immunity issue in the first case moot. Sources including this one have concluded that the Adult Survivors Act (ASA) is likely to withstand a constitutional challenge. This is because a similar law passed on 2019, the Child Victims Act (CVA), was upheld as constitutional. The ruling in the CVA cases, in turn, relied heavily on a 9-11 related statute of limitations revival act which was upheld by New York State's highest court in 2017: Shortly after the passage of the CVA, lawsuits were filed with the state and federal courts of New York arguing that the CVA was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. Decisions have been rendered in state and federal courts holding that the CVA was constitutional. Both courts relied on the legal standard enumerated by the In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 30 N.Y.3d 377, 400 (2017). which established that for a revival statute to be deemed constitutional under the Due Process Clause, there must exist an identifiable injustice that moved the Legislature to act," and second, "in each case, the Legislature's revival of the plaintiff's claims for a limited period of time was reasonable in light of that injustice."

Charged: yes. Another answer has mentioned incitement to riot in 18 USC 2101. There is also incitement to insurrection in 18 USC 2383. This carries with it upon conviction a prohibition on holding office under the United States, both in the federal law itself and also via Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States. There are laws under which charges could be brought, and there is certainly no impediment to bringing them after M. Trump's term of office ends. Bringing them before then raises questions of presidential immunity, but I strongly doubt that speaking at the start of a "Save America March" can be construed as an action in any official Presidental capacity. Convicted: only maybe. M. Trump's statements have to extend beyond what is protected by Amendment 1 and actually be incitement to insurrection. Although there is a strong case that seeking to kill the Vice President of the United States ("Where's Mike Pence?" as people shouted) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives ("Tell Nancy we're coming for her!"), seeking to obstruct the function of the Congress, and seeking to remove the Electoral College certificates, are indeed insurrection; as possibly is whatever the woman who refused to stop brandishing a knife at the door of the building was intending to do; reading the transcript of the whole speech given at the start of the "Save America March", it is difficult to point to where M. Trump specifically incited any of those things. One can make circumstantial arguments, but the words actually uttered then and there merely encouraged marchers on a "Save America March" to march to the Capitol and cheer people on, "demand" that congresspeople "do the right thing", and "make your voices heard". This is in contrast to M. Trump's son and daughter in law who explicitly mention "fight", "fighter", and "fighting", 7 times by Eric Trump by my count and 4 times by Lara Trump. And of course Rudy Giuliani not only said "fight" but also proposed "trial by combat". In more potential criminal trouble than even them is lawyer and prominent Trump supporter, L. Lin Wood, who explicitly called, without equivocation, several times over a period of days, on Twitter and on Parler, for the Vice President of the United States to be executed by firing squad. There will certainly be mixed fortunes in the Trump family from this. Whilst there may be a case against Eric and Lara, and possibly Donald Sr.; Ivanka Trump did not speak beforehand that I know of, and is reported afterwards to have asked her father to go and speak to the mob about stopping, which she also did directly, albeit ineptly ("American Patriots — any security breach or disrespect to our law enforcement is unacceptable. The violence must stop immediately. Please be peaceful."), herself via Twitter for a short while.

Jan Böhmermann faces prosecution in Germany for violating their penal code section 103 as discussed here. Lèse-majesté is not a crime in the UK, though apparently it was a common law crime in Scotland until 2010 (though not prosecuted since 1715). Though there is always the possibility of a defamation lawsuit, depending on what you say.

Is there something in the language of the act that makes sexual harassment a civil rather than a criminal offence? Yes. Laws that create criminal offenses have to have language to the effect of "violation of this law is punishable by up to X years of imprisonment or a fine of up to $Y", or "violation of this law is a Class Z felony." Sometimes it is not entirely clear if violation of a law can form a basis of a private civil lawsuit, or if it can only be enforced by government officials, from the language of the statute alone. When it is unclear the courts have to resolve that ambiguity. In rare instances, it may be clear that some parts of a statute have criminal penalties, but due to unclear wording and punctuation in the statute, it is hard to tell precisely which parts of the statute these criminal penalties apply to, and in those cases, courts also have to resolve that ambiguity. There is also some conduct that it is constitutional to punish with a civil penalty, but not as a crime that can result in incarceration. For example, it is unconstitutional in most states to incarcerate someone for failing to pay a debt, but there can be a civil penalty for failing to pay a debt. Courts decide if these constitutional limitations are violated. Similarly, while Congress can enact both crimes and civil penalties, there are some governmental bodies, like school districts or water boards, that have the power to enact certain civil penalties, but do not have the authority to create new crimes. Was that up to the lawmakers to decide, or is that just something that evolved out of the ways the courts and prosecutors responded to sexual harassment claims? And who decides such things in general? Generally, this is decided by lawmakers. Obviously, however, anyone can lobby legislators to take one position or another. Also, the fact that something has a civil penalty does not necessarily mean that prosecutors aren't the people who enforce the law. Sometimes violations of the law prosecuted by prosecutors have civil rather than criminal penalties. For example, many tax law violations are prosecuted by government lawyers with civil penalties, but only a small minority of tax law violations are prosecuted criminally. Further, it isn't uncommon for a type of offense, like securities fraud, to have both civil penalties and criminal charges available as remedies that can be enforced by prosecutors. And, when that happens, prosecutors get to decide which tool to use. For example, even if exactly the same conduct could be prosecuted with either a civil penalty or a criminal charge, prosecutors might prefer a civil penalty because the burden of proof is much lower, the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not apply (you can refuse to testify but that fact can be used against you in a civil penalty case), and a defendant in a civil penalty case doesn't have a right to a lawyer at government expense. Also, enforcing a civil penalty generates net revenue for the government most of the time, while criminal punishments normally cost the government more money to carry out than any revenue the government may receive from the person found guilty for fines and court costs. On the other hand, trying to enforce a significant enough civil penalty to discourage misconduct against someone who has no money or property may be a futile effort, while criminal sanctions could discourage misconduct from other similarly situated people in the future.

Embezzlement is criminally prohibited by 18 USC 666, and this DoJ manual page on what is embezzlement cites the answer in Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268 that Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come. It differs from larceny in that the original taking was lawful, or with the consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have existed at the time of the taking Following other case law, the elements of the crime are there was a trust or fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the private organization or State or local government agency; the property came into the possession or care of the defendant by virtue of his/her employment; the defendant's dealings with the property constituted a fraudulent conversion or appropriation of it to his/her own use; and the defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the use of this property. This page lists over 32,000 disbursements; filtering just for rent give over 2,400 disbursements, a number of which are recent and made to some business with Trump in the name (Trump Tower LLC etc). The conversion would have to be fraudulent to be embezzlement. There actually is not any evidence provided that a transfer violated FEC regulations (we have dates, amounts, and recipient), so we would have to speculate about what else is true. There are processed disbursement images up to 10/21/2020 such as this receipt for 3 charges for food and lodging paid to Trump Hotel Collection. In fact this payment was made by Donald J Trump for President, Inc. although the search term was the aforementioned PAC: I will overlook that anomaly. This is the FEC page on that committee (you have to follow the committee number because the name was also used in the 2016 campaign but was terminated). There vast numbers of filings linked there, but nothing that I saw indicates that Trump is in any sense an employee of the organization, so there is no actual evidence that there were any "Trump actions". First, it would have to be shown that there were Trump actions. Second, it would have to be show that the action was fraudulent. Technical misappropriation is not fraudulent. This FEC page describes the safe harbor provisions for misappropriation. This page specifically addresses embezzlement. Although they use the word "embezzlement", they do not purport that misappropriation constituted embezzlement as defined above, to point out that civil penalties may result from violation, see 11 CFR Part 104. Ultimately, the legal propriety of the disbursements depends on its purpose: here is what the FEC say about illegal conversion for personal use (food for daily consumption, mortgage or rent for personal residence, tuition...). The available evidence does not even suggest embezzlement.

In all cases of speech in U.S. Jurisprudence, the speech uttered is presumed First Amendment Protected unless proven otherwise. Critical to this proof is the intent of the speaker and his/her word choice and usage. In order to prove that Trump uttered unprotected speech, the prosecution must show that the language was deliberately spoken by Trump to promote Imminent Lawless Action (Brandenberg v. Ohio). That means that not only must the actions come with a defined time of action, but it also means that you have to prove Mens Rea - that Trump knew in his mind at the time he spoke that the words would incite. Finally, you cannot cherry pick a quote but rather must view the totality of the events in question. Trump did make statements against violence prior to and following the speech in question, which suggests he was not advocating for violent actions taken that day. The word "fight" which does not always mean a violent. Miriam-Webster's definition of "to fight" is: 1 : to struggle in battle or in physical combat. 2 : to argue angrily : quarrel. 3 : to try hard While the first definition of the word does indicate physical violence, but the second and third are possible to do with no violence whatsoever. The concept of fighting for something is often used by people at constitutionally protected protests and gatherings and the use of the term has never been used to convict the speaker for the misinterpretation of the words by the person who hears them. If this were the case, you can expect the Beastie Boys to get slapped with criminal charges for their advocacy of fighting for the right to Party (incidentally, the song never once advocates for violence in the pursuit of wild teen parties... it's merely a list of the restrictions and hypocrisies of the rule makers and enforcers). What's more, Mafia Dons don't normally go down for specific instructions to "kill the mook" but rather for RICO charges. Their whole organization is corrupt and thus they can be held responsible for the corrupt actions of people in their chain of command in the organization. There has yet to be any evidence supporting that Trump knew and participated in the planning of the assault on Congress. Yes, there was planning prior to the events, which means people would have done this without Trump's speech... which means they were not instructed specifically by him at the time. Trump could have said something different and the results would be the same. On top of that... the violence at Congress was started during Trumps speech, not after it... and the place where the speech was given was far enough away from Capitol Hill that it would be difficult to argue that the first wave of rioters even heard the speech let alone were influenced by it. You can believe this was Trumps goal all you want, but the fact of the matter is the law says that Trump does not have to do anything to prove his intent. The burden of proof rests with he who doubts is enforce and in order to prove the speech was unprotected, you have to show clear evidence Trump did intend for the riot to happen.

Yes, because the crimes are different instances. Let's remove the guilty plea and the fact that it is murder: can a person assault a person, be tried and imprisoned, then assault the same person later – and get off by declaring "Double jeopardy!". No, it's not the same crime. It's the same type of crime, and involves the same victim, but it is still a different crime. The same with your proposed scenario. (Incidentally, your first line is wrong: the woman wasn't murdered, she was thought to have been murdered).

The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.

Is it considered a breach of confidentiality if data is uploaded to a website which only makes that data available to the uploader? I'm a developer working at a company that handles sensitive banking information and recently, I've had troubles organising my code and thus posted it in a private repository on Github, which only I can access in any way. A week later, I got a notice from management to delete everything and a general aura of "you messed up" is hanging around me. The only information I'm getting at the moment is "check your contract" which says the following: § 8 Confidentiality The Employee agrees to keep confidentially any business and trade secrets as well as operational matters of a confidential nature which are designated as such by the management in writing or orally or which are apparently recognisable as such, not to make them available to any third parties without the prior approval of the management, and to protect them against unauthorized access. This obligation shall continue even beyond the termination of the employment. To the best of my knowledge, I have respected said clause since I have not made it available to anyone but me. I'm just an intern freshly out of school so I might not fully grasp the details of this. Would uploading the code to GitHub count as making it available to a third party? EDIT : With hindsight, I was totally in the wrong. The code itself was Python/SQL scripts for data analysis and collection but no credentials were stored. While it wasn't a security breach since even with those no data could be accessed, it was not acceptable to store "company owned" code on a 3rd party. We are using Git internally now, so all is well.

Assuming none of these terms are defined elsewhere in the contract: A third party is a party (a person or company) that is neither you nor the other party to the contract (here, presumably the company that hired you). Since GitHub is neither you nor the company, it would therefore be a third party, and thus it would in fact violate that contract as written to upload the company's code there. Keep in mind that GitHub is not an autonomous system with no humans involved; it's run by a company of people, many of whom could theoretically access the code in private repositories. That said, from a practical standpoint, most companies aren't going to fire someone for a mistake made in good faith, especially if actual disclosure to any humans is rather unlikely. However, do remember that we don't know the company's rules, what training you may have received, what exactly you uploaded, or what regulatory/contractual rules they must comply with. Any of that could affect their decision-making, so you should take this as a general answer and use your own judgement when applying it to your situation.

I don't believe GDPR makes a distinction between 'real life' and 'online'. It's all real life. You can tell anyone that they don't have consent to keep your personal data, but that doesn't mean they always have to delete it. There are six lawful bases for processing of personal data, so if an organisation is using and can justify one other than consent then they don't necessarily have to delete your data when they ask. The six bases are listed by the UK Information Commissioner's Office: (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/#ib3

Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG.

Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline.

If you merely provide software for your client to use, you are not processing personal data on behalf of the client. But if you have access to systems that store personal data, then you must consider the GDPR. Or more accurately: your client must consider the GDPR. Under what legal basis can they give you access to the data in these systems? The easiest way to solve this is indeed if you act as the client's processor. Processor status is never the default, but requires a binding contract with the data controller. This contract will require you to only process personal data as explicitly instructed by the client, and may require you to take certain security measures as a precaution. Without such a contract you aren't a data processor, but possibly a data controller of your own (with all the compliance obligations that implies).

Short Answer No. Not everything that is efiled is publicly accessible. Long Answer Most documents are public, but there are default levels of security for different kinds of documents. The e-filing system can support several levels of security. Some kinds of documents can be (and routinely are as a matter of course) sealed by court order following a motion to do so. Also, every time someone efiles a document, the filing party has to certify all required redactions of documents that are efiled have been made before they are filed at the relevant levels of privacy/security. Nonetheless, the amount of information which is publicly disclosed in a bankruptcy is very substantial and far exceeds what would have to be disclosed publicly in a non-bankruptcy context, and exceeds what would have to be disclosed publicly in other kinds of litigation. The exact contours of what is and is not disclosed publicly is quite technical and detailed, and isn't all spelled out in one place. Some of it is in general national efiling rules, some is in local court rules, some is in non-rule efiling procedures, some is in standing court orders of a judge or a particular court, and some is in case specific orders, or is implicit in how the efiling system interface works. Generally speaking, the petition, summaries of finances, motions and responses and replies to them are public, as are court orders, but exhibits to motions and responses and replies are often not public. Impact Of A Recent Breach As a matter of practical reality, all sealed and protected documents on PACER were recently (within the last few months) the subject of a malicious hacking attack that compromised the privacy protections of all of electronically filed documents in the entire federal e-filing system. As security breaches go, it was one of the most epic breaches in the history of the Internet and has been attributed to Russian hackers. The federal courts, including the bankruptcy courts, are currently engaged in temporary work arounds that don't used the efiling system for documents with privacy protections as fixes are prepared and the cause of the breach is evaluated.

You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.

You are right that this is probably a private space; you are wrong in thinking it is your private space; it isn't. The space belongs to your employer and they can do whatever they want with their space unless there is a law that says they can't. As to what type of "hidden surveillance" is allowed that depends on your particular circumstances including what state and federal laws apply and the employment contract you are covered by. As a starting point, if this was happening in Australia then: If you gave permission, all would be legal If you did not give permission: it would be illegal to record anything taking place across a public telecommunications system (i.e. phone tapping) it would be legal for anyone to make an audio recording (not phone tapping) of any conversation to which they were a party it would be legal to make a video recording without sound.

Is there any merit in continuing to fight a trial despite an overwhelming chance of losing and there being no plea deal? For example, if the evidence is overwhelmingly against them and the defendant knows they are guilty and there is no chance for a lesser sentence or a plea deal (happens in certain jurisdictions), is there still any merit to continuing with a trial?

Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called "jury nullification." And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you "roll the dice" there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move.

Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.

While trials don't have a set time, generally the length of a trial is based on its complexity (and to a certain degree, also the gravity of the charge). Simpler cases (e.g. breaking and entering) will generally take less time to hear than more complex cases (e.g. a violation of proper calculation procedure of an SEC mandated income report concerning transfers of capital accrued by partially owned subsidiaries). For example, last year I was called to jury selection for a drunk driving case that was estimated to last 2 days; this year, I was called for jury selection, which took over a week before I was dismissed as a potential jury, for a murder trial that was estimated to last over a month. However, I'm sure that OJ's celebrity did play a role in the length of his trial; if nothing else, then it would have lengthened the jury selection and voir dire process significantly.

How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.

By my understanding you should not be held criminallly liable. In order to be held guilty of a crime the prosecution needs to show the elements of the crime are met. One of these elements is "mens rea" - ie guilty mind/intent. According to your question you lacked intent to commit the crime, so the prosecution can't prove it, so their case must fail. Note that in some places there are "crimes" which are strict liability - I'm ignoring these abominations here, as they are generally a grey area between criminal and civil law where freedom is not at stake and do not seem in the spirit of your question.

It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.

Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.

No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412

Infidelity and child support Lets say hypothetically I got married and had a child. Five years later my wife sleeps with several other men but I don't have proof of this. I wish to attempt to gain full custody of the child, avoid paying child support payments, and avoid paying alimony. So, I have all my assets signed over my brother and all my income goes to my brother. Then, when I need money I request money from time to time from my brother. Is this legal in the United States, in New York State for example? How then would child support, if any, be distributed? This hypothetical case is inspired by and similar to the one mentioned in an article in the Hudson Reporter discussing a divorce of a sports star in Spain who diverted 80% of his income to his mother.

For clarity, in a divorce case in New York State involving children, the judge typically decides: (1) child custody, (2) child support, (3) alimony, (4) division of the couple's property, and (5) allocation of attorney's fees and costs associated with the case. The judge also terminates the marriage if the jurisdictional requirements for doing so are met. In New York State, there is both no fault divorce and fault based divorce, and in a fault based divorce, the judge decides if fault was present. Divorces are handled by the New York State Supreme Court (not, as one might suspect, by the New York State Family Court), which is a trial court of general jurisdiction in New York State. In a fault based divorce, marital fault is considered with regard to issues of property division and alimony, but not with regard to child custody or child support. If you are married and your wife has a child during the marriage, in New York State, you are presumed to be the father of the child. You can bring a lawsuit to prove that you are not the father of the child, but the deadline for doing so is fairly short after the child is born. After five years this statute of limitations would probably have run. But, it sounds like the infidelity is not alleged to have caused the wife to become pregnant, so that isn't really an issue. The extreme levels you would have gone to in order to spite your spouse and your hostility towards her, make it unlikely that the court would award you full custody or joint custody, although it would be required to award you some parenting time so long as you were legally presumed to be the father. If you are legally considered to be a parent of the child, custody will be allocated in the best interests of the child, and child support will be awarded based primarily on your income, your ex-wife's income, and the number of nights that the child spends with each parent. In all likelihood, you would be awarded little parenting time given your conduct and statements, and full custody would be awarded to the wife who would get child support from you based upon your income. (Assets are rarely considered in child support awards.) If you sign assets over to your brother, the court will probably treat you as if you still owned those assets for purposes of property division upon the divorce. If your assets exceed those of your spouse, the court will probably award all remaining assets to your spouse and require you to pay a property equalization payment to your spouse to make up for your inability to pay a full amount to your pre-transfer share of assets to your spouse. If the transfer to your brother took place after the divorce was commenced, the court would probably also hold you in contempt of court and put you in jail. Your transparent efforts to divest yourself of assets, and your unsubstantiated claim of infidelity would not in any way reduce you alimony obligation to your spouse, if under the facts and circumstances, such as the length of the marriage and the relative economic means of the parties, the court finds that an alimony award is appropriate. Unsubstantiated claims of infidelity will only make the court treat you more harshly. Most New York State divorces are no fault divorces in which infidelity is irrelevant, but New York State does have residual fault based divorces which could count against your ex-wife in a variety of ways (although not with respect to child custody or child support). But this is only if you can prove the infidelity in court. In reference to the linked case in Spain, it is worth noting that a New York State divorce judge has much more power and discretion than a Spanish divorce judge. The New York State divorce judge is allowed to equitably divide the couple's property rather than merely adhering to formulaic community property rules, and the New York State divorce judge has contempt of court power which the Spanish divorce judge lacks.

Between your mother and you the bank does not care where the payments come from. If they do not get them, they can sue you, or your mother or (most likely) both of you and they will chase whichever of you has the most money and ultimately repossess the house to satisfy the debt. What matters between you is the contract or deed that you signed with your mother where you documented that you would each pay half of the mortgage. Unfortunately, agreements between family members are presumed not to be contracts. That is, the courts will not get involved to decide how much each of you owe - you have to sort that out for yourselves. A signed agreement will usually overcome that presumption. Other evidence may overcome the presumption - for example, evidence that you split the payments 50/50 for some period of time. Talk to your mother. And a lawyer.

Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.

There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.

The "less wealthy" spouse can spend as much as they want on legal fees. The article is oversimplifying, though. It's not just about wealth, and the order won't necessarily be for all of the legal fees. Look at California's Family Code §2030-2034: 2032 (a) The court may make an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 2030 or 2031 where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties. 2032 (b) In determining what is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances, the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320. Further reading: Maiden, Jan (2001) "Winning By Financial Attrition: A Study of Attorney Fees Under California Family Code Sections 2030 and 2032," California Western Law Review: Vol. 38: No. 1, Article 9. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss1/9 It leads with an example where a party's fees were $115,000 but the party was only awarded $45,000. It also gives an example where a court found that "[e]ven where need is established, if the other spouse does not have the ability to pay, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to impose such an obligation upon one of the destitute parties which will hang as a sword over the obligor".

Indiana Code § 5-2-6.3-3 requires a person charged with a felony to remit 90 percent of any income derived "directly or indirectly from a felony" to the state's crime-victims fund. So if the defendant's crime was not a felony, the law does not purport to have any effect on the mugshot transaction. But even if it was a felony, the law does not actually prohibit the mugshot sale, it merely imposes a tax on transactions related to that offense. But the law is unconstitutional, as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that these "Son of Sam" laws violate the First Amendment: We conclude simply that, in the Son of Sam law, New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income. The State's interest in compensating victims from the fruits of crime is a compelling one, but the Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored to advance that objective. As a result, the statute is inconsistent with the First Amendment. Simon Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991).

Your daughter says of your son: "He hit me." She has made an allegation. Assume that the evidence shows that there is a red mark on her arm, tears and she and her brother were the only two people in the room at the time. This evidence is enough to establish a prima facie case. However, this evidence has not yet been tested. Now, for obvious reasons, we are going to assume that your family operates on an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial model of justice of so it is you who will be doing the testing. You might ask for a statement of the fact from your son. This will almost certainly contradict the evidence of your daughter because ... siblings. Assume that your son says they were arguing over a controller and that your daughter threw it at his head, he ducked and it bounced off the wall and struck her in the arm. So now you might cross-examine both the plaintiff and defendant to try to find any inconsistencies or other reasons to doubt their testimony. Or you might examine the controller for evidence of it being smashed into a thousand very expensive pieces. At the end of this process, you may prefer your daughter's version over your son's: if so, your daughter has met her burden of proof and is entitled to whatever remedy your Solomonic wisdom decrees. However, if you prefer your son's or find them equally plausible then she hasn't and justice requires a remedy in the other direction. This is because it was your daughter who had the burden of proof throughout. However, assume instead you son said: "I hit her but she hit me first". Well now he has admitted to the alleged facts and your daughter's burden is met but he is raising an affirmative defense ("I did it, but ...") rather than a negating defense ("I never did!"). The onus has now shifted to him to demonstrate the required elements of self-defense. Of course, unlike in the public legal system, self-defense is generally not a total defense withing a familial legal system and the best he can hope to do is mitigate the punishment and, vitally important in the interests of justice for children, ensure his sister gets punished too; because vengeance is more important than mercy.

Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first.

Bait and switch - written vs oral obligation A company is advertising a sale stating that I will receive a discount site wide for 50% off. A hyperlink to the sale clearly shows the sale applies to all available products, further in each one of those products available durations (ex. 1,3 and annual). Finally, by clicking on a link I can take advantage of that sale as advertised (vs having to call and talk to someone). After the purchase, I have access to the product, I receive a receipt and other information clearly showing the sale is valid and final. That being said... I call the same company prior to purchasing the product via the advertised sale link. A representative from that company verbally states the sale is really only available annually and not any other time frame (I'm not sure if it matters but he did not ask me to not purchase because of the error). The call ends, and I go ahead and purchase the product using the sale price (I took screenshots of the advertisement and the company's website showing the sale). He calls me the next day and said that the purchase was done behind his back and that he told me it was only available annually. Therefore the advertised terms are not valid and his statement is. Am I wrong or is what he saying will hold water? Can they just change their mind (I can't find any disclaimers) From what I've described is all of this bordering on false advertising? I'm doing research to find a case as well. If someone has a case similar please let me know. PS We are in different states.

Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price.

I very much suspect she is in right to 1) no receive promotion emails anymore, 2) Have them close the account again and 3) have them delete her pictures. No, she does not have those rights. She agreed to a legally binding contract when she signed up for the service when she clicked "OK" to open the account. That contract outlines her "rights," as you call them, and they can be very different from what you assume to be ethical and moral bounds to a business relationship. What you imagine to be fair business practices could be generally regarded as fair and normal consumer relations; but that's not necessarily what may be in the contract. What she agreed to in the Terms of Service (TOS) could be some form of long term licensing of her photos to the service, and that could be why they won't delete the photos and why she can't delete them in bulk. The TOS states the terms of the promo emails she agreed to receive. Read the TOS; everything will be outlined. The company is in no way obligated to make life easy for her or change the contract to appeal to her; she agreed to everything, including downloading all her photos. If she didn't read the TOS and feels they copied all her photos "without her knowing", that's her fault. It's possible that the company is breaking consumer protection laws with some of their practices, but you'll need to read Canada consumer laws and see if they require ease of use, permanent op-out of emails, etc. I doubt the company would be flagrantly violating consumer law.

Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion.

Fair use is always a fact-driven issue, and the details matter. That said, copying a single ad in order to criticism the ad, or comment on it, is very likely to be found to be fair use. If only a section of the ad were shown, to illuminate the point being made, that would make a fair use holding more likely. Or if the entire ad was shown in low resolution's for context, and a detail shown in higher resolution, that would also help. Such an ad is largely factual, not creative in the way that a work of fiction or fine art is, which leans toward fair use. Such a reproduction of the ad will not serve as a replacement, nor harm the market for the ad, which leans toward fair use. The use seems to be transformative, which leans significantly toward fair use. If the whole ad is shown that leans somewhat against fair use, but that does not prevent the use being held to be fair use. As for trademark protection, that is not likely to be an issue. Trademarks are protected against being used in trade (also known as "in commerce") without permission. This means using the mark to label, identify, or advertise a product or service of the same general type as the product the mark is properly associated with. Using the mark, or a similar mark, in such a way that people are likely to be confused into thinking that a product or service came from the same source as the mark, or approved, endorsed or sponsored by the mark owner, is usually infringement. Using the mark to discuss the product or service, and in particular using it as the name of the product or service, is nominative use. Nominative use is not infringement. Using an ad that includes trademarks to discuss the associated product is a form of nominative use.

...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on.

In such a case the person who bypasses the terms knows that use of the site is conditioned on agreement to the terms, and has taken an explicit action to continue past the terms and use the site. I suspect that if a dispute were to arise where this is relevant, it would be held that taking such action was legally equivalent to clicking "I agree". But I don't know of any court case on this point, and i can't be sure what a court would do. If having intentionally bypassed the terms, such a person tried to raise his or her lack of consent to the terms as a defense to some obligation imposed by those terms, such equitable concepts as "unclean hands" and estoppel might be raised, since such a person, in effect, leads the other party, the site owner, to believe that s/he has accepted the terms, I suspect that such a person will be treated as having accepted them. If this becomes at all common, I suppose that the designers of such sites will in future store a record of such consent being given, and not allow the user to proceed unless it has been.

Written promise pre-purchase vs signed agreement, what's stronger? The signed agreement is decisive because it "states that it supersedes any previous agreements". The language portrays that the customer no longer considers the refund option a requirement for moving forward with the transaction. Signing that contract without the right to a refund releases the supplier from having to do good on his previous promise. what about false advertising? There is no false advertising. False advertisement is the supplier's act, whereas the subsequent waiver --by signing the agreement-- is the customer's act. The fact that the customer's informed decision benefits the supplier has nothing to do with false advertising.

As described, this may be a form of illegal bait-and-switch advertising, but not breach of contract. The contract states the specific vehicle to be sold, which does not match the test-driven car. If the dealer had listed the better car's VIN in the contract but supplied a different car, that would be breach of contract. Whether it is illegal advertisement depends on the representations and disclaimers made by the dealer. To the extent that the dealer supplied indications that there was a difference between the test model and the purchase model, or to the extent that the customer should have known that the test car had features not found in the specific model that the customer believed he was buying and paying for, the dealer was being non-deceptive. To the extent that the dealer holds that selling model X instead of model Y is an "honest mistake" on their part, the dealer was being deceptive (or, was plainly in breach of contract). It's hard to see what "honest mistake" the dealer might have made, but perhaps the mistake was "not being clearer to the customer that they had test-driven a fancier model, not the one that they were actually buying". The customer's attorney could pursue this matter and either get the better car, or get a better financial deal, but it really hinges on who said / wrote what (and has a more believable story about what was said).

Are there any repercussions for my landlord having us sign the wrong lease? When we moved in to our current house our landlord said our lease would be a year to year lease. We recently found out that they are selling the building and our housing situation isn't concrete anymore because it turns out our lease is a month to month instead. We asked the landlord to fix the issue and send us a new lease to sign but they are refusing to do so. Is there anything we can do about this situation?

You signed the lease In general, this is definitive of your intention to have a month-to-month lease. Any correspondence that you have prior to you signing that you wanted or even agreed on a yearly lease is only evidence that such things formed part of the negotiations but, for whatever reasons, what was ultimately agreed was a month-to-month lease. If you can prove misrepresentation you might be able to get what you want but the usual remedy is recission (ending) of the contract, not a change to the contract. However, given that the type of lease is such a fundamental feature and is usually prominent on the document, proving you were misled rather than agreeing to a month-by-month lease will be difficult.

There's good information at https://www.gov.uk/private-renting-tenancy-agreements/your-landlord-wants-to-end-your-tenancy. There are several types of tenancy with different rules, but in all of them, the landlord has to give you a certain amount of notice to move out, and it has to give a specific date. "Three months from when a buyer is found" doesn't seem to fit that, so I would say you have not yet received formal notice to move out. This statement may have just been a courtesy to give you more advance warning. So for instance, if you are in a tenancy that requires two months notice, the landlord may have intended this to mean "I plan to send you formal notice about one month after a buyer is found." Of course, this is not binding; he could send you formal notice tomorrow if he changes his mind. As far as I know, the sale of the house is really irrelevant in all of this. You don't automatically have to move out just because the house is sold; if you're not explicitly told to leave (with appropriate notice) then you don't have to, and you'll just start paying your rent to the new landlord. If you have a fixed-term tenancy, then the sale of the house doesn't shorten it. I am not sure what the point is of getting angry at the estate agents. Your tenancy is a matter between you and your landlord, and the estate agents have nothing to do with it. They work for your landlord, not for you.

The Supply of Goods and Services Act doesn't apply here. Section 1(1) says that the only contracts concerning goods covered by the Act are those 'under which one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another the property in goods'. A lease doesn't transfer the cooker to you: it gives you exclusive possession of a dwelling containing the cooker. The cooker remains the property of the landlord. Assuming that your lease is for fewer than seven years, the statutory provision for a landlord's repair obligations is set out in s11 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Unfortunately this does not help you: although the landlord is responsible for maintaining the gas and electricity supply equipment, the Act specifically excludes 'appliances for making use of the supply of ... gas or electricity'. The text of your lease may have specific provisions for the repair and upkeep of the cooker, so you should read it carefully and seek advice if you are unsure. Most landlords will leave copies of the instruction manuals for installed appliances. You should ask for a copy of the manual if one was not provided and can't be found in the flat. In practical terms, you should report the fault in writing to the landlord (or managing agent if you have one), saying that you are unable to use the cooker and that it is a potential danger given that you don't understand how it works. At the very least, you should ensure that the condition of the cooker is reflected correctly on your inventory.

No, for two reasons. First, your question seems to assume that the current level of (1) vacancy, and (2) rent, will continue unchanged for the indefinite future. A lot of people thought that in 1989, and 2000, and 2007, just before the last three Bay Area housing crashes. The purpose of a long-term lease is to create certainty for the lessor. As the lessee, you are on the hook for whatever damages you cause by breaking the lease. As you say, right now, the complex will probably be able to mitigate fairly easily. That will change next time the market crashes. If you break the lease, you're gambling that it's still 1987...but there's a chance it's 1989 instead. If it is, you are on the hook, because the landlord exchanged a lower rent for certainty. Second, you're thinking about what the landlord will be able to prove in court. This is almost never the most helpful thing to be thinking in a situation like this. If you get to the point where your lawyer is having to stand up in court and argue about the reasonableness of the landlord's efforts, you've already spent more than two weeks' rent (even at Bay Area prices) paying the lawyer. Realistically, if the landlord says it took six weeks to rent, and sends you a bill for six weeks, the cheapest thing for you to do will, probably, be to pay it.

Of course she is living with you. Clothes, toothbrush, cooking and eating, sleeping, I suppose breakfast as well, that's living with you. And it's not illegal, but it is apparently in breach of your leasing contract. I'd study your contract carefully to see what the consequences are if she is living for you for more than 14 days.

It depends on whether the lease requires it. If the lease requires you to have renter's insurance, you have to have renter's insurance. If it requires you to have a specific company's renter's insurance, you have to have the specific company's renter's insurance. If you don't do that, you have violated the terms of the lease and can typically be evicted. If you comply with the terms of the lease by having some renter's insurance and they still want you to have a specific brand of insurance, you have not violated the terms of the lease, and you cannot be evicted for such. They cannot "bill you" just because they want to change the terms of the lease -- that requires your agreement, or they can unilaterally change the lease terms at the end of the current period. The same goes for package service (I don't even understand what a monthly package service charge would mean).

There are some consequences for you, under the Seattle Residential Code. Per R103.5 Any person violating or failing to comply with the provisions of this code shall be subject to a cumulative civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per day for each violation from the date the violation occurs or begins until compliance is achieved. $182,500 per year. Also under R103.4, Whenever any building or structure is being occupied contrary to the provisions of this code, the building official may order such occupancy discontinued and the building or structure, or portion thereof, vacated by notice. There should be a notation on your panel indicating permit number and approval, but if you have the permit number, you can check if the inspection was done and the work was approved (I think this will report status). The legal burden of assuring that the work was done correctly and paperwork is in order ultimately falls on the owner, though the city at least initially talks to the contractor. Insofar as a customer taking a picture doesn't count as an actual final inspection, I suspect that some cost- and time-saving short-cuts were taken. Following up on the new information about being a tenant, the primary legal question is whether you have a duty of care towards the landlord, since in engaging this company, the landlord's interest may be put at risk. The landlord may have protected his interest via a clause in the lease saying "you must get written permission to modify the property, and you assume full liability for resulting damages", so first thing to check is what the lease says (perhaps look for a "Tenant's duty of care" clause). In lieu of clear evidence that you caused damage to the owner (economic damage, by negligence w.r.t. his need to have proper permits and the whopping fines that follow), I don't see what the risk to you would be in just washing your hands of the problem.

In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction.

If I buy a domain, do I need to create an LLC? So, I want to create a name and buy a domain for a website to use currently. However, in the future I would like it to be a business so that way I can self-publish. Do I need to create an LLC if I already own the domain? Can someone legally create an LLC with the same name as my domain? Just trying to understand what the difference is between an LLC and a business

Do I need to create an LLC if I already own the domain? No. Can someone legally create an LLC with the same name as my domain? Yes. Just trying to understand what the difference is between an LLC and a business An LLC, a "limited liability company," is a kind of legal entity that has a separate identity from the members of the LLC. The members' liability is limited with respect to the company's liability, hence the name. A business is a commercial activity. The two concepts are independent. A person can have a business without forming a corporation, or indeed many businesses. A single corporation can also have many businesses. Back to the question about someone forming an LLC using your domain name, this raises the issue of trademark protection. In the US, at least, you can't register a trademark unless it is "in use in commerce" (15 USC 1051(a)(3)(C)), which means explicitly that you cannot use the mark "merely to reserve a right in" it (15 USC 1127). But there are many subtleties of trademark protection that are widely misunderstood by most people, so if you anticipate wanting trademark protection for a name, you will probably want to learn about how trademark protection works and likely talk to a trademark lawyer.

If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here.

I wouldn't be surprised to see other states and jurisdictions with similar statutes. Fortunately, in the United States, there is a safe harbor against demands for state income taxes: For every dollar of taxable income, you can only be taxed by one state. (This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.) Therefore, if you show that the LLC (or its members if it's a pass-through) paid taxes to another state on the income in question (e.g., by sending a copy of the tax return), that's legally the end of the matter.

It depends How good is your (legal) English? For example, do you know the legal difference between "will", "shall" and "must"? Or, the difference between "employee", "subcontractor" and "worker"? Or the difference between "bankruptcy", "insolvency" and an "act of bankruptcy"? Contingency What are you going to put in your dispute resolution clause? Do you prefer mediation, arbitration or litigation? Will it be a one size fits all or will it be escalating? What happens if one of you dies? Or emigrates? Or divorces? Or is convicted of a crime? A financial crime? A violent crime? A sexual crime? Or what if such is just alleged but not proven? What happens if the company ceases to exist? Or is sued? Or is acquired by someone else? Or by one of you? Who is responsible for insuring the subject matter of the contract (if anyone)? To what value? If the person who should doesn't can the other person effect the insurance and claim the premium as a debt due and payable? Not all of these will be relevant to your contract. Familiarity How familiar are you with this sort of contract? Is this something you do all the time or is this a one off? For example, I am happy to enter a construction contract without legal advice because that's my business and has been for many years - I know my risks and how to manage them, inside and outside the contract. However, when I set up shareholder's agreements, wills and business continuation insurance with my partners, we went to a lawyer. What is your relationship with the other person i.e. how much do you know and trust them? Stakes If the contract is not very important (which is something that varies with the participants, for some people a million dollar contract is not important for others a $5 one is), so that if, by screwing up, you are OK if you lose everything you've staked then write it yourself. Alternatively, if the contract is vitally important to you and your heirs and assignees unto the 6th generation, I'd get a lawyer to write it - its pretty cheap insurance. How long the contract lasts will be a factor in this - a contract that exposes you to risk for 3 months is different than one that does so for 25 years. Basically, its a risk reward calculation. TL;DR Contracts only matter when relationships break down. If you reach for the contract then you can expect that the other party will be playing for keeps and that contract is your only defense against the worst they can do. If you are happy with your skills in mitigating against a cashed-up opponent who wants to see you go down no matter the cost then draft it yourself.

A web site's Terms of Service are not a contract but, rather, a license. law.washington.edu has an interesting discussion of contracts vs. licenses and asks the question, "Does it matter?" In the case of a web site, the owner of the web site is granting you a license, subject to certain terms, to access the web site and use it. No consideration is required for a license. From the linked article, which discusses copyright, "In the context of copyright law, a 'license' is a permission to do an act that, without the permission, would be unlawful." In the case of a web site's terms and conditions, the owner is granting permission to you to access and use the web site subject to the terms of the license. Typically, such a license will require you to release any liability that may accrue because of your use of the site. The Stack Exchange license, in fact, grants certain permissions related to copyright, "Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content." The Stack Exchange license also places requirements on those who contribute to discussion including a requirement to "perpetually and irrevocably [license] to Stack Exchange" anything we post. In this case, by pressing the "Post Your Answer" question, I have agreed to license my creation, this answer, to Stack Exchange.

Fairly easily. You want to use their API. They give you the conditions for using it. As long as their conditions aren't illegal or unreasonable, you need to adhere to them to use their API. Is it illegal to not include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name? Almost certainly not. Is it an unreasonable term? Almost certainly not. If you want to include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name, you can try - but you can't then use their API.

I doubt that they are legally required to get your VAT as a condition of registration. However, they are a private company, and they are allowed to attach almost any restriction they want to registration. It is more likely that they require your VAT for some of the business interactions that they expect will happen after you register for the site and have decided to make it a condition of registration.

No, you cannot ever legally use copyrighted property without a valid license from the copyright owner. It is understandable that when government restrictions prevent people from licensing intellectual property, people will turn to piracy and black markets to obtain them. However, whenever you find yourself in a region where you can legally license the property, you are (presumably) also in a region where intellectual property rights are respected, and it is illegal to use the property without a proper license from the owner. I.e., the fact that you paid a pirate for a copy – even where that was the only option to obtain one – does not give you a license. You have to obtain a license from the owner.

I have found my email address online in a .txt file. What should be my next step? A few days ago someone tried to log into my bank account, the attempt was unsuccessful but it was quite concerning. I’ve spent the past weekend moving my most important accounts to alternate emails and setting up TFA everywhere. I plan to get rid of my old email altogether since it was also used to sign up for some random websites and newsletters in the past weeks. As a part of the clean up I’ve run a Google search for my email and found a .txt file online with my email and thousands of others. They were categorised as valid/invalid. The site was since taken down but I have screenshots. I live in the E.U. and I’ve been thinking about a GDPR or a police report. The website owner was really easy to find and lives in the same country as me. What should be a next step?

Just the email in such a list is annoying but not really concerning. There are millions of people who put their email into publicly available contact data, and after a couple of years of use any email is going to be exposed some way. That's why websites use passwords in addition to just the email and why mail programs have spam filters. Your email was probably not used to sign up anywhere. Instead, spammers pretend that you signed up to slow attempts to prosecute them. A bit of a joke, really, considering how hard it is to prosecute spammers. The valid/invalid remark is used to facilitate spamming, no need to send mails to long-inactive addresses. More concerning than a 'leak' of your email would be a leak of your email plus password. (Such things also happen, and they are a reason why one should use different passwords and 2FA/MFA on important sites.) If it is just the email, see my first bullet point. There is a significant likelihood that the 'website owner' you think you identified is another victim of the address trader. Getting to the real culprit will require significant forensic effort. That effort is unlikely to happen for just emails.

there was absolutely nothing in the letter. You could hold it up to the sunlight and see that it was empty. There is no legal reason to do this. Somebody screwed up. Office workers are not infallible. It happens. I've seen government officials with no grudge against my client do it too now and then. Taken together with the spelling errors in your name it reflects general administrative incompetence and not some nefarious plot. The cautious thing to do would be to call them and tell them that you got a misaddressed letter with nothing inside it. A judge might frown at your conduct if you had some inkling they were trying to communicate with you and did nothing. Save the empty envelope to prove that they didn't send you a security deposit letter as they claimed if there is a dispute or litigation down the road.

I know that I have to provide detailed information which data I save and how I use it. Yes, you should, if you are getting access to users' Dropbox accounts, which will contain all sorts of private data, copyrighted (and illegally copied copyrighted files), etc. You provide the detailed information to your users through a click-through Privacy Policy - TOS (Terms of Service) in your App, like any other App out there. Click wrap (Wikipedia) user agreements are legally binding in many jurisdictions. Even if you don't access files and information - such as personal information or files - you still need a clear TOS for your App, for both your users' and your own legal protection. But I am a poor student who don't want invest money into a lawyer to write me a privacy policy ... I do not plan to get paid for (this app)... Being a free or paid App doesn't make a difference when it comes to the TOS, if you need one, and if you need to pay for one to be drafted. But not investing money in a lawyer can be a critical mistake if your App will be distributed on the popular App directories like Google Play and iTunes and your TOS does not clearly and legally outline all possible usage and data polices. Lawyers have experience in covering all the bases. Is there any way I can do this privacy policy on my own? Sure, you can: https://www.google.com/search?q=privacy+policy+generator But you run considerable legal liability not having a TOS that correctly and legally addresses all users' privacy concerns and clearly outlines what you do to insure security. That's what lawyers are for. Is it possible to just create some “I save all your data“ policy which would of course be to much but it would include all data I save and so I would not miss anything in my policy? Sure, you can simply say I save all your data. But how can you be sure that you've haven't missed important policy details and scenarios that could result in legal action against you? Like how long do you save data? When will you delete it? How secure is it? Can the user ask for deletion? What happens if you get hacked? What about users in countries other than the US? Users under 18 years old? You must use arbitration for any disputes? And on and on. The considerable legal liability of using a non-professionally drafted TOS means you run the risk of getting sued. You have to decide if it is worth the risk.

So I suppose we basically need to disclose the exact geolocation of the datacenters that store this kind of content. That is incorrect. You need to identify a place of business where federal investigators may inspect the records without first making an appointment for access. The location of cloud storage is not particularly relevant. is it possible in any way to achieve compliance with 18 USC 2257A while using Google Cloud Storage (Or perhaps any other cloud storage service)? Yes. You must store the records as required by the statute and by the regulations issued under the authority of that statute, 28 CFR Part 75. I only scanned the regulations, but it seems that the "location" of the records is the place where they are available for inspection, not necessarily the place where digital files are stored. (The regulations also provide that you may indeed keep the records in digital form.) But consider, for example, what would happen if the FBI came knocking for an inspection and a local utility company accidentally severed the fiber cable on the next block. Such a network outage happened at my company a few years ago, and the incident disabled all of our redundant networking, so we had no internet access whatsoever for several hours. The investigators would probably tolerate such a disruption, but it is probably better to have a copy on site in addition to any off-site copies you might have. Regardless, you should hire a lawyer with relevant experience, because you need advice from someone who can find out whether there has been any litigation that may have a bearing on your rights and obligations, and you should find out what state and local law have to say about this, if anything. This is a criminal statute, and trying to protect yourself from criminal liability without qualified legal advice is quite possibly going to leave you vulnerable.

It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR

You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.

Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.

I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).

What effect does the coronation have after accession had already taken place upon the predecessor’s passing? Does it have any actual consequence on the state of affairs for the monarch?

Other than the oath (see the Coronation Oath Act), nothing at the ceremony has any legal significance. The coronation is a "symbolic formality." The reign begins at the moment of the preceding monarch's death. The Coronation Oath, in which the monarch swears to govern the peoples of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth Realms “according to their respective laws and customs” is the only aspect of the ceremony which is required by law. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9412/

Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.

Any country can certainly decide who it should grant citizenship status to. There is no international rule that I know of requiring that the recipient be currently a resident of the country granting citizenship. Any country may issue passports to its citizens.

I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.

I think the key word here is "assume". A person, N, who is clearly the next of kin of a recently deceased person D may not assume that s/he is D's sole heir, or indeed is D's heir at all. N must wait until D's will (if any) is known, and an executor or administrator is lawfully appointed. Only the executor may lawfully dispose of D's property, by conveying it to specified beneficiaries, selling it, giving it away, or by any other means. Anyone who does so without the proper executor's authority is probably technically guilty of theft, although in a case like the one in the question, a prosecution would be very unlikely. But N would be liable to any heir H for the value of items properly left to H but disposed of by N. H might not choose to pursue such a claim, but would be legally able to. N should remember that the value, monetary or sentimental, of objects may not be known to N, and may be much greater to H than N is aware of. I suppose that in the case of objects of slight value which must be dealt with promptly, such as perishable food on D's premises, reasonable steps would not be objected to.

What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.

The Magna Carta acted as an origin of many legal concepts of today, includng the English, and thus US, common law system. It clearly affected the Founders' views of government and was instrumental in creation of the US constitution. But no provision of the Magna Carta would be considered on its own to be valid US law.

Once a person is sworn in as POTUS, there are only two legal mechanisms for involuntary removal of that person from the office: Article II Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides only that: The President ... shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The 25th Amendment was passed to establish clear procedures of official succession. Its Section 4 also provides an elaborate mechanism whereby "the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" can precipitate a process that would allow Congress, within 21 days, to transfer the office to the Vice President. Otherwise, there is no contemplation in the law of a "backsies" mechanism for removing a person from the office because "it should have gone to someone else." (The idea that a person who was in the designated line of succession, but in the wrong order, was sworn into office does not seem nearly as problematic as other events that have happened in real history. For example, in the 2000 Presidential Election it was conceivable – and some people probably maintain in fact – that the "loser" of the election would be sworn into office. The U.S. Supreme Court settled the legal questions before the inauguration. However, the realization at the time was that any legal challenges or decisions after that date would be moot, because "election error" is not a cause to remove a sitting U.S. President.) The question of a previous President reappearing, and his successor refusing to cede the office, takes us to the height of speculation. In this case I would merely note that I can find no law pertaining to Presidential Transition in which an outgoing President is "stripped of authority" or "removed from office." Rather, the acting POTUS is effectively the most recent person sworn to the office, and not removed from it.

Asked in court about something you are not allowed to answer Say you own a company in the USA that offers services via the internet. I read that in some situations, you are required to give personal data of a user to the US government and you are not allowed to tell anyone. Now what happens if you are witness in a trial and questioned about this? If you say you never gave user data to the government, you lie. If you say you are not allowed to answer, then it is clear that you did. Or is such a question inadmissible in the first place?

National security letters can compel the production of some kinds of (non-"content") user data, and (according to Wikipedia) typically contain a nondisclosure requirement forbidding the recipient of the letter from disclosing it. I assume that a witness has received and complied with a national security letter, and a non-government party wants to ask the witness questions which outside the courtroom, the witness would be forbidden to answer by the national security letter. The witness, or the government if represented in the lawsuit in question, may object to the questions. The purpose which justifies the secrecy requirements of a national security letter is also likely to justify the exercise of state secrets privilege. If the judge thinks a statute might otherwise be violated, they might intervene in the absence of any objection, or consider alternative remedies like an in camera hearing. If the court does not intervene to prevent the evidence being given, and the witness is charged with breaching the secrecy law, this would raise complex questions about the interpretation of the law imposing criminal penalties. The common law doctrine of absolute privilege for witnesses giving evidence in judicial proceedings applies in the United States, and could be raised in defence to any criminal charges.

No Voluntary disclosure, even accidental, by the client ends privilege. The information may still be confidential (inadmissible) if it happened in the appropriate circumstances, for example, as part of a mediation. Edit A recent decision of the High Court of Australia has determined that a litigant can use material that comes into its possession that would have attracted privilege irrespective of how this happens. In that case, the law firm was hacked by an unknown party, the information was given to a journalist and published and the litigant wanted to use it in their case - they were allowed to do so. The court decided that privilege is not a legal right that could found a course of action. Basically, it only prevents the compulsory production of such information - it doesn't protect the information itself.

The court should not compel the witness to disclose the information because there is a state secrets privilege which bars disclosure of governmental secrets in litigation. An interlocutory appeal of some sort would generally be permitted in cases where the privilege is not honored, and typically, the federal government would become an intervenor in the litigation with respect to that issue. Not infrequently, the state secrets privilege will prevent a matter from being litigated at all, rather than merely preventing the admission of evidence, or requiring that the matter be resolved in a sealed secret bench trial. For example, spies cannot sue the government for not being paid for spying as a result of the state secrets privilege. Similarly, someone who suffers a personal injury arising from a covert operation can not sue the government for that injury.

Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.

Generally they don't. If the conversation was made while there was a third person present, the person can be a witness at trial. Unless the witness is impeached, the witness's statement may be sufficient for you to meet your burden of proof to show the statement was made, because the burden is just a preponderance of evidence in most civil cases. Note that, the existence of a statement is not sufficient to prove breach of privacy. The context surrounding the statement is important. If you intend to record communications from the landlord in the future, please check with your jurisdiction's laws regarding recording of communications. Many jurisdictions (such as California) only permit a private communication to be recorded when all parties give consent. Not only an illegally recorded conversation is inadmissible as evidence (with the exception to rebut a witness), it is also a crime to do so. Some other jurisdictions in USA allows one party to record the conversation without obtaining consent from the other party.

Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46".

Attorney-client privilege is normally waived if a privileged communication is voluntarily disclosed. Submission of an attorney-client privileged document to a judge to review in camera does not waive the attorney-client privilege. Most of the case law involves inadvertent "oops" style disclosures of attorney-client privileged documents (keep in mind that big lawsuits often involve exchanges of terabytes of data that have to be reviewed page by page for attorney-client privileged materials by armies of junior lawyers and paralegals, so mistakes are inevitably made now and then), which is a somewhat convoluted area of law. Basically, if it is caught soon enough, the person accidentally receiving it can be ordered to not look at it any more and to destroy it without keeping copies if it remains within an accidental recipient law firm or government agency's possession and has not been further disseminated into public records yet. In particular, such documents can't be presented as evidence at trial if the mistake is caught before it is too late to correct the mistake. In those cases, the legal system does its best to pretend that the mistaken disclosure of attorney-client privileged materials never happened.

Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR.

Is there any chance for a parent to get a joint custody without a legal status in the U.S.? Jan 2020 - I came from Outside of U.S. (foreign citizen) on a fiancee visa. Mar 2020 - I married my ex-wife (she is a U.S. citizen). Sep 2020 - I got my 2 year temporary green card. Mar 2021 - Our daughter was born. May 2021 - We decided to divorce. She is the plaintiff. Jun 2021 - The divorce is finalized. She is the primary custodian. May 2022 - I applied to remove the conditional status from my green card. It was 3 months before the expiration. My application is still pending. I am worried that they might suspect as if there is immigration fraud or something. What is they want to take me to the deportation court or something. I was thinking to get a joint custody of our daughter. Do I have a chance? Or do I need to be able to provide a Legal Residence Status? Is my current status considered to be a Legal Status? Will the judge think it’s unstable status? I live in Arkansas. If possible to provide an answer with link to some official .gov references.

Yes. Citizenship and immigration status are not factors that are expressly considered under Arkansas law in an award of joint custody. See Arkansas Code Section 9-13-101. This is discussed in a previous answer is here.

Are the reasons (mom can't stay because of covid-19 and the son is too young to live by himself) legally justifiable reasons? Unfortunately, not in this case. The landlord can prevail by arguing that the mom, insofar as a holder of a non-immigrant visa, knew or should have known of the risks of being denied entry in the US. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 154 (a) & (b), the mom is the "Party [who] Bears the Risk of a Mistake". Since the risks of which the mom was aware include even arbitrary ones such as the USCIS officer's discretion, an allegation of "supervening circumstances" as per the coronavirus crisis is very unlikely to add any merit to the mom's legal position. Is the 8 months compensate reasonable? Although this is admittedly subjective, at first glance it appears reasonable or perhaps even generous (the landlord is proposing the midpoint: half of the remaining 16 months) considering that the landlord is entitled to the completion of the lease. The "8 months as compensation" is essentially the landlord's proposal to settle his otherwise viable claim of breach of contract. You as lease holders can always attempt to negotiate and make alternative proposals, which is what you are doing already. Here, the landlord seeks to obviate court proceedings that can be a drag for both him and especially for the mom because she would be unable even to present her arguments in court and/or quasi-judicial proceedings. A settlement would benefit the landlord also from the standpoint that he would no longer be required to prove mitigation of damages (if that is a requirement in his jurisdiction). And, unless the settlement provides otherwise, the landlord would be free to immediately re-rent the unit without having to reimburse the mom (or the person(s) whose name is in the lease). That being said, it is important for the lease holder(s) to secure in writing (specifically in the settlement document) a statement from the landlord in the sense that, by virtue of the agreed compensation, the landlord waives any and all claims related to the early termination of the lease. It is always smart to be cautious and preclude the landlord from eventually bringing a claim alleging that the agreed compensation was for something else or that it did not fully settle the controversy(-ies).

Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).

Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly "no", as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law.

Iowa law that is relevant to custody is here. At no point is a child prohibited from expressing his wishes to a judge. §598.41 prescribes how the court determine custody. Para 3(f) specifically includes Whether the custody arrangement is in accord with the child’s wishes or whether the child has strong opposition, taking into consideration the child’s age and maturity. This would have been the case at the initial custody hearing, and any petition to modify custody. There is no rule setting a lowest age for considering a child's wishes, but there may be a tendency to consider "teenager" as potentially old enough. A custody arrangement can be modified, but the petitioning parent has to show that there has been a “substantial and material change in circumstances” since the initial decree. But let's assume that the parents have joint custody, then none of that applies and you live where your parents agree you should live. You don;t have legal standing to petition for a change of custody, but you might (if there is a good enough reason) succeed on a petition for emancipation when you are 16.

Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the United States? Yes. There would need to be first, a legal establishment of paternity if that is not already in place, and then an application to a court for a child support order. The question of whether one should proceed in a U.S. court or a Brazilian court is a tactical one that would be evaluated based upon the circumstances by the lawyers involved in doing so. Generally, that would open the door to child custody proceedings as well in the same, or a parallel case.

In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.

If you falsely claim to be a US citizen in order to obtain work, vote in a US election, or receive public benefits in the United States, you can be deported, lose a green card, or be banned from ever obtaining a green card or US Visa. See https://dyanwilliamslaw.com/2015/02/why-lying-about-being-a-u-s-citizen-can-stop-you-from-becoming-a-permanent-resident-and-what-you-can-do-to-overcome-this-obstacle/ and https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-falsely-claiming-us-citizen-can-deportable.html for more detail. This very much includes checking an incorrect box on an I-9 form when obtaining a job, although that is not usually considered a "benefit". In fact incorrect I-9 statements are a common source of such bans. However, if a person lies in response to a merely curious question, when no government or private benefit, and no job eligibility is involved, the ban should not, as far as I can see, come into effect, nor should that be grounds for deportation, or indeed any criminal or immigration action. If a person falsely claims to be a US Citizen merely to obtain social status or personal importance or reputation, that would seem not to be a crime under the doctrine of U.S. v. Alvarez, nor should it lead directly to any immigration consequences, althoguh I suppose it might draw attention to someone who is deportable on other grounds.

Ex-slaves not born in U.S. and 14th Amendment The 14th Amendment states that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." Did cases ever arise in courts concerning any ex-slaves not born in the United States include arguments that the 14th Amendment did not apply to them?

At least one such person was naturalized, according to Wikipedia, in 1868, a time at which I believe naturalization was conferred by district court judges. Although this doesn't perhaps constitute a court case, as asked by the question, it does show that formerly enslaved people who has been born outside the United States were not automatically granted US citizenship. Wikipedia says: Although native-born American former slaves became citizens upon the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in July 1868, this change in status did not apply to the members of the Clotilda group, who were foreign-born. Cudjo Kazoola Lewis became a naturalized American citizen on October 24, 1868. The passage cites Dreams of Africa in Alabama: The Slave Ship Clotilda and the Story of the Last Africans Brought to America by Sylviane A. Diouf

A US citizen who resides abroad can register to vote in federal elections in the last state or territory where they resided in the US. So in your example, the US citizen who was resident in Puerto Rico, and who moves to Canada without first residing in any other state or territory, would register to vote in Puerto Rico. Since he is registered to vote in Puerto Rico, he does not vote in an election for choosing presidential electors since Puerto Rico doesn't have any presidential electors. Only the 50 states and DC have presidential electors, and each of them chooses the electors based on elections by people registered to vote in that state (or DC), so he would have to be registered to vote in some particular state or in DC to participate in an election for choosing presidential electors, but he does not qualify to register to vote in any of the states or DC, because he was not resident there last. Yes, US citizens who are neighbors in Vancouver, Canada, one of whom is a former New Yorker and the other of whom is a former Puerto Rican, would be registered to vote in two places (one in New York and the other in Puerto Rico). They would get two different ballots, and may even have different dates for elections (for elections that are not held on the November election day). They would have different offices to vote for, and, in the case of the ballot for the November election in a presidential election year, the New York ballot would contain an election for a slate of presidential electors, while the Puerto Rico ballot would not.

It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review.

The Constitution does not describe such a method, and no one has ever tried to do so. During and immediately following the U.S. Civil War, states that attempted to secede from the U.S. to join the Confederate States of America were not represented in Congress until their insurrections ceased and a post-war government approved by the Union forces in the Reconstruction era was in place. But this was not on the theory that these areas had ceased to be states, it was on the theory that there was a vacancy in the positions because these areas had not held elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, had not nominated U.S. Senators, and were in degradation of the U.S. Constitution once the 14th Amendment was adopted (denying the right to serve in office to confederate leaders until Congress acted otherwise). Prior the 14th Amendment this denial of U.S. government representation was simply viewed as a function of practical reality and the war powers of Congress, and perhaps the "invasion or insurrection" and "Republican government" clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Certainly there is no recognized roadmap for doing so today.

See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3.

I assume that you were not born in the United States, and that your mother was/is not a US citizen. If these assumptions are incorrect, the answer below does not apply. A child born outside the United States to a US citizen and a non-US citizen will be a US citizen so long as the parent spent a certain amount of time physically present in the United States. For a child born before 1986 to gain US citizenship through a single parent, that parent would have had to spend 10 years total in the USA, of which at least 5 years were after the parent’s 14th birthday. So if your father was a citizen and lived in the US until at least 1966 or his 19th birthday (whichever was later), you would be a US citizen. However, the document you describe does not prove that your father was a US citizen. Instead, it only proves that your father was admitted to the US as an permanent resident (a so-called “green card”). If your father did become a citizen, he would have received a Certificate of Naturalization. This would be necessary to prove your father’s US citizenship and, by extension, yours.

A defendant has the right to be tried by his peers. In the U.S., this is an incorrect belief. A defendant does not has the right to be tried by his peers in the U.S. The "jury of his peers" language is a legacy of English law in the days when aristocrats were entitled to a jury of aristocrats rather than commoners, while commoners were entitled to a jury of commoners. The sole legacy of that in U.S. law is in court-martials in which officers are entitled to have their cases heard by a panel of fellow officers, rather than by a panel of active duty military personnel generally. Outside of court-martials in the U.S., the "jury of his peers" concept was eliminated not later than the time when the current U.S. constitution was adopted (in 1789) which eliminated hereditary titles of nobility, or when 6th Amendment to the Bill of Rights was adopted (as applicable in federal criminal cases) which was adopted in 1791. Instead, the Courts have interpreted the 6th Amendment right to trial by jury, which has now been applied to state and local governments as well, to require that the jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community (regardless of what an individual jury actually ends up as) and to have people who are conflicted or biased removed from the jury.

The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered "involuntary servitude" but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today.

Why is there a consort coronation for female consorts but not for male ones in the United Kingdom? Wikipedia: Charles's wife, Camilla, will be crowned alongside him as queen consort. (...) This will be the first coronation of a consort since that of his grandmother Queen Elizabeth (later known as the Queen Mother) in 1937. In addition to this, wives of Kings of England are styled as "queen consort", while husbands of Queens of England are styled as "prince consort" - and it seems that Philip of Edinburgh even had to be specifically made prince by Elizabeth II, i.e. it wasn't automatic due to their marriage (prince of Britain I mean, since he was already prince in other monarchies). What are the rules when it comes to the coronation of a consort in the UK, and what are all the differences relating to the sex of said consort? Where do there these differences come from?

There has only been one Prince Consort Albert, the husband of Victoria, was the only Prince Consort in post-conquest English/UK history. It was a title created specifically for him because the establishment and the country didn’t like him very much. The titles of the five pre-Victorian male consorts varied widely. Mary I of England's husband Philip was declared king jure uxoris and given powers equal to his wife while she reigned, but Queen Anne's husband Prince George of Denmark received no British titles other than the Dukedom of Cumberland (his princely title being Danish). Meanwhile, the official title of the three husbands of Mary, Queen of Scots was never fully resolved. At least one (Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley), was declared king consort, and both he and his predecessor Francis II of France sought recognition as king jure uxoris (under a proffered theory of the "Crown Matrimonial of Scotland"), but the title and powers of the consort were a constant issue during Mary's reign and remained unresolved when Mary was captured and executed. Philip was not Prince Consort, he was made a British Prince - the same title held by his sons. The only legal requirement is the oath The Coronation Oaths Act 1688 requires the oath to be taken by the Monarch and specifies its form. This is the only thing required to make the coronation legal. Everything else is due to religion, tradition, and choice. It is not true that all Queen consorts have been crowned In general, when the King was married at the time of the coronation, the Queen consort was also crowned. However, there have been exceptions. When the King married after the coronation, sometimes there was a coronation for the Queen consort but often there wasn’t.

Where the primary part of two acts in the same year would be the same, commonly a secondary phrase is added in brackets indicating the narrow subject of the act to avoid this happening. For example, the Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Act 2016 was followed later in the year by the Supply and Appropriation (Main Estimates) Act 2016. However, where such a secondary phrase would be inappropriate, especially where the later act replaces the earlier act, the main part of the short title of the second act is appended with "(No. 2)". One such example occurred in 2009, where the Appropriation Act 2009 was replaced by the Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2009. So in your hypothetical case, the later act would likely have "Parliament Act (No. 2) 1911" as its short title. I should note though that this is governed by custom, so there is no guarantee that a particular act must follow this approach.

Currently there is nowhere in the USA where polygamy is legal. So regardless of their sexual or gender expression or orientation, being married to MORE THAN ONE person at the same time is illegal. If, however, it turned out that someone had more than one spouse at their death, I'm sure that property distribution would be a matter for the probate court to sort out. As far as legally-married "trans spouses", for lack of a better term, I don't see why that would that impact inheritance in any way?

The earliest mention of the principle that I can find is in Rolston v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [1975] NI 195, where the matter of compensation for the widow of a police officer murdered in Northern Ireland arose. I am sure there are earlier cases that express the same principle in different terms, however. It is a broad principle that applies to most areas of civil law, and I cannot find an original source for it. I imagine that it is simply "received wisdom" that has been repeated long enough to become a cornerstone of the law of restitution in England and Wales. There is currently no statutory basis for the principle so I cannot cite any relevant Acts of Parliament either.

Is it gender-based discrimination against C and in favour of B and thus a constitutional right violation? Apparently not, according to this source LGBT rights in India, Wikipedia: Same-sex sexual activity was decriminalized in 2018. [India] has ... explicitly interpreted Article 15 of the Constitution to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. But many legal protections have not been provided for, including same-sex marriage. ... Same-sex marriages are not legally recognised in India nor are same-sex couples offered limited rights such as a civil union or a domestic partnership. However, things appear to moving towards equality - albeit slowly: In 2011, a Haryana court granted legal recognition to a same-sex marriage involving two women. After marrying, the couple began to receive threats from friends and relatives in their village. The couple eventually won family approval.

Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.

The short answer, is "it's complicated". I can think of situations where any of the above options you listed might be true. (Another possible option is "The baby has no nationality at birth", and would therefore be considered stateless, and would fall under the birth country's rules regarding statelessness). To find a definitive answer for your specific situation, I would start with Wikipedia: British nationality law Spanish nationality law Although Wikipedia is not authoritative, it does give you a good overview of the situation for both countries. There are then links to authoritative sources in each article. In the case of a British and Spanish couple, their baby would probably be both British and Spanish at birth. Additionally, if the baby is born in a country (such as the US) which follows the jus soli rules, then the baby would also acquire the citizenship of their birth country.

"Regina" or "R" or "The Crown" or "The Queen" is the respondent. These are different ways of expressing the same concept. However, it is not typical to name "Crown Prosecution Service" in the citation, or the formal heading of the case. This differs from Scottish practice where appeals look like "Adam v HM Advocate". Other public prosecutions can be brought by bodies other than CPS, such as the Health and Safety Executive, so R does not invariably mean the CPS. For England and Wales, the philosophy is that criminal prosecutions are brought by the Crown as the fount of justice, and maintained as such on appeal, and it so happens that the interests of the public are represented by agencies such as the CPS. They are not representing their own interests and are not parties to the case. We do see "Adam v Crown Prosecution Service" in judicial review cases, which are civil rather than criminal. For example, SXH v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] UKSC 30 was about challenging the CPS's decision on whether to prosecute somebody. An "appeal by way of case stated" may also arise in this way, where there is a point of law to be decided in the Administrative Court of Queen's Bench, such as Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin). The DPP is the head of the CPS. The distinction is that a judicial review is about whether the public body's decisions were lawful - they are the ones being scrutinized - whereas in a criminal case, the prosecution is mounted on behalf of the public in general, with the CPS merely happening to be the agency usually responsible. Equally, the CPS can be a party to employment disputes and things like that. "R (Crown Prosecution Service)" looks a little unusual because "R (Somebody) v Anotherbody" usually means a judicial review on behalf of the Somebody, against Anotherbody, with the R being a vestige of the historical basis for this kind of review. It would be odd for the CPS to be in that position. If you look through recent Court of Appeal judgements you will see some variations in presentation, but a common pattern of saying something like this: In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) On appeal from Oxford Crown Court Mr Justice Glossop Before: Lord Justice Tibbs Mrs Justice Bloggs Mr Justice Dubbs Between: Regina (Respondent) and Adam (Appellant) B Smith (instructed by Appeals-R-Us Solicitors) for the Appellant C Jones QC (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent

Under what circumstances can a low/midlevel employee be personally sued for a corporate act? Let's say, for instance, that the issue at hand was the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Exxon was sued of course, and I would imagine that its then chairman would have, or at least could have been, sued. The perpetrator of the accident was one Captain Joseph Hazelwood of the vessel. From what I understand, he was sued, even though he was a "mid level" employee. Was it his tie to the incident that allowed him to be sued? Change the facts some. A janitor or plumber working for a contracting agency in "servicing" a client negligently flipped a switch that caused the client's building to be burned down. I would imagine that the agency could be sued. Can that person also be sued, or is s/he too "low level" for this? Put another way, my understanding is that a person needs to have "standing" in order to be a plaintiff in a case. Is it true that someone (even if low level), similarly needs to have "standing" (or its equivalent) to be a defendant, and if so, what constitutes such "standing?"

The fact that the employer has vicarious liability for acts of its employees "within the scope of employment" does not mean the employees are not also liable for their own acts. In reality, however, the employer is more likely to have insurance for such "acts or omissions" of employees. The plaintiffs can "sue everyone in sight" and let them figure out who actually pays when they are found liable. That way, when the employee's actions are (for instance) ruled a "personal frolic" or otherwise outside the scope of the employer's liability (in tort or contract), the case doesn't get dismissed for failure to name all the proper parties. One policy goal is to place financial liability as close as possible to the person most likely to have been able to avoid the harm, thus discouraging such risks, without placing the entire burden on individuals employed in hazardous occupations and without artificially limiting potential sources of compensation.

Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not.

Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.

Regular maintenance does not include repairs for being broken – I have a contract with a company that (for a monthly payment) provides regular maintenance on the furnace, which does not cover the situation where the motor wears out, or whatever. In the worst case scenario of an oil line breech, the tenant would not be liable for the tens of thousands of dollars of cleanup that would be required. Under Pennsylvania law, there is an implied warranty of habilitability, for example the landlord warrants that it doesn't rain inside the house, there is hot and cold running water, and so on. Safe heat is an example of something that is included in a place being habitable. This warranty is not waivable by lease provision (Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240). However, the subjective recommendation of a repair guy has little legal cash value: what is needed is an arms-length evaluation of the safety and functionality of the system. If the recommendation is based on inefficient fuel use and long-term likelihood of eventual system failure, that is probably not sufficient to compel a repair. Excess CO on the other hand is a clear danger. The repairman should be able to at least explain the specifics of the improper setup and the consequences of doing nothing. Documentation of actions taken is a good idea.

You are asking the wrong question: it is up to you to decide how to deal with your injury. The employer's role, if any, is limited to after-the-fact compensation. In Texas, workman's compensation coverage is not mandatory, so that is a variable affecting the details. If the employer has workman's comp, they are protected from various legal actions against time, but they also don't get a "vote" in compensation, which is provided by the insurance company. Assuming that the employer is a non-subscriber (as they are called), then the question of employer liability is resolved either by negotiation or lawsuit. You can read a breakdown of the legal essentials here. When you go to court, you would have to prove that the employer was at fault. Let's assume that you've proven that, then the remaining question is whether that loss is reasonably related to the injury that the employer was responsible for. There are multiple kinds of medical transportation available, ranging from patient self-transportation on the bus to calling 911. The laws regarding 911 calls are a matter of local jurisdiction, but the general rule is that you only call 911 for genuine emergencies. However, there isn't a clear, practical standard that distinguishes between an emergency vs. "something that you need to deal with eventually". Given your description of the injury, I will work on the assumption that this qualifies as a true medical emergency in your town. Now, typically, 911 EMTs make a professional judgment whether you need ordinary ambulance transportation vs. "Medic One" style transportation – this isn't decided by the employer. The one area where an employer could have a say in the matter is in accessing his personal or work phone, in order to call 911. Your description of the circumstances is not exactly clear: do you have a phone, or access to a phone? You do not have to have employer permission to make an emergency call on your phone. So to continue looking for ways to make this a problem for the employer, I will assume that you had no access to a phone of your own or any other employee, and the employer refused to let you use his personal phone or company phone to call 911, but would let you use his phone to call home (this is an entirely rhetorical assumption, but I have no evidence that the situation is otherwise). Now the question is whether the employer has a legal obligation to provide access to a work or personal phone in order to make an emergency call. Now we have a specific Texas law, Penal Code §42.062 which says in part that it is a crime when one knowingly prevents or interferes with another individual's ability to place an emergency call or to request assistance, including a request for assistance using an electronic communications device, in an emergency from a law enforcement agency, medical facility, or other agency or entity the primary purpose of which is to provide for the safety of individuals Here is a lawyer's talk-through of this law, which does not address to $64,000 question whether the law creates a "duty to assist" rather than a "duty to not interfere". The answer is tied to the basic lawsuit question of whether the employer is at fault. Under the common law, if a party has created a harmful situation, they have a duty to assist in mitigating that situation. So if you were horsing around on the job and you're at fault for the injury, then the employer is not liable and you have to shoulder the burden for treatment. If they are at fault, they also have to assist you in seeking emergency medical treatment. I doubt that the courts would find it to be a crime to refuse to call 911, but the employer could be civilly liable.

The employer might be liable for a discrimination claim, under the doctrine of disparate impact. See Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc and references cited therein. The idea is that an employer can be liable absent proof of intentional discrimination when a practice disproportionately affects protected classes of individuals, and the practice is not justified by reasonable business considerations. So it would depend on why this particular state of affairs in employment came about. There is a test known as the 80% rule which attempts to quantify the notion of "under-representation" as evidence of discrimination. This test (not widely respected by the courts these days) might constitute evidence of discrimination, if a protected class is demonstrably under-represented. The current standard seems to be by comparison to random selection. In EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, the court found that a grooming policy had a disparate impact on members of a religion (Sikhism), and was thus contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although a requirement to shave does not obviously discriminate on the basis of religion. This points to an important element of a successful disparate impact claim, that there has to be a policy with a causal effect. In the above scenario, there is no proposed policy that has this effect. Note that the burden of proof is on the person suing for relief – they must have a theory of something the company does that causes this hiring pattern, a practice that is discriminatory. The identified policy (whatever it might be) could be justified by a business necessity defense (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424), by showing that the practice has a demonstrable relationship to the requirements of the job. That, b.t.w., would not excuse a racially or religiously discriminatory hiring policy for a factory manufacturing menorahs or kinaras. If a company recruiting locally in Boise ID had a 75% black work force, it would be reasonable to suspect that something was up. But legally, without showing that this results from a unjustified policy of the company, mere statistically anomalous distribution is does not sustain a claim of discrimination.

As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years.

First of all, to clarify some numbering, HR 4635 (107th Congress) was not actually passed. The language was passed as part of HR 5005, becoming Public Law 107-296, and this provision now appears at 49 USC 44921. The exact text of this provision is: A Federal flight deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The language makes it clear that this is only referring to civil liability. So, if the officer is defending the flight deck, and they are sued for damages resulting from their actions, the plaintiff will not win (assuming the law is correctly applied). But this law says nothing about whether or not they can be prosecuted for a crime. In any case, the officer in your example does not appear to have been defending the flight deck, so this law wouldn't apply at all. In your example, the officer's defense against a murder charge would probably be based on defense of others. There is a discussion on Justia. It seems that a key question would be whether shooting the unruly passenger was proportional - was there a reasonable fear that the passenger was actually going to kill someone?

Is an arrest legal if no reason is given? From the UK Government website: The police arrest procedure If you’re arrested the police must: identify themselves as the police tell you that you’re being arrested tell you what crime they think you’ve committed explain why it’s necessary to arrest you explain to you that you’re not free to leave From the current news of the protests over the coronation: Anti-monarchy group Republic's chief arrested at Coronation protest Six demonstrators, including Mr Smith, were arrested by police while unloading placards near the Coronation procession route, the group said. Republic posted photos of officers taking details from them on Twitter. "So much for the right to peaceful protest," the group said, adding the officers would not give the reasons for their arrest and confirmed their CEO was among them. Given that the police identify themselves as the police, tell you that you’re being arrested and explain to you that you’re not free to leave but do not tell you what crime they think you’ve committed or explain why it’s necessary to arrest you even after that information is requested and enough time has past that any other urgent business has been conducted, is that a legal arrest or not? A similar case where it was ruled the the arrest was not legal would be Police inspector Dean Gittoes where a police officer was found guilty of assault for making an unlawful arrest. This would indicate the officers involved could face legal consequences if the arrest was not legal.

I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers

In most U.S. states, a citizen's arrest using proportionate non-deadly force is authorized when the citizen has witnessed the crime or has been asked by a law enforcement officer to assist in making an arrest. The U.S. Constitution is not violated by this authorization. For example, in Colorado, citizens arrests (not made at the direction of a law enforcement officer) are authorized by Section 18-1-707(7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which states that: A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. Generally speaking it is illegal in the context of a citizen's arrest to use: disproportionate force, force applied to punish rather than detain someone, or deadly force, although there are times when deadly force is authorized for reasons similar to those that would apply for self-defense in the absence of a citizen's arrest. Deadly force is generally not authorized to protect tangible personal property or most forms of real property, but some places authorize the use of deadly force to protect a residence. I've heard before that a thief have "right" to flee, and trying to knock him out is not justified because you can only use violence to protect your self, instead of your money. While it is understandable that you might think this based upon U.S. Supreme Court cases like Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the law is actually more nuanced and that case held that: when a law enforcement officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, the officer may not use deadly force to prevent escape unless "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." It was found that use of deadly force to prevent escape is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of probable cause that the fleeing suspect posed a physical danger. Thus, it is illegal to shoot to kill a fleeing thief or shoplifter, even though it is not illegal to restrain a shoplifter physically to prevent that shoplifter from fleeing the scene prior to the arrival of the police.

According to the ACLU, there are certain questions you have to answer when entering the US, and in some states you may have to identify yourself when stopped and told to identify yourself. Nonimmigrant non-citizen may be required to answer questions about immigrant status posed by an immigration officer. Otherwise, you are not required to answer questions by police. A judge can order you to answer questions, but the police cannot. Also, "obstruction of justice" covers things such as destroying evidence, assaulting a process server, communicating with a juror, and can cover investigative demands by prosecutors, but not being uncooperative with police.

Police are authorized by statutes to carry out the functions of law enforcement. I.e., they are granted by law the authority to: Investigate alleged or apparent crimes Detain and arrest individuals when there exists "probable cause" to believe they have committed a crime. There are a plethora of details encompassed by these general descriptions. For related inquiries see also: How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? search-and-seizure In the specific example you cite you are in a public place, albeit on private property. If the property owner asked the police to leave they would have to meet a higher statutory threshold to legally remain and pursue their investigation. In practice, however, they may do whatever they want. Publicized incidents suggest that the best chance you have of ensuring your rights are protected in a police confrontation are to: Have the incident recorded in audio and video in as detailed a fashion as possible, and seen by as many witnesses as possible. Avoid actions that could escalate the incident or serve as a pretext for escalation by the police. Try to get higher-ranking police on the scene. E.g., if you can safely access your phone you may want to both start video recording and call 911 to ask the dispatcher to send the officer's superior to the scene, while making it clear to the dispatcher that you intend to comply with all lawful requests but that you feel threatened or unsafe.

This may be allowed, or prohibited, it all depends. At the federal level, there is no specific prohibition against asking this question, however it may be found to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act if the result discriminates in employment based on race. At the state level (in Washington), WAC 162-12-140 gives examples of fair and unfair pre-employment inquiries. W.r.t. arrests, it deems such questions as fair under limited circumstances: Because statistical studies regarding arrests have shown a disparate impact on some racial and ethnic minorities, and an arrest by itself is not a reliable indication of criminal behavior, inquiries concerning arrests must include whether charges are still pending, have been dismissed, or led to conviction of a crime involving behavior that would adversely affect job performance, and the arrest occurred within the last ten years. Exempt from this rule are law enforcement agencies and state agencies, school districts, businesses and other organizations that have a direct responsibility for the supervision, care, or treatment of children, mentally ill persons, developmentally disabled persons, or other vulnerable adults. See RCW 43.20A.710; 43.43.830 through 43.43.842; and RCW 72.23.035. In other words, asking just about arrests is unfair and illegal. You can look up the law of other states here. In California, you can't ask about an arrest until late in the process as part of an individualized investigation, and can't be an automatic "arrest? No job!" rule. In contrast, Arkansas has no prohibition against arrest as job disqualifier.

Footage of an arrest is clearly evidence: tampering with it is a crime. Notwithstanding, destroying someone's personal possessions without authorisation is a crime. Accessing a computer (which all modern image and audio recorders are) without authorisation is also a crime.

Disclosure to police of an illegal recording is permitted by s. 193(2)(e), and in court by s. 193(2)(a). The recording could be excluded if the person who made the recording did so on behalf of police (to sidestep their obligation to obtain a warrant), but even then its importance as evidence may outweigh other Charter considerations.

They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court.

Could a contract prevent someone from talking to the authorities? Would a contract (such as an NDA or non-disparagement agreement) be enforceable if it prevents a person from talking to the authorities such as: the police the labour board starting a lawsuit responding to a subpoena I noticed a common phrase in contracts is "You aren't allowed to do x y z unless required by law". For example from here Receiving Party's obligations under this Agreement do not extend to information that is...is disclosed as required or ordered by a court, administrative agency, or other governmental body. Or another example from here: Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Agreement shall preclude Executive from making truthful statements that are required by applicable law, regulation or legal process. What is the point of such statements? Without them would it be breach of contract for the signer to do something they are legally required to do? Or is the intent of such statements to limit the amount of term found to be unenforceable?

No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations.

A piece of paper with writing on it is NOT a contract! A contract is the terms and conditions that the parties agree that they will be bound to. A written contract merely serves as evidence (really good evidence) of what those terms and conditions were. For this to matter, it would have to be part of a dispute about the contract. If the parties looking at the term know and agree on what it means then that is what it means. If there is a dispute about this term then a 3rd party (e.g. judge, arbitrator) will look at the term and the context of the contract (both the written contract and the actions of the parties in giving effect to the contract) and decide what they think the parties meant. For the example given, I don't think there is any room for dispute about what is meant and it would be disingenuous of either party to claim that there could be. "Time is of the essence" is a commonly used legal phrase with a well understood meaning - it explicitly makes time a condition of the contract; generally, time is a warranty. A condition is a term for which termination of the contract is a possible remedy; you cannot terminate for breach of a warranty. "Time of the essence" is either a typo or, if deliberate, is clearly trying to get across the same concept. TL;DR 100% enforceable.

That is, you don't even have to give them a copy of the contract. In the same way you might reference some legal code without actually copying the legal code directly into the contract. If you do not communicate material terms of the contract to your contractor, the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of meeting of minds. Referencing "some legal code", provided that that code is publicly available is fine: your contractor can look it up and decide if they are happy with it. But doing the same with "Independent Contractor Agreement #123" will only work if you provide a copy of it to your contractor. For example, it can be attached to the paper being signed as a Schedule. So, in a nut shell, abstracting prose out is fine as long as it is communicated/attached.

If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract.

united-states The Thirteenth Amendment forbids slavery and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime. This means that, outside of unique situations like the military, an employer cannot keep you as an employee against your will. Any contract that denies you the right to quit your job is illegal. A contract might require a reasonable notice period or something along those lines, but it cannot bind you to work for the company for as long as the company wants. While you can sign an employment contract without it being involuntary servitude, the Thirteenth Amendment is also generally read to mean that your employer can only sue you for money if you refuse to work. A US court cannot order you to work for an employer and threaten to hold you in contempt of court if you refuse. This doctrine predates the end of slavery, but the Thirteenth Amendment is among the reasons now cited to justify it.

Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of.

Yes Quite a large chunk of the legal system deals with those general concepts. 27 - pretty much all contract law deals with when and how you must discharge your obligations 28 - ditto, although if it’s not owed until tomorrow … 29 - there are laws against criminal conspiracy 30 - making false accusations can be a crime and can give rise to defamation

To preface my answer, this aspect of UK law is unclear at best and I try to set out general principles where available. If you are acting in a private sphere, then the recording of conversations are unregulated, however this is only for personal use – i.e., should you desire to make notes on what was said for your reference at a later date. Should you wish to share it with a third party, then you would need consent from all participants or be able to demonstrate that it would be in the public interest. If you are acting as an employee or a company, then the situation changes. Firstly, you need to check your contract, whilst this does not constitute a crime, it may be against the terms of your employment. Secondly, a company can only make recordings without knowledge under statutory conditions, such as to establish facts, ensure regulatory compliance or demonstrate standards that are achieved or need to be achieved by training. It is a general principle that conversations recorded without consent are inadmissible in court, particularly in terms of a criminal proceedings. In civil matters, it similarly follows the concept that a claimant should come to court with clean hands. However, judges are usually more pragmatic in civil cases and if parties are aware of the existence of the recording, then it often be subject to usual rules of disclosure, though this may open the creator of the recording to subsequent litigation regarding the illegality of the recording under Data Protection Act or others.

Is customer entitled to the same car tested in the test drive or in the ad? I know someone who went to purchase a brand new car from a dealer in the US. The customer came in with an internet ad and asked to test drive the car listed. After the test drive, she paid for it. But when she returned outside, and got in the new car, she found inside was different. Less features. Less comfortable wheel and seats. The dealer argued they make an honest mistake with the test drive, but they sold the customer the car they asked for, the one from the internet ad. They think the buyer must have been aware the car they test drove was too nice. The customer though thinks they deserve the car from the test drive, even if it was a mistake, because they first tested it and immediately paid five minutes later. Update 1: To clarify, this was a brand new car, not a used car. Update 2: The VIN on the contract matches the VIN of the car the customer received. The customer didn't expect she'd get a different car, so didn't think to check VINs before signing the paperwork. Update 3: The customer remembered the test drive car's mileage, as it was a unique number. Weirdly, the contract lists the mileage of the test driven car, not the mileage of the car she received. When she was signing the paperwork, this just supported her idea that everything was fine. Was this a breach of contract? Is the customer entitled to the online ad car or the one in the test drive? What law supports this?

As described, this may be a form of illegal bait-and-switch advertising, but not breach of contract. The contract states the specific vehicle to be sold, which does not match the test-driven car. If the dealer had listed the better car's VIN in the contract but supplied a different car, that would be breach of contract. Whether it is illegal advertisement depends on the representations and disclaimers made by the dealer. To the extent that the dealer supplied indications that there was a difference between the test model and the purchase model, or to the extent that the customer should have known that the test car had features not found in the specific model that the customer believed he was buying and paying for, the dealer was being non-deceptive. To the extent that the dealer holds that selling model X instead of model Y is an "honest mistake" on their part, the dealer was being deceptive (or, was plainly in breach of contract). It's hard to see what "honest mistake" the dealer might have made, but perhaps the mistake was "not being clearer to the customer that they had test-driven a fancier model, not the one that they were actually buying". The customer's attorney could pursue this matter and either get the better car, or get a better financial deal, but it really hinges on who said / wrote what (and has a more believable story about what was said).

No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.

Let's say one of us borrows the other one's car (with permission) and has an accident. Whose coverage is responsible at that point to satisfy the legally mandated insurance coverage? I assume that's only coverage against damage to others (which should go under liability insurance?) but if I'm wrong please correct me. There are different types of insurance that may be required: liability insurance - pays damage to others (usually including your own passengers) which you are responsible for. This is legally required almost everywhere (both in the USA, where this depends on the state, and elsewhere). Rules vary on the required minimum amount, and the exact coverage (e.g. whether lost wages are covered in case of injury). uninsured motorist coverage - pays damages you or others suffered, which are the responsibility of another driver who is not insured. This is mandatory in some states of the USA. In some other countries, these damages are covered by a public insurance or trust (such as the Verkehrsopferhilfe in Germany). personal injury protection - pays your own medical costs, no matter who is at fault. Required in some states of the USA. Is the lender's insurance supposed to cover it? This depends on the insurance policy, but in almost all cases the policy is for the vehicle (and often has to be, under the laws requiring insurance). So if yes, if you lend your car to someone else, your insurance will cover them. Note, however, that some insurance policies restrict your right to lend your car - read the fine print! There is one situation where your own policy may be relevant: If the damages exceed the limit of the vehicle's insurance policy, your own policy may pay the rest - again, this will depend on the policy. If so, wouldn't this not make sense? Insurance companies look at your driving history (& risk) when they offer you a plan, and if the borrower has a poor history, you've increased the company's risk without their knowledge, right? It would seem to open insurance rates to abuse. Yes, exactly. That is why many (if not most) insurance policies place limits on lending your car. You may only be allowed to lend it to people over 21 years of age, or only to people who you have registered as car users with the insurance company. Is the borrower's insurance supposed to cover it? If so, wouldn't this not make sense? Insurance companies charge you differently based on what and how many vehicles you want covered, so wouldn't borrowing someone's Lamborghini suddenly open your insurance company to a massive risk without their knowledge again? No, the borrower's insurance does not usually apply. Making the borrower's insurance apply would be problematic because the risk is based on the vehicle (type), too. Also, the borrower may not have insurance (e.g. may not own a car). In particular, enforcing the mandatory liability insurance is easier in practice if it is per vehicle, because you can check the insurance at vehicle registration (which practically all countries already require). If the liability insurance were per driver, it would be difficult to prevent a person w/o insurance to borrow a car (as in your example). Finally, sometimes after an accident there is a dispute about who was driving the car (especially with hit-and-run accidents), but there is usually clear evidence (collision damage) what vehicle was involved. If insurance applies to the vehicle, a dispute over who was driving will not interfere with the victim's restitution.Thanks to supercat for pointing this out.

If that is the licence that Uber are operating under then they are breaking it. This is not legal in that Google can sue them for copyright breach. However, this is the licence that Google offer to the average person on the street for which they pay Google nothing. It is entirely possible that Uber and Google have come to terms on a completely different licence arrangement which may involve Uber handing over slabs of cash (or not) and not needing to attribute. Google is free to offer licences on different terms to different people.

I would inform the authorities about that loss as soon as possible (consider that your lost license could be found by a criminal who then conveniently "loses" it during a bank robbery), and ask them how to get a replacement license as soon as possible. See here: http://www.dmv.org/ok-oklahoma/replace-cdl.php That website actually recommends having a copy of your CDL with you at all times, or your company should have a copy on their files they can fax to you, so it would seem legal to drive with a copy. There is a difference between "driving license" in the sense "the permission given to you by the state to drive a car on public roads" and "driving license" in the sense "a piece of paper or plastic giving evidence that you have permission to drive". In most countries, driving without license is a serious offence, while driving without the piece of plastic is a minor offence.

It will very much depend on what you modify. If you only drive on your own land, that's mostly fine (possibly not fine if your own land is a road accessible to the public). What will cause you problems: The manufacturer has a general permission to distribute car models with certain characteristics in your country. There's trouble if your modification means your modified car doesn't have these characteristics. Your car insurance is for a certain car model. Your insurance may be invalid if you modify your car. As "boy racers" were mentioned, part of the insurance cost is based on the type of drivers this car model attracts. If you change it from "boring old family car driven by boring old dads who never have accidents" to "exciting boy racer car driven by maniacs who crash their car regularly", you would be expected to tell your insurance so they can adapt their insurance. As far as passing your MOT test goes: If you don't advise the tester of the change, and therefore the fact that your car is unsafe is missed, your MOT is not valid. Same in the time between making changes and the next MOT if your changes made the car unsafe. Usually that will be found out at the worst possible time: After you are involved in a costly accident.

the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant.

In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered.

Is it legal for a company to enforce price minimums in the USA? When exporting from Europe to the USA but not sourcing directly from the manufacturer, it is common to receive communications from companies along the lines (1) in the USA we have a minimum price policy, which you are breaking/you have to source from our US supplier (2) We forbid export of this product to the USA/it can only be done through authorized channels. Is it the case that a company is allowed to prevent export of an identical product from a different country. Or is this anticompetitive behaviour which legislation prevents?

It didn’t work for Nintendo Nintendo used to have a policy of setting minimum retail prices for its products. If retailers didn’t comply, Nintendo would decrease or eliminate their supply. In 1991, the FTC investigated Nintendo for price fixing, and Nintendo agreed to pay some money back and to reframe the minimum price as more of a “suggestion.” Technically, this was a settlement, so the courts didn’t actually rule against (or in favor of) Nintendo. But being investigated by the FTC is already pretty serious. https://www.upi.com/amp/Archives/1991/04/10/Nintendo-gives-coupons-to-settle-price-fixing-case/5169671256000/

I've found Commission Decision 2003/675/EC which sheds light on what exactly happened here (more digestable press release here). Basically, there was a dispute involving Nintendo and its various independent distributors who had exclusive distribution rights in their respective territories, Bergsala AB for Sweden. Note this wasn't simply a matter of Bergsala's rights being violated, but rather a scheme to reduce parallel imports/exports which the Commission found to be anti-competitive. For most parties, this was brought to an end in December 1997 (see section 2.2.11 on pgs. 54-55). So no, there was no change in the law, but the anti-competitive scheme stopped in late 1997. Weirdly this should have resulted in the possibility for more imports, but since those imports would no longer have artificially higher prices, perhaps the advertisements and/or imports were no longer worth economically worth it. Or perhaps Bergsala pivoted to greater enforcement the exclusive rights it did have, even if this didn't include the ability to block parallel imports according to EU competition law. In any case, trade of Nintendo products in Europe was greatly altered in late 1997. Please take my summary with a grain of salt, I'm not very well versed in the field of commerce and I've already misunderstood the decision at least once; check the cited decision for proper details.

You paid a higher amount so you got to drive the latest model for a year. I can buy a lower amount right now, but I only get to drive last year's model. Or I can pay a higher amount to drive the latest model again. That's life. I have a Wii. I didn't buy it when people queued up for it, but when the shop was selling them off for half the price. That's life. You pay more for the latest and greatest, and then it gets cheaper. The protection you are talking about is this: If the shop advertises a motorbike for £8,000 and when you go into the store the price is suddenly £10,000 then there is some protection in place. The protection means the shop will get a major telling off from trading standards if you complain, and possibly a fine. It doesn't mean you get the motorbike for £8,000. And it most definitely doesn't mean you get money back when they reduce the price a year later.

Yes. Contracts do not excuse a site from obeying the law, and the law requires sites to obey court orders. "It violates my contract with a third party" is not a valid reason to disobey a court, and disobeying a court order is contempt. On the other hand, contract law (at least in the U.S. and U.K.) says that contracts that violate the law or public policy are invalid, and so you could not win a breach of contract suit if the defendant could not legally comply with the contract. Now, a contract might require the company to attempt all possible legal ways to get the court to revoke its order, or to avoid the order in the first place (for instance, if Google does no business in China, a U.S. court might not excuse them from a contract because they capitulated to the Chinese government). However, when push comes to shove, private contracts are lower priority than court orders.

A business is free to set its pricing model in whatever way it chooses, unless there is a specific law restring this. As no country or jurisdiction is mentioned in the question, there is no way to judge if some specific law applies. (In the US that would probably be a matter of state law.) A business could set its prices at 10 per user, but with a Minimum charge of 100 if it chose to do it that way. It is up to a potential customer to decide if this is a fair price or not. As long as the price plan was disclosed in advance, the customer has no ground for a legal complaint. The customer could always ask the business to change its policy, but there would be no legal duty to make a change.

If a business literally has an "exact change only" policy, that can't be enforced in post-pay situations. But if they have a "you are free to overpay, but we won't give you change back", that's different, especially if it's communicated from the beginning. If they tell you they don't give change, then you're taking their goods/services implicitly agreeing to their terms.

A business owner can normally refuse service for any reason unless anti-discrimination law, or some other specific law, applies. "Critic of the business" is not a protected class. Whether a business would act in such a way I cannot say if it would risk significant negative publicity. But I see no legal reason why they could not.

Yes. A company from one member state may do business in any E.U. state so long as it complies with local law in the course of doing so. For example, a Dutch company doing business in Germany must still pay German taxes and comply with German labor laws for its German employees. But, it doesn't have to form a German subsidiary to do business in Germany.

Do governments with Rule of Law sometimes (too broad of word?) hand over their citizens even without extradition treaties? Prompted by this question. For example, officials from Cuba or Iran (or even friendly countries like Taiwan, Ukraine, etc) officials go to US officials, present evidence that one of their nationals committed a crime in the source country then legally (how is irrelevant) entered the US for the long term. To make it juicy, lets say it was a heinous crime with lots of solid evidence. Would the US say "sorry, wish we could help, but legally impossible", or could they arrest him and start extradition proceedings anyway (under some legal theory which I'm unaware of)?

There are circumstances in which countries that are generally recognized to follow the rule of law will extradite in the absence of a treaty. For example, the U.S. generally will not extradite absent a treaty, and there are many countries with which the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty. Regardless, 18 U.S. Code §§ 3181 and 3184 leave the executive with the authority to extradite without regard to the existence of a treaty, persons (other than citizens, nationals or permanent residents of the United States), who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries. U.S. Department of Justice Manual, 9-15.100 - General Principles Related to Obtaining Fugitives from Abroad

No The right to Due Process is a personal right of anyone who may come before a US court, or interact with an agency of any US government, Federal, State, or local. It is noit a national right, to be granted ort withheld depending on hoew US nationals are treated by a particular country. No one has authority to deny De Process to anyone who is physically within the US, nor to anyone who is interacting with any part of the US government/the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the Fedferal and State governments, respectively, to grant Due process to al, and congress may not alter this by law, nor authorize any poat of the government to deny Due Process to anyone for any reason. Due Process is a somewhat flexible concept, and exactly what process is required may vary in different circumstances, but the basic elements of Due Process are not optional. All this is true no matter ow unjustly the courts or other agencies of a foreign government may treat US nationals. Such treatment may be addressed through diplomatic channels, or through economic or political pressure.

Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law.

No. The U.S. Attorney brings charges on behalf of the United States, which is the filing party, at least in criminal cases. That's why every criminal case is styled "United States v. [Whomever]."

Any society that makes rules will make rules that generally favor the people in power. Police are an essential component of a system that is built to maintain power for the people who are powerful, and there are few incentives for politicians, prosecutors or judges to punish them for maintaining order, even when they do so in ways that most people would think are not civil. Anyone involved in creating the law therefore builds systems to protect themselves -- and each other -- from accountability. The police fail to meaningfully investigate themselves, the legislature erects barriers to accountability (Sec. 614.022, for instance), and the courts routinely provide them immunity for their wrongdoing. So yes, there is a difference in how our legal system treats law enforcement and how it treats everyone else. I don't know anyone with any experience in the law who would even try to pretend otherwise.

If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech.

When you are in another country, you are subject to their laws - you may be arrested and go through the due process as defined by that countries laws. This potentially means anything from a fine, to incarceration or deportation or even execution, depending on the local countries laws. A good example is the caning of American citizen Michael Fay in 1994 by the Singapore authorities, as a judicial punishment for vandalism, or the case of Swiss citizen Oliver Fricker, who was also caned in 2010 for vandalism.

For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?

What is the nature of these “internal documents” from the U.S. Supreme Court? The media have been reporting on the contents of Justice John Paul Stevens' documents, which have now been made public. This article for instance includes excerpts from what seem to be correspondence between the justices—sometimes with an informal tone, clearly not meant to be released. I'm curious how these documents are produced, and how they are distributed practically. It would otherwise seem like an email exchange between people who work remotely. I've always imagined them as nine people working in the same office building. Do the nine justices continually send written letters to one another? (Is this because they don't always work in proximity to one another?) Are there assistants typing up each person's notes and sending them to the other eight Justices?

The Justices communicate by exchanging written memoranda, or at least they did during Justice Stevens’ time. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (2007), p 48: Outsiders tend to be surprised by how rarely Supreme Court justices speak to each other, one on one. Under Rehnquist, the nine spent a good deal of time together as a group. Argument days, most Mondays and Wednesdays when they were in session, were preceded by the traditional thirty-six handshakes, each justice with every other, and they had lunch together most of these days as well. There were also conference discussions every Friday during these weeks. After the conference, however, the justices tended to communicate with one another through memos, which were often drafted by their law clerks. (After e-mail became ubiquitous, the memos also circulated electronically, but always with paper copies as well; among the justices, only Thomas and Breyer, and eventually Stevens, were fully comfortable communicating by e-mail.) Some further detail about the distribution of these memos appears later in an anecdote about Bush v. Gore (p 170): Stevens drafted an order of just a few sentences remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for the setting of a statewide standard to continue the recount. He sent his messenger scurrying down the marble hallway to Kennedy and the rest of the justices. He heard nothing back, except from Ginsburg, who said she would join if it was a way of bringing the whole Court together. (The rush of events in Bush v. Gore strained the Court's technology, which was, in 2000, still rather primitive. As a security precaution, the e-mail system circulated only within the building. Plus, there was only a single, communal computer from which the justices and clerks could obtain access to the Internet. Because only Thomas and Breyer used computers regularly at the time, there was little pressure from the justices to update. For the most part, the justices communicated with one another by hand-delivered memos, which were typed by their secretaries.)

There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.

This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.

Unless there is something special in Pakistani case law on this topic, it would pass the originality requirement. In my opinion, it is actually very well laid out, and it is clearly not just slapping a few tags on plain text. This article does not indicate any particularly high standards for originality in Pakistan.

A good starting point would be the SCOTUS opinion, or everything on SCOTUSblog, especially the application for injunctive relief filed on Aug. 30. There is a long sequence of petitions and orders which ask the courts either to issue an injunction preventing the law from taking force, or to vacate an administrative stay of proceedings by the lower court regarding petitioner's challenge. The lower court denied the petitions, therefore petitioners turn to SCOTUS to get an injunction against the law. Then you can turn to the SCOTUS opinion to see what the reasons were, for and against the petition. The majority position is that an applicant must carry the burden of making a “strong showing” that it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” that it will be “irreparably injured absent a stay,” that the balance of the equities favors it, and that a stay is consistent with the public interest. The majority concludes that The applicants now before us have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law at issue. But their application also presents complex and novel antecedent procedural questions on which they have not carried their burden. Immediately after this the court comments that federal courts enjoy the power to enjoin individuals tasked with enforcing laws, not the laws themselves. However, it is unclear whether the named defendants in this lawsuit can or will seek to enforce the Texas law against the applicants in a manner that might permit our intervention The law states that Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who and the named respondents (government workers of various sorts) all appear to be precluded from filing an action – thus an injunction against the judge is superfluous since he cannot file a lawsuit anyhow. It is also unclear whether SCOTUS can issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide a lawsuit under Texas’s law. When SCOTUS say "it is unclear" in this context, they mean that petitions did not adequately demonstrate that the court can in fact issue such an injunction. It's not that SCOTUS cannot decide such matters after extensive consideration of the facts / arguments and discussion, it's that the standards for an emergency action require something that the court found lacking in the petition: we cannot say the applicants have met their burden to prevail in an injunction or stay application. In reaching this conclusion, we stress that we do not purport to resolve definitively any jurisdictional or substantive claim in the applicants’ lawsuit.

The exact form used can vary based on the court. At the federal level, the Administrative Office for the US Courts has a standardized form, although I don’t know that district courts have to use it. State courts obviously wouldn’t be expected to use the federal form, and I’m having a harder time turning up a blank state warrant form. The standard elements are in the federal form, though. A search warrant will have a header identifying it as a search warrant and will have something identifying the court that issued it. It will be signed by some sort of judge. The body of the warrant will be written as a command to the police to do a search, telling them where to search and what to look for. There will generally be some standard language about what to do with the property once it’s seized.

In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!

You would be amazed at how vanishingly few the number of cases are where a signature is disputed. Signatures are easy, quick and don't require you having inky fingers all the time. They are so useful that to throw them out to deal with infinintesimally small fractions of disputes over their veracity (bearing in mind that 99.999999999% of contracts never have a dispute that gets to a court [or at all]) is ridiculous. When it does happen, handwriting analysis is probably not going to be put into evidence anyway. Testimony like "I saw him sign it" is way more likely to be used.

Is it possible for India to extradite its own citizens? The Extradition Act deals with extradition in India. But in its Sections it doesn't have any such provisions or details. and can State High court of India enquire into such extraditions?

In general, A country X can extradite people in X to country Y, at the request of Y and to the extent authorised by X's own law. Typically, there will be an extradition agreement between X and Y (a kind of treaty) concerning how this will happen. X's domestic law will take account of the agreement, when it comes to extraditing any specific person. An agreement is not always required - it depends on X's law. Several countries refuse to extradite their own citizens. So Y could ask X to extradite a citizen of Y who is in X, or indeed a citizen of a third country Z who is in X, but not a citizen of X. Typically, for this situation, an extradition agreement between X and Y would include a provision saying that X could prosecute in place of Y, within X, rather than sending the person to Y. India is not such a country. It does allow its citizens to be extradited to other countries, in principle. By policy, if the other country Y objects to extraditing its own citizens (i.e. sending a citizen of Y, currently in Y, to India), then India will reciprocally refuse extradition of Indian citizens from India to Y. Aside from the possible nationality bar, there are plenty of other considerations for whether a proposed extradition would take place. For example, the extradition treaty between India and Türkiye specifies in its Article 8(1) that The nationals of a Contracting State shall not be extradited to the other Contracting State provided that the Requested State shall submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution if the act committed is also considered as an offence under the laws of the Requested State. That is, Indian citizens in India would not be extradited to Türkiye, but instead could be prosecuted in India. Provisions of the Extradition Act mean that the offence is treated as if it had occurred in India, for such a prosecution. This does not stop an Indian citizen in Türkiye from being extradited to India, or the reverse situation. On the other hand, the agreement between India and the United States says in Article 3 that Extradition shall not be refused on the ground that the person sought is a national of the Requested State. which alongside the general obligation in Article 1 means that Indian citizens in India could be extradited to the USA, assuming all other conditions are met. Regarding the High Court question: While the extradition proceedings must take place before a magistrate, they can be challenged by way of judicial review. The same applies to decisions made by central government as part of the process. In India this is called "writ jurisdiction" and can be exercised before a High Court, or the Supreme Court. It is limited in scope and usually would only apply if there has been some procedural irregularity, irrationality in decision-making, or violation of fundamental rights.

This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts.

The default is that countries are not required to repatriate alleged criminals It is one of the cardinal provisions of sovereignty that one country cannot "reach into" another country's territory for any reason. However, countries can voluntarily repatriate an alleged criminal subject to their own legal systems allowing this. This can be ad-hoc or through a longer-term extradition treaty. Even where extradition is allowed, there are common things that will prevent it: Dual criminality - generally, the alleged crime must be a crime in both jurisdictions, Political crimes are usually not subject to extradition Possibility of certain types of punishment - nations without the death penalty will generally not extradite for alleged capital crimes. This can be overcome with appropriate guarantees that such a penalty will not be sought. Jurisdictional issues Own citizens - some countries will not extradite their own citizens notably Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Syria. Fair trial standards - extradition will usually be refused when a fair trial cannot be expected.

Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.

As far as I understand, no. In Canada, everyone has the constitutional right to be free from any cruel or unusual punishment, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. If you're guilty of a crime, well then, you're guilty. You're either going to be tried in court (and if you were guilty of that crime, then you will probably be found guilty), or you will plead as such. Before being tried, you could try to plea bargain with the prosecutor: plead guilty and be sentenced to a lesser charge. Say you were charged with assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm. You thought that the punishment was cruel or unusual - and thought that the trial judge had made an error in the law. In this case, you can make an appeal to a higher court. There are also other things that can factor this: mitigating and aggravating circumstances. If many circumstances are mitigating, then it may make way for a lower punishment, and vice versa with aggravating circumstances, where punishment may be higher. Again, this is something where if something was erred, you can appeal to a higher court. However, just because you think a sentence is too long won't constitute cruel or unusual punishment. In R. vs Latimer, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that minimum sentences, even if within special circumstances, will not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, and be upheld. Originally, he had been sentenced only to one year, based on the recommendation of the jury. He had been charged with second-degree murder. The Supreme Court reinstated the default punishment: A life sentence with no eligibility of parole for ten years.

I think that the plain meaning points to (1). The "other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" modifies who "is admissible", in the present tense, i.e. at the time of seeking admission. It doesn't modify the departure. Also, if it were (2), there would be weird issues like, if the departure doesn't count as a departure for the purposes of this section, then what about the unlawful presence? Does it stay accrued until a future departure, or does it just get wiped clean with no consequences? If it stays accrued, then in some cases it may be worse than interpretation (1), because interpretation (1) starts the 10-year period earlier while it doesn't affect you while you are a permanent resident, so that if you lose your permanent residency in the future the ban will be over earlier. The only case I know where a departure doesn't count as a departure for the purposes of this ban is when you leave on a grant of Advance Parole, as ruled by the BIA decision in Matter of Arrabally. But the reasoning in that case was that Advance Parole was specifically granted to allow the person to travel abroad an preserve their eligibility for Adjustment of Status, which a ban would defeat. But this reasoning wouldn't really apply to the case in this question, because permanent residency isn't specifically granted for travel abroad, and a returning permanent resident isn't subject to this ban anyway, so interpreting it as a departure doesn't defeat the maintenance of permanent residency. The issue you are asking about is rare. In most cases, when people become permanent residents, they stay permanent residents or naturalize to become US citizens, in which case they do not have to worry about this ban after becoming permanent residents. Only if they lose permanent residency would this question come up. I am not aware of any guidance or case law regarding this case.

Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder).

This helpful video gives the answer, and it's no, you don't have to open your door unless they have a warrant. If you've committed an indictable offence (those considered most serious, such as murder, manslaughter, causing really serious harm (injury) and robbery) they have the power to enter without a warrant (see 17 b of the PACE Act). In the case I saw there was no indictable offence and so the lady didn't (shouldn't!) have opened her door. You can speak to them through a closed door or window and if they try to break in it is they that are breaking the law.

Can having sex with a partner ever be considered a rape? Does a partner must seek permission each time he/she wants to have sex? Is there any act of husband or wife which can be considered as rape?

germany Is there any act of husband or wife which can be considered as rape? The paragraph for sexual offences is §177 StGb. Obviously there are nuances between those offences, not everything is "rape", but all of it is illegal. To answer your question, yes, the same acts that are considered rape when they are not husband and wife. While marriage had been an exception, this was considered archaic by many and this exception was removed in 1997: Vergewaltigung in der Ehe ist seit Juli 1997 strafbar. Mit dem 33. Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz wurde das Merkmal außerehelich aus dem Tatbestand der Vergewaltigung, § 177 StGB, gestrichen, sodass seitdem auch die eheliche Vergewaltigung als ein Verbrechen geahndet wird. Translation: Marital rape has been punishable since July 1997. With the 33rd Criminal Law Amendment Act, the characteristic "extramarital" was removed from the definition of rape, § Section 177 of the Criminal Code, so that since then marital rape has also been punished as a crime. There is no mention of how consent is to be expressed or even that it needs to be expressed explicitely.

The legal age of consent in the United Kingdom is 16 years old, and the legal age of consent in Algeria is also 16 years old so "sexting" itself would not be against the law. However, it is illegal in the UK "to take, or permit to be taken [..] any indecent photography of a child". This counterintuitively also applies to a child (under 18 years of age) taking a photo of themselves, as the photo is considered "Indecent". Within the UK prosecution of possessing, distributing, showing or making of indecent images of children isn't binary. Determining factors in potential prosecution are based on if (amongst other things): There is reason to believe that a child or young person has been coerced, blackmailed or groomed, or there are concerns about their capacity to consent (for example, owing to special educational needs). Source: gov.uk If the adult was trying to repeatedly solicit a picture from the minor then it could come under the Protection of Children Act. It's a legal grey area where it really depends on if the minor was pressured into sending pictures for the purposes of exploitation, malicious intent, persistent behaviour. 'Outcome 21' allows police in the UK discretion to determine if such behaviour occurred and whether to take action against those involved.

The whole institution of marriage is subject to arbitrary interpretation/twisting within/by any sovereign jurisdiction. Countries are normally within their rights to recognise marriages subject to any conditions they like, or even completely repudiate the institution of marriage altogether. Is there an international law to protect his/her rights to marry to a person of his/her choice? No. what are the legal ways for this person to protect his/her rights to marry? A few options: Elect a politician/party that will change the law; or If you do not care whether the government recognises your marriage if done the way you want, just marry where/how you want and live with it; or If you need the government to recognise your marriage (e.g. for relationship property protection etc.), move to a country where your "rights to marry" will be protected the way you want.

"Age of consent" is a legal meme that refers indirectly to different criminal statutes, for example in Missouri under MO Rev Stat § 566.034, A person commits the offense of statutory rape in the second degree if being twenty-one years of age or older, he or she has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen years of age §023 also states that "It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecutions under sections 566.032, 566.034, 566.062, 566.064, and 566.071, that the defendant was married to the victim at the time of the offense". MO Rev Stat §451.090 allows marriage with parental permission to those aged 16 and 17 (by prohibiting licensing of marriage to those younger) No recorder shall issue a license authorizing the marriage of any male or female under sixteen years of age nor shall a license be issued authorizing the marriage of any male or female twenty-one years of age or older to a male or female under eighteen years of age. Combining these legal parts, you get the result that a man may marry and impregnate a woman whom he could not legally have intercourse with (irrespective of pregnancy) were they not married. It just depends on what the specific law says.

The First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech", so to the extent that such a definition serves to limit one's freedom of speech, it is unconstitutional. If would also be unconstitutional to reward "love speech" or any other viewpoint. Crimes, such as murder, arson, rape and so on, are not constitutionally protected. The government can therefore define various parameters of severity (various degrees of assault defined in terms of "wantonness"). Assault, arson and murder are not legal forms of "expression", so assault motivated by a viewpoint is not "protected speech" – it isn't speech at all.

Do I have to pay child support if we are just dating and not married? We are not planning on having a child, but what if by some odd chance she gets pregnant? Does it depend on where I live? Like Toronto? The Modern Rule In Most Developed Countries It does depend upon where you live. No jurisdiction of which I am aware has ever distinguished between a planned child and an unplanned pregnancy in making a child support award. The vast majority of countries that have a category of obligation called "child support" apply it without regard to whether the parents are married. This would include all jurisdictions in Canada and the United States. But, in those jurisdictions, liability for child support in the case of an unmarried couple requires a mother seeking child support from a father, to establish the father's paternity by any of a variety of means, within the time allowed by law. Given the availability of cheap and highly reliable DNA tests to establish paternity, this step is now almost trivial and often waived by fathers who simply admit paternity instead when paternity seems clear. In contrast, paternity is presumed rather than something that has to be proved in cases involving a married couple. There is an exception to this general rule in most jurisdictions that have child support at all. This is because the husband of a married woman who has a child is presumed to be the father. Therefore, a man who is the biological father of the married woman's child is only obligated to pay child support if the father's paternity is established within the time allowed by law by the husband, the mother of the child, or a third-party on behalf of the child with standing to do so. Also, in most jurisdictions that have a concept of child support payments, a termination of parental rights (generally for abuse or neglect, but also in connection with a legal adoption by someone else) also terminates obligations to pay child support payments that arise after parental rights are terminated, although this rule is not universal. Generally that exception would not apply in the fact pattern that you describe. Historical and Comparative Context Historically, the concept of child support was unknown, illegitimate children and their mothers had no rights with respect to their fathers (and fathers had no rights with respect to their illegitimate children in most circumstances), and only married people were entitled to post-divorce support from an ex-spouse that was known as alimony and alimony served to provide support to both the ex-spouse and their children. The harshness of this historical rule was mitigated somewhat by the concept of common law marriage that had the practical effect of declaring an unmarried man who caused an unmarried woman to become pregnant to be declared husband and wife despite not having actually having gone through a marriage ceremony in many cases. At that time, there was an incentive for the man to re-characterize the nature of the relationship retroactively, because if the woman was not a prostitute, it would often be a crime or tort for the man to have had sex with the unmarried woman, enforceable by the state or by her father or guardian. But, if the couple were deemed to have been common law married, then all of these sanctions could be avoided. At this time, in areas where the state was not powerful enough to enforce these kinds of sanctions for premarital sex giving rise to a pregnancy, social pressure and sometimes even a literal "shotgun" marriage would be used to force the father to marry to mother. Prior to the 19th century in Western predominantly Christian countries, the only way to get a divorce was by special legislation in which the legislature passed a law specifically ending a particular couple's marriage. In the 19th century, bit by bit, Western countries started to allow judicially decreed divorces under a general statute on a proof of fault basis, with alimony awarded to the not at fault spouse under a breach of contract damages styled analysis that did not involve a separate child support component. Bit by bit in various Western jurisdictions during the 20th century, child support began to be recognized as a separate obligation from alimony and property division in a divorce, as partnership theories of family law, and parent-child relationship based theories of family law, began to replace the contract based theories of family law in earlier divorce actions. Non-marital relationship entitlements to child support also arose around the same time. Many U.S. states have both civil and criminal penalties for failing to provide financial support to your child. Japan only recognized child support as a separate type of relief in family law in the late 20th century (multiple decades after World War II), and has never had post-dissolution of marriage alimony after a divorce, although it has had temporary support not clearly distinguished between alimony and child support, during the pendency of divorce proceedings (which tend to be much shorter than in the U.S. and Canada). The primary relief to a spouse upon a divorce in Japan historically was property division and complete allocation of each child to one parent or the other, with no child support or alimony post-decree, until these late 20th century reforms allowing for limited child support payments (which are still rarely actually received even when ordered by a court) were adopted. The analysis in countries where the parents of the child are subject to Islamic rules of family law are beyond my competence, but quite different. Unlike Western jurisdictions, Islam has recognized non-legislative divorce since its inception in the early 600s CE as did prior pagan communities in places where Islam arose. One of the main reasons that child support and alimony were rare or non-existent at the time in almost all countries was that the legal systems and economic systems in existence at the time made intangible monetary obligations to pay child support in regular installments over a long period of time, and to enforce custody arrangements, was effectively impossible for former spouses to enforce in all but a very small fraction of cases.

Actual sex with a minor is an offence. Under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, doing something "which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence" is attempting to commit the offense, and is itself an offence. They have attempted the offence of having sex with a minor, although they didn't succeed because unbeknownst to them the other party was not a minor. There is some variability in whether it matters that there is no actual minor involved. In that specific instance the offence he was charged with was arranging the commission of a child sex offence (Sexual Offences Act 2003 §14), where one "intentionally arranges or facilitates something that he intends to do". Since he pleaded guilty, we won't find out how an appellate court would interpret 14(1)(b) ("doing it will involve the commission of an offence").

Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here.

Is "I didn't think it was serious" usually a good defence against "duty to rescue"? Supposing A gives B food that contains an ingredient that, unknown to A, B is violently allergic to, and B collapses. A refuses to call an ambulance, saying that B is just being dramatic, and continues to do so even when C confirms that B does, in fact, have this allergy and it is life-threatening. (Suppose that A is the only one present whose phone is working). In jurisdictions with a "duty to rescue" law, if B dies as a result of this, is "I thought C was exaggerating" likely to be a sufficient excuse?

germany You have the duty to help others even if they cannot articulate that. There was a case recently where people stepped over an unconscious person to get money from an ATM, thinking it was a homeless person sleeping inside the rather warm entrance to the public bank building. Turned out it was a normal elderly customer who had a medical emergency. Three customers walked around them and did not get help. Only the fourth customer called an ambulance about 20 minutes later. The person died in hospital, doctors said the delay in treatment did not cause the death, the person would have died even if help had been available earlier. Police used the banks security cameras to prosecute all who had just ignored the person and "thought it was okay, they were just sleeping". Newspaper Article: For example Der Spiegel. The actual text of the verdict: AG Essen-Borbeck, 18.09.2017 - 3 Ds - 70 Js 654/16 - 252/17, 3 Ds 252/17 In this case it was monetary fines, but if the person had actively asked for an ambulance, like in your case, and were actively denied instead of ignored, I'm pretty sure that would have made it way worse for the defendants.

The state health codes applicable to food are here esp. ch. V and here. The primary focus of those health codes is preventing the introduction of toxic substances or pathogens. There is obviously no law against serving meat, nor is there any law against half-and-half pizza. The only possible prospect for a health law addressing your interest would be via the allergy avenue (yes, you do not allege to be allergic to anything – my point is that even if you did, this would not help your cause). There are some provisions regarding training and informing when it comes to "major food allergens", which however is defined as Milk, EGG, FISH (such as bass, flounder, cod, and including crustacean shellfish such as crab, lobster, or shrimp), tree nuts (such as almonds, pecans, or walnuts), wheat, peanuts, and soybeans or proteins derived from the above. Note that mammal meat is not included (it may be an individual allergen, but it is not a statutory major food allergen). Even if you wanted to sue, you would have a very hard time establishing that you were damaged. First you would have to establish that they have a legal obligation to serve you "vegetarian food" (crucially undefined). You might be able to establish that they made such a promise. Now we have to determine whether a reasonable person would conclude that a pie with half-meat and half non-meat is clearly not vegetarian food. I do not believe that there is secular case law addressing this, so the courts would resolve this by determining whether there is a reasonable means for a vegetarian to eat part of such a pizza – obviously, yes, only eat the cheese part (leave wide margins). So there is no legal recourse for getting what you want: there are still ample political options.

Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.

This particular statement ("Person A lacks professionalism and integrity") may be protected because it isn't sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. established that the test is whether "a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements [...] imply [a defamatory assertion]". The court mentioned that "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language" would negate the impression that "[the speaker] was seriously maintaining [the defamatory claim]. The court also considered "the article's general tenor". It also emphasized that the statement was "sufficiently factual that it is susceptible of being proved true or false". Said in other ways: Is the statement "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false"? Can the statement "reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual"?

As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for Murder, Manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him? There are basically two distinct issues here. What is the duty? And if a duty was breached, what intent is necessary to breach it? There is not a legal duty to be vaccinated. There is a duty to use reasonable care not to hurt others. The duty not to hurt others could be satisfied by not seeing Bob in person, by wearing a mask around Bob or by having other non-transmission means available, in addition to being vaccinated. But Eve didn't do any of these things. We don't know if Eve had any reason to think that she presented a risk of infection to Bob because she could have passed the virus to him while she was asymptomatic. We also know, by the assumption of the question, that Eve was the source of the infection. But, in real life, proving the source of an infection beyond a reasonable doubt is very challenging or impossible. This must be established for any homicide crime. There is no indication that Eve knew she was transmitting the virus to Bob, or that Eve intended to transmit the virus to Bob (if she intentionally spat in Bob's face intending to infect him that would be a different matter). At most, her conduct was reckless, but if she was asymptotic and has no idea that she was doing something that was actually putting Bob at risk, her intent could be as slight as negligent (for tort law purposes only) or criminally grossly negligent. Since she lacked the necessary intent to commit murder (i.e. either an intention to kill, or an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm), she could not be guilty of the offense of murder. There are three types of voluntary manslaughter in England, none of which apply here: "There are three types of voluntary manslaughter: that resulting from loss of self-control; that resulting from statutorily defined diminished responsibility; and killing in perseverance of a suicide pact." So, this leaves involuntary manslaughter as the most serious possible homicide offense. Involuntary manslaughter could encompass either reckless conduct (i.e. "the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as an act which must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm resulting therefrom albeit not serious harm") and is usually in furtherance of some other criminal offense, or in the case of "gross negligence manslaughter", negligent conduct that is a far greater level of wrongdoing than the negligence that would suffice for civil tort liability. Gross negligence manslaughter is the most plausible charge and is itself a hard call that involves judgement and discretion on the part of the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, and the jury in a jury trial) that is exercised on a case by case basis considering all of the circumstances. Also, to be clear, the wrongful act in a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter case would be transmitting the virus (which could have been prevented multiple ways) and not failing to get vaccinated itself.

No More generally, government agencies have no duty to protect. In the cases DeShaney vs. Winnebago and Town of Castle Rock vs. Gonzales, the supreme court has ruled that police agencies are not obligated to provide protection of citizens. In other words, police are well within their rights to pick and choose when to intervene to protect the lives and property of others — even when a threat is apparent. In the united-kingdom , the situation is the same with the relevant case being Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, a precedent followed in australia. However, the police, fire fighters, ambulance officers etc. do owe the same common law duty of care as everyone else where such a duty exists if and when they do choose to act, unless specifically exempted by law. For example, they owe a duty to people in custody or innocent bystanders.

He is probably guilty of negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter, at most (a minor felony), and is possibly not guilty of a crime at all. The primary distinction between classes of homicide is mens rea (i.e. intent). The only affirmative act he took was to move the pillow. He did so both without intending to or knowing that he would kill Jane (the intent necessary for murder), and also, without clear actual knowledge that he would be creating a risk that Jane would die (a reckless state of mind that would support a conviction for manslaughter). Also, note that Walter himself, at this time, is not engaged in a felony, so he is not guilty of felony murder. We can presume he is present with the consent previously given of the owner of the property and did not mean anyone any harm. Likewise, this is not what is meant by "extreme indifference" for purposes of a murder statute, the paradigm of which is shooting randomly into a crowd knowing that someone will almost certainly be killed without knowing or intending that any particular person will die. The mental state necessary for negligent homicide is the equivalent of "gross negligence" in a civil case and is called "criminal negligence" in a criminal case. To be criminally negligent a person must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur, and the risk must be of such a nature that the defendant's failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard of care. If a jury found that a reasonable person ought should clearly know that moving a pillow put Jane at risk of dying, then he might be guilty of criminal negligence. But, if a jury found that a reasonable person would not know that moving the pillow put Jane at grave risk of death, his action would not be criminally negligent. There are also at least three questions of causation which is not entirely independent of the question of negligence. First, generally an act is only considered a cause of a consequence if it is a foreseeable result of the action. If Jane's vomit caused death is not a foreseeable result of moving the pillow, then her death might not be legally caused by moving the pillow. Second, how likely is it that she would have died even if Walter had never entered the room. There are lots of ways that the pillow could have been jostled during the night leading to the same result. If it likely would have happened anyway, Walter's involvement might not be the legal cause of the death. Third, how much fault should be attributed to Jane? This is closely related to the second question. If her death was primarily caused by her getting dangerously high and placing herself in a vulnerable position, perhaps Walter's involvement is not a meaningful cause of the death. A New Mexico court has held that the defense that the victim was negligent has value only if it establishes that the victim's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. State v. Maddox, 99 N.M. 490, 660 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1983). But, what about Jesse's negligence? Under a relevant standard criminal jury instruction in New Mexico: The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a significant cause of the death of __________________ (name of victim). Evidence has been presented that the negligence of a person other than the defendant may have contributed to the cause of death. Such contributing negligence does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act that significantly contributed to the cause of the death so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's actions. However, if you find the negligence of a person other than the defendant was the only significant cause of death, then the defendant is not guilty of the offense of __________________ (name of offense). Caveat: A number of states impose strict criminal liability on drug dealers, often for murder, if someone died from using a drug sold by them, but often it has to be a child, and often the drug has to be the proximate cause of death, e.g. due to an overdose or impurity in the drug. I would presume that Jesse and not Walter supplied the drugs to Jane, that Jane is an adult, and it is not obvious that the drug itself (as opposed to the vomiting due to the manner in which the drugs were used) was the proximate cause of death, so a statute like this might not apply in any case. This brings us to the hard part of the question: Without the pillow Jane rotates on her back and starts to vomit and cough, still sleeping. At first Walter tries to react, running to the other side of the bed to help her, but then he stops and decides to do nothing as she dies. Note that if Walter had moved the pillow without knowing that he was creating a risk, left the room ignorant, and then this happened, surely Walter would have no legal liability for Jane's death. If Walter develops the necessary intent for criminal liability, this probably doesn't happen until he observes that she is starting to choke on her vomit and might die. Even then, he does not intend for Jane to die and probably doesn't even know for certain that she will die from his inaction, so he is probably, at most reckless, if he has a duty to rescue for criminal law purposes. Generally, under both civil and criminal law, there is no duty to rescue, even if you can do so without any risk of harm to yourself. But, there is an exception, at least in civil liability, for a duty to rescue that arises from the fact that you put the person at risk of peril through your affirmative actions. Does this apply here, at all, or in a criminal case? The first question is the exact language of the homicide statute. Some homicide offenses require affirmative acts, while others can arise from acts or omissions where there is a legal duty to act. Every crime requires some voluntary act or omission, and the voluntary act itself was not a crime and perhaps was not even a tort, at the moment it was taken, because Walter did not realize that his act created a risk of harm. He create a peril, but he did so innocently. A pretty standard formulation is that an omission is only a crime when the law creates a legal duty to act, but this is, of course, a question begging standard as it doesn't clarify whether there is a legal duty to act, which is at issue here. As the previous link notes, creation of a peril can give rise to a legal duty to act, but only sometimes. (4) Duty arising from creation of peril. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. The cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or accidentally imperils another. This case would fall in the category of someone who innocently or accidentally imperils another, in which the cases are split, which which the linked article cites the following authority: Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) (defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). A commentary that is part of a California standard jury instruction (for involuntary manslaughter, not murder for which this kind of liability is presumably not available) makes the following observation: A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant's behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].) These examples would suggest that an innocently or accidentally created risk is sufficient to create a duty sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter liability for an omission under California law, and would probably lead to involuntary manslaughter liability in the case in the question as well, under California law. New Mexico, unlike California, does not have a standard criminal jury instruction or really definitive section of its criminal code that clearly resolves this question, although the fact that California which uses a murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter distinction in the same way that New Mexico does, limits criminal liability for omissions to involuntary manslaughter suggests that New Mexico would as well. The New Mexico case State v. Greenwood, 2012 -NMCA- 017, 271 P.3d 753 (N.M. App. 2011), touches on the issue, suggesting that there may be liability only for involuntary manslaughter (or certain specialized crimes based upon a relationship such as that of a nursing home to a resident of a nursing home) based upon an omission, and that the liability for an omission can only arise when there is a legal duty, but almost implies that only contactual duties are sufficient. It does so at paragraph 35 which says: Importantly, even if the LINKS contract relating to Jared were to have been renewed and to have been in force at the time of Jared's death, we are not convinced that it would be the sole basis or even a controlling factor in determining Defendant's legal responsibility under the Act. Defendant's criminal liability must exist solely based on an omission— a failure to act when she had a legal responsibility to act. See Deborah A. Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 Baylor L.Rev. 589, 594 (1983) (stating that " authorities have long agreed that before an omission can constitute an offense[,] there must first be a duty to act" ); see also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907) (" The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct cause of death." (citation omitted)). But, this could be dicta because it was a case where any legal duty would arise under contract rather than for another reason, and as is the case in many smaller states, there is simply no case that has ever been decided in New Mexico which is squarely on point. Under British criminal law, in similar circumstances, a homicide conviction was vacated: R v Khan & Khan (1998) CLR 830, confirmed that there is no separate category of manslaughter by omission unless the omission constitutes a breach of duty to act. The defendants supplied a 15-year-old prostitute with twice the amount of heroin likely to be taken by a regular user. The defendants left her unconscious in the flat, returning the next day to find that she had died of the overdose. Had medical assistance been called, the girl would probably not have died. The unlawful act was supplying the drug but the death was caused by the quantity injected by the victim. The trial judge invited jury to consider liability on the basis of the defendants' failure to summon medical assistance. On appeal, the conviction was quashed because the brothers had not accepted a duty to act before she took the heroin. A dissertation on when criminal liability is imposed for omissions in Scottish law can be found here. New Mexico, whose laws really should govern, has just two homicide statutes: § 30-2-1. Murder A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony. B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree. Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. Walter doesn't qualify for any of these prongs of the statute. § 30-2-3. Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Clearly, Walter also does not qualify as guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no quarrel or heat of passion. So, either Walter is guilty in New Mexico of involuntary manslaughter, or he is not guilty of homicide at all. New Mexico also has an unusual, and rather merciful "excusable homicide" provision at New Mexico Statutes § 30-2-5, that should also be considered: Homicide is excusable in the following cases: A. when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or B. when committed by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Arguably, Walter falls under "excusable homicide" part A, as moving the pillow was a lawful act done without unlawful intent and that is what caused the death.

The doctor is a professional Engineers don’t put extra wings on airplanes because the client asks. Lawyers don’t throw unsubstantiated allegations in their pleadings because the client asks. Accountants don’t change the balance sheet because the client asks. And doctors don’t prescribe unnecessary medications or vitamins because the client asks. For most people with normal health and a relatively balanced diet, nutritional supplements are medically unnecessary. They may make the user feel better through the placebo affect but doctors prescribe things that are necessary, not things the patient wants but doesn’t need. You can sue a doctor if they are negligent. One sure sign of negligence is if they adopt the treatment plan proposed by the patient without applying their professional judgement.

On a mobile app, can I use IP location services to determine if a user is from EU prior to GDPR consent? I have a question about the GDPR law. I am creating a mobile application where I will need to store some personal data in order for the app to work. I would also like to include personalized ads in the app. Now if GDPR applies, I would need to get explicit consent from the user before showing personalized ads. However, here is my problem: In order to know if GDPR applies to my user, I have to determine whether they are in the EU. I can do this by using a location API based on the user IP or by accessing some device settings. If I understand correctly, both ways would require prior GDPR consent of my user. Can I access a user's location before they gave their GDPR consent? If not, how do I even know that I need their consent before asking them for it? It seems a bit like a chicken - egg problem to me.

Since you are from Europe, GDPR applies to all your processing activities per Art 3(1) GDPR, regardless of where the users are located. If you would like to avoid GDPR compliance, you would have to manage your business from abroad so that you no longer have an European establishment, and would have to avoid offering your services to people who are in Europe. So let's assume that you have no European establishment. Then, GDPR can only apply per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to offering goods or services to people who are in Europe. For determining this, IP-based geolocation is indeed common. Very likely, you do not need consent for this. GDPR does not require consent for everything, just a legal basis. There are six potential legal bases in Art 6(1), though the relevant ones are consent, necessity for performing a contract, legal obligations, and necessity for a legitimate interest. For things like security checks, it would be common to claim a legitimate interest. Complying with GDPR can hurt revenue. However, data subjects have a right to data protection, but you do not have a right to a particular business model. Similarly, paying taxes can "hurt revenue", but it's not really optional. If your business model can't deal with GDPR compliance (or with taxes), it might not be a sound business model. In Europe, many newspapers have since moved from advertising-only to a consent-or-pay model. That is, the user is given a choice: You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription. You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking. The legality of this is hotly debated. In principle, such an approach can be compliant, but the details are problematic, for example that you can only buy subscriptions rather than individual articles, and that these subscriptions are often orders of magnitude more expensive than what would be earned through ads. But this might actually be easier to solve for a mobile application than for a website, due to the availability of in-app payment and micropayment infrastructure. In any case, GDPR limits how much you can "encourage" consent – per Art 7(4), you cannot make access to your service conditional on consent. There must be a way to use your app without consenting to anything, unless that consent is actually necessary for the app to work. For example, consenting to camera access is necessary for a QR code reader app to work. It is extremely unlikely that ads would be necessary in this sense. Users also must not suffer detriment for declining or withdrawing consent. From this, the EDPB has developed the concept of "permissible incentive" in their guidelines on consent. In this post, "Europe" means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate.

GDPR definitely applies. Your scenario seems to raise two questions: What is the legal basis for processing? Are the security measures appropriate? Legal basis Every processing activity of personal data requires a legal basis. Most well-known is consent, but there are six categories in Art 6(1) GDPR including legitimate interests and necessity for performing a contract with the data subject. Conditions on consent are laid out in Art 7 GDPR. You say that data subjects “explicitly agree to the website's privacy policy and GDPR”. The GDPR does not generally expect “agreement” to a privacy policy, as information per Art 13 is an unilateral notice. Such general agreement also cannot constitute valid consent. In the context of certifications, the legal basis would likely be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject: You were contracted to provide this validation service to the data subjects. You should however make it clear which information will be displayed on the validation page (other than a valid/not valid) response. For example, I am concerned that showing the email address would not be strictly necessary for providing the validation service. You should also consider whether this validation service is a core component of your certification service, or whether there should be an opt-in or opt-out here. Security Measures The GDPR requires that you implement appropriate security measures, “taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms” of the data subjects (see Art 32 GDPR). This gives you a lot of leeway to determine what measures are appropriate, but also criteria that you must consider in your determination. A number of security measures are explicitly suggested and must also be considered: pseudonymization and encryption ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability, and resilience of your systems ability to restore the service (e.g. backups) processes for regularly testing and evaluating your measures Aside from generic IT security measures like backups and providing the service over a HTTPS connection, I would be concerned about “insecure direct object reference” style attacks on the database. If I know that certification no 1234 exists, I could try to get the information for other numbers like no 1233 and so on. This would leak personal data. Basic defenses could include requiring additional information such as the data subject's name to be provided, or using anti-bot measures such as captchas and rate limits. However, the real solution is to avoid sequential IDs, and to generate sufficiently large tokens with a cryptographically secure random number generator. Instead of a “certification number”, it would be better to view this as a “validation code”.

Article 32 of the GDPR requires companies to adequately secure their data when handling data belonging to EU citizens. This also applies to cross border scenarios where data is transferred between countries. Technically speaking, the GDPR doesn't set a standard for security: you don't have to encrypt your data, use AES or RSA encryption, or hash and salt passwords. It is your choice on how to secure your data, though the GDPR does mandate specific ways to secure data. However, not doing so opens yourself up to two consequences: The European data protection supervisor is tasked with the enforcement of regulations. A company can be forced to increase their level security if a valid complaint alleging that inadequate security measures are in place is made There is a significant amount of security risk, and if a data breach occurs, the GDPR allows authorities to levy heavy fines. Especially heavy fines may occur if it is found that the data was not securely stored. So the answer is: A complaint to relevant authorities can force the company to take action, or they will lose access to the European market.

Under European rules (GDPR, ePrivacy), you only need consent here if you both access or store information on the user's device (such as cookies), and this access/storage is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. A session cookie is strictly necessary for providing a log-in functionality, so such cookies are unlikely to require consent. In contrast, cookies for measuring ad impressions are not strictly necessary for showing the website content. Necessity must always be thought from the user's perspective, not from the provider's economic needs. If you use one cookie for multiple purposes, you should analyze each purpose separately. Maybe setting a cookie does not require consent under one purpose, but accessing the same information for a different purpose could require consent. If you have to ask for consent, this consent must be in line with the GDPR's requirements in Art 7. Consent must be freely given, i.e. there must actually be a way to decline the consent without suffering detriment. Consent must be informed, i.e. the user must be told directly for what consent is being sought, without having to click through to a long privacy policy. Consent must be specific, so it must be possible to consent for one purpose while declining consent for another. An "I agree to the terms of service and privacy policy" checkbox cannot constitute valid GDPR consent because it fails all these criteria: I cannot use the service without agreeing, I'm not told essential information up front (you cannot expect users to actually read long privacy policies), and this is an all-or-nothing bundle that does not allow specific choices. If you do not have to ask for consent, you should still be transparent about your use of cookies, for example by providing a paragraph on this topic in your privacy notice. I think showing a cookie banner would be a bad idea in that scenario, since it could be confused with an invalid consent banner (no way to decline the cookies).

I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).

Yes, your transaction history is your personal data. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. Your transaction history relates to you, and you're definitely identifiable for the bank. You have access to the transaction history to the app, which would probably satisfy Art 15 GDPR. You do also have a right to data portability under Art 20 GDPR which allows you to get your data in a machine-readable format – but strictly speaking this right only applies to data you provided yourself. You could try to explicitly invoke this right. Your GDPR rights must be satisfied without cost. Your bank almost certainly does provide machine-readable API access, in conformance with the open banking mandate from the Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2, Directive (EU) 2015/2366). The Directive requires your EU member state to have passed a law that gives you “the right to make use of services enabling access to account information”, if you're already using online banking. However, the exact details of that right will depend on the laws in your EU member state. You might already be able to connect to your transaction history via Open Banking software such as GNU Cash.

It seems like some law must have been breached during the sharing of this information? Possibly, even probably. The scrutiny of your personal account in order to glean personal data (your IP address) and then using that personal data to match accounts may contravene Recital 50 of the GDPR: The processing of personal data for purposes other than those for which the personal data were initially collected should be allowed only where the processing is compatible with the purposes for which the personal data were initially collected. If the website terms which you agreed to don't include this data matching, then that processing is not lawful. The rest of Recital 50 is relevant and worth quoting in full: If the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, Union or Member State law may determine and specify the tasks and purposes for which the further processing should be regarded as compatible and lawful. Further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes should be considered to be compatible lawful processing operations. The legal basis provided by Union or Member State law for the processing of personal data may also provide a legal basis for further processing. In order to ascertain whether a purpose of further processing is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, the controller, after having met all the requirements for the lawfulness of the original processing, should take into account, inter alia: any link between those purposes and the purposes of the intended further processing; the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller as to their further use; the nature of the personal data; the consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects; and the existence of appropriate safeguards in both the original and intended further processing operations. It seems to me that an anonymous account could reasonably expect that the "further processing" of data matching is not in the public interest, an exercise of official authority, scientific or historical research or statistical. There is no link between the data matching exercise and the purpose for which IP addresses are normally collected: the operation and physical security of the website. Now, it may well be that the website terms do allow this data matching to discover links between accounts, or in any case prohibit having two accounts and allow reasonable methods to discover such links. It's also possible that a court has ordered the processing (as Iñaki Viggers has mentioned. We don't have that information; but ostensibly one wouldn't normally expect a personal account to be examined in this way, and certainly wouldn't expect any link discovered to be relayed to a third party.

The obligation to notify the supervisory authority (CNIL in your case) no longer exists. It was part of the previous regulatory framework, but it is not part of GDPR (which takes affect tomorrow). If you use CCTV that may monitor employees (i.e. they sometimes enter the HQ to consult with the owner), your obligations under the GDPR is basically to inform the employees that the CCTV cameras are there. I.e. Data subjects are entitled to understand when their personal data is being processed, covering the transparency aspect of processing. The use of CCTV must be communicated via signage which indicates the areas covered and instructions for further information.

What are the steps to collect against a SAFE investment contract? I have a fund that signed a SAFE (simple agreement for future equity) and wants to invest $400k in my company. It has been 2 months and they haven't sent the money. This had materially impacted my company. They have $85M in assets. How can I collect what I am owed and how long does this process typically take?

A SAFE is basically what used to be called a "subscription agreement", i.e. an agreement to invest money in the future that will ultimately give rise to an equity investment if made. From a practical perspective, while the contract is legally enforceable, pursuing a lawsuit to enforce it is almost always a death knell level bad move. Firms who sue investors early in the game don't get future investors. The amount of time it takes to enforce such an agreement in a lawsuit is also too long (perhaps a year or two before you have money in hand if it runs its course and still many months if it settles), and the cost of doing so is too great (probably more than $40,000 that you won't get back to bring in $400,000), for it to make sense to do so at the delicate early stage of a start up. Instead, what you need to do is get on the phone with the investor, or quite possibly meet in person, at their offices or in a more casual deal making environment over drinks, for example, to figure out what is troubling them or slowing things up and how to make them happy. This is more of a function of continuing to sell the fact that you are good investment and an opportunity that they are missing out on, than it is about telling them about your legal rights. If this fails, it is probably wiser to seek financing from someone else than to force them to perform.

It should be legal (though I can't find an analogous case where the court has ruled that it is). There is a regulation summarizing the government's position (thus, what will be enforced in 17 CFR 240.10b, which prohibits use of "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in stock trading. Section 240.10b5-1 says: The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and §240.10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information. The executives clearly have a direct duty of trust of confidence. Section 240.10b5-2 enumerates the following duties: (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information. In the hypothetical, (1) is plainly not applicable. (2) is predicated on having a relationship (which doesn't exist) and the information-having expecting you to keep the information secret (he doesn't know that you have overheard them). (3) is likewise not applicable. The basic rule is that you can't "misapproprate" information, but you can use information that falls into your lap (even from a person who has a duty to not disclose the information). This subsection starts saying "For purposes of this section, a “duty of trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others", which means they aren't necessarily giving you an exhaustive list. Still, there is currently no legal basis for prosecuting a person who overhears information from someone he has no relationship to, even if you are pretty confident that the information has not been made public.

You have a fiduciary duty as a director to act in the best interests of the company. Not your interests, not his interests, not the shareholders' interests (individually or as a group); the company's interests. You must also separate the other guy's performance as an employee from his performance as a director. If he is not performing as an employee then the correct course of action is to sack him as an employee, not as a director; and vice-versa. If he turns up to the board meetings and considers the information he is given as a director then he is not "performing poorly" in that role. However, provided you follow the law and your company's constitution I have no doubt this would be legal. You need to consult a lawyer before you do anything - it can't be the company's lawyer because he does have a conflict of interest. Notwithstanding its legality, it's a stupid idea. It doesn't fix the fundamental problem: you are in business with someone you don't want to be in business with. You need to find a way to not be in business with him and to start that process by ticking him off is a bad move. You need to reach agreement on how to end your relationship: just shoving him out while he is still a shareholder will have him looking for the first opportunity to sue you and the company the instant it underperforms.

This is largely a contract law issue, with little to do with intellectual property. Let's take a closer look at Offer and Acceptance of a Contract. An Offer or Acceptance can be made: Orally In writing By conduct First, you offer your client a written contract, with terms and conditions. Your client refused to accept. There is no contract. Then, your client offers you another contract, orally: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. It is irrelevant whether $X and $Y are the same as in the written contract or not. This is a separate contract, and the original terms you proposed does not apply. Did you accept this contract? From Felhouse v. Bindley (1862): Acceptance must be communicated clearly and cannot be imposed due to silence of one of the parties. Since you accepted the deposit and began work, you have accepted the contract by conduct. This is a contract where there is no terms and conditions besides that one sentence mentioned by your client. Furthermore, you intent to carry on this contract (you wish to complete the project and get the money). This contract has benefits to you for Consideration. Would it have made a difference? Suppose that your client's response is: We are sorry, our company has a weird policy about accepting contracts in writing, 30 people have to approve it and it takes 3 months. Would you take a verbal acceptance? We will give you $X as deposit and you will begin work, after work is finished we will give you $Y, as stated in the contract. Then this would be an oral acceptance of the original (written) contract with terms and conditions. But that cannot happen, since the client explicitly refused your offer. An acceptance must be unconditional. Qualification of terms of offer means to destroy the original offer. Counter-offer means to reject the original offer. Can the client use the deposit as evidence that there is a verbal contract? Yes, certainly. But this contract is not the un-signed contract. Read this conversation, again, carefully: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. There is no mention that your proposed terms and conditions apply, is there? Even if the client, after 2 weeks, come back to you and says: Sorry for refusing your offer earlier. After due consideration, we think your company's proposal is best. We would like to move forward with you. It will be $X for the deposit, and $Y after completion. All your proposed terms and conditions apply. Deal? This time your client is making an Offer. If you accept, it will be a new contract, not the same one you offered to the client earlier. About the money. This is really a case by case situation. Depending on how much the entire project is completed and the nature of the project, results can be different. A deposit is necessary to begin work. The deposit secures the client's intention to carry on the project. The final payment is make after work is finished satisfactorily. Isn't the current situation exactly what a deposit is for?

Better to start fresh. From an investor's perspective, an old C-corp inherently leaves open questions over whether there are any skeletons in the closet and the dollar cost and effort involved is trivial.

is there any legal action I can take against the dealership to enforce their compliance with our contractual agreement? Yes, you can sue for breach of contract. You would probably seek an order for specific performance. You could also claim damages but it is difficult to see exactly what damage you have suffered. Is there a reasonable timeline that they must deliver within if a date is not specified in the contract? Yes, where a contract is silent on a date for performance of an obligation they must be carried out in a reasonable time. From the circumstances 4 months is starting to seem unreasonable but they will no doubt argue that it is reasonable- this is something the court would decide.

What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this.

the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.

Are sites that give unfiltered ADS-B data legal? Are plane tracking services such as ADS-B Exchange and TheAirTraffic that do not honor the FAA's Limited Aircraft Data Display program legal to use? Is it legal to operate a feeder station for one of these? Is it legal to run one of these services? In other words, is LADD enforceable?

Section 566 ("RIGHT TO PRIVACY WHEN USING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM", page 3385) of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, the law which created LADD, says, Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Administrator shall, upon request of a private aircraft owner or operator, block the registration number of the aircraft of the owner or operator from any public dissemination or display, except in data made available to a Government agency, for the noncommercial flights of the owner or operator. This says nothing about creating legal obligations for anyone except the FAA Administrator, so it seems that LADD is not binding on anyone except the FAA. There is one case in which LADD is binding: the FAA's page on LADD says, Vendors who subscribe to FAA SWIM [System-Wide Information Management] Data feeds are bound by a Data Access User Agreement to filter any LADD participant from public display of aircraft flight data. Thus, flight trackers using FAA SWIM data are required to comply with LADD, even if they obtain data on the aircraft from another source. The wording of the FAA's site also implies that compliance is not mandatory for trackers that do not have agreements with the FAA to use SWIM data.

A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.

Ark. Code 5-60-120 is very clear that the act of intercepting is a crime. Not just "recording and using", not just "recording", but intercepting in any way. Specifically: It is unlawful for a person to intercept a wire, landline, oral, telephonic communication, or wireless communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and recording. Intercepting is illegal, therefore it is not "okay". Perhaps the "sort of a lawyer" was speaking of the probability of getting caught doing it.

First, it is highly unlikely that it would remain continuously exactly at 60,000 feet. I mention this because that altitude happens to be the boundary between Class "A" airspace, and Class "E". (see graphic below) Class A airspace is the domain of a lot of commercial air traffic, so the FAA regulates it closely. Specific requirements for aircraft can be found in 14 CFR 91.135. If no prior coordination was made with FAA Air Traffic Controllers, and no clearance was explicitly given, the balloon would be in violation of this regulation at a minimum. Presuming it would drift above 60,000', it would still be in Class E airspace, which the FAA has jurisdiction over, even if the flight requirements are less stringent. Specific requirements for balloons can be found in 14 CFR Subpart D, 101.33, 101.35, 101.37, and 101.39. Presuming the Chinese did not comply, it would also be in violation of these sections.

In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.

I can't see any law that would make this illegal. If you don't like it, you can either pay the upgrade, or not fly Ryanair.

Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.

Copyright Prominent at the bottom of the page is: © RealClearPolitics 2015 This is nice because it tells you who you have to approach for a licence. If it wasn't there the material would still be copyright you just wouldn't know who owned the copyright. Questions So: If I'm looking to build an app or write a book and I wish to use statistics, am I allowed to basically use their numbers as long as I cite where it is coming from? No, unless what you do constitutes fair use and I don't think it does. If I do make a profit from it, do I owe any royalties to the original scientists/surveyers? No, but you would owe whatever licence fee you negotiated with the copyright holder, ostensibly RealClearPolitics. Must I ask them for permission? Yes, unless you are OK with running the risk of being sued. Commentary I see books reference hundreds of studies all the time This is because they are generally protected by Academic Fair Use public polls should be open information to everyone The only public poll that I know of is an election and that information is available. What you are looking at is a private poll commissioned by and paid for by RealClearPolitics and it is their intellectual property; why should that "be open information to everyone"? commercial interests may be legally entangling Always

What differentiates living as mere roommates from living in a marriage-like relationship? For jurisdictions that provide that a couple become spouses after living together in a marriage-like relationship for a given period of time1, how is such a marriage-like relationship different than living as mere roommates? 1. For example, in British Columbia, a person is a spouse for the purposes of the Family Law Act if they have "lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship" for a period of two years. But that is just an example, and this question is open to answers from jurisdictions with analogous paths to spousal status, even if they use different terminology.

canada Courts have generally recognized that there is no "checklist." Courts will look at a multitude of indicators "of the sorts of behaviour that society, at any given point in time, associates with a marital relationship" (Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492). [The indicators] include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. However, it was recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. (M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 59.) Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist. (Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124).

My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have.

So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other.

From the time that the lease expired and you remained with permission, you had a shorter period of obligation and protection. I assume that the lease ended long ago, and you've been living there month to month. Assuming that we can read "two rental periods" as "two whole months" (if there is something else in the lease that indicates this, such as a rent due-date), then we can interpret the notice requirement as saying that you must give notice before the first of the month 2 months before the intended end of tenancy – that is one meaning of the lease. Another meaning is that you can give notice 58 days in advance. The lease has an ambiguity as to what the notice requirement is. Since you did not write the lease, and they did (well, someone, whose obligations they inherited, did), the ambiguity is construed against the party to wrote it. In the present circumstance, because you want to leave soon, you would not be held to the notice requirement that favors the landlord. It's entirely non-obvious why such wording would be used. In 504B.135, the statutes say (a) A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less. (b) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in writing. Once you're past the end of the lease, you are a tenant at will, by the definitions section: "Tenancy at will" means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date. Assuming that you pay rent at the first of the month, then the lesser of a whole calendar month and three months is, obviously, a whole calendar month. The stuff at the end of the statute that you cite – "The notice must be in writing and direct the tenant's attention" – is addressed to the landlord's notice to tenant, where he says "Your tenancy will not auto-renew". This applies to leases of 2 months or longer, not recycled 1 month leases, and requires the landlord to give the tenant appropriate notice (it does not define the tenant's notice requirement).

A brief explanation follows. The Code of Hammurabi articulates the first form of alimony: If a man wish to separate from a woman who has borne him children, or from his wife who has borne him children: then he shall give that wife her dowry, and a part of the usufruct of field, garden, and property, so that she can rear her children. When she has brought up her children, a portion of all that is given to the children, equal as that of one son, shall be given to her. She may then marry the man of her heart In the Middle Ages, English ecclesiastical law mandated that a husband still has an obligation to support his wife even when they are separated (recall that divorce was not possible). This carried over to the US. As discussed in this article, there was a view (articulated in Bradwell v. Illinois by Justice Bradley that "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender .... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator". The basic rationale at the time was that the wife had a right to support as a consequence of the marriage, and would continue to exercise that right were it not for the conduct of the husband (by law, someone was at fault, and if it was the husband, he would have to compensate his wife). When no-fault divorce became a possibility in the late 60's, concepts of alimony were re-worked, so that alimony was no (usually) longer a permanent property right, and in its place there developed a desideratum of "maintenance" allowing the spouse with lesser economic power to maintain a diminishing property right. See this 1973 version of Washington's replacement-for-alimony law, which includes "The standard of living established during the marriage" as the law now does. Because this is established by state law in the US, and state legislatures aren't infamous about keeping close track of legislative debates, I don't think there are any surviving records of the rationale of the author of these bills. In fact, this law was drafted a few years earlier by The Uniform Law Commission – there may be some record of their discussion. [This article][5], written after the law was passed, takes note of the history of contractual concepts being applied to marriage (e.g. the territorial legislature enacted a measure that "marriage is declared to be a civil contract"), from which perspective one expects there to be compensation for breach of contract.

I am a notary public in Vermont and have had to deal with people who had name variations. Readers of Law StackExchange like to citations to reliable sources; I'm not going to do that, just describe my experience. Many states do indeed allow a person to adopt a new name through usage. Government agencies and large commercial agencies don't like that, and they can and do thwart the law by imposing their own administrative procedures. If you don't like their procedures, fine, give a lawyer a $20,000 retainer, have the lawyer sue, and wait three years. And after spending all that money, the court might find that although it isn't a crime for a person to change their name by usage, there is no law requiring the administrative agency to accept it. If you don't have tens of thousands of dollars to waste or years to wait, you have two choices. Get married, and use the marriage license as evidence of your name change. The format of marriage licenses is different in every state, so how well this works depends on the state. The other option is to get a court-ordered name change.

This Marriage Annulment FAQ purports to be based on real-world examples. The reasons for not knowing the status of a marriage appear to fall into three main categories; That the marriage process is later found out to be suspect (e.g. that the marriage may not have been conducted or registered correctly) The one or both parties may have still been married at the time of their subsequent marriage (or may not have gone sufficiently far through the process of divorce to be allowed to be legally remarried). That the wedding or divorce have additional complications relating to different territories or jurisdictions, for example marrying in a foreign country and not realising that ceremony may be invalid elsewhere.

Short Answer Usually, a divorce decree doesn't leave former spouses as co-owners of the former marital residence, but sometimes this happens anyway. To oversimplify, if the divorce decree leaves a couple a co-owners, either of them can usually force the sale of the property and a division of the proceeds left after paying off the mortgage, in a special kind of lawsuit called a partition action. The rights of mortgage lenders and lienholders against both former spouses cannot be changed without paying off the loan in most cases. If a spouse who lives there isn't able to pay off the old loan and refinance it in their name alone, this usually means that the house will be sold to a third party with the net proceeds of the sale split. The net proceeds from the sale of the house are divided in proportion to their ownership interests in the co-owned property that can sometimes be tricky to calculate. Often the ability of either party to force a sale of the house in a partition action leads the parties to reach a settlement in the shadow of the possible outcome. Long Answer Caveats This answer sets forth the general rules that apply the vast majority of the time. There are some rare and obscure exceptions to these rules that can apply buried in dark corners of Texas law, and this answer doesn't not comprehensively ferret out every single such exception to the general rules. This answer also doesn't discuss ways in which outcomes that shouldn't be allowed by these rules can be made possible by one party or another's procedural mistakes in the court system, which is fact specific and can arise in certain situations. What Is A Divorce Decree? The only way a divorce case can end is for the divorce to be called off (either by mutual agreement or because one or both of the divorcing spouses die before the case is over), or for a divorce decree to be entered by the court, ending the marriage and establishing the rights of the parties after the divorce with respect to each other and their property. A divorce decree can be entered either by mutual agreement of the spouses in a divorce case, but if they can't agree, the judge in the divorce case will impose a divorce decree dividing property and handling other issues in the divorce as the divorce judge sees fit consistent with Texas law. Either way, it isn't official until it is signed by the judge. Sometimes a divorce decree will be very short, but will incorporate by reference one or more other documents like a mutually agreed separation agreement, or a parenting plan, or a schedule of who gets what property in the divorce. The Role of A Divorce Decree Almost anything can be done by mutual agreement (although all decisions related to children must be approved by the judge with a finding that the agreement is in the best interests of the children). A judge has far more limitations on what the judge can do in a divorce decree to establish the post-divorce property rights of the ex-spouses, but the judge still has great discretion in how the judge may make those decisions. Usually, the ownership of a house is handled in a way that leaves only one spouse owning the house in connection with a divorce proceeding. For example, ex-husband may be ordered to transfer the house to ex-wife, and ex-wife may be ordered to transfer her pension to ex-husband in exchange, if that is what the divorce decree says. One of the grounds for appealing a judge's divorce decree decision to a higher court is that the judge didn't adequately separate the spouses financially. But that doesn't mean that a divorce decree can never leave ex-spouses as co-owners of property. Once the divorce case is over, if nothing in the divorce decree separates ownership of the house, then the ex-husband and ex-wife have the same rights with respect to each other that a house co-owned by two people who were never married would have (unless the divorce decree states otherwise). Some divorce decrees, however, prohibit the sale or transfer of the house without the mutual consent of the former husband and former wife (for former husband and former husband, or former wife and former wife, in a same sex marriage), either indefinitely, or for some time period defined in the divorce decree. In rare cases, the divorcing spouses could agree to do something that leaves neither of them owning their house, like agreeing to sell it, or agreeing to give it to charity, or putting it in the trust for their children. The Rights Of Unmarried Co-Owners Of Property When A Divorce Decree Doesn't Provide Otherwise A lawsuit to terminate co-ownership of real estate without the consent of all of the owners of the real estate is called a partition action. In the case of a house that cannot feasibly be divided in kind the way that, for example, farmland could be, what a partition action does is force the house to be sold, with the proceeds divided. Conceivably, one spouse or the other could be both one of the two sellers, and one of the buyers at the partition sale if the spouse that is both selling and buying is the highest bidder in a sale that is open to the general public. In this case, the partition sale is functionally equivalent to cashing out the equity of a spouse who is not the highest bidder at a partition sale. Frequently, given the inevitability of an ultimate partition sale in these cases, the parties will instead reach a mutual agreement to either have one party cash out the other for an agreed valuation of the house and allocation of the equity in the house. Alternatively, another common form of settlement is that the co-owners will agree to sell the house for an agreed price to a third-party and then to divide the net proceeds either according to a pre-agreed formula or in litigation over net proceeds from the agreed sale held in a court controlled bank pending a judicial determination of each spouse's share of the proceeds. Partition actions aren't the most expensive kind of court case, but usually, at least one of the parties needs to have a lawyer for it to go smoothly and the legal fees aren't usually negligible either. Critically, the fact that "mom pays mortgage and lives in the house" doesn't matter much in a partition action after the divorce is over. Paying the mortgage and living in the house are frequently considered to cancel out, rather than changing the share of the equity to which each former spouse is entitled. An ex-wife cannot just get an ex-husband off of the title without being the highest bidder at a partition sale. If ex-husband is the highest bidder, he will stay on the title and she will be off the title and will have to move out or pay him rent. If the third-party is the highest bidden, she will have to move out or pay rent to the third-party, and neither of them will be on the title anymore. The Rights Of Mortgage And Lien Creditors The fact that both ex-spouses are responsible to the mortgage company (and any lienholders who have rights identical to mortgage companies for the purposes of this question) if they were both on the mortgage before the divorce can't be changed without the mortgage lenders consent (which is almost never given), unless the mortgage is paid off in full and (if necessary) refinanced. If there is a partition sale, the mortgage debt must be paid off before either spouse gets any of the proceeds from the partition sale. The Impact of Community Property Laws In Texas One complicating factor in this analysis is that Texas is a community property state. So, to determine what share of the equity in a house belongs to each spouse (if any) you have to apply community property rules that are deceptively simply, but are quite complicated to apply in practice. The general rule of community property in Texas is that property acquired before the marriage or by gift or inheritance by a single spouse, or allocated to a spouse in divorce decree, is separate property. All other property of the couple of community property. Any property for which separate property status can't be proven, or for which there is too much co-mingling of community and separate property, is community property. A spouse is entitled to 100% of the that spouse's separate property, and in addition, to 50% of the community property of the couple, upon divorce. Also, at death, a decedent can't leave the surviving spouse's separate property to someone else, can't leave the 50% of the property that is community property immediately prior to death, that is owned by the surviving spouse, to anyone other than the surviving spouse, without the surviving spouse's consent. Ideally, the divorce decree will spell out what percentage of each piece of land or other property that is owned by each former spouse once they are divorced. But, sometimes a divorce decree entered by mutual agreement, or by a judge, is sloppy and doesn't make that point clear. If the divorce decree doesn't clarify what percentage of the property is owed by each ex-spouse, this has to be cleared up later when the house is sold in a partition action, if there is no mutual agreement to the contrary. A valid pre-nuptial agreement, or a valid post-nuptial agreement, however, can modify the community property rules of Texas that would otherwise apply. The application of community property rules is also particularly complicated in cases where the couple spends part of their marriage in Texas, and part of their marriage either in a state that is not a community property state or that has very different community property laws on some key issues. The Impact Of Post-Divorce Economic Activity Related To The House Also, the amounts spent by the co-owners of the house after the divorce, and the question of whether one of the co-owner has been excluded from the co-owned house by the other, could change the share of each co-owner in the equity in the house after the divorce. The exact rules for how these adjustments are made are complicated, and are often subject to a judge's discretionary decision about this issue should be resolved in a partition action. Footnote Re Gender All of the rules discussed above, even if I haven't worded my explanations that way, are gender neutral. The rules are the same for ex-husbands as they are for ex-wives (and vice versa) in opposite sex marriages, for ex-husbands in same sex marriages, and for ex-wives in same sex marriages.

(Germany) Repairs at end of rental contract for pre-existing issues: who has burden of proof? I recently moved to a new apartment, and cancelled the contract for my previous apartment where I had lived for several years. The contract for the old apartment had a three month notice period, so I found a replacement tenant for the landlord to avoid paying rent on both places for that time. On moving in, the new tenant found some areas needing a little work. He has contacted the landlord, who has now asked me to resolve these issues or have the cost of doing so taken from my deposit. Some of these issues are fair complaints and I'm working with the new tenant to resolve them quickly. So far so good. The problem: Some issues date from before I moved in, but the landlord is now demanding I resolve them at my own cost. When I moved in, I signed the contract (which is the standard and well-known in Germany "Hamburger Mietvertrag für Wohnraum") at the landlord's office and received the keys directly. There was no official handover appointment where the state of the apartment was inspected, and I failed to photograph or otherwise document these issues at the time. I understand that the real problem here is my failure to document these issues on moving in (it was my first time renting my own place and I was naive). I'm fortunate enough to have a good job and ultimately I'll be fine even if I do have to pay these costs. But on principle I'm obviously not keen to pay for work handling issues from before I first rented the place, and now I'm also just plain curious who actually has the burden of proof in any dispute like this. tl;dr: Where does a tenant stand if their ex-landlord deducts costs for pre-existing issues from my deposit? The contract states the apartment condition as "renovated" at the time of moving in. Will the tenant find they have to pay for resolving pre-existing issues because they failed to document them at the time, or can they demand the landlord prove the issues were not pre-existing? In case it's relevant, there are a few little things but the primary issue is about the paint on two walls of the living room - the walls can't be painted evenly as they are unplastered and have a very uneven texture (very porous in some places, relatively smooth in others). The landlord now expects me to pay to plaster the wall.

australia A tenant must return the property in the state it was given subject to fair wear and tear Fair wear and tear represents the deterioration that occurs in normal use - so it includes wear on a carpet from walking on it but not wear from having a horse walk on it (unless you’re renting a stable but who puts carpet in a stable?) If the wall is in the condition that it was given to you but for the normal deterioration over time, then you are not liable to fix it. As for who has the onus of proof, since the landlord is the one claiming the entitlement, they have to prove it. However, the burden is only the balance of probabilities. So, if there is a fist shaped hole in the plaster wall and there is no evidence it was there when the tenant moved in, then, it’s more likely than not that it happened on the tenant’s watch and they have to fix it. Because putting fists through walls is something that residents are more likely to do than landlords. However, if there is a painted wall and the initial application of the paint is defective, then absent evidence that the tenant painted the wall, it’s more likely than not that the landlord did it. Because painting walls is something landlords are more likely to do than residents.

It is usual for a lease to specify for what purposes and on what notice the landlord is entitled to access. Often there is a provision allowing the landlord access on no notice in an "emergency" which is often not specifically defined. Access for purposes of repair, and for purposes of inspection may be on 24 hours notice, or 48 hours, or some other period, or on "reasonable notice" with no specific period specified. Access for a reasonable purpose (such as inspection) on reasonable notice that does not actually inconvenience the tenant, and that is not demanded with unreasonable frequency will probably not constitute such a breach as to justify ending the tenancy, and may well not justify sizable damages in the absence of other breaches. Much will depend on the wording of the lease or rental agreement, and on the practice of the local courts. One might well ask oneself "what actual harm will an inspection with insufficient notice do me" because a court might ask a similar question if an action is brought. If the inspection does cause a problem, then that should be addressed.

Has this contract been translated (badly) from another language because the construction of the clause is cumbersome and confusing? Does the contract say that I can have guests over 1 night without charge? Without charge, yes. However "Without Landlord's prior written consent, Tenant has no excuse to accommodate ..." so you need the landlord's permission for overnight guests. If so does it only start charging on nights after the first? No, if a person stays more than 1 night (with the landlords permission) then this triggers the landlord's right to charge. See below for how much they can charge. Is it supposed to be 10% of monthly rent $137 per guest per night? "With temporary commendation, day-based, and additional 10% of rent each person is applied." The term is ambiguous, I can see three ways that this would be interpreted: If you have a guest who stays more than 1 night in a month they can charge 10% for that guest for that month (i.e. 2 to 31 days all for the same price). For 2 people for 2 days this would be $1,400 x 10% x 2 = $280. They can charge 10% of the monthly rent per night that the guest stays. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2 = $560 As, 1 except the rent would be pro-rata. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2/31 = $18.06 Assuming that the landlord put forward this contract the interpretation adopted in the absence of other evidence would be the one least advantageous to the landlord i.e. 3. However, there is other evidence - the landlord accepts that the rate is pro-rata - he has just failed to account for the 10%, so 3. again. How is overnight defined? Well, is it defined in the contract or by the law where you are? If not, it would take its normal English usage - "for the duration of the night". If they arrive before sunset and leave after sunrise the next day then they have stayed overnight. What if they came over at 9am and slept in the day? It says nothing about requiring your guests to sleep. If they party overnight then they are overnight guests. If they sleep all day but don't stay overnight they are not overnight guests. What about 2 am? If sunrise is after 2am then this is not overnight.

You say that you have a joint lease. This means that you and your roommate are jointly (together) and severally (individually) responsible for fulfilling the terms of the lease. From the landlord's position there is only one tenant - both of you together constitute the tenant. If you want to change this so that the tenant from date X is your roommate and someone else you have 2 options: Jointly give notice, ending the current lease and triggering the return of the deposit. Your roommate and your replacement are then free to negotiate a new lease with its own deposit. The landlord would conduct a final inspection on your lease and an initial inspection on the new lease. With the landlord's permission, substitute the new person for you on the existing lease. This does not end the lease and does not trigger the return of the deposit. The landlord is not obliged to do anything. You can negotiate whatever deal you like about the security deposit with whoever you like.

What does "PROVIDED FURTHER" here mean? The term keeps two provisions separate, and hence independent of each other (unconditional). The former provision addresses landlord's initiative [to terminate the lease] whereas the latter addresses tenant's initiative. The latter pertains to early termination of lease and is not to be confused with tenant's default/non-payment. If rent is to be paid on the 1st of each month and the landlord wants the tenant to move out by August 13, the landlord needs to give a written notice at least thirty days prior to August 1 because the 1st of August is "the next rent payment date". This is regardless of tenant's timely payment of rent. Tenant's initiative to prematurely terminate the lease forfeits his security deposit regardless of having hitherto/always paid rent on time.

There are some consequences for you, under the Seattle Residential Code. Per R103.5 Any person violating or failing to comply with the provisions of this code shall be subject to a cumulative civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per day for each violation from the date the violation occurs or begins until compliance is achieved. $182,500 per year. Also under R103.4, Whenever any building or structure is being occupied contrary to the provisions of this code, the building official may order such occupancy discontinued and the building or structure, or portion thereof, vacated by notice. There should be a notation on your panel indicating permit number and approval, but if you have the permit number, you can check if the inspection was done and the work was approved (I think this will report status). The legal burden of assuring that the work was done correctly and paperwork is in order ultimately falls on the owner, though the city at least initially talks to the contractor. Insofar as a customer taking a picture doesn't count as an actual final inspection, I suspect that some cost- and time-saving short-cuts were taken. Following up on the new information about being a tenant, the primary legal question is whether you have a duty of care towards the landlord, since in engaging this company, the landlord's interest may be put at risk. The landlord may have protected his interest via a clause in the lease saying "you must get written permission to modify the property, and you assume full liability for resulting damages", so first thing to check is what the lease says (perhaps look for a "Tenant's duty of care" clause). In lieu of clear evidence that you caused damage to the owner (economic damage, by negligence w.r.t. his need to have proper permits and the whopping fines that follow), I don't see what the risk to you would be in just washing your hands of the problem.

When the fixed term ends, you have two options if you want to stay. The first option is that you and the landlord can sign a new tenancy agreement, with a new fixed term. This new agreement replaces the old one at the end of the current fixed term, so the landlord is free to make changes, including proposing any number for the rent - and you are free to reject it. Alternatively, when the fixed term ends, if you don't sign a new agreement, and you don't leave, the tenancy automatically* becomes a Statutory Periodic Tenancy - often called a rolling contract. This has no fixed term, which means that if you want to leave, you have to give 1 month's notice, while if the landlord wants you to leave, they must give 2 months' notice. Apart from that, the terms of the existing contract, including the rent review clause mentioned in the question, remain in force. The rent review clause suggests that the landlord can unilaterally impose a rent increase after the fixed term ends, but only up to the amount specified. Hence, without signing a new agreement, any increase beyond that would not be allowed. Also, it doesn't appear to make any mention of future rent increases, which suggests that the default rules for rolling contracts will apply, in that the landlord can propose a rent increase, which you can accept or reject. Failing that, the landlord can impose one via a Section 13 Notice, but only once a year. If you feel the requested rent is unreasonable, you can challenge this, and a tribunal will make a ruling based on the state of the property and the rents for similar properties in the area. (* If the tenancy has any provisions relating to what happens once the fixed term ends, then the tenancy may become a Contractual Periodic Tenancy. However, unless those provisions relate to rent, then they may not be relevant here.)

Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.

Does the Posse Comitatus Act Apply To The U.S. Space Force? In 1956, the Posse Comitatus Act was adopted. It made it a crime to use the Army to enforce U.S. law in the United States in the absence of an invasion or insurrection. (The law itself is discussed and cited on Wikipedia). But, the United States Space Force, created in 2019, didn't exist at the time. And, the U.S. Space Force is predominantly drawn from the U.S. Air Force, which in turn has its roots in a subdivision of the United States Army which is covered by the Posse Comitatus Act. So, my question is: Does the Posse Comitatus Act apply to the U.S. Space Force?

Space Force appears to have been specifically included on Dec 27, 2021. "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Public Law 117-81, Sec. 1045 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1385

States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).

"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.

As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.

The Constitution says "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States". As supreme military commander, the president alone gets to say whether or not to commit troops for such an expedition. Congress does have the power to control the purse. It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that Congress cannot command the president.

Does this mean all countries law applies to it? Basically yes. If the videos are in english and are about science in general does this mean if some country some day bans ( imprisonment ) science videos or use of a specific colour in videos can they extraterritorialy enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other country like USA or India? With respect to criminal cases, only if it can arrest that person or convince another country to arrest and extradite that person. Generally speaking, countries will only extradite someone if it is a serious offense under the domestic laws of the country of arrest as well as the country requesting that the person be handed over, and also only if the crime occurred in or was targeted at the requesting country. Sometimes the arrest is not legal in the place where it is made. For example, in this case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court (the quote is from the official syllabus to the case): Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). I mean can a country just bring to jail any youtuber outside its borders ( using its national language as the language of the video ) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? If the country can manage to arrest the person, yes. There are high profile cases from Saudi Arabia where that has happened. See, e.g., here and here (a blogger and his sister arrested in Saudi Arabia, while his wife and children flee to Canada), here (journalists for Lebanese periodical arrested in Saudi Arabia in relation to years old publications) here (more journalists arrested in Saudi Arabia), here ("A male Saudi Arabian teenager has been arrested in Riyadh over a series of online videos of conversations between him and a female Californian streaming-video star that went viral."), here (Yemeni blogger), and here (Washington Post journalist tortured and killed in Saudi Arabian embassy in Turkey at the direction of a senior member of the Saudi Arabian royal family). Also can a country just hold liable for youtube's data privacy practices a youtuber outside its borders and enforce the judgement if the practices of both youtuber and their chanell and youtube is legal in their home country? A country can hold anyone liable for anything its domestic laws allow it to hold someone liable for, and can enforce that judgment against any assets it can exert power over. Some countries with similar legal systems recognize each other's court judgments widely. Countries with very different legal systems often don't recognize each other's judgements. For example, most European countries do not recognize U.S. money judgment for torts (i.e. civil wrongs such as personal injury awards). Similarly, the U.S. does not recognize most foreign defamation judgments, and does not recognize most judgments of Saudi Arabian courts. One last thing is wether inclusion of ads make a difference? Usually not. But it can matter for purposes of assertions of lawsuit liability over someone outside the jurisdiction seeking to impose liability for something that harmed someone in their country. If conduct amounts to "doing business" in the country seeking to impose liability or amounts to a "purposeful availment" of the laws of the country seeking to impose liability in some why, an imposition of extraterritorial liability is more likely, and that tends to happen more in cases where there are ads that are commercial targeting the people of the country where the courts seek to impose liability.

We look first to the Hutaree prosecution of 2012, US v. Stone where defendants were charged with seditious conspiracy: Specifically, the Government charges Defendants with conspiring to “oppose by force the authority” of the United States Government. Essential to that charge, Defendants must have agreed to oppose some positive assertion of authority by the United States Government; mere violations of the law do not suffice. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 693 (1887). In Baldwin, SCOTUS found (emphasis added) that All, therefore, depends on that part of the section which provides a punishment for ‘opposing’ by force the authority of the United States . . . . This evidently implies force against the government as a government. To constitute an offense under the first clause, the authority of the government must be opposed; that is to say, force must be brought to resist some positive assertion of authority by the government. A mere violation of law is not enough; there must be an attempt to prevent the actual exercise of authority.

Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

What are the laws regarding reprinting of really old documents found behind paywalls? I love reading old newspapers, so I have a subscription to a Newspapers.com and British Newspaper Archive, while I also get free access to NewspaperArchive.com through my local library (I just enter my library card number and password and I get it through my home computer). Awhile ago, I took screenshots of an article I found in an old newspaper on Newspapers.com and posted them in a stack exchange (I believe the history stack, but I can't find it anymore). Because the article was behind a paywall, someone edited the question or maybe answer and deleted the screenshots, claiming it was a copyright violation. Well, I looked up the author of the article and discovered that he died something like 90 years prior. My understanding of the copyright laws is that the copyright expires 70 years AFTER the author's death. So, my understanding is that I can freely copy these articles. So, is this the case? Am I allowed to copy old articles WHOLESALE, virtually anywhere I want to, EVEN if I get the article behind a paywall via a screenshot?

Depending on where exactly you are in the world, there is some protection for the representation of copyright-expired material if work went into presentation. So you might be allowed to put a Bach cantata into musical notation yourself, since he died in 1750, but you cannot simply copy another publisher's sheet music to save that work. The same might apply to an old newspaper article. If you find a print and scan it, you can upload it, but you may not be able to take it from the database organized by someone else. In austria, there is §40f Urheberrecht, which defines databases (they may or may not be collected editions). §40h clarifies how the right to a private copy in §42 extends only to "private use and neither directly nor indirectly commercial purposes." In germany, there is 87a-e UrhG, which covers databases whose assembly did not represent creative work (e.g. by simply ordering things by date). They are protected if the assembly required significant investment. This "lesser protection" lasts only 15 years, not 70, and there is a "a significant part" test for copying less than the whole database.

The duration of copyright varies according to different laws; however generally copyright lasts for 70 years after the death of the author(s), and you can check if the author died on Wikipedia or on the internet. Once copyright expires, books are considered public domain and you don't need permission to reproduce or copy etc. Books, as well other types of creative works listed at 17 USC §102, are automatically protected by copyright even without a copyright notice. You need the permission of the copyright owner to reproduce or transmit such works. On top of that is generally accepted to make a copy (often referred as backup copy) of a work protected by copyright for you own benefits. That means that if you bought a printed book and you want to read on your e-book reader, you could scan it and store on your device. However you must keep in mind these: It's meant for your personal use; You can't share it You'll be considered responsible if somebody else gets a copy of that book Furthermore in some countries, laws explicitly forbidden to scan the whole book without the permission of the copyright owner. It's worth to ask the publisher for permission to scan it if you want to read on you e-book reader for personal use. Some publishers offers digital copies of their book (either for free or for a very small charge) and you'll get a better copy than what you could scanning the book.

I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions.

Almost none. It is a legacy of the era when copyright protection was a function of year of publication. Including it is appropriate, however, to meet the formal requirements for a legal notice of claim of copyright which has some procedural implications if it is omitted.

Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is.

First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.

On Growth and Form by D'arcy Thompson is a somewhat tricky case. (The last word of the title is "Form" not "Forms" by the way.) The first edition was published in 1917, and is therefore out of copyright in the US. The expanded edition ws published in 1942, and will be in copyright IN THE US until 2037, unless the copyright holder failed to renew the copyright in 1970 (after the initial 28 year term). Actually the renewal could have been anywhere in the period 1969-71, as a 1 year margin plus or minus was allowed. Assuming that the renewal was done properly, any images included in the first edition are free for anyone to use. Any added in the 1942 edition are not. If Wikipedia lists the image you want as public domain, check the detailed reason that they give. For the image of figs 517 & 518 from the 1942 ed The original publication date is listed as 1917, which implies that the image was in the first edition. Wikipedia is pretty good at copyright, but has been known to get things wrong. In fact I have been involved in correcting a few errors of this sort. In this case verification is not excessively hard. I would suggest that you find a copy of the first edition, and check if the image you wan to use is included there. If it is, you should feel free to use it. if it isn't they you are are not free without permission unless the renewal was not made. Verifying copyright renewals is a bit arduous, but it can be done. On a further look it seems that the version on the internet archive linked in the question is a copy of the first edition. It carries a 1917 date, and I see no indication of a revision or 'second edition" or a 1942 date. The IA metadata says "Publication date 1917 " If this is correct, this version and any orall of its contents are in the public domain for anyone to use in any way at all. Note that if the book had been first published in 1942, the answer would have been different. And the answer would be different again under UK law, which now uses a life+70 term, placing the 1942 edition out of copyright. The same would be true in many other countries which use life+70 or life+50. (The US uses life+70, but only for works published after 1977. The 1978 copyright act came into effect 1 Jan 1978.) Note that in countries which use a term longer than life+70, and there are a few, this work would not yet be out of copyright.

You cannot safely rely on the US doctrine of Fair Use, except if the rights-holder sues you in US courts. In France, there are limited exceptions to the authors proprietary rights. Under Art. L-122-5, there are some relevant potential exceptions: 3ºa) analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated... 4º. parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre. Your description of the intended use does not fit these criteria. Consulting with a copyright attorney is advised, if you don't want to obtain a license.

Gödel's loophole After WWII before Gödel was about to be interviewed in order to get a US citizenship, he had found a loophole in the US constitution which allowed a fascist regime to legally turn the US into a dictatorship. I tried searching it online and only found that Gödel's loophole is related to article 5 of the US constitution; however, I couldn't find more information about it. So what is Gödel's loophole? Can you explain it to me?

This article lays out what little is known about the putative loophole, thought to depend on problems of "self-reference". (This is because of the nature of Gödel's view on "self-contradiction"). Note that Article V might itself be amendable.

School districts / states do generally have the power to set the curriculum including the viewpoint that will be officially conveyed. One well-known major restriction on such viewpoint restrictions is that the schools cannot restrict the free exercise of a religion, and cannot take a position on a religion. Apart from the religion third-rail, schools have pretty free reign in setting the curriculum, see Evans-Marshall v. Tipp City for one instantiation. In this case, the teacher assigned various books, including Heather Has Two Mommies, one of the books that prompted an outcry. The upshot of that case is that a teacher cannot invoke the First Amendment to override policy. This article (draft version, easier to handle) (published version, annoying footnote structure) reviews the topic, and section III covers prior cases. It notes that the cases of Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell do not address the constitutionality of these education laws, though the reasoning in the prior cases might be applicable if there were a suit over curriculum. There is an implication that some of these rules have been enforced in the past, but most of the evidence is in the form of news stories (Beall v. London City School BOE is not available in the open). The article does engage in a somewhat deeper study of enforcement in Utah, where it was enforced (until it was repealed). Enforcement is necessarily indirect. The law require school districts to have a particular curriculum; violation would come when an individual teacher taught contrary to the prescribed curriculum. Those laws do not contain any provision like "a teacher who violates these rules gets fired", instead, punishment is via the general rule that you have to teach what is in the state-mandated curriculum. Rather than officially terminating a teacher for violating this curricular guideline, districts use vague reasons for non-renewal such as "due to problems with communication and teamwork" (from Evans-Marshall).

It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.

The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.).

Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).

I wrote a letter to the Eclipse Foundation. The consultant pointed me to section 5 in their FAQ. My case falls under the term "linking". He warned that he isn't a lawyer, but offered the following short answer: The Eclipse Foundation does not consider linking with EPL content to be a derivative work and so you are not required to disclose your source code.

No. While the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment doesn’t apply to the federal government, the Supreme Court has read the same requirements into the 5th Amendment. This is generally considered to have started with Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (in this case, "the Court began in earnest to fold an "equal protection" guarantee into the concept of "due process."” United States v. Madero, No. 20-303, at *9 (Apr. 21, 2022)), and as Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92 (1976) put it, Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.

All ex post facto laws are unconstitutional in the United States. But, not all retroactive laws are unconstitutional in the United States. An ex post facto law is basically a law that retroactively makes conduct illegal or punishes it more severely than it was punished at the time if it was already illegal. By way of example, tax legislation is often constitutionally retroactive, and laws that retroactively make the punishments for acts that are crimes at the time more lenient (or retroactively grant amnesty for previously illegal conduct) are legal. I strongly suspect, but do not know for certain, that India's constitutional law makes the same distinction that U.S. constitutional law does in this regard.

What is the minimum age to allow a child to ride in a forward facing back seat? State: Arkansas For purposes of this question, "a forward facing car seat" means the same car seat, just turned around. I called the state police, and they told me that car seats must be rear facing until the child is 2. However, I could not find any official guideline from an official .gov or Arkansas website that would clearly say, forward facing ride is illegal for children younger than 2. Can a parent turn the seat around for, say, a 21-month old child, and have them ride forward-facing? Is there any official source?

Summary: there's no minimum age; rather, you must use the seat in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Instructions for reversible seats typically do not depend on age but on the child's weight and height. Arkansas law (AR Code § 27-34-104 (2020)): (a) While operating a motor vehicle on a public road, street, or highway of this state, a driver who transports a child under fifteen (15) years of age in a passenger automobile, van, or pickup truck, other than one operated for hire, shall provide for the protection of the child by properly placing, maintaining, and securing the child in a child passenger restraint system properly secured to the vehicle and meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect on January 1, 1995. (b) A child who is less than six (6) years of age and who weighs less than sixty pounds (60 lbs.) shall be restrained in a child passenger safety seat properly secured to the vehicle. (c) If a child is at least six (6) years of age or at least sixty pounds (60 lbs.) in weight, a safety belt properly secured to the vehicle shall be sufficient to meet the requirements of this section. The key passage is "properly placing, maintaining, and securing the child in a child passenger restraint system properly secured to the vehicle." This implies that you can put the seat in the forward-facing position only if it is designed to be used that way and then only when the manufacturer's instructions say that it's acceptable. In my experience this typically depends on the child's height and weight rather than on the age. For example, one manufacturer says of its seats [Convertible seats] in the rear-facing mode should be used for children weighing 5-40 lbs, with a height of less than 49 in. and whose head is 1 in. or more below the top of the car seat. [Convertible seats] in the forward-facing mode should be used for children weighing 22-65 lbs. and height less than 49 in. and can walk unassisted and whose top of the ears are below the top of the car seat. So if the instructions for your seat have the same criteria then you can turn it around when the child reaches 22 lbs. CDC weight data for boys shows that virtually every 21-month-old boy is heavier than this (note that the data are in kilograms and that 22 lbs is 9.979 kg). Therefore, the legal answer is that there is no minimum age; the requirement is to use the device "properly." Follow the manufacturer's instructions. (Aside: the incorrect belief about the 2-year threshold could be a widespread misconception among Arkansas police. If this is so, and if they are therefore in the habit of ticketing people for having children under 2 in a forward-facing seat, then you could get a ticket. You might be able to convince the officer of the reasoning in this answer, but you might not, in which case you would have to take it to court to show that you were following the manufacturer's instructions and therefore the law. You will have to weigh the potential hassle of having to do this, including the likelihood of its happening or not, against the benefit of letting your child see the back of your head while you're driving. My guess is that you're unlikely to get a ticket for several reasons, and that your child is likely to be significantly happier facing forward, but I don't know Arkansas police and I don't know your child.) If you do not have the instructions for your seat, you should be able to find them online. Some seats are not designed to be used facing forward. If yours is such a seat, you will need to get one that is. Remember that complying with the law may seem more important because you're more likely to get pulled over by a police officer than to be in a collision. But in fact the most important consideration is safety. If you are in a collision you will want your child to have the greatest protection possible.

tl;dr: no, they're not law yet. Background The two bills are different. A5217 proposes to create a juvenile alternative to the current community service program, and A1969 proposes changes to the state's anti-bullying law. It looks like they've reassigned the number "5217." The correct version of A5217 is at this link. A bill becomes law when signed into law by the governor. To be delivered to the governor, the bill has to pass both houses of the legislature. In order to pass in one house, the bill has to survive a full vote there. To be voted upon, a bill typically has to clear its committee. Sometimes that entails getting adequate support (like sponsors). Bills include the language "Be it enacted" because each house has to vote on the precise language the governor will eventually sign. A5217 is still in progress, meaning that it has yet to pass the Assembly. It has been introduced, referred to the Assembly Law and Public Safety Committee, and got a third prime sponsor (on May 24 DiMaso joined Lopez and McKnight as a sponsor). The companion bill, S3447, has been introduced and referred to the Senate Law and Public Safety Committee. A1969 has been introduced and referred to the Women and Children Committee. It does not yet appear to have a Senate companion.

Under the Dutch Civil Code article 1:245, "All minor children are subject to authority". Article 1:247 says that "Parental authority comprises the duty and right of the parent to care for and raise his minor child". This basically means that parents have the right to exercise authority over their children (until age 18). Art. 1:249 says that: A minor child must observe the rights and powers that are granted to his parent or guardian in connection with the exercise of authority and he must take into account the interests of the other members of the family of which he forms a part. There are some exceptions, under Art. 1:246, people who cannot exercise authority over a minor: ...minors, adults who are placed under guardianship and persons whose mental abilities are so disturbed that they are unable to exercise such authority, unless the disturbance is temporary. As for the latter, that is a determination that would have to be made by the court. Death and divorce of parents add complications. There is also subsection 1.14.2.2a, about emancipation of an underage mother, where a mother 16 or older can request emancipation ...to care for and raise her child under the right to exercise authority over it and then The Juvenile Court may award the request only if it thinks this is in the best interests of the mother and her child. If another person was charged with exercising authority over the child, then the emancipation of the underage mother has the result that she as of then shall exercise this authority exclusively. Under §1.14.4, the court can also order custodial control of a minor If the moral or mental developments of a minor or his health are seriously endangered and other measures to avert this danger have failed But such control is given to a Foundation under Art. 1(f) of the Youth Care Act (not an SO). Under Art. 1:266 Provided that this is not contradictory to the interests of the children, the District Court may remove a parent from the right to exercise authority over one or more of his children on the ground that this parent is unfit or unable to comply with his duty to care for and raise his children. Art 1:269 is more specific about grounds for depriving parental authority. Insofar as they have apparently denied your request under §1.14.4, that is about as far as one can go.

People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned.

colorado You have committed aggravated motor vehicle theft in the second degree in violation of CRS 18-4-409(4): A person commits aggravated motor vehicle theft in the second degree if he or she knowingly obtains or exercises control over the motor vehicle of another without authorization or by threat or deception and if none of the aggravating factors in subsection (2) of this section are present. If the value of the vehicle was less than $2000, then this is a Class 1 misdemeanor and is punishable by 6 to 18 months imprisonment and/or a fine of $500 to $5000. Colorado's general theft statute (CRS 18-4-401) requires an additional element, that you intend to permanently deprive the rightful owner of the benefit of the property. So your slide example is not theft. However, they specifically excluded such a requirement from the motor vehicle theft statute. If you drove it on a public road, then you may have committed a few traffic violations as well: The vehicle's registration is presumably expired, so you violated CRS 42-3-121(1)(a). If any of its required safety equipment is not working (all lights and signals, brakes, mirrors, horn, seat belts, etc, as well as a muffler) then you are in violation of CRS 42-4-202(1). The vehicle is presumably not insured, so you violated 42-4-1409(2). You might think your own auto insurance policy covers you when you drive another vehicle, but if it's like my policy, this clause only applies when you drive it "with the express or implied permission of the owner, and within the scope of that permission". If the dump truck has a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) over 26,000 pounds, then it is a commercial motor vehicle under CRS 42-2-402(4)(a)(I), and under 42-2-404(1) you need a commercial driver's license to operate it, which you presumably don't have. (Note that GVWR is the maximum weight, including load, at which it is rated, whether or not it is currently loaded.)

RCW Chapter 26.44 covers abuse of children, and RCW 26.44.030 1(a) states the duty to report: the reporter "has reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect" – the law doesn't say "a child is currently suffering abuse", it say "has suffered". But then: subsection (2) says: The reporting requirement of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to the discovery of abuse or neglect that occurred during childhood if it is discovered after the child has become an adult. However, if there is reasonable cause to believe other children are or may be at risk of abuse or neglect by the accused, the reporting requirement of subsection (1) of this section does apply. So, no, unless it is reasonable to believe that the abuse is ongoing, in which case, yes. It's not really possible to judge the status of a "hypothetical", because some hypotheticals are hypotheticals, and others are real, so it would depend on the totality of evidence that would support that conclusion.

This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.

In colorado, it appears that the kidnapping statutes do not apply if the act is not "knowing" or if the perpetrator lacks intent. § 18-3-301 Any person who does any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a person under the offender's actual or apparent control commits first degree kidnapping: (a) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to another; or (b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to another; or (c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. § 18-3-302 Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. 2. Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian or with intent to sell, trade, or barter such child for consideration commits second degree kidnapping. § 18-3-303 Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other's consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. As @ohwilleke pointed out in this answer, this means that as soon as the hypothetical car thief becomes aware that the child is in the car and doesn't then act to return the child to their parents, it becomes second-degree kidnapping. (It's also possible that CO case law has interpreted the statutes differently than I'm interpreting them here, but the plain language seems to require the actual intent to take and/or confine a person illicitly.)

In a way aren't Non-Disclosure and Non-disparagement Agreements functionally very similar? At a high level NDAs basically say "do not disclose confidential information to the public". At a high level Non-disparagement agreements basically say "do not disclose information to the public that could harm us". Both are trying to protect the company from damage caused by information getting into the wrong hands. For example if a bank was hacked into and lost a bunch of money, wouldn't both NDA's and non-disparagement agreements prevent employees from telling the public about it? I guess NDAs are more about facts where as Non-disparagement include negative opinions.In a sense are all non-disparagement a type of NDA because they are prohibiting what could be said?

Not all disclosures are disparagements, an NDA will typically cover the release of any private information, whether positive or negative. Publishing the company's future product plans might violate an NDA but would not be disparagement. Not all disparagements are disclosures, a negative opinion does not require the release of any private information. Making a blog post stating your opinion that the company's CEO is incompetent or that their products are overpriced is likely not disclosing any private information that would be covered by an NDA, but is disparagement.

There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.

No The term "sword and shield" is allegorical rather than legal and may be called up in any number of contexts. Such as ... Waiver of privilege In the particular instance, Anthem was claiming that the reports were privileged and hence protected from discovery, presumably because they were prepared in contemplation of litigation - this litigation, one supposes. However, privilege is lost or waived if the privileged information is disclosed, as it was by relying on the conclusion of the report in its defense. As such, the entire suite of reports is no longer protected. Basically, if you want to keep privilege you have to keep what is privileged secret. Note, the could have lost privilege if they had disclosed the findings of the report in any way such as by press release or by simply leaving the document in a public place. In this context, the judge is stating that they cannot use the "shield" of privilege to protect a report that they have used as a "sword" to make a attack their opponent.

Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret.

Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.

The inventor or would-be developer can require potential investors to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) before revealing the details of the idea. In an initial letter a statement such as "This idea is being disclosed in confidence to enable4 you to consider if you wish to invest in the project." That would put the investor on notice, and if the investor discloses it to another or makes use of the idea in a competitive project, there may be grounds for a suit for breach of confidence. If reasonable precautions are taken to disclose the information only to those under a duty of confidence, and to protected it from unauthorized disclosure, it may be protected as a trade secret, and any evasion of those precautions or breach of confidence may give grounds for a lawsuit. In the US the Uniform Trade Secret Act has been adopted by almost every state. In other jurisdictions there are other similar laws. As stated in the Wikipedia article A trade secret is information that is not generally known to the public; confers economic benefit on its holder because the information is not publicly known; and where the holder makes reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.

Its difficult to tell without seeing the exact paperwork, and the exact meaning of without prejudice varies by jurisdiction (I think UK is the same as here in NZ though). If an agreement is reached through communications marked "without prejudice" it should be valid in court to the extent that it shows an agreement was reached and what the agreement was (but the court will not generally look at the documents marked without prejudice for other reasons – e.g. admissions made – if no agreement is reached). There are a couple of other relevant things to mention – although not strictly part of your question: Lawyers are officers of the court, and have duties to the court, which include acting ethically. So, provided it's a reputable law firm, it is reasonable to (somewhat) trust their solicitors in procedural matters. My understanding is that courts encourage anything that will help settle a matter out of court – hence the whole idea of "without prejudice" letters being valid. I believe that the court will uphold an agreement reached through communication of without prejudice emails as it's in their interests. If you have these kinds of concerns, you can raise them with their solicitor, suggesting that you would prefer the final document to not be without prejudice, even if it only refers to the matter and agreement, without sensitive stuff. I imagine they would be only to happy to oblige, as they can bill their client for another letter!

You cannot contract outside the law Any "contract" that purports to break the law isn't a contract - it's an unenforceable agreement. For example, across all jurisdictions, a contract that is unconscionable is void. So is a contract that requires one of the parties to break the law - a "contract" for murder for example. In addition, you cannot call an employment relationship a "business" relationship - if the relationship meets the requirements of an employer-employee relationship then that's what it is and woe betide you if you haven't complied with all relevant entitlement, tax, insurance and safety laws. In addition, all of the relationships you listed are contracts.

Interpretation of the term "fully enclosed area" My HOA in Colorado USA, has the following rule Each Lot shall provide a fully enclosed area for containment of trash, garbage or other garbage, and each Lot at all times shall be kept in a clean, sightly and wholesome condition and grass and weeds shall be kept mowed. No trash, litter, junk, boxes, containers, bottles, cans, implements, machinery, lumber or other building materials shall be permitted to remain exposed upon any Lot so it is visible from any neighboring Lot or from the street, except as reasonably necessary during the period of construction. The Board of Directors, through its agents and employees, shall have the right and duty to enter upon any Lot and remove such unsightly objects and materials at the expense of the Owner, and upon due notice to the Owner and failure of the Owner to comply with this Section, such entry shall not be deemed a trespass. The cost of such removal shall he chargeable by the Board of Directors to such Owner, by Individual Assessment in accordance with Paragraph 5.3(c) hereof. The board has recently started to enforce their interpretation that this means that our garbage cans must be hidden from view of the street. I can not come to that same interpretation based on this language. I think the cans themselves are "fully enclosed areas", and do not need to be hidden from the street. What is the board required to enforce it's interpretation of the rules? If I disagree is my only option to sue the board if I am cited by the board for violation? Additional questions: If I fly a drone above the street and can see the board president's trash can, can I request that the president be cited for violating this rule? If I have photographic proof that the board has not enforced the rule in this interpretation since 2007 (when google street view imagery became available in my area), does that change the answer to the above questions?

Fully enclosed area means being inside something, likely a non-see-through fence. You will not convince anyone that a trash can is "fully enclosed; it is a container, which is called out. Your chance of litigating this successfully is approximately zero unless your goal is to spend money and force the HOA to do the same. You can certainly ask what the expectation is or examples that meet the requirement. Your ability to fight your issue by citing other installations is limited unless they are forcing you to do something other homes are not required to do. "I can see your can with a drone" will not let you leave your trash can out.

You have to take the General Notes part in its full context. The relevant clause says The term “Common Area” as used herein means all portions of the Project except the Units, and without limiting the generality of the forgoing, all structural projections within a Unit which are required for the support of a Condominium, gas, water pipes, all sewers, all ducts, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations of the structures wherever located (except the outlets thereof when located within the Units)… The most proximal expression is "wires and other utility installations", so construing "outlets" as covering gas, water, sewers, ducts etc. would be contrary to the interpretive principle known as the Last Antecedent rule. Nothing in the context requires a broad-scope interpretation of the "outlet" exception. This being in the US, courts would use ordinary English usage to understand what an "outlet" is, that is, even if "you could argue" that something is an outlet, the term "outlet" is used in the context of buildings to refer to an electrical outlet. The way this works is that you would need to get an expert witness to testify as to the common meaning of "outlet" in this context. There are two approaches to doing that. One is to get testimony of a contractor, as to what they mean when they say "outlet". However, contractors speak a special language (and not consistently so), and it's dubious that either party of a contract could have understood "outlet" in a special way shared by contractors. So the other approach (exemplified by Heller) is to call on a language and usage expert. A DIY approach is to google things like "sewer outlet", "electrical outlet" and so on, to see if you get many hits. You do not have a sewer outlet in your unit. You might have a water outlet if you work on cars and brought one inside the unit, but clearly context dictates that that is not relevant. The way courts resolve these matters is to determine what the ordinary meaning of a term is, and set aside specilized and technical meanings. See for example Nix v. Hedden where SCOTUS ruled that a tomato is not a legal fruit, because scientific definitions notwithstanding, a tomato is clearly a vegetable in common usage. Note that I am specifically addressing the question you posed, about "outlets". IO believe that attention to "outlets" is misguided. Focus should be on the regulation about "the HOA not being responsible for water leaks between units or interior damage", which is what they are invoking. By your description, the hole in the pipe which constitutes the source of the leak was behind the wall. The problem is that "between units" can have two very different meanings, one being "from one unit to another", and the other is "which takes place in the area that exists between units". Since you do not own the area behind the walls (presumably: property descriptions can be less than totally clear), there was no leak from one unit to the other. There was a leak which took place in the space between units. The definitions for the project clearly indicate that such behind-the-wall stuff is "common area". If a breech in the drain pipe occurs outside the wall and leaked into the unit below, that would be a leak outside the common are, and would be a leak between units in the "from one to the other" sense, although the water would have to pass through the common area. But if it originated on the other side of the wall, it originated in the common area which is always present between units. Suppose, being devil's advocate, that you own not just the stuff inside the walls but also the stuff behind the walls, up to the next unit's walls. But if you apply that analysis of property boundaries, then the adjacent unit's property is the stuff inside his walls and between, up to your walls, so unless you are very special, you don't own the area between the walls. So to reiterate, "outlet" is a irrelevant. What matters is the interpretation of "leak between". Under neither interpretation of that expression is a leak behind the wall the responsibility of the person "upstairs".

It depends on what state this is. In Washington state, there is a form that sellers must fill out, and section 3 addresses sewer connections. This matter could have been disclosed – the allowed answers are "yes; no; don't know" (or NA). These are sellers disclosures, and Zillow / Redfin are free to be unreliable (I personally know that they are wrong about square footage). A real estate agent also doesn't become liable for being misinformed. Assuming your state has this or analogous question, "No" means that you were told (doesn't matter if you didn't notice it), and "Don't know" means you're gambling. Let's say that the answer was "Yes". Still, you can't necessarily sue (and win): you would have to prove misrepresentation (fraud or negligence) and not innocent error. You could do this by, for instance, proving that seller had the septic tank cleaned out some years earlier. Perhaps an action against buyer's inspector is possible, since that's nominally what they might have been hired to find out. But that is only true if checking the sewer connection can reasonably be considered part of the deal, so you have to look at the contract with the inspector (and the inspector's report).

No. Just because some building is "owned by the public" or State, doesn't mean it's public property. A state's national guard installation comes to mind immediately. State workers' offices are not public places. Airport hangars/buildings/runways. You can't just go hang out in the DPW garages.

There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.

"Posted" is a Term of Art "Posted" is a term of art in trespass law, specifically meaning that signs forbidding entry have been placed at the borders of a parcel. The page "Properly posted definition" from Law Insider reads: Properly posted means that signs prohibiting trespass—or bright yellow, bright orange or fluorescent paint—are clearly displayed at all corners, on fishing streams crossing property lines, and on roads, gates and rights-of-way entering the land. Or, they are displayed in a manner that is visible to a person in the area. The entry "Posting" in the "Legal" section of The Free Dictionary reads: Posting In connection with Trespass statutes, the act of placing or affixing signs on private property in a manner to give notice of the trespass. The page "The Importance of Posting Property Signs" reads in relevant part: Why should you use posted signs on property? Posting property is a great way to let someone know they have entered private land and they might not be welcome. Using posted signs not only indicates trespassing but also can specify restricted activities. Signs are good for both rural and urban settings as a way to protect owners and their property. ... Most states have specific rules for property signs that must be followed. Some rules may include: Words used: POSTED or NOTICE Sign size: 11" x 11" or 144 square inches Lettering size: minimum of 2" Sign color: purple, bright orange, yellow Sign distance: every 100 feet Some states allow the use of spray paint to mark trees and fences in lieu of a sign. Purple paint is frequently used because it stands out against common natural colors. However, if a trespasser is unaware of this marking method, it would be more effective to use a sign. Check local and state laws to confirm what is needed to properly post legally in your area. Several US states use the term "Posted" in their laws on trespass, and provide that the presence of the word "posted" on a sign has special significance. Maryland maryland Maryland Criminal Law Code § 6-402 (2017) provides that: (a) Prohibited. -- A person may not enter or trespass on property that is posted conspicuously against trespass by: (a) (1) signs placed where they reasonably may be seen; or (a) (2) paint marks that: (a) (2) (i) conform with regulations that the Department of Natural Resources adopts under § 5-209 of the Natural Resources Article; and (a) (2) (ii) are made on trees or posts that are located: (a) (2) (ii) 1. at each road entrance to the property; and (a) (2) (ii) 2. adjacent to public roadways, public waterways, and other land adjoining the property. The law firm page "Trespassing Laws in Maryland" reads in relevant part: Posted Property Trespass A person is not allowed to enter onto property that is posted conspicuously against trespassing. That posting can come in the form of signs that are placed where they can be reasonably seen or by paint marks on trees or posts at the entrances and land adjacent to the property. New York new-york-state The page "Posting Your Land" from the NY Dept of Environmental Conservation reads in relevant part: Trespassing Trespassing is illegal even on unposted property. Instead of posting, a landowner or other authorized person may issue written notice to another individual informing them that they are prohibited from entering the property. The notice must contain a description of the property, what restrictions apply (hunting, fishing, trapping) and the person or persons prohibited from entry. It should be delivered by certified mail or other processes (ex: legal notice in newspaper) to prove that the person was served. At any time, anyone by the landowner, occupant, or other authorized person to leave the premises (posted or not), must do so immediately. Trespassing on areas posted against trespass pursuant to the Environmental Conservation Law is punishable by a fine up to $250 and/or up to 15 days in jail. It is a defense to this type of trespass that there are not signs posted instructing people to stay off the property. It may also be a defense that any signs posted in the area are not in the proper place to be easily seen by visitors to the property. Signage Details Hardware and farm supply stores frequently carry signs for posting. Customized signs may also be obtained from local printers. DEC doesn't provide signs to private landowners unless the landowner is a cooperator under the Fish and Wildlife Management Act. In this case, they will be provided with "Safety Zone" signs. Cooperators provide free public access to most of their property in a large cooperative hunting/fishing area. Signs must be a minimum of 11 inches by 11 inches. They also must bear the name and address of the owner, lawful occupant or other person or organization authorized to post the area. The sign must bear a conspicuous statement which shall either consist of the word "POSTED" or warn against entry for specified purposes or all purposes without the consent of the person whose name appears on the sign. These words must cover a minimum space of 80 square inches (about 9 by 9 inches) of the sign. Image from the NYS DEC page linked above (There is a very similar image included in the Wikipedia article "Trespass".) California california In California "Posted property" is the legal term for property where suitable signs have been placed along the boundary or near it, to informa people tht trespassing is forbidden. But it appears that in CA the word "Posted" need not appear on such signs, the words "No Trespassing" being sufficient. California also makes it a misdemeanor (Under section 602) to enter into or remain on property of another, without any legal right to be there, if one is instructed not to enter, or to leave, but such proeprty is not considered "posted". California Penal Code section 553 provides that: he following definitions apply to this article only: (a) “Sign” means a sign not less than one (1) square foot in area and upon which in letters not less than two inches in height appear the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” (b) “Posted property” means any property specified in Section 554 which is posted in a manner provided in Section 554.1 . (c) “Posted boundary” means a line running from sign to sign and such line need not conform to the legal boundary or legal description of any lot, parcel, or acreage of land, but only the area within the posted boundary shall constitute posted property, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (e) of Section 554.1 . California Penal Code section 554 provides in relevant part that: Any property, except that portion of such property to which the general public is accorded access, may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the manner provided in Section 554.1 , and thereby become posted property subject to the provisions of this article applicable to posted property, if such property consists of, or is used, or is designed to be used, for any one or more of the following: ... California Penal Code section 554.1 provides that: Any property described in Section 554 may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the following manner: (a) If it is not enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of the area and at each entrance. (b) If it is not enclosed within a fence, and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or contains any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs along or near the exterior boundaries of the area at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner, and, if such property has a definite entrance or entrances, at each such entrance. (c) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre, and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of such fence and at each entrance. (d) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or has any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs on, or along the line of, such fence at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner and at each entrance. (e) If it consists of poles or towers or appurtenant structures for the suspension of wires or other conductors for conveying electricity or telegraphic or telephonic messages or of towers or derricks for the production of oil or gas, by affixing a sign upon one or more sides of such poles, towers, or derricks, but such posting shall render only the pole, tower, derrick, or appurtenant structure posted property. California Penal Code section 555 provides that: It is unlawful to enter or remain upon any posted property without the written permission of the owner, tenant, or occupant in legal possession or control thereof. Every person who enters or remains upon posted property without such written permission is guilty of a separate offense for each day during any portion of which he enters or remains upon such posted property.

California state law criminally restricts trespassing via Cal. Pen. 602.8(a): Any person who without the written permission of the landowner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession of the land, willfully enters any lands under cultivation or enclosed by fence, belonging to, or occupied by, another, or who willfully enters upon uncultivated or unenclosed lands where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering the lands, is guilty of a public offense. However, subdivision (c) states exceptions, that this does not apply to: ...(2) Any person on the premises who is engaging in activities protected by the California or United States Constitution. (There are other exceptions for process-servers, surveyors, and labor union activities). Additionally, anyone who remains on property after having been told to go away is guilty of trespass: simple entering when there is a no-trespassing sign is allowed in the case of religious or political canvassing. So at the state level, a division is made between protected activities (First Amendment issues) and non-protected ones (Commerce Clause issues), where criminal trespass is not applicable to religious or political solicitations. Aliso Viejo limits canvassing thusly: No person shall enter upon any residence or place of business and ring the doorbell, or rap or knock upon any door, or create any sound in any other manner calculated to attract the attention of any occupant of such premises, for the purpose of securing an audience with the occupant and engaging in peddling, solicitation or canvassing in defiance of a notice described in subsection (C) of this section. and subsection (c) says: Notice by the owners or occupants of any residence or place of business of their unwillingness to receive any uninvited peddlers, solicitors, canvassers, or handbills shall be given by displaying a weatherproof card, decal, or sign easily seen from the public right-of-way or the normal entryway to a house or dwelling. The notice must be placed upon or near the main entrance door to the residence or place of business and must state: “No Solicitors,” or words to that effect, with the letters at least one inch high. Solicitors and peddlers, but not canvassers, are also required to have a license. By their definitions, solicitors request things of value, and peddlers engage in commerce: canvassers engage in First Amendment protected activities, including disseminating commercial information (but not making sales). Violation of the code is punished variably, basically at the discretion of the prosecutor (there being a choice between infraction and misdemeanor dispositions). The Santa Monica police say that "There are many legitimate organizations that solicit door-to-door, either to sell products and services or to promote a religious, political or charitable cause. However, there are also a growing number of individuals who illegally solicit with the purpose of committing fraud. So when someone knocks at your door, ask the person to produce the required license before he/she begins a sales pitch". The implication is that you have to have a license to engage in "canvassing", which is almost guaranteed to be incorrect (First Amendment thing). The Santa Monica Code says in 6.32.040 that "Every person engaged in soliciting, canvassing, taking orders or peddling of goods, wares, merchandise or services shall pay a license fee in accordance with Section 6.12.010(a) of this Code" (that section however does not demand a fee for activities not generating money, i.e. political and religious disseminations). Santa Monica also limits door to door operations via a signage ordinance: No solicitation or peddling shall be conducted at any place of residence in the City where any sign prohibiting trespassing or solicitation has been posted or displayed. If the sign posted or displayed limits the hours of trespassing or solicitation, no solicitation or peddling shall be conducted at any place of residence in the City during the time period posted or displayed It is of interest that the signage ordinance does not mention canvassing (and canvassing is not defined), but the license law does. So in terms of legal prohibitions, it depends on municipality, and perhaps interpretation of local ordinances. Of course, one can always put up a sign saying "No Religious Solicitations" and hope that persuades the person, and one can sue for damages, if there are arguably any damages. "Do Not Disturb" might be more effective. SCOTUS noted in Martin v. City of Struthers that "Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not upon the determination of the community" and ruled that Struthers may not "make this decision for all its inhabitants" (on First Amendment grounds). Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell addressed a licensing requirement (struck down as overly vague and broad) that covered canvassing, and said A municipality has the power to enforce reasonable door-to-door soliciting and canvassing regulations to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyance. The Court has consistently recognized that a narrowly drawn ordinance that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to determine what residents will hear or see may serve these interests consistent with the First Amendment so a license requirement for religious canvassers could be consistent with the SCOTUS stance: if it is narrowly tailored. Subsequently, in Watchtower v. Stratton, the court stated (regarding a licensing requirement) that § 107 of the ordinance, which provides for the posting of "No Solicitation" signs and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the resident's unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener A "No Solicitation" sign then has the desired effect: it is legal to make it illegal to solicit in the presence of a No Soliciting sign. The specific ordinance was not narrowly tailored (to "preventing fraud"); requiring a surrender of anonymity. Other cases such as Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 have overturned anti-solicitation laws as not being narrowly tailored: for instance, solicitations too early in the morning or too late at night are constitutional; and in general, a sign by the owner means "keep out", and the first amendment does not overrule private property rights. It is unlikely that any ordinance mandating "uniform business practices" would survive; the concept is too vague and unlimited, and would be a significant burden on any business. And, of course, religions have constitutional protections that businesses lack.

Here's a bit of Georgia law that is relevant. By law, your apartment shall have installed an approved battery operated smoke detector which shall be maintained in good working order unless any such building is otherwise required to have a smoke detector system pursuant to Code Section 25-2-13. Also, "Detectors shall be listed and meet the installation requirements of NFPA 72". Furthermore, Any occupant who fails to maintain a smoke detector in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility, other than a nursing home, listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in good working order as required in this Code section shall be subject to a maximum fine of $25.00, provided that a warning shall be issued for a first violation. (note that there is a burden on the occupant, not just the landlord). However, Failure to maintain a smoke detector in good working order in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in violation of this Code section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not be considered by the court on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or occupancy of such dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section. Whether or not a photoelectric smoke detector is NFPA-compliant is not a legal question, but you could read NFPA's comparison of ionizing and photoelectric detectors here. If we assume (as is reasonable to do) that you install an approved device, then there is no code violation by picking your own device, does not change liability, and can have no effect on insurance rate / cancellation. OTOH, it is conceivable that the lease is written to prohibit any monkeying around with the smoke detector.

Are there laws in India against child violence outside schools? For example there are many beggar children who are physically hurt by people like shop owners and the like to leave the premises etc. Is this punishable by any law?

Yes. Although there are numerous child-protection laws, there is nothing specific for (beggar) children in this scenario so it would fall within Criminal Force, an offence contrary to section 350 Indian Penal Code: Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent ... or intending ... or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other. The punishment for which may be found at section 352 Whoever ... uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment ... for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. For completeness "Force" is described by section 349 as: A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling... [A substance could be, for example, a broom handle or a pan of water] Also, for completeness there's the alternative of Assault under section 351 if no force is used.

Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.

A teacher could not instruct students in how to build explosives for use in Federal crimes: It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction [...] with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence (source) This Federal statute creates a law preventing the teaching (in any context, including schools) of bombmaking for the purpose of committing a federal crime. So "bombmaking" is one subject that cannot be taught, although I don't think that there have been any prosecutions of regular K12 teachers under this law.

Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.

This is probably permitted on the theory that socializing children to do household type chores serves a reasonable educational purpose. If the dishes being washed were from a restaurant unrelated to the pre-school, on the other hand, this would probably be prohibited child labor.

A store owner may ban any person from that store that s/he chooses, provided that the ban is not for a reason forbidden by applicable anti-discrimination law, such as banning all people of a particular race or religion. That does not appear to be the case in this situation, from the description. Since this is a franchise, the store has a local owner who is not the chain company. The company will have a franchise contract with the local owner, which will specify in what ways the company can and cannot control the store. They might or might not have the power to require the store owner not to ban you, or not to engage in verbally abusive behavior in the store. In any case, you, or any third party, cannot force them to exercise such power, even if they have it under such a contract. It is very unlikely that law enforcement the authorities will treat the verbal harassment as a crime based on a customer report. You could publicize the situation, as by an online review, which might cause the chain company to take some action, for fear of bad publicity. But be careful. You have already learned that your initial understanding of the situation was significantly incomplete. If any public statements you make are untrue, and harmful to reputation, you could be accused of defamation and sued, perhaps successfully.

In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject.

No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability.

Is storing on EU-based servers sufficient to be GDPR-compliant with regard to the Schrems II arrest if they're controlled by a U.S. company? After the Schrems II decision, data transfers to US data processors are increasingly risky at best, for example to public cloud providers such as GCP, Azure, and AWS. A very common suggestion is to store your data in EU-based data centers of these cloud providers if your application isn't too latency-sensitive, for example in this answer. I fail to see how this makes a significant difference. All of the major public cloud providers are US companies, and their servers in Europe are still under their control, and so the US government can just as easily demand to hand over data hosted on EU servers as they can on US servers. In a strict sense of the word, data transfer to the US is indeed avoided, as the data physically remains on EU servers. But in a broader sense of the word, and really in the spirit of the Schrems II arrest and GDPR in general, the data is de facto transferred to a US controlled company the moment when it's stored on any GCP, Azure or AWS server, regardless of where that server is located. Thus, I feel as though hosting on EU-based servers of US-based public cloud providers doesn't solve anything at all, and simply provides a false sense of security and compliance. Is this correct, or am I missing something?

The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court.

As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. That's not exactly true, consent is merely one of six possible legal basis for processing (article 6). For example, processing of personal data can also be lawful if it necessary to perform a contract, legally mandatory, or in the public interest. The court decision acknowledges that but rules out another basis in this case because it considers that it is possible to serve fonts without relying on a third-party ([…] der Einsatz der Schriftarten auch möglich ist, ohne dass eine Verbindung von Besuchern zu externen Servern hergestellt werden muss). Confusingly, it only refers to article 6(1)(f) when it seems to me that (b) would also be plausible but maybe this wasn't raised during the proceedings? If the data controller cannot invoke any other basis for the lawfulness of the processing then yes, the only thing left is asking for consent, i.e. invoking article 6(1)(a). But that doesn't mean that you should expect to be asked for consent each and every time your personal information is being used. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation. Yes, implying consent doesn't really make sense under the GDPR definition (article 4, see also article 7): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action European data protection authorities have issued guidelines that detail what that means and clearly reject “bundling” different data processing. The regulation also makes it clear that data subjects should be able to withdraw consent at any time, which does not seem possible with the fonts on golem.de My reading of all this is that assuming consent because you are using a service (or even created an account or checked a box at some point) simply isn't valid consent. Either you don't need consent at all in the first place or what you need is freely given, specific consent and “implying” consent or bundling it with a registration process achieves exactly nothing. But this is still extremely common and it might take some time before enforcement and case law definitively settle this question. Smart data controllers trying to avoid collecting consent (like Meta) have abandoned any claim that signing up to the their services would constitute consent (because that's transparently not the case) and try to bypass the issue entirely using another basis like contractual necessity. This is also being litigated. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself. That sounds more like the way EU directives work. Regulations are supposed to be immediately applicable (no implementation in national law necessary) with minimal differences between countries (except when they explicitely provide for that). Of course, enforcement would still mostly be in the hands of national court systems and (in Germany) provincial data protection authorities but there are mechanisms to ensure consistency (the European Data Protection Board, prejudicial questions to the CJEU, infringement proceedings from the European Commission…).

I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software.

[I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users.

The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case.

If you operate from outside Germany but within the EU, it is generally sufficient to satisfy your own country's regulations. This is a foundational principle of the EU single market, though it's not quite realized yet and has exemptions for consumer protection purposes. However, the German TMG law which includes the Impressumspflicht explicitly enshrines this principle. So from the German Impressumspflicht perspective, you're good to go. However, you will not be able to operate anonymously, because of your country's laws. GDPR requires you to clearly state your identity and contact details in your privacy notice. If you engage in internet-based commerce, the EU eCommerce Directive will have caused your EU member state to pass legislation that requires you to disclose: your name the geographic address where you are established contact details incl an email address if applicable, registration numbers from trade registers or similar if applicable, your VAT ID Note that you must have a VAT ID for cross-border B2B sales within the EU. You state that you are not selling anything via your website, and are instead collecting payments via another website. What the consequences of this are would depend on the laws and caselaw in your jurisdiction, but you will have to make these disclosures on at least one of the two websites. About Germany going after bloggers who show ads: income from ads is taxable income, and operating a business requires registration. However, the German Impressumspflicht is rarely enforced by the state. Instead, other market participants (competitors) trawl the internet for potential violations and then send a cease-and-desist letter. They can do this because skirting legal obligations distorts the level playing field, which harms those competitors. There is a thriving cease-and-desist industry built around this, but it only affects businesses that operate within Germany.

You are responsible for any processing of data that happens under your control – but are you the data controller in this scenario? Since you have no meaningful influence over whether or not this backup happens on the operating system level, there could be a strong argument that you aren't a data controller for these backups. And if you aren't a data controller for that processing activity, you aren't responsible for compliance. However, if you were to integrate directly with relevant Google APIs in order to facilitate backups that could make you a controller. Then, Google would either have to be your data processor (won't be the case here), or you would need a legal basis for sharing the user's data with Google. For example, you could ask for the user's consent before activating such features.

GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Wrong. User consent is one of the ways that justify storing personal information, but there are others. You may check art.6 to see the several reasons that allow to store personal information. In this case, it seems reasonable to justify it under the paragraph f (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of course, that means that the data has to be used for this purpose. Avoiding spammers and other banned users would be such a purpose, but you should ensure that you do not send those e-mail address commercial information or even a Christmas greeting. In any case, be careful with anything you store. If along with the e-mail you stored more info, this could be interpreted as excessive and beyond the scope of paragraph f. For example, imagine storing "User wrote nazi statements" explaining why the e-mail is banned; EU laws are very restrictive about storing information about political or religious beliefs.

My account was broken into and virtual items were stolen, customer support refuses to help I have all the proof showing that my account was broken into , but they still refuse to give me my items back after opening multiple tickets. I only get the same copy and paste messages from their support team members. There is a restoration system in place as well , my one time restoration was never used and they still refuse to give me my items back.It is also said that ''Unless required by law'' they won't 100% give the items back. Do you guys have any clue what they mean by that? All the help is appreciated.

To answer this based on contract law, one would have to know where the company is located, where you are located, and what the terms of use specify regarding jurisdiction and possible mandatory arbitration. Next, you write that you have "all the proof" that your account was "broken into." Proof in a legal sense? I think you would be writing things differently if you had as court judgement in this regard. And how did it happen? In my experience, there are several scenarios: You were tricked into revealing your credentials, or your own computer was compromised to gain your credentials, or you re-used the same credentials on different systems and one of those was compromised. The most likely scenario by far. There was a security breach on the site of the game company, either revealing your credentials or allowing direct access. There was an accidental software bug on the site of the game company which affected your inventory. There was a deliberate software change on the site of the game company which affected your inventory, e.g. to improve play balance. The latter three options are all possible, but the first option happens much more frequently. And from the viewpoint of the company, this is indistinguishable from you acting foolishly and losing it. The thief would have been acting with your credentials, after all. And that is where the term you quote comes in. The company is in a contractual relationship with their customers, so they cannot disclaim all responsibility for everything that happens through their terms of service. In some jurisdictions, sneaking an illegal clause into the boilerplate terms of service weakens the legal force of the whole document, so they make this sort of disclaimer. But if lost things could be restored too easily, the thrill would go out of ownership.

I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.

The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.

Much of your ability to sue the email company for damages depends on local and Estonian laws, but the most important aspect is the TOS and user agreement you agreed to when you originally signed up for the service. Read it (though if the portal is now off-line, it may not be accessible). You may have agreed to hold the company not liable for any damages from loss or stolen data, and you may have also agreed to arbitration and to not pursue them in court. It all depends on what is (was) in that agreement, so find a copy of it; though it's possible that some local or Estonian laws may supersede any contractual agreement with the company. And FYI, the email you received concerning the video and demanding payment in Bitcoin is a common scam right now, and the threat may indeed be meaningless.

So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.

Purchasing a lot that contained the keys does not provide any rights to access the locks that those keys would open. What someone who did this would be charged with would vary by both location and also by prosecutorial discretion. The only exception in this scenario would be if the storage locker contained the deed to the property in question.

In theory its only a crime if you know, or reasonably suspect, that it is stolen. The fact that you have to ask means that you have some level of suspicion, so that's not good to start with. In practice merely being investgated by the police will bring you a world of hurt long before it gets to trial. How much can you afford to spend on legal fees, and will you be able to make bail?

Does a situation like this constitute breach of contract and/or a violation of advertising laws? No. There is not enough information that would lead to a finding of either. It is unclear how customers would be allegedly affected (if at all) by the release of a product at a different store, let alone where the goods or services at issue are digital and require no physical presence at a venue or premise. Except for very specific factual circumstances, a change of sales venue would hardly be cognizable as deceptive or unfair practice. Also, prior to purchasing or reserving a game, there is no contract between the public and the developer/supplier. Potential customers typically are not entitled to a specific performance by the developer. Even if [Phoenix Point] supporters' decision were provably based on the prospect of release at Steam, your description nowhere reflects that there was a mutually conscious exchange (or promise of an exchange) of considerations involving the parties' support of a game and the counterparty's release of the game at a specific venue. Absent that meeting of the minds, either party's reliance or expectation on the other is irrelevant. Generally speaking, the sole cruciality of either party's motives does not create legal obligations.

Giving flat to roommate and vacating apartment? I rented an apartment in California whose lease ends in 12 months. Now I got a job in another state and have to leave. Instead of paying lease break charges, I wanted to add a new person as roommate and wanted to share with him half rent for 4 months and then he will pay full rent after 4 months. We have this email communication with that new person saying I will pay half rent only for 4 months and then he has to pay full rent, will that email communication enough or will it cause any problems later? I will add new person to the leasing also based on confirmation email accepting my terms from him

You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you.

Assuming it's an assured shorthold tenancy (which it will be unless the tenancy agreement says otherwise), the tenancy continues until the tenants give notice, or the landlord gives notice and the tenants leave voluntarily (and failing that, when a court forces them to leave). If no-one gives notice, and the tenants are still present once any fixed term ends, the tenancy continues as a "rolling" tenancy until it's ended as described above. A tenancy agreement stays in force even if the owner of a property changes (whether by purchase or inheritance). So to summarise: by default, nothing changes, and the tenants have the same right to stay that they had before. See, for example, this article, or this one.

Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble?

You can be held liable for rent after you are off a lease. Rewriting a lease only affects future obligations, and doesn't extinguish past obligations. However, you appear to have released X from all obligations via paragraph 2. If you plan to sue for past rent, the court will have to interpret the statement that "The landlord, Y, and Z agree to relinquish X from any obligation regarding the lease as mentioned above", which is non-standard English. It is extremely likely that the court will interpret this to mean "release". You might argue, using earlier emails, that all parties had a clear understanding that this means "from all future obligations, but not past obligations", but that is not what the written agreement says, and the parol evidence rule, which is codified as explicit law in California, says execution of a contract in writing... supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument That clause lets X off the hook, in exchange for his claim on the security deposit and for relinquishing his tenant rights to the unit. You cannot sue X for any rent.

Assuming you have a six-month Assured Shorthold Tenancy, you don't have to give any notice at all. As long as you are not in occupation after the end of the tenancy (which means moving out before it ends), that's it. For example, this page from Shelter says: The general rule is that the tenant can leave on the last day of a fixed-term tenancy without giving notice, and this will end the tenancy.[2] If the tenant remains even a day longer than the last day of a fixed-term tenancy, a statutory periodic assured shorthold tenancy will arise, which the tenant can end by serving a valid notice to quit. [2] Right d. Flower v. Darby (1786) 1 T.R. 159; Cobb v Stokes (1807) 8 East 358. This is extremely bad news for landlords, who don't (necessarily) get any notice that they have a void. In general, I would say you ought to give a month's notice (full disclosure, I am a landlord), on the other hand, if they haven't fulfilled their responsibilities perhaps not (but you may have an exaggerated idea of their responsibilities). If you do this, don't expect to get a good reference from your landlord! (Which is going to make it harder to find somewhere else to live). You should also anticipate difficulties in recovering your deposit (you are legally entitled to it back, but that doesn't mean your landlord can't be difficult about it - possibly even requiring you to sue for it). I have just noticed the second part of your question. If you do nothing (in other words, stay in residence), at the end of your Assured Shorthold Tenancy you will switch to a periodic tenancy. The landlord can't force you to switch to another six-month contract, but on the other hand, if you don't, they are perfectly entitled to give you two months notice. If they are smart, they will give you this notice now, so that you can only stay for two months on the periodic tenancy. Note that the letting agent has an incentive to get you and the landlord to sign another contract (they can charge the landlord a fee for it), so they may not be being entirely honest about whether a periodic tenancy is an option. (On the other hand, a poor landlord may be more interested in locking a tenant in for six months.)

You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.

I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.

Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.

Does the robots exclusion standard have any legal weight? There is a standard through which websites communicate to the web crawlers upon which search engines are based which pages should be indexed and included in the search results. This is called the Robots exclusion standard, is implemented in the robots.txt file that most web sites have, stack exchange's is here. If one was interested in the whole content of a site, for example one was researching the network structure of web sites, would it be legal to ignore the robots.txt and crawl the whole site (perhaps excluding /search[?/])?

The existence of a robots.txt file and the directory and file inclusions/exclusions in a robots.txt file do not constitute a legally binding contract for the use of the website by the visitor; if it exists, the Terms of Service would usually establish the contract for use of the site. Many TOSs prohibit bots, crawlers and any automated means from crawling or scraping a site, and you are contractually obligated to honor those stipulations simply by visiting the site. Violating a TOS is typically a civil matter, depending on jurisdiction. Simply crawling a site to "map" it, and crawling a site to "scrape" it and copy all content are two different things. Crawling could violate the TOS. Scraping content can violate the TOS and also be copyright infringement, depending on jurisdiction. See https://law.stackexchange.com/search?q=scraping I suppose a TOS could state that users are legally bound to the restrictions in a robots.txt, but I've never seen that in a TOS.

Patents are not that relevant in this case. Software patents are unenforceable in most parts of the world anyway. What matters here is copyright. Every work contract has a clause that everything an employee creates as part of their employment is copyrighted by the company. So using company-owned code to build an own project would be a copyright violation. There are also other legal tools in some jurisdiction which can be used against employees trying to misuse intellectual company property. But that's a topic for Law Stackexchange. Also, this isn't really related to a BYOD policy. Being able to bring your own device to work and then back home might make data theft more convenient, but isn't required. There are many other ways to steal sourcecode, like USB drives or uploading them to the internet. To prevent the first you would have to design your software development offices like a supermax prison facility with meter-high walls (so nobody can throw a device over it) and strip searches on everyone leaving the building. This is neither feasible nor reasonable for anything below matters of national security. To prevent the second, you would have to completely prevent internet access from developer workstations, which would greatly impede the productivity of any software developer. So most companies do not even try to physically prevent employees from stealing sourcecode. They rather rely on the legal safeguards and on maintaining a mutual trust relationship with their employees. It might seem counter-intuitive to some, but when you do not treat your employees like potential criminals they are in fact less likely to betray you.

First of all, Google's TOS says we reasonably believe that your conduct causes harm or liability to a user, third party, or Google — for example, by hacking, phishing, harassing, spamming, misleading others, or scraping content that doesn’t belong to you And you ask: But suppose a researcher, say based in UK, managed to work around them, get a big amount of data from Google searches and use it to publish some research. You're confusing methods with results. Someone uses methods to get a result, but if the results are not legal, the methods are usually illegal, too. Would the above depend on how they circumvented Google's checks (i.e., by using lots of proxies)? The words "or scraping content that doesn’t belong to you" means just that; it does not give any wiggle room for the actual method used to scrape. Could they get, theoretically, into trouble? Very much so. The researcher would have at least civil liability, and possibly criminal exposure. Would they, practically? Google can be very not kind to people who break their TOS. And Google has lots of money to spend on lawyers and court fees to enforce their TOS. Google would probably be able to easily prove the data came from their servers, and would probably have server logs to help prove it. And see user6726's answer for specific legal citations in the US and UK.

This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.

Please see this related answer where this is discussed, although is a slightly different context. There have not been many cases on this subject, but it appears that, at least in the US and EU, a person is free to post web pages that link to others without permission and indeed against the wishes of the operator of the destination site. However, "deep linking" that bypasses a login or other access control page, or an advertising page that visitors who enter via a home page would be expected to load, particularly if such deep linking deprives the destination site of revenue, may constitute copyright infringement. "framing" a linked page so that it appears to be part of the linking site, may also be copyright infringement, and might also be actionable under trademark law. See Nolo's page on Linking, Framing, and Inlining And the Wikipedia article on Deep linking In Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) deep linking was held to be contributory copyright infringement. See The Wikipedia article on the case In that case, the content being linked to had been posted without the authorization of the copyright holder, and no fair use issue was raised by the defense. In general, courts have found that publishing a page on the web invites others to visit it and link to it. In the Wikipedia article on "Deep linking" (linked above) it is said that: In a February 2006 ruling, the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court (Copenhagen) found systematic crawling, indexing and deep linking by portal site ofir.dk of real estate site Home.dk not to conflict with Danish law or the database directive of the European Union. The Court stated that search engines are desirable for the functioning of the Internet, and that, when publishing information on the Internet, one must assume—and accept—that search engines deep-link to individual pages of one's website. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) a US court held that links to copyrighted images as part of an image search were not copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit court of Appeals held that Google's display and caching of thumbnails was fair use, mainly because they were "highly transformative." However, a ToS or ELUA may be a legally binding contract between a site operator and site users. If it forbids linking, that may be enforceable, depending on the laws of the country where suit is brought. Owners of publicly accessible databases are permitted, under EU law, to impose and enforce access restrictions. See the case of Ryanair vs PR Aviation brought in the European Court of Justice.

Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.

"Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (*cough*) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive).

It is not different. But one company can decide to approach compliance differently from another. Here, TomTom has chosen a fairly safe/conservative interpretation, whereas Google and Apple decided that more data collection is appropriate. A “find my device” style functionality appears to be entirely unproblematic if the user books that particular service (regardless of whether the service is paid or gratis) and provides consent for the location data collection. The legal basis for such a service could then be Art 6(1)(a) consent or Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract to which the data subject is party. Personally, I believe that Google is not sufficiently transparent about how Find My Device works, but that TomTom could provide a compliant service if they wanted to. That TomTom doesn't offer this service primarily shows that they don't think developing this service is worth it. Wiping a remote device is unrelated to this issue and doesn't seem to provide GDPR challenges. At least in a business context, remote wiping may be an appropriate security measure and may then even be mandated by the GDPR (e.g. see Art 24 or Art 32).

Why did US v. Assange skip the court of appeal? The high court’s appeal was further sought to be appealed to the UKSC but not first to the EWCA. Why was the Court of Appeal passed over in this case?

The decision which Assange sought to appeal, United States v Assange [2021] EWHC 3313 (Admin), was a decision of a divisional court of three judges. That is because s 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 provides for an appeal from "the appropriate judge" to the High Court, not the Court of Appeal. A divisional court of the High Court, called the Administrative Court, exercises this appellate jurisdiction and as an intermediate appellate court of three High Court judges, has a similar status to the Court of Appeal. When a point of law has already been considered by a single judge, and a panel of three judges on appeal, it makes sense for the Supreme Court to consider whether to grant leave to appeal directly under the provisions cited by Jen rather than requiring the parties to go through another intermediate court. An example of this is R (on the application of Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd) v Crown Prosecution Service [2020] UKSC 39, an appeal from a divisional court exercising judicial review jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from the divisional court in Assange's case.

Article 8 is pretty clear. The fact that it is recommended to extend the draft to women indicates that there is a conflict needing resolution. A relevant case before the European Court of Human Rights ruled on this and found the law to violate articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR. They identify an exoneration from the tax under the Military-Service Exemption Tax Act sect. 4. Reading the judgment could be helpful (maybe you know the case). What I get from it is that there are a bunch of situation-specific details that could be applied (e.g. you have to first complain formally in-country before going to ECHR), and issues of disability level and the distinction between disability and illness. This gives a model for anyone to attempt to resist the tax, but only a change in the law will get rid of it.

No, if, as you say we put aside the human rights questions surrounding the death penalty itself and assuming that the prisoners had been legitimately charged, convicted and had exhausted their appeals process. Once a person has been convicted, sentenced to death and has exhausted their appeals then the timing of the execution passes from the judicial branch to the executive branch of government. This is why governments can implement and remove moratoriums on executions at their discretion. Doubtless there are administrative rules and logistical issues involved in the actual timing of the execution but if these have all been correctly dealt with then they are essentially held at the pleasure of the person in the government charged with the decision. Was it legal? Probably. Was it ethical? ...

I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.

Up to 12 months in jail. Just by coincidence, only this week some guy who was given a jail sentence of several years for manslaughter, then jumped bail and left the country, and was extradited back to the UK, was given six months jail for jumping bail. The punishment is for jumping bail, which is an offence independent of whether the original charges are true or false. So the cases are somehow comparable, except Assange jumped bail for seven years, which would be worse, and Assange didn't leave the country but entered a foreign embassy, which I have no idea how that compares to leaving the country.

It isn't that uncommon to do something similar to this, which is called a "test case". One of the more familiar examples of this kind of litigation conduct is the case of Plessy v. Ferguson. There have been test cases, for example, that involved important questions of E.U. jurisdiction in civil law countries as well.

I cannot find any relevant judgements from June 2007 that were published by the Irish High Court using the judgement finder. However, over 50 similar cases were issued at the High Court regarding this matter, and all but 10 were settled prior to a bundle of four cases being issued before the High Court which ultimately referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This bundle of four cases was Metock & Ors. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 77 which ultimately became Case C-127/08 at the ECJ. It's unclear why the 15 June 2007 judgement hasn't been uploaded, or why it took until 14 March 2008 for the High Court to refer the matter to the ECJ. In conclusion, Ireland was ruled to have wrongly interpreted the relevant Directive and the Court held that non-EU family members of an EU citizen can move to an EU Member State without needing to have resided in another EU Member State prior to that. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC precludes legislation of a Member State which requires a national of a non-member country who is the spouse of a Union citizen residing in that Member State but not possessing its nationality to have previously been lawfully resident in another Member State before arriving in the host Member State, in order to benefit from the provisions of that directive. Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that a national of a non-member country who is the spouse of a Union citizen residing in a Member State whose nationality he does not possess and who accompanies or joins that Union citizen benefits from the provisions of that directive, irrespective of when and where their marriage took place and of how the national of a non-member country entered the host Member State.

The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically ("shall be") a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of "claiming" of citizenship from some report that one can "claim" Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still "claim" it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no "claim" of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would "render him stateless", though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary "is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless." (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are "eligible" to "claim" one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being "eligible" to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot "sue" a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court.

are there any states where teenagers sending nudes to each other isn't a crime? For the recent surveys on law enforcement it appears that it is a crime in many states with many having explicit laws against it however are there any states where this isn't a crime and what about states that don't have an explicit law against it ?

Blaire Bayliss reviews the law in "The Kids are Alright 😂🍆🍑: Teen Sexting, Child Pornography Charges, and the Criminalization of Adolescent Sexuality" (2020) Colorado L. Rev. 251. The article uses the term "sexting" to mean the exchange of sexually explicit messages or images between individuals using electronic messaging. When images, this can constitute child pornography under federal law. Also (from cyberbullying.org), States that do not have a specific sexting law often rely on existing statutes when dealing with teen sexting. All states, for example, have child pornography or child exploitation laws that prohibit sending, receiving, or possessing images of a sexual nature of a minor. Bayliss notes though that some states have adapted their child pornography laws to account for teen sexting: For example, in Rhode Island, teens will not be charged under state criminal child pornography laws but may be "tried" in family court. And in Colorado, "teens who are approximately the same age and who exchange sexual images with the understanding of consent have committed a civil infraction." See Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-7-109(3). Bayliss's article and map are from 2020, but a 2022 dataset by the Cyberbulling Research Center shows not much has changed. That dataset also provides links to state-specific sexting laws where they exist. Note that no state law can exempt teens from the application of federal child pornography and related laws. Of course, if the image does not even constitute pornography, then all of the above is irrelevant, but I understand you to be asking about the circumstance where the content is typically or historically criminalized.

Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.

You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't.

what the law says about a person sending nude photos to a 10 year old child. The pictures are of her mom. This is a felony under Australian law and comes under the umbrella of Child sexual assault. The following quotes are from Statutory definitions of child sexual abuse, from the Australian State and Federal Governments. From the legislation for Northern Territory: Care and Protection of Children Act 2007 Exploitation of child Exploitation of a child includes sexual and any other forms of exploitation of the child. Without limiting subsection (1), sexual exploitation of a child includes: (a) sexual abuse of the child; and (b) involving the child as a participant or spectator in any of the following: (i) an act of a sexual nature; (ii) prostitution; (iii) a pornographic performance. This type of abuse would also constitute Child Sexual Abuse and Child abuse generally. The person is also calling the child's mom a whore and talking about sexually explicit acts he is doing From the legislation for Australian Capital Territory: Children and Young People Act 2008 In this Act: "abuse", of a child or young person, means- .../... (d) emotional abuse (including psychological abuse) if- (i) the child or young person has seen or heard the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a person with whom the child or young person has a domestic relationship, the exposure to which has caused or is causing significant harm to the wellbeing or development of the child or young person; .../...

What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? In short, yes. She shows up at a local police station, tells her side of the story including the whole bit about things getting destroyed and her getting kicked out, cites the missing persons report, and make it clear that she's not missing but an independent adult who is free and making her own decisions. Since she's over 18, she can do that. (Bringing proof of age might be helpful.) The mystery of the missing person will be considered solved from the police side. She does not have to give a specific address where she's living, just convince the officer that she's OK and making an intentional decision to create distance between herself and her mother. She could also try calling (the same local station which is convenient to her current location) before showing up to see if that satisfies the officer, and only go in if needed. Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. Shouldn't be a problem, as long as it's a mutually willing (non-coercive) relationship. Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Yes, you can reject it. You do not have to answer ANY question a police officer asks; you have the right to remain silent and/or to say only "I have the right to remain silent." To reduce the probability that they'll even ask questions, you might prefer not accompanying your girlfriend when she goes to clear the missing persons report, if she goes in-person. This adds more weight to her assertion that she's going there to clear it of her own free will, not because you're forcing her.

Per your comment responses, Maryland is a two party consent state which means that the other party must consent to your recording IF there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In one's own home is generally considered a place where one has this expectation and thus these recordings are problematic. Depending what you intend to do with them, I would first contact a lawyer to get legal advice as to how to handle this before you publish them. If you are looking to file a criminal complaint (and assuming statute of limitations hasn't run out) the prosecutor may be willing to not prosecute you for violating 2 party consent law because you were trying to gather evidence of someone else's crime, but it's not a guarantee (though this will look bad on the prosecutor come election season). If you are suing your parents it might not be admissible as evidence but I can't specifically say that either. If you are using it to show other people in the same situation what to look for it's probably best to find another set of recordings as these ones carry a lot of legal issues that will come back to bite you if you release them. Finally, while not legal, your parents may not want to pursue the criminal recording side of this matter if they are aware of the "Barbra Streisand effect," wherein actions taken to ensure something isn't viewed by the public cause that something to gain wider viewership than if they never bothered trying to censor it.

I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation.

"The EU" is a lot of different jurisdictions, and laws vary between them. The following answer applies to the UK. A: Alice is guilty of making and possessing indecent images of a child. The fact that the child was herself is irrelevant, as are her current feelings on the subject. The "making" offence was committed when she was under 18, so for that she would be treated as a child, but the possession offence would be be charged at her current age. If Alice has made recent copies of the pictures, for instance by moving her files to another computer, then she is guilty of "making" as an adult. B: As with "A", but with increased penalties for publishing it. C: As with "B", except that the offence was committed when she was under 18.

Why the obscure but specific description of Jane Doe II in the original complaint for Westenbroek v. Kappa Kappa Gamma Fraternity? In Westenbroek v. Kappa Kappa Gamma Fraternity (2023), filed in the Wyoming District of U.S. court, the plaintiffs are seven women, members of Kappa Kappa Gamma sorority at University of Wyoming, suing the national organization (based in Ohio) for allegedly having admitted a man to their sorority. The original complaint was filed anonymously. Paragraphs 15–21 describe the plaintiffs. Paragraph 16 reads: Jane Doe II is a citizen of a state that is not Illinois, Ohio, Utah, Washington, or Wyoming. Plaintiff Jane Doe VI is also described in this odd way. The other plaintiffs are simply described as citizens of a single specific state, variously Nebraska, Colorado, or Oklahoma. What is up with “not Illinois, Ohio, Utah, Washington, or Wyoming”? I can think of reasons why Wyoming and Ohio are in there: the case concerns a Wyoming matter and was filed in the District of Wyoming, and the defendant is based in Ohio. Why are Illinois, Utah, and Washington mentioned specifically, and no other state is?

This case was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, meaning that it’s a lawsuit between citizens of different states. In most cases, diversity jurisdiction requires “complete” diversity: every plaintiff has to be a citizen of a different state than every defendant. If one of 12 plaintiffs is a Maryland resident and one of 15 defendants is also a Maryland resident, that tiny overlap means the entire lawsuit is kicked back to state court. In this case, the defendants are an Ohio fraternity, an Illinois resident, a Wyoming company, and a person whose residence is unclear. Defendant Smith might be a Wyoming resident, a Utah resident, or a Washington resident. The plaintiffs aren’t sure. However, as long as the plaintiffs aren’t residents of any of those states, there’s complete diversity of citizenship. It doesn’t matter whether Doe II is from Alaska or Florida, just that she isn’t from the same state as any defendant.

There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.

The situations cannot reasonably be compared legally. In Wynn v. Vilsack, a motion for preliminary injunction was granted (and the program was not ruled unconstitutional). In the ruling, the court found that the evidence "does not support a finding that USDA continues to be a participant, passive or active, in discrimination", and does find that there were past successful remediation efforts, thus "the Court expresses serious concerns over whether the Government will be able to establish a strong basis in evidence warranting the implementation of Section 1005's race-based remedial action", moreover "Plaintiff has convincingly shown that the relief provided by Section 1005 is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest". The court finds that there is a good-enough case that the law fails strict scrutiny. Incidentally, Congress repealed that law. On the other hand, in Evanston, we have no facts or concrete legal allegations (e.g. drafts of a legal complaint). The cited memorandum is a recommendation, not a law. There does exist at least one available council action from 2019 which says that The Chief Financial Officer is hereby authorized to divert all adult use cannabis funds received by the Illinois Department of Revenue for sales of adult use cannabis to a separate fund in a City account for local reparations. SECTION 3: The City may receive donations to this fund from separate organizations, corporations, and individuals established herein by the City Council. The city also has a page referring to Ordinance 102-O-20 (not available) indicating that "The Committee will work with residents, City staff and experts to explore and identify programs and opportunities to be supported by the Reparations Fund". The Program Guidelines §3 indicates that a person may be eligible for money if they are an ancestor, direct descendant, or "other" who has suffered from a "City ordinance, policy, or procedure that served to discriminate against the Applicant in the area of housing". It thus does not exclude Asian and Hispanic homeowners, LGBTQIA2S+, Catholic, Muslims or anyone else, except insofar as a Catholic was not demonstrably the victim of such discrimination. The city also provides an extensive historical study of past government discrimination in housing. You may be able to eke out more concrete information on what they have done here, at the reparations committee website. In terms of potential differentia between the USDA program and the Evanston program, the most obvious difference would be in terms of prior remediation efforts. If you sue Evanston for their program, they could defend the program as providing the remediation that justifies the program – which had already been provided in the USDA program.

There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.

The main legal question is, whose law applies? According to Krauss v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 787, where Krauss (in all-party PA) was recorded by Globe (in one-party NY). Krauss sued Globe in NY under PA law. The court found that the "law of the place of injury" determines which laws hold. Since the recording took place in NY and not in PA, NY law applies, case dismissed. A similar setup (and different outcome) arose in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, 137 P.3d 914 where SSB (in one-party GA) recorded Kearney (in all-party CA). The CA Supreme Court reached the opposite decision, finding that "the failure to apply California law in this context would impair California's interest in protecting the degree of privacy afforded to California residents by California law more severely than the application of California law would impair any interests of the State of Georgia". It is unlikely that functioning in the capacity of an officer of a NJ company at work would be found legally relevant. The main questions would be, where was the recording made, and which court system is deciding the matter? Assuming that the suit is filed in PA and given that Pennsylvania no longer follows the lex loci delicti rule (Griffith v. United Air Lines,416 Pa. 1), the prospects are greater, following the persuasive precedent of the California ruling would tip the sales in favor of a finding against the NJ person making the recording of a party who is in PA (and who files the suit). In a somewhat related PA Supreme Court case Pennsylvania v. Britton, 229 A.3d 590 there arose a "two jurisdictions" problem of recording – involving California and Pennsylvania – the court observes that when an issue implicates substantive laws, such as the privacy rights asserted by Appellant, a conflict-of-law analysis requires the forum court to apply the law of the state with the most interest in the outcome of the controversy which is to say, the PA Supreme Court agreed (indirectly) with the reasoning in Kearney v. SSB.

Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.

Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence.

In April 2017, a US District court on Colorado ruled that a law prohibiting women from exposing their breasts in public was an unconstitutional discrimination against women. The law was ordinance 134 passed by Fort Collins, Colorado in May 2016. The group opposing it was led by the activist organization "Free the Nipple." This ruling is not binding in other states, however. See this Snopes report for more details. The case is being appealed to the Tenth Circuit. A similar ordinance has been taken to state court in New Hampshire on similar grounds as described in this AP story and this US News story A similar claim in Illinois in 2017 resulted in a law against 'public indecency" being upheld (in Tagami v. City of Chicago) at the Federal Appeals Court level, according to this Reason story A similar law in Ocean City, Maryland, was challenged in federal court in the summer oif 2018 according to this news story. in 1991 in United States v. Biocic the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a similar law against a similar challenge. This Munknee article lists states where a woman going topless is legal and illegal. According to a Time Article (which gives a similar list): The vast majority of states actually have laws on the books making clear that women can’t be arrested under state law solely for being topless in settings where it’s OK for men. But many local ordinances ban the practice anyway. In short, it is not yet fully settled if there is a US constitutional right for a woman to go topless, and state and local laws vary widely. Local laws do not always conform to the laws of the state, but would probably require a court challenge to enforce the state law. Laws in other countries will vary, but many places ban such exposure.

When family members are aware of a crime of someone from the family but refuse to testify , are they held liable for perjury? What do family members that don't want to testify against their family members usually do ? do they face the penalty ?

united-states Perjury only applies to someone who actually does testify and is untruthful. A person who refuses to testify at all, when ordered to do so by a subpoena, is committing contempt of court. It is possible, in principle, for the court to order them jailed indefinitely until they do testify (civil contempt). It is also possible for them to be prosecuted criminally afterward (criminal contempt).

Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.

I am not a lawyer either, though I have been through Pennsylvania a few times. The relevant law is 18 Pa.C.S. 5703, which prohibits recording without consent of all parties (Penna is a "two-party consent" state, like Florida and Washington). Unfortunately, violation of that law is a third degree felony, which has a maximum of 7 year prison. A specific instance of someone getting in trouble for recording their boss is Commonwealth v. Smith (Smith used a cell phone to record his boss, then argued that a cell phone isn't a "device"; the court determined that it is, and that was Feb 16 2016 so who knows the final outcome). An attorney in Pennsylvania might be able to tell you how often people actually serve time for violating the law. You should call one.

The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful.

Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare.

This appears to be covered by the Norway Criminal Procedures Code, of which an English version can be found here. Chapter 10 deals with witnesses. Here are some relevant sections: § 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. There follow a number of exceptions (spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, state secrets, etc). None of them seem to apply to your example. § 115. The court may decide that a witness who fails to attend or who leaves the place of sitting without a valid reason shall be brought before the same or a subsequent sitting of the court. In special cases the court may decide that a witness shall be detained in custody until he can be examined. § 128. Before the examination the president of the court shall admonish the witnesses to tell the whole truth without concealing anything. He shall inform the witnesses of the liability consequent on giving false evidence or making a false affirmation. § 137. If a witness refuses to give evidence after being ordered to do so by a legally enforceable court order, the court may by a new order decide that the witness shall be kept in custody until he fulfils his obligation. Nevertheless a witness may not be kept in custody for more than three months altogether in the same case or in another case relating to the same matter. So effectively, if the witness fails to show up voluntarily, he can be brought in forcibly. He can be ordered to testify, and if he refuses, he can be held in custody (probably a jail) for up to three months. However, the authority to compel testimony is limited to courts; the police cannot compel statements from witnesses. § 230. The police may take statements from suspected persons, witnesses and experts but may not order any person to make a statement. So in your example, it appears that the witnesses would be free to refuse to speak to the police. However, if the case came to trial, they could be ordered to testify, and could be held in custody if they refused.

Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.

In the US, they would not be automatically prosecuted. The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence. Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them. If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence.

Is it legal to lie about an illegal requirement? As an example, its not legal to discriminate against a person of a certain race while renting out your house. So lets say an Asian person sees a house rented out with a "no Asians" condition. Would it be legal for them to "mask" themselves as a White person, tell the landlord they're White, sign a paper saying they're White and then proceed to rent the place? Now... they'd be outright lying but at the same time what they're lying about is not supposed to have been asked in the first place. So does one wrong (discrimination) trump another (lying) in a court of law? Update: since it’s not clear, I’m talking about a scenario where the “Asian” person is willing to admit they lied in a court of law. This isn’t a question on how race is legally defined.

Lying may be wrong, but it in the United States, it is generally not illegal. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). For a lie to be illegal, it generally needs to fall into one of a few specific categories, usually involving either fraud or the frustration of legitimate government activities (as in perjury, falsification of records, or lying to a federal agent). In any of these cases, the First Amendment is generally going to prohibit any penalties unless the false statement is material, i.e., it had the potential to change the outcome of the event in which it was uttered. As you noted, it is generally illegal to discriminate against Asians, so I would expect a court to treat the tenant's ethnicity as immaterial and require the landlord to honor the rental contract. Of course, this assumes that the landlord is prohibited from disciminating against Asians, which is not always true. The Fair Housing Act has exemptions for (a) private clubs; (b) for buildings with four or fewer units, one of which the landlord occupies; (c) for single-family homes that the landlord is renting without the help of an agent; and (d) for religious organizations. In such a case, the landlord may be actually be permitted to disciminate against Asians, so the tenant's false statement about their ethnicity would become material the transaction, and a court may therefore permit the landlord to rescind the contract. (Note, though, that even though the FHA permits discrimination in those limited situations, it does not permit advertising discriminatory preferences. The landlord's "No Asians" language is therefore illegal, whether it is communicated on a sign in the window or in a classified ad or by word of mouth.)

Can a state declare: "any violence against insert a group here shall not be prosecuted," which is pretty much what Nazis and Communists did, and then claim non-involvement in the violence that would ensue? This would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. https://www.justice.gov/crt/guidance-regarding-use-race-federal-law-enforcement-agencies goes into exhaustive detail on the topic of what may constitute an illegal abuse of selective enforcement. A key quote is highly relevant to your question: [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. There is a lot of case law on this topic. This is frequently discussed in the context of race (especially profiling).

It is legal, unless the laws of that state say otherwise. Governments are allowed to charge different tuitions to residents vs. non-residents. They can also require proof of residence (not just your say-so). Being physically present in a state for a couple of years is not proof of being a resident. That doesn't mean that the interrogation that you are getting is allowed by law, but it's at least consistent with the general pattern of out of state tuition laws in the US. If you have contradictory elements of "proof" (voter registration in another state), they can demand more evidence. It really depends on what the state laws are, so you could name the state. Also, the full financial disclosure may in fact not be related to tuition rates but to financial aid, where they can demand all sorts of things by way of proof.

If the ability to get a Pannini is conditioned on buying paper towels for money, then he isn't really selling paper towels for $2 and the Pannini for free, he is really selling a package consisting of paper towels and a Pannini for $2, so it would probably still be illegal. The phrase lawyers and judges use to talk about attempts to create loopholes like this one is "too clever by half", which means: "Shrewd but flawed by overthinking or excessive complexity, with a resulting tendency to be unreliable or unsuccessful."

There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit.

A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.

The fair housing act does not mention "socially marginalized groups". It says that it shall be unlawful To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. The U.S. Supreme Court just ruled on a case, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project Inc., that covered disparate impact as a measurement of discrimination. Disparate impact raises the question of whether policies that appear to be neutral but result in a disproportionate impact on protected groups are legal. The Supreme Court, in its ruling, indicated that disparate impact claims can be brought but it also imposed significant limitations. How does this case apply to your question? The underlying situation in the referenced case is one where, from the ruling: The ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits, granting too many credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in pre-dominantly white suburban neighborhoods. The basis of the claim, which can now be heard under a disparate impact claim, is that a government organization discriminated against pre-dominantly white neighborhoods. FHA protects against racial discrimination, not against racial discrimination only against certain groups.

It depends on what state this is. In Washington state, there is a form that sellers must fill out, and section 3 addresses sewer connections. This matter could have been disclosed – the allowed answers are "yes; no; don't know" (or NA). These are sellers disclosures, and Zillow / Redfin are free to be unreliable (I personally know that they are wrong about square footage). A real estate agent also doesn't become liable for being misinformed. Assuming your state has this or analogous question, "No" means that you were told (doesn't matter if you didn't notice it), and "Don't know" means you're gambling. Let's say that the answer was "Yes". Still, you can't necessarily sue (and win): you would have to prove misrepresentation (fraud or negligence) and not innocent error. You could do this by, for instance, proving that seller had the septic tank cleaned out some years earlier. Perhaps an action against buyer's inspector is possible, since that's nominally what they might have been hired to find out. But that is only true if checking the sewer connection can reasonably be considered part of the deal, so you have to look at the contract with the inspector (and the inspector's report).

How to put a disclaimer about IP in an open source fangame? I am creating a fangame. Specifically a game where you can open weapon cases from Counter-Strike: Global Offensive for free and collect or trade skins that you obtain. The entire game source is my own work, except there are two files containing names and parameters of items from CSGO. I want to distribute my game's source including these files. I am ready to retract these parts should Valve contact me regarding intellectual property, however I'd like to put some kind of disclaimer in case somebody else used my source code and then got hit by Valve or anything. To state that I don't have a right to the IP contained and that the use of these files is at the risk of the user, not me; so they couldn't point at me, claiming the game was fully open sourced by me under MIT (which I plan to use). What would the best approach in this be?

IF part of your code and data is non-open-source, you can't release this software under the MIT license. However, from what I know, CS:GO uses real-life weapons, and their names aren't protected by copyright. Weapon stats aren't copyrightable either. With skin names, you should be safe as well, since there isn't enough (or any) lore around them to establish them as literary works. However, if you are using any in-game descriptions or images, they are copyrighted content and can't be legally copied without permission from Valve. Which might be easy to obtain by writing them.

Copyright never protects ideas or processes, it only protects expression: words, images, and sounds, some of which may describe ideas. But when a work is nothing more than a translation of an idea into words, with no independent originality -- when almost anyone would use more or less the same way to describe the idea, then the work will not be protected by copyright at all, as it is not considered an "original work". Computer code that implements an algorithm often falls under this rule. It is my belief that the code shown in the linked SE thread would fall under this rule, and would not be protected by copyright at all. If this is correct, then anyone may share such a program with no copyright concern.

The fact that a developer is showing off work that he/she has done for other another company doesn't imply that that developer owns any copyright to the work. In Canada, see the Copyright Act, § 13 (3): Where the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright and § 13 (4): The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right... In the US, see 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b): In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. and § 201 (d): The ownership of a copyright may be transferred... "What rights should and should not be attributed to the developer?" That is a business decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. Advice about the prudent balance of copyright between an employer/client and employee/contractor is legal advice. "Is it okay to use this projects as part of the developer's portfolio?" If the developer can link to public use of a product that he/she developed for a company, then the developer is not violating copyright by simply advertising that they worked on the product and linking to, without reproducing, the work. If the developer for whatever reason maintained copyright ownership in the code and other assets, it would not be copyright infringement to reproduce those as part of the portfolio. If the developer did not maintain copyright ownership in the code or assets, reproducing those may be copyright infringement, dependent on whether the copyright owner allowed the developer to reproduce those elements, or if the reproduction is fair use. There may be other laws or contracts implicated, though: non-disclosure agreements, trademark law, among others.

In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way.

Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk.

It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement.

You need to check if the original game developers patented the mechanics/rules of the game. For your example, Monopoly was patented, but expired in the 50s and while it would not be a copyright violation to mimic the rules/mechanics, it would be a different intellectual property violation (patent infringement). Spry Fox vs LOLAPPS is also relevant as it extends copyright protection to the implementation of an idea, but ideas (like rules/mechanics) cannot, by themselves, be copyrighted. This means that there is an avenue for the original developer/company to sue even if the visual/audible aspects are different, but the overall gameplay is the same. Also see Tetris Holding LLC vs Xio Interactive Inc. as it relates to the visual aspect of the game.

This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.