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Share The Road Sign Does the following sign mean that bikers and motor vehicle owners are sharing the same lane? But I thought it's not a good idea to share a lane. Thank you!

You did not state a jurisdiction, but this sign is of the style specified by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) which is used throughout the United States, so I will assume a jurisdiction which follows the MUTCD. The "Share the Road" sign is numbered W16-1P. (The MUTCD version just has the words and not the car/bike symbols; the latter might be a recent update or a local variation.) Its description reads: In situations where there is a need to warn drivers to watch for other slower forms of transportation traveling along the highway, such as bicycles, golf carts, horse-drawn vehicles, or farm machinery, a SHARE THE ROAD (W16-1P) plaque (see Figure 2C-12) may be used. So, as is generally the case for yellow warning signs, it does not have any effect on the laws which apply. (It is generally only white regulatory signs that do that.) Whether or not it is a "good idea" to share a lane, it is legal. Both cars and bikes are entitled to use the road, and if it's a road with only one lane in this direction of travel, then necessarily they must share it. Of course, they wouldn't typically travel side by side indefinitely, but they will be abreast briefly when a car passes a bike. California law, as an example, requires only that the car stay at least three feet away from the bicycle as it passes, when possible.

If the judge is kind, yes However, this is at the discretion of the judge. Even if the judge believes every word you say, you still broke the law. The speed limit in Michigan is “a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper” and that is not “greater than that which will permit a stop within the assured, clear distance ahead.” (MCL 257.627(1)). The posted speed limit is an upper bound on what is “careful and prudent”. Given you description of trucks obstructing your view, it’s arguable that the speed you were travelling at was not “careful and prudent”. The speed limit in school zones may be set at “not more than 20 miles per hour less than the speed limit normally posted but shall be not less than 25 miles per hour.” (MCL 257.627a(2)). And the speed limit on a local street in an area zoned for residential use is 25 mph “unless another speed is fixed and posted.” If you were in a residential street, the school zone speed is no different from the normal speed - the lights just serve to warn drivers that children are about. Finally, you are responsible for knowing the law. You are on that road at that time, it’s your duty to know what the posted limit is as well as determining what speed is “careful and prudent”. It doesn’t matter if it’s hard to know, the law presumes you know it. All that said, if you catch the judge in a good mood, they might give you a break. You don’t have a legal right to one so ask, don’t demand.

As far as I know in the United States, no DMV provides test vehicles. You need a vehicle to take the driving test. Since you are not currently licensed, you can not legally drive yourself to the test alone... So logically, you must bring someone... anyone... willing to drive you to the test and provide a vehicle for you to test in. As others have stated in the comments above, worse case scenario is the hiring of a driving instructor. If you read the written instructions (and I remember correctly), it does state something along the lines of "must be accompanied by a licensed driver and provide an insured, registered, vehicle". Which is a bit more formal than the "bring a friend". Most people just naturally use more casual terms when speaking. I don't know your age, but it's probably more common to hear "bring a parent" than "bring a friend" when speaking face to face with the DMV staff. Also, not all insurance policies are driver limited. Some policies are on the vehicle regardless of driver. Typically Liability-only insurance is vehicle specific, not driver specific. [*1] You'd have to review the policies or call the insurance agents to confirm this. You may even do something as simple as add you to the current insurance for a month or two while you're practicing and testing. Just reimburse your friend for any increase in premiums during this time. Contact the insurance company/agent. The cost may be minimal. In addition, there are non-owner insurance policies which cover you even if you do not own a vehicle. This would provide insurance if none of your friends has a policy which would work. Realize that most people taking the test for the first time have probably already been added to a policy owned by their parents. So, your situation is a bit more unique. It's not meant to be inherently confusing but if you're "outside the norm" you have to do some deductive reasoning on your own. And finally, if an accident or damage were to happen during your practicing or testing, it would still be your responsibility. If you are in control of the vehicle, you are responsible for any damage to it or damage caused by the vehicle due to any negligence on your part, regardless of any insurance policy. You'd be a pretty bad "friend" if you caused damage and didn't financially make restitution leaving your "friend" holding the bag, so to speak. Restitution could be something as simple as paying the deductible on your friend's policy. Of course, if you are not covered by insurance any claim may be denied -- leaving you responsible for everything. The mindset that just because your friend owns the car they are totally responsible for anything that happens while your driving seem very, very self-serving and, well, I'd be apprehensive about loaning you my vehicle as well. In fact, I absolutely would not.

Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.

In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving.

The nuisance of potentially waiting for all the traffic on the main road is a notion alien to the law. Seeing the red light, y correctly does not enter the intersection, because it would block the intersection, § 11 Ⅰ StVO. Keeping intersections clear is a general consideration, say for emergency services. Nevertheless, if safely stopping required entering the intersection, it’s not an issue here, § 4 Ⅰ 2 StVO. Stopping before entering the intersection is not a hard requirement, because the traffic lights do not regulate the intersection but an “isolated” pedestrian crossing. § 37 Ⅱ StVO concerns traffic lights at intersections. x has to yield traffic as indicated by the sign, § 8 Ⅰ StVO. Making a U‑turn or right-hand turn would be no issue, since this would not interfere with traffic (assuming properly dimensioned streets). Going straight is permissible if done with caution, § 8 Ⅱ StVO, but I would not recommend that. y might decide any moment “Eff it! I’m taking B street [Am Falkplatz].” and boom! Going left, however, is not allowed, since x had to stop short of the traffic light, which is frowned upon (blocking the intersection), but moreover it would take y’s right of way.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.

Copyright implications of dismissing Individual and Representative Plaintiffs v. Github Inc, Microsoft Inc, OpenAI (et al.) on derived LLMs "Individual and Representative Plaintiffs v. GITHUB, INC., a Delaware corporation; MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a Washington corporation; OPENAI, INC., a Delaware nonprofit corporation; [...]" is a class action lawsuit filed against OpenAI et al which includes the allegation of "violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act" (p.4) wrt the way Codex, a GPT-3 series large language model, was trained using open source code from Github user repositories. They note "Numerous questions of law or fact common to the entire Class arise from Defendants’ conduct—including [...] Whether Defendants’ conduct violated the Class’s rights under the DMCA when GitHub and OpenAI caused Codex and Copilot to ingest and distribute Licensed Materials without including any associated Attribution, Copyright Notice, or License Terms. (VI)(D)(37)-(VI)(D)(37)(1) The defendants have made a motion to dismiss the case on several grounds stating "the crux of this claim asserts that OpenAI improperly benefited from using Licensed Materials to create Derived Works" (VI)(A)(3)(B) but refuting that "Plaintiffs do not asserts a copyright infringement claim. Instead they allege that Defendants violated the DMCA by [...] (3) knowingly providing CMI that is false by "asserting and/or implying that CoPilot is the author of Licensed Materials"". (VI)(C)(1). If the DMCA abuse claim of this case gets dismissed, I'm wondering if it would have the effect of nullifying the legal basis to prosecute commercial use of large language models (LLMs) derived from data selected by an even larger model (henceforth, "data derived LLM") -- or at least setting the precedent to do so. Examples of data derived LLMs include Alpaca, Koala, GPT4ALL, and Vicuna, all of which were trained on data produced by OpenAI's models and are currently only available for non-commercial purposes. EG, "the instruction data is based on OpenAI’s text-davinci-003, whose terms of use prohibit developing models that compete with OpenAI." Also worth consideration is this provision in OpenAI's ToS: (c) Restrictions. You may not [...] (iv) except as permitted through the API, use any automated or programmatic method to extract data or output from the Services, including scraping, web harvesting, or web data extraction; [...] The precedent set by the action to dismiss or not dismiss the class action lawsuit against OpenAI et al could have an enormous impact on the economics of training LLMs, since (as of Apr 29) it is orders of magnitude cheaper to train a data derived LLM like Alpaca than a new one. Surely OpenAI would attempt to restrict others from using their LLMs to train new ones for fractions of the price (the maximum penalty for violation is suspension and termination ToS 6(a)), but under their current ToS, could they prosecute such incidents? The big question I'm asking is: Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs?

A motion to dismiss sets no precedent Whether it succeeds or not, it does not result in a judgement on the merits, it is simply an analysis on whether the case as pleaded shows the defendant has a case to answer. The case would have to go to trial, have a judgement issued (i.e. not settle), and await the result of final appeals (if any) before it would be considered precedent. As to your final question Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs? No one knows. Hence the lawsuit.

It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on "How to Find the Purple Moth" [imaginary example] in volume 28 of the Journal of Moth Science is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law 17 USC 102(b) provides that: b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright. So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true. I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.

The maxim "de minimis non curat lex" is not so much of a rule as a guideline. It essentially says that when a court considers a matter too trivial to bother with, it can simply dismiss the case. It also constitutes advice not to make a legal case over trivial matters. It always involves judgement over what is or is not trivial in a particular context. It does not ever change the law. For example, perhaps it's the case that photocopying a page of a book, in a particular situation, would be considered to be a copyright crime without the use of the rule. Is it then the case that the rule might be able to be invoked, to say that the photocopying is perfectly lawful? Photocopying a single page of a book is very unlikely to be a crime. Under US law the government must prove intentional copying of works for personal financial gain with a total retail value of at least $1,000 (and in practice criminal charges are not brought unless unlawful copies are made in bulk as a business). I have not found the exact monetary lower limit of criminal copyright infringement in England and Wales, but I am confident that a single page of a book would not qualify. Beyond that UK law specifically provides for fair dealing. This allows one to lawfully make a copy or use copyrighted materiel for, among other purposes: Private and research study purposes. Performance, copies or lending for educational purposes. Criticism and news reporting. Incidental inclusion. Copies and lending by librarians. Caricature, parody or pastiche. (Source: "UK Copyright Law: Fact sheet P-01" If making a copy of a page of a book did not fall within the scope of fair dealing, then it might be an actionable tort, and if the copyright owner choose to peruse it, the maxim would not automatically lead to a dismissal, although it could form part of an argument for dismissal. If such dismissals occur routinely, a legal realist might say that showed that such copying was not in fact covered by the law, but most legal theorists would not put it that way. (Legal realists generally take the view that the actual law is what courts actually enforce, not what is on the statute books or even what is described in court opinions.)

The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits.

Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.)

The only issue relevant to your age is the (ir)revocability of the license. GPLv3 purports to be an irrevocable license. To be really irrevocable, the license would need to grant certain rights in exchange for something of value, that is, you need a license that passes muster as a contract. Copyright licenses are typically treated as contracts, but it is not clearly established in law that licenses are contracts or are not contracts. Out of the goodness of your heart, you can grant permission to use your property, but you can also withdraw that permission. If you have a contract granting perpetual permission to use your property in exchange for something of value, then you can't later withdraw that permission. In the case of Jacobsen v. Kratzer, the sides advances opposing theories that the license was a "bare license" vs. was a contract. (The matter was ultimately settled out of court). This article puts together the legal factors surrounding the notion of license as contract, see p. 21 ff, and esp. §IV for arguments that licenses should be contracts, to be fully enforceable. A contract for non-essentials formed with a minor is not enforceable, until you are 18. You could therefore revoke the license, until you are 18. Anyone who uses the software does so at their peril. However, if the license is not a contract, no existing legal doctrine (in the US) whereby the permission is irrevocable. In other words, yes you can, at their peril. The whole license-as-contract issue is very complicated, and I'm only focusing on the revocability issue. There is a separate question whether one can sue a user for both copyright infringement and breach of contract. The case of Artifex v. Hancom, see also this analysis, found that (in the particular case), plaintiff can pursue the matter as both infringement and contract breach.

The requirement to make the code publicly available is binding on Olio, and on Olio's successor, Flex. Olio, by accepting the code under the GPL, had contracted with the original author of that code, one of the contract provisions being to make any modified code available publicly. If Olio fails to abide by that agreement, it is in violation of the license, and the original author could sue Olio for copyright infringement, or sue Flex as having bought the assets and liabilities. But the individual employees of Olio are not under any obligation to publish such modified code, as they were presumably not parties to the license deal -- Olio was. Therefore the NDA does not require them to violate any law or contract to which they might be parties. The NDA could probably not be used to prevent the employees from testifying if called in such a copyright suit. If the NDA did require an illegal action, it would be void. If it merely required a person to violate a civil agreement that could be settled for money, it might or might not be enforceable, depending on the exact provisions, its reasonableness under the exact circumstances, and the local law.

From the perspective of US law: Scenario 1: Removing the watermark is perfectly legal, obviously. You own the copyright. Scenario 2: Abandonware is not really a thing in the US when it comes to copyright (and the Wikipedia article you linked says this.) Even if the company went out of business, the copyright almost certainly went to somebody - the former owners, the creditors, etc. As far as the Internet Archive goes, they are taking advantage of an exemption in the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, along with the copyright exemption found in 17 USC § 108. But both of these exemptions require you to be a "library or archive" to take advantage of them, and you are not a library or archive, so you cannot take advantage of either. As a practical matter, if the software is really abandoned it's unlikely that anyone will actually come after you for infringement, but that's not quite the same as it being legal - you could be on the hook for up to $150,000 in statutory damages per work infringed, if the owner does sue you. You could attempt to claim fair use, of course. If the image is abandoned you might get a favorable result on factor 4 of the fair use test (the effect on the market for the original) since there's no market if nobody can find the owner. But it would depend on the other factors; that alone wouldn't get you fair use. Scenario 3: I'm not sure where you get the idea that downloading a copyrighted image to your desktop is somehow protected. It isn't automatically legal to save a copy of something just because it's on the Internet. And the existence of a watermark may indicate that someone wanted to prevent the file from being copied. The website containing the image will likely have terms of use, which may indicate whether or not you're allowed to make a copy. For example, Stack Exchange's TOS says in part: Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content.

Why are there distinct burdens of proof in civil and criminal cases? In a criminal case, in all common law jurisdictions that I know of, an accusation must be proven to a high level which is commonly stated as being "beyond reasonable doubt", whereas in a civil case the burden of proof of the accusation is typically lower, expressed as something like "preponderance of evidence" or perhaps "more likely than not". Is there any explanation in the legal literature of what justifies having a distinction in burden of proof?

Because in a civil case you have two equally involved sides. If I claim you damaged my car which cost $10,000 to repair, it's not only that you lose $10,000 if you lose the case, but I lose $10,000 if you win the case. Therefore the burden of proof should be equal in both directions. Assume a kid at an expensive boarding school is accused of causing $10,000 damage to the headmaster's car, and instead of suing for damages, the headmaster took the $10,000 out of the kid's school fees and tells the parents that the kid will be thrown out if they don't pay another $10,000. We have the exact same argument, but now the headmaster would be in court and accused. If the burden of proof was "proven beyond reasonable doubt", in the first case the parents would have to pay if it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the kid was responsible; in the second case they would only get their money back if it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the kid was not responsible.

The standard of proof for a criminal conviction is the same. So they would similarly need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the foreign national of a crime. But deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has a different standard of proof. (In deportation you also don't have criminal defendant rights like right to an attorney if you can't afford one.) I believe the standard is "clear and convincing evidence".

(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.

The defence in a criminal case has no obligation to inform the prosecution of anything. The onus is on the prosecution to provide the evidence to convict and the defence doesn't have to and indeed shouldn't help them do it. The defence can and probably would use conflicting statements by a prosecution witness to discredit that witness in the eyes of the jury. These do not have to be material to the case: just showing the witness is inconsistent in general is helpful.

Prejudice and bias goes to credibility The trier of fact has to decide how much weight to give each piece of evidence including witness testimony. A clearly prejudiced or biased witness will, all else being equal, deserve less weight than a more unbiased or less prejudiced witness. Or, at least, one who is less obviously biased and prejudiced - because everyone is biased and prejudiced. A witness who clearly and unequivocally declared their bias and prejudice probably deserves more credit than one who reveals it unwillingly during examination. The witnesses you use are the people who were there - you don’t get to choose their character.

The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.

Acquittals in criminal jury trials cannot be appealed (at least in a way that affects the outcome, Colorado and a few other states allow criminal appeals by the prosecution solely for the purposes of clarifying the law prospectively). Interlocutory appeals (i.e. appeals before the case is over) by the prosecution are allowed for pre-trial rulings (e.g. suppression of evidence rulings in a pre-trial hearing), in criminal cases, but not for evidentiary rulings made in the midst of a jury trial (which is when jeopardy attaches for the purposes of the double jeopardy rule, which is what prevents acquittals from being retried). An error in a ruling on an admission or rejection of evidence at trial may be appealed by a convicted defendant if the alleged misapplication of the evidence rule was an abuse of discretion by the judge, and was not "harmless error" (i.e. if as part of all errors made in the case there is a reasonable probability that it changed the outcome that the jury reached).

Bad people are quite uncommon Most people behave in good faith most of the time - don't tie yourself in knots over the very few people who would be unscrupulous enough to try to do this. Burden of proof The person who makes the allegation has the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. So the person who claims they didn't receive it has to prove that. If there are two equally credible witnesses, one saying they packed and posted the thing and one saying the thing was not packed then the burden has not been met. If the person who packed it has a photo of it packed and addressed then the other person has definitely not met their burden of proof. Insurance Insure it against loss or damage in transit. Then you can just replace it and claim on your insurance.

What is the purpose of pardoning powers? Various countries have pardoning powers given to either the president or the governor, this is secured as a constitutional right of the president and governor. What is the purpose of such powers? Is there a special reason why are they handed to a president or governor?

They are the modern legacy of the Royal prerogative of mercy Or in Commonwealth countries that still have a monarch, it is the Royal prerogative of mercy. Its modern functional purpose is to provide justice beyond the law. Its historical purpose was to allow the monarch to commute automatic death sentences in a legal system that did not, at that time, have an appeals process to correct miscarriages of justice, either through mistake or in a system that was not as flexible as it is today. It exists as the ultimate backstop against injustice. Ultimately, exercise of the power is a political rather than a judicial one and, as such, any limits on misuse come through the ballot box, not the court.

He will be thrown out of office (the "except in case of impeachment" clause means the president cannot immunize a person against impeachment); because he was pardoned by POTUS, he will not be charged of the crime that he was pardoned for – the prosecution does not get a chance to argue anything. They might however prosecute him for some other offense not covered by the pardon (if POTUS forgets a sweeping statement like "any and all crimes related to X"). I don't think a prosecutor is likely to try to argue that the Constitution means "the president cannot pardon a person who has been impeached".

The direct answer is simple -- the US Constitution (Article II, Section 1, Clause 2) provides that electors are appointed in the manner that state legislatures direct -- so the answer is the state legislature decides. But state legislatures don't exist in a vacuum, and the reality is not so simple. State legislatures direct the manner of choosing electors by passing state laws, which, in the case the state decides to choose electors by holding some sort of popular election, include laws for how and when ballots can be cast or received, and how recounts are to work, etc. Normally, state laws are interpreted by state courts, and state courts can strike down or modify state laws if they find that the state laws violate the state constitution. And more fundamentally, state legislatures derive their authority from state constitutions, so in principle, state legislatures should not be able to perform any act that does not conform to the state constitution (which is interpreted by the state courts). However, the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) overturned the Florida state supreme court ruling on how to conduct recounts in the Florida election for presidential electors. Normally, federal courts do not get involved in state law issues, but the decision was mostly made on equal protection grounds, and the equal protection clause is part of the federal Constitution. So federal courts can get involved if there is an issue that relates to federal law or Constitution. In the Bush v. Gore case, there was an interesting concurring opinion that said the Florida supreme court had acted contrary to the Florida legislature, but this opinion was only joined by 3 justices, so it is not binding. Recently, the issue came up again when the US Supreme Court declined to stay a decision by the Pennsylvania state supreme court that said the Pennsylvania constitution required mail ballots postmarked by Election Day but received up to 3 days after Election Day to be counted, even though the state law said they must be received by Election Day. Notably, although the US Supreme Court declined the stay, the order listed that 4 conservative justices dissented and said that they would have granted the stay. This was before Justice Barrett was confirmed, so, now that she is confirmed, depending on her legal position on this issue, there might now be a majority of 5 justices that would intervene against the state court if such an issue were to come up again. The order did not list the legal reasoning for each of the dissenting justices, so it is unclear what legal justification they had in mind in agreeing to overrule the state court.

To start, for this hypothetical to happen, a whole bunch of decisions contrary to sanity have to happen: The Vice President and President Pro Tempore do not invoke the 25th Amendment to temporarily remove the President from office Congress does not issue Articles of Impeachment The President does not pardon himself The District Attorney decides to prosecute the sitting President rather than waiting for his term to be over There are probably more I'm missing. With that out of the way, in theory there's no law that says a President cannot serve while in prison, and simply being a felon does not disqualify him from the Presidency. The judge might order that while he was still serving as President, he serve his time under house arrest - he'd constantly be surrounded by police officers, so it would be pretty difficult for him to run, and it would keep him as as able as possible to keep performing the official functions of the office. The judge could also just defer his sentence. Putting him in regular prison would have serious national security implications, both in terms of protecting his person and in allowing him to effectively serve as Commander-in-Chief, so the government could probably make a compelling case against putting a sitting President in prison. According to this Senate Report, the President will also continue to receive Secret Service protection once he leaves office, so long as he is not removed by Impeachment. There doesn't seem to be a provision against that protection if the President is in prison, so the Secret Service would be obliged to find a way to protect him while he is in prison. Most likely this would mean he would be put in an isolated prison wing, possibly with Secret Service protecting his section.

Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws.

Elected officials are not "employees subject to the civil service laws" unless a state has made extremely odd decisions, and maybe not even then. The "civil service," as that term is used when talking about government employment, consists of at most those people who work for the government as a career. It generally actually means something even more restricted: civil servants are people protected from arbitrary action or political cronyism. For instance, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour division (interpreting the same type of language) defines it as follows (29 CFR 553.11): The term “civil service laws” refers to a personnel system established by law which is designed to protect employees from arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and political coercion, and which uses a competitive or merit examination process for selection and placement. Continued tenure of employment of employees under civil service, except for cause, is provided. Elected officials, in contrast, do not have an expectation of continued employment other than for cause -- they can be voted out for any reason whatsoever.

First, there is no definitive correct answer to this question because it has never happened over the course of 45 Presidencies. But, it certainly could come up. If the President purports to pardon himself for a federal crime and is then prosecuted, the judicial branch would have to decide if the pardon was valid. But, I would disagree with the answer from @user6726, and would instead take the position that the concept of a pardon inherently implies that one is pardoning someone else. This is why President Nixon, when he resigned, had Vice President Ford, when he became President upon Nixon's resignation, pardon him, rather than pardoning himself. President Bush, in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal also took the position that he did not have the power to pardon himself. Basically, a pardon is an event that is ordinary conceived of as involving two persons, a giver of the pardon and a recipient. Also, recognizing the power of a President to pardon himself or herself would be to give him or her impunity to disregard the law not just in areas where he or she has Presidential immunity, but in anything that he has ever done in his life. (Also, the President can only pardon federal crimes, not state crimes.) There is, of course, an academic literature on the subject (which none of the answers in the PoliticsSE refer to and which the other answer here does not refer to). The two leading law review articles addressing the question are: Brian C. Kalt, "Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case against Presidential Self-Pardons" 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996-1997) (obviously adopting my position). An expanded version of this article became a chapter in a book called "Constitutional Cliffhangers: A Legal Guide For Presidents and Their Enemies" by the same author. Robert Nida and Rebecca L. Spiro, "The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power" 52 Okla. L. Rev. 197 (1999) (closed access). It opens with the following language (in part): [C]an the President pardon himself for criminal acts committed while or before holding office? Article II of the Constitution prohibits a President from using the pardon power to overturn an impeachment.5 The Framers of the Constitution placed only this limitation on the ability of the President to exercise his pardon power,6 and the only sanction for the abuse of the pardon power is the removal of the President through impeachment.7 The Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the President may grant himself a pardon from prosecution and, if so, when such a pardon may be issued.8 In the over 20,000 instances that Presidents have used this exclusive power,9 no President has used this power to pardon himself.10 One viewpoint is that a presidential self-pardon is inherently inconsistent with "natural law," which proclaims that one may not judge oneself.11 This article is cited in Comparative Executive Clemency by Andrew Novak who calls it an unresolved question but believes many legal scholars believe that it is possible. Leading Constitutional law scholar Adrian Vermeule analyzes but does not resolve the issue in his book "The Constitution of Risk". A 2017 Vox review from 15 legal experts is here. Their views are mixed and nuanced. A 2017 op-ed in the Washington Post from a former member of Congress who was involved in the impeachment proceedings for President Nixon says "no." Another review of expert opinion in 2017 can be found here. This also noted a dispute within the realm of academic legal opinion. There has also been debate over whether treason is treated differently for pardon power purposes than other federal crimes, but the precedent of the pardons issued after the U.S. Civil War pretty definitively resolved this question in favor of the power of the President to pardon treason, so the nature of the federal offense wouldn't matter. Note also that the pardon power is not limited to cases where criminal charges have been brought or convictions have been obtained. This issue is irrelevant to a President's self-pardon power.

The pardon does what it says it does Typically, the pardon is given for which the accused has already been convicted. Therefore, the principle of double jeopardy applies: the person has already been tried on the facts and all the charges that were or should have been brought have been determined. This, of course, doesn't prevent charges from being laid for other crimes allegedly committed at other times over different events. In the case where a person is pardoned more broadly, as in the Michael Flynn example, in addition to the double jeopardy limitation, a prosecutor is prevented from charging anything that falls within the scope of the pardon. Pardons do not constrain civil suits If you are pardoned of say, murder, that does not prevent the victim's dependants from bringing a wrongful death suit, just as being found not guilty wouldn't. These are different cases with different parties and the pardon has no effect. Similarly, a Federal pardon does not prevent a State (or another country) from laying charges over the same matter and vice-versa.

Does any state force recognition of common law marriage on couples if they do not want it? I will use Texas as an example, but I'd be interested in any others... Per this link, a couple is considered married under common law in Texas if they: 1.) Agree to be married, 2.) Live together as a couple, and 3.) Tell others ("hold themselves out") that they are married It also states that in order to get out of such a marriage: "Common law marriages in Texas have the same legal status as a ceremonial marriage." And "if the common law marriage doesn’t work out, you’ll have to get a formal divorce to end it. However, to get a divorce: ... the couple must first prove to the court that they were married. The person that first files papers with the court has to prove that there was a common law marriage. Recognizing that if there are children involved, or if one partner contests the divorce, things get messy and need to be sorted out legally. However, what if there are no children, and the couple mutually decide to not follow through with formal wedding plans, and instead agree to simply part ways and pretend that nothing happened? There is no paper trail. No proof that anything ever happened except perhaps jointly signed leases showing that at one point they lived together. No reason for either to assert a claim over the other for reasons of alimony, custody, or asset disputes. Neither has any interest or desire in attempting to prove to the state that they were married under common law. Really their situation is no different from any other co-habitating and/or engaged couple who later split up before completing an intended marriage ceremony. To title question then, would the state have any interest or legal right to assert that having once met conditions that would allow them to be considered married, that they are in fact still married despite their objections to that legal status and to being characterized as such? Could both later legally claim to be single and never married? Bonus points for addressing how "just kidding" or "I was lying" could be used to counter the issue of "holding out". Also bonus points for addressing how taking the 5th might assessed in answering questions around status, particularly in the context of applying for a marriage license later to someone else.

would the state have any interest or legal right to assert that having once met conditions that would allow them to be considered married, that they are in fact still married despite their objections to that legal status and to being characterized as such? Could both later legally claim to be single and never married? Yes. For example, the state could prosecute someone for bigamy if there was a common law marriage that was not dissolved and someone remarried. There are all sorts of other circumstances (e.g. paternity, government benefit eligibility, taxation) where the government might want to prove that you have a common law marriage as well. It is certainly possible to ignore the law and not get caught. But, generally, the agreement of the parties requirement for common law marriage means it doesn't happen very often. And, usually, at least one person in a married couple has an economic incentive to not ignore the existence of a marriage even if the couple had no children. Even if they don't have much in the way of assets at the time they separate, twenty years later there might be considerable assets acquired by the parties during marriage and a presumption of substantial alimony and inheritance rights. So someone who was O.K. with "forgetting it" when they were 23 might change their mind when they are 43 or when you are dead and a probate case is pending. There is no statute of limitations to establish the existence of a common law marriage. In short, ignoring the existence of a common law marriage is high risk and low reward. If there is ambiguity, one quick and dirty process as opposed to filing an action for annulment, is to file an action for divorce, apprise the court of the circumstances, and have it authoritatively dismiss the divorce case on the merits by ruling that the parties aren't married I've done that for a client once, in the face of fairly strong evidence that they were married, when the parties to the divorce case both told the court under oath that they never believed themselves to be married to each other at any time. One countervailing force is that issuance of a marriage license to someone creates a rebuttable presumption that they were not married at the time it was issued. This can be overcome with a showing of the existence of a common law marriage, but it makes the "proving a negative" of non-marriage easier, especially in cases when the parties are now dead and this is necessary to know for paternity or inheritance purposes. Finding proof of even a marriage license marriage (or a divorce) can be difficult as lots and lots of jurisdictions can get you married or divorced (not all in the U.S.A.), but there isn't a national comprehensive index of marriages in the United States. For what it is worth, France solves this problem by requiring copies of marriage certificates, divorce decrees, and death certificates to be filed where someone was born, but common law countries never had a comparable low tech system to solve the indexing problem. Also bonus points for addressing how taking the 5th might assessed in answering questions around status, particularly in the context of applying for a marriage license later to someone else. There is nothing special about it. You can refuse to testify about possible prior common law marriages if you subsequently have a marriage certificate issued. Keep in mind that you can only plead the 5th without consequences in a criminal case. In a civil matter, you can plead the 5th but this usually results in an adverse inference for purposes of the civil case that you committed the crime implicated by your refusal to testify on that ground.

The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime.

The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted.

These situations do come up (and incidentally, this is nothing new, it has been a difficult and recurring legal issue since at least the 18th century), and they really suck to be in, and often there aren't easy answers. There are a lot of legal doctrines out there that are designed to avoid a hard clash of conflicting court orders and to prevent someone from suffering contempt of court sanctions when they are in this bind. Generally, litigants caught in this bind look for these outs. For example, when particular property or records are at issue, often the person in question will "interplead" the property placing it in the jurisdiction of a court to resolve and out of their hands. There is a doctrine called in custodia legis which provides that once something is in the custody of a court that another court may not exercise jurisdiction over it. The entire sub-field of civil procedure pertaining to jurisdiction and venue is designed to avoid these conflicts. U.S. law has a whole sub-field a statutes and legal doctrines like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine designed to prevent these conflicts from coming up when they arise between federal and state courts. One of the most important legal doctrines is that a person cannot be punished for contempt of court for failing to do something that the person being held in contempt of court does not have the ability to do. One argument, which doesn't always work, is that once you are subject to a legally binding court order that has been served upon you that you may not legally defy that court order in order to follow the order of a court which cannot override the decisions of the court issuing the first order. Usually, contempt citations are directed at individual employees or agents rather than at entities. For example, in a dispute over Indian Trust Funds against the United States government, contempt citations were brought against the Secretary of Interior personally and could have sent that individual to jail for not complying. One way the an individual can get out of the order relating to an employment or professional duty is to resign from office and thus deprive oneself of the ability to perform the order. But, the short answer is that there is no one simple legal rule for resolving these situations, and the litigants stuck in these situations look for every available legal argument to resolve it until it is resolved.

I think it is not possible to answer the question as is, but this document from the Indian courts lays out the relevant legal variables. A major split is between Sharers and Residuaries: a Sharers are all related by blood. A secondary split relates to testate vs. intestate succession (was there a will?). There are also special rules for West Bengal, Chennai and Bombay. A widow is generally entitled to a share of her husband's property, but if the husband dies before his father, the husband does not have his father's property. But then, if a Muslim marries under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, they are not treated legally as Muslim for purposes of inheritance. All told, it is most likely that the widow has no legal claim on the property, but still a person should engage an attorney who can assess the particulars of the case.

I am a notary public in Vermont and have had to deal with people who had name variations. Readers of Law StackExchange like to citations to reliable sources; I'm not going to do that, just describe my experience. Many states do indeed allow a person to adopt a new name through usage. Government agencies and large commercial agencies don't like that, and they can and do thwart the law by imposing their own administrative procedures. If you don't like their procedures, fine, give a lawyer a $20,000 retainer, have the lawyer sue, and wait three years. And after spending all that money, the court might find that although it isn't a crime for a person to change their name by usage, there is no law requiring the administrative agency to accept it. If you don't have tens of thousands of dollars to waste or years to wait, you have two choices. Get married, and use the marriage license as evidence of your name change. The format of marriage licenses is different in every state, so how well this works depends on the state. The other option is to get a court-ordered name change.

It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.

It is illegal to marry while you are already married This is the crime of bigamy in all 50 states. A marriage ends with the death of one of the couple, a divorce or (in some very limited circumstances) an annulment. The US will recognise any of these wherever they happen so it’s your choice whether you get divorced in your home country or the US. By the way, don’t cause the death of your husband, that’s also illegal.

Can a signature be valid without a name datum associated with it? I noticed that my signature got less readable over time, but improved in unique characteristics which is a positive development in my opinion, since I never see a form without a field for first and last name and it's thus not necessary to identify me based on the signature which in the same time gets more unforgeable. It's definitely practical to have name fields on a form, but I was wondering whether there's a legal rule (probably a very general one) which requires a signature to be collected together with name data only in order to be valid (meaning to have the effect you intuitively expect after signing a contract or form). Maybe there's a difference between contracts and forms. I doubt that the law in Germany and the EU hasn't converged, yet, so I'm interested in the rules for the latter or both if there's a difference. The question arose out of curiosity and to be able to be a smart-ass if someone ever annoys me because of the unreadability of the signature.

No, in germany there is no universal requirement as to form (Formfreiheit). This includes associating a signature with a name in block letters. In principle you can enforce a contract in court even if the written contract does not identify the contracting parties by spelled out name, but by signature only. It stands to reason there is no benefit in omitting the full names. The legislature implemented elevated form requirements for certain legal transactions by mandating the use of a notary. Here, again, there is no requirement as to put a plain text name next to your signature. The link between signature and person is established via the notary’s documentation. You could put an alias “Donald Duck” next to your signature, the notarial deed will indicate that in fact Kalle Richter signed the document. As far as I am aware all european-union legal transactions will need to go through their official channels. It is simply not possible, for example, to establish a European Economic Interest Grouping on a scrap of paper. Thus there is no issue and in turn no regulation. One thing is for sure, the european-union does not impose a “minimum framework” on its member states. I recollect there are some directives regarding electronic signatures, but that is a different story now.

I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious.

Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here.

There are a couple of flaws in your hypothetical. Nobody, certainly not the state, represents the birth records as inerrant or complete. Birth records frequently have to be corrected. In fact the point of many paternity suits is to correct the official birth record. Sometimes the father, or even the mother will be listed as "unknown" on the birth record, so the absence of a birth record naming a person as a father is not dispositive. No government official would ever issue a legal document declaring that the man is not any child's legal father because the records don't establish that. At best they could issue a document stating that the man was not the father of record for any child in the state. Anyway, the exercise would be pointless. The only birth record the court would be interested in would be that for the child before them. None of the other birth records would be relevant to the case at hand. The court in a paternity case would ask for evidence, such as birth certificates, or statements acknowledging paternity. If the two parties continued to dispute paternity, the court would order a paternity test. Older blood typing tests sometimes left paternity ambiguous, but modern DNA paternity testing is can achieve 99.99% certainty, baring fraud or laboratory error.

In the U.S., you are not required to include your real name on a copyright registration: If you write under a pseudonym and do not want to have your identity revealed in the Copyright Office’s records, give your pseudonym and identify it as such on your application. You can leave blank the space for the name of the author. If an author’s name is given, it will become part of the Office’s online public records, which are accessible by Internet. [...] In no case should you omit the name of the copyright claimant. You can use a pseudonym for the claimant name. But be aware that if a copyright is held under a fictitious name, business dealings involving the copyrighted property may raise questions about its ownership. Consult an attorney for legal advice on this matter. Therefore, a pseudonym seems like a perfectly legitimate name for a copyright notice, considering that it is also a legally valid name for an official registration with the U.S. Copyright Office. As noted above, this may complicate your ability to prove your right to litigate against copyright infringement, but it does not actually diminish your right to do so if you can successfully validate your identity as the copyright holder.

Per Art 12(6), they are allowed to ask for additional identify verification: where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Additionally, Recital 64: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. There is no consensus regarding what this means in practice: Must the controller use all measures that they can be reasonably be required to use? Or only those measures to verify the identity to a reasonable level of certainty? I agree with you that asking for a passport is excessive, and that email verification would be sufficient. However, that is just my personal opinion. The GDPR can also be interpreted in a way that asking for a copy of your passport is OK. Where they process a copy of your passport, that is personal data as well. You also have data subject rights with regards to this processing, for example the right to be informed of the purpose of this processing and of when the data will be deleted. If it is only used for the purpose of verifying your identity, the copy of your passport should be deleted immediately afterwards. The data controller may have additional obligations because a passport or ID card is a very sensitive document. E.g. Art 87 allows member states to impose additional rules. Most sensible controllers will therefore want to avoid processing passports, unless they only operate in specific EU member states.

Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company? Because a sender's opportunism regarding the bizarre contents of the autoreply preclude a finding that there is a meeting of the minds. Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., "Yes, I agree to the contract") was an autoreply? It mostly depends on the element of authorization to set up the autoreply that way. If the person who wrote the autoreply was authorized by the user of the email account to set it up that way, the contract binds the user. This form of blind and reckless formation of contracts is an extreme scenario of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). The contract might be null and void as unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and/or on other grounds. But a wide range of scenarios would fall short of warranting a nullification of the contract. (Disclaimer: I am affiliated with the linked site.)

The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.

Ownership/reuse of custom content purchased from online performers I'm thinking of doing a project where I pay onlyfans creators/cam performers for custom voice/video recordings. In this case I don't actually want the content to be sexual in nature - not that it matters to the question - but I'd like to be able to curate/edit this collection of recordings and present it publicly as an art project (probably just online). I would not try to sell or otherwise profit from this, but I would like to present this as my own work. My question is, if I directly purchase this custom content, am I allowed to re-distribute it like this? My understanding is that in general this is not allowed with content posted on Onlyfans, but directly purchasing custom content from the performer strikes me as different. Are the rules different if a third party like Onlyfans is not involved? E.g. if I have the number of a content creator that I follow and directly arrange this transaction with her over sms. In all cases I would explain what I'm doing and the performer would agree to participate, but I'm wondering how formally I would need to acquire permission to use the content how I want to.

if I directly purchase this custom content... As a general rule, "intellectual property" is very different from tangible property - arguably, "intellectual property" is a misnomer. Trying to apply concepts from property law (such as "a thing has a single owner, who can do anything not illegal with it as they please") is fraught with danger. You would generally not "purchase content", but rather purchase a license for the content, allowing you to do various things. One of those things might be to "curate/edit this collection of recordings and present it publicly as an art project (probably just online)". Another might be to "to sell or otherwise profit from this". All that depends on what your contract says. In an ideal world(?), contracts would all be detailed enough to leave no uncertainty about what is allowed and what is not. In the real world, a bunch of SMS can form a contract. For instance, the following is a contract: A (version 1): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will pay $10 for it. B: sure ...but it’s not clear what A and B agreed as to what the clip would be used for. Saving and viewing on A’s device, probably yes; putting it in fullscreen in the next blockbuster movie, probably no. Showing it to A’s friends, putting it in an art project? That’s getting dicey. You might have heard about "work for hire" granting full copyright control to whoever pays for the work to be created. In the united-states, the above exchange does not explicitly designate the content as work-for-hire, as would be required by 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("...if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire"). Here’s a better SMS contract: A (version 2): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will use it to make an art project, collating many such clips, and publishing that on the internet. I will pay $10 for it. B: sure Here there’s no question that B agreed with the proposed use. On the other hand, it’s likely than a different use would be deemed a copyright violation - the contract was proposed by A and should be understood as limiting A’s right to use the clip to exactly what they said they would do. If they wanted it to say something else, they could have sent a different SMS (see contra proferentem).

Yes, a licensee of Sketchfab is only required to cooperate with this audit process because it was agreed to in a contract. Copyright law does not (in the US, or anywhere else that I know of) give a content creator such a right to demand proof that something is being used in accord with a license. If a content creator or copyright holder thinks that some content is being used without permission, or is an unauthorized derivative work, the holder has only a few possible courses of action. The holder can send a cease and desist letter. This has no legal force, but puts the alleged infringer on notice, makes further infringement clearly "knowing", and may well cause an infringer to stop infringing for fear of an expensive suit. The holder can send a takedown notice if the content is online in a venue that accepts such notices. But there is not a legal obligation to honor such a notice, and a counter-notice may lead to the content being put back up. Finally the holder may sue for copyright infringement. This has significant upfront costs, and requires significant time from the holder or the holder's business. The holder may therefore be unwilling to bring suit unless significant recovery seems likely. Once suit is brought, the holder will have discovery rights to demand answers to relevant questions from the alleged infringer, including the source of the content in question.

(Since this is looking rather close to looking for legal advice: "I'm not a lawyer, this is not legal advice, don't sue my pants off".) The relevant section of the license is this (bolding mine): You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital file-sharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of any monetary compensation in con-nection with the exchange of copyrighted works. Therefore, if you are using the content licensed under the BY-NC-SA primarily to make money, that is a breach of the license. Any more advice past that is wading seriously into legal advice.

It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works.

Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license.

Titles can't be copyrighted. Meta-data like #2 aren't copyrighted. Not sure if the MPAA could protect its ratings, but I can't find anywhere that it has asserted restrictions on the use of those. If the list of "Similar works" is not somebody else's intellectual property then there's no problem. (If it is I'm not certain what protection it could be eligible for.)

First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not.

You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license.

Decoding and publishing lock combination Many combination locks can easily have their combinations decoded, even while the lock is shut. Suppose someone decoded the combination to a lock, wrote down the combination on a piece of paper, and taped it up next to the lock. For the sake of the scenario, suppose that the decoder doesn't open the lock or enter the locked area. The decoder is aware that someone might read the combination, open the lock, and go into the locked area, but hasn't made plans with anyone to do that. Has the person committed a crime by decoding the combination and posting it next to the lock? If someone else reads the combination, opens the lock, goes into the locked area, and commits a crime, without any other interaction with the decoder, does the decoder share any criminal responsibility? Civil liability? I am aware of this question, but it poses a distinct scenario where the decoder also enters the locked area. More generally, I am interested in the question: Suppose that the usefulness of some object relies on the secrecy of some information. If that information is published, the object becomes worthless. Is it legal to obtain and publish that information, if no physical damage is done to the object when deriving the information?

The decoder is aware that someone might read the combination, open the lock, and go into the locked area ...Has the person committed a crime? england-and-wales Maybe not a criminal offence, but the decoder might be liable civilly under the Tort of Negligence, which is: a legal wrong that is suffered by someone at the hands of another who fails to take proper care to avoid what a reasonable person would regard as a foreseeable risk. In many cases there will be a contractual relationship (express or implied) between the parties involved, such as that of doctor and patient, employer and employee, bank and customer, and until relatively recently it was necessary for such a contractual relationship to exist in order for a claim for negligence to succeed. But the civil law relating to negligence has evolved and grown to deal with situations that arise between two or more parties even where no contract, written or implied, exists between them. Is it legal to obtain and publish that information, if no physical damage is done to the object when deriving the information? One scenario where this might be a criminal offence is if the information is protected with a Government Security Classification marking (i.e. spying). See Section 1, Official Secrets Act 1911: (1) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State— (b) makes any sketch ... which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or (c) ... communicates to any other person any secret ... sketch ... which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; he shall be guilty of felony Section 12 states that: The expression “sketch” includes any photograph or other mode of representing any place or thing;

Ark. Code 5-60-120 is very clear that the act of intercepting is a crime. Not just "recording and using", not just "recording", but intercepting in any way. Specifically: It is unlawful for a person to intercept a wire, landline, oral, telephonic communication, or wireless communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and recording. Intercepting is illegal, therefore it is not "okay". Perhaps the "sort of a lawyer" was speaking of the probability of getting caught doing it.

If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public.

Yes and No See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967): What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. The glass has clearly been "knowingly exposed" and if that glass was, on the normal methods of examination by the officer (sight, smell etc.), evidence of a crime then it would be able to be used as evidence. However, any DNA on that glass is not "knowingly exposed" - finding the DNA requires a laboratory, specialised equipment and trained technicians.

If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is "new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]" If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice.

As a baseline, you may assume that your code will be used legally. It sounds like this still applies in your case: there is an entirely reasonable and legal use for login code, so you had no reason to assume that there might be a problem. This puts you legally in the clear. To be liable, you'd need to know or at least reasonably suspect that your code would be used to violate the law.

A party may subpoena materials from a nonparty using a subpoena under Rule 45. A party may generally subpoena anything that is within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, i.e., any material that is relevant, not privileged, and proportional to the needs of the case. Rule 45 also protects third parties from subpoenas that impose an "undue burden," but I would argue that this is essentially the same thing as Rule 26's proportionality requirement. Records of phone calls, e-mails, and text messages are routinely subject to subpoenas under Rule 45, but again, that assumes that the messages are relevant and not privileged. Records to Facebook and Google can be a bit more complicated. I don't know that the question has actually been definitively answered, but social-media companies seem to take the position that access to certain records created by their users is exempt from subpoena under the Stored Communications Act.

I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.

Is there legislation regarding minors joining dating websites? Are dating websites a special category of websites that must follow certain regulations in terms of who they are allowed to join their site? So if I am a 15 year old, does the law in the USA allow a dating APP to let me join?

U.S. law does not forbid 15 year olds from joining dating websites. Direct U.S. regulation of Internet communications mostly via the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) has a cutoff age of 13 years old. This said, nothing obligates websites to allow minors to join their dating app, and they may be reluctant to do so for fear that if you are mistreated by someone as a result of the app that they could be held responsible. In particular, amendments to the Communications Decency Act (CDA) called FOSTA-SESTA for the "Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) and "Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA)" which took effect April 11, 2018, limited the prior near total protection from liability under Section 230 of the CDA. The amendments maked it illegal to knowingly assist, facilitate, or support sex trafficking, and amended the Communications Decency Act's section 230 safe harbors (which make online services immune from civil liability for their users' actions) to exclude enforcement of federal or state sex trafficking laws from immunity. Federal sex trafficking laws largely apply to commercial sex by people under the age of 18, which an online dating app could facilitate, if used by someone inclined to use it in that manner. The two main federal sex trafficking laws are as follows: Section 1591 now provides in part the following: “Whoever knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion ... , or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act,” shall be imprisoned not less than 15 years (not less than 10 years, if the victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age). The Mann Act outlaws prostitution and unlawful sexual activities that involve interstate or foreign travel. It consists of three principal substantive sections. Section 2421 proscribes the interstate or foreign transportation of someone for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity; misconduct which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Section 2422 condemns coercing or enticing another person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or unlawful sexual activity, or using interstate communications to coerce or entice a child to engage in such conduct. The communications offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years; the travel offense by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Section 2423 outlaws four distinct offenses: (1) §2423(a) - transportation of a child in interstate or foreign commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual purposes; (2) §2423(b)—interstate or foreign travel for purposes of unlawful sexual abuse of a child; (3) §2423(c)—foreign travel and subsequent unlawful sexual abuse of a child; and (4) §2423(d)— arranging, for profit, the travel outlawed in any of these offenses. The first is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, each of the others by imprisonment for not more than 30 years. So, the reluctance of a dating app to allow minors to use their services is understandable. They either need to aggressively police a low cost or free except for ad support service with considerable employee expense to do so, to avoid the risk of FOSTA-SESTA authorized liability, or they can not offer the service at all. In a nutshell, the app providers consider you to be jail-bait and don't want to face the associated risks.

In the UK, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 includes provisions which are thought to apply to websites, although as far as I know there is no case law on the matter. If a website's use of JavaScript makes it inaccessible to users with some disability, it may fall foul of the DDA. However, there is no law specifically requiring JavaScript-free versions of web pages.

united-states Are there laws in the United States which obligate adult video websites to retain personal information (such as first and second names) of the actors/actresses in the videos uploaded on their website? If so, could someone please provide them? In the U.S. producers of adult material are required to keep information about the age of their performers pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 2257 and 18 U.S. Code § 2257A which is part of "The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988", and 28 C.F.R. 75 which contains regulations adopted related to that Code section. See also U.S. Justice Department commentary on its website. You can read the full text at the links. The information must be retained for seven years after they are created or last amended, unless the business goes out of business less than two years after the records are created or last amended, in which case the records must be maintained for five years after the business ceases to operate. They key language of Section 2257 states: (a)Whoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, digital image, digitally- or computer-manipulated image of an actual human being, picture, or other matter which— (1)contains one or more visual depictions made after November 1, 1990 of actual sexually explicit conduct; and (2)is produced in whole or in part with materials which have been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or is shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce; shall create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction. (b)Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall, with respect to every performer portrayed in a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit conduct— (1)ascertain, by examination of an identification document containing such information, the performer’s name and date of birth, and require the performer to provide such other indicia of his or her identity as may be prescribed by regulations; (2)ascertain any name, other than the performer’s present and correct name, ever used by the performer including maiden name, alias, nickname, stage, or professional name; and (3)record in the records required by subsection (a) the information required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection and such other identifying information as may be prescribed by regulation. Section 2257A extends this requirement to simulated sexual content. The regulations spell out the details requirements more specifically with more precise definitions. Much of this information may only be disclosed to specified individuals and is not necessarily available to members of the general public in the absence of an investigation authorized by the U.S. Attorney General. But access to these records is not governed by these statutes and regulations. An objection to a subpoena and request for a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 (and related rules) or the equivalent state court rule would be the usual process for litigating that point. Whether the reason asserted is really justifiable would be a question for other law (usually under the law of California where most adult material in the U.S. is produced).

The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 apparently sets no lower limit on marriage for Muslims. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 then defined a child as a female under 18 and a male under 21, and a child marriage is one where at least one party is a child. The law then says that "Every child marriage is voidable at the option of the contracting party who was child at the time of solemnization of marriage". The punishment (not at the discretion of the child) for a male offender is rigorous "imprisonment which may extend to two years" or a fine of 100,000 rupees (or both). While the political question of modifying the law to allow Sharia and Nikah to prevail for Muslims, the current law does not allow this. The crime is a cognizable offense (section 15), meaning that no court order is required for police to arrest without warrant, and bail is not available.

The law doesn’t “defines a minor as a legal person below (some age)” It defines it as a natural person below (some age).

There are only two arguments you can make: The match making website did something wrong. I don't see how you can make this argument unless you have some reason to suspect they actually did something wrong. Strict liability applies. I think this fails for two reasons. One is that no theory of strict liability that I know of would apply to this situation. The other is that this is precisely the kind of risk that a user of the site should be protecting themselves from because it is much easier to detect fraud when you have extensive contact with someone than when you just operate a matchmaking service. So absent some evidence they did something wrong, such as ignoring specific warning signs from this particular user, there is no way such a suit could succeed.

In many US states (and in the UK), statutory rape is a strict liability offense. This means that there is no intent requirement at all; the only allowable defenses are those that negate the actual act (there was no sex, the person was of age, or sometimes that the action was not a conscious or voluntary action), it falls within a statutory exception to the crime, or there is an applicable defense that has nothing to do with intent. Many general defenses do not apply to strict liability crimes; in particular, "I thought X when Y was true" tries to show there was to intent to commit the crime, which is irrelevant. In Michigan (where the crime took place), statutory rape is evidently such an offense. That throws some standard defenses into doubt, because anything based on negating criminal intent doesn't matter. However, Michigan does specifically say that it is not criminal to have sex with a person under 16 if they are your legal spouse; this is a very common exception to statutory rape laws. So, marriage is a way to not risk jail for statutory rape in Michigan. However, things do vary by state. In Indiana, it is specifically a defense that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was over the age of consent (unless it was a forcible rape).

It is not prohibited in California under EDC §49011, though your local board could make it prohibited. In-person solicitation of goods or money during school hours is prohibited in NY state, under Regents Rule 19.6, but recruiting children during school hours is allowed.

How to prevent the problem of a document changing its content after you signed it I just read this: The problem is that if there is a dispute over what was actually in the NDA later on, its going to be extremely difficult to establish what the NDA said. I'd refuse to sign an online NDA out of fear that some years from now, I'd be presented with "you signed this document" which looks nothing like the document I thought I signed. I think this is applicable to both online and hardcopy documents in the same way. For hardcopy, someone with enough sophistication could just either copy your signature, or graft it from one document to another. Likewise, for electronic media, you could easily just paste their electronic signature onto a different document, since it's just bits of 1's and 0's that the document is saved in the database or cloud with, so it's easily changed. I'm wondering how you can prevent these problems. If you are the one creating the document to be signed, wondering what must need to be done so that if you were in court the document would be considered valid, the content considered the original content and valid, and the signature considered valid. If you give a copy of the document to the person signing it, then they could use it to reference the original. But if they lose it, then they lose the protection. Also, they could just throw it away and say that they never got a copy, and say that you changed the original contract. I'm not sure how one would protect against this sort of stuff, what needs to be done on the document creator's part to maintain "legal validity" or "legal soundness". Seems like documenting the process somehow might help, but I can see loopholes there as well. Hoping one could outline/clarify what should be done here.

The USPS and other postal services have created a service called Digital Postmarks or EPCM (Electronic Postal Certification Mark) to address exactly this problem. Basically you can upload any document that you want to be "unalterable and time stamped". The service computes a hash (a number that will change if the contents change), and store the time stamp and the hash on a secure server. If, at some time in the future, you want to confirm the authenticity of the document, you can upload another copy - the fact that it produces the same hash proves it's not been tampered with.

There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.

are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.

You would be amazed at how vanishingly few the number of cases are where a signature is disputed. Signatures are easy, quick and don't require you having inky fingers all the time. They are so useful that to throw them out to deal with infinintesimally small fractions of disputes over their veracity (bearing in mind that 99.999999999% of contracts never have a dispute that gets to a court [or at all]) is ridiculous. When it does happen, handwriting analysis is probably not going to be put into evidence anyway. Testimony like "I saw him sign it" is way more likely to be used.

If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract.

The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected.

The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once.

There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly.

Why is Star Wars a copyright issue but a MLB team is not? Over the weekend, I was asked to be part of a photo shoot for a political candidate. I was wearing a t-shirt that featured a Star Wars character and the photographer stated that he wanted to position me in a fashion so it wasn't visible to avoid a, 'copyright issue'. (For those who are curious, the request was made last minute and I wasn't advised on clothing restrictions) After a certain point, it was determined that the ideal angle still was showing the Star Wars character, so they gave me a t-shirt featuring logos and imagery associated with a Major League Baseball (MLB) team. I'm trying to figure out why the MLB shirt wouldn't create a copyright issue for the photographer, while the Star Wars character would. Is it relating to the litigious nature of Disney (I really doubt this MLB team would sue) or is there something about MLB logos that are inherently fair use? Regarding this potential duplicate which questions whether a trademark can be used by a political campaign without permission and the most upvoted answer is of course, "it depends," but for the equivalent scenario in my question it seems like it would not be allowed because of the logo's prominence in the photo. Thus it begs the question why is this copyrightable material acceptable and this one is not? To clarify the issue, the MLB logo in particular is for the Philadelphia Phillies. As a team, they've had a variety of logos over the years and based on the answers provided thus far, it seems some may be subject to copyright and others would be subject to trademark depending upon the complexity of the art. In this specific case, it's this version of their logo: As this is more than just stylized lettering, it seems this would presumably be subject to copyright.

From the mention of a MLB shirt, I am going to assume the OP is located in the united-states. Logos are (in general) copyrightable Anything with a modicum of creative input is by default copyrighted. This includes both film shots from movies and logos of sports organizations. "Modicum of creative input" is known as the threshold of originality. That legal doctrine is in force in the US, but not in other jurisdictions - for instance, the UK uses "sweat of the brow" where creativity is not needed to obtain copyright protection. A still shot from a film set almost surely passes the threshold of originality. However, some logos do not. For instance, the Pittsburgh Pirates logo is a two-dimensional letter P - somewhat stylized, but not that much. It is arguably below the threshold of copyright protection. On the other hand, the Red Socks logos (which is, well, two red socks) is almost surely copyrighted. Let us assume that the logo or imagery present on the OP's photo shirt was indeed copyrighted. Does that make the photo a copyright violation? Incidental use It might be the case that having the artwork on the shirt as an incidental part of the photograph makes it OK. In the US, such incidental use could be covered by fair use, but as always, it’s a delicate balancing act. A professional photograph taken for political advertisement is going to be held to a higher standard than a blurry photo from your aunt’s Facebook gallery. Dmitry Grigoryev says in comments that walking around with a Star Wars shirt could be construed as distributing (via public display) a copyrighted work. However, "putting it on and walking around" is an essential function of a shirt. Absent terms to the contrary, whoever sells a shirt with a copyrighted design grants an implied license to the shirt-wearer to move about with that shirt. [EDIT: see Mayken’s comment, that’s a statutory exception to copyright.] The scope of such implied licenses can be unclear, though, and it could arguably not extend to promotional photographs for political advertisements. Note a recent case in Germany (link to judgement, in German) where it was held that a hotel posting online pictures of its rooms, including a wallpaper design, violated the copyright of the designer. I am not familiar enough with German copyright law to determine if an appeal of that lower-court decision would have any chance of success, but I think that ruling is reasonable within the general principles of EU copyright law. (Whether it is morally acceptable is of course another thing entirely.) Non-legal explanations It is also possible that the photographer or another PR staff member would rather have the politician associated with baseball than with Star Wars for image reasons, and copyright is only a pretext for that. Or that they (mistakenly) thought that the baseball shirt design was not copyrighted.

Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either.

YES, if you can get an image of it, you can use it A work that old is not under copyright protection in any country in the world. Under US law any work published in 1924 or before (as of 2019) is in the public domain. Unpublished works may be protected for up to 120 years after creation under US law. But no work that is over 600 years old has any copyright protection. In any case, merely owning the physical work does not mean owning the copyright. In the case of a work sufficiently recent that it is under copyright, say from the 1970s, the copyright initially belongs to the artist. If the artist sells or gives the painting to a museum (or anyone else), the artist retains the copyright unless that is explicitly included in the deal, in a written agreement. If the artist dies, the copyright is inherited, just as any other property that the artist leaves, as directed by will or law. If a museum owns a painting that is out of copyright, it can restrict access to it and prevent people from photographing or copying it, because it can restrict what people do on its property. But if an exact copy (known as a "slavish copy") gets out, the museum has no copyright in it, because making a slavish copy does not create an original, copyrightable work under US law. See the case of Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) and Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) The law may be different in non-US countries, but the reasoning of the Bridgeman case has bene followed elsewhere. A "slavish" copy is one that attempts to reproduce the original as exactly as possible, without adding or removing or changing anything. A photo of a painting in a frame on a stand with people standing beside it is not a slavish copy. The images of art one sees in books on art are usually slavish copies. So are the images one sees on museum web sites, as a rule. The term implies that the copyist had no more freedom than a slave in making the copy. At least that is the metaphor. Slavish copies do not get separate copyrights because they are not original works. Photos of 3D works such as sculptures require choice of angle, lighting, etc, sufficient t make them original works -- no two photographers will produce quite the same image of a sculpture. But some courts have ruled that wire-frame models of 3D works of art are slavish copies and not protected by copyright.

It depends. Wikipedia is quite strict on its policies, and it only allows uploading images (and other media) that either are in the public domain or with a licence that allows to be reproduced (often, Creative Commons, CC). If you go to the details of the image it claims that the picture is licenced under CC, with attribution to Saffron Blaze. So most probably Saffron Blaze got permision to take the picture, and he distributed it with the CC-Attribution licence. When scrapping a web site for data, Google and other engines usually search for metadata (the robots.txt file) that tells them what to index and what to not. If a user gives them permission to index a picture by not stating restrictions in the robots.txt, they can do index it. Of course, in both cases it might be that someone uploads a picture that he does not have permission to share. In this case the situation will, of course, depend on jurisdiction, but many laws have provisions that ensure that, if the content provider is dilligent in addressing copyright issues caused by the users, they are protected. For example in the USA the Digital Millenium Copyright Act establishes "safe harbor" provisions that protects content providers if they give a way to denounce copyright infringiments and address those in a given timeframe.

Copyright Issues There are several issues here. The Original Rose Image and its Derivatives The image was apparently first posted to Stack Exchange as part of this question by user "Ongky Denny Wijaya". That user did not say where the image came from. If that user created the image, whether by taking a photograph, or in an image drawing program (or in any other way), then s/he owns the copyright, and licensed it under the CC-BY-SA (4.0) free license by posting it to SE. However, if that user did not create the image but got it from somewhere else, it was quite probably protected by copyright and used without permission. If "Ongky Denny Wijaya" did not have the rights to the image, then s/he could not license them, and all uses on SE and deriving from SE are copyright infringements, and the copyright holder, whoever that is, could sue for damages. The first two answers to your SE question give LaTeX code for rose images only slightly resembling the original rose image. They are not derivatives of the original image. The third seems to be a transformation of the original, and so is a derivative work. It may not lawfully be used without the permission of the original copyright holder whoever that may be. Unless you can reliably determine who that is, and seek permission, you may not lawfully use that image, nor LaTeX code for it. Original SE Content When a user posts original contest to SE, it is automatically released under the CC-BY-SA (4.0) Creative Commons free license. That license allows anyone to reuse the content, and to create modified (derivative) versions of the content, but under some conditions. The most important of these are 1) that the content must be attributed properly to the copyright holder, and any copyright notice must be preserved. (That is the "BY" part.) And 2) the reused or modified work must be provided to others under exactly the same license. (That is the "SA" part.) The first part can be done by listing the user name of the original SE poster, and providing a link to the post. The second part is potentially trickier. If the modified work is "merged into" a new work, the entire new work must be released under CC-BY-SA, which would hinder any commercial publication. If the re-used or modified work is kept separate, at the very least it needs to have a separate license statement, making it clear that anyone can re-use or further modify the work, and making it clear just what is included in that release. That should be associated with the credit or attribution statement mentioned above. That would apply both to an image, and to LaTex code for generating the image. If this is not done, reuse of any such content is an infringement of copyright, and could be the subject of a lawsuit. Fair Use Use of the whole or the majority of an SE question or answer, or of the whole of an original image posted to SE, would probably not constitute fair use in the US, although that would depend on the rest of the facts. If such use did not qualify as fair use, that it must be used in accordance with the stated license, as described above.

The length of a literary work doesn't determine if its use is fair use. Copyright does not cover names, titles of works, catchwords/catchphrases/advertising slogans etc. or lists of ingredients (like in a recipe or chemical instructions), however, the procedure can be copyright. The work must also be original. If the tweet copies something that already exists then there is no copyright in the tweet - if the thing that is copied has copyright protection then the tweet itself may be a violation. That said, assuming that the Tweet enjoys copyright protection, the owner will be the author: presumably the owner of the Twitter account. For anyone else to legally use it, the use must be either: Licensed by the copyright owner Fair use (USA) or Fair Dealing (most everywhere else in the English speaking world) For Item 1, the Twitter terms of service say: You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). In case you don't know what that means, Twitter gives you this plain English summary: Tip: This license is you authorizing us to make your Tweets on the Twitter Services available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. So, you can get permission from the copyright holder or from Twitter. Well, Twitter has given permission: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. Providing you use their API, you can "reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the ... Content ..." Therefore, fair use/dealing considerations are irrelevant.

Well baseball for historical and frankly crazy decisions of SCOTUS is exempt because it is not a business that crosses state lines (by definition of the court if by no one else's). The other sports have had their run-ins with antitrust laws; some they've won and some they've lost. All of these have been to do with antitrust provisions in restraint of trade between leagues and clubs and clubs and players. As for monopoly powers: The elements of monopolization are twofold: possession of monopoly power in a relevant market; and willfully acquiring or maintaining that power. There are two clear defences to allegations of running a monopoly: the definition of the market - if the market is defined as "baseball" then there is a clear monopoly, however, if the market is "professional sports" it is not so clear that there is a monopoly. Certainly, both definitions of market are arguable. that the monopoly was "the result of superior skill, foresight, and industry". These types of monopoly are allowed as the acquisition of monopoly power was not willfull.

This is known as "film novelization"(For example, the novelizations of the Star Wars movies are film novelizations, created under license), and is copyright infringement unless made under a license from the copyright holder. Specifically, you would be making a derivative work of the original, by changing the medium. One of the rights provided by copyright is the right to control the transference from one medium into another. This, in my (non-lawyer) opinion, is unlikely to be found as fair use. There are four test factors for determining fair use(source), decided on a case by case basis: Transformative Character of the Derivative Work: Unlikely to be found in your favor, as nothing is transformed ("I don't change anything, the name are the same, everything is the same, it's just a conversion to textual form"). Nature of the Original Work: A narrative entertainment film, thus unlikely to be found in your favor. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Taken: You've taken all of it; not in your favor. Effect on the Potential Market: You are essentially providing a free version of what copyright holders can often charge for; negative effect on their potential market. Not in your favor.

What law makes intending to cause harassment alarm and distress an offence in the UK? https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-62793135 I know that s5 makes conduct “likely to cause” … harassment alarm or distress a crime on a strict liability basis. But what provision makes intention to cause it a crime?

Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (which was amended by section 154 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994). [F14A Intentional harassment, alarm or distress. (1)A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, he— (a)uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b)displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress. (2)An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is also inside that or another dwelling. (3)It is a defence for the accused to prove— (a)that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other dwelling, or (b)that his conduct was reasonable. (4)F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.]

Why would he not have been charged with "housebreaking"? In england-and-wales neither "house breaking" nor "breaking and entering" are legal terms: the offence is called burglary contrary to s.9 of the Theft Act 1968 which in 1983 was: (1) A person is guilty of burglary if— (a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit any such offence as is mentioned in subsection (2) below; or (b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm. (2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are offences of stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm or raping any woman therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein. There is no difference between nightime and daytime entry, and there is no requirement for a forced entry. All that's needed is to go in without permission intending or attempting to do one of the relevant offences. I can only surmise that the reason(s) theft, rather than burglary, was charged was a (pre CPS) prosecutorial decision based on the admissible evidence, Fagan's mental state and what was in the public interest because the quoted text seems to meet the criteria for burglary. (ETA subject to the actual circumstances surrounding the alleged theft of the wine, which are not clear from the quoted text.)

Does "duty to rescue" apply to a child that one has no direct responsibility for? And I am, certainly under English law, guilty of a crime. No, not necessarily, because a failure to act does not automatically create criminal liability in England and Wales. Most offences require a combination of a physical act and the intent to carry it out - often referred to as the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea. If one or both of these elements are missing (or cannot be proved) then there is no offence unless there is a specific Duty of Care imposed by law which obligates a person to prevent, or mitigate the risk of, harm coming to someone or something. There is a simple mnemonic that may assist with identifying whether or not there is such a DUTY Dangerous situation created... In R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161 Miller fell asleep while smoking a cigarette, then woke up to see his matress smouldering. Instead of calling for help or doing anything about it, he went to sleep in another room so was convicted of arson - not for setting the fire but for failing to do anything about it. This would be analogous with someone tampering with the signs to incorrectly say that the deep end of the pool is the shallow end thus causing the child to be out of his depth and drown. Under statute, contract or by public office... In R v Dytham [1979] QB 722 a police officer was convicted of misconduct in a public office because he stood by and did nothing as a man was beaten to death. For the OP: a lifeguard will have a duty of care, under contract, to act in order to rescue the child in the OP. Take it upon oneself... In R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354 the defendants took on the responsibility for caring for a vulnerable person who later died due to their neglect. In the OP's scenario, this might equate to someone announcing they will act as an impromptu lifeguard but then do nothing to save the child from drowning. Young persons... Anyone who has a parental relationship with a child has a legal obligation to look after the health and welfare of that child. In the OP's scenario, if the parent was absent, too drunk etc so could not raise the alarm this may be a breach of this duty of care and make them liable for the death of their child.

Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar.

A person with standing can sue to enforce them In the UK, standing is interpreted broadly as anyone with an interest in the matter who suffers or might suffer detriment from your breach.

This is not a "if you breach the contract we may sue you" clause. This is a clause which says "if we find you trying to breach the contract, we can ask a court to stop you from doing so (even though you may not have actually breached the contract at that point in time)". The provision entitles the aggrieved party to specific relief - in this case, by the way of an injunction. Specific relief means relief of certain determined nature or of a specific kind, rather than a general relief or damages or compensation. Essentially, the clause that provides that if the receiving party of the confidential information threatens to disclose such information, the disclosing party shall be entitled to ask the court to specifically order the receiving party not to disclose the confidential information (as opposed to post-facto asking for damages for the harm caused by reason of such disclosure). In the absence of this provision, a court may rule that the disclosing party has no locus to take pre-emptive legal action, as no damage has been caused yet by the other party.

It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."

If the agreement is the result of a binding determinative process like the decision of a court, arbitrator or administrative tribunal, the aggrieved party can go to the court for enforcement. If it isn’t, then the agreement may be enforceable as a contract (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?). Breach of the contract allows the aggrieved party all the normal remedies. In either case, breach by one party does not excuse breach by the other. Of course, the agreement can be worded “you do this then I do that” so if you don’t do this, you are in breach but I’m not. If it isn’t either of the above, it can’t be enforced.

What makes a price tagged item on a shelf an invitation to treat, rather than an offer of sale? Contrast the counter intuitive treatment in law of a store displaying stock on its shelves, with the much more common sensical treatment of a poster for an auction. In an auction the stock may be particularly advertised while the prices are understood to remain to be determined. In a shop, the items are already specified, as are their prices on the tags underneath them. All the terms of the contract have already been set by the vendor such as to suit it, with the only thing remaining missing being a willing buyer. When one is so enticed by the advertised terms as to approach the store’s till with desired items in hand, why is this an offer to contract rather than a final acceptance of an offer previously promulgated by the seller by displaying their stock with specified sale prices? Why are the displays of prices retractable invitations to treat rather that offers of sale in themselves?

switzerland This answer is mostly to point out that the situation isn't so obvious, and may greatly differ between jurisdictions. OR Art 7 specifies: 2 The sending of tariffs, price lists and the like does not constitute an offer. 3 By contrast, the display of merchandise with an indication of its price does generally constitute an offer. So the seller is bound to the price tag of an item in a shelf or in a window. If the prices differ, the customer can generally request the lower price, unless the seller can clearly show that there was a significant error. There's a separate law ("Preisbekanntgabeverordnung") that specifies that (under most circumstances) a shop must put price tags on their items. What margin constitutes an error is disputable. The federal court ruled that an offer for an opal ring for 1380 Francs instead of 13800 could be considered an error. But a T-Shirt that is offered for 20 Francs in the shop window but 25 Francs on the shelf is probably not.

To expand on Dale's answer, the general principle applying to acceptance are as follows: The offeree's clear and absolute expression of intention and assent must be made in response to, and must exactly match, the terms of the offer. This expression must be communicated with the offeror in order to be effective. This means that a verbal contract is just as binding as a written one, with or without initial or signature. The importance of the initial or signature, as correctly identified by Dale is to be able to hold the offeree to account if a breach of the contract follows. Importantly, a contract can stipulate in what form the expression of acceptance must take. In the case of unilateral contracts, such as in adverts (see Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893], for a relevant item of UK case law), no expression of acceptance is needed to be received by the offeror - merely attempting to perform the act has been held as adequate acceptance.

The Advertising Standards Authority is the body in the UK that regulates advertising, and is backstopped legally by Trading Standards. In both the "CAP" code that covers non-broadcast media (leaflets, print adverts, signage etc) and the "BCAP" code that covers broadcast media such as radio, TV etc there is in section 3 "Misleading Advertising" the following (emphasis mine): 3.31 Marketing communications must not falsely claim that the marketer is about to cease trading or move premises. They must not falsely state that a product, or the terms on which it is offered, will be available only for a very limited time to deprive consumers of the time or opportunity to make an informed choice. And the "Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations" have this to say under the list headed "The following practices are banned outright": 6. Limited time only Falsely stating that a product will only be available for a very limited time, or that it will only be available on particular terms for a very limited time, in order to elicit an immediate decision and deprive consumers of sufficient opportunity or time to make an informed choice. Both of which would seem to apply here. Of course where Bob has purchased I expect any liability the seller would have would be likely limited to the cost of the product/service. Where Bob hasn't purchased anything? Bob could of course bring the misleading advertising to the attention of the ASA who may act regardless, they don't care whether Bob has purchased anything or not, of course Bob probably wouldn't get any compensation or the like because they have no damages.

It is legal, at least in the US, for a store (or other entity) to refuse to sell any item to any individual for any non-prohibited reason (prohibited reasons are typically things like race or religion). More over, in various US jurisdictions, it is prohibited to "furnish" alcohol to a "minor" (for example, under California's ABC law), which can be interpreted as prohibiting to an adult if they reasonably suspect that adult will pass the alcohol onto the "minor". This is to prevent "straw" sales. Additionally, larger chains generally prefer to have harmonized policies across branches, and where practical, across state lines, so will have policies that can accomodate multiple alcohol control regimes.

The "contract" (sometimes called a charitable pledge or a pledge to make a donation) is not enforceable under contact law because there is no consideration. From a contract law perspective, it isn't really a contract at all. This fact pattern is literally the "standard" example of a "contract" that is unenforceable for lack of consideration. The promises made in the charitable pledge might be enforceable under an equitable doctrine called promissory estoppel, if someone detrimentally relies upon the promise made in the contract and it is not inequitable to do so. As a practical matter, however, donees almost never sue to enforce a pledge to make a donation. A donative pledge should also be distinguished from a transfer document, which is also not a contract. In a transfer document, the donor is unilaterally giving something to someone, and the recipient is signing merely to affirm that they accept the transfer being made to them, rather than rejecting the donation and disclaiming it.

Ethics and morality aside, does the situation cross over into a general legal understanding of extortion? No. Extortion necessarily includes coercion. An offer to tell what is wrong (and from the point of view of the target — only allegedly wrong) is neither threat nor force, therefore no coercion. It would have been coercion (and therefore extortion) if the guy said along the lines "If you don't pay I will exploit the vulnerability, and/or tell a bunch of bad guys about it — they will be sooo thankful to me". Provided that the guy does not say/imply he will do something if not paid, there are no legal issues here.

No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated.

Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position.

Do existing contracts get automatically transferred to the acquiring company? Company A and Company B have a business relationship lasting for years. All kinds of agreements are in place between them. License Agreements, Supply Agreements, Development Agreements and so on. Company A gets acquired by Company C. After closing, former Company A now operates as Company AC. What happens to all the existing contracts where Company A was a Party? Do they get automatically transferred? Having to assign all the existing contracts seems to be an "impossible" task, but i do not know the leagl basis for the transfer. Can anyone shed some light both in US and European jurisdictions?

Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable. Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A & B. So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C.

An arrangement like that (if successful) would be a fraudulent transfer in which creditors could gain access to the assets of the company's to which the assets were transferred, if pursued before the statute of limitations for doing so runs (typically four years from the date of transfer, or one year from discovery of the transfer, in the U.S.). In a bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee could exercise that right on behalf of all creditors. Also, the debt can't be transferred without the creditor's consent. To do the transaction, the assets would have to be transferred to a subsidiary, not the liabilities.

When an entity goes bankrupt, its affairs are subject to detailed court supervision and creditors rights with respect to the bankrupt entity are severely limited by an "automatic stay" that funnels all disputes between creditors and the entity to bankruptcy court. This process, in the case of a medium to large sized business, is very expensive. If lots of creditors of the consolidated group are creditors of an entity that doesn't have any assets, it may not be worth the trouble to go through that process, since those creditors will get nothing, or there may be other reasons that it needs to function as a non-bankrupt entity. The creditors of the non-bankrupt LLC could force an involuntary bankruptcy, if they suspect that some creditors are being unduly favored or if they want more transparency, but they might prefer a non-bankrupt company if it allowed them to pursue their creditor's rights outside of bankruptcy and it had some assets. There are some very tricky collective action problems involved in cases like these, that must be made with imperfect information. It could be that the parent company is looking for a quick reorganization that is insulated from the day to day affairs of the company and involves a restructuring of only long term debt and a subsidiary bankruptcy would complicate a simple, pre-packaged plan. Still, it is hard to know with limited information.

The entire purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to say that this contract is the agreement, and anything previously negotiated is not part of the agreement. I don't know why they would fail to include that in the contract.

A contract need not say anything about the fact that the company could be sold. What matters is that the terms of the contract are not changed. Since there is no opt-out on transfer clause, you have to finish the term of the contract (or pay whatever fee is assessed if there is an early termination clause). So the question is how certain you are that you did not agree to the possibility of adding a "Universal Service Fund" charge. There may be subtle language which allows the company to add charges for specified purposes, and the new owners are availing themselves of that possibility. It may be difficult to determine just how this fee is legal (if it is), because customer service might just say "we are now charging this fee", or "we have to charge this fee", but you could try asking them where in the contract this new fee is allowed. You can hire an attorney to read over the contract to see where this possibility is mentioned; perhaps it is not, and then an exchange of letters between attorneys might be necessary. There is such a thing as the Universal Service Fund, which is a government operation to improve rural telecommunications. Telecomm companies have to pay a percent of their interstate revenues to this fund. If your bill has not increased since the acquisition, that suggests that you simply did not know that you had been paying into the fund, since the original company didn't give you a detailed invoice. If it has increased by this amount, that suggests that the earlier owner hadn't exercised an option to pass the cost on to the customer. It is likely that there is some clause in the contract that addresses charges required by law. That does not mean that you could not prevail in a suit against the company, but it would make the job harder (more expensive) for you. One company sort of explains how they are legally allowed to pass the cost on to the customer. Because it is allowed by federal regulation, it need not be mentioned in the contract.

Companies have a registry of their shareholders. Anyone with at least one share registered in their name is a shareholder of record. However, the vast majority of people who consider themselves "shareholders" aren't actually registered owners of a stock. Instead, almost all public stock in the US is held "in street name." That means that the stock is formally held in the name of a brokerage. What an individual has is "beneficial ownership:" the brokerage passes dividends on to the beneficial owner, will vote how the beneficial owner tells it to vote, and requires agreement from the beneficial owner before it can sell the stock. To make stuff even more complicated, the broker itself generally holds the stock in street name. Almost all public stock in the US is really owned by the Depository Trust Corporation in the name of Cede and Company (a general partnership of a few DTC officers). The reason public stock is mostly held in street name is efficiency. Transferring the legal owner of a piece of stock is a nontrivial process; until recently, it involved physically shipping stock certificates to the new owner. Even now that stock ownership can typically be transferred electronically, it's much easier to tell Cede & Co. "the new beneficial owner is this person." Because beneficial ownership is just a contract, you can skip all the formalities of updating the company's official register of shareholders.

You would have to look at your contract with the company or the company's rules. Some companies have clauses that say they own things you develop while working for them and some don't. Without knowing your specific company's policy, it is impossible to say.

Bill and Jane are free to enter into a contract where, among other things, each provides valuable consideration; in this case Bill provides valuable lawn mowing services and Jane provides valuable money. In week No 1 they have negotiated the terms and the contract is complete when Bill mows the lawn and Jane pays the money. If Bill turns up next week without Jane's instruction then there is no contract and Jane does not have to pay anything; I don't think this is what you are asking but I include it for completeness. If it is understood that this arrangement continue week after week then either there is an ongoing contract or, more likely, a series of independent contracts. If there is an ongoing contract, then it can be renegotiated but it cannot be changed unilaterally by Bill. That is, he cannot unilaterally increase the price to $2. If there is a series of contracts then the terms of each of those contracts will be the same based on the course of dealing. Basically, the parties have accepted over a long period of time that the rate for a mow is $1 and Bill would have to get Jane to accept the revised rate before he mows the lawn. For your example, Jane owes Bill $1 but if she wants him back next week she will have to agree to Bill's rate.

What does it mean that, for commercial use of this font, "a license is highly recommended"? I intend to be running a web application in the browser for commercial use. The font I am considering at the moment is: Akzidenz Grotesk which can be downloaded for free provided it is for personal use. For commercial use, the website states: Akzidenz-Grotesk is totally a free font for personal use. No license, sign up or registration is required for your personal use. But in case of commercial use, a license is highly recommended or you can buy this font by clicking here. The confusing part to me is the wording: a license is highly recommended as if it is purely optional. When consulting the EULA at the website they are linking to their language is very clear that they are not joking about their license. For my purposes it seems that I need to resort to a Web Fonts License. The case seems pretty clear and cut to me that the website freefontsvault.com has erred in the details provided; but still, I would like to have some confirmation if there is something obvious I am overlooking?

When the site says "a license is highly recommended" I can think of one possibility. A web site can be so designed that it uses a particular font if that font is already installed locally, but falls back to some other font if it is no0t, rather than embedding the font. Since the font in question is provided free for personal use, those who individually download it could use such a site. The designer of a font holds copyright on it, and may license it under whatever terms s/he chooses. If a person wants to design a web site with this as an embedded font, then it must be licensed from the rights-holder on whatever terms the rights-holder offers or will agree to. There does not seem any option but to pay the licensing fee if this font is to be used in a commercial site or product. Using it without permission would be copyright infringement. The rights-holder could sue for damages. Whether it is worth paying that fee is a matter of judgement for the site designer. But there does not seem to be any provision making a license optional for a commercial developer.

Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.

"Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem.

Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.

In the EU, software license resale is legal, even if explicitly forbidden by terms of any EULA or other contract imposed upon the parties. To quote the European Court of Justice's press release on its ruling in a case in Germany between Oracle and a German reseller, An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his `used' licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet. [...] The principle of exhaustion of the distribution right applies not only where the copyright holder markets copies of his software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD) but also where he distributes them by means of downloads from his website. Where the copyright holder makes available to his customer a copy – tangible or intangible – and at the same time concludes, in return form payment of a fee, a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, that rightholder sells the copy to the customer and thus exhausts his exclusive distribution right. Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy. Therefore, even if the license agreement prohibits a further transfer, the rightholder can no longer oppose the resale of that copy. There are many such companies in the EU who resell software legally, including used OEM Windows licenses that are far cheaper than retail copies. This is, in my opinion, a fantastic thing -- but undoubtedly has been behind the trend towards time-limited licenses rather than perpetual ones, which we all arguably suffer from today.

You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.

Font shapes are not legally protected, whereas font names are. As such, one can make copies of fonts and give them new names. Helvetica is one of the 'base' fonts included in PostScript printers. This made having a 'desktop' version very desirable. Some years ago, the font foundry URW made their Helvetic clone (Nimbus Sans) available under an open license. This allowed the font files to be included in open source software distributions, including LaTeX set ups, with no fee or legal restrictions. Subsequently, these font files have been used as the basis for the 'TeX Gyre' fonts: see http://www.gust.org.pl/projects/e-foundry/tex-gyre for the fonts and https://www.tug.org/TUGboat/tb27-2/tb87hagen-gyre.pdf for background. The TeX Gyre fonts are available in OpenType format, and so can be used with (for example) OpenOffice (technically and legally). Note that these fonts are 'metric compatible' with the 'parents', i.e. they can be used directly as replacements for Helvetica, etc. with no change to the appearance of documents.

Strictly speaking, yes, Microsoft owns the copyright for all that stuff. But they grant users a license. So it's a matter of knowing what they let us do with it. I grabbed the EULA for Excel 2013. You'll want to check your version. My reading of this is that you can do the thing that you want to do. M. ADDITIONAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS AND/OR USE RIGHTS ... Media Elements. Microsoft grants you a license to copy, distribute, perform and display media elements (images, clip art, animations, sounds, music, video clips, templates and other forms of content) included with the software in projects and documents, except that you may not: (i) sell, license or distribute copies of any media elements by themselves or as a product if the primary value of the product is the media elements; (ii) grant your customers rights to further license or distribute the media elements; (iii) license or distribute for commercial purposes media elements that include the representation of identifiable individuals, governments, logos, trademarks, or emblems or use these types of images in ways that could imply an endorsement or association with your product, entity or activity; or (iv) create obscene or scandalous works using the media elements. Other media elements, which are accessible on Office.com or on other websites through features of the software, are governed by the terms on those websites.

If Microsoft and Activision Blizzard are both based in the USA, how does the UK have standing to block the merger? Per this story from the BBC or Bloomberg The UK Competition and Markets Authority has apparently decided to block the merger of Microsoft and Activision Blizzard. The story notes: "To go through, the deal has to be approved by regulatory bodies in the UK, United States and European Union." From Wikipedia: "Activision Blizzard, Inc. is an American video game holding company based in Santa Monica, California." "Microsoft Corporation is an American multinational technology corporation headquartered in Redmond, Washington." Both noted as "American" and both noted as being based out of American states, rather than registered abroad. Question: If both companies are American and based in American locations, then why does the UK or the EU have any ability to block such a merger? I could see saying "those companies are no longer allowed to sell their combined products in those locations", which might be equivalent, yet not blocking the actual merger itself.

The basis is set out in the Final Report of the Microsoft / Activision Blizzard Merger Inquiry, in particular Chapters 1 (p24) and 3 (p35-36). The role and powers of the Competition and Markets Authority are set out in the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended in 2013 when it replaced the Competition Commission (with predecessor bodies going back to 1949). The overall procedure is pretty complex, but the main point is that a CMA investigation will happen whenever there is a "relevant merger situation", and the result of that may be an order telling the companies what to do. It could stop them from merging, or impose various conditions about the conduct of business - see Schedule 8 for a long list of possibilities. Their jurisdiction over this anticipated "relevant merger situation" is on the basis that The two enterprises, namely Microsoft and Activision Blizzard, would cease to be distinct enterprises (s.23(1)(a)) because they would be brought under common ownership or control (s.26). The acquired company, Activision Blizzard, has a UK turnover of more than £70m (s.23(1)(b)), in fact £716m in FY2021. The report dedicates some words in Chapter 3 to proving that Microsoft and Activision are both businesses, just in case anybody was in doubt about that. In essence, the CMA has these powers because a lot of people in the UK play World of Warcraft (etc.) and there could be a "substantial lessening of competition" in the console gaming market as a result of the acquisition. If Activision had fewer UK customers then the £70m threshold would not be reached. While the investigation overall is addressed to "Microsoft" and "Activision Blizzard" without analyzing the precise structure of the enterprises, any final order from the CMA would be addressed to more specific entities - perhaps Microsoft Ltd. in the UK as well as its American parent, among others. In other cases, orders have been similarly directed to various non-UK companies as well as domestic ones. But the CMA does not require a company to be UK-registered in order to exercise power over it. The relevant statutory condition is about how the enterprise (of whatever kind, wherever incorporated, however structured) does business in the UK. Other countries' equivalent bodies do basically the same thing, and can similarly impose conditions on foreign companies. The structure and safeguards in the law mean that the CMA cannot act totally capriciously, or impose conditions that go beyond the scope of its remit (competition in the UK market). So even though Schedule 8 seems very broad on its face, it actually is more limited.

Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually.

You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".

I know the OP is asking about America, but its also worth knowing about other countries. This is legal if both subscriber and subscription are within the EU. There was also a court case about this. In another case in 2014 the pub lost, but that seems to have been because the decoder was only licensed for domestic use. These cases were for satellite decoders rather than Internet streaming, but the legal issues would be the same. Both these cases involved British pubs, so obviously this law doesn't apply to them since Brexit.

Is it actually necessary for businesses (such as a Small Town News USA Inc) that do not reside in EU to care about GDPR? Only if they offer goods/services to or monitor behavior of people in the EU (Art. 3(2)). Note that: having a commerce-oriented website that is accessible to EU residents does not by itself constitute offering goods or services in the EU. Rather, a business must show intent to draw EU customers, for example, by using a local language or currency. If it is then how (and by whom) would compliance be audited and/or enforced? Supervisory Authorities will care of it.

A company does not cease to exist simply because it goes bankrupt. The company may wind down its operations, but it may just go through a process of restructuring its debts. If the company is merely restructuring, the bankruptcy would not probably not have much effect on its ownership of intellectual property such as copyright and trademark rights. So it would retain those interests in the video game, and the company making the sequel would need to obtain licenses from the original company. If the original company is going through bankruptcy in anticipation of shutting down completely, you can expect it to sell off all its assets, which would include its copyright and trademark interests in the game. In that case, the company making the sequel could either attempt to purchase those rights itself, or it would need to obtain a license from whoever does buy those rights.

Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.

Most games have a TOS to playing that include provisions such as sales of in game items through out of game currencies (i.e. real world money changes hands for digital product or account). I believe Pokemon does have this as part of the TOS which could get you and potential customers banned from competition and possibly the modern online trade features, but am unable to look at the current TOS to verify. It should not be hard to find such a document and read for yourself.

Can a defendant remain silent (invoke 5th amendment) during cross examination? Suppose a defendant testifies at a criminal trial and is advised beforehand that the prosecution has a right to cross examine him. Suppose the defendant answers all of his lawyer's questions on direct examination. Would that defendant be able to refuse to answer some (or any) of the questions the prosecution asks on cross examination? I would expect the prosecution to ask questions that would tend to incriminate the defendant, and I'm wondering if, by voluntarily testifying on direct, the court would see his right to remain silent as being waived permanently, or if the court would be fine with the defendant re-asserting his 5th amendment rights during cross.

No, a defendant may not remain silent on cross-examination. Witnesses who voluntarily testify in their own defense are subject to cross-examination on that testimony. In Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, (1900), a murder defendant testified that he was at two bars and then his cabin the night of the crime. The trial court held that having waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the defendant was subject to cross examination about what he was wearing that night, his connections to a co-defendant, the co-defendant's clothes, and who else was at the cabin with him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that if a defendant voluntary makes a statement about the crime at trial, the prosecution may cross-examine him with as much latitude as it would have with any other witness: The witness having sworn to an alibi, it was perfectly competent for the government to cross-examine him as to every fact which had a bearing upon his whereabouts upon the night of the murder, and as to what he did and the persons with whom he associated that night. Indeed, we know of no reason why an accused person, who takes the stand as a witness, should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).

Generally speaking, witnesses are not legally represented at trial, unless they are also parties. While a witness may choose to seek legal advice about a request or order they have received to give evidence, they would generally be expected to take this opportunity before they actually show up at trial. A witness examination would not normally be adjourned because a witness said something damaging to their own credibility or to one party’s case, and would like to pause and obtain legal advice. One goal of cross-examination is to expose unreliable evidence by obtaining this kind of tactical advantage over a witness. It is up to the party whose case was damaged to try to fix the problem in re-examination or reply evidence. That party may not be particularly interested in protecting the witness’s personal interests. There may be exceptions in specific factual situations, when it becomes clear that a witness does not understand their right to object to giving evidence on the grounds of self-incrimination or some other privilege. A judge may choose to halt further questioning of the witness if there is a real risk of a mistrial or some other procedural unfairness, which can be addressed without unfairly depriving the cross-examiner of their opportunity to challenge the evidence.

Miranda rights do not attach until the suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. "Custody" means that the suspect reasonably believes that he is not free to leave the conversation. "Interrogation" means that the officer is engaging in direct questioning or other conduct that would reasonably be expected to elicit a response. A suspect is free to waive his Miranda rights and begin speaking without a lawyer, but a waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. "Voluntary" means that the waiver is obtained without coercion (torture, threats or promises) by the government. None of the five scenarios indicate that Clyde ever believes he is in custody, so he has no Miranda rights in any of them, making his confession admissible in all of them. But to play it out further, let's assume that Officer Olivia arrives and immediately slaps handcuffs on Clyde: No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. Miranda rights attached at the beginning of questioning. Clyde waived by confessing. Reading the Miranda rights established that the waiver was knowing. We don't have any facts suggesting the waiver was not intelligent. The waiver was not obtained by government coercion, so it was voluntary. The waiver was effective, so the confession is admissible. Same as 3. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. The key thing to keep in mind here is that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was to avoid misconduct by the government, and it has generally been implemented only to that end. The key case here is Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), which involved a guy who approached a police officer and asked to talk about a murder he had committed. The officer Mirandized him, and he told them all about the murder and where he buried the body. It turned out that he was a chronic schizophrenic and was going through a psychotic break at the time of the confession, which he had only offered because "God's voice" told him to. As with your truth serum scenario, the question became whether the Miranda waiver satisfied the voluntariness requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court held that "capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by external pressure." But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the defendant's due-process rights nor his right against self-incrimination are offended by non-governmental influences, even when they undercut the defendant's free will. Since then, other courts have relied on Connelly to hold that voluntariness was not defeated by: a suspect's flu, hangover, hunger, or exhaustion, U.S. v. Elwood, 51 F.3d 283 (9th Cir. 1995); a suspect's heroin use, Elliott v. Williams, 248 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001); a suspect's heroin withdrawal, U.S. v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1992); a suspect's orders from his father, N. Mariana Islands v. Doe, 844 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1988); or a suspect's unusual susceptibility to suggestion or intimidation, U.S. v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1993). tl;dr: Because the truth serum was not administered by the government, the confession is admissible in all five scenarios.

This is normal. It only seems imbalanced because only the prosecutor has been able to call witnesses so far. Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. At this point, only the prosecution has put on its witnesses, so it hasn't had an opportunity cross examine anyone, and the defense has been able to lead because it has only been able to cross examine. Were the prosecutor to call the defendant's wife or mother or something like that, he would probably be permitted to use leading questions. And when the defense puts on its case, the roles will reverse: the defense attorneys will have to use open-ended questioning for any witness he calls, and the prosecutor will be able to use leading questions.

The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.

These questions are typically left to the discretion of the judge in whose courtroom the presentation is happening. It is very common to see these types of devices in trial courts, but they are much less common in appellate courts, and I doubt you'd ever see one in the United States Supreme Court, where the arguments are essentially limited to oral presentations.

As far as I know, the leading case on the matter is Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43. There, the court explains While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, a corporation is a creature of the State, and there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State; and an officer of a corporation which is charged with criminal violation of a statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a refusal to produce its books. The court specifically denies that corporations have 5th Amendment rights: The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of which he is an officer or employe. This contrast with protection against unreasonable searched of corporations, per the 4th Amendment: A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and, in organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and, although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers, it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Congress, a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, the constitutional privilege against testifying against himself cannot be raised for his personal benefit by an officer of the corporation having the documents in his possession. ... An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Likewise, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals") and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85: Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." So only natural persons can plead the fifth.

I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.

Are U.S. mailboxes federal property? A common claim seems to be that mailboxes in the United States are federal property (example, example, example). (To be clear, some mailboxes are owned and maintained by the USPS, typically cluster boxes, but this is referring to mailboxes purchased and installed by property owners.) The justification for this statement is typically that U.S. code makes mailbox vandalism or use for non-USPS materials a federal crime; thus, USPS has total control over your mailbox. This seems questionable. Obviously, if you go smashing other people's mailboxes or go box to box inserting pamphlets, you are liable to get in trouble with the postal inspector, but that seems unrelated to who owns the mailbox. In fact, the USPS website seems to acknowledge that some mailboxes are privately owned. What is the real story here? Are U.S. mailboxes property of the USPS? To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox? Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox? Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it?

The real story is that the articles you link to are logically fallacious. The first hedges its assertions by saying a mailbox is "effectively considered" to be federal property. It cites 18 USC 1705, which it correctly notes "puts your mailbox under Federal jurisdiction." But that's not the same as assuming ownership of it. The piece also says that you "effectively lease" your mailbox to the federal government, which is a somewhat exaggerated way of putting it, but even if we accept it at face value it falls far short of a claim that the mailbox is federal property. The second concludes that mailbox tampering is a federal offense because "the mailbox belongs to and is controlled by the USPS." There is no evidence offered to support the assertion of ownership, and there is of course an alternative explanation for the fact that mailbox tampering is a federal offense, which is that there are laws such as the aforementioned 18 USC 1705 that prohibit it. These laws, however, say nothing about ownership. The third is ultimately based on the assertion of a letter carrier who said, "Listen, lady, your friends don’t own these mailboxes. We do." The claim was made in explanation of the prohibition against private individuals putting items into a mailbox. As far as I can see, the article is off the mark in another way: that prohibition has nothing to do with safety and security, but rather with protecting the postal service's revenue: it arises from 18 USC 1725, which explicitly is about avoiding the payment of postage. In any event, it does not establish ownership. In short, the idea that all mailboxes are federal property is a myth, as implied by the USPS page you link to. To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox? To a fairly high extent, but they do need to comply with the relevant law. They can't, for example, hang a plastic bottle by the roadside for the purpose of receiving their mail. Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox? 18 USC 1705 actually prohibits willful or malicious injury, tearing down, or destruction of a mailbox, not defacing. So technically, they could, but a prosecution seems highly unlikely. Under section 1725, placing non-mail in the box is only prohibited to the extent that there is intent to avoid paying postage. That would be difficult to establish for someone putting something in their own mailbox. Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it? If they're willing to forego mail delivery, yes. They may be able to arrange to have the mail held for retrieval at the post office. If they do not, their mail will be returned to the sender as undeliverable. This arises from the Domestic Mail Manual, which says (in general) that "customers must provide authorized mail receptacles or door slots" as a condition of city delivery (I could not find a corresponding requirement for rural delivery, but it must exist somewhere). The manual also describes requirements for customer mail receptacles.

Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished.

Generally, "yes", but it isn't a constitutional or federal right. It is a right that flows from the right of the owner of real property to determine who is allowed on real property, and the fact that generally speaking, a concealed weapon carrier isn't a protected class that cannot be discriminated against. Thus, while this is the default rule in the U.S. and the predominant rule in the U.S., a state has the authority to prohibit businesses that are otherwise "public accommodations" from discriminating against concealed weapon holders if a state wishes to do so. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some exceptions, either for all concealed weapon holders, or for some subclass of them (e.g. undercover police officers). For example, a law review note, a.k.a. student written law review article, cited in the comments notes that some states require a business owner to post a sign prohibiting concealed carry in order to have the right to remove someone from the premises of their business for this reason.

Focusing on the legal question, the obstruction of correspondence statute would not be applicable to UPS package deliveries. To repeat 18 USC 1702, Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Private package delivery services deliver to the porch (pr similar), not to an authorized depository (such as a mailbox). They are not "mail", and they have not been in the custody of the postal service (unless they have, where USPS actually makes the delivery). Such deliveries constitute unsolicited goods / unordered merchandise, since they were not things that you requested. There are state and federal rules to the effect that you may accept such goods as gifts, and you have no obligation to return the goods. Here is the Washington state law for example, and here is what the FTC says about it at the federal level. The intended recipient cannot impose an obligation on you to store and guard his possessions, nor can a delivery service impose an obligation to safeguard property that they are responsible for.

Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute.

Following the guidance of the police In summary: If the item is hazardous or dangerous you should report it to the police using the emergency number. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a private place, hand it to the owner of the premises - it's their responsibility to attempt to find the owner and the property becomes theirs if they can't. If the item is non-hazardous and found on public transport, hand it to the operator - they have their own by-laws about lost property. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a public place, if it has a serial number, hand it to the police - they may be able to trace the owner if it is a government document, hand it to the issuer if it is of low value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner "these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item." if it is of high value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner and if you can't hand it to the police.

All residents in Germany need to have a registered address. The reasons for that are numerous: no need for a separate voting registration, it gives a place to deliver legal notices, it helps enforcing tax regulation (though tax law has another definition of "residence"), certain taxes are assigned to the municipality where you are registered, no need to do a utility bill or credit report dance when trying to prove your address to third-parties, it was always done like that. The last is reason enough as far as bureaucracy is concerned. As far as your question goes, there are a few wrong assumptions. First, nobody is trying to limit or deny registrations. Municipalities actually get money for every resident they have registered through tax allocation. Second, if you (semi-)permanently live at some place you are not considered "officially homeless" but as someone has didn't properly register themselves (which could result in a fine). Third, multiple people can be registered at the same address. How else could people register themselves in huge apartment buildings? Or even a family living together? If there is a suspicious amount of people registered they might want to check whether other regulation (such as minimum space per person) is adhered to. Fourth, to register somewhere you need proof that you actually live there. This is where you probably ran into problems. This proof is usually a letter given by the person allowing you live at a place. Note that this is not necessarily the owner of the place but literally the person allowing you to stay (the authorities can check with the owner though). Often subletters won't sign that piece of paper, either because they think they are not allowed to or they don't have permission by the owner to sublet the place to begin with. If that happens you are supposed to tell that to the authorities (§ 19 Abs. 2 BMG) who then can choose to fine the one providing the place for refusing to sign the paper. (The need for proof was recently reintroduced after it was noticed that there was a huge amount of people who registered at an address where they didn't actually live.) Fifth, if you never have been registered before you can't actually properly pay your taxes as you need a tax ID for that. This is automatically assigned when you – surprise – register for the first time. If you are not an EU/EEA/CH citizen you also need to register yourself before they can change anything about the residence permit within Germany. To end with an answer to your question if taken literally: German citizens can register themselves as homeless (ohne festen Wohnsitz) if they really are. For foreigners this is a bit more complicated. EU citizens usually don't have freedom of movement rights if they can't properly support themselves, a living space is supposed to be part of that. Other foreigners likely violate their residence permit.

Purchasing a lot that contained the keys does not provide any rights to access the locks that those keys would open. What someone who did this would be charged with would vary by both location and also by prosecutorial discretion. The only exception in this scenario would be if the storage locker contained the deed to the property in question.

Are parents liable to prosecution as soon as they know that their child has stolen something? In Germany, children up to the age of 14 are not liable to prosecution. What happens when a child steals a sweet in the supermarket and the parents don't notice at first? Only when they get home do they notice that their child has stolen something. Can the parents be prosecuted from that moment on if they know about it but do not give it back?

No, you are not personally criminally liable for a crime a third party has committed, even if you are their guardian. The conflict is managed by civil action, i. e. the store owner sues the child/guardian for damages. In general, it is not a crime to not report a crime, planned, happening, or finished. There is one section that penalizes failing to report a planned crime, § 138 StGB. However, only very serious crimes such as homicide are eligible. So what about aiding theft, §§ 242 Ⅰ, 27 Ⅰ StGB, e. g. by attending the child: This requires criminal intent, that means knowledge about and deliberate intent to commit a crime. Since the guardian wasn’t aware of anything, he can’t be liable. As a guardian (§ 1626 BGB, or in general any guarantor) you can commit a crime by omitting a behavior, § 13 Ⅰ StGB (Garantenstellung). Theft by omission, §§ 242 Ⅰ, 13 Ⅰ StGB. The purpose of § 13 Ⅰ StGB is that you are forced intervene if an infringement of protected legal interests (e. g. life and limb, property, freedom) is imminent. As a parent you are a guarding guarantor (Beschützergarant). You are supposed to protect your child. However, § 13 Ⅰ StGB only has the extent of protecting legal interests of your patron. The supermarket owner’s property is not a legal interest you are mandated to protect. Hence no crime either. Approving or rewarding a crime, § 140 StGB: Theft is not eligible, only crimes that are deemed suitable to disturb public order. Failure to educate, § 171 StGB: If you grossly fail to educate your child, even go as far as encouraging it in engaging in criminal activities, you commit a crime. However, this is a one time occurrence we’re talking about, so not even remotely criminal. Various “gang crimes”. A family should not be considered a gang (Art. 6 Ⅰ GG), but the DA has an infinite amount of fantasy.

The most apparent potential offences would be under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, but these require the mens rea of "knowingly" or "intentionally" doing things without authorization, or doing so "with intent to defraud", etc. See also the Department of Justice's manual entry on this family of offences. Particularly relevant is this quote: As part of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant was aware of the facts that made the defendant’s access unauthorized at the time of the defendant’s conduct. Given your stipulation that the person has unintentionally viewed or downloaded the material without authorization, this would not be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030.

If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation.

We are talking about larceny and larceny & destruction of property in the two cases. So at the minimum, there are more laws that apply. But what are the laws? Florida names its Larceny statute... Theft: 812.014 Theft.— (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. Destroying someone's else property in Florida is in the statute on Criminal Mischief: 806.13 Criminal mischief; penalties; penalty for minor.— (1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another, including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of vandalism thereto. So, yes, you would additionally get the criminal mischief charge, but... that only grants monetary damages of 250 USD plus the damages done to the items for first timers, but it can become upgraded to a felony in the third degree - which has a maximum limit of 5 years. Note that damaging items in the course of theft is specifically an aggravating factor for the theft charge, if grand theft is combined with property damage of 1000 USD and more. A bicycle costing between 750 and 5000 USD is grand theft, felony in the third degree according to 812.014.(2)(c)1. This is also the 5 years limit. One could get both sentences... but still only sit 5 years, because often sentences are served concurrently, only rarely consecutively. So, no, you do not necessarily commit a higher offense just for breaking the lock - you'd need to have a 1000 USD damage for that - but you most certainly commit additional offenses that can result in a higher verdict in the end.

It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).

Scotland: Duty of finder - Section 67 of the Civic Government Scotland Act 1982 no threshold is stated, by non compliance fine of £ 50 Northern Ireland: Cash If you find cash, please hand this into your nearest police station. Cash that is not reunited with the owner is donated to charity. England: The item I've found is of low value or can't be directly identified to a person You don't need to report this to us. Please make reasonable enquiries to try to find the owner, these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item. Note: What is to be considered to be low value is not stated. Other jurasdictions have a threshold. In Germany it is € 10 (§ 965 (2) BGB). That would then be £ 8,43 at the present rate. For any amount larger, it must be reported to the police. If the owner is not found (again dependent on jurasdiction) it may be given to you. If the owner is found, a reward between 3 and 5% can be claimed (§ 971 BGB). Section 965 - German Civil Code (BGB) Duty of the finder to notify (1) A person who finds a lost thing and takes possession of it must without undue delay notify the loser or the owner or another person entitled to receive. (2) If the finder does not know the person entitled to receive or does not know that person’s whereabouts, the finder must without undue delay notify the competent authority of the finding and the circumstances that may be material to determine the person entitled to receive. If the thing is not worth more than ten euros, no notification is necessary. Note: The original version of the law (1896) it was 3 Marks. Sources: Section 67 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 If you find treasure or lost goods - Citizens Advice Scotland Know What To Do - When You Have Lost or Found Property (Northern Ireland) Report lost or found property | The Met The item I've found is of low value or can't be directly identified to a person | The Met Section 965 - Duty of the finder to notify (Germany)

The Human Rights Watch published a report on children in Saudi Arabia's justice system("Arbitrary procedures for determining age of majority in criminal cases"): Judicial opinions on when a child can be tried as an adult vary widely, and frequently depend on measures of children’s physical development, contrary to international standards, which call upon states to make determinations of adult competence based on “emotional, mental and intellectual maturity,” and not the child’s physical maturity. For example, Sharia scholar Shaikh Ahmad bin Hamad al-Mazyad, who has served as a senior advisor to the Ministry of Justice for more than 20 years, told Human Rights Watch that judges decide that a person has reached majority (baligh) based on known physical signs of puberty (bulugh, which can also be translated as “majority”), saying that it was acceptable to execute a nine-year-old girl sentenced if she had reached puberty (for further on this see Chapter V, “The Juvenile Death Penalty,” below). He also stated that according to Sharia, age 15 was “the outside limit” for majority (bulugh), so that a child age 15 or older who lacked these signs could still be sentenced and executed if found to have committed murder. ... “some experts in fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] consider the appearance of signs of [physical] maturity to be the equivalent of having reached the age of majority, while other experts in fiqh go toward 20 as the age of majority, and while there is nothing clear in the text of the law in Saudi Arabia specifying this age, it is moving toward being 18.” On the basis of this report - and the case cited in your question - it seems like physical attributes are the primary issues considered, although age appears to be an issue as well.

He has to follow the law of the country he is in and those of which he is a citizen. A citizen is subject to their country's jurisdiction wherever they are, however, some laws are only enforced within a nation's boundaries and some have extra-territorial application. 18 U.S. Code § 2423 - Transportation of minors covers the US law (I don't speak Hungarian or Polish so I leave that up to you). It says: (c) Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places.— Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either temporarily or permanently, in a foreign country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 18 U.S. Code § 2243 - Sexual abuse of a minor or ward gives the age of a minor as anyone under 12 years old and anyone under 16 unless the perpetrator is not more than 4 years older. For your 21+ year old this would be anyone under 16.

Murder vs aggravated assault vs attempted murder Just watched "Night watching" on A&E. On the show, someone was stabbed 23 times. At the end the narrator said that a suspect was arrested and charged with 23 counts of aggravated assault. Why not charge attempted murder? I would imagine the penalty for attempted murder is about the same as murder right?

It could depend on jurisdiction: in Georgia, attempted murder has a 10 year maximum term and aggravate assault has 20 years max. The essential difference is that attempted murder requires proving intent to kill, whereas "harm" is much broader and thus easier to prove.

It looks like this is covered by article 34 of the criminal code you linked: ARTICULO 34. - No son punibles: [...] El que obrare en defensa propia o de sus derechos, siempre que concurrieren las siguientes circunstancias: a) Agresión ilegítima; b) Necesidad racional del medio empleado para impedirla o repelerla; c) Falta de provocación suficiente por parte del que se defiende. Se entenderá que concurren estas circunstancias respecto de aquel que durante la noche rechazare el escalamiento o fractura de los cercados, paredes o entradas de su casa, o departamento habitado o de sus dependencias, cualquiera que sea el daño ocasionado al agresor. Igualmente respecto de aquel que encontrare a un extraño dentro de su hogar, siempre que haya resistencia; English (my translation, no guarantees): ARTICLE 34 - Not punished are: [...] Someone who acts in self-defense or in defense of their rights, as long as the following circumstances apply: a) illegitimate aggression b) a rational need for the means used for preventing or repelling the aggression c) a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender It is understood that these circumstances apply with respect to someone who during the night defends from a housebreaking or a breach of the enclosure, the walls or entrances to their home, or the home of their dependents, no matter what damage is caused to the attacker. Reading these rules, which look quite similar to the law in most other countries, I'd say shooting an armed intruder would be covered. It would probably already be covered under the general rules ( a) to c) ): There is an illegitimate aggression, and shooting is necessary for stopping the agressor, because no milder means is practical in the situation. Additionally, the last paragraph would apply, which provides additional protection to someone defending their home, so even if a judge decided that normally shooting someone attacking with a knife is not necessary for protection, it would still be ok for home defence.

It depends on the jurisdiction but, very broadly speaking, the person might be ill such that: they did not know what they were doing or that what they were doing was wrong (insanity) their ability to understand their actions or make a reasoned decision or self control was highly impaired but not to the degree of insanity (diminished responsibility or perhaps provocation) they were unconscious when they acted (automatism - e.g. an offence committed while 'sleep walking') Clearly they lack the same culpability as a person with "good mental health", who consciously committed a criminal offence, knowing it was wrong. That does not mean the ill person can 'get away with it'. Claiming diminished responsibility as a defence to a murder charge may mean the person will instead be tried for manslaughter, which is also punishable by imprisonment. Depending on the circumstances a court (and subsequent people in authority) might be persuaded that the person is so dangerous they must be indefinitely detained and treated without their consent. Doesn't this sort of allow psychiatrists to make up the law, because they can decide if something is considered a mental condition? Just because a psychiatrist comes along doesn't mean the court will do what the psychiatrist says is best - the court will hear both sides of the argument, establish the facts, interpret the law and deliver a verdict. Some people would argue that someone who would commit such crimes (such as rape) couldn't possibly be in their right mind. Certainly, but so far as I'm aware that defence is very rarely used and never successful.

All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out.

I interpret the sentence "intruder enters your home using the internet" in the question as not as physically entering the home but as virtually entering the home, in other words hacking into the victim's home network remotely. When that interpretation is incorrect, please comment. Note that an action can only be considered self-defense when the self-defense prevents a crime currently in progress from being completed. When A hacked into B's computer and then B punches A in the face later, that's not self-defense, that's illegal vigilante justice. The self-defense argument would only work if it actually prevents the completion of the crime. For example, if A and B were in the same room, A sees B hacking into A's computer right now and uses physical force to prevent B from completing the hack (like yanking the keyboard out of B's hands). Also keep in mind that the intensity of self-defense must be appropriate for the severity of the crime. What is and is not appropriate is for a court to decide in each individual case, and the guidelines that are to be applied vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But causing bodily harm to people when the crime they are committing does not cause bodily harm is often not considered within the limits of self-defense. For further information about what is and is not allowed in self-defense, I recommend the series about self-defense by Law Comic.

If I remember the case correctly, he didn't make his home look uninhabited (that is nobody is living there) but as if the inhabitants had left (gone shopping etc.) to make it look attractive to burglars. He then waited inside, armed with a gun, with the intent of shooting any burglars that might arrive. He shot the first burglar in the legs, and then proceeded to kill the unarmed and now defenseless burglar, who was lying injured on the ground and was in no position anymore to hurt him. He then did the same with a second burglar, shooting her in the legs, then shooting her multiple times, and when he found she was still alive, he shot her point blank in the face while she was lying on the ground. You are asking the wrong questions. You are asking "is it illegal to remove a truck". It's not. What is illegal is to intentionally create a situation where you shoot people and try to claim "self defence". It can very well be argued that by luring burglars into your home with the intent to kill them, they are not actually illegal in that home, because you wanted them to be there. You can do many things that are each completely innocent but add up to a crime. Actually, for everyone interested, I posted a question maybe last week or the week before whether you can be convicted for both first degree murder and second degree murder for killing a person, and it was exactly this case that inspired the question. What should he have done? If he hadn't lured the burglars in, I believe the case would have still been a double murder, since he killed both unarmed teenagers when they were absolutely no threat. It might not have been first degree murder since it would not have been premeditated. But he intentionally lured them in, making it premeditated (first degree) murder. If he had only injured them, the fact that he lured them in could very likely have made this an assault. You asked: "Now that the burglars are in his house, what should he have done? " Well, he got himself into a dangerous situation. Remember, he was convicted for premeditated murder. So just before he shot the girl in the head, he should have instead put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been one murder instead of two. Just before he shot the boy, he should have put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been just attempted murder. When he heard the first person entering, he should have called the police and waited. When the burglar came in sight, he should not have shot and injured him. It's a similar question to "if I try a bank robbery and there is an armed guard, what should I do". The only legal thing to do is to drop your weapon and wait to be arrested. If an armed burglar had appeared instead of two unarmed teens, well, he would have put himself into a dangerous situation. Just as the burglar would have no right to shoot even if a home owner points a weapon at him, he had no right to shoot, no right to self defense, since he had intentionally created the situation. Tough shit. That's what you may get if you plan a murder. Responding to some comments: @J.Chang Are you being serious? You are not allowed to make your house inviting to burglars, while waiting inside with the intent of killing them. Self defense only applies when a reasonable person would believe they are in danger. Reasonable persons don't think that a burglar comes in with the intent of blowing themselves up and taking the home owner with them. And no, you don't get to "assume the worst". Not when the worst is something no reasonable person would expect. Thanks to Dale for pointing out that even for soldiers in a war situation, where different rules apply, deliberately killing a helpless enemy combatant is murder.

This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter.

This isn't strictly a legal question, but there are many reasons that a police force might delay. These include, but are not limited to: The case is a low priority so resources are devoted elsewhere, and no one ever gets back around to dealing with it. The case may implicate another ongoing undercover operation which the arrest would disrupt. It is likely that if the police wait that they will be able to bring much more serious charges, when the conduct they have evidence for is not as serious if they wait and monitor the suspect for future criminal conduct or leads to more serious past conduct. For example, the police may only have evidence of a single incident of harassment but may think that if they wait and watch that they may get evidence of extortion or attempted murder. There is a concern that prosecuting immediately would lead to community uproar that would undermine community safety or impair police operations generally. In the same vein, public opinion might produce a tainted or unfavorable jury if charges were pressed now, but the jury might be less likely to have pre-existing opinions or to consider the case a hot button issue once publicity around an incident has died off. The police may intentionally be exercising discretion not to press charges because it seems unjust to do so, or the perpetrator had some justification, or otherwise deserves a second chance. Pre-charge negotiations might be ongoing between prosecutors and defense counsel. The perpetrator already faces more serious charges that are highly likely to result in his incarceration and the new charges would be served concurrently and not add to his sentence, so pressing charges is not a priority. There are doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence or there is a belief that more evidence may be obtained soon (and nobody bothers to check back and try to press the case when that potential lead doesn't pan out). A modest delay in pressing charges for any number of reasons causes a witness to become unavailable or evidence to be lost. Generally speaking, law enforcement has wide discretion to decide which cases to focus on and try to have prosecuted, and which cases the leave be. No law enforcement agency has the resources to prosecute (with prosecuting attorney assistance) every possible case that they could prove.

Is law enforcement responsible for damages made by a search warrant? Why do police use a battering ram without first checking the doorknob on a low threat warrant? What if a small child was on the other side of the door and got seriously injured by the battering ram? The door and frame is likely to be damaged and may cost hundreds of dollars to replace but there is a small chance someone could also get injured. I have seen where the landlord will let police in with a search warrant with 0 damage but in other cases they can devastate the house breaking and rummaging with a near 0 regard the property and tenants personal items. Can the landlord sue for damages? Are police above criminal law for destruction of property in this matter when they don't at least try the unlocked door? I understand that some damages in court could be argued as previous damage or damages needed for entry but what if you can prove it was intentional and unwarranted with no reason?

The police officers themselves are covered by Qualified Immunity - to put it briefly, a government official acting in their official capacity in a discretionary act (as in, they have some discretion in whether/how they carry out the act) is immune from suit so long as they pay reasonable deference to relevant law. In the case of the police, so long as the search or seizure itself is reasonable (either because there is a warrant, or because they had probable cause), they can take appropriately destructive measures to carry out their duty. Even if the search or seizure is later found to have been unreasonable, an officer may still have Qualified Immunity unless their action violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known" (Harlow v. Fitzgerald). However, a search/seizure doesn't give the police license for arbitrary destruction, whatever they do has to be reasonably pursuant to the legal search/seizure. For example, if a suspect is barricaded in a house with a gun, they can knock down doors, windows and walls to apprehend them. On the other hand, that does not mean the officers can then break open safes to try and find evidence - once their probable cause for the entry is fulfilled (apprehending the suspect), they need to get a warrant to do more than a plain sight search of the house. Warrants will specify what items are being searched for, so even with a warrant the police have to take reasonable measures to carry it out - an example of an unreasonable measure would be to tear into walls in order to try and find a stolen bicycle. On the other hand, tearing into walls could be justified if their warrant included searching for drugs from a dealer, where it is not uncommon to hide them in the walls. States and the Federal Government enjoy Sovereign Immunity from suits in most cases. There are some exceptions, but none would apply in this case so long as the general policy of the police department was not illegal or unconstitutional. However, county and city governments do not enjoy Sovereign Immunity and state governments and the Federal Government often allow suits against them for negligence from their actors, so someone injured by unreasonable police action can usually try to recover damages from the officer's department.

Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).

a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.

Seeking out every person with a warrant would take more staff-time and resources than many areas can afford. As such, only the most serious warrants are actively sought out. Others are either passively tracked (officers have a description or image, so that during normal duties, they would recognise such persons) or only heeded if a check of a person already detained shows one (of the warrant is very minor). As well as this, many of the people with "mid-range" warrants will make efforts to avoid police, such as by moving frequently; not reporting address details; staying with various friends or family, at their homes or businesses; being mobile as much as possible in public areas where few law enforcement personnel are likely to be present, let alone likely to recognise them as subject to outstanding warrants.

The IRS Criminal Investigation division is typically going to be the arresting agency, assuming that (1) the offense is treated as a criminal matter; (2) a warrant is actually issued; and (3) anyone actually sets out specifically to serve the warrant. It is usually the case, though, that the violation is handled as a civil matter. When it is treated as a criminal violation, the defendant and the Service often reach an agreement that eliminates the need for an arrest. If there is a warrant, though, any police agency could theoretically make the arrest if they happened across the defendant. But if it's a time-sensitive investigation -- if the defendant is expected to flee or destroy evidence, for example -- it's a safer bet that you'll see an actual warrant execution. In that case, you would have CI taking the lead, perhaps with assistance from other agencies.

The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.

Usual disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. If you are serious about proceeding with this, talk to a lawyer who specialises in this kind of thing. I imagine that you will need to provide proof of the above incidents in order for any legal action to succeed. Accessing a tenant's room without notice or permission, and without a very good reason (e.g. a gas leak) is likely to be classed as harassment; specifically, "acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier". Renting out your room and removing your belongings before the end of a tenancy is likely to be illegal eviction. Both of these are criminal offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Shelter mentions that it's normally local authorities, rather than the police or individuals, who carry out prosecutions under this act (see also: Shelter articles, Landlord Law Blog articles), so you might want to start there. There is also the matter of civil action, including for breach of contract. For that, consider speaking to a lawyer.

This helpful video gives the answer, and it's no, you don't have to open your door unless they have a warrant. If you've committed an indictable offence (those considered most serious, such as murder, manslaughter, causing really serious harm (injury) and robbery) they have the power to enter without a warrant (see 17 b of the PACE Act). In the case I saw there was no indictable offence and so the lady didn't (shouldn't!) have opened her door. You can speak to them through a closed door or window and if they try to break in it is they that are breaking the law.

Is it really an abduction if the protest or resistance ends before the "victim" is "released"? My friend ran into her ex-boyfriend at a store. They began arguing, he grabbed her and carried her to his truck, then drove off with her and didn't have her consent. She tells me that he was going to take her home after "dragging her to Burger King". She says he made her go. The police pulled them over on the way back and arrested him. She later had the charges dropped claiming she didn't want to send him to jail because he didn't hurt her. Was this an abduction and an illegal act? Does it become acceptable legally if she later is okay with being taken away? Was he therefore falsely arrested because there was no crime?

Yes. This is clearly kidnapping. It is probably not a terribly aggravated sub-type of kidnapping, but it is kidnapping nonetheless. It is probably a felony. The fact that the victim does not press charges, or ratifies the conduct after the fact, does not change the fact that a crime was committed. The police decision to arrest the ex-boyfriend was entirely proper. It was not a false arrest. They had probable cause to believe that a crime was committed by the ex-boyfriend, and, in fact, a crime actually was committed by the ex-boyfriend. In the United States, the prosecutor has full authority to prosecute the ex-boyfriend to the full extent of the law for felony kidnapping for his conduct, over the objections of the victim. The decision to prosecute or not is entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor who brings criminal charges on behalf of the state and not the victim. Often the police and prosecutors will honor a victim's wishes, and this appears to be what happened in this case, but they are not required to do so, and could change their minds and bring charges in the future against the ex-boyfriend within the statute of limitations, if they wanted to do so. (This analysis does not apply in countries with Islamic law, but the facts of the question suggest that Islamic law does not apply in this jurisdiction.)

The legal system is set up to alleviate the problem or conundrum of intimidation by perpetrators. In the US criminal system, the State is the plaintiff, not the individual. In the extant described situation, very likely all you would have to do is sign an affidavit that the recovered phone is your phone, and that it was removed from your possession by unknown means on or about a certain date. From your description given here you don't know if it was stolen...you appear to have perhaps dropped it or left it somewhere, and someone picked it up/found it. Clearly it didn't belong to them, but this is more like "recovered lost property" rather than "received stolen property." The craigslist poster might be entirely un-chargeable with a crime, though they might have to give up the phone to you.

The state argued, and the jury was convinced, that Mr. Holle turned over his keys specifically intending to facilitate the robbery. They necessarily found that Mr. Holle was not telling the truth when he said he thought it was all a joke. I don't know what evidence they had to demonstrate that, but I could imagine that there was testimony indicating Mr. Holle knew that these people had engaged in similar acts before, that the group spoke of the plan with a level of specificity that made him aware they were not joking, or that he saw them taking other steps to prepare that let him know they were planning a crime. It doesn't matter if he wasn't renting the vehicle or didn't have an agreement to divide the spoils. The question of "why" he facilitated the crime is technically irrelevant to the legal question of whether he facilitated the crime. Nonetheless, I could imagine several reasons why he would have lent his car: he wanted to ingratiate himself with this group, he was bullied into doing it, he believed he would get some of the pot they stole, he didn't like the target, and so on. The fact that he was risking prison time is a uniquely poor argument that he didn't know what he was doing. The risk of punishment is always present for committing a crime, and yet we know that people commit crimes all day, every day. Why do they do it? Probably a good question for psychology.SE.

Such a search would have been emotionally satisfying for many people, but it would almost certainly not have been legal. Evidence that someone committed a crime is not always sufficient to permit a search of their home. An arrest warrant requires probable cause to believe the target individual committed an offense, and a search warrant requires probable cause to believe that the target location will have evidence of a crime. So whatever evidence they had that Epstein committed a crime, they would generally need a separate warrant to search his properties for evidence of that crime. There is no "emergency clause" for search warrants. I imagine you're thinking of the "exigency" exception to the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before searching property, which allows a search in cases where there is an actual emergency, where evidence is being destroyed, or when someone ducks into private property while officers are pursuing them. "Reasonable suspicicion of possible threats to ... potential victims" would not be enough to justify a search based on an exigency. If Epstein is already in jail, he doesn't really pose a threat to anyone, he isn't able to destroy any evidence, and no one is pursuing him anywhere.

In that case, Cruise-Gulyas was subject to a second stop, and the court found that the second stop was an illegal seizure. There is no qualified immunity since this was an exercise of a clearly established First Amendment right. The authority to seize her ended when the first stop ended. The finger is not a basis for a stop, since it does not violate any law ("This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity", Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105.

Jurisdiction? washington. RCW 9A.16.020 says when force is lawful. (1) Whenever necessarily used by ...a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction Not apparently applicable in this case. (2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody Looks promising, except RCW 9A.52.070 says "(2) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a gross misdemeanor". For the record, (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary but you didn't describe malicious trespass (which incidentally is not statutorily defined in Washington). Our last hope is: (4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public For example, you can detain a person for a few seconds to ask what he's doing there and to get whatever answer you are going to get. It does not extend to "detain the trespasser until you are satisfied that he has truthfully identified himself", or "until the police show up".

In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do.

No An arrest is the act of detaining a person or property by legal authority or warrant and has been made when a police officer or another individual makes it clear to the person that they are no longer a free person. A person does not need to be physically touched to be placed under arrest as words alone are capable of bringing about an arrest if they establish that the person is no longer a free person. Now, if a LEO asks you to accompany them, then, so long as you have the choice not to, you are not under arrest.

A prior offence vs. 2 or more prior offences I am confused about the following statement. First it says: a prior offence in the last 10 years, you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 3 years from the date of the conviction but then it says: 2 or more prior offences in the last 10 years, you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 5 years from the date of the conviction. Shouldn't the second part say: 3 or more prior offences in the last 10 years, you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 5 years from the date of the conviction because the first part says if you already have a prior offence and later you have a second one, then you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 3 years from the date of the conviction?

No. The first part addresses the penalties for a second offense. The second part addresses the penalties for a third or subsequent offense.

I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed.

The relevant offence is at s.47(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988: A person who uses on a road at any time, or causes or permits to be so used, a motor vehicle to which this section applies, and as respects which no test certificate has been issued within the appropriate period before that time, is guilty of an offence. Benin commits an offence as he uses the car on the road, and as not having a valid and current MOT (usually) invalidates motor insurance, the car would in all likelihood be seized under s.165A of the Act. Aisha may commit an offence if it can be shown that she causes or permits Benin to use the car. This would hinge on what steps she would reasonably be expected to keep the car off the road and/or prevent Benin from using it such as taking it back (via a pre-arranged MOT appointment to not fall foul of s 47) taking the keys from him or selling it - which she can do as the registered keeper (the credit company is the actual owner).

It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.

Probably moot considering how much time has passed but here goes. California 22349(a) states that no person may drive upon a highway at speeds of greater than 65 mph. So if you're going to be convicted under 22349(a), it doesn't matter if you're going 80 or 90. The charge is that you were doing greater than 65. The judge found you were going 90. 90 > 65. Conviction secured. The only sticky part is if the judge charged you the extra $150 because he alleges you went 90 instead of 80. You could appeal that, since even the officer argues you went 80, but since the officer testified that his radar clocked you at 90, you'd probably lose, especially since the officer's rationale for writing 80 was, by his testimony, your alleged admission at the scene, and you at the scene would have reason to downplay your speed. TL;DR: Yes, the judge, as the trier of fact, can do that. Something came out during the trial (radar at 90) that contradicted the ticket (80) so the trier of fact (the judge) resolved this by going with the radar. You might have been able to get out of it, if you asked the officer why he didn't write 90 when that's what the radar read. There was a reason the officer didn't trust that radar, and if he articulated it, then the judge would likely have stuck with 80.

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)

There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.

There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.

Is there any legal avenue for declaration of residence in Denmark with the right to not have a home? This website (https://international.kk.dk/cpr-number) clearly states a condition for officially becoming a resident in Denmark and getting a CPR number is that you have an actual residence, a place to live. Something I have noticed in Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, is that it is often reflected as extremely important, by various administrative procedures, that you live in a “real” form of housing, like an apartment or a house. It is not at all easy to just casually declare some address as your own, or a PO Box. It must be a dwelling the government considers official in all ways, not just meeting various habitability codes, but also I think an address that in general has a kind of residential “zoning”, like some addresses are simply not even considered residential, regardless of what’s actually there. The part that makes this seem like a regrettable bureaucracy is that in all of these three countries, the converse is true for maintaining residence status: matters of citizenship, criminal activity, deportation and so on aside, there is (I think) basically no formal concept of needing to maintain your residence status. Basically, the second the government has accepted your residence application at some address, you could immediately move out and become homeless for the next ten years, but you will have officially gotten your foot in the door, and will be entitled to all of the rights of someone residing in that country. But before that initial registration happens, the opposite, where you are barred from a number of civil services and provisions because you’re basically just a foreigner, visitor or illegal alien there. It seems that this type of law is far more geared towards a certain practical effect then it is meant to have a particular intrinsic meaning, an actual necessary condition for some reason. They just need to make it slightly hard for anyone in the world to move there unrestricted and self-declare as residents. But given how trivial one’s evasion of that condition can be - I have registered at a hostel I spent a month at and have not been there in several months; I can easily register with a friend on a whim, who simply says “mi casa es tu casa” even though I maybe have never even set foot inside of their home - it opens the genuinely important question to me of whether people should ultimately have the legal right to declare themselves a resident of a certain country, under certain conditions, without needing to have a specific home, address or apartment that you live at. I think it’s very important because it is a fundamental and natural human right to not have to pay money to spend time inside of a building every night. You absolutely have the right to be “homeless”, to sleep on the ground, in a van, to camp, to be a drifter, to move around from place to place. So, is there any legal avenue for a person to declare residence in Denmark, openly communicating that they do not have any home or personal address? For example, could there be any claim to fulfilling the essential role of a resident but who simply asserts their right to be a part of Denmark without having to have a home? Is there any even tiny legal opening for such an idea? And if not, isn’t that a pretty major violation of human rights, that it’s effectively illegal to not pay money to live inside of an apartment, that it mandatorily costs money just to have a place to sleep at night, that you have to pay money just for being alive?

No It is not a fundamental human right to be able to become a resident of Denmark. Every country has the right to decide who is and who is not a resident and what criteria need to be satisfied. Having a residence is usually a pretty fundamental criterion for being a resident. At the same time, most countries have laws that state what areas and types of structures can be used as residences. There may be zoning requirements and building codes. You may argue that you should be able to decide what you will accept as your living quarters but that presumes, wrongly, that your decision doesn’t affect other people. As a simple counter example, emergency services might need to enter your “dwelling” and it must be, among other things, structurally sound enough for them to do so safely. So given that becoming a resident of Denmark is not a fundamental human right stated anywhere, Denmark can decide who is and is not. Of course, you can lie and say you have a residence when you don’t but lying to the government in order to obtain something you are not actually entitled to is likely to solve all your Danish residence problems; they’ll deport you.

Suppose I live in State A, but am on vacation to State B. While on vacation, suppose someone living in State C, but currently in State D, accesses my bank account to take money out illegally. The bank has a central headquarters in State E, although my branch of the bank is in State F. In which of these states could I file a lawsuit? Any of them? All of them? The thief would be the defendant in a lawsuit brought by you. The fact that you are on vacation in State B is irrelevant. You can always sue someone where they are domiciled, so State C is one forum where you could sue the thief. You can also always sue a natural person (as opposed to an entity) in a State where they are physically served with process, so if a summons from the courts of State D were served upon the thief while the thief was in State D, then State D could handle the case. You could also probably sue in State A on the grounds that intangible property is deemed to be located where the owner is domiciled and the theft of intangible property was a harm directed a State A. But, there is an argument that if the thief has no way you knowing that you lived in State A as opposed to State F where your branch is locate, that the thief's actions were targeted at State F. State E would not be a very plausible state to argue that there is jurisdiction. A federal district court has geographic jurisdiction only over cases that could be heard in the state courts of the state where it is located, so a federal court case would be brought only in the states where a state lawsuit could be brought. A federal court cases would either have to seek at least $75,000 (since there is diversity of citizenship between you and the thief), or would have to state at least one theory arising under federal law (which might or might not apply to this case). The you can choose which state to file in from those that are available. Which of these states could file charges against the person? A state can prosecute if the crime happened there, or if the crime caused a harm there. In this case the answer to both of those questions could be muddy. Basically, State A or F is probably where the crime caused harm, and it isn't clear from the OP facts where the crime was committed by the thief (we only know where the thief is now). These acts would also probably violate some federal crime that could be prosecuted in federal court, mostly likely the federal courts in State A or State F. Which of these states could file charges against the person? Could the federal government file charges as well? Would more than one prosecution violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment? What if these were countries instead of states? The double jeopardy clause applies to prosecutions within a single U.S. state, and in addition to any state prosecutions, a single prosecution can be made at the federal level. Likewise, prosecutions in different countries do not count against each other for purposes of a double jeopardy clause. Many U.S. states have a binding or non-binding policy of not prosecuting crimes that have already been prosecuted by another U.S. state or by the federal government, the U.S. Justice Department likewise has a non-binding policy of not prosecuting cases which have already been prosecuted by a U.S. state or another country. But these policies do not have constitutional dimensions and are not required by the 5th Amendment. if I use a Canadian Wi-Fi network without authorization from within the United States, would US or Canadian law apply? In criminal cases, choice of law and jurisdiction over the case are the same thing, because a state or country can only apply its own criminal laws. In civil cases, choice of law is a question distinct from jurisdiction. A court applies the law with the most significant connection to the disputed legal issue in question (sometimes more than one set of laws in a multi-issue case), even if it is the law of a different state or country, which is a standard that affords a judge considerable discretion. Either U.S. law or Canadian law could be plausible to apply in this case depending on the detailed circumstances and the legal issue that is disputed.

It is legal, unless the laws of that state say otherwise. Governments are allowed to charge different tuitions to residents vs. non-residents. They can also require proof of residence (not just your say-so). Being physically present in a state for a couple of years is not proof of being a resident. That doesn't mean that the interrogation that you are getting is allowed by law, but it's at least consistent with the general pattern of out of state tuition laws in the US. If you have contradictory elements of "proof" (voter registration in another state), they can demand more evidence. It really depends on what the state laws are, so you could name the state. Also, the full financial disclosure may in fact not be related to tuition rates but to financial aid, where they can demand all sorts of things by way of proof.

There is, in general, a rule that all matters connected with a single transaction or event should be included in a single legal case. Different jurisdictions apply this diffidently, and I haven't yet researched this in Maryland specifically. Also, if you agree to pay a part of what the landlord claims, you will quite likely be asked to sign a settlement agreement as part of the transaction. This is likely to include a release of all claims connected with your tenancy at the apartment. If it does, and you sign the agreement, you will be giving up any claim you might otherwise have because of the failure to properly notify you. You may want to consult a lawyer about this. A one-time consultation might not be very expensive. If you sued the landlord, you could do so in small claims court, where legal costs are significantly lower than in other courts.

The difference is that the person was originally invited to live there, so they do have a claim of residency. A tenant recently allowed someone to move into his apartment as his caregiver. This is the problem here, the person was invited to live in there in exchange for a service. This person now has a legal right to occupy the property and the eviction process must be followed. If the person broke into the house and occupied a room, that is trespassing since there was no original legal right to occupy the property. The trespasser cannot claim any legal right to the property and therefore is trespassing. Can it really be so that he is legally bound to allow these strangers to share his apartment with him because of a technicality that classifies them as "squatters"? Unfortunately yes. This should be a lesson to the tenant that they need to properly run background checks and have solid contracts with live-in caregivers/roommates. Unfortunately this is not only inconvenient, but will probably be an expensive lesson as well.

If you have an actual lease under which you reside at your parents' place, they must abide by the terms of that lease – presumably that sets the rent that you pay and states how long the lease is good for, Otherwise, if you're just living there, and have been living there for some time, then the courts may treat you as a month-to-month tenant. That means that they can end the tenancy with 30 days notice. Or, they can initiate an eviction proceeding. The less optimal outcome is that the court may treat you as a house guest, in which case no formal eviction proceeding is necessary. One way or the other, it is illegal to physically give a person the heave-ho from their residence, even if it is a family member. One recourse then is to hire an attorney to persuade your parents of at least that aspect of the law, if it is really in doubt. This gent addresses the matter for parents whose children have moved back home. He also mentions hiring a mediator, which could put the situation on a clearer legal ground. As for psychiatrists, anybody can see a psychiatrist; and anybody is free to hire a lawyer to try to force another person to see a psychiatrist. The prospects of getting a court order to force a child or a parent to see a psychiatrist because they are at loggerheads over some matter is extremely remote. The courts only force psychiatric treatment in extreme cases (e.g. threats of violence, actual delusions).

The judgment linked to by the article says: During the period from 5 October 2007 to 11 April 2008, Mr Ryneš installed and used a [continuously recording] camera system located under the eaves of his family home. The camera was installed in a fixed position and could not turn; it recorded the entrance to his home, the public footpath and the entrance to the house opposite. [my emphasis] That is the context of the case. He hadn't obtained consent from his neighbour to film the entrance to their home and therefore their family. He hadn't obtained consent from passers-by or warned them by means of a sign that there was a surveillance system monitoring that part of the public space. The court ruled that: The second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision. [my emphasis] If you recorded or took photos of your family members enjoying walking through Trafalgar Square, a very busy public space, it's likely you could successfully claim it was a purely personal or household activity - if the authorities were at all bothered by it (which they are not).

I gather that you either a) don't want the bike or b) are physically unable to retrieve it. You are acting like a spectator here. You ARE involved. By doing nothing, you are creating trouble for others, and failing to create a good. They must go through an extensive process to protect the rights of an owner they don't know who even is. What you should do, is to send a paper letter to the landlord at that complex. Dear landlord, You may have a bicycle at Location Here inside Apartment Complex Name Here. I am the owner of the bicycle. I had to leave the region, and I had to leave the bicycle behind. I cannot come back and claim it. Perhaps you know someone who could use a bicycle. Please give the bicycle to them, or dispose of it as you see fit. Here is the key to the lock. Signed, Your name Why a paper letter? Because you can't email a key! If you sent an email and key separately, they'd get confused. Plus, the signature on paper is legally binding, so they don't have to worry about it being a trick. Tape the physical key to a piece of paper, to keep it from rattling around and chewing a hole in the envelope. (it could be the paper the letter is written on, note that a printout of a Word document is fine). Paper letters have gone out of style, I know; you can work out how to send them, but an older person will help you do that faster, since well, we used to do everything that way. Now if you do want the bicycle, that gets harder. You will have to have one of your roommates give a key to someone who can retrieve it for you and store it for you. And you/they may need to coordinate with the landlord to even get access to it / find out if it's still there. This is probably a waste of your time.

Limitations of State law Given the seemingly faulty law reported in WSJ, this gives rise to the question: When states define & enforce ill-conceived law, is Federal law (Constitutionality) the only limit to state law? https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-court-takes-up-home-equity-theft-tyler-fair-debt-property-private-investors-pacific-legal-fbec50cf?mod=hp_opin_pos_2#cxrecs_s Geraldine Tyler never thought she’d end up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court—especially at 94. But she also never imagined the government would seize her Minneapolis home and sell it. Ms. Tyler is a victim of what’s often called home-equity theft, but this form of robbery isn’t criminal; in fact, it’s legal in a dozen states. The Supreme Court, which hears oral arguments Wednesday in Tyler v. Hennepin County, has the opportunity to end these predatory tax foreclosures once and for all. Ms. Tyler’s trouble began when she moved into a senior residence in 2010 and fell behind on her property taxes. She ended up owing Hennepin County roughly $2,300. After tacking on penalties, interest and related costs, her debt ballooned to $15,000. To collect what it was owed, Hennepin County seized and later sold the one-bedroom condo for $40,000. You might think the county would settle the $15,000 debt and return the $25,000 balance to Ms. Tyler. But the county took all $40,000 and left her with nothing to show from her only significant asset. Ms. Tyler fought back, and the justices will soon decide whether the government violated the Constitution by confiscating the total value of her former home. Most states treat property-tax collection like other debts, only taking as much as the government is owed. But Minnesota is one of 12 states, plus the District of Columbia, that regularly take a windfall when collecting delinquent property taxes. Several more states that typically protect property-tax debtors have created special loopholes that allow the government to take a windfall so long as it uses the property for public purposes.

State legislation can be invalid due to inconsistency with either the U.S. Constitution or the state's constitution. State legislation can also be inoperative due to pre-emption by conflicting and valid federal law.

In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.

Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know.

You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.

Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.

There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News.

Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)

States can, and some states do, have "mini-Sherman" anti-trust laws of their own. Whether a city could have such a law would depend on whether the state had delegated that power to cities. I haven't heard of a city that has such a law, but I haven't really looked. Or if a state has a "mini-Sherman" law, a city could perhaps bring action under such a law, depending on its exact terms. Or a city could impose a licensing scheme on a specific industry that also prevented a monopoly, similar to the requirements that many cities and towns place on taxicabs, or on bars. Both of those typically limit the number of units that a single entity may own. So perhaps it could be done for parking.

Did I commit sexual harassment by asking a spam caller when they would sleep with me, to stop the calls? My friend used to complain that he gets phone calls from credit card companies many times (about 1-2 times per day). I had noticed the same, we would be chilling and he would get such calls and it was pretty irritating. They would change their phone numbers so frequently that blocking the numbers was useless. One day when we were watching a movie such a call comes and he gets furious. I tell him that I will handle it and I take the phone. I talk to the credit card selling woman for some time asking things I am not at all interested in and then I state that sure I will take it, but when will you sleep with me. She thought she probably misheard and asked me that she didn't get me the last time and I repeated the exact same thing again to her. She paused for around 10 secs and then disconnected it herself and my friend never ever got a phone call from those credit card companies again. However as I was narrating my story to another friend, I was informed that this probably constitutes sexual harassment. Even though it has been months since the incident, I am a bit concerned. Did I actually do something illegal?

The legal answer is that it depends on where in the world you are. In the US, "sexual harassment" is legally subsumed under laws against illegal discrimination, which can exist at the federal level and the state level. You cannot discriminate on the basis of race for employment, housing, public accomodations and so on. You cannot discriminate on the basis of sex in employment. However, you are not employing anyone, so that law does not apply to you. In general, being a customer or potential customer, or a person in possession of a phone, is not a federally-regulated activity. The First Amendment to the US Constitution protects your right to expression, regardless of whether they may be found to be offensive. It is legal in the US to be rude.

Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.

You can file a lawsuit of course. The question is whether you have any evidence whatsoever that they didn't hire you because of illegal discrimination. As you say yourself, they didn't hire you "for no apparent reason". It is entirely legal not to hire you "for no apparent reason". Without evidence of illegal discrimination that court case will go nowhere. Consider that there are jobs where 100 people apply, and a dozen people are interviewed. Getting not hired three times, when 12 people got interviewed, is just normal. If the same 12 people were interviewed at each job, then you and eight others were rejected each time, because there were 12 good enough to be interviewed, but only one job. Not being hired three times is nothing. Maybe instead of thinking of lawsuits, you might think of some training to do better in interviews. So not only do you not have any evidence of illegal discrimination, it's not even reasonably likely that there was illegal discrimination. Are you really claiming that all the three times where you didn't get the job you were the best possible applicant that was there? Did you check who got the job? Maybe it was a gay black jewish woman in a wheelchair who was just exceedingly good at her job? The point is really: Belonging to some protected class doesn't give you a right to get the job. It gives you a right not to be rejected because you belong to that protected class. It doesn't give you a right not to be rejected for any other reason. And being rejected without being given a reason is no proof, not even an indication, of some illegal discrimination going on. The most obvious and common reason for rejection is that out of all the applicants, you were not the best.

Short answer: yes and no. I've never heard of this term before, but what you are calling "mobbing" does, in fact, sound like the dictionary definition of type 2 sexual harassment, at least if said "mobbing" is done with a sexual bent. http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/types-of-sexual-harassment.html This type of sexual harassment occurs when a co-worker or supervisor in the workplace makes sexual advances or comments to an employee that, while not affecting promotions or the future of the employee's job, makes the working environment of the employee offensive and hostile. In general, the comments tend to affect the employee's ability to do her job. Note that this is completely different from "type 1" or "quid pro quo" style sexual harassment, which is the kind that everyone is aware of; however, this version occurs quite often as well and is pretty well codified. Again, that's straight-up sexual harassment, though; there are other illegal forms of harassment that deal with singling out someone because of their race or creed, for example. That being said, I am no lawyer but the simple act of ganging up on a worker is not, I don't think, in and of itself illegal. If you're being ganged up on because you're black, or because you were a whistle-blower, that's one thing, but if people are ganging up on you simply because they don't like you, well, I'm sorry but you probably don't have any recourse (please note that I am not a lawyer and that this is not a site to receive legal advice from). More info on "mobbing": http://www.manageangerdaily.com/2010/03/how-to-combat-workplace-mobbing/

No, it is not illegal. The company has no standing to punish you for that. Companies can't sue random people for sending random email... that was largely settled under the (YOU)-CAN-SPAM Act, when in the guise of standardizing US anti-spam laws, spam was largely legalized and state laws were pre-empted and barred from existing. However, all the other laws still apply Laws on harassment, for instance. Sometimes people with mental illness think another human "owes them" a relationship (which kind of misses the point of what a relationship is, but never mind that). And those people, who sadly are an all-too-common cliché, tend to act badly in very predictable ways. As such, we have plenty of laws on the books (and plenty of family court judges who have seen it all) to dispense consequences to the misbehavior and protection to the victim. All those laws really don't care in which medium one might violate them: sky-writing, naval light signal, email, whatever.

"Nexus" means "connection". A "causal nexus" in this context is a connection that causes harassment at work. There isn't any bright line dividing behavior on personal term that does or does not meet this test. The law does't work that way. Instead, there is a fairly vague test (in legal theory this is called a "standard" as opposed to a "rule") and there are examples of conduct that does or does not meet the test. A lot of the more obvious examples would be the kind of situations that come up in small town life. For example, suppose that the worker who is being harassed is the firm courier, and has only about half a dozen main stops that she visits several times a week, all of which are businesses or government agencies run by people who are part of the Pessimists Club together, whose members have beer and rubber chicken at a member's bar together every Tuesday night. In that context, saying lewd and suggestive things about the courier whom a member employs over a poker game with the people who run all of her main stops in connection with her job might have a causal nexus for harassment case purposes with her job, effectively enlisting everyone she has to do business with in her job in a campaign of harassment against her. In contrast, suppose that someone who is engaging in iffy conduct that doesn't quite cross the line of harassment at work towards this courier goes to that Pessimists Club meeting and targets his crass comments not at the courier but his ex-girlfriend towards whom he has engaged in lots of harassing conduct. His comments about his ex-girlfriend would not have a causal nexus to the courier's workplace and probably wouldn't be something that could be considered to determine if he was engaged in workplace harassment. This would be true even though small town gossip made his harassment of his ex-girlfriend common knowledge which make the courier take otherwise ambiguous conduct from him much more seriously knowing his modus operandi and capacity for escalating the situation. But, ultimately, one has to make a rather holistic evaluation of the entire situation to determine if there is a causal nexus or not between non-workplace behavior and alleged workplace harassment.

This would be wire fraud, which is any type of fraud committed using electronic communications (the term originally comes from the use of telegrams to commit fraud... just like how "wiring" money devised from paying the bill at one telegram station and having the bill collector take an equal amount of money from a different station.). Wire Fraud is basically a fraud crime over electronic communications, so it doesn't matter how you defraud someone, the fact that you did it in this manner is guilty... using a bank system to fraudulently create more money in your digit account would qualify. The bank would be the victim since it does have a set amount of money in assets that it owes to its customers (account holders) and Federal Insurance (which prevents the Bank Run scene in "It's a Wonderful Life" from happening) requires the bank to carefully keep books. Additionally, Wire Fraud comes with a $100,000 fine against the perpetrator for committing the crime where a financial institution is a victim, so it's in the Bank's interest to report a sudden income surge of fake dollars to the authorities lest they have to pay the fine out of their own pocket, risk their federal insurance, or lose their consumer confidence with account holders (who will pull their money and go to a more honest bank).

There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.

What happens if your case survives a motion to dismiss on a lie? I have seen a few youtube videos that go over the basics of US civil process. My understanding of it is that the first move of the defendant is always to move to dismiss. In this stage, everything alleged by the plaintiff is taken at face value, and I believe there are also reasonable inferences included, to decide whether the claims have merit. This makes me wonder: what if it is established in court that you knowingly or through gross negligence included a falsehood, or a claim you have no evidence for, just to clear that initial hurdle? What would the consequences be for that?

what if it is established in court that you knowingly or through gross negligence included a falsehood, or a claim you have no evidence for, just to clear that initial hurdle? What would the consequences be for that? The case proceeds and if it goes to trial, the finder of fact determines if the case prevails or not. Also, note that except in the case of a verified complaint, a complaint in a civil case is not made under oath or under penalty of perjury. In the rare and unlikely event that it is established that you knew that your case had no factual basis at the outset, you (and your attorney in many cases), can be sanctioned by the court, usually in the form of the attorney fees incurred by other side as a result of the knowingly false statement.

Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable.

We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.

Is it true that a suit of defamation could require “very little effort”? No. Definitely not. The Wikipedia article (and understandably the comment on which it is premised) leaves out many details about substantive and procedural law which are essential in US jurisdictions. For instance, the [Wikipedia] item of "1. accusing someone of a crime" is insufficient for the falsehoods to be considered defamation per se. The crime of which one is falsely accused needs to be considered an infamous crime or involve moral turpitude. Under [US] defamation law, a crime is deemed serious or infamous when it is classified as felony or its punishment could exceed one year of prison. The case law cited in Lakin v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 76 (2016) reflects how this criterion is uniform among US jurisdictions. Another difficult issue in defamation lawsuits is the need to prove the defendant's mental state known as actual malice. Even where there is clear proof of a defamer's actual malice, a plaintiff can be denied justice because of judge's arbitrary choice to side with the defendant (just like with non-defamation lawsuits). For case law from various jurisdictions regarding defamation law and actual malice, you might want to see the citations in my briefs in the SCOTUS here and here. Most of the records in regard to the latter case are available here. Defamation lawsuits are not exempt of having to comply with the procedural laws involved in judicial proceedings either, nor is the discovery, drafting, or legal research any simpler for being a lawsuit about defamation. In the context of the comments that prompted your question here, the "repeated violations" that SE imputed to former moderator Monica would hardly be grounds for a viable lawsuit against SE for defamation per se or otherwise. Here are some reasons: Rejecting a policy of gender pronouns such as the one SE seeks to impose is not considered an infamous crime. There is no legislation to that effect, at least yet. An actual refusal to adhere to that policy hardly involves moral turpitude. Far from involving corruption (i.e., moral turpitude), the controversy about gender pronouns touches on some of a person's deepest beliefs. Thus, the "offense" of opposing such a policy cannot be said to constitute an act of moral turpitude. The previous two items rule out a viable claim of defamation per se. Thus, Monica would have to prove that SE's falsehoods about her (whatever they are) caused her concrete losses (a typical example is lost income) by prompting others to dissociate from her. I am unaware of whether Monica's situation would fit in this scenario. You are right in that a claim of mental distress is not viable either. Note from here or here that in a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) (1) the conduct must be intentional and reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe Any claims of harassment that might be available to Monica would not be against SE, but against the specific individuals who engaged in harassing her directly. Depending on the methods and severity of the harassment, Monica might be able to obtain injunctive relief --typically in the form of restraining orders-- against those specific individuals. It is noteworthy that not all criticism or heckling at or about Monica would be cognizable as harassment.

Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect.

Voluntary Dismissal of a case in Maryland follows the Maryland Revise Civil Procedure District Court Rule 3-506 - Voluntary Dismissal: (a) By Notice of Dismissal or Stipulation. Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim may dismiss all or part of the claim without leave of court by filing (1) a notice of dismissal at any time before the adverse party files a notice of intention to defend, or if the notice of dismissal specifies that it is with prejudice, at any time before judgment, or (2) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties to the claim being dismissed. (b) Dismissal Upon Stipulated Terms. If an action is settled upon written stipulated terms and dismissed, the action may be reopened at any time upon request of any party to the settlement to enforce the stipulated terms through the entry of judgment or other appropriate relief. (c) By Order of Court. Except as provided in section (a) of this Rule, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim may dismiss the claim only by order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. (d) Effect on Claim. Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissal, stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim. (e) Effect on Counterclaim. If a counterclaim has been pleaded before the filing of a notice of dismissal or motion for voluntary dismissal, the dismissal of the action shall not affect the continued pendency of the counterclaim. (f) Costs. Unless otherwise provided by stipulation or order of court, the dismissing party is responsible for all costs of the action or the part dismissed. There is a form that explicitly refers to the 3-506 rule

Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that.

You could bring a motion to compel for failing to respond substantively to a motion to admit which is objected to, just as you could for an interrogatory. The process is the same. Normally, a request to admit would not be deemed admitted if a substantive objection was filed by the deadline, even if there was no express admission or denial. Only if the objection were completely and utterly meritless would a judge be likely to order that the request to admit would be deemed admitted in that case since the response was a de facto non-answer and the objection was a mere sham. @Iñaki Viggers states in his answer: the purpose of a request for admissions is [to attempt] to stipulate --rather than to discover-- the facts on which plaintiff and defendant agree. This is not really true. A request to admit is a discovery tool to prevent you from having to prove up what should be non-controversial facts that might nonetheless take time or documentation to prove at trial and to gather evidence for in advance of trial. The questions in a request to admit are typically ones that the other side would not willingly stipulate to (for example, because they'd like to be able to offer testimony to explain a seemingly unfavorable fact) but may not be able to deny. If a party denies a request to admit and then offers nothing to support the denial in discovery practice or at trial, that party risks court sanctions for the groundless denial. Good litigation practice is also always to include some requests to admit that are effectively outcome determinative to give the opposing party a chance to screw up and essentially default the case by not responding on time.

Do NDAs apply to all future interactions between the two parties or just the next one? A follow up to the question is an NDA binding for sex worker or escorts? If someone hired an escort (or sex worker) and had her sign an NDA stating that she will not divulge their relationship, and that the client had hired her as an escort, would such an NDA need to be signed before each encounter or just the first one? Basically I'm asking what is the perpetuity of when an NDA applies to confidential information. For example you normally sign an NDA once for an employer at the start, but I guess with an escort it might be considered separate encounters each time.

Depends on the NDA Just like any other contract, it does what it says it does. You could draft the NDA either way.

This would be entirely dependant on the jurisdiction. The things that would need to be legal to make this transaction legal are: Is the sexual act legal? Is gambling legal? Ongoing consent by both parties To make this an enforceable contract, in addition you would need: Sexual acts to be valuable consideration, basically, is prostitution legal? The fundamentals of a binding contract: intention, legality of objects etc.

GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls.

GDPR compliance is a matter between every customer and the business, not between different customers. How did you get the other customer's contact details? If they were provided or leaked by the business, that might be a failure of the business's obligation as a data controller to protect the personal data they are processing, possibly even a data breach in the sense of the GDPR. When you contacted the other person this was presumably a purely private or household activity, just like contacting any other personal acquaintance. In that case, the GDPR simply does not apply to any “processing” you may have done (compare Art 2(2)(c)). Things would be very different if you were promoting your own business, but that doesn't seem to have been the case. If the matter really is as plain as you described, then you can effectively ignore their references to the GDPR until you are contacted by your data protection authority, by their lawyer, or are served with court papers. None of these should happen: even if you were a “data controller” and your processing were subject to the GDPR – only the other customer and not the business would be the data subject, and only a data subject has a right for remedies like making complaints to the data protection agency and only the data subject would have standing to sue you in court for GDPR violations.

tldr; the agreement is a mess, one-sided, do not sign. This agreement does little to serve your interests, and a lot to harm them. It is also fairly poorly phrased, I have doubts that someone with legal knowledge wrote it. It states: I agree to not disclose, or discuss with anyone, any matters relating to the investigation You are agreeing not to talk to the investigator. If you do talk to them, you will be in breach of the terms you've agreed to. I'm sure they'll just say "oh, that's not what it means" - but that is not how contracts work, they mean what they say. It also says: which includes but is not limited to: ... All documents created by me or shared with me during the investigation. This applies to documents created during the investigation, not in relation to the investigation, not for use in the investigation, not related to the complaint. And again, you can't share these documents with anyone, including the investigator. It may well be unenforceable, as it gives you nothing in exchange for the rights you are giving up, and the concept of "consideration" is key to the common law of contracts in the USA, and also Canada (stemming from British common law) which means both parties must receive something of value: Here's a wiki article on Consideration in US law and a page on Consideration in Canadian law With all of these flaws and the fact that it may well be unenforceable, it would not be wise to sign it. If it did the following, it might be a more useful agreement: Had time limits, after which the restrictions are lifted Allowed you to acknowledge the case and state that you can't discuss it while it is ongoing Applied only to the workplace, talking to the press and publishing details to the public internet, such as social media - this may already be in your contract of employment (relating to bringing the company into disrepute) if so it isn't really a restriction being applied by this agreement, but a re-iteration of the existing agreement Promised a fair investigation in a timely manner, with a report at the end, and appropriate action is taken if claims are substantiated, and libel has occurred Or, they could offer you money right now for your silence, that would absolutely be consideration, in some jurisdictions, the sum may need to be considered reasonable, but this is not universal. There are also cases where NDAs turn out to be invalid: 11 ways NDAs can be invalidated An actual case where an NDA was found to be too broad

The issue is more one of what an attorney is ethically authorized to disclose pursuant to professional ethics rules (Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 as enacted locally) more than one of attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client privilege governs what someone can or cannot be compelled to disclose without their consent (usually by subpoena). Attorney confidentiality, in contrast, governs what an attorney can disclosed when not compelled to do so by something like a subpoena. Generally, disclosure of confidential client information is allowed if it is in furtherance of the representation or authorized by the client (there are also other exceptions but those aren't really any different in a two lawyer v. one lawyer situation). Often when two attorneys represent the same person (and the disclosure won't waive the privileged nature of the information vis-a-vis third-parties under a joint defense theory), disclosures from one attorney for a person to another attorney for a person will do that. In practice, however, the analysis could be quite fact specific and there isn't really a bright line rule governing when it would or would not be allowed.

Its difficult to tell without seeing the exact paperwork, and the exact meaning of without prejudice varies by jurisdiction (I think UK is the same as here in NZ though). If an agreement is reached through communications marked "without prejudice" it should be valid in court to the extent that it shows an agreement was reached and what the agreement was (but the court will not generally look at the documents marked without prejudice for other reasons – e.g. admissions made – if no agreement is reached). There are a couple of other relevant things to mention – although not strictly part of your question: Lawyers are officers of the court, and have duties to the court, which include acting ethically. So, provided it's a reputable law firm, it is reasonable to (somewhat) trust their solicitors in procedural matters. My understanding is that courts encourage anything that will help settle a matter out of court – hence the whole idea of "without prejudice" letters being valid. I believe that the court will uphold an agreement reached through communication of without prejudice emails as it's in their interests. If you have these kinds of concerns, you can raise them with their solicitor, suggesting that you would prefer the final document to not be without prejudice, even if it only refers to the matter and agreement, without sensitive stuff. I imagine they would be only to happy to oblige, as they can bill their client for another letter!

I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.

Does volunteer photographer own copyright? An amateur photographer at a scenic rest stop sees a couple trying to compose a decent photo of themselves with the beautiful river in the background. This happens so often that as he approaches nobody even needs to say a word: They hand him their camera, and then step back so he can take their picture with it. But in this hypothetical scenario something extraordinary happens: As he takes their picture a commercial airplane doing an emergency landing hits the river in the frame of the photo. So he happens to have pressed the shutter button on what turned out to be a very valuable picture. Let us supposed that a media buyer offers $10k to license the photo. Who owns the copyright to that photo? On the one hand, the camera owners could argue that the photographer exercised no more "creative expression" than does a tripod or selfie stick. They just didn't have one handy, so they composed the photo and the photographer was just a mechanism to hold the camera and release the shutter. Therefore, they must own the copyright. On the other hand, the photographer could argue that he "fixed the expression" of the creative work. As an experienced photographer he made subtle decisions regarding framing and timing of the photo that were outside of the control of the couple. Alternatively, if he hadn't been volunteering to photograph the couple with their camera, he could have instead been holding his own camera and captured the valuable element of the photo, which was the serendipitous emergency landing. Does any law or jurisprudence inform who owns the copyright in this scenario? If the aforementioned facts suggest it is the couple (and owners of the camera), then let us change one fact: After taking the couple's desired photo, the photographer sees the airplane out of the corner of his eye and, with no time to spare, shifts the camera to capture a separate spectacular photo of the water landing. Does he now have firm claim on the copyright to that photo? And if so, can the photographer enforce his property rights in the photo, given that it was captured and is stored on equipment he does not own and cannot legitimately possess? I.e., can't the camera owner say, "OK, you own the photo copyright, but I own the medium where you put its only copy, and I will not sell or grant you access to that medium except for the full value of the photo."

What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.

Working a mobile car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car owner California law creates an expectation of consent for taking photographs of people for purposes of commercial distribution of the image to the public. California Civil Code § 3344. But, absent copyright or design patent issues (which would only very rarely come up since most people don't own the copyrights or patents to the designs of their cars, and the owner of the copyrights generally grants an implied license for the owners of the cars to display the copyrighted or patented designs), there is no parallel requirement of consent for taking photographs of things. Furthermore there is no common law expectation of privacy in anything that someone you do business with must necessarily see with their own eyes. So, if you must see the car to clean it, then taking photographs before and after the work is done does not violate any expectation of privacy to which the customer has not implicitly consented and does not violate any California or federal statute. Better practice would be for the business to explicitly have the customers consent in writing to the photographs, to remove all doubt. But the implied consent to having someone see your car when they are cleaning it would be unreasonable to deny in almost all circumstances. A company might voluntarily have an agreement to keep any photographs taken confidential and to have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements not to reveal what they see while working. If it did, this would create a legally enforceable expectation of privacy for the customer. For some VIP clients, this contractually enforceable discretion might be something that would induce them to pay a higher price for the same services. But those kind of protections are not the default standards of law that apply in the absence of an agreement. And, even then, taking photographs for purposes of internal use only would probably not violate an agreement of this kind. The work still requires that people inside the business, including remote supervisors, be able to see the cars to do their work.

Who knows. It doesn't matter. 17 USC 102 lists the kinds of things protectable by copyright under US law. These are: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. A landscape feature is none of these and is not subject to copyright protection under US law, nor I think under the law of any other country. The "copyright notice" has no legal effect. 17 USC 120 Specifically prohibits copyright being used to prevent the taking of pictures of a building from a public place. In many countries Freedom of panorama (FOP) specifically permits publication of photos taken from public places. Se also this article on FOP. FOP is an exception to copyright protection, which applies to copyrighted architectural works and publicly posted works of art, such as sculptures. Since landscape features are not copyrightable at all, FOP does not strictly apply to them, but all the arguments for FOP would apply to them even more strongly. In US Law, particularly under the Fiest vs Rural case, only works with original content, created by a person, are protected by copyright. (Other countries generally have similar limits on copyright.) But a feature of the landscape is not the original creation of any person. (If someone carved the landscape into a designed shape, it might be protect able as a sculpture.) 3 and 4. If it were a building, you could take pictures of it from a public place or a private place where you have a legal right to be, under 17 USC 120 . But since a part of the landscape is not protected by copyright at all, this is not really relevant. No under the US First amendment there is generally a right to say even false things. But if the landowner attempts to enforce this "copyright" it would be considered frivolous and any court proceeding would be promptly tossed out. The sign gives the landowner no rights s/he would not otherwise have.

You don't seem to be distinguishing properly between "original artwork" and photographs of it. A 19th-century painting will be out of copyright, so you can set up an easel copy it yourself, or even take a photo if the owners don't mind; your copy can be used however you please. However, other people can't use your photograph without your permission. Similarly, if you want to reuse a photograph used in an art book, the important thing is the copyright on the photograph, not the painting.

Bottom line I'd tread pretty carefully here. If you paid $2000 for the photo, you might want to check to see if it came with a licensing agreement. Background One way to view this is through the lens of privacy. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A subjects privacy invaders to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. Because you mention public personas and your facts don't involve disclosing private details, negative publicity, or interfering with seclusion, one might think appropriation of name or likeness applies. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy. Comment (a) to this section explains that a person's identity is in the nature of a property right. Courts have tended to recognize an individual's interest in the exclusive use of his or her own identity, going so far as to require licensing for usage. The most common way to violate this "property right" is by appropriating someone's name or likeness to promote a business or product. Cases abound on the subject, but a classic one is White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). To summarize, Samsung ran a picture-based ad featuring a futuristic robot dressed in an evening gown and turning "Wheel of Fortune"-styled letters. Vanna White was nonplussed and brought suit, which she won on appeal. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit argued the operative question wasn't how Samsung appropriated her likeness, but whether they had done so. The point of citing White here is simply to observe that a person's "likeness" probably extends even further than mere photo reproduction. Back to your facts: posting actual images of celebrities for a commercial purpose appears a much more clear cut appropriation of likeness than White. While it may seem similar, I'd distinguish your situation from that of restaurant "Walls of Fame"---which showcase signed photos of celebrities with the owner---in that the celebrities you mention weren't using your product or service at the time of the photograph. You might argue the photos aren't being used for advertising, but the plaintiff would counter that you posted them on a client-facing business website. In the Ninth Circuit this would be a question of whether there was an appropriation, not the way in which it was accomplished. For argument's sake, assume the court agrees your usage isn't commercial. Even that doesn't necessarily mean you're in the clear. In § 652C, and varying state-by-state, non-commercial purposes are also subject to scrutiny: Comment (b). Apart from statute, however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of the name or likeness. It's important to remember the Restatement isn't binding: it simply attempts to "restate" what courts (which are binding) have had to say on the topic. If you paid a lot of money for the photo, it might pay to see if it came with a licensing agreement.

The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.

In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).

Technically, yes, GDPR might apply. Filming other people does involve the processing of personal data, and GDPR will apply unless this is for “purely personal or household purposes”. But exactly that will be the case for most holiday snapshots or short clips for your personal social media. As far as I understand, you do not have to worry about purely personal activities. Even if GDPR would apply, this doesn't mean it would be illegal. It means you'd need a “legal basis”, such as a “legitimate interest”. If there are just a couple of people in the background of a video, it's possible that their rights might weigh less important than your interest in shooting the video – but that would need a case by case analysis. Your legitimate interest would almost certainly prevail if you need to record a crime to which you are victim. Regardless of GDPR concerns, note that this is just a small aspect of legal concerns. Instead, also consider personality rights copyright (if art or architectural works are visible) / freedom of panorama customs and reasonable expectations of other people These issues will depend largely on the specific country or area you are travelling to. Europe is not homogenous in its perception of privacy issues. For example, consider the issue of dashcams in a car. These are considered to be quite normal in some European countries, but effectively illegal in others.

What offence if any is committed by guessing a combination entry lock on a door? If one effectively guesses the correct passcode to the lock so as to open it without causing any damage and then peacefully enters (seemingly a mere civil trespass) the (previously) secured premises, do they commit any criminal offence?

None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of "breaking" Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage

You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.

Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.

There are two issues, one is the legal issue of whether what you are doing is a crime, and the other is the evidentiary issue of proving that that is what happened. If you take the phone home with the intention of keeping it ('finders keepers') then you have committed larceny (sometimes called 'theft', sometimes correctly). This specific type is called 'larceny by finding'. If you take the phone home with the intention of finding the owner then you have not committed larceny because you have not committed the mental element ('mens rea') of the offence: you don't intend to permanently deprive the owner of their rights. However, and this is the evidentiary issue, if hypothetically you were found in possession of the phone then the police might not believe your explanation and a court might well convict you of larceny. P.S. Firefox has marked 'evidentiary' as a spelling error and suggested 'penitentiary' instead. :s

IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.

Entering onto someone's land without lawful excuse is trespass Permission is lawful excuse. You don't have express permission. You have implied permission to enter in some circumstances, for example, to approach someone's front door or to reasonably recover your property. You would also have lawful excuse if you were a police, fire or ambulance officer discharging their duties or if you were in physical danger if you didn't enter - running from an assailant across someone else's property is not trespass. Among others. Whether the field is fenced or not or if that fence has an opening or gate does not give you permission although it can remove some implied permissions, not least that you do not have implied permission to enter over the fence. If its not your field, stay out of it.

Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police.

As the answer by Greendrake says, if you have a a legal reason, to enter property, you re not a trespasser. Trespassing is generally defined as entering on property against the expressed will of the owner or lawful occupant, without lawful authority. A firefighter is not trespassing when responding to a fire, even if the owner orders the firefighter to leave. A building inspector is not tresspassing while making an inspection (if local law grants an inspector access). Neither is a police officer with a warrant for entry, or a person with a court order to recover property. In some cases such lawful authority must be communicated to the owner, in others it need not be, this depends on the nature of the authority and the exact provisions of the governing law. Whether such a person entering with authority may be armed depends very much on the local law, and the nature of the authority. In some cases and some places such a person is free to be armed, in others this would be illegal. If one is lawfully present somewhere and is attacked, one is entitled to defend oneself (or another), although there may be a duty to avoid a confrontation by retreating if this is reasonably possible when not in one's own home in some jurisdictions (such as California). But the use of deadly force (such as a gun) is generally not lawful unless there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. None of this is legally different when one is lawfully on another's property than when one is in a public place. California Law California Penal Code section 693 provides that: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. It should be read together with sections 692 and 694. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction #505 reads: The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if: The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ [or] ) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being (raped/maimed/robbed/ )]; The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; AND The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified According to "California Self-Defense Laws" (a page posted by a CA law firm: California law allows use of force in self-defense or defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or they are in imminent danger of physical harm, and that force is necessary to stop the danger. However, you may only use the degree of force reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The page "California Self Defense Laws" from Findlaw reads: The right to use force -- even deadly force if necessary -- to defend oneself is a broadly accepted principle of the criminal justice system. But while all states allow defendants to claim self defense if they can back up such claims, states differ on the scope of what may be considered appropriate use of force and when it may be applied. ... As a general rule of thumb, any force used against an intruder must be proportionate to the harm reasonably feared. In People v. King {Crim. No. 20380. Supreme Court of California. August 29, 1978.} The California Supreme Court held that self-defense was a possible defense to a charge of possession of a handgun by a felon, and wrote about the right of self-defense in CA law. The opinion reads: [I]t is apparent that the conviction cannot stand if the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the right of self-defense as it related to the section 12021 charge. ... When enacting section 12021 and its predecessor statute, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of the several existing statutes giving any person the right to use force, including deadly force in appropriate circumstances, in defense of self or others. This right has been included in provisions of the Penal Code since its enactment in 1872. Section 692 provides: Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made: By the party about to be injured; By other parties." Section 693 provides: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. Section 694 extends the right to defend others, providing: Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense. Although the extent of these rights has been defined and circumscribed by judicial decision (see, e.g., People v. Ceballos, supra, 12 Cal.3d 470) none of these sections has been amended to restrict the rights affirmed therein since its adoption over a century ago. Civil Code section 50, affirms the same rights, providing: Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest. It, too, was adopted in 1872, and it was amended in 1874 to expand the right of defense first declared to encompass guests. Similarly the provisions of sections 197 and 198 governing the circumstances in which homicide is justifiable were included in the Penal Code of 1872, and are traceable to the Statutes of 1850. ... Use of a concealable firearm in self-defense is neither a crime nor an unlawful purpose. ... We conclude, therefore, that the prohibition of section 12021 was not intended to affect a felon's right to use a concealable firearm in self-defense, but was intended only to prohibit members of the affected classes from arming themselves with concealable firearms or having such weapons in their custody or control in circumstances other than those in which the right to use deadly force in self-defense exists or reasonably appears to exist. Thus, when a member of one of the affected classes is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate section 12021. As in all cases in which deadly force is used or threatened in self-defense, however, the use of the firearm must be reasonable under the circumstances and may be resorted to only if no other alternative means of avoiding the danger are available. In the case of a felon defending himself alone, such alternatives may include retreat where other persons would not be required to do so.

How does the pardoning power of the president and governer work ? (India) Article 72 states that the president can pardon offences relating to a matter to which the power of the union extends. Article 161 states that the governor can pardon offences relating to a matter to which the power of the state extends. There's these additional provisions, too. Article 73 states Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend (a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and (b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the government of India by virtue of any treaty on agreement: Provided that the executive power referred to in sub clause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this constitution or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters with respect in which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws (2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive power or functions as the State or officer or authority thereof could exercise immediately before the commencement of this Constitution Council of Ministers Article 162 states Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by the Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof Council of Ministers What are the provisions of the constitution referred to here ? Does this mean that neither the governor nor the president can pardon offences and sentences in the concurrent list ? (There are 3 lists : the union list , the state list and the concurrent list. These lists provide the things on which the union , state or both can make laws.)

You’re overthinking this The President can pardon Federal crimes, the state Governor can pardon state crimes. A convicted person will have been convicted under a Federal law, a State law or, possibly, both. The President can pardon the Federal convictions but not the State ones and vice-versa for the Governor.

States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).

A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act.

The source of the power of the United States government to do the things that it does are the people themselves. (United States Constitution) The people have decided on three branches of government (judicial, executive, and legislative). The expression of the will of the people through these three branches of government results in the government having authority to enforce laws within the borders of the United States. It is not through any contract, agreement, certificate, registration, or other that you come under the jurisdiction of the United States, but simply by your presence. (There are some limited exceptions for foreign diplomats and tribal sovereignty.)

From Wikipedia: An enacting clause, or enacting formula, is a short phrase that introduces the main provisions of a law enacted by a legislature. It usually declares the source from which the law claims to derive its authority. In many countries, an enacting formula is not considered necessary and is simply omitted. The simplest enacting clauses merely cite the legislature by which the law has been adopted; for example the enacting clause used in Australia since 1990 is "The Parliament of Australia enacts". Alternatively an enacting clause may invoke the ultimate sovereign. For example, California, based on the principle of popular sovereignty, has the following enacting clause: "The People of the State of California do enact as follows." For example, Acts of the US Congress begin with words not unlike those of Acts of Parliament: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled UK statutory instruments go further, stating not only who made the order, but also which legislation provided the power to make this order. To take a recent example at random: The Secretary of State for Education makes the following Order in exercise of the powers conferred by section 129(1) of the Education Reform Act 1988 From these, one might surmise that the purpose of these sentences is to convince the reader that the person or body issuing the legislation has the power to do so. For most statutory instruments, the power to make them comes from Acts of Parliament, and so the specific section(s) of the those Acts are stated. For Acts of Parliament themselves, it is taken as read that the Queen, Lords and Commons acting together (or more formally, the Queen-in-Parliament) have the power to legislate, so it is sufficient to merely state that is they who have done so - and similarly for the US Congress and other legislatures. In response to edits in the question: Can't the hackneyed sentence ... be shortened? Yes it could, as evidenced by the fact that not all countries use an enacting clause at all, and some of those that do have shorter, simpler ones. Why not something less pompous? Why should they? One shouldn't underestimate the role of tradition in the UK constitution - indeed it's held together in part by unwritten conventions whose long use has solidified them into something like law. As mentioned in the question, bills don't become acts until they've been assented to by a hereditary monarch, which is indicated by a clerk uttering a statement in Norman French. Compared to that, what's wrong with acts starting with a grandiose statement? Incidentally, if you thank that's pompous, then you'll enjoy the enacting clause which appears at the top of UK Finance Acts: Most Gracious Sovereign WE, Your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom in Parliament assembled, towards raising the necessary supplies to defray Your Majesty’s public expenses, and making an addition to the public revenue, have freely and voluntarily resolved to give and to grant unto Your Majesty the several duties hereinafter mentioned; and do therefore most humbly beseech Your Majesty that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:— Finally, context is everything. I would strongly recommend watching a recording of the State Opening of Parliament. In addition to all the pomp and circumstance, the main event where is the Queen - wearing a priceless bejewelled crown, sitting on a golden throne under a golden canopy, watched by Peers of the Realm dressed in ermine robes - reads a speech prepared by the government, in the chamber of the House of Lords, with its golden ceiling, intricate carvings, statues and stained-glass windows. Compared to that, a few extra words at the start of an Act seems kind of modest, don't you think?

There are two kinds of immunity: absolute and qualified. Absolute immunity is limited to the official discretionary acts of judges, prosecutors in the litigation process (but not in the investigatory process) and the President. And, in the cases of judges and prosecutors this is only immunity from civil liability and not criminal liability. Thus, for judges the scope of absolute immunity extends to legal rulings and conduct related to being a judge in a courtroom. In the case of a prosecutor, it pertains to litigation conduct (but not conduct physically dealing with a defendant or investigating a crime). This is usually an open and shut question which can be determined on the face of the legal complaint against the official. Only the President has relatively broad kinds of activities covered and his saying he is immune doesn't mean that a judge trying a case will agree with him. If he's murdering his wife, no judge will believe that he's acting in his official capacity to do so. Other government officials generally have only "qualified immunity" which means that they have liability if they intentionally violate clearly established law, which basically means that there is a binding judicial precedent governing the facts and circumstances at issue.

Yes The rule against prosecuting a sitting President is not a law, it is a Justice Department opinion and policy. The justification for it is that dealing with a criminal case would be severely distracting to the President, and thus harmful to the nation. Besides, the opinion goes on, any serious issue can be dealt with by impeachment. That reasoning obviously does not apply to a former President. Article I, section 3, paragraph 7 of the US constitution says: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (emphasis added) This clearly contemplates the criminal prosecution of a former office holder, after such a person was removed by an impeachment. There is no exception for a President. Therefor a President can be criminally charged and prosecuted for actions during the presidency, provided that the evidence to establish probable cause is there, and that a Grand Jury indicts said former President. So far as I know there has never been a case where such a thing was done. President Ford's pardon of President Nixon stopped any Federal prosecution of him. I think there have been cases were former US Judges, after impeachment, were criminally prosecuted. But that is not quite the same thing -- no one claims that sitting judges are immune to criminal charges. To be clear this would not apply just to issues that a President had been impeached for. A former President is no different from anyone else in this respect. Any such person can be prosecuted if there is probable cause, and convicted if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal violation of some law, even if the violation occurred while the president was in office.

The 25th amendment §3 says Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. Nothing in the Constitution deprives the Vice President of his powers / duties when he is also Acting President. Alternatively, the VP can become acting President under §4, without presidential cooperation, by declaration of the VP and a majority of the cabinet. Then either the President asserts that there is no inability, or Congress decides there is. But: unless the president dies or resigns, or is impeached, the VP is Acting President and actual Vice President, and therefore breaks ties in the Senate. Note that under §4, the VP plus cabinet must declare POTUS unable, and must do it again if POTUS denies the inability. That means that there must still be a VP, who along with the cabinet re-affirms the disability.

Karen sues a workshop for damages as she was trespassing and disregarding mandatory safety gear. Does she have a case? Let's paint the scene: We work in the back of a metalworking workshop in Austin Texas. Huge machines make lots of noise, at times there are steel panels on the floor with access holes to access the cabeling, in the entry area is grating to try and keep the metal shavings sticking to boots and pants in check. To complete the picture, there's a big sign "Safety Gear required at all times", "Crane operation only by trained personnel" and "Only Employees allowed in the workshop" on the door, together with "NO TRESPASSING". Every employee wears the mandatory steel-toed boots, coveralls, hearing protection, glasses and whatever else is needed. A wild Karen enters the premises in her car, parks in the loading zone, opens the (unlocked) door to the workshop, then just enters the workshop and, of course, disregards all the signs that tell her that she can't be there. Nothing demands for the premises to be access controlled during work, so the gate of course is open - which also helps with deliveries, for which a bell exists to call someone to the door. But Karen doesn't use that. Entering the clearly marked workshop most likely constitutes trespass on its own, but we don't want to fight that battle if she was trespassing or not. We focus on the real event: Because people wear the mandated hearing protection in the deafening loud workspace, nobody noticed her entering the moment she does. And, in her infinite wisdom, Karen wears stilettos. The OSHA-compliant grating at the entry traps one of her heels, it breaks and she falls forward, right into the clearly marked waste dropoff area. She falls face-first into a bin of metal filings, suffering injuries to her face and eyes. Blinded, she flails around and moments later finds the remote of the very crane that put the box of shavings there. Using it as a way to lift herself, her fingers press the button to release the hook and it hits the back of her head. Now, about a minute after the events started, someone notices the intruder and calls an ambulance. After being released from hospital, Karen believes that she is in the right to sue our metal workshop for negligence so we have to pay her hospital bills... Does Karen's claim, that the shop 'caused her injuries and suffering' hold water, if the shop was OSHA compliant and she was trespassing without mandated safety equipment, which directly lead to the injuries? Or might her claim be useless because she violated all sorts of clearly marked rules? (useless here means: can be dismissed in the very first stages of litigation due to a motion for dismissal/summary judgement, or even dismissal as frivolous)

This is a pretty good example of "Contributory Negligence". Depending on the precise details of the case, both (or multiple) parties may have contributed to Karen's injuries. She certainly had some role by ignoring posted signs and wearing inappropriate footwear. But the shop may have made access too easy. Maybe they didn't have a front-desk person posted in a safe-area, causing her to go seeking an employee. The shop had a dangerous bin of metal shavings without a lid on it, and at a height and location where a single misstep means someone could fall into it head-first. They had dangerous crane-control mechanism in easy reach that didn't need a Key or other Lock-out mechanism. Ultimately, the details will matter. But it should be straightforward for mediation or a trial to determine each parties contribution to the overall unsafe situation and injuries. Taking the description above at face-value, I think Karen and the shop might both be found partially responsible for the injuries. It may not be a 50/50 split, but Karen likely acted unreasonably, and the shop, despite OSHA compliance, may well have created more hazards than appropriate.

This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order.

Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.

There are numerous what-ifs. Society’s moral values and thus laws may change. Or the unlikely death of your wife makes this question moot. (Let’s hope not.) Yes, failure to render assistance is punishable under § 323c Ⅰ StGB. Everyone can commit this crime (Allgemeindelikt). However, this section concerns accidents, contingencies or other unplanned adverse events. In your specific case there is no element of “surprise” though, quite the contrary. Your wife does not even need to be aware of the circumstances; the assessment “is there an accident” is made objectively. Having said that, unfortunately there’s a difference of opinion how courts judge (case law) and how “legal scientists” (at law school) think. Ultimately it depends on what evidence investigators find. Frankly, § 323c Ⅰ StGB is a “minor issue” here. You can get at most “just” a one-year-sentence. And there’s the option to consider one’s own spouse’s death as poena naturalis, thus refrain from imposing any penalty because the grieving widow “won’t learn anything” from that, § 60 1 StGB←§ 153b StPO. I’d worry more about §§ 211 ff. (murder, manslaughter, etc.): To kill someone means, a) any short‑term shortening of lifetime through action, or b) in the case of § 13 StGB, any failure to potentially prolong the lifetime. § 13 StGB, Garantenstellung, also applies to spouses, cf. § 1353 Ⅰ 2 BGB. It could be argued that failure to take, say, a loaded firearm away from you constitutes manslaughter. Or, worse, maybe you’re particularly wealthy and she’ll inherit your assets. This could be construed as greed, an aggravating circumstance. At any rate it’s necessary that the omitted action makes a difference, i. e. prevents or at least inhibits the crime’s success (your death). At some point, with terminally-ill patients, you might say “he’ll die tomorrow anyway”. Then your wife could attend your suicide. Finally, for a legally airtight plan I’d seriously consider to change the jurisdiction though, e. g. by going to Switzerland. Everything happening here is subject to German criminal law, § 3 StGB. PS: Marriage can be viewed as a kind of contract. In principle you are completely free in formulating its terms. However, you cannot make provisions concerning termination of life (nichtdisponibles Rechtsgut).

Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent?

All of these sound like violations of the Criminal Damage Act of 1971. The courts seem to construe "damage" fairly broadly, to include damage that affects an object's value or usefulness, so I'd imagine that removing signs or cameras or anything else would satisfy that definition.

tl;dr Hitting the pedestrians is a separate crime, even if they shouldn't be there. Background On a highway, you might have a legal right of way and therefore a claim against the pedestrians for failing to yield. Since the states (and not the federal government) own and operate the interstate highway system, your specific answer depends on the state law. In North Carolina, for example, pedestrians walking along or upon a highway have a statutory duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles. So you could probably videotape and press misdemeanor charges against them individually. That said, contacting the police and waiting (or taking an alternate route) is the best recourse. Having the right of way (or feeling ethically justified) doesn't allow you to commit an offense like hitting a pedestrian. The fact that the pedestrians aren't supposed to be in your way is of little consolation in the charges you'll face if you injure or kill one. The court will see this as a legal/ethical problem, but one that won't go in your favor. In particular, you deliberately directed your vehicle into the crowd with the knowledge that the action might cause harm. One doesn't have to imagine the Austin Powers steamroller scenario to know that injuries are possible when cars go through crowds. That will pull all of the "involuntary"-flavored mitigations off the table. In particular, driving a car into a crowd might be considered "an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty." In the worst case scenario, where someone died as a result, a North Carolina prosecutor might push for second-degree murder (which operates on a "recklessness-plus" standard and might not be as crazy as it sounds since driving into the crowd is likely reckless, and driving in slowly with them yelling at you to stop could push a jury over the top). In that case, as a defendant, you'd hope your charge could be mitigated down to something like death by vehicle (which is similar to "vehicular manslaughter" in other states), and you'd shoot for the misdemeanor version of death by vehicle since you weren't driving under the influence. However, a key element of proving death by vehicle is that you unintentionally caused the death---and the fact that you deliberately drove into the crowd might ruin your defense. In the case where you just hurt someone, you'd likewise hope to mitigate intentional charges to unintentional ones. A claim for false imprisonment is unlikely to succeed. False imprisonment is called a variety of things---like felonious/misdemeanor restraint, unlawful detainment, etc.---depending on where you live. To prove it (and generalizing a bit since this varies by state), you typically have to show (1) detention or restraint against your will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint. A big challenge here is that courts often interpret this to mean detention or restraint by exercise of force or threat of force, as in Harris v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380 (1928) for example. The protesters are just in the way, so it's unlikely this would hold up. Self defense almost surely won't be a viable excuse. The idea of driving the car slowly through the crowd relies on the notion that you should be able to escape the alleged detention. The escape you're considering in driving through the crowd likely comes at the expense of making contact with members of the crowd. Making unprivileged contacts might be allowable in self defense. However, self defense probably hold up either. Setting aside notions of proportional defense, you have to be defending yourself against something: force or threats of it by the protesters. So if they don't use force, or threaten it, against you, then your defense is going to be really shaky.

Probably not In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the tort of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. What standard of conduct do you think your employer failed to conform with? Owning a tree or a parking lot is not, of itself, negligent. Further, the branch fell "during high winds" - the wind is not within your employer's control. Now, if you can prove that your employer knew that the particular tree was ill and likely to drop branches in high winds and failed to do anything about it, that might be considered negligent. I know of a case where a council who had refused permission for a tree to be removed because it was "healthy" was found negligent when that tree latter (in calm winds) dropped a branch on Jaguar.

Can a restaurant or retailer be held to "posted" prices? I walked into a fast food restaurant in New York City where a large poster in the front of the store advertised a new dinner special for $6.99. That was quite a bargain so I went to the counter and ordered it. Apparently the "special" was so new, it wasn't on the menu. At any rate the staff refused to honor the advertised $6.99 price, and computed an a la carte (sum of the parts) price that came to over $10. I declined to buy the special at that price. I returned the following week, and the special was available, with a new posted price of $9.99. The staff would let me have it at that price (a small discount from $10-plus but not the bargain of $6.99), but for the same price, I ordered something else. I didn't want to be an SOB the first time, but supposing I was, could I have legally held the restaurant to the posted $6.99 price for the special?

Under the law of common law contracts, posting a price is an invitation to treat and is not binding. However, in many jurisdictions, there may be (probably is) statutory consumer protection law that make this practice illegal. Whether this means the business must honor the price or merely makes them liable to prosecution and fines depends on the specific law. For example, in Australia the law refers to this as multiple pricing. The law requires that the business withdraw the product from sale until the multiple pricing is fixed (i.e. they take the poster down) or, if they are unable or unwilling to do this, they must sell for the lower price. If they do neither then they have committed an offence and are liable to be fined by the government; the consumer does not get any compensation.

In practice this is rarely done in the US. There have been cases of employment contracts with automatic increases tied to the CPI (Consumer Price Index) or some other measure of inflation -- I believe at one time a number of union contracts specified this. Employer and employee could certainly agree on any such formula. But in the absence of any explicit provision for such a link, and an agreed formula for the resulting salary, I think a stated salary would be interpreted as a fixed sum, not subject to change until an explicit change is made. Fixed wages are the almost invariable custom, and in the absence of any explicit provision for an automatic inflationary change, I think a court would assume a fixed amount, if it came to a court case.

Typical in any of the several united-states No, this fails to meet two of the core elements of libel. The statement must be Adverse (fails) Stated by one party To a second party About a third party (fails) The case you're thinking of, where a company brags excessively about their company or products, are covered by a variety of securities and trade laws, such as false advertising. Many of these are applicable in the Federal domain, i.e. are Federal rather than state laws. Edit: Now I see you've changed the question a bit to claiming to be first. Yes, the injured party can sue for that, but they are more claiming false advertising than libel. Accusing someone of not being first-to-market is not a particularly powerful or damning claim. Oreo didn't invent the sandwich cookie nor did Apple invent the computer. So such a claim is really a lot more about the publicity than actual, provable damages; so the controversy is more likely to be aired outside the court system, or in the courts but mainly for the publicity. (an example of the latter being the "Taco Tuesday" trademark-busting action; IIRC Taco Bell even paid the other party's legal fees, despite prevailing.)

Your first course of action should probably be to return to the store, explained what happened, and ask either for another jar of peas or for your money back. Bring your receipt and the jar of peas with the moth in it. If the store refuses to refund your money or replace the jar of peas, you might try approaching the manufacturer. In my experience, European packaged foods have a telephone number for customer service among the fine print on the back of the label. If the manufacturer is no help, you could consider taking legal action, but the costs of doing so would be far greater than any benefit you are likely to realize. That is the same reason why the store and the manufacturer will probably handle your claim without much resistance; the cost of resisting is far higher than the cost of a jar of peas.

The answer would vary considerably. Consumer protection laws in some jurisdictions would find such a scheme to be an actionable deceptive trade practice, while consumer protection laws in other jurisdictions would find that it was not an actionable deceptive trade practice. One of the trickier points is quantifying the injury. How are you harmed if you buy a good at 20% off when it is really 20% off? How are you harmed if you don't buy a good at 20% off and then later buy the same good at 20% off when you were expecting it to be full price? Some consumer protection laws require that you show injury, and in those cases, it probably wouldn't be actionable. But, other consumer protection laws make false statements actionable, even if there is no reliance upon the statement or harm caused, in which case statutory damages might be recoverable.

As described, this may be a form of illegal bait-and-switch advertising, but not breach of contract. The contract states the specific vehicle to be sold, which does not match the test-driven car. If the dealer had listed the better car's VIN in the contract but supplied a different car, that would be breach of contract. Whether it is illegal advertisement depends on the representations and disclaimers made by the dealer. To the extent that the dealer supplied indications that there was a difference between the test model and the purchase model, or to the extent that the customer should have known that the test car had features not found in the specific model that the customer believed he was buying and paying for, the dealer was being non-deceptive. To the extent that the dealer holds that selling model X instead of model Y is an "honest mistake" on their part, the dealer was being deceptive (or, was plainly in breach of contract). It's hard to see what "honest mistake" the dealer might have made, but perhaps the mistake was "not being clearer to the customer that they had test-driven a fancier model, not the one that they were actually buying". The customer's attorney could pursue this matter and either get the better car, or get a better financial deal, but it really hinges on who said / wrote what (and has a more believable story about what was said).

Typically, these notices are required where the individual packaging lacks the statutory nutritional and warning labels. If this is the reason for the prohibition, selling them separately is a breach of public health law. It may also be a breach of contract with the vendor of the collective pack. Breaking them up and placing them in vending machines, even if those are not accessible to the public is probably unlawful.

Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.

Can it be illegal to have/use a "wipe data" login on your device? Suppose I have a computer and I set up two logins that are identical other than one sanitises my data SSD upon logging on. This would cause any information I have on said drive to be inaccessible to anyone. Have I committed any crime? Assume the data itself is legal, and is not evidence of a crime I have commited. An important use case of such a tool would be reporters who may have evidence of crimes they are investigating. If that changes the situation that should be mentioned in the answer. Suppose someone verbally requests the login credentials of the computer, and I provide the sanitising one which they proceed to use. Have I committed any crime? Any jurisdiction would be relevant, as would any values for the "someone" above (such as employer, police officer, border agent). Cases where such a question would be particularly relevant seem to occur at borders in particular, with examples in the USA, Canada and most recently in the UK. So I can be specific about what I have done I have used the example of a general purpose computer, but I assume the same thing would apply to commercially available tools.

canada If this is done with the specific intention of obstructing justice (see R. c. Charbonneau, 1992 CanLII 2979 (QCCA)), then this is an offence contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code. The offence is not dependent on the deleted evidence being evidence that would have been used against the deleter. Every person who intentionally attempts in any manner other than a manner described in subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of [an offence]. A couple of examples: In R. c. Renaud, 2019 CM 4021, the accused had asked someone to delete photographs and texts off of their smart phone. He was found not guilty on this charge because the mens rea was not proved. In R. v. Subia, 2022 ONSC 1693, the accused admitted that he used specialized software in an attempt to delete traces of evidence (images) from his phone. He was found guilty of attempted obstruction of justice.

Yes, their waiver has no legal basis and is invalid under the GDPR. They should have hired a better lawyer. GDPR rights cannot be waived (mrllp.com). The last bit should have been: Therefore, in consideration of my participation in any project, I understand that retaining my name and email address, as described above, does not require my consent and that the right of erasure, as spelled out in the GDRP Article 17 (1) b does not apply. The legal basis for our lawful processing of this personal data is Article 6 (1) f ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller"). I.e. there is nothing in the GDPR that compels GitLab to erase this information, but their waiver is bogus. Keeping track of individual contributions in a software projects is necessary for a number of reasons, including security (if somebody contributes code that jeopardizes security, you want to audit everything that person has contributed).

GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls.

This question really depends on the specific countries involved, as all law depends on jurisdiction. However, there are essentially two ways that breaking into foreign computer systems could be illegal: 1) Your own country has laws against hacking that include hacking into foreign computers or 2) The country you're breaking into has laws about hacking that are not limited to citizens. In the first case, your own country would find such "hacking" illegal; in the second, your target country would find such "hacking" illegal. If you violate the first, which is the less likely option, you could be traced, located and prosecuted by your own country. If you violate the second, which is the more likely option, the target country would target you for extradition and prosecution. Depending on the amount of political power your target country has, this could result in you being shipped off to another country to face their courts, without the protection of your own country. In other words, it could very well be illegal, though the specific sentence resulting from such a crime is far too specific to even attempt to address in the general case.

Intentional sabotage of a TSA computer system is almost certainly a serious crime and would also almost surely give rise to civil liability, although you might avoid both if you warned the TSA that the phone was set up to intentionally break their system, in which case it might be confiscated as contraband. If the product had a "feature" unknown to you and that you had no reasonable reason to know of that caused the harm, you would ultimately have no criminal or civil liability, although the manufacturer might be strictly liable to the TSA under a product liability theory, and you would probably be detained as a witness to figure out what happened. If the product had a "feature" that broke the TSA computer that could be de-activated and that you meant to de-active but carelessly failed to, you would have negligence liability to the government and might or might not have criminal liability (I'm not enough of an expert in the relevant statutes to know). You might be liable for a strict liability Federal Communications Commission offense for having a device that is in violation of their regulations.

Generally speaking, what isn't illegal by law is legal. It's possible for law enforcement agencies to share crime rates, maps, and their data, but within any laws regarding access and sharing of that data. Such crime data may be publicly available, but that depends on local and state laws. The local or state agency would have to enter into a legal licensing agreement - if local and state laws allow such sharing - with the GPS company to provide the data, update it, and reasonably assure that it is accurate. The more realistic reason GPS systems might choose to not show crime data may be public relations. If a GPS user lives in an area that has been objectively identified by data as having a higher than baseline crime rate, i.e. for carjackings, that user may not be very happy with that designation. Worse, what happens to public relations when data errors show an area is wrongfully identified as high crime? What kinds of lawsuits could result? Real estate agents suing since bad data from a GPS unit soured the sale of a house?

Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.

You quoted the definition of personal data from Art 4(1) GDPR. This definition of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: […] To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. […] If the user ID is unique, then the hashed user ID will be unique as well. Thus, the hashed ID will enable “singling out”, and would still count as identifying in the sense of the GDPR. You also claim that there's no way to reverse the hash. This is not quite correct. Assuming that the hash function itself is secure, then the only way to crack the hash is to brute-force the input. The difficulty of brute-forcing depends only on the entropy of the input data, not on the size of the output hash. It is thus comparatively easy to crack hashes of short low-entropy strings like sequential integer user IDs, IPv4 addresses, or weak passwords. In contrast, it would be difficult to crack long random user IDs, such as UUID version 4 identifiers created from a cryptographically secure RNG (CSPRNG). Even if the hashes can't be cracked, they are not anonymous – you can link them to the original user ID, after all. The GDPR only considers data anonymized if there are no “reasonably likely” means to re-identify the data subject. If this de-identification is reversible, it's called pseudonymization instead. If storage allows, a better technique to generate pseudonymous IDs is to create a table that maps the true ID to a CSPRNG-random ID. Unlike a hash, the random ID cannot leak extra information about the original ID. This pseudonymization technique could perhaps also be turned into irreversible anonymization by deleting the ID mapping, assuming that no “singling out” can happen. Pseudonymization is a very good security measure. It is explicitly mandated whenever appropriate in Art 32 GDPR. So you should probably use it. It's just that GDPR continues to fully apply to processing of the pseudonymized data. Since the pseudonymized data is the data subject's personal data, you may be required to delete it when receiving an Art 17 request for erasure. You may also be required to forward the request to others with whom you shared the data. However, the right to erasure has many conditions and exceptions. If you actually need to keep the data for a particular purpose, chances are good that you can keep it.

Choosing DPA to submit data breach complaint (EU-specific) Context The institution I am working for - in EU member-state A - recently suffered a cyber-attack which led to data being copied from the institution's infrastructure outside of it. The offenders asked for ransom to not publish the data, which the institution refused to pay, leading to a data breach. We are still waiting (roughly 30 days, now) to be informed by our law department about what exact data have been breached. I am working remotely for that institution, residing in EU member-state B for the last 4 years and 4 months. My Question I am considering to submit a complaint to the corresponding DPA about the breach and the way our institution is/has been handling the situation. Nevertheless, I am not sure to which the "corresponding DPA" in my case is. Should I address the DPA of my home country, B, where I stay in, my institution country's DPA, A, or probably both? Would it be better if, probably on top of that, I also address some EU body/institution, since more than one member-states are involved?

GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland.

This is less of a compliance question, and more of an infosec question. On one hand, you want to be able to restore access to an account to users who have lost their access. On the other hand, you must prevent unauthorized access e.g. from hackers. These factors must be balanced. Whether you'll fulfil a data subject access request will generally follow the same criteria as deciding whether you'll reset someone's access credentials, so I'll mostly discuss identity verification in general. Trying to validate names is generally pointless from a security perspective, since the name on the account might not be real, or because validation documents like scans from a passport can be easily forged. When a service has identity validation measures like requesting a copy of photo ID, or requesting a photo of you holding up a validation code written on paper, that doesn't actually help validating that the person requesting access is the account owner, but that the person requesting access appears to be a natural person, and now documents about their identity are on file. A lot of information like names, birthdates, or addresses is also not at all secret and could be easily guessed by a malicious actor. Most websites work by equating access with control over an email account. If you can receive a password reset code over email, you have access. In effect, this delegates the responsibility of account recovery to the email or OAuth provider. So the issue is what happens when someone loses their email account, which is not entirely uncommon for accounts that are multiple years old. One reasonable (and likely GDPR-compliant solution) is to deny access when someone loses their account. Quite a lot of services operate this way. A milder form of this is to email the old address that someone is trying to take over the account, and turn over the account only if you have other evidence of ownership and there has been no reply over multiple weeks. Since this is part of an identity verification measure, I don't think the GDPR's normal 1 month deadline would apply. However, this approach is very risky: an attack can succeed through the mere inaction of the true account holder, and it would arguably be a data breach if you give access to the wrong person – safer for erasure requests only. Also, emails like “click here or we'll delete your account” look a lot like spam (I get a lot of those about alleged problems with my Paypal account). A potentially more reasonable approach is to use questions about the account to verify ownership. When did they create the account? When did they last use it? Can they answer questions about non-public content of the account? (But don't let an attacker choose the questions!) You see some older sites that ask the user to select a “security question” for recovery purposes. But this isn't a best practice – they are frequently the weakest link in an authentication system. If the user answers truthfully, the answer may be easy to guess or discover for an attacker. E.g. the infamous “what is your mother's maiden name” question is horrendously insecure in the age of Facebook. If the user provides a more secure answer, that is essentially just another password that's even easier to lose than an email account. High-value accounts typically offer a secondary authentication method as a fallback. E.g. my bank can send me new access codes via physical mail. GitHub can optionally link a Facebook account for recovery purposes. But these measures would be overkill for most cases. Especially collecting a physical address for the sole purpose of offering account recovery would likely violate the GDPR's data minimization principle, though it may be fine when the user opts in with freely given consent. To summarize: what you're trying to do is extremely difficult, because you've need to balance different security aspects: keeping malicious actors out, and letting legitimate account owners in. Whereas I'd resolve that by denying any account recovery or subject access requests, other approaches exists with other risk profiles. The GDPR requires you to perform reasonable identity verification measures, but what is reasonable depends on the business context and is ultimately an infosec question.

It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc.

a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.

In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.

In order to process data (which includes storing data), a data controller must establish one or more of the lawful bases contained at Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR. Briefly, those are: a) Consent of the data subject b) Necessary for performance of a contract with the data subject c) Necessary for compliance with a legal obligation d) Necessary to protect vital interests of data subject or another person e) Necessary for public interest or exercise of official authority vested in the controller f) Necessary for controller's legitimate interests Clearly a) and d) don't apply. As you've settled the debt, it seems unlikely to me that b) or f) apply. That leaves c) and e). A common example under c) would be a requirement by Companies House or HMRC to keep accounting records for a certain period of time. Some public bodies may also find it necessary, under e), to retain records which they need to be able to carry out their other functions. It seems highly unlikely to me that either of these would justify retention for your "lifetime" however. I would start by sending them a written demand to have your data erased under Article 17(1). Make sure you also specifically request that they provide you with all the information (and in particular the purposes of the processing) under Article 15(1), and that, in the event that they refuse to erase your data, they explain the reasons why pursuant to Article 12(4). Their response on these points will be helpful in establishing whether there is a lawful basis. Your next step after that is either to complain to the ICO or to apply to court for a compliance order under Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The former is free while the latter is not and carries risks of cost if you are unsuccessful. If you opt for one of these steps, make sure you cite the relevant provisions of the GDPR and explain why you think there is no lawful basis for the data retention (including by referencing any response you received from them). "I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment" It doesn't matter whether we are talking about your account or your track record. What matters is whether the account constitutes personal data, which it almost certainly does, per the definition at Article 4(1): "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;"

I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this. Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct. If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data. Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service. Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario. Whose personal data is it anyway? Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy. The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect: Company A is not responsible for handling erasures From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on why that data is being processed. In particular: Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases. It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a "processing activity" and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident. Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level. Caveat: public access and cloned files If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the "original" is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies. In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them.

It seems that A is the data controller and X is a data processor who processes personal data on behalf of A, and will only use the data as instructed by A. This will be formalized by a contract/data processing agreement per Art 28 GDPR, which is probably meant here by a “order processing contract”. The Art 33 GDPR responsibility to notify the supervisory authority in the event of a data breach lies solely with the data controller A, not the processor X. However, the processor X is required to notify the controller A “without undue delay”.

Jurisdiction over FDA What exactly grants Federal courts jurisdiction / authority over the FDA, such that they can invalidate approval of pharmaceuticals? This article prompts the question: https://abcnews.go.com/Health/canada-offer-access-mifepristone-abortion-drug-banned-us/story?id=98750787

Article III of the United States Constitution vests the nation's judicial power -- which includes the authority to hear "all cases, in law and equity, arising under ... the laws of the United States" -- in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the inferior courts established by Congress. The federal courts therefore have authority under the Constitution to hear basically any case alleging that a federal law has been violated. The federal district courts specifically have jurisdiction over any case in which the United States or any federal agency is a plaintiff or defendant. But jurisdiction to hear a case is different than being empowered to grant the relief requested in a case. That authority comes from the Administrative Procedure Act, where Congress has specifically permitted judicial review of agency actions in 5 U.S.C. § 702: A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.

This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer.

It is a vanishingly small possibility. First, someone would need to bring a case that an appropriation for the Air Force was unconstitutional. A Federal court is unlikely to find that it is because: The constitution would be interpreted broadly where the thing being considered did not exist when it was ratified. That is, the court would consider if, had the Air Force existed the drafters of the constitution would have wanted it governed by the Federal government or the State governments. Almost certainly they would decide on the Federal government. The Air Force is a direct descendent of the Army - originally being the United States Army Air Force. As such, an alternative line of reasoning for the court is that the army contemplated by the constitution consists of both the Army and the Air Force - the fact that they have been split is not relevant.

It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.

It's a bit of an oversimplification. You're correct that there is a federal law against murder, 18 USC 1111. However it applies only to a murder committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This covers situations like crimes committed on federal lands such as national parks or federal buildings, or crimes on US-flagged ships at sea, aircraft in flight, or in space. It does not apply to "ordinary" crimes committed at most locations within the US. 18 USC Chapter 51 covers a few other situations, such as murder of a federal officer, foreign diplomat, by incarcerated or escaped federal prisoners, US nationals murdering each other while abroad, and so forth. The idea is that these restrictions keep the laws within the enumerated powers of Congress as stated in Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution. A federal statute covering all murders throughout the US would probably be unconstitutional for this reason. So while what he says is not strictly correct, it is true that in the vast majority of cases, murders are covered by state laws and not by federal laws. Even if one was to agree with Ramaswamy that medical abortions are a form of murder, even still, no federal murder law currently on the books would apply to a typical abortion, except under very unusual circumstances.

The CDC does not authorize shots or vaccine distribution. The FDA authorizes vaccine distribution, or distribution of medicines in general. A medicine is authorized for use in a certain way, which is an "instruction" directed at the medical professional. So-called "off-label" use is discussed by the FDA here. Such use if legal, it simply stretches the limits of what the FDA was allowed to approve (e.g. was found to be safe and effective for X, was not similarly tested for Y). Patients are free to take whatever medicines they want if they can find them, and if they are not on the Controlled Substances list. Hence it's legal to take DMSO, but it's not legal to peddle it as a cancer cure. The prescription regime for covid vaccinations seems to be somewhat relaxed, in that it is likely that many people get a vaccine without a (meaningful) doctor's exam, instead, you show up and get the shot. This is normal with flu shots. The upcoming 3rd shot approval is addressed to doctors, so they can then recommend third shots.

In the US, there are a number of non-government organizations which take on such cases, such as the ACLU or the Institute for Justice; individual law firms may also take such cases pro bono. There is no automatic right to free representation in case a constitutional issue is alleged, so if IJ doesn't like your case they won't take it. These are private organizations: there is no general government agency that one can call on, other than the Public Defender's office in case you are charged with a crime and can't afford legal defense. (A constitutional issue may arise in a case that a PD might handle, but you can't e.g. call on the public defender to sue the government for infringing your 2nd Amendment rights.) A state attorney general could file suit against the US government over a constitutional issue, as Washington's AG did in the case of the Trump travel executive order, where the underlying issues were constitutional. An individual might inspire a state AG to take on an issue, but the AG would be representing the interests of the state, broadly, and not individual interests.

In that case, Cruise-Gulyas was subject to a second stop, and the court found that the second stop was an illegal seizure. There is no qualified immunity since this was an exercise of a clearly established First Amendment right. The authority to seize her ended when the first stop ended. The finger is not a basis for a stop, since it does not violate any law ("This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity", Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105.

Can it be illegal to not speak to the police until you have spoken to a lawyer? It is reported that Ernest Moret was arrested for failing to answer police questions. The incident was described as: When the officers began questioning Moret, [his colleague Stella] Magliani-Belkacem called her friend Sebastian Budgen, a senior editor at Verso Books in London, at whose home she and Moret had arranged to stay. Budgen arranged for a lawyer to visit Moret. The lawyer called Budgen at 1am on Tuesday to confirm that Moret had been arrested over his refusal to tell police the passcodes to his confiscated phone and laptop. This is the police statement: At around 7.30pm on Monday 17 April, a 28-year-old man was stopped by ports officers as he arrived at St Pancras station, using powers under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. On Tuesday 18 April, the man was subsequently arrested on suspicion of wilfully obstructing a schedule 7 examination, contrary to section [schedule 7, paragraph] 18 of the Terrorism Act 2000. What is the law here? At what point does it become a crime to answer a police question with "I would like to speak to my lawyer"?

I do not know the exact circumstances for the alleged obstruction (and whether there was a political or diplomatic purpose to prompt the questioning would be off-topic here) so I have just focused on the relevant legislation in answer to: What is the law here? SHORT ANSWER It's not a crime to answer a police question with "I would like to speak to my lawyer"? But it is a(n alleged) crime to obstruct or otherwise fail to comply with an examination under the Terrorism Act 2000. This Act is one of a very small number of laws that makes it compulsory for someone to answer questions or provide information, but as they are not under arrest there is no statutory requirement for them to have independent legal advice. What they say or provide cannot be used against them (with some exemptions, below) and failure to comply is an offence. LONG ANSWER A police officer is an examining officer, and under paragraph 2 Schedule 7, Terrorism Act 2000: (1) An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b). section 40(1)(b) says: (b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Under Paragraph 5: A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— (a) give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests; (b) give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes his identity; (c) declare whether he has with him documents of a kind specified by the examining officer; (d) give the examining officer on request any document which he has with him and which is of a kind specified by the officer. BUT, under paragraph 5A (1) An answer or information given orally by a person in response to a question asked under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be used in evidence against the person in criminal proceedings. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply— (a) in the case of proceedings for an offence under paragraph 18 of this Schedule, (b) on a prosecution for perjury, or (c) on a prosecution for some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the answer or information mentioned in sub-paragraph (1). Failure to comply with paragraph 5 is an offence under paragraph 18 (1) A person commits an offence if he— (a) wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, (b) wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or (c) wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule. Once they're arrested on suspicion of this offence then they are entitled to free and independent legal advice under section 58 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

No If the police want to arrest you your legal obligation is to submit and, if the arrest was a violation of your rights, pursue a legal remedy afterwards. You do not have a right to resist an arrest even if that arrest is without legal basis. "Resisting arrest" is a specific crime with a specific definition. For example, in new-south-wales it is in s546c of the Crimes Act 1900 and it says: Any person who resists or hinders or incites any person to assault, resist or hinder a police officer in the execution of his or her duty shall be liable on conviction before the Local Court to imprisonment for 12 months or to a fine of 10 penalty units, or both. If you are charged with resisting arrest the state needs to prove each element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If they can't do that the charge will be dismissed. If they can prove it then you may have a defence to resisting arrest if: you did not know that the person was a police officer or you did not know that you were being arrested if the police officer was not acting lawfully. However, a police officer will be acting lawfully even if the arrest is subsequently found to be unlawful provided they are acting in good faith and without malice. Suspecting you of committing a crime even if you didn’t makes it lawful to arrest you.

It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two.

Usual disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. If you are serious about proceeding with this, talk to a lawyer who specialises in this kind of thing. I imagine that you will need to provide proof of the above incidents in order for any legal action to succeed. Accessing a tenant's room without notice or permission, and without a very good reason (e.g. a gas leak) is likely to be classed as harassment; specifically, "acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier". Renting out your room and removing your belongings before the end of a tenancy is likely to be illegal eviction. Both of these are criminal offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Shelter mentions that it's normally local authorities, rather than the police or individuals, who carry out prosecutions under this act (see also: Shelter articles, Landlord Law Blog articles), so you might want to start there. There is also the matter of civil action, including for breach of contract. For that, consider speaking to a lawyer.

Answering the question title, a Texas law enforcement officer can certainly make arrests in Louisiana these days under the right circumstances (I'm not about to look up the laws as of 1934). For starters, Louisiana law grants any person the authority to make an arrest when the person being arrested has committed a felony, whether or not that felony was committed in the presence of the person making the arrest. This is normally a legally risky thing to do (the arrest is illegal unless the person actually committed a felony, while a cop's felony arrest is legal as long as the cop had probable cause), but in this case the pair had been involved in a kidnapping and a robbery in Louisiana. Any person could have made a lawful arrest, and could have used necessary force to effect that arrest. But suppose the gang turned out to be innocent of the Louisiana crimes. In that case, a citizen's arrest would be illegal. But the Texas lawmen weren't at the ambush alone. They were there with the parish sheriff and a deputy, who were Louisiana peace officers with the authority to make an arrest on probable cause. And under Article 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, A peace officer making a lawful arrest may call upon as many persons as he considers necessary to aid him in making the arrest. A person thus called upon shall be considered a peace officer for such purposes. Neither of these things depends on the Texas officers' status as Texas officers. There are some arrests which are legal based on that (e.g. hot pursuit), and a Texas officer has some extra powers in Louisiana based on federal law that make an arrest easier (e.g. cops in the US can carry concealed firearms nationwide without needing a CCW permit), but under normal circumstances a Texas police officer has no special authority to make an arrest in Louisiana. However, it's not at all uncommon for police agencies in different states (or at the state and federal level) to cooperate on something, and there are ways to make it work out. With more planning, there are normally formal ways to do it instead of needing to rely on "we'll ask you for assistance" (for instance, officers could formally be appointed as deputies in the appropriate agency; this happens a lot on federal task forces, where a deputized state or local cop gets nationwide jurisdiction). If Bonnie and Clyde existed these days but the feds wanted to involve state cops, they'd just set up a federal task force, make Hamer a special deputy US marshal, and go from there.

There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement.

Usually how long does it take for the police to acquire IP details from the ISP now they no longer need a warrant to serve them under the snoopers charter. The Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice published by the UK Home Office in March 2015 encourages service providers to furnish a disclosure notice within a fortnight: 3.50. Ordinarily the CSP should disclose, in writing or electronically, the communications data to which a notice relates not later than the end of the period of ten working days from the date the notice is served upon the CSP. In practice, it is impossible to tell what "usually" looks like because historical data is not available. Would they usually then come and search your house for devices if it was cyber related? It depends on what grounds an offence is believed to have taken place. In any case, unless you are arrested a search warrant would be required, and a constable (authorised by an inspector) must apply to a court. Lord Widgery CJ in Williams v. Summerfield [1972] 2 QB 512 described a search warrant as: ... a very serious interference with the liberty of the subject, and a step which would only be taken after the most mature careful consideration of all the facts of the case. Warrants that are governed by legislation for specific offences (The Theft Act 1968, section 26; The Firearms Act 1968, section 46; The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, section 23(3); Obscene Publications Act 1959, section 3; and Protection of Children Act 1978, section 4) require specific information as to the suspected offence. For example: If it is made to appear by information on oath before a justice of the peace that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his custody or possession or on his premises any stolen goods, the justice may grant a warrant to search for and seize the same… (Theft Act 1968) More general search warrants are issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the would first need to persuade a justice that there are reasonable grounds for believing: that an indictable offence has been committed there is material on the specified premises which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of the offence it is likely to be relevant evidence and it does not consist of or include items subject to "legal privilege", "excluded material" or "special procedure The justice would normally want to ensure there are reasonable grounds to believe that you would prevent access to that evidence (e.g. by refusing entry or by destroying it first), which make a warrant necessary. If you are arrested because a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that you have committed an offence, and the offence is indictable, PACE also grants a power to search premises following arrest: 32(2)(b) if the offence for which he has been arrested is an indictable offence, to enter and search any premises in which he was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence

The misunderstanding The only person who can chose to prosecute or not to prosecute a criminal case is the state: in the US this is through the office of the relevant District Attorney advised by the police. When a person makes a complaint to police (or other authorities), the police/DA commence an investigation. In an ideal world all complaints would be investigated rigorously and thoroughly, however, we live in this world. The police/DA will assess the complaint and decide if it warrants the dedication of scarce resources to investigate. One of the factors they will consider is how vigorously the complainant prods them in the ass. Ultimately, the police/DA will decide if there is enough evidence to place the matter before the courts. The complainant has no say in when or if this will happen. A complainant cannot "drop the charges"! The misconduct For a police officer to disclose to another police officer that they were the subject of a felony (or any) complaint is gross misconduct and a huge betrayal of trust. At best it shows poor judgement, at worst it is corrupt. Your friend needs professional legal advice right now!

Could a justice be sued in a case that goes, ‘‘all the way up to the Supreme Court?’’ Hypothetical. Person (A), before in his life, had engaged in some act that, allegedly, defamed some other person (B); later on in life, person (A) becomes an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court... Could person (B) sue person (A), and take his case, ‘‘All the way up to the Supreme Court?’’ If so, what would happen? Would the justice (being sued) recuse himself? What happens if he does not recuse himself? (Amending hereafter: Given that comments & answers were disrupted by the issue of the ‘‘Statute of Limitations,’’ while being good willing as is obvious, then it should be neglected, for the purpose of extending this query to its most lucid extension.)

To the title question, yes, of course, Justices are subject to the law same as anyone else is (at least in theory; whether actual practice bears that out is another matter). Chief Justice Roberts (and the rest of SCOTUS, and a good chunk of the judiciary to boot, and then some) was a named defendant in the case Shao v. Roberts that was appealed to SCOTUS. The Justices all recused themselves rendering the court short of a quorum and leaving the prior appellate court decision to dismiss the case sua sponte in place. However, Justices essentially police themselves. As the head of the judicial branch they are largely independent of Congressional or Executive attempts to control how they go about their business. Recent calls to create a legal code of ethics for Justices exist because such a code perhaps cannot, and currently does not, exist under the current constitutional order. As such Justices make their own decisions on when to recuse (see my answer here for further details). Your hypothetical justice would do the same, and the court would proceed as it always does whether they do or don't.

I'm not sure there would be any need - or any ability to bring - any civil action. Forgery would appear to count as a Category D felony under Section 205.090 and, "In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.", so person "a"'s damages should have been met under the process of the criminal prosecution of person "b" for forgery, with nothing further to claim. Person "c" will have stolen a car. Whether that car was legitimately owned by person "a" may only be relevant if person "c" is using their belief that it belonged to person "b" as mitigation (for example recovery of a debt - though it won't help much as this should have been done through proper channels), which again would be a criminal proceeding.

This would be virtually impossible to do from scratch. If you had the guidance of someone who successfully pursued a similar legal action it might be possible. In theory you should be able to pursue grievances in court by becoming well versed in the applicable laws and rules, having impeccable attention to detail, exceptional deductive and writing skills, and getting lucky enough to run your filings through patient clerks who will tell you every time you're missing something or doing something wrong. New York Courts even offer this encouraging CourtHelp website for pro se guidance on common actions. But if you really want to attempt a pro se civil action, especially against a government entity, or other entity with essentially unlimited legal funds, you not only need all of the above but also some sort of assistance from somebody who knows the system. I would spend as much time looking for sympathetic advocacy groups and lawyers offering pro bono service as I would reading relevant law and procedure. (One more thing: The word "quick" is never used in conjunction with formal legal actions, except in jest ;)

I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well.

It isn't that uncommon to do something similar to this, which is called a "test case". One of the more familiar examples of this kind of litigation conduct is the case of Plessy v. Ferguson. There have been test cases, for example, that involved important questions of E.U. jurisdiction in civil law countries as well.

You didn't bother to state who this appeal is with or even where you are but I'm almost certain I know the answer. Just once. If the appeal is denied, you may be able to appeal to a higher body such as a higher court or an ombudsman. However, any group or court allowing the same appeal ad infinitum until you get what you want would be farcical.

Yes, certainly. A prominent example was Lawrence v. Texas. The defendants were charged in state court with "deviate sexual intercourse". They moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. Their motion was denied and they were convicted and fined; the denial was upheld by the state's court of appeals. They then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the statute was indeed unconstitutional. A defendant likely wouldn't have standing to sue the state for enforcing the law in general, only for enforcing it on the defendant himself.

Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.

How does GDPR's right to erasure apply to deduplicated storage? I am trying to understand GDPR's right to erasure (and principle of storage limitation) in the following case: Company A offers a online data storage service that is intended to be used by the users of other companies (e.g. company A hosts a FTP server for company B and its users). The users of the service that company B subscribes to may be employees of company B or just regular private consumers. The users can upload arbitrary files, they may or may not contain their personal information, it is each user's individual decision what data they upload and/or access. The storage system that company A uses for its service deduplicates all uploaded files. This means that if user A uploads a file, and then user B uploads the same file, the file will exist only once but under two distinct aliases chosen individually by each user. This also means that if user B deletes their file (or more precisely their alias to the file), then the file will still be present in the storage service until user A also deletes it. A common sense counter-argument for this would be that without deduplication, in a system where each file is always distinct, if there are duplicate files then if one user requests erasure then we would not also delete all duplicates of the file which might belong to other users. Is there any reason for this to not extend to deduplicated files with aliases? According to section 65 of the GDPR1, personal data can be kept for as long as it is needed for its intended purpose. Is the purpose that it is needed for other users to be able to access their data valid? I would really appreciate any insight on this and any good resources to further my understanding of GDPR.

I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this. Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct. If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data. Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service. Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario. Whose personal data is it anyway? Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy. The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect: Company A is not responsible for handling erasures From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on why that data is being processed. In particular: Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases. It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a "processing activity" and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident. Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level. Caveat: public access and cloned files If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the "original" is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies. In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them.

No. Art. 17(1) GDPR lists conditions when erasure can be requested. None of the listed grounds would apply in this case. However, you might have to explain why you process the data (for moderation purposes as you explained above), and why that is lawfully. In particular Art. 5 and Art. 6 need to be taken into account. In your case, processing will be based on Art. 6(1)(f): (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Even if the data subject would be a 9 year old child, the legitimate interests of you and other forum users outweigh the objection of the data subject. Based on Art. 5, there will be a moment when the data has to be deleted. For example 1 year after the last login attempt.

Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here.

There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement.

a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.

Artice §12(5) GDPR limits the right to access: Information provided under Articles 13 and 14 and any communication and any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge. Where requests from a data subject are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the controller may either: (a) charge a reasonable fee taking into account the administrative costs of providing the information or communication or taking the action requested; or (b) refuse to act on the request. The controller shall bear the burden of demonstrating the manifestly unfounded or excessive character of the request. A request to request the filing that you acted on their request is already excessive, repeated and frequent requests could be acted upon by taking the not-acting steps or sending an invoice before any action is taken. Also, very frequent requests with overlapping times might be answered jointly. It would be good to inform the customer in the last answer granted for free, how often they requested information and that any further answer might incur such and such fees for compiling the information.

The GDPR does not set fixed retention periods. Instead, it says data may not be kept for longer than necessary. What is necessary depends very much on the specific context of the processing activity, in particular on the purpose of processing. The GDPR allows retention for as long as necessary. For example, businesses (including financial institutions) are required to keep financial records. This requirement stems from EU member state law, which also sets specific retention periods. If a business wants to keep personal data in financial records for longer than this retention period, they can't just point to the law to authorize this processing – they must instead find a different purpose why they need to keep the data, and then find a suitable Art 6 legal basis. In some cases, retention periods might not be coupled to a fixed duration, but to certain events. For example, personal data for online accounts should typically be kept until the account is closed, which is potentially indefinite. This follows directly from the GDPR approach of limiting data storage by necessity, not by duration. All processing needs a clear purpose + a legal basis. In the context of a genealogy site, the site should analyze carefully what data they collect for what purposes. These purposes might enable potentially unlimited retention. But such processing must also be covered by a legal basis, and I doubt that the site would have a legal basis to make such storage irrevocable. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(a) consent, then the data can only be used as consented to, and consent can always be withdrawn in the future. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract, then the data can be used for compatible purposes in the sense of Art 6(4), but that would require a new legal basis (e.g. legitimate interest). If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest, then the data can be used for Art 6(4) compatible purposes but the data subject has the Art 21 right to object to processing. While a genealogy site may have a legitimate interest in keeping supplied data in order to use it for future research, I think this is a fairly weak legitimate interest that can be easily overridden by an Art 21 objection, which in turn could require Art 17 erasure of the data. The genealogy site should also keep in mind principles like data minimisation and data protection by design and by default, so just keeping data for the off chance that it might be useful in the future is not GDPR-compliant. Data can only be collected and processed for “specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes”. The Art 89 privilege for research purposes also imposes conditions. There is a pretty big carveout in these GDPR requirements for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, and statistical purposes. Specific rules for this exemption are given in Art 89 GDPR. The main value of this exemption is that Art 89 research purposes are always considered compatible with the purpose for which the data was originally collected (cf Art 5(1)(b)), though this might not cover data that was collected under the legal basis of consent (cf Art 6(4)). Other GDPR rules stay intact, and Art 89(1) imposes extra steps to consider: Special attention MUST be given to the data minimisation principle. If the research purpose can be achieved without identifiable data, the data MUST be anonymized. If the research purpose can be achieved with pseudonymized data, pseudonymization MUST be used. Appropriate safeguards MUST be implemented (though this just re-iterates the general requirement in Art 24). In some cases, the research purpose stands in conflict with data subject rights like the right to be informed or the right to object. If so, EU or member state law can provide exemptions from the data subject rights, but can also impose further conditions or safeguards. It is not possible to rely on the Art 89 exception without taking member state law into account. Art 89 does not modify necessity-based retention. Now on to the main question: how long can the personal data be kept for research purposes? While Art 89 research purposes allow us to extend the retention period because we have a new and compatible purpose of processing, it does not affect the general principle that data may only be kept as long as necessary for that purpose. In a scientific context, it would be common to preserve many data sets indefinitely for the purpose of enabling reproducibility of the scientific findings. A privately-run genealogy service might not benefit from Art 89. This “research” angle doesn't seem to be a good fit for a genealogy site. Such a site would typically not be collecting personal data for specific research purposes. At best, it would be operating as an archive of personal data which can be mined by future generations of researchers. But the GDPR specifically only considers archiving purposes in the public interest, which might not cover privately run archives. Archives rely on specific privileges in national laws, and severely restrict access to the information. For example, I'm leafing through the law on public archives in a German state. It forbids access for 10–100 years, depending on the date of death of the data subject and on the age of the documents. This leads me to believe that a privately run genealogy site cannot reasonably rely on the Art 89 exemption, and must instead rely on an ordinary processing purpose + corresponding Art 6 legal basis. This doesn't directly prevent indefinite storage, but means that it will be easy for a data subject to invoke their right to erasure. It is not quite enough to say “we will keep the data indefinitely”, it is also necessary to have a clear purpose for this retention.

It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc.

Why do blatant copyright infringements not get prosecuted? I feel like everywhere you go you'll see copyright infringement. When I open social media, people post copyrighted videos and photos all the time. I suppose I'm assuming they've not got permission - but what 30 follower account is able to get permission from big movie studios etc? My question - Why is this kind of infringement not acted on more, and prosecuted? For example: There are so many YouTube Shorts that just blatantly post clips of Movies, Football games, TV Programmes, etc. Why do these never get in trouble? Perhaps they get a copyright strike, but surely they would be prosecuted/sued? There are 'Leak' sites for mods of games, which operate under the proviso of having all content that is uploaded copyright free and not owned by a single entity. Enough so that newer users may not be aware that they're downloading pirated items/stolen source code. Why do those who upload to these sites, or even host these sites, not get in trouble, and prosecuted/sued, or even those that download from these sites?

You are wrong that they never get into legal trouble. It isn't terribly common but it certainly happens to those that get relatively prominent. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are judgement proof. It makes little sense for Disney, for example, to sue some guy living in his parents' basement for uploading a clip of their movie when that guy has no assets. Financially, it wouldn't be worth the cost of a lawyer. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are in jurisdictions that look the other way. If you're a Russian citizen pirating content owned by American companies, the Russian authorities aren't going to cooperate and arrest you and the American companies likely can't recover any judgement they'd get because you don't have any assets in America. There is a whack-a-mole problem. If there are hundreds of people posting pirated content to Facebook and each one is running hundreds of pages, that's tens of thousands of pages posting content. By the time you identify and close all of them, the pirates will have created tens of thousands of new pages. There is a cat-and-mouse problem. Copyright owners have automated tools to scan for their IP to issue takedown notices. Piraters know this so they modify the video (posting it as a mirror image or adding some additional video elements) in order to evade the automated tools. If copyright owners have to manually identify pirated content, it's realistically not cost effective to do so. The humans finding that content would cost more than the business loses in revenue to pirates. Tracking down the actual human/ business behind the copyright infringement is often a fair amount of work and may involve motions in courts in multiple countries. That work tends not to be highly prioritized by law enforcement. If you're a small fish, it is unlikely that anyone would go to the effort of unmasking you in order to sue.

Since the person who posted the game component under the CC-BY license has no right to do so, no one who used it in reliance on that license had any rights either, and all such uses were at least technically infringement (unless they came under a copyright exception, which seems unlikely). The holder of the copyright on the component could sue in any country where a game using it was published. The details of the law, including the rules on damages and other remidies, will vary from country to country. In the united-states those rules are contained in Chapter 5 of title 17 USC particularly sections 502-505. Section 504 provides for possible money damages. Section 502 provides for a possible injunction (court order to stop infringing). Section 503 provides for for infringing works to be seized. Section 505 provides for possible awards of costs and legal fees to a successful plaintiff (copyright holder). Section 502 allows injunctions to "prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright" on "reasonable" terms. But when the infringement has already been stopped, no such injunction is needed and a court is not likely to impose one. Section 503 allows the court to order the impoundment of infringing copies and "plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced". This is largely obsolete for digital content. Section 504 is the key. It offers the plaintiff a choice between actual damages plus profits and statutory damages. The rule for the first is: The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. This means money made by use of the unauthorized content, plus any loss of sales or other losses suffered by the owner. Money mad by the infringing work but not made by use of the infringing content is not included, if this can be proven. Income obtained after the infringing content was removed would probably not be included in the infringer's profits. Statutory damages can be any amount between $750 and $30,000 that the count thinks is just, but id the infringement is proved to be "innocent" the lower limit is $200. The exact provision reads: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. An award of costs and fees under section 505 is entirely up to the discretion of the court. If the maximum possible award of infringer's profits is $10,000, and a defense of innocent infringement is plausible, a plaintiff might well find such a suit unprofitable, given the legal expenses involved in preparing an carrying through such a suit. But that is entirely up to the copyright owner. An owner may choose to file even an unprofitable suit in an effort to deter others. A person who has discovered that s/he has innocently infringed a copyright and made some money in the process would be wise to document the prompt removal of the infringing content form any publication, and efforts to notify the copyright owner. Ther is no way to be sure what actions the owner will take, if any, within those that the law allows. Often a owner in such a case will not bring suit if the infringement was apparently innocent, resulting profits were small, the infringement has been halted, and future infringement by that infringer seems unlikely. But different owners have different policies on such matters. An owner can delay in deciding whether to file suit or not.

If by "streaming," you mean "having my web browser create temporary copies of media from an online source so that I can view it," then Canadian law is unclear. I can't really do better to demonstrate than to cite a few articles on the subject. According to Alex Buonassisi and Jennifer Marles of IP law firm Oyen Wiggs: [...] it is not entirely clear that receiving an unauthorized stream of a copyrighted work in Canada does not infringe copyright. At best, this activity could be said to fall within a grey zone. According to Sandy Kang writing for law school blog IP Osgoode: As for users of such websites, it is currently uncertain whether their act of streaming video would be found to infringe. According to Michael Geist, a University of Ottawa law professor specializing in IP: The most controversial sources are unauthorized streaming websites that offer free content without permission of the rights holder. [...] Those accessing the streams are unlikely to be infringing copyright, however. As you can see, there is a variety of expert opinions on whether streaming pirated movies is an infringement. The section under debate is 30.71 on temporary reproductions, especially subsection (b): It is not an infringement of copyright to make a reproduction of a work or other subject-matter if (a) the reproduction forms an essential part of a technological process; (b) the reproduction’s only purpose is to facilitate a use that is not an infringement of copyright; and (c) the reproduction exists only for the duration of the technological process. I don't want to duplicate what articles above have already stated, but I'd like to dive deeper into Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, cited by the first two articles as a similar case (reaffirmed in 2015 after a few rounds of statute amendments). In it the Supreme Court held that prerecorded "ephemeral" copies used to facilitate a broadcast was an infringement. The key piece of reasoning is: [... the broadcaster] has not established that, at the time of their enactment, the sections of the Act providing for the right to broadcast a performance must have been understood to include the right to prerecord. Even now it remains fully possible, and quite common, to broadcast live performances. To me, there are two key differences why this logic might not directly transpose to the streaming pirated movies situation: "Ephemeral" prerecorded copies aren't necessarily "temporary" copies within the scope of section 30.71 above, particularly subsections (a) and (c) might not strictly be met. This case discusses the point of view of the broadcaster which is analogous to the hoster, not the end-user. While making ephemeral/temporary copies might not be strictly necessary for broadcasting, viewing online content necessarily creates at least a temporary copy on the end-user's computer. Two other random notes: None of the involved sections have a "reasonableness" or "should have known" clause whereas they are present in other parts of the Copyright Act. This means whether its legal should theoretically depend strictly on the facts (i.e. if it turns out to be illegal, pleading "oh I didn't know it was pirated" won't work). Funny enough, I don't actually see anything in the law that would differentiate between streaming online pirated video and your example of something illegal being aired on TV provided its digital (presumably some part of the TV has a temporary copy too).

I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it.

In general, a gameplay video would be either a partial copy or a derivative work, and in either case an infringement if created without permission. Such a video might be covered under fair use in US copyright law, particularly if made for the purpose of commentary on a game or instruction in how to play or design a game. In general, a fair use defense is more likely to succeed if only the minimum amount of the work required for the purpose is used, and sound tracks might not be required for such a purpose. Thus a maker of such a video might choose to omit the sound to improve the fair-use case. Moreover, when the sound track contains licensed popular music it would be subject to a separate copyright, and many music publishers are notoriously litigious, so prudence would advise omitting the sound. All that said, fair-use is a case-by-case determination, and if the makers of such videos have not been sued, they (and we) can only guess how a case would turn out. As to why game makers refrain from having such videos taken down (if they in fact do refrain) one can only speculate. Game publishers may consider the videos good advertising. Questions based on the absence of legal proceedings are inherently speculative, unless a copyright holder has announced a policy of not taking action and the reasons for it.

canada Bob is not committing any standalone copyright infringement unless he needs to make a further copy of the material in order to receive it (such as a download). However, Rob is committing an offence punishable by indictment by making for sale an infringing copy (s. 42(1) of the Copyright Act. If Bob, knowing that Rob is selling infringing copies, buys one of them, then Bob commits the offence of possessing a thing while knowing the thing was derived from the commission of an offence punishable by indictment (Criminal Code, s. 354). (Credit to jcaron, who noted this and provided a similar answer for France.)

It seems crazy to me that you would have to give credits for some image especially if you're just sharing those images for fun. It seems crazy to me that anyone would think you can just use someone else's image without giving them credit. I mean, it's not really a good idea to assume that if you see something you want, you can just take it. But anyway, back to the point: in order to share an image on social media, (1) you have to make a copy of it, (2) you have to give ("distribute") that copy to the social media website, and (3) they have to make and distribute copies of it in order for anyone else to see it. In the US or countries with similar copyright laws, the right to make copies of a creative work - like an image - is reserved to the copyright holder, which is often the person or company that created the work in the first place. Same with the right to distribute copies. So based on that part of the law alone, all three steps I mentioned above would be illegal, and if that were all there were to it, it would be flat-out illegal to share images on social media. However, there are two ways to get around this. One is to have the copyright holder give you permission to (1) make copies of the work, (2) distribute those copies, and (3) legally give other people the right to make and distribute copies of their own. The typical way to do this is with a license, such as the Creative Commons licenses. For example, the CC-BY-ND 4.0 license says this: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material. In your case, what that means is that the copyright holder for the image ("Licensor") grants "You", the person who downloaded or otherwise acquired the image, permission to (1) make copies ("reproduce") and (2) distribute copies ("Share") of the image (the "Licensed Material"), as long as you abide by certain conditions ("Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License"). And there's another section that says this: Every recipient of the Licensed Material automatically receives an offer from the Licensor to exercise the Licensed Rights under the terms and conditions of this Public License. which means that the copyright holder ("Licensor") gives anyone who gets a copy of the image (such as the people you share it with) permission to (3) make and distribute copies of their own, as long as they comply with the same conditions. So there you go: as long as you abide by the conditions, and the social media site abides by the conditions, you have permission to do all three things you need to do to share the image on social media. Now, what are those conditions? There are a few of them but this is the main one for what you're asking: If You Share the Licensed Material, You must: retain the following if it is supplied by the Licensor with the Licensed Material: identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Licensor (including by pseudonym if designated); a copyright notice; a notice that refers to this Public License; a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties; a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably practicable; indicate if You modified the Licensed Material and retain an indication of any previous modifications; and indicate the Licensed Material is licensed under this Public License, and include the text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, this Public License. This says that if you share the image, you have to keep the attribution information provided along with the image when you got it. The attribution info might be in the image itself, or it might be part of a web page in which the image is embedded, or something else. Whatever it is, you have to pass it on along with the image in some reasonable way. On social media, that might mean including the attribution info in the same post where you share the image, if it's not already included in the image itself. If you don't, then this part of the license kicks in: However, if You fail to comply with this Public License, then Your rights under this Public License terminate automatically. That means that if you share the image without keeping the attribution information that was there when it was shared with you, then you have lost your right to share the image at all (because, remember, the license was the only thing that allowed you to share the image in the first place; otherwise it would have been illegal to copy or distribute it). So in summary, if an image is under a Creative Commons license, yes you must share the attribution info along with the image. Otherwise it's illegal for you to share the image at all. For completeness, though, I should mention there's another way to get around the sharing of images being illegal. Most countries' copyright laws provide limited exceptions where you can copy and distribute something you otherwise wouldn't be able to in order to enable education, research, journalism, critical analysis, and that sort of thing. In the US, the factors that go into determining whether this exception applies are how you're using the copyrighted work (in your case, the image) - this includes whether you're trying to make money off it the nature of the work, such as how creative it is how much of the work you're using whether and how your use affects the market for the original And although the details vary widely in other countries, many of them also use some of the same or similar criteria. This is one way that the fact that you're not making money from sharing the image could conceivably push it toward being okay, although you don't necessarily get a free pass to share the image just because you're not making money from it. Because the laws vary so much from country to country, and the circumstances vary so much from case to case, it's impossible to say in general whether attribution is really required when you're taking advantage of this exception. Even if it's not mentioned directly in the law, it might be among the relevant pieces of information taken into account by a court in any particular case. However, I have a hard time imagining how including attribution could hurt this kind of case, so my guess would be that even someone who intends to rely on this exception to copyright law is better off keeping attribution information intact.

If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.

Is it legal to shine a non-laser light source at an aircraft? After all the media coverage about people pointing lasers at commercial aircraft, I started to wonder what was so special about lasers. It seems to me that the amount of distraction that could be done with a 5mW laser is significantly less than what could be done with something else. For example, if I bought/borrowed the light beam from the Luxor hotel, put it in my backyard, turned it on, and pointed it at the planes flying out of a major airport, I would expect that pilots might have some more issues with a 4.3 Billion candela beam than with a 5mW laser (right?) However, I can't find any laws against it, so would this be legal? Alternatively, what if I just wanted to swing that beam around in the sky, and it accidentally crossed the path of a plane? Are there different laws regarding unintentionally hitting a plane with something like this?

If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.

Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well.

Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined).

In the United States, You have no expectation of privacy in public. Anything you can see from a public place, you can take a picture of, even if the "victim" is in their own home but has the blinds open. If you are standing on a public sidewalk or street, you would legally be able to take a picture with certain exceptions. An exception to this would be: if with just your eyes you can see into a private home, you can take a picture of that, but if you require a telescopic lense with some sort of IR adapter to "see through" blinds. That MAY be considered illegal. For real world examples of this question, check out PINAC. Another example is "Creepy Camara Guy", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs6iLtl0BAw. This guy basically goes around recording videos of people in public in a VERY obnoxious way. But he is within his legal right. (Note: Video unavailable: "This video is no longer available because the YouTube account associated with this video has been terminated.")

No one can tell you how the facts are going to line up if you get sued. The attractive nuisance doctrine is alive and you can be found liable if you have, on your property, a dangerous condition which is attractive to children, especially if the danger is not appreciable to the child. Now, I'm a bit skeptical that a child would climb a fence to kick snow, especially if there is other snow outside the fence for them to kick, but stranger things have happened. What can you do? These are ideas, I don't think they are legal advice. Start with the premise that dangerous stuff happens everyday, and kids aren't getting hurt by most of it. Use a fence with barbed wire. In other words, injured the the child with a lesser injury to reduce your liability. Use an opaque fence. Granted, curiosity might be too great and a child will trespass to discover what you are hiding. Use a shed, just one of those thin aluminum structures. Include proximity sensors to set off alarms and lights and whatever. Get your project away from kids; find space in a commercial area.

The U.K. Civil Aviation Authority provides information about making noise complaints to the relevant airport. It also notes that your local planning authority can provide more information about operating hours and noise restrictions. You could also ask at Aviation Stack Exchange for more information about identifying the aircraft and owner. This is also a political issue that Parliament attends to from time to time, so you can talk to your MP about it: Research Briefing: Aviation Noise (2017) Independent Commission on Civil Aviation Noise (2021) At common-law, there might have been causes of action available in trespass, nuisance, or public nuisance, but the Civil Aviation Act 1982 says that "[n]o action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance" as long as aviation regulations and orders are complied with.

It is basically fraud, and there are two ways in which it could be illegal: it might be a crime, and you might get sued for doing it (you would not be fined or imprisoned, but you may have to compensate the hotel chain for their loss). Whether or not it is a crime depends on the jurisdiction. In Washington, there are very many laws against fraud such as RCW 9.38 (credit), RCW 9.45 (numerous things where a business defrauds others), RCW 9.60 (forgery) but none of them would apply to lying about a material fact to a business in order to get a discount. Texas likewise has a long section on criminal fraud. It is not clear from the wording whether a customer lying to a business (not involving forgery, vehicles, credit, or financial institutions) is covered. 32.42(b)(10) says A person commits an offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence commits one or more of the following deceptive business practices... making a materially false or misleading statement of fact concerning the reason for, existence of, or amount of a price or price reduction The question of interpretation that this raises is whether a person who has said "I'm over 70" so that they can get a discount has made a statement "concerning the reason for a price reduction". The ordinary interpretation of "concerning the reason for" would be that it refers to explaining why or under what conditions a price reduction exists. For the moment, I am skeptical that this definition would include the case at hand, but that will require a search through case law and jury instructions. From the lawsuit angle, you would have knowingly made a false material statement in order to obtain a value, which is illegal, and they could sue you to recover the discount.

I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks...

Does AGPL apply to products created by the software, or just the software? I'm a 3D modeler by trade, and in the past I've used some software to create a base mesh for humanoid renders. I'm seeing now that, while it used to be AGPL and CC0, it's now entirely AGPL, and by some mechanism which I do not fully understand this seems to apply to products and meshes created with it. That is, if I produce a model while using this software, I am required to release the model, and any software dependent on the model (say, a game or a web app), under the same license. This feels extraordinarily aggressive. This is very strange to me. It feels like a paintbrush manufacturer demanding royalties on all paintings done with their brush. Additionally, when AGPL was created, it was apparently to close a gap in GPLv3 which allowed companies to alter software on a server and open it to the public via a web interface; which was phrased loosely enough to potentially apply to all products created by the program. While I'm historically a big fan of GPL-created works and feel that they have done wonders for the whole of the software and multimedia community, this AGPL oddity is a total deal-breaker for the software-in-question. I'm no longer even entirely certain about my rights to my videos. What is the nature of this reach? Do I need to make my application AGPL simply because I used an AGPL-produced resource in it? And, perhaps most importantly, has this ever been enforced in a court of law, or could it be in the United States?

OK, seems I was right to begin with, but after building some work with this I had to be sure. The problem seems to step from a lot of not-lawyers overinterpreting the reach and applicability of copyright law, which, with a few asides, is the full extent of the AGPL. Additionally, the software is not based in an English-speaking country, which may have thrown the interpreted meaning of "derivative product", as opposed to simply "product". The AGPL is indeed in almost all ways the same as the GPL version 3; in fact you can see this by diffing the two documents. The only extension of the GPLv3 made for AGPL applies to software being run on a server. While it is indeed possible to include code in the final files, which might, in theory, constitute a significant portion of this program, that does not happen. The AGPL is apparently also meant almost exclusively for software, though the wording does include the ambiguous phrase "and other products"; this concerned me as it felt as though it might apply to the resources created by the work. It, broadly speaking, does not. So, I've got nothing to worry about--unless I was distributing derivative software, which would be an entirely different question and subject to this.

Company B has created a derived work from company A's copyright-protected work, so yes, B has infringed on A's copyright. It might be difficult for A to prove it, however, so B might get away with it, but it's still infringement. On the other hand, if B creates software that behaves like A's through reverse engineering, that is, by examining the program's function without examining its code, then they will not have infringed the copyright in the code.

Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk.

The requirement to make the code publicly available is binding on Olio, and on Olio's successor, Flex. Olio, by accepting the code under the GPL, had contracted with the original author of that code, one of the contract provisions being to make any modified code available publicly. If Olio fails to abide by that agreement, it is in violation of the license, and the original author could sue Olio for copyright infringement, or sue Flex as having bought the assets and liabilities. But the individual employees of Olio are not under any obligation to publish such modified code, as they were presumably not parties to the license deal -- Olio was. Therefore the NDA does not require them to violate any law or contract to which they might be parties. The NDA could probably not be used to prevent the employees from testifying if called in such a copyright suit. If the NDA did require an illegal action, it would be void. If it merely required a person to violate a civil agreement that could be settled for money, it might or might not be enforceable, depending on the exact provisions, its reasonableness under the exact circumstances, and the local law.

I am assuming that you are in the United States for this question. Please correct me if this is not the case. MathWorks still holds the right to take action, which may be anything from cease-and-desist letters up to litigation. You have followed the correct process in asking for permission to use a trademark. The owner of the trademark, MathWorks, has given you their answer, which is quite simply, "no". You may not feel that their reasoning is fair, but the default state of trademarks is that they are under ownership of whomever created them, and you do not have permission to use them. Things will remain that way unless MathWorks changes their mind. It doesn't matter if it feels dismissive of them; they are under no obligation to even consider requests to use their marks. If they didn't explicitly say, "sure, go ahead", or even, "yes, you may use it provided you follow a list of conditions", then using their trademark will be an unlicensed usage. If you still would like to pursue getting permission to use their trademarked assets, you will need to try to contact them again. Until they say otherwise, using their trademarks will be considered unauthorized use. (Edited to add this clarification brought up by @David Siegel): However, your usage might not be violation of trademark. The primary purpose of trademark restriction is to stop someone from misrepresenting a product as being from the entity that owns the trademark; this stops someone from, for example, selling a cola soft drink called "Coke-a-Cola". The reasons for this are manyfold, but the basic idea is that allowing that type of usage means that consumers might not be able to tell that your product is distinct from the original, and could then mistakenly attribute the quality and level of service of the previous brand with the new product. If your usage of MATLAB marks is such that you are identifying the products used as from MathWorks, and not yourself, and are doing everything in good faith to disassociate your website and/or offerings from MathWorks, it is possible that your usage would be considered correct usage of trademark. Even if it is legal usage, MathWorks still may decide to take action. If MathWorks believes that your usage is unauthorized and that it is trademark violation, they may decide to take action. This is regardless of whether it actually is; until you have this case in front of a court, you will not get a definitive answer. We cannot answer whether this is a legal usage of trademark. Ultimately, whether or not a usage of a mark is considered to be correct usage is a question that can only be answered by the courts, which means the only person who can give you concrete advice on a course of action is a lawyer. In lieu of proper legal advice, you will need to weigh the risk of MathWorks taking action against your usage with the benefit you receive from usage. (Edited to add this clarification by @Dale M): Regardless, you may be breaking copyright by using the logo. There is a separate issue besides just trademark at play here. The copyright for the MATLAB logo belongs to whomever created it/owns it (presumably, MathWorks in this case). Using the logo without permission is a copyright violation. The only case in which this would not be a violation is if the logo is released for use in general under a compatible license, such as Creative Commons; do note that these licenses typically have additional conditions, such as requiring attribution. If you are unaware as to whether there is a such a license, or if you fail to follow the terms of the license, usage of the logo almost certainly constitutes copyright infringement.

Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.

If you can accurately describe in one license what constitutes the conditions where you wish to let users freely copy the software, and forbid any other uses, then you can also offer a second license that allows specified commercial uses with a second license. Basically, it reduces to being clear (to yourself and to the world) on what you mean by "service", and what you want to allow vs. prohibit. That SSPL has a section on "Offering the program as a service", though it does not prohibit it, it just requires the user to make the source code available for free. You could rewrite that section, and then hire a lawyer to give an opinion as to whether your re-write does what you think it does. Pay attention to the fact that you are interested in restrictions on "cloud servers" but the SSPL permissions are broader.

The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP.

How can roomate finder offer an 'LGBT household' option for filtering potential roomates without violating USA's fair housing act? The title sort of says it all. I was using a roommate finding/room rental app when I noticed it had an option to filter for 'LGBT housing'. The Fair Housing Act forbids discriminating against sex, including sexuality. Thus I'm wondering how allowing preferential treatment to LBGT sexualities/genders wouldn't constitute discrimination?

The words of the prohibition in 24 CFR 100.60(a)are that It shall be unlawful for a person to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling to a person who has made a bona fide offer, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin or to refuse to negotiate with a person for the sale or rental of a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, or to discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of handicap. It would be discriminatory for the landlord to refuse to rent to a person because they are or are not of some sex. Based just on the plain language of the prohibition, the author of the app or operator of a website is not renting / refusing to rent. Nevertheless, Roommate.com was sued, and found not liable, though not on the grounds that they hadn't discriminated Fair Housing Councils v. Rommate.com addressed an attempt to punish roommate.com on discriminatory grounds. The court states that "The pivotal question is whether the FHA applies to roommates". The court's reasoning is a clear application of the notion of "Congressional intent". As they say, There’s no indication that Congress intended to interfere with personal relationships inside the home. Congress wanted to address the problem of landlords discriminating in the sale and rental of housing, which deprived protected classes of housing opportunities. But a business transaction between a tenant and landlord is quite different from an arrangement between two people sharing the same living space. We seriously doubt Congress meant the FHA to apply to the latter. Consider, for example, the FHA’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Could Congress, in the 1960s, really have meant that women must accept men as roommates? Telling women they may not lawfully exclude men from the list of acceptable roommates would be controversial today; it would have been scandalous in the 1960s The court continued on other grounds, observing that given that the FHA is a remedial statute that we construe broadly... we turn to constitutional concerns, which provide strong countervailing considerations That is, even if you ignore congressional intent, there is a constitutional reason why FHA cannot apply to roommate choice. SCOTUS in Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 stated that "the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights", and "Courts have extended the right of intimate association to marriage, child bearing, child rearing and cohabitation with relatives". Then in order to "determine whether a particular relationship is protected by the right to intimate association we look to 'size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship'". After extensive analysis centered around the point that "Government regulation of an individual’s ability to pick a roommate thus intrudes into the home, which 'is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people'", the court "adopt[s] the narrower construction that excludes roommate selection from the reach of the FHA". TL;DR the FHA doesn't apply to roommates and it's legal to select one's roommates based on their race, color, religion, sex, sexuality, etc...

That’s legal The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination on the basis of “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, marital status or disability”. Federal law prevents employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), national origin, age (40 or older), disability and genetic information (including family medical history). What law school you went to is on neither list. If Harvard’s policies break the rules, that’s not the firm’s issue. However, AFAIK, Harvard is scrupulously fair in their admissions program - so long as you have the grades and the money, they’ll let you in. It’s not Harvard’s fault that most of the people who get the best secondary education and have the most money are predominantly white, Christian, and US born - that’s do to politico-social-historical-economic factors beyond Harvard’s control.

You cannot sell the same goods or services at different price points based on gender in the EU Council directive 2004/113/EC required members to implement local laws to "prohibit discrimination based on sex in the access to and supply of goods and services" and it "should apply to both direct discrimination and indirect discrimination." The example you cite would appear to be both direct (tickets) and indirect (skirts) discrimination.

Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario.

Discrimination in employment The starting point is: discrimination is legal unless there is a law that says it isn't. So for example, when I advertise a plumbing position, I can discriminate on the basis of if a candidate is or is not a plumber and, further, I can discriminate on how good a plumber I think they are. What I can't do, in the united-states is discriminate against someone on the basis of age if they are 40 or older. It is legal for me to discriminate against someone on age if they are younger than 40. Why? Because that's what the law says. The full list of what constitutes illegal discrimination in employment is a person's race, color, religion, sex (including gender identity, sexual orientation, and pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information. It is also illegal to retaliate against a person because he or she complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit. Elections aren't employment Voters are free to vote for the candidate of their choice based on whatever reason they want. If I want to decide that the only candidates I will vote for are female homosexuals between the ages of 27 and 62 with one leg and a pirate accent, then that's my right.

The default rule is that a landlord can refuse to rent to anyone for any reason, in which case the landlord can refuse to rent in this case. There are civil rights laws that limit this discretion in the case, for example, of discrimination based on race, or family status. But, those laws often have exemptions for owners of small amounts of property (e.g. a unit in their own home), which can't easily be determined from the question. If a civil rights law applies, the landlord must choose among potential renters on a non-discriminatory basis - the landlord doesn't have to rent to anyone in particular, but can't use the prohibited reasons to make the choice. If the default rule does not apply because a civil rights law unrelated to immigration bars discrimination against a tenant, someone's undocumented immigrant status probably doesn't provide an absolute defense to the civil rights law, but might be one factor among many that a landlord could consider in choosing among available tenants in much the same way that credit ratings, income, and a prospective tenant's criminal record, and other factors might be considered.

Education level is not an FHA protected category. However, whenever you give one broad group preferential treatment over another, you'll raise eyebrows. Someone might argue, for example, that while your incentive does not explicitly mention a protected category like race or sex, it might disproportionately impact one group in a protected category over another. In fact, the Supreme Court in 2015 addressed this question in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project. They found (albeit by a 5-4 vote) that disparate impact could, under certain circumstances, be the basis for a discrimination claim under FHA. The Wikipedia article on this subject is informative. As for your case, it really depends on what you are trying to accomplish with the policy, and what you reasonably predict it will do. For example, given that in most areas, white people more often have graduate degrees than black people, then if this policy did in fact end up advantaging white tenant over black tenants, someone might claim that you are in effect discriminating on the basis of race. I would not want to be on the defending end of that claim. In general, if you want to be safe from FHA's wrath, you need to evaluate each applicant on their individual merits as a tenant, not their membership in some group. Whenever you treat one person differently from another person, you should have a reason that clearly derives from your business interests as a landlord, and you should write it down. Legal questions aside, it seems like a really bad idea to offer incentives like this. I can't imagine it achieving any legitimate business goal, and I can easily imagine it making tenants or applicants feel cheated and devalued. And when people feel cheated and devalued, even if they haven't legally been wronged, they often seek legal redress. Or slash your tires. The fact that grad degrees would not be required under your policy isn't relevant. In the eyes of the FHA, any disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category is discrimination. The only real question here is whether this is disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category.

First, to be clear, this is almost never a state level limitation. To the extent that the link in the question implies otherwise, it is incorrect. Instead, local governments, typically a municipality or in an area that is not part of any municipality, a county, enacts land use regulations, the most common of which is usually called a "zoning code." There are also usually locally adopted building codes that supplement the zoning code. A zoning code typically establishes rules regarding how different kinds of real estate can be used in different enumerated zones. Usually, there are several different zones in which residential uses are allowed and different rules apply in each one. One of the typical limitations in a residential zone is to establish the number of unrelated people who don't own the home who may live there. The purpose of such limitations is to discourage the establishment of boarding houses, group homes, women's shelters, homeless shelters, flop houses, and halfway houses in relatively low density residential zones, on the theory that these uses are undesirable in terms of neighborhood character and cause undesirable people to move into a neighborhood that lowers property values for other people who live there. More crassly, people in affluent neighborhoods want to ban property uses that make it possible for poorer people to live near them. Often the actual scope of the limitations, however, is far broader than is necessary to prohibit these particularly unpopular "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) uses. The drafters of zoning codes are frequently more concerned about preventing loopholes in their restrictions from being identified than about limiting property rights in a respect that most current property owners in the zone don't avail themselves of anyway. For example, in Denver, where I live, the City Council recently passed a Group Living Amendment to its zoning code easing restrictions on uses of residences by unrelated people. This measure was sufficiently controversial that members of the public used their referral powers to petition to have the repeal of the recently enacted legislation places on the November 2021 general election ballot for voters to consider repealing it. As the link in the question notes, homeowner's associations, frequently also impose limitations on this kind of use of a residence, which are often even more strict, and are frequently adopted for the same reason. HOAs have more authority to do so than local governments because as private entities, they aren't required to meet constitutional law limitations on their authority. The question is, if both parties agree to forgo any safety measures that it might be there to protect, who exactly is it hurting if one person pays the other to stay over? In simple terms: why is it illegal? Why does the government care who stays in who's house, while paying money? Is there some 3rd party that is negatively affected if the guidelines aren't followed? The third-party is the neighboring property owners who fear that the quality of their neighborhood will be reduced by this kind of agreement. I am sympathetic to these criticisms. But, they aren't barriers to enacting laws if people with the power to enact legislation disagree. The simple rule is that in the real world, legislation is not required to adhere to a liberal/libertarian ideal in which laws are enacted only to regulate matters in which someone else may arguably be harmed. Subject to light constitutional regulation, the authority of local government's to enact legislation regulating the use of property is frequently plenary (i.e. unlimited) or close to it. The government can do anything it wants that it isn't forbidden from doing by the constitution or a higher level government's statutes. Courts aren't permitted to second guess the accuracy or desirability of these legislative determinations in most cases. Many states, furthermore, have "home rule cities" that are expressly protected from having their legislative authority limited in many respects by state legislation. A regulatory taking, the prevents property from having any beneficial use, must be compensated by the government enacting the regulation of its use. But regulatory laws may reduce the value of property by limiting the uses to which it can be put so long as there is still some beneficial use of the property that remains available. A very light and disputed impact that is perceived to be negative, such as the one in this case, is a sufficient rational basis for a municipal or local government to enact such legislation, and many local government zoning codes do, in fact, regulate this kind of activity. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of local governments to enact this kind of legislation in the United States in the face of a constitutional challenge to it, in the case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. in 1926, although some more extreme versions of limitations on non-related people sharing a home have subsequently been held to be invalid, mostly as a result of later enacted federal fair housing laws.

From what age may children walk home alone from an activity/sport in Germany? In the UK, there are strict safeguarding rules for children. If a child is not picked up after school or an activity by their parents or caregivers, the teachers need to wait until they are picked up and their responsibilities are clear to ensure the child's safety. I haven't found any similar advice for Germany. There is plenty of advice for parents and leaving children alone (usually at home), but I have not found anything concrete on the responsibilities of others who might be looking after the children and where that responsibility ends. Are there particular laws that apply to children in this context in Germany, particularly in what context they can be unaccompanied and who is responsible for them? Do the laws change at particular ages? Let's say I run a swimming course, for instance, and the class finishes at 5 pm. Who is responsible for the child now that the class has ended? If a 10-year-old child says that their parents "said they could go home alone", can I reasonably stop them? If their parents then instruct me verbally (e.g. over the phone) to send them home, am I free to send them walking off into the sunset with no more responsibility? Is this different if they were 6 years old? Or a 6 year old accompanied by a 10 year old?

germany Ah, okay, there isn't any easy answer/number/table for this. In general, the "Aufsichtspflicht" results from Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 1631 Inhalt und Grenzen der Personensorge. There are not clear cut lines or given ages. This is mainly because it does not make a lot of sense. A very independent and mature 6 year old can do things a less developed or even disabled person might not be able to do, even at the age of 18+. Generally speaking, the parents have the duty to care for the child, anything else can be handled by contracts. For example a contract with a kindergarten. Or School. Or private/public pool. From personal experience I can say this: Germany is very safe. Kids go to school on foot, on bike or longer distances by normal public transport among all the other adults. We do not have "school busses". Between 07:00 and 08:00 public transport is packed with kids of all ages going to school. Schools do not normally have their own stops. Kids get off at the nearest stop and walk the rest of the way. Around the school you will see streams of children coming from all directions on bike or foot. It is rare to see adults accompanying them, unless it's the first weeks of elementary school or the last day before school holidays where parents pick up their kids to do something fun after school. When I was a kid, I walked to school every day, almost from day one of elementary school. The first few weeks an adult would accompany us (one of the parents, they had a rotation going), then we walked on our own, as a group of 3-4 kids in the same class from the same neighborhood block. Google maps says it's a 10 minute walk of 800 meters. If any teacher had stopped me from leaving the school building on my own when school was finished, I am sure people would have wondered why. That only happened for mentally handicapped kids. Even kids who needed transport for one reason or another would just know to wait in front of the school. No teacher or other adult would be there. At 5th grade, I know half my class came by bike and in the winter or on rainy days by public transport, because they did not live in walking distance to the school. Neither did I, but I lived close enough to not get the public transport ticket subsidized, so the kids from our street got there by bike, or on foot when the parents deemed riding a bike to unsafe in snow and ice in winter. Who is responsible for the child now that the class has ended? The parents. Unless the contract says otherwise, or circumstances are exceptionally dangerous. There is no exact written guideline for this, because it would not make sense. The adult has to know what is exceptionally dangerous and what is not. It can be perfectly safe for a 10 year old to walk home through the woods. If that is what the parents deem okay, then it is okay. Yet as the adult in charge, you have the duty to keep them back, if you know the woods are on fire today, or a criminal escaped into the woods or something similar that would make it significantly more dangerous then the parents had in mind when they made their general decision. If a 10-year-old child says that their parents "said they could go home alone", can I reasonably stop them? If you have a contract that says they cannot go home alone, sure. If there is a special situation that implies the conditions have changed from what your contract said (lets say the radio broadcasts a storm warning and you see that the weather is horrible and branches flying around could injure a smaller kid) you can (maybe even have to), even if you do not have a contract. Otherwise... why would you? It’s their parents decision. If they had wanted you to keep an eye on their kids when the time is up, they would have made a contract that says so.

In 50/50 custody you have the right to stand your ground to ensure the safety and well being of your children. You do not need to involve police unless it is an emergency. "911 Operator, what is the emergency". Only call them when you feel your children are in grave danger. For example, you know for sure that the other parent is drunk and driving, or the other parent is drunk and on the ground unable to move and the child is in danger, etc. If you involve the police over your partner excessive drinking than, and they find that she was not excessively drinking, you will face false accusation charges and her lawyer will try to make you look like the bad guy trying to take away her children. how drunk does my ex have to be for me to deny a drop-off? Is it entirely based upon outward signs or blood-alcohol level? You should not search for drugs or alcohol, or administer tests, as to avoid the accusation of an illegal search. You can, however, based on your judgment of common sense assess the situation and see how drunk (s)he is and make your decision based on that circumstances. Make a 1-page log to document the date, time, situation description (3-5 sentences of what you see and why you make that decision.) It would be wise to have a witness around, so write down the person name as well for reference, (NOT MANY PEOPLE LIKE TO BE WITNESSES, But you can write down the people names that you know were around that incident.) Don't tell your partner that you are making the log. Suprise them in the court when you have a full page of incidents due to drinking. Am I correct in assuming that in order to protect myself from being accused of denying visitation, that (in the future) I need to involve the police if I suspect her of being intoxicated? *Always protect yourself! Be Your Own Advocate. * Don't involve the police unless its am emergency, read the first comment above. If I involve the police, do I need to be sure that she is extremely intoxicated in order to avoid a "false alarm"? (Obviously, this scares me as I'd prefer she didn't drink at all) This drinking incident is alarming itself. However, you should consult with your family law attorney. I would say that document five issues if it exceeds 5 in one month than filing a motion with the court to adjust the drinking problem, and that you request the child to be with you 60/40 custody. You must be able to demonstrate that you have the time, commitment and resources to take over the 60/40 custody. What options do I have, if any, if she drinks around him in her own home? Is she within her legal right as long as she doesn't get in a car, doesn't pass out or does something blatantly abusive? File a motion to adjust the custody, speak with your family law attorney.

Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.

In the united-states the heart of COPPA is 15 U.S. Code § 6502. This section requires (in sub-section (b) (1)) that: (A) ... the operator of any website or online service directed to children that collects personal information from children or the operator of a website or online service that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child (defined as a person under age 13)— (i) to provide notice on the website of what information is collected from children by the operator, how the operator uses such information, and the operator’s disclosure practices for such information; and (ii) to obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from children; It also requires (in subsection (b) (1) (B)) any such website operator to provide a description of personal information (PI) collected and to permit a child or parent to refuse permission for further use or collection of such PI. subsection (b) (1) (C) prohibits requiring more PI to be submitted than is "reasonably necessary" for a child to participate in a game or other activity, or be eligible for a prize. subsection (b) (1) (D) requires an operator: to establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected from children. Nothing in COPPA requires any content to be labeled as "for children" or as "not for children". Marking some content, or even an entire site, as "not for children" is evidence that the site is not "targeted at children" and so may avoid the operator being required to comply with 15 USC § 6502. In addition, other US laws, not part of COPPA, prohibit knowingly furnishing to a minor sexually explicit or otherwise "inappropriate" content, even when this is not legally obscene and would be protected when furnished to an adult. Marking content as "not for children" and attempting to verify age might help avoid application of such laws. The Wikipedia article about COPPA says: In 2019, the Government of the State of New York sued YouTube for violating COPPA by illegally retaining information related to children under 13 years of age. YouTube responded by dividing its content strictly into "for kids" and "not for kids". This has met with extremely harsh criticism from the YouTube community, especially from gamers, with many alleging that the FTC of the United States intends to fine content creators $42,530 for "each mislabeled video", possibly putting all users at risk. However, some have expressed skepticism over this, feeling that the fines may actually be in reference to civil penalties, possibly intended for the site's operators and/or warranted by more serious of COPPA violations or specific cases of "mislabeling videos." (citations omitted) This WGN news story "All You Need To Know About COPPA On Youtube" includes a link to an interview with Peder Magee, a Senior Attorney of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. Magee says in the interview that recent actions under the law were for failing to properly handle PI collected from children. At time 5:02 Magee says "...and if you are collecting personal information [from children] you may have to comply with the law". COPPA does not make any content "illegal". What it prohibits is collecting excessive PI from children, not obtaining consent for collecting PI in some cases, or refusing to delete such PI on request. If a site does not collect any PI from users, 15 USC § 6502 simply does not apply to that site. Website operators may choose to restrict the access of children to avoid possible applicability of 15 USC § 6502 and its administrative requirements. They have the option of providing access but complying in regard to any PI collected. Note that COPPA is, in theory, applicable to non-US sites that are targeted at US users or collect PI from US users. However, according to the Wikipedia article: in practice, the FTC has never (as of 2015) actually issued any enforcement action against foreign companies, and attempts to do so may be frustrated by the lack of jurisdiction. Obviously, laws in countries other than the US are likely to be different.

This effectively comes under duty of care. Firstly, in England and Wales there is no obligation to be a Good Samaritan - in other words, there is no obligation to be a rescuer. Until you intervene to try and rescue someone, you do not owe that person a duty. As soon as you do intervene, however, you do owe them a duty. Specifically, you owe them a duty not to make the situation worse (Horsey and Rackley, Tort Law, 3rd ed., OUP 2013, p. 75). The specific situation Horsey and Rackley give is that of resuscitating a drowning child and breaking a rib as you do so: this may be 'making the situation worse' (Horsey and Rackley, pp. 75-76). Does this mean that you'll be liable if you give someone first aid and in doing so, you make the situation worse? Not necessarily, because, as Horsey and Rackley point out, duty is different to liability. Using the drowning child example again, they state: So, for example, while someone who intervenes may owe a duty not to make the situation worse, their actions would still be judged against those of a 'reasonable person' in the circumstances (and so if a reasonable person would have tried to resuscitate the child in the same way, there will be no breach of their duty and therefore no liability to pay compensation.) (p.76) The 'reasonable person' standard corresponds to what you mentioned in the question about lack of expertise. If a doctor intervenes in such a situation, the standard of care they'd be expected to give would be higher than, say, for someone who's simply done a basic first aid course. The question is whether or not you've acted as the reasonable person in your situation would have done. On that basis, then, your tutor is pretty much correct: so long as you take such care as is reasonable based on your expertise, or lack thereof, then under English and Welsh law, you're unlikely to be liable.

Maybe: In California, you must be at least 16 years old to drive with an out-of-state permit. Since some states offer permits to persons younger than 16, those would not be valid in CA until the individual's 16th birthday. An out-of-state learner's permit is only valid for 10 days following the date of entry (inclusive). For periods longer than 10 days, one must apply for a Nonresident Minor's Certificate. Cal. Veh. Code § 12504(a) takes the previous two sections on nonresident licensing, which apply to persons over the age of 18, applies them to persons aged 16-18, and adds the 10-day caveat as described above: (a) Sections 12502 and 12503 apply to any nonresident over the age of 16 years but under the age of 18 years. The maximum period during which that nonresident may operate a motor vehicle in this state without obtaining a driver's license is limited to a period of 10 days immediately following the entry of the nonresident into this state except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section. (b) provides that the 10-day restriction does not apply where the person has a license and has a Nonresident Minor's Certificate: (b) Any nonresident over the age of 16 years but under the age of 18 years who is a resident of a foreign jurisdiction which requires the licensing of drivers may continue to operate a motor vehicle in this state after 10 days from his or her date of entry into this state if he or she meets both the following: He or she has a valid driver's license, issued by the foreign jurisdiction, in his or her immediate possession. He or she has been issued and has in his or her immediate possession a nonresident minor's certificate, which the department issues to a nonresident minor who holds a valid driver's license issued to him or her by his or her home state or country, and who files proof of financial responsibility. General learners permit information for non-residents travelling in the 50 states can be found here.

british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a "minor" to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that "A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time "is a reference to Pacific Standard Time" (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until "the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date.

Depending on the bridge, you might be trespassing in some way. Railway bridges are the property of the railway company, they don't allow to go there unless specifically allowed and even the absence of a sign is not an ok in those cases. Similarly, highway bridges usually are communal property and they don't need to be marked as off limits if there are laws that prohibit being there. The absence of signs and fencing is not a carte balance to go there: If your starting point for the climbing is not easily accessible, they don't have to fence it. But besides trespassing, you might make a huge dookey: Depending on the attorney general, you might be, in Austria, in violation of § 46 StVO for being a pedestrian on the Highway, as the bridge in whole is part of the highway structure. Even if you are under the lanes, you are technically on or inside the highway structure. If the attorney really wants you in, they could pull out § 89 StGB "endangerment" as well as the § 176 / § 177 "endangerment of the commonality" (by reckless or negligence). After all, you might or might not be climbing the bridge to perform something to endanger all the people using it. In Germany, you will get fined for violating traffic laws if you go onto railway tracks or climb onto a railway bridge as you violate the railway code and the minimum charge is 25 €. You could get also sued for Reckless endangerment of the train traffic (§ 315 StGB) and locked up for between 6 months and 10 years. If you do delay trains in any way (and even if it is to allow a crew to get to you), you are also liable damages - this is very easy in the 5 to 6 digits. Similarly, if it was a highway, you'd get billed 10 € for being on foot on a motorway without special privilege under $ 25 StVO and again, you could get jailed in extreme cases under § 315b StGB.

Is "slow walking" legal? I've heard various claims that "slow walking" (walking slowly in a road) is not illegal or at best its illegality is ambiguous. Is that true? To what extent is it legal to walk in a road? I can certainly imagine that this is allowed in some jurisdictions and types of roadways, and it seems reasonable (certainly slow biking would be a legal substitute almost everywhere). But I can't find anything definitive about it. The relevant scenario I'm envisioning is one where (as recently in London) many small groups walk or bike through streets at a normal pace for brief periods, dispersing when asked by authorities (and possibly reforming elsewhere). So in a sense there are two parts to the question: Is biking or waking in streets permitted generally and, in cases where it is permitted, does it remain permitted if practiced in an organized fashion?

In my State (Louisiana, USA), pedestrians may walk on the side of the road. No guidance is given on how fast they should walk. Pedestrians are not allowed to walk in the middle of the street. In the US, the laws for this will vary by state. Louisiana has statutes that say that pedestrians are bound by traffic laws, and obstruction of traffic is not legal on foot or in a vehicle. Basically, consult your local laws. §216. Pedestrians on highways or interstate highways A. Where sidewalks are provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent highway. B. Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the highway or its shoulder, facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction. C. It shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to cross an interstate highway, except in the case of an emergency. D. Upon conviction of a violation of this Section, a court may order, in lieu of the penalty provisions provided in R.S. 32:57, that the offender perform three eight-hour days of court-approved community service activities, at least half of which shall consist of participation in a litter abatement or collection program. §213. Crossing at other than crosswalks A. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. B. Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way or place of whatever nature publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel, including bridges, causeways, tunnels and ferries; synonymous with the word "street".

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)

Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is.

The law says don't drive an unsafe vehicle on the road. You disobeyed the law. There were methods of having your tyres fixed without driving on the road (e.g. taking the tyres to the mechanic in a different vehicle, calling a mobile mechanic etc.) so you have no defence of necessity. In all likelihood you will be convicted and penalised. You need legal advice. Whether it's fair or not is a philosophical consideration, not a legal one.

No, it is not illegal in UK to use proxies. No, it is not like the tor concept. No, the ISP does not slow you down (they mostly throttle detectable p2p connections), but if you use public proxies, many of them will be unacceptably slow. Note: for things like facebook, a proxy is utterly useless. You already donated your private data to them, there's nothing to hide.

I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.

Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - No 10 Downing Street is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So, people with legal authority over the space can restrict or ban your access if, for example, you repeatedly flaunt the rules that they impose on the space. Their private security can request that you leave. If you refuse, you are trespassing and subject to arrest, either by security as a citizens arrest or by the police.

Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.

Is it illegal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA? https://meta.stackexchange.com/q/388551/178179 mentions that SE will force some firms to pay to be allowed to train an AI model on the SE data dump (CC BY-SA licensed) and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA. This makes me wonder: Is it illegal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA? I found https://creativecommons.org/2021/03/04/should-cc-licensed-content-be-used-to-train-ai-it-depends/: At CC, we believe that, as a matter of copyright law, the use of works to train AI should be considered non-infringing by default, assuming that access to the copyright works was lawful at the point of input. Is that belief correct? More specifically to the share-alike clause in CC licenses, from my understanding of https://creativecommons.org/faq/#artificial-intelligence-and-cc-licenses, it is legal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA, unless perhaps if the output is shared (2 questions: Is the output of an LLM considered an adaptation or derivative work under copyright? Does the "output" in the flowchart below mean LLM output in the case a trained LLM?).

united-states The flowchart included in the question is trying to summarize a rather large amount of legal uncertainty into one image. It must be emphasized that each decision point represents an unsettled area of law. Nobody knows which path through that flowchart the law will take, or even if different forms or implementations of AI might take different paths. The short and disappointing answer to your question is that nobody knows what is or isn't legal yet. To further elaborate on each decision point: The first point is asking whether the training process requires a license at all. There are two possible reasons to think that it does not: AI training is protected by fair use (see 17 USC 107). This is a case-by-case inquiry that would have to be decided by a judge. AI training is nothing more than the collection of statistical information relating to a work, and does not involve "copying" the work within the meaning of 17 USC 106 (except for a de minimis period which is similar to the caching done by a web browser, and therefore subject to a fair use defense). The second point is, I think, asking whether the model is subject to copyright protection under Feist v. Rural and related caselaw. Because the model is trained by a purely automated process, there's a case to be made that the model is not the product of human creativity, and is therefore unprotected by copyright altogether. Dicta in Feist suggest that the person or entity directing the training might be able to obtain a "thin" copyright in the "selection or organization" of training data, but no court has ever addressed this to my knowledge. This branch can also be read as asking whether the output of the model is copyrightable, when the model is run with some prompt or input. The Copyright Office seems to think the answer to that question is "no, because a human didn't create it." The third decision point is, uniquely, not a legal question, but a practical question: Do you intend to distribute anything, or are you just using it for your own private entertainment? This determines whether you need to consult the rest of the flowchart or not. The final decision point is whether the "output" (i.e. either the model itself, or its output) is a derivative work of the training input. This would likely be decided on the basis of substantial similarity, which is a rather complicated area of law. To grossly oversimplify, the trier of fact would be shown both the training input and the allegedly infringing output, and asked to determine whether the two items have enough copyrightable elements in common that copying can reasonably be inferred.

Copyright protects literary and artistic expression, not facts. So, in a database, the structure of the tables, the construction of the queries and the presentation of the user interface are all subject to copyright. The data stored in each record is not subject to copyright if it is a fact but is subject if it is a literary or artistic work. For example, in the IMDb database, the name of a film, the year it was made, the director’s name, the actors’ names etc. are not copyright, however, the star ratings, the reviews, the table structure, the queries and the user interface all are. For your fossil example, the fossil, where it was found, who found it, when etc. are all non-copyrightable facts. Any photographs of it, drawings of it or scientific writing about it are all copyright because they all involve creative transformation of the fossil. That creativity is key. For the book, if the scanning is automated and the text is generated by OCR then there is no new copyright. If a human makes editing or compositional choices, there is.

No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.

The comment is incorrect; creating a derivative work without permission is still disallowed, even for private use. In US copyright law 17USC 106 defines the exclusive rights that the copyright holder has, the right "to do and to authorize". The second of these is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that the right is the right to "prepare" a derivative work, not the right to "distribute" or "sell" the work. US copyright law defines a derivative work in 17 USC 101 which reads: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. The laws of other countries are similar to US law on this point. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. However, it should be noted that if a person creates a derivative work in private, and never shows it to anyone else, the copyright owner would never learn of it, and so could never sue for infringement. But if it were shown or described to anyone, and the owner did learn, then he owner could in theory sue. Whether the owner would choose to sue over a derivative work never circulated is a different matter. The real effect of this law is that when an infringing derivative work is distributed and the owner wants to sue, the owner need not prove distribution. Proving creation of the derivative work is enough. The quoted comment asks about whether such a rule is "unconstitutional or something" and says that "You should be allowed to do whatever you want with your own stuff in your own home." The US constitution does not grant any such broad right. There are lots of things one might do in own's own home that are illegal: building a bomb for example. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, sometimes called the Copyright Clause or the IP clause, grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See the LII page "Intellectual Property Clause" and the page Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright where it is written that: Congress was within its powers in giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works. Even as applied to pantomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed. {Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). For other problems arising because of technological and electronic advancement, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).} See also the Wikipedia article "Copyright Clause".

The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.

No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.)

Arguably not (or, the example terms are not restricted by copyright, but not for the reasons given, which means this protection may not extend past the examples given in all cases). The protection for "stock characters" comes from the "Scènes à faire" doctrine, which protects elements that are elementary and near-required to be part of a genre. For example, a fairy tale is "obligated" to start with "Once upon a time" and end with "And they lived happily ever after". Character classes, by virtue of being character classes, do not qualify under this doctrine to me, simply by virtue of being "character classes". What matters are: a) the terms used for the classes are generic b) there is prior art to any claimed copyright, with uses of such terms in fantasy fiction stretching back at least hundreds of years and predating, for example, modern English. Note that the above is not universal to all character classes. For example, if you had classes whose names that directly related to various other copyrighted works IP (e.g. "Jedi Councilor", "Yogo Wardmaster", "Grey Warden", "Aes Sedai", "Asha'man" "Eversor Assassin"), those could still be infringing copyright.

The general rule is that the author of the software owns the copyright, so that would be the student. This is regardless of whether the student writes the code for fun, or for a thesis. If a student is hired to write that code, then it kind of depends on the university rules, and who hires the student. In the case of a "work for hire", the employer owns the copyright. However, it is non-trivial to determine whether that principle is applicable in the case of a student hired by the university. In part, it depends on which country this is in because work for hire laws are not exactly the same everywhere, and in part it depends on the details of the employment my a university. In a typical US institution RA appointment, it would come down to university policy – some universities declare that copyright in all student-written software is retained by the student. You would need to look for something resembling an "IP Policy" – here is a sample, note that such policies are subject to revision.

Can you bet sexual acts? I'm pretty sure you cannot make a bet and have the outcome one or way another be a sexual favor. But why would this be illegal?

This would be entirely dependant on the jurisdiction. The things that would need to be legal to make this transaction legal are: Is the sexual act legal? Is gambling legal? Ongoing consent by both parties To make this an enforceable contract, in addition you would need: Sexual acts to be valuable consideration, basically, is prostitution legal? The fundamentals of a binding contract: intention, legality of objects etc.

No, it's not illegal... Ads are shown as a contract between the site that hosts it and the advertising company. The contract does not stipulate that customers need to buy something, in fact, the contract can't force the customer to buy anything! At best, the contract can pay the hosting site based on the ad being shown, clicked, or any sale made after it. ...but you will do exactly the opposite Advertizement is made to put your own brand into the head of people. In fact, most ads don't have any effect on people. As I am writing this, ads for a kid TV, travels to Turkey and the primetime films for the weekend on the TV-station I have on are shown. I have no intention of consuming any of these advertised products. Impact of a campaign is measured by two metrics: people reached, and people responding. People reached is measured in clicks. People responding is measured in changes in earnings or sales. Clicking the ad increases the reached rating. If the rating is bad, the ad campaign is just ineffective... which leads to the most paradoxical thing: Bad advertisement and good advertisement both lead to more advertisement - bad to level out the missing response, good to maximize the response. By clicking on the ad you just funnel more money to the ad industry. When does it get illegal? [DDOS] The only way it would become illegal is if John Doe sets up a computer - or rather a botnet - and has that network click the ads thousands of times per second. Google can handle easily 83,000 searches per second, twitter gets more than 9000 tweets that are distributed to millions of people, Tumbler and Instagram handle together about 2500 posts per second. In fact, every second, more than 100000 Gigabytes of traffic run through the net. To have an impact on one site, you need to be truly a large number of calls... and then it is called a DDOS. DDOS is illegal under the CFAA, in this case 18 UC 1030: (a)Whoever— (5) (A)knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (b)Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. In the UK, you'd break the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 section 3, because denying someone else service via DDOS is unauthorized, clearly unauthorized, and prevents access to any data (the website) on any computer (the server): (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b)at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c)either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2)This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (b)to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer But can a DDOS be protest? [NO!] Anonymous attempted to petition to make DDOS a legal form of protest in 2013. The petition got 6,048 of the 25000 signatures needed to warrant an answer by the white house - unlike people in 2016 asking for a Death Star. At least it prompted Joshua I. James to write a research paper about the proposal in March. He too points to the CFAA and Section 5A, especially the sentence I quoted above. Among a lot of stipulations, he points out that internet protest in the shape of a DDOS would need to follow the same rules as a legal protest on the streets - which for example demands that entrance to businesses can't be blocked, and one is not allowed to harass employees and customers. According to the general rules for legal protest as given, there are still a number of challenges. First and foremost, entrances to businesses should not be blocked. In terms of DDoS, if sustained denial of service takes place, then access (entrance) to the server (business)is effectively blocked. This means that, at a minimum, sustained denial of service should be considered as a non-legal approach to protesting. Thus, he concludes sustained DDOS is per se can't be a legal protest, and even a non-sustained DDOS would impact people using the site in a way they will deem harassing - which means that even a non-permanent DDOS can't be a legal protest. And then comes the final blow: DDOS, unlike a real protest on the streets, can't, by its very nature, inform people of why there is protest, even if it were a form of protest! This means that nobody knows it is meant to be a protest and not a normal DDOS, and as it can't convey what the action is about, it can't be a proper protest.

I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.

A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals.

The guy does not imitate his brother, but instead claims that money donated will be split with him -- however, his brother has no agreement/idea with this. That's called Fraud (Wikipedia), "...a deliberate deception to secure unfair or unlawful gain..." and will be recognized as such in almost every legal jurisdiction in the world. At very least, it's against Patreon's Terms of Use: "Fraud - Don’t post information that is false or otherwise misleading. Impersonation - Don’t impersonate anyone. Don’t use another’s account, or allow others to use your account." The way this would not be fraud is to clearly state on Patreon that you are raising money for your brother, and to involve him in the process and have him choose to accept the money before you start to collect it. If he won't accept the money, don't collect it in the first place.

Can you unambiguously, legally, and conclusively determine what is and is not a "porn site"? I'm sure many are easy... but what about that "Swimsuit modeling" site, or the "Artistic Nudes" site featuring classic French Renaissance paintings? There will always be a grey area. What makes a "site" in a legal sense? Consider all the blog sites filled with user generated content: If just a few pages out of tens-of-thousands are hardcore, indisputable porn, would you require the entire domain to be classified XXX, even if 99% of its content is completely innocent? Who would enforce this? Are you proposing an "Internet Police" force to review all new domain names and their content before they get approved? That is called "Prior Restraint on Free Speech", and is established law. Suppose a site does get approved, then immediately changes the content of their pages from Cooking Recipes to hard-core porn. Who is going to review and approve every update to every website, when sites are updated constantly?! Maybe you're proposing that any individual who finds porn on a .ORG site has the right to sue for damages? This would likely clog the courts with endless vigilante lawsuits about what content belongs on which domain. This is a flat out horrible, poorly thought out idea.

Unless there is a law or regulation against it, it is legal. However in a big government it can be practically impossible to determine whether something is legal. For example, nobody even knows how many criminal statutes have been promulgated by the U.S. federal government. And that's nothing compared to the volume of executive regulation and judicial case-law that determines whether something is illegal. I.e., in practice determining that something is legal is a bit like proving a negative. Furthermore, if you look long enough some argue that you can probably find some law under which almost any action could be considered illegal. Note also that even if it is not against the law, it could be proscribed by contract (read your Terms and Conditions!), and breach of contract is in general – but with an astonishing number of exceptions! – illegal.

Yes, it's legal. To be illegal, the photographs would have to be obscene or pornographic. Nude people, ordinarily photographed, doing non-sexual, non-excretory things are neither. However, I would strongly advise caution, particularly if you plan to display or share these photographs. There are definitely cases of people who have been charged with sexual exploitation of a minor for sharing nude photographs of their children.

Who has right of way at an intersection with two stop signs across from each other? The traffic on the main road (with no stop signs) of course has first right of way. Suppose two cars are across from each other turning onto the main road. One is turning right and one is turning left (to both ultimately go the same direction). Who has right of way? Is it the person turning right? Is it the person who got to the stop sign first? Does the answer change if there's a whole line of people turning right from one side and a whole line of people turning left from the other side? I'm looking for the general rule in the United States. If the state matters, I'm in Ohio.

The NHTSA gives rules for the United States. Right of way goes to the first person to stop. So if a line of cars were at both stop signs, and all cars wanted to make the same conflicting turns, they would alternate. If the opposing cars stop at the same time then the one turning right has the right of way. (This is because a right turn falls under the "Straight Traffic Goes First" rule.)

Damaging someone else's property is not protected free speech in the US. Nor is using someone else's property without permission and against the owner's wishes. Scenario 3 would surely be vandalism or "Malicious Mischief" or some similar offense, even if the paint can be fairly easily removed. The same would be petty surely true of scenario 2, as it would take at least some effort to remove the sticker, and it could be a safety hazard until it is removed (obstructed vision). Scenario 1 would probably not be even a minor crime, unless perhaps the person trespassed to attach the string. But the person has no right to insist that the car's owner not remove the sign. I am assuming that the car is owned by someone else, and the the person placing the sign, sticker or paint acted without permission from the owner or any authorized person.

The Ct. driver's manual p. 44 says that "Solid yellow lines may be crossed to make a left turn to or from an alley, private road, driveway, or street", and also "A double solid white line prohibits lane changing" (turning left is not the same as lane changing). In Washington, there is a fine of $136 for crossing a double white line, but this is related to the hyper-limited access pay lanes on the freeway. I have not found anything in the Connecticut code that indicates an analogous absolute prohibition against crossing a double white. In lieu of a statutory prohibition, you may succeed in arguing that it was a legal turn, as long as the turn was in compliance with the rest of the law, e.g. you signalled, you yielded right of way (which essentially means he was driving so fast that he appeared after you started to turn). His speed may be contributing negligence that prevents you from being liable, so it just depends.

While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.

In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered.

I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed.

The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home.

While local law varies, most jurisdictions do not authorize citizens' arrests for traffic violations. Generally, citizens arrests are authorized only for misdemeanors and felonies outside the traffic code. Indeed, there are many traffic offenses for which law enforcement is authorized only to stop a violator and issue a ticket, but not even law enforcement is authorized to actually arrest someone. And there is no such thing as a citizen's citation or ticket. Citizens arrests also usually require that the citizen witnessed the crime in progress, but that requirement would be met in this case. If the case had been a hit and run, however, a citizens' arrest probably would have been legally authorized, although the wiser course of action would still be to call the police and to follow the offender at a safe distance.

To what extent is coaching legal in California? According to the California Code, Business and Professions Code - BPC § 2903: (a) No person may engage in the practice of psychology, or represent himself or herself to be a psychologist, without a license granted under this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. The practice of psychology is defined as rendering or offering to render to individuals, groups, organizations, or the public any psychological service involving the application of psychological principles, methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting, and influencing behavior, such as the principles pertaining to learning, perception, motivation, emotions, and interpersonal relationships; and the methods and procedures of interviewing, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior modification, and hypnosis; and of constructing, administering, and interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests, attitudes, personality characteristics, emotions, and motivations. To me, this sounds like it would cover a lot of behavior that people who market themselves as coaches engage in. WeTrainLifeCoaches which trains life coaches in California suggests: There are no legal requirements to become a general life coach in California, so the best way to show your legitimacy to clients is by receiving certification from an agency. The best-known certification agency is The International Coach Federation (ICF), which offers different levels of life coach certification. As they speak about there not being a legal requirement, it seems like the coaches they train are not automatically licensed via the above-quoted profession code. In actual case law, where's the line between what coaches can legally do and what they require being licensed under that section?

In California, psychologists are regulated under Ch 6.6 within Division 2 (Healing Arts) of the Business and Professions Code. §2902 identifies the essential restriction on the business practice, stating that "A person represents himself or herself to be a psychologist when the person holds himself or herself out to the public by any title or description of services..." using various forms of the word 'psychologist', as well as "when the person holds himself or herself out to be trained, experienced, or an expert in the field of psychology". In order to say that you are a psychologist, you have to hold a professional psychologists's license. Likewise to hold yourself out as a nurse, you need a nurse's license. A consequence of being a licensed psychologist is that under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, you may assess a patient's mental state, and you must keep that information confidential. A life coach cannot make a diagnosis, and cannot prescribe cures for mental conditions. §2908 in particular allows other people to do some of what psychologists do: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent qualified members of other recognized professional groups licensed to practice in the State of California, such as, but not limited to, physicians, clinical social workers, educational psychologists, marriage and family therapists, licensed professional clinical counselors, optometrists, psychiatric technicians, or registered nurses, or attorneys admitted to the State Bar of California, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques by referral from persons licensed to practice medicine, dentistry, or psychology, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques which offer avocational or vocational self-improvement and do not offer therapy for emotional or mental disorders, or duly ordained members of the recognized clergy, or duly ordained religious practitioners from doing work of a psychological nature consistent with the laws governing their respective professions, provided they do not hold themselves out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words “psychological,” “psychologist,” “psychology,” “psychometrist,” “psychometrics,” or “psychometry,” or that they do not state or imply that they are licensed to practice psychology; except that persons licensed under Chapter 13.5 (commencing with Section 4989.10) of Division 2 may hold themselves out to the public as licensed educational psychologists. Analogously, we can talk about the law here without running afoul of UPL laws, because "talking about the law" is not the same as "practicing law". It is a fairly formalistic distinction, but I or a life coach can talk about what would be good for your soul, as long as I don't claim to be a psychologist dispensing professional advice.

Overview of the CCPA The CCPA constitutes California Civil Code TITLE 1.81.5. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (sections 1798.100 - 1798.199.100) (Note: the online version gives both original and amended versions of many of the code sections. Be careful to refer to the current version, which is usually the last version of the section provided.) Additional The CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS (also known as Title II, Division 1, Chapter 20) are regulations issued by the California Attorney General, as required byn the CCPA, implementing and interpreting the CCPA. They include sections 999.300 et seq. Section 1798.110 allows a consumer to request that the business provide information about its collection of personal information, as well as a copy of the information actually collected. The information must be disclosed "upon receipt of a verifiable consumer request from the consumer." Section 1798.105 allows a consumer to request deletion of information, and Section 1798.106 allows a consumer to request correction of incorrect information. Sections 1798.115 and 1798.120 grant additional rights when the business shares or sells information. Section 1798.130 specifies that a business must respond to requests from consumers within 45 days. Actual fulfillment of the request can be delayed fro a further 45 days, provided that the consumer is given notice within the first 45 days. A business must provide reasonable methods to submit a request. For an online-only business, an email address is enough. Otherwise an 800 phone number must be one of the ways. Consumers must use one of the methods specified by the business, and must provide enough information for the request to be "verifiable". (But the business must respond to requests made by other methods.) Additional Regulations section 999.308 (c) (1)08 (c) (1) b and 999.308 (c) (1) c say that a business must provide in its privacy policy instructions on how to submit a request for information (called a "request to know") with links to a an online form or portal for this purpose, and a description of the verification process. Additional Regulations section 999.312 subsections (a), (b), and (c) indicate how the business may select the methods for a consumer to submit a request to know. 999.312 (e) says that when a consumer submits a request through some method other than one of the4 designated methods, or submits a request that is incomplete, the business must either treat it as having been proerply submitted, or inform the consumer how to correct or properly resubmit the request. Additional Regulations section 999.313 say that a business must acknowledge the request within 10 days "and provide information about how the business will process the request." Additional Regulations section 999.313 subsections (c) (1) and (c) (2) say that if the business cannot verify the identity of the consumer it may deny the request, but must respond informing the requestor that it could not verify his or her identity and also giving more general information. Sections 1798.145 and 1798.146 list various exemptions and limitations on the obligations of a business. In particular, the CCPA does not apply to medical information covered by the Federal HIPAA law. Under section 1798.150 a consumer whose information was improperly accessed and taken can sue for an amount between $100 and $750 per incident, or the amount of actual damages. The CA Attorney General has issued detailed implementing regulations for various provisions of the CCPA. See link above Under section 1798.155 a business can be fined up to $2,500 fore each violation of the CCPA, or up to $7,500 for each intentional violation with respect to consumers under 16. Only the California Privacy Protection Agency may enforce such fines. Conclusions A Consumer must make a request by one of the designated methods provided by a business, or it may be ignored. The business has to inform consumers about those methods. Email and telephone are likely methods, as is a form on the business's web site. The consumer must provide enough information that the business can verify that the request is valid. The business must inform requestors who use an improper method or did not supply sufficient identification information of how to correct or resubmit the request. The business has 45 days to respond, and up to an additional 45 days to actually provide, correct, or delete the information, but only if the extra time is reasonably required. It must, however, acknowledge requests within 10 days. If the business does not comply, the consumer cannot directly sue. Instead the consumer may complain to the California Privacy Protection Agency, which can (but need not) investigate, and may hold a hearing and impose a fine after such a hearing. If there is an information breech a consumer can sue directly. Specific Provisions 1798.110 Consumers’ Right to Know What Personal Information is Being Collected. Right to Access Personal Information (a) A consumer shall have the right to request that a business that collects personal information about the consumer disclose to the consumer the following: (a) (1) The categories of personal information it has collected about that consumer. (a) (2) The categories of sources from which the personal information is collected. (a) (3) The business or commercial purpose for collecting, selling, or sharing personal information. (a) (4) The categories of third parties to whom the business discloses personal information. (a) (5) The specific pieces of personal information it has collected about that consumer. 1798.130 Notice, Disclosure, Correction, and Deletion Requirements (a) In order to comply with Sections 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.115, and 1798.125, a business shall, in a form that is reasonably accessible to consumers: (a) (1) (A) Make available to consumers two or more designated methods for submitting requests for information required to be disclosed pursuant to Sections 1798.110 and 1798.115, including, at a minimum, a toll-free telephone number. A business that operates exclusively online and has a direct relationship with a consumer from whom it collects personal information shall only be required to provide an email address for submitting requests for information required to be disclosed pursuant to Sections 1798.110 and 1798.115. (a) (1) (B) If the business maintains an internet website, make the internet website available to consumers to submit requests for information required to be disclosed pursuant to Sections 1798.110 and 1798.115. (a) (2) Disclose and deliver the required information to a consumer free of charge within 45 days of receiving a verifiable consumer request from the consumer. The business shall promptly take steps to determine whether the request is a verifiable consumer request, but this shall not extend the business’ duty to disclose and deliver the information within 45 days of receipt of the consumer’s request. The time period to provide the required information may be extended once by an additional 45 days when reasonably necessary, provided the consumer is provided notice of the extension within the first 45-day period. The disclosure shall cover the 12-month period preceding the business’ receipt of the verifiable consumer request and shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business, in a readily useable format that allows the consumer to transmit this information from one entity to another entity without hindrance. The business may require authentication of the consumer that is reasonable in light of the nature of the personal information requested, but shall not require the consumer to create an account with the business in order to make a verifiable consumer request. If the consumer maintains an account with the business, the business may require the consumer to submit the request through that account. ... (a) (5) Disclose the following information in its online privacy policy or policies if the business has an online privacy policy or policies and in any California-specific description of consumers’ privacy rights, or if the business does not maintain those policies, on its internet website and update that information at least once every 12 months: (a) (5) (A) A description of a consumer’s rights pursuant to Sections 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.115, and 1798.125 and one or more designated methods for submitting requests. (a) (5) (B) For purposes of subdivision (c) of Section 1798.110, a list of the categories of personal information it has collected about consumers in the preceding 12 months by reference to the enumerated category or categories in subdivision (c) that most closely describe the personal information collected. ... (b) A business is not obligated to provide the information required by Sections 1798.110 and 1798.115 to the same consumer more than twice in a 12-month period. 1798.150 Personal Information Security Breaches (a) (1) Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information, as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 1798.81.5, or whose email address in combination with a password or security question and answer that would permit access to the account is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the personal information may institute a civil action for any of the following: (a) (1) (A) To recover damages in an amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not greater than seven hundred and fifty ($750) per consumer per incident or actual damages, whichever is greater. ... (b) Actions pursuant to this section may be brought by a consumer if, prior to initiating any action against a business for statutory damages on an individual or class-wide basis, a consumer provides a business 30 days’ written notice identifying the specific provisions of this title the consumer alleges have been or are being violated. In the event a cure is possible, if within the 30 days the business actually cures the noticed violation and provides the consumer an express written statement that the violations have been cured and that no further violations shall occur, no action for individual statutory damages or class-wide statutory damages may be initiated against the business. ... (c) The cause of action established by this section shall apply only to violations as defined in subdivision (a) and shall not be based on violations of any other section of this title. Nothing in this title shall be interpreted to serve as the basis for a private right of action under any other law. 1798.155. Administrative Enforcement (a) Any business, service provider, contractor, or other person that violates this title shall be liable for an administrative fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation or seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) for each intentional violation or violations involving the personal information of consumers whom the business, service provider, contractor, or other person has actual knowledge are under 16 years of age, as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 1798.185, in an administrative enforcement action brought by the California Privacy Protection Agency. 1798.192 Waiver Any provision of a contract or agreement of any kind, including a representative action waiver, that purports to waive or limit in any way rights under this title, including, but not limited to, any right to a remedy or means of enforcement, shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforceable. ... Excerpts from the Regulations § 999.308 Privacy Policy. (a) Purpose and General Principles (a) (1) The purpose of the privacy policy is to provide consumers with a comprehensive description of a business’s online and offline practices regarding the collection, use, disclosure, and sale of personal information and of the rights of consumers regarding their personal information (b) The privacy policy shall be posted online through a conspicuous link using the word “privacy” on the business’s website homepage or on the download or landing page of a mobile application. ... (c) The privacy policy shall include the following information: (c) (1) Right to Know About Personal Information Collected, Disclosed, or Sold. a. Explanation that a consumer has the right to request that the business disclose what personal information it collects, uses, discloses, and sells. b. Instructions for submitting a verifiable consumer request to know and links to an online request form or portal for making the request, if offered by the business. c. General description of the process the business will use to verify the consumer request, including any information the consumer must provide. d. Identification of the categories of personal information the business has collected about consumers in the preceding 12 months. The categories shall be described in a manner that provides consumers a meaningful understanding of the information being collected. ... § 999.312. Methods for Submitting Requests to Know and Requests to Delete. (a) A business that operates exclusively online and has a direct relationship with a consumer from whom it collects personal information shall only be required to provide an email address for submitting requests to know. All other businesses shall provide two or more designated methods for submitting requests to know, including, at a minimum, a toll-free telephone number. Other acceptable methods for submitting these requests include, but are not limited to, a designated email address, a form submitted in person, and a form submitted through the mail. (b) A business shall provide two or more designated methods for submitting requests to delete. Acceptable methods for submitting these requests include, but are not limited to, a toll-free phone number, a link or form available online through a business’s website, a designated email address, a form submitted in person, and a form submitted through the mail. (c) A business shall consider the methods by which it primarily interacts with consumers when determining which methods to provide for submitting requests to know and requests to delete. If the business interacts with consumers in person, the business shall consider providing an in-person method such as a printed form the consumer can directly submit or send by mail, a tablet or computer portal that allows the consumer to complete and submit an online form, or a telephone with which the consumer can call the business’s toll-free number ... (e) If a consumer submits a request in a manner that is not one of the designated methods of submission, or is deficient in some manner unrelated to the verification process, the business shall either: (e) (1) Treat the request as if it had been submitted in accordance with the business’s designated manner, or (e) (2) Provide the consumer with information on how to submit the request or remedy any deficiencies with the request, if applicable. § 999.313. Responding to Requests to Know and Requests to Delete. (a) Upon receiving a request to know or a request to delete, a business shall confirm receipt of the request within 10 business days and provide information about how the business will process the request. The information provided shall describe in general the business’s verification process and when the consumer should expect a response, except in instances where the business has already granted or denied the request. The confirmation may be given in the same manner in which the request was received. For example, if the request is made over the phone, the confirmation may be given orally during the phone call. (b) Businesses shall respond to requests to know and requests to delete within 45 calendar days. The 45-day period will begin on the day that the business receives the request, regardless of time required to verify the request. If the business cannot verify the consumer within the 45day time period, the business may deny the request. If necessary, businesses may take up to an additional 45 calendar days to respond to the consumer’s request, for a maximum total of 90 calendar days from the day the request is received, provided that the business provides the consumer with notice and an explanation of the reason that the business will take more than 45 days to respond to the request ... (c) Responding to Requests to Know. (c) (1) For requests that seek the disclosure of specific pieces of information about the consumer, if a business cannot verify the identity of the person making the request pursuant to the regulations set forth in Article 4, the business shall not disclose any specific pieces of personal information to the requestor and shall inform the requestor that it cannot verify their identity. If the request is denied in whole or in part, the business shall also evaluate the consumer’s request as if it is seeking the disclosure of categories of personal information about the consumer pursuant to subsection (c)(2). (c) (2) For requests that seek the disclosure of categories of personal information about the consumer, if a business cannot verify the identity of the person making the request pursuant to the regulations set forth in Article 4, the business may deny the request to disclose the categories and other information requested and shall inform the requestor that it cannot verify their identity. If the request is denied in whole or in part, the business shall provide or direct the consumer to its general business practices regarding the collection, maintenance, and sale of personal information set forth in its privacy policy. ... (c) (5) If a business denies a consumer’s verified request to know specific pieces of personal information, in whole or in part, because of a conflict with federal or state law, or an exception to the CCPA, the business shall inform the requestor and explain the basis for the denial, unless prohibited from doing so by law. If the request is denied only in part, the business shall disclose the other information sought by the consumer.

Setting aside kidnapping, child-endangerment, etc., there are a host of laws requiring the bus and the driver to have special licenses (ie, a commercial drivers license), inspections (including a physical and regular drug tests), training, insurance and so on. Breaking any of these laws is a crime. In most states, these crimes are treated as misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors, so the largest penalty will be something like a year in jail and/or $5,000 fine. In other words: Even before the prosecutor gets to the serious stuff, the driver is in trouble. For those of you who want to dig into the details, this page breaks out what you need to do to become a school bus driver in CA. This page links to the manuals for drivers and buses in WA, along with a list of all of the specific laws and administrative codes involved.

This is commonplace in many jurisdictions across many profession, trades and businesses The authorisation of the register and the amount of any fee (which can be zero) is spelled out in the legislation. As is who is authorised to collect it and maintain the register: sometimes it’s a government authority, sometimes it’s a professional association. Sometimes the title is protected and sometimes it isn’t. Off the cuff, the following is an incomplete list for australia. Some of these are Federally regulated and some are State based. Some of the State based ones are nationally recognised, meaning if you register in one state you are registered in all, and some aren’t. Some states require registration that other states don’t. Architect Engineer Doctor Nurse Physiotherapist Nutritionist Veterinarian Solicitor Barrister Anyone working with children Plumber Drainer Gasfitter Roofer Electrician Waterproofer Builder Real Estate Agent Used Car Dealer Bus driver Truck driver Taxi/ride-share driver Train driver Ship’s master Second-hand goods dealer Security guard Bartender Forklift operator Crane operator Builder’s hoist operator

Yes, in general US prosecutors are licensed attorneys if they're practicing law. You don't necessarily technically need a license if your job is purely administrative, but to appear in court you do. They are subject to professional ethics requirements, and can be disbarred for violating them. There may be a state or two where they aren't licensed, but the common rule is that they are.

Most jurisdictions don't require special licensure for bodyguards and don't regulate it as a profession or occupation. Body guards in those jurisdictions don't have any special legal authority or any special legal responsibilities other than a fiduciary duty to protect the client. They have the same rights to make citizens arrests and carry weapons that any ordinary citizen would. If a jurisdiction does regulate bodyguards, the answer depends upon the law of the jurisdiction which varies considerably. Only a minority of jurisdictions in the world even recognize the concept of cash bond, or the concept of a bail enforcement agent. Logically, it is unlikely that the regulation of bail enforcement agents in places where bail bonds exist is unlikely to be the same as that of a bodyguard. A bail enforcement agent's authority flows from the adjudication of a court that a particular person has diminished rights while on bail, and that the bail bonding company through its bail enforcement agent, has extraordinary authority (analogous to that of a parent or legal guardian) over that particular person for whom the bail bond agency has taken responsibility. A bail enforcement agent doesn't have special authority over anyone else as a general rule. In contrast, a bodyguard is generally seeking to protect one person from the entire rest of the world, when the entire rest of the world is not subject to any court orders temporarily diminishing their rights. So, it wouldn't make sense for a bail enforcement agent to have the same legal treatment as a bodyguard, even if both were regulated occupations or professions. A body guard is more analogous to a private security guard for a business, or premises, or vehicle, which a minority of jurisdictions regulate as a licensed occupation or profession. Of course, if the skills and qualifications for both bail enforcement agents and bodyguards are similar in a jurisdiction where both profession or occupations are regulated, nothing would prevent the same individual from obtaining both kinds of licenses. In your fictional world, however, you can do whatever you want.

If both parties are legal, permanent residents of California, their marriage is recognized under Californian law no matter where it originated (provided that the marriage doesn’t violate Californian law, e.g. if Alice were a minor). Alice and Bob would file for divorce in California and the matter would be adjudicated under a Californian court and under Californian law. After these proceedings, Alice and Bob would still be married in Afghanistan (and maybe other foreign countries? That’s a tricky question, so if someone else can figure it out please leave a comment!) but the US would cease to recognize the marriage. In no case would either a Californian or Afghan court make a ruling under the other’s laws. As far as child custody, property, etc. the divorce would essentially proceed as a normal divorce case, although things could become complicated if Alice and Bob own property in Afghanistan, which would usually still be able to be appropriated by a Californian court but, once again, the matter is complex since Afghanistan still recognizes the marriage. As you can tell, a divorce of this nature is not as complicated as one might think, but nevertheless could create some complicated legal situations. Also, marriage is regulated state-by-state, so other states may have different rules regarding foreign marriages. As always, the best path of action is to consult an attorney who specializes in divorce. Edit: A commenter brought up the issue of whether California would recognize a marriage where both parties weren’t present. While this varies by state, California generally doesn’t allow so-called “proxy marriage” unless one of the parties is deployed in the military.

Yes. There is a special attorney-client confidentiality rule (at least in most U.S. jurisdictions) that requires an attorney to keep confidential and protects with the attorney-client privilege, information disclosed when an attorney and client are in the process of evaluating whether they want to establish an attorney-client relationship. If enough relevant information is exchanged, this information can also create a conflict of interest that would prevent the attorney from representing the opposing party in the same dispute. The ethical rule in states that have adopted a version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is Rule 1.18: Duties to Prospective Client (a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client. (b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client. (c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to the prospective client, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). (d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if: (1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing; or (2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and (i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and (ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

Can a German declaration of division (Teliungserklärung) or community ordinance (Gemeinschaftsordnung) prohibit long-term rentals? Consider an apartment block consisting of three equal units A, B, and C, located in Bavaria, Germany. At present, all are owner-occupied and the Community of Apartment Owners (Wohnungseigentümergemeinschaft) has three members Asani, Bahar, and Camille, with equal power. Units B and C are on the market and are bought by Diya, who decides to rent them out. Now Asani finds himself having a minority in the Community of Apartment Owners and, as an owner-occupier, having other needs and interests than Diya, but Diya can possibly push through or block any decisions taken by majority vote (depending on the specifics in the declaration of division (Teilungserklärung), a person owning two units may have either one or two votes). This situation is not desirable for Asani. Is it legally possible in Bavaria, Germany, to enact a rule that restricts the rights of owners to rent out their property long-term? For example, could it contain a rule that every owner must live in their property, or that the majority of homes must be owner-occupied, or that new rentals are not allowed, or that everyone who owns a property in the building must also live in the building, or something similar? Such a rule would need to be changeable only by unanimous consent, otherwise Diya owning two out of three properties could simply abolish the rule, so Asani, Bahar, and Camille would together agree on such a rule (perhaps Asani would pay Bahar and Camille in case they fear the rule might reduce the sale value, but that is separate from the legal question). I've searched the web about restrictions on renting out, but all I find is either about restrictions on short-term (holiday) rentals, or about owner-occupiers objecting to specific prospective tenants. I couldn't find anything about the possibility to restrict long-term rentals in general. Is there any law that would prevent the rules governing the property as a whole (such as the Declaration of Division (Teilungserklärung) or the Community Ordinance (Gemeinschaftsordnung)) from containing such a restriction? I am primarily interested in the situation in Bavaria, Germany, but for context it's also interesting to know the situation elsewhere.

Yes, you can put pretty much anything you like into the co-op statutes. You are actually interested in whether it makes a difference, though, whether the sheriff will come enforce a court order if it came to a trial. a rule that every owner must live in their property, or that everyone who owns a property in the building must also live in the building, or By virtue of indirect effect of basic rights (mittelbarer Wirkung von Grundrechten) a court will never issue an order mandating Diya to live in her apartment, Art. 11 GG. The sheriff will not forcefully “shove” her into her apartment: “You must live here now!” that the majority of homes must be owner-occupied, or Similar, but Art. 2 I GG. Vacancy of apartments is legal in Germany. that new rentals are not allowed, or As soon as Diya is recorded in the Wohnungsgrundbuch (apartment register) as the new owner of units B and C, she incontestably assumes the role of owner about said units. If she rents them out despite the co-op statutes forbidding so, she does nothing illegal (that means breaking state/federal law). After all she is indeed the owner, so there is no fraud involved, § 263 Ⅰ StGB. The fact that she agreed to not rent out is a matter between Diya and the co-op. No court will evict the new tenants from units B and C, because Diya has breached her obligations. However, it might be a just cause to oust Diya from the co-op, § 17 WEG. Yet still it requires severe grounds as it essentially means exercising eminent domain, Art. 14 Ⅲ GG. I tentatively claim it won’t work out as long as Diya pays her share in maintenance and the tenants chosen by Diya are well-behaved. something similar? You will need something that produces evidence. “Diya does not live in unit B” is a claim that needs corroboration in court. […] restrict long-term rentals in general. […] Tenancy agreements are by default unlimited in time. Short-term rents are sort of “forbidden” except if justified by one of the reasons named in § 575 Ⅰ BGB. Hence restricting long-term rentals borders on a blanket-ban on all rentals.

Can the council cut down a tree I plant on common land? Yes. When you plant a tree on common land, you are making a donation to the commons and the tree is no longer yours. The fact that it is common land resolves the question. This is really obvious in the fact pattern where you plant a tree in middle of Hyde Park, and is less obvious, but still true, in the fact pattern in the question. But, be aware that lots of land that is commonly believed to be common land (particularly in the fact pattern in the question), is in fact, private land subject to an easement in favor of the public. There is a fair amount of micro-variation in the common ownership v. private land with easement norm between different neighborhoods in the same municipality, that flows largely from customary practice at the time that particular neighborhoods were developed and deeded (which can span more than a thousand years in some U.K. cities), which has gone back and forth over time. Where there is private land subject to a public easement, a property owner would retain ownership of the land and the tree, subject only to limitations associated with the easement. But, those limitations might very well authorize the Council to remove or cut down the tree to further the purpose of the easement (e.g. if it was blocking a sidewalk with its growth, or threatened utilities for which the easement was created). Of course, in some circumstance, the Council can enforce general regulatory laws that authorize cutting down trees on private land (e.g. tree infected with something that could spread to all trees of that type in the area). Also, it is possible that some public land by be under the control of an entity other than a Council, like a neighborhood association, or another governmental entity (e.g. in the case of a verge along family housing on a military base, or in the case of rental properties on land derived from by a university's land, or in housing associated with a royal palace). In those cases, somebody with responsibility for the land could cut down the tree, but not the local Council.

Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure.

It's not impossible. Here are the regulations. Single- and two-family dwellings are legal, as are mobile homes. But the activity is not necessarily allowed (since you aren't residing there). "Customary home occupations" are allowed, but that means businesses customarily run out of a home like making / selling homemade arts & crafts, selling antiques, education, but also "Any other uses which the Board of Zoning Appeals finds to be of similar character". However, "Public Uses" are allowed with an approved site plan, spelled out in §303; or "Rural businesses" with similar approved plan. This means you have to give lots of information about the site and the plan has to be approved. There doesn't seem to be a specific prohibition, and the use seems consistent with the principle that This district is created to establish and preserve areas with agricultural and rural qualities by allowing for traditional Agricultural Uses along with low-density residential activities but the Sevier County Board of Zoning Appeals might feel otherwise. A counter-indication is that §504.3.1 lists for R-2M zones "Bed and Breakfast Inns, limited to a maximum of four (4) bedrooms for rent", thus the zone must be more residential for B&B usage to be accepted. Since the standards are not clear, the only solution is to officially inquire with the Zoning Board.

Because an owner cannot tell another owner what they can and can't do with their own property The quoted paragraph clearly sets out some of the things the leasehold arrangement allows: "... set out the rights and responsibilities of the residents, such as funding the maintenance of the building and placing restrictions on antisocial behavior." When you own land, you own it; and no one can tell you what you can and can't do with it, not even your co-owners (governments excepted). Want to run chickens? Sure: it's your land. Spinal Tap your stereo to 11 at 2 am? Sure: it's your land. Become a hoarder? Sure, it's your land. When there's a single dwelling on the land, none of that is a problem. When there are multiple dwellings on the land, as in a block of flats (apartments for the Americans among us) then some of these are likely to be problematical. But they aren't problems the law cares about because you all own the property. Different common law jurisdictions have arrived at different solutions to this problem but the UK has particular difficulties because people have been owning land there for a long time. A lot longer than in the USA, Australia or New Zealand. This is quite an elegant solution: all the owners own the land but each of them have a lease over their own flat and that is a contract the law will enforce.

Two factors are relevant. First, the language of the lease sometimes contains an abandonment clause that makes vacancy a default under the lease. This is common in a commercial lease, as vacancies can undermine the apparent viability of a strip mall or mall, but these provisions are less common in residential leases where the rent is current. Second, since this in New York City, there is an issue of rent-control. Rent-control benefits are available only for residential leases, and if you do not live there for long enough, it could be reclassified as a pied-a-terre and cease to qualify as a rent-controlled apartment. If your apartment is not a rent-controlled apartment, this isn't a concern, but if it is, further research related to continued qualification as a rent-controlled apartment in New York City is necessary.

I have read that Assured Shorthold Tenancies of less than 6 months are allowed, but you are not allowed to evict a tenant before 6 months. That applies only to section 21 ("no fault") evictions. Specifically, according to section 21 of the Housing Act 1988, a notice can't be served in the first 4 months of a tenancy (section 21(4B)), and can't take effect in the first 6 months (section 21(5)). Section 8 evictions, which require one or more of the reasons listed in Schedule 2 of the Act, do not have this restriction - though only some of them can be used during the fixed term part of the tenancy, and they must be listed in the tenancy agreement in order to be used in that way. Will I have to wait until he has actually left before I can arrange an AST with new tenants? Yes, but that's always true. It's very unwise for a new tenancy agreement to be signed until the previous tenants have moved out, because if they don't leave before the new agreement takes effect, the landlord is now committed to finding accommodation for the new tenants. This is why tenancy agreements are often only signed on the first day of the tenancy.

No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract.

Is it illegal to display a price perpetually while giving the impression it's a discount? Over a year ago, I purchased a license for Spine. At the time, it had an offer from $99, to $69. I didn't have plans to use it yet, but I purchased it at the time to catch a better price. However, since I bought it, it has always had that pricing. Reviewing the Internet Archive, the pricing as it's shown today has been perpetual since 2016. While there's no deadline, it gives the impression that it's a discount, but in reality it's an arbitrarily inflated price, struck out, with the normal price next to it. Is this pricing actually legally compliant, and if not, where can one report such behavior? The organization is based in Washington, United States. Regarding governance, these are the relevant terms of the license: 17 Governing Law. This Agreement is governed by and construed in accordance with, without regard to conflicts of law provisions, the internal laws of: (a) the State of California and any suit, action, or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement will be brought in the state or federal courts located in Los Angeles County, California; or, (b) England and Wales, provided You are located in the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, or a member state of the European Union, and any suit, action, or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement will be brought in the courts located in London, England. You irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of these courts in any such suit, action, or proceeding and waive any objection based on improper venue or forum non conveniens. 18 Trade Control Laws. The Spine Editor and Your use of the Spine Editor are subject to United States and international laws, restrictions, and regulations that may govern the import, export, and use of the Spine Editor. You agree to comply with all such laws, restrictions, and regulations. — https://esotericsoftware.com/spine-editor-license#s17

In England and Wales, falsely suggesting a sale or discount price would be contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. https://www.hants.gov.uk/business/tradingstandards/consumeradvice/goodsandservices/pricinglaw practices that have been widely used by businesses for many years are now deemed under the Guide as “less likely to comply” or, in other words, more likely than not to be viewed as misleading and in breach of the CPUT Regulations. So what is now less likely to comply? Price establishing for 28-days within a 6-month period Using a reference price that applied many months (at least more than 2 months) prior to the promotion. Using a reference price when only a minimal amount of product actually sold at that price. There is now an expectation that a business will have sold a “significant number” of units at the higher price in order to make a price comparison. https://marketinglaw.osborneclarke.com/advertising-regulation/no-more-28-day-rule-pricing-and-promotions-under-the-spotlight/

It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention "around $70AUD" which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly "do business in" Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC.

It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.

You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.

There is no fixed rule for this. Every situation is different, and of course there is nothing specific to software in there. It is very much a matter of intent. For example, negative profits are no clear sign. Company X thinks they could make $6 million profit by developing a product and selling it, minus $4 million development cost. It turns out development cost is $10 million. Raising prices is not possible because of competition. Company X will suffer losses of $4 million, without being predatory in any way. The reality is that a judge will look at the situation, take everything into account, and make a decision based on what they see. Since this is all about competition law, the main point is the intent or effect that your pricing makes competition impossible. That's what the judge will decide. For example, if you offer your service for $500,000 while others offer a similar service for $1,000,000 you could be using some super efficient processes that allow you to make money at that price, or you might have an idiotic sales person who will drive your company into bankruptcy, or you are trying to drive your competitors out of business. That's what the judge will decide.

There is a subtle difference between NSF policy and enforceable obligation. The primary stick that goes with the carrot is being excluded from future funding. Current policy does not generally force material in the public domain, but it is a possibility in "exceptional circumstances". There no doubt is a paper record somewhere in D.C. indicating whether such a codicil was added to any of these grants. NSF generally does not have contracts with individuals, they have contracts with institutions who have relations (typically employer-employee) with individuals, so even if there were a policy requiring works to be put in the public domain, NSF would have to go after the institution, who would have to go after the author. Since that would conflict with longstanding NSF policy on copyright, it is unlikely that they would want to pursue such an approach. The statement that McGraw-Hill Book Company announces that the material, which is copyrighted, will be available for use by authors and publishers on a royalty-free basis on or after April 30, 1970 is not itself a license, it is a suggestion that a license will com into existence. A present-tense declaration "this work is dedicated to the public domain effective April 30, 1970" can be interpreted as a license effective of a date certain. Similarly, "will be available to all publishers for use in English after December 31, 1970, and in translations after December 31, 1975" does not say that it is in the public domain effective of some date. One might say that the copyright statement is simply not well written and the author really intended the books to be in the public domain as of those dates. But without compelling evidence that the book was actually released into the public domain, a court is very unlikely to abrogate a person's property rights.

Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible.

How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.

Why can a court always, irresistibly appoint a trustee? The embolded phrases make it sound like a court can unpreventably, necessarily appoint trustees. Are there no exceptions? Can't a court fail to appoint a trustee? For example, can't a court fail to find anyone willing to be a trustee — particularly if the trust appears too complicated or controversial, and/or the trustee would not be recompensed enough? (3) It is a fundamental principle of Equity that a trust will not fail for want of a trustee.65 If a trust is created by the settlor, but the trustee declines to act as trustee, the beneficiary can apply to the court to have a trustee appointed [emphasis mine]. The right of the beneficiary to have a trustee appointed cannot be considered to be a right against the trustee’s right of ownership, because there will be no trustee at that particular moment. It is much more satisfactory to analyse this right as arising because Equity will ensure that the beneficiary’s proprietary right to the trust property is respected. 65 See Section 12.4.5, p. 374. Virgo, Principles of Equity & Trusts 2020 4th edn, page 51.

The court can appoint a government trustee All common law governments have an office called something like the Public Trustee that can act as a trustee of last resort. They work to a schedule of fees payable by the trust. Often they also provide their services commercially. They are often the same office that acts as the public guardian of “wards of the state”. They don’t have the right to refuse a court appointment. Of course, for an unsustainable trust, the court can order it would up instead and have the assets distributed to the beneficiaries.

This is an example of an affirmative defense In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the law provides an exception that amounts to if you do X you commit a crime unless Y, the defense has to prove (to a lower burden) that Y happened. An affirmative defense only kicks in if the prosecution has proved their case; which is usually because the defense concedes it if they are relying on an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense also must be introduced as soon as possible; preferably before charges are laid but, if not, at the commital/arraignment - courts take a dim view (up to excluding them entirely) if they are introduced late. As to whether a case like this goes to trial that depends on the evidence available to support Y and the weight that the prosecutor and then the committal/arraignment judge/grand jury gives to that evidence. If they believe that a jury would believe it, they will not take it trial; if they don't, they will.

You could certainly run the argument: it is unlikely to succeed. Fiduciary duties are either specifically legislated (e.g. company directors) or involve a relationship of confidence (the obligation to keep secrets) as well as trust (e.g. lawyer, doctor). Engineers (including software engineers) do not have this and AFAIK a fiduciary duty between an engineer and their client has never been found, even where the work is a one-on-one commission. For example, an engineer designing a bridge has the duties imposed by their contract to their client and a general common law duty e.g. the bridge won't fall down. Where the engineering is for a mass market commercial product finding a fiduciary duty seems a vanishingly small possibility. The relationship lacks the intimacy required to create one. Reliance on a person's expertise is not enough - that's just a normal contractural or common law duty.

The court's job is to resolve the dispute. The parties are in court specifically because there isn't agreement on what the terms of the contract were or even if there is a contract at all. If one of the parties contends that there is no contract then the court will have to determine if there is or isn't. Even if both parties agree there is a contract the court will need to satisfy itself that there is. This is a jurisdictional matter; in the absence of a contract the court can't make a ruling. Having decided there is a contract, there is something about the contract they don't agree on - if they agree then why are they in court? Each party will state their position on the dispute and provide evidence that supports that position. The court will decide based on the evidence and on the balance of probabilities which version is more correct. It is a given that the parties are in dispute about the exact terms of the contract, whether this was because of an initial misunderstanding, someone didn't read it or someone saw an opportunity to screw someone else doesn't matter. The court will decide what it thinks the parties thought (or should have thought) at the time on the basis of the evidence and the law.

does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself.

The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc.

The government can’t withdraw The government does not have a right to unilaterally withdraw charges once the case is before the court. All they can do is ask the court to dismiss the case as they have done here. It’s up to the court (judge) to decide whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not. It granted, then the case has gone to completion and the defendant is legally not subject to punishment as they were not convicted of the crime, notwithstanding any previous guilty plea. Now, while it would be unusual for a judge to refuse such a motion it’s not impossible and they might do so if they felt that the interests of justice are better served by completing the trial in the usual way. This is possibly more common in civil litigation where a losing plaintiff might not be permitted to settle if the judge doesn’t feel an innocent defendant is being adequately compensated.

The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.

Did the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms cause any existing laws to be immediately struck down? In the Charter, certain laws became more difficult to pass without the use of the notwithstanding clause. Some laws theoretically violated the Charter as soon as it was enacted (certain sections of the Indian act, for instance). Did any laws immediately become void simply by the Charter being enacted?

The invalidity of laws that are inconsistent with the Charter is by virtue of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which came into force with the bulk of the Charter. It states that: The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. This might be read as immediately applying by its own force to render laws inconsistent with the Charter to be void. And language to this effect has been even used by the Court, saying that a provision inconsistent with the Constitution is "invalid from the moment it is enacted" (e.g. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 2003 SCC 54). But for Section 52 to have effect "requires the exercise of judicial power to declare the law to be unconstitutional" (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 at para. 54). That a law is inconsistent with the Constitution is "revealed through litigation, specifically the judgment that declares the inoperability of the impugned law" (Sullivan at para. 55). Section 52 has no practical effect aside from Courts or other decision-makers declining to apply law that is inconsistent with the Constitution. Whether a law was void as soon as the Charter was enacted is not really a meaningful question nor even detectable until a Court declares the law to be invalid. The Court has also clarified that declarations of invalidity are not necessarily retroactive to the moment of enactment (internal citations removed): [60] ... Mr. Sullivan points to the idea that an unconstitutional law is invalid from the moment it is enacted. But the strict enforcement of such a principle “cannot easily be reconciled with modern constitutional law”. Instead, it is subject to a number of exceptions and s. 52(1) must be read “in light of all constitutional principles”. In Albashir, my colleague Karakatsanis J. explained that declarations of unconstitutionality are generally retrospective, consistent with the notion that a law is unconstitutional from its enactment. However, other constitutional principles may require a purely prospective declaration of unconstitutionality or a suspended declaration. Similarly, the legal effect of a s. 52(1) declaration by a superior court must be defined with reference to constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, and federalism. I'll say this one more way: while it's true that some laws were immediately inconsistent with the Charter, s. 52(1) did not have any observable effect until a court declared such laws to be invalid.

No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.

None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.

Is the government exempt from anti discrimination legislation Broadly speaking, the government (in Canada, the executive power vested in Her Majesty the Queen) is not subject to any law unless the legislature binds the Crown explicitly. In this case, Ontario Human Rights Code does bind the government and any agency of the Crown. However, Canada is a federal country, and for certain areas exclusively regulated by the federal government, provincial laws may not apply fully. This is the case for human rights and employment laws; the federal government along with federally regulated industries (banking, telecommunications, airlines etc.) enjoy immunity from provincial human rights codes. But they are still subject to the federal Canada Human Rights Act (which only apply to businesses under the federal jurisdiction), which also prohibit age discrimination. Additionally, government actions are also subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 15 of which prohibits discrimination based on age. what is with the huge number of jobs that list "Must be eligible to participate in the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program" as a requirement (with <30 being the top listed requirement). For example, the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program you referred to in the question is a federal program within the spending power of the Parliament of Canada and are immune from provincial laws that interfere with its application. Ontario laws simply to no apply in this case (but federal law and the Charter does) even if an action physically happens in Ontario. What Exemptions are there to the Age Discrimination laws in Ontario? Anti-discrimination law in general only prohibits "unreasonable" discriminations. If someone can show that they have "good reason" to discriminate, it can be legal. For example, it is legal for a casting director to choose a black man to portray Martin Luther King Jr. instead of a white woman. It is also legal to discriminate against people with certain disabilities if they are in fact unable to carry out tasks required in a job even with reasonable accommodation. It is also legal for an employer (or for the law to require an employer) to give special leaves to women for pregnancy and childbirth, even though otherwise discrimination is not permitted based on sex. Age-based discounts for example are usually not illegal (and even explicitly legal in Ontario's legislation for senior's discounts) if the purpose is genuine (e.g. less spending power for teens and seniors). While age requirements are on its face a discrimination, youth programs usually qualify as affirmative action programs that are designed to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged group. It is the same basis why certain gender-, race- or age-based scholarships and grants are legal. In the employment context, the government considers youths as a disadvantaged group and improving youth employment is a reasonable government objective. The Charter allows affirmative programs by the government: (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. and both federal and Ontario human rights legislations allow special programs: 14 (1) A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a special program designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part I. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 14 (1). 16 (1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry out a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disadvantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group. Canadian Human Rights Act

In the United States, the answer depends on who is unlawfully in power. In the hypothetical you presented, the answer is probably that the law would remain valid, as Congress generally has the sole authority to pass judgment on whether to admit the elected person. A third party would not have the ability to challenge the law based on the qualifications of a lawmaker. But if we were dealing with an administrative official promulgating regulations, those rules would generally be void if that official were unlawfully appointed. That was the case in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), where a cola distributor challenged a labor regulation, saying that the members of the NLRB who enacted it were improperly appointed. The Court agreed that the appointments were improper, so the regulations were nullified. A judicial decision coming out under these circumstances would also be nullified if one of the judges weren't really a judge. That happened just last year, in Yovino v. Rizo. In that case, ten judges from the Ninth Circuit heard a case, and the vote split 6-4. But the author of the majority opinion died before the decision was published, which is when it become effective. The Supreme Court held that because there were therefore only five votes for that decision, it was not a majority opinion, and therefore not binding on future Ninth Circuit panels.

The Department of Justice has a nice guide on each section of the Charter, including section 28. As @MichaelSeifert's comment says, section 15 did not come into effect until later to give government time to resolve possible conflicting laws. During this time, section 28 can still be used to ensure other Charter rights are enforced on a gender equal basis. During the period from 1982 until April 1985, section 28 was the only Charter guarantee of sexual equality. It has been said that this may be the main effect of that section. There is to date limited jurisprudence on section 28. It is also important to note that section 28 is for interpretation of the Charter, not other laws. It cannot be directly applied to other parts of the constitution, ordinary laws nor other actions of the government. 28 Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons. Equally, section 15 cannot be used to challenge other parts of the constitution, it can only be used against laws and actions at a lower level (Adler v Ontario (AG), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609). The DOJ guide also describes this section as "interpretive, confirmatory, and adjunctive", in other word, symbolic. Nothing wrong with this, laws, especially constitutional acts that are profoundly political, are often symbolic. It also helps to contextualize section 1 analysis that determines the extent of acceptable limitations on Charter rights. Additionally, in my opinion, a very important historic reason is the Persons case. Section 28 is reminiscent and affirmative of the results in the that case, which declared that "persons" in the Constitution included female persons. This is was not as obvious as we would think today, gender-neutral language on its face did not mean that the law was interpreted in a gender-neutral way. Not to mention, in French, masculine forms (the Charter uses chacun and "tout citoyen canadien" for example) are often used as the generic (nothing wrong with this since gender in French is grammatical). But the section affirms the generic value of the expressions for both sexes, similar to subsection 33(1) of the Interpretation Act or other places where you see things like "masculine forms/pronouns has been used only for convenience and the rules apply equally to women.". The Supreme Court of Canada rejected women as "qualified persons" within the meaning of the Constitution for the purpose of appointing Senators; it was only because SCC was not Canada's final court at the time that the case succeeded in the British Privy Council. Notwithstanding clause As a compromise with the principle of parliamentary supremacy, section 33 of the Charter provides that (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15. [...] The legislatures cannot use the notwithstanding clause on other sections, e.g. democratic rights (sections 3-5), mobility rights (section 6) or language rights (sections 16-23). Section 28 is also not subject to a notwithstanding declaration, as such, it may mean that a government action notwithstanding other sections of the Charter nonetheless cannot violate sexual equality (but this question remain unsettled). This is one argument used to challenge the Quebec law on state secularism. The litigation is still ongoing, but the decision of the Superior Court of Quebec so far has disagreed with the preceding interpretation. The Superior Court deemed that once the legislature suspended the application of a Charter section, the rights in that section essentially are no longer guaranteed by the Charter and section 28 cannot be applied.

Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004.

The future prospects are negligible, and the present status of such influence is non-existent. In a few cases, you may find an appellate decision citing some statement from a reputable law review. Here is an article that addresses such influences on SCOTUS (which, the authors note, have decreased over time). However, you are describing a wingnut legal theory, and courts do not rely on wingnut legal theories, they rely on what the actual law is.

UK law and time limits A patient with a history of mental health problems goes to his/her GP claiming depression. However, because the patient does not appear to act in the expected manner, the GP refuses time off. This is contrary to the Mental Capacity Act of 2005 that requires (3) A lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to— (a) a person’s age or appearance, or (b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about his capacity. It turns out that the patient does have some serious problems and suffers at work. Can the patient take the GP to court because the GP broke the 2005 Act and, if so, is there a time limit that must be observed? If not, what recourse to action would he/she have?

How is the Mental Health Act relevant? It sets out the law relating to removing a person’s decision making ability over their own life and placing it in the hands of a guardian and, possibly, confine them to an institution against their will. The question is not whether a person is mentally ill, it’s whether that illness prevents them from making decisions about their life.

Such sad and tragic circumstances, my sympathy to all involved. General I do not know the specifics of English law as it applies but I believe it is similar enough to New South Wales, Australia that the general overview that follows is not likely to be far wrong. Before a court intervenes there has to be a dispute and someone with standing must bring an action to the court. We can surmise that a dispute arose about the best medical treatment for the child between the child's parents and the child's medical professionals - if there was unanimity there would have been no legal proceedings. Ultimately this is an issue of the welfare of the child. Medical professionals are under a legal obligation to report issues of child welfare to the relevant authorities. In the UK, the government authority responsible for child welfare is the Department of Education. We can presume that they intervened in accordance with their policies and procedures and their understanding of the law and the dispute could not be resolved. It is likely the DoE that brought the matter to the courts or the parent's disputing a DoE decision. The court will decide such issues in the best interest of the child. In deciding what that is, they will consider all the evidence including the parent's wishes, the child's wishes (not relevant in this case but it can be for older children), other relatives, medical opinion etc. They will also consider what the law is, including precedent and make their decision. If you read the linked article about the high court trial the judge is quoted as saying: “It is with the heaviest of hearts but with complete conviction for Charlie’s best interests that I find it is in Charlie’s best interests that I accede to these applications and rule that GOSH may lawfully withdraw all treatment save for palliative care to permit Charlie to die with dignity.” “I dare say that medical science may benefit objectively from the experiment, but experimentation cannot be in Charlie’s best interests unless there is a prospect of benefit for him.” “Charlie’s parents have sadly but bravely acknowledged and accepted that the quality of life that Charlie has at present is not worth sustaining, for he can only breathe through a ventilator, and although they believe that he has a sleep/wake cycle and can recognise them and react to them when they are close, they realise that he cannot go on as he is lying in bed, unable to move, fed through a tube, breathing through a machine.” “Understandably, Charlie’s parents had grasped that possibility, they have done all they could possibly have done, they have very publicly raised funds. What parents would not do the same? But I have to say, having heard the evidence, that this case has never been about affordability, but about whether there is anything to be done for Charlie.” “But if Charlie’s damaged brain function cannot be improved, as all agree, then how can he be any better off than he is now, which is a condition that his parents believe should not be sustained?” This decision was reviewed by the European Human Rights Court who “endorsed in substance the approach” taken by the British courts and declared “the decision is final”. Is it "symptomatic of a Single-Payer healthcare system" Probably not. Almost universally, child welfare cases are decided on the "best interests of the child". This judge in this case within this legal and cultural system decided as he did - and I do not doubt that it was a difficult and emotional task. Change the judge, change the case, change the law and change the culture and you may change the decision but, then again, maybe not. Perhaps in a place with a different culture towards health care, the medical practitioners would not have formed the opinion that the experimental treatment was not in the best interest of their patient and there would have been no dispute that required government intervention. Legal basis Governments can pass laws that impact the people in their jurisdiction. The UK government has passed laws that allow them to interfere in the normal relationship of parental authority. The UK government is not unique - all countries have such laws. Further, the UK government controls who enters and leaves their borders and in what circumstances. Did the NHS (or the hospital) take custody of the child away from the parents? Almost certainly not - this was not a custody battle. Or does the NHS get to decide upon the welfare of its patients once they are in the system? Of course. Every medical professional/hospital/clinic everywhere in the world has a legal and moral responsibility to provide treatment in the best interests of their patients. They will get sued if they don't. Why were the parents not able to take Charlie away on their own recognizance, like (presumably) adults can refuse treatment and leave the hospital? Because an adult can decide for themselves, a child cannot. Other people have responsibility for deciding for the child and when, as here, people with overlapping responsibilities (parents and medical professionals) have divergent views, the government intervenes through executive or judicial action.

The doctor is a professional Engineers don’t put extra wings on airplanes because the client asks. Lawyers don’t throw unsubstantiated allegations in their pleadings because the client asks. Accountants don’t change the balance sheet because the client asks. And doctors don’t prescribe unnecessary medications or vitamins because the client asks. For most people with normal health and a relatively balanced diet, nutritional supplements are medically unnecessary. They may make the user feel better through the placebo affect but doctors prescribe things that are necessary, not things the patient wants but doesn’t need. You can sue a doctor if they are negligent. One sure sign of negligence is if they adopt the treatment plan proposed by the patient without applying their professional judgement.

As a preface, while the best course of action isn't always clear and the reality of implementing some solution is often rocky, the bipolar diagnosis situation you describe is probably the single most common situation in which legal arrangements must be made for an adult child, and is almost as common as the need for children to make legal arrangements for the care of their declining parents. You aren't the only one going through situations like these. Probably 0.5%-2% of people in any given area experience bipolar, usually starting in adolescence or young adulthood, and difficulties managing it of the kind that you describe are the rule and not the exception. Also, just ignoring the problems you describe is a very bad idea. Premature death either from suicide or bad judgment related to the bipolar diagnosis is all too common in these situations. It is serious business, not something that should be thought of as bad character, or futile to do anything about, or blameworthy. It just is, and if someone doesn't do something when the plan gets off course, serious consequences often follow. There are really several intertwined issues present here. Realistically, given the nature of the concerns expressed, a limited guardianship may be necessary to accomplish the goals expressed. What Are Medical Powers Of Attorney? A healthcare or medical power of attorney gives the person who holds it (who is called an "agent" or "proxy") the authority to make medical decisions for someone called the principal (i.e. John Smith) when the principal lacks the capacity to give informed consent at that very moment to do so. This is because a power of attorney is an inherently revocable document expressing the wishes of the person writing it. You generally can't bind yourself in the future without court approval or a contractual relationship with a third party which a power of attorney is not. It isn't uncommon for medical personnel to decide on the spot when to and not to listen to someone with a medical power of attorney based upon how mentally competent the patient seems at the time on a decision-by-decision basis. For example, they might defer to the medical power of attorney agent when the patient is unconscious or heavily drugged, and listen to the patient when the patient is conscious, not drugged, and not acting erratically. Parents, incidentally, do not automatically have this authority, nor do spouses. A medical POA is a document that allows the agent to say "yes" when the patient (i.e. John Smith) cannot. Another name for a document that is very similar and sometimes used is a "health care proxy." It would typically cost a few hundred dollars to $1,000 to have a medical power of attorney drawn up after discussing the situation and the principal's needs in a meeting with a lawyer and might take an initial meeting and then a second one at which the document is signed after it is prepared following the initial meeting. Other lawyers might manage this in a single meeting and draft it while you wait. If all you need is a power of attorney, don't be penny wise and pound foolish by doing it yourself, unless the form is provided to you by the health care provider you will spend most of your time dealing with and they prefer their own form. Otherwise, the likelihood that you will have to pay more to a lawyer later cleaning up your own mistakes probably exceeds any money that you will save. Other Kinds Of Authorizations Many medical providers will allow someone to act on behalf of a patient in matters other than matters that call for the kind of medical decision that would normally require the informed consent of the patient, even when the patient is not manifestly incapable of making medical decisions at that very moment. This could simply be a note in the file that the patient has given that person authority to do so, it could be a written authorization to access HIPAA protected personal health information of the patient, and it could be a variety of other things (e.g., authority to make financial arrangements). Some of this is often incorporated in the same document as a medical POA. Picking Up Controlled Substances A Medical POA may, or may not, necessarily be sufficient to authorize someone to pick up a controlled substance on behalf of a patient if the patient is physically able to do so, without the presence of the patient. I don't know what the true rule of law under the controlled substances acts and pharmacy regulation is, but I do know that practice in real life varies quite a bit. The best practical solution to the issue of picking up controlled substances would be to ask the usual pharmacist what they require and to comply. (A legal guardian would generally have the power to pick up controlled substances for a ward.) Guardianships and Limited Guardianships What Is a Guardianship? A guardian of the person is someone appointed by a court who has the authority to make medical decisions and other personal life decisions for their ward (i.e. John Smith), even contrary to their apparent stated wishes. A guardian has the authority to say "yes" and also to say "no" to the expressed wishes of the ward, overruling the ward. A guardianship of an adult can be general, or can be limited on a customized basis. A guardian must be appointed by a court with jurisdiction over these cases, usually in the county where the ward resides. But, a guardianship can be requested by the ward as opposed to contested. Realistically, a court would be unlikely to grant a full guardianship or a contested guardianship in these circumstances, but might grant a limited guardianship with the consent of the ward in these circumstances. The parents and possibly any siblings, would have a right to notice of the proceedings and to object or to seek to be appointed instead. What Process Is Involved In Having a Guardian Appointed? This would realistically be a proceeding that should ideally involve a specialist lawyer (with experience in mental health or elder law and guardianships) and at least one medical professional's statement (probably a treating psychiatrist or psychologist). There would also probably be a court investigator or guardian ad litem appointed at the ward's expense, to confirm that the facts represented in the petition to have a guardian appointed really reflect the ward's intent. Usually, a proposed guardian selected by the adult ward during a lucid interval would have priority for appointment. The medical professional and lawyer should be able to provide good suggestions regarding what the scope of the limited guardianship needs to be, although don't ignore or fail to give full credit to your own layperson's practical understanding of the situation either. The guardian would have to provide information to the court in connection with the petition showing eligibility to serve (e.g. criminal record check, credit check, CV, nomination by ward). Often the guardian would have to demonstrate good intentions towards the ward in some way, especially if the guardian is a third party and not someone who serves as a guardian as a livelihood. Some courts would require the guardian to have insurance for liability in connection with the task or a surety bond up to some dollar amount. The final decision would usually be made in an in-person hearing at which the ward, the proposed guardian, the proposed guardian's lawyer, the medical professional, the guardian ad litem or investigator, the judge, a court clerk, a court reporter, and any family members who chose to appear (with their lawyers, if any), were present. If the guardianship was granted, perhaps with modifications requested by the judge to the terms of the guardianship, then the Court would issue what are called "Letters" that formally appoint the guardian to the post. Once appointed, the guardian would have to file periodic status reports with the court and would also be subject to the court's jurisdiction in the event of any future dispute regarding the guardianship, or any allegations of misconduct by the guardian, or any circumstance that requires court approval such as a change in the terms of the guardianship or in the person serving as guardian. The procedural details I am describing are approximate and aren't necessarily up-to-the minute correct, and might vary somewhat even from court to court within California under local rules and customs of practice; but they give you a gist of what the process would be like if it is working properly and with best practices. Typically, this might cost $3,000 to $10,000 all in for an uncontested proceeding, and many times that much in the event of a contested attempt to have a guardian appointed. Health Insurance Eligibility I'll defer to someone else's answer regarding health insurance eligibility, as I don't have time to look into that at the moment. My instinct is that this wouldn't be a problem in any case except a guardianship and probably wouldn't be a problem even in a case with a third party guardian, but I can't confirm that without doing research.

https://bchumanrights.ca/mask-poster/ Technically speaking is wearing masks a law, a health order or the store policy as a result of the health order? Technically speaking it's a Ministerial Order made under the power delegated to the Minister by the Emergency Program Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 111, s. 10. Can a customer be denied service or entry for not wearing a mask even if they claim they have a medical exception? No, they cannot. If they claim they have an exemption, then as far as you are concerned, they have an exemption. Refusing service would be illegal discrimination on the basis of disability. Must they prove it with some sort of certificate? No. Some people have claimed that they do not need to show proof. Those people are right. If the customer is acting in a dishonest manner, for example if I see them wearing a mask before entering the store, does that make a difference? No. Does the quality of mask or the material it is made of make a difference? Yes. They must wear a face covering. "face covering" means either of the following that covers the nose and mouth of a person: (a) a medical or non-medical mask; (b) a tightly woven fabric; Some customers pull their shirt over their face and my coworkers tell them that is alright. Depends on the shirt: if it is made of "a tightly woven fabric" then it is alright.

In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)

Fault, in English law, is "blameworthiness". While it covers both the act and the mental state of the defendant, it cannot equate to the subjective criminal intent of the defendant known as mens rea. In other words, you can be at fault for negligence without having the requisite intent to commit a criminal act. This is perhaps best pointed out by the next sentence after the one in bold: It would be perfectly possible for a criminal code to provide separate crimes of negligence, with lower maximum sentences, at appropriate points in the hierarchy of offences. There are also examples of such offences in English law already. For example, careless, and inconsiderate, driving ("driving without due care and attention") contrary to Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is an offence that requires fault without mens rea. The defendant merely has to be careless and inconsiderate — they do not have to be in the state of mind where they know or believe that what they are doing is criminal in some way. In contrast, dangerous driving contrary to Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 has the implied requirement of mens rea because of the word "dangerously". This implies the defendant must have a subjective belief that what they are doing is dangerous (or otherwise be reckless about it), and therefore criminal.

Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.

What legal relief is available when a neighbour uses my address as his own for communication without written consent from me? A property, say plot no.31, was sub-divided into two parts. After subdivision the plot number on record for the newly created subdivision was, say, 31-A; the original plot number remained 31. The division was challenged, and the challenge dismissed at all levels after the first initial success. Many years later, after the challenger passed away and that sub-division was inherited by the challenger's heirs, it was discovered that even after dismissal the challenger continued to use the postal address of the challenged sub-division. This continued for years even when the heirs too knew from record that the address was 31-A instead of 31. When asked the postal department stated the address being next door, all mail was delivered assuming the misstated address to be simple oversight by the sender/s. Even assuming defence by 31-A claim the misrepresentation was by oversight, it comes across as far-fetched for such oversight to continue for whole decades. What legal relief is available when a neighbour uses my address as his own for communication without written consent from me? Is the the postal department also culpable? EDIT: To follow up with @eis' answer that tort demands establishing damage here is my concern. Documents which establish proof of address s.a. Utility Bills - telephone, energy, water service lose clarity. If so inclined, one may call this behaviour causing loss of value to the property simply because it amounts to squatting - if only on paper. EDIT 2: Pursuant to the comment by R.M below, an additional question that comes to mind is as follows - Could such use of my address as an alias for their own address serve to establish 'proof of residence'? For instance, some days ago I encountered a pizza delivery boy waiting outside my premises. Upon enquiry he intimated the pizza was to be delivered to them but the address given by them was mine.

Mark the mail delivered as "addressee unknown, return to sender" and give it to the postal delivery person next time around. If the mail stops getting through, the neighbor will update their address.

Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.

If what you show is correct and above-board then you are being sued in superior court. However it sounds unlikely that the plaintiff could have served you with notice of such a lawsuit without you realizing it, so if I were you I would first call the court to see if they do in fact have a case with the docket number listed. Then ask: When and who served the original notice in the case (because if you really didn't get it then whoever said you did majorly screwed up and is probably in trouble) Who the plaintiff's counsel is If the letter was from a real lawyer on the California Bar, and that case really is open in the superior court with you as a defendant, then you really are being sued, and you should either get a lawyer or negotiate a settlement, because if you don't answer and defend then you're just going to have more judgments against you. If any of the above does not check out then whoever sent that letter is in big trouble if you report it to the DA, postal inspector, and (if they are a real lawyer) the Bar.

Unrecorded sewer easements seem to be a major category of such problems: the easement may only be recorded on the government sewer map, and not against the property. Likewise underground gas and electric. There is also a prescriptive easement, like adverse possession, though in that case the issue would be that the property owner may not know that he was granting an easement by allowing the use of the land.

If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.

The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.

If you claim ownership of property but do nothing with it for 12 years (not even collecting a £1 rent), then in due course ownership will pass to the tenants, under the doctrine of adverse possession. Your solicitor is the only person who can advise you properly, since he knows all the details; but ultimately you will have to choose between being on bad terms with these neighbours (including suing them for possession) and losing the garages. To deal with your edit: normally, just requesting the rent is enough, even if the tenants ignore every request. However, if they specifically refuse to pay anything, they are claiming that they own the garages not you, and if you do nothing you will lose possession eventually. If you sue them for possession now, you will probably win (assuming your question is accurate and complete), but every day weakens your case. Of course, suing will be expensive and damage your relationship; but it won't be any cheaper in the future.

Since you asked about any jurisdiction, and presumably any common law jurisdiction, in which one of the elements of theft is the intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property, here's the UK* answer. Regarding borrowing specifically, the UK statute referring to theft - the Theft Act 1968 - provides for this in section 6(1): A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. In other words, a thief may say 'I only wished to borrow it', but that won't necessarily amount to a defence under English law. It depends on how long (s)he borrows it for, and how (s)he treats it while borrowing it. In addition, the case law clarifies what is meant by 'his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights'. This has been held to mean: Selling, Bargaining with. R v Cahill, R v Lloyd Rendering Useless. DPP v J Dealing with in a manner which risks its loss. R v Fernandes, R v Marshall Borrowing in certain circumstances. R v Lloyd Pawning. s6(2) Theft Act 1968 Not enough to just deal with it. R v Mitchell So how do we prove whether someone intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently, or at least permanently enough to amount to an offence under the Act? The answer seems to be that we look at how they deal with it, and what condition they leave the property in. If they do any of the things listed above, with the exception of no. 6, then they have demonstrated an intent to permanently deprive; if they merely use the property, then that isn't enough to show such intent. You asked specifically: I am looking for an answer that explains whether someone who credibly asserts – e.g., by advance sworn affidavit – that they intend to return the item can be convicted of theft, or any other crime, for taking someone else's property for an extended but not infinite period of time. In the case of R v Lloyd, the court held borrowing would become intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property if 'all goodness, virtue and practical value is gone'. So if someone swore they were planning on returning the item, the court could nonetheless convict them of theft if they held on to the item for so long, and treated it as their own to such an extent, that all its value was gone. (In R v Lloyd, the items in question were films, and as they were returned in much the same condition as they'd originally been in, this was held not to be intention to permanently deprive, and therefore not to be theft.) *By 'UK' I mean 'English and Welsh'; the answer may be different in Scotland.

can one turn left or right at a red light with dual lane turns? The link Turning | Alberta.ca says "when the light is red, if there are no signs prohibiting the turn, you may turn left on a red light from a one way to a one way after you come to a complete stop at the proper stopping location (stop line or crosswalk) and it is safe. This also applies to dual lane turns. Yield to pedestrians crossing to your left." It seems it's saying with dual lane turns, one can also turn left on a red light. However, in this link Turning lanes | Alberta.ca it says "unless prohibited by a sign, at a dual right turn intersection, you may turn right on a red light after you come to a complete stop at the proper stopping point (stop line or crosswalk)." It doesn't mention turning left on a red light. So can one turn left or right at a red light with dual lane turns? Thank you!

The critical consideration is that the permitted left turn must be onto a one-way roadway in that direction. One is not permitted to perform a left turn which involves crossing traffic from the left, which would also imply that it is not a one-way roadway.

As mentioned in the comments, the simple answer is 'probably not' because you probably haven't yet gotten around to taking your halftrack in to get the necessary paperwork to demonstrate eligibility for registration, even if said halftrack was eligible for registration. I'm also going to confine this answer to whether you can legally drive the halftrack on public roads. I am not aware of any special laws about merely owning a halftrack that (say) you keep on a farm as decoration, but in any case I think you are more interested in whether the vehicle in question can be registered. Vehicle registration standards are (mostly) dealt with under State and territory law. I can give you an answer for Victoria, to at least illustrate the issues and where to look for answers. However, (at least some of) the relevant standards appear to be uniform across Australia. The starting point is that it is an offence to operate a vehicle on a public road without registering said vehicle: Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), s 7. The Act provides that: the Regulations may prescribe how registration is applied for and granted or refused: s 9; and the Minister may prescribe standards for registration by notice in the Gazette: s 10. The standards cover "the construction, efficiency, performance, safety, design and equipment of, and the method of identifying" vehicles. I'm not good at searching Gazettes so I'm going to wave my hand over a gap and skip straight to things like: 'Guide to Modifications for Motor Vehicles' on the VicRoads website (VicRoads being the road traffic authority in Victoria, the government agency in charge of registering vehicles): https://www.vicroads.vic.gov.au/~/media/files/documents/safety-and-road-rules/vsinumber8guidetomodificationsformotorvehicles.ashx?la=en 'National Code of Practice for Light Vehicle Construction and Modification (NCOP)', which is an Australia-wide document: https://infrastructure.gov.au/roads/vehicle_regulation/bulletin/vsb_ncop.aspx This is one of those areas where you probably need a mechanic more than a lawyer. Once you have satisfied yourself that your halftrack meets the applicable standards, you need to go and get a 'VASS Approval Certificate' ('Vehicle Assessment Signatory Scheme') from a certified tester and then register the vehicle with VicRoads. Happy driving!

Can you get a ticket? Absolutely. You're relying on the knowledge of the person issuing you the ticket. How knowledgeable are they? In my experiences around the world, people enforcing laws on a day to day basis know surprisingly little about the law (although they often think they know everything). I think this part of the code you mentioned might be relevant: 5200.(a) When two license plates are issued by the department for use upon a vehicle, they shall be attached to the vehicle for which they were issued, one in the front and the other in the rear. But "the department" likely refers to the Department of Motor Vehicles in the State of California, which never issued you anything. But that may not stop eager law enforcement personnel from issuing you a ticket. If you do receive a ticket, I think you'll successfully be able to fight it and win. It will be obvious to a judge that there is nothing you could have done to reasonably avoid the issue. Just make sure you have documents showing that you only moved very recently. According to the the State of California's official Department of Motor Vehicles website, you have only 20 days to get your registration (and likely the state's mandatory insurance) switched to your new state. See https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/howto/htvr09#reg I have no idea how vigorously they enforce the law there. It's likely up to the whims of the people in charge of enforcing it.

The nuisance of potentially waiting for all the traffic on the main road is a notion alien to the law. Seeing the red light, y correctly does not enter the intersection, because it would block the intersection, § 11 Ⅰ StVO. Keeping intersections clear is a general consideration, say for emergency services. Nevertheless, if safely stopping required entering the intersection, it’s not an issue here, § 4 Ⅰ 2 StVO. Stopping before entering the intersection is not a hard requirement, because the traffic lights do not regulate the intersection but an “isolated” pedestrian crossing. § 37 Ⅱ StVO concerns traffic lights at intersections. x has to yield traffic as indicated by the sign, § 8 Ⅰ StVO. Making a U‑turn or right-hand turn would be no issue, since this would not interfere with traffic (assuming properly dimensioned streets). Going straight is permissible if done with caution, § 8 Ⅱ StVO, but I would not recommend that. y might decide any moment “Eff it! I’m taking B street [Am Falkplatz].” and boom! Going left, however, is not allowed, since x had to stop short of the traffic light, which is frowned upon (blocking the intersection), but moreover it would take y’s right of way.

Yes because Texas adopted the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 571.108; TX Inspection Procedure Chapter 4, 04.20.28 Passenger cars manufactured 1986 – Newer: 3 stop lamps required Light trucks/SUVs under 80” wide, manufactured 1994 – Newer: 3 stop lamps required per DPS Further Backed by Caselaw https://caselaw.findlaw.com/tx-court-of-appeals/1644657.html

The only specific prohibition of "backing" is at s. 157 of the Highway Traffic Act: 157 (1) No driver of a vehicle shall back the vehicle upon the roadway or shoulder of any highway divided by a median strip1 on which the speed limit is in excess of 80 kilometres per hour ... However, there is a careless driving prohibition: 130 (1) Every person is guilty of the offence of driving carelessly who drives a vehicle or street car on a highway without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway. And there is the Criminal Code's dangerous driving offence: 320.13 (1) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, is dangerous to the public. It would be misleading to say that it is absolutely "legal" or "allowed" to "drive in reverse on a non-divided road that has a speed limit of more than 80 km/h". It just isn't prohibited by s. 157(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. 1. Note that "divided" in the question was just a paraphrase of "divided by a median strip." There are many sections of road in Ontario that are not divided in that sense, with speed limits above 80 km/h, including much of the trans-Canada highway.

In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving.

Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.

Copyright on commercial image from the 1930s (UK) I want to use a railway poster from the 1930s in publicity for a play, but the Science Museum wants a fee for it, claiming copyright (https://collection.sciencemuseumgroup.org.uk/objects/co231218/london-midland-scottish-railway-poster-see-the-peak-district-poster). On what basis might their claim be legitimate? afaict they are not paying the money to descendants of the artist, and it seems likely that he wouldn't have had copyright in the first place (that would have been with the railway company, which no longer exists, and was absorbed by British Rail). When I (politely) asked them, they said: "The copyright was revived in the 1990’s and the rights were assigned to us by the British Railways Board at that time." Revived by whom? How?

The modern rule in the UK is that copyright lasts until the end of the calendar year following 70 years after the death of the author. So if the author died in or later than 1953, it would be under copyright under this general rule. However, this wasn't always the rule and the museum speaks of a copyright revived in the 1990s. So I went down that rabbit hole of historical UK copyright legislation. I personally find it interesting, but it turned out to not be entirely determinative. It all turns on publication date and date of death of the artist, neither of which I can find, with the museum only stating the artist was active in the 1930s. But even assuming the most favourable facts for this to still be copyright under a "revived" copyright, the latest date I can find for copyright to still remain under that regime is end of 2015. Per Copyright Act 1956 s. 3(4)(a): in the case of an engraving, if before the death of the author the engraving had not been published, the copyright shall continue to subsist until the end of the period of fifty years from the end of the calendar year in which it is first published; For the fact pattern I'm outlining, we must assume the author died before publication. As for the engraving bit, s. 48 defines that lithographs are engravings, and while I am far from an expert in this field, skimming the Wikipedia article on lithography, it does seem quite possible the poster could be a lithograph. I'll note here since you bring up who precisely would be the owner of the original copyright, that it does seem likely that the poster was a work for hire, following the provisions of s. 4(2). As such, the copyright would have indeed ultimately transferred to British Rail. Jumping ahead a bit, the more precise year which the museum states is "the 1990's" is 1995 (we'll get to why). So in order for copyright to have first expired as per the museum's statement and the authors active years, we must assume a publication date between 1930-1945 (or thereabouts, I'm not being super careful in this answer about the months things happen in, so there may be accumulation of off-by-one errors). Because of those years, I now have to quickly address why the Copyright Act 1911 isn't relevant. The transitional provisions outlined in the Seventh Schedule reveal that only for photographs are the copyright duration provisions maintained from the 1911 Act. Now we can jump into the modern law, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA). The transitional provision in the Schedule 1 s. 12(2)(b) directly maintains the 1956 copyright duration in this case which given our possible publication years, would have led to copyright expiry sometime between 1980-1995. However, in 1995, the UK passed The Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995. This was in accordance with European legislation harmonizing copyright duration, in Directive 93/98/EEC (itself since replaced by Directive 2006/116/EC). Side Note: 1995 is a peculiar year for copyrights in Europe due to that directive and so is exactly where I started my research for this answer, because it caused weird quirks for copyright terms in some countries in some cases. For the UK, s. 5 of the regulation amended the CDPA, basically establishing the general European standard of copyrights expiring 70 years after the author's death. More importantly for our case though is the regulations own section explaining in which cases the new copyright term expires. In s. 16: The new provisions relating to duration of copyright apply— (a) [...] (b) [...] (c) [...] (d) to existing works in which copyright expired before 31st December 1995 but which were on 1st July 1995 protected in another EEA state under legislation relating to copyright or related rights. Now, I'm not going to go through and look at all the EEA contries legislation to confirm, but it seems incredibly likely that one of them would have had engravings protected for life+70 in 1995, given that's what Europe has now standardized on (since we're assuming pre-publication death for an author who was active in the 1930s). Notably, s. 17 even defines cases of expired works re-entering copyright as "revived copyright", matching the terminology the museum's statement used. It would have been great if the 1995 regulation explicitly spelled out the relationship with CDPA's Schedule 1 s. 12, but in judicial interpretation, newer legislation takes priority, so the 1995 law would control. Note: The answer is getting long enough so I'm not going to fully research/cite this, but for regulations vs. legislation, we have a weird case of a regulation amending a statute. I'm fairly certain this is due to UK Acts passed for European Community membership elevating regulations to primary legislation when they are passed for compliance with European law. So given our assumed facts, the poster would have revived copyright per the 1995 Regulations. However, you may note (as I belatedly did after first posting this answer) that even given revived copyright, that revived copyright is still life+70. And the assumptions made for copyright revival under this clause requires a posthumous publication date of 1945 at the latest. This means at best any copyright under these particular circumstances would have expired in 2015. There is a bit of a middle ground here. If the poster is not a lithograph, or the publication was not posthumous, the work would have gained a life+50 term per aformentioned Copyright Act 1956 s. 3(4). But then for copyright to expire and be revived, we still have to assume a 1945 death date at the latest. Alternatively, instead of copyright revival, it could have gotten extended from life+50 to life+70 per the 1995 Regulations s. 16(c). But because we are more than 20 years from 1995, it mathematically works out that it doesn't matter anymore and we can just work with the life+70 rule. A combination of 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) and posthumous publication though does actually give another reasonable way for the work to still be under copyright. If published in 1988 before the CDPA entered into force, it would have followed the cited 1956 rules of copyright expiring 50 years after publication. The 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) specifies that longer existing terms can continue. So that results in 2038 as a latest possible year through this method. In the end I think there are two or three reasonable interpretations: The museum is correct the work is under copyright, but incorrect about the reason. It's instead because the work is under copyright because the author died after 1953 (or is still living), or The work is still covered under the 50 years after posthumous publication rule for engravings established in the Copyright Act 1956 (publication years 1973-1988 for copyright expiry at the end of calendar years 2023-2038). The museum is correct that copyright was revived, but I can't find a way for this to be true and for the work to still be under copyright (with 2015 the latest year I can find for the given facts). Note that this is my own reading of legislation, please take it with a grain of salt.

This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.

Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable.

It's highly unlikely that A would even recognise this as similar. It's really bog standard. A coloured patterned background (in a different colour and with a different pattern). Two buttons. A picture and a testimonial. All things that have been done thousands of times. In the end, it is _copy_right. What exactly is B supposed to have copied?

In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).

Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.

A few years ago, there was a trial in the USA about some short sound on some music CD: One party claimed that one piece of music on the CD contained a sound of less than one second length which is copied from another CD without the permission of the copyright owner of the other CD. It could never be found out if this claim was really true. The court's decision was: If it is not possible to distinguish between a copy and a work that does not depend on the other work at all, it is not a copyright infringement - even if the sound has been copied from the other CD. For this reason, I'd guess that a 4x3 image would not be a copyright infringement, yet, while 60x45 would definitely be one. Just for reference: The same image as 3x4 and as 45x60:

Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money.

Do US born children whose parents are NOT citizens get automatic citizenship at birth? If you immigrate to the USA, will the baby get automatic citizenship? Wouldn't that kind of be a loophole?

Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment makes a person born on U.S. soil a U.S. citizen at the moment of birth. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. This is not a "loophole," because it is exactly what the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying to achieve. There are narrow exceptions because of the "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause: The children of an ambassador are held to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince. ... Thus the children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 155-56 (1830).

Yes, non-US citizens can own equity in US companies. To be specific: You do not have to be a citizen or resident of the US to own securities in a company incorporated in the US.

Your scenario as written is impossible. If one is born in the US, then they cannot lose their citizenship before they turn 18 (and it is rather difficult to lose it accidentally; in order to lose jus soli citizenship in the US, one must "intentionally revoke it"; generally speaking, you have to go to a US consulate (in another country) and formally renounce your citizenship. Additionally, the US will not accept the resignation your citizenship if you do not have a different one (i.e. if accepting the resignation will render you stateless).

Immigration and naturalization is pretty far out of my comfort zone, but I'm confident that the answer is yes. Although people often believe that a foreign embassy is considered the territory of that country, I don't know of any law that supports that belief. Instead, through the Vienna Convention, the embassy grounds remain the territory of the host state but are provided a variety of protections and immunities because of their diplomatic status. With the embassy on U.S. soil, the child would therefore satisfy the "born ... in the United States" prong of the 14th Amendment's Citizenship Clause.* But that would not be the end of the analysis, as birthright citizenship also requires not just that the child is born in the United States, but also that the child be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." So if the child were born to an American citizen who had entered the Indian embassy to get a travel visa, the child would be both born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, making it eligible for birthright citizenship. But if the child were born to Indian ambassador or to diplomatic staff, who would generally be able to claim diplomatic immunity, that child would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and would not be able to claim birthright citizenship. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73, (1872) ("The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."). * I haven't been able to find any cases saying this explicitly, but all the cases involving children born in foreign embassies sort of skip over the question as though they just assume that the child was born in the United States. See, e.g., Raya v. Clinton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2010); Nikoi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 939 F.2d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1991) These cases also go on to conclude that those children are not citizens of the United States, because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages.

The law is not settled and will shortly be before the High Court (sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns) but theoretically: yes! The provision on Disqualification is s44, specifically subsection (i): Any person who: (i) is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. Which, on the face of it, makes eligibility to sit in the Australian parliament dependent on the citizenship laws of every other country in the world: all 195 of them. Indeed, right now, any citizen of Australia (which is itself a qualification by virtue of s16 or s34), is allowed to live and work in New Zealand, and to vote after a year's residence - that is they are "entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject [but not a citizen] of a foreign power". Therefore, interpreted that way, no Australian is entitled to sit in parliament. Of course, a simple referendum1 could change the Constitution to fix that - except, a referendum must be called by parliament and we no longer have one. Personally, I think it is unlikely2 that the High Court will rule in such a way that would plunge the nation into a constitutional crises by deciding no one can sit in parliament or that who can sit is determined by the laws of foreign nations. Notwithstanding, at present there are 5 MPs who have been referred to the High Court (2 of whom have already resigned), 2 more who will be referred when parliament resumes in September, 21 known to have been born overseas who have not confirmed that they have renounced any foreign citizenship they might have and an unknown number who may have foreign citizenship by descent. Each of the cases is distinct: some were born overseas, some have foreign citizenship by descent, one is a 3rd generation Australian whose mother registered him as an Italian citizen when he was a child (17) and he claims he never knew. How the High Court will rule will almost certainly vary with the particular circumstances but its anyone's guess what they will decide. However, it appears that the drafters of the constitution intended that it should capture all dual-citizens, not just those who sought dual-citizenship by a deliberative act. If a person is found to be ineligible then different things happen depending on if they ware a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives. For a Senator, the High Court would recount the results of the election - because of the strange way voting works for the Senate, only educated guesses can be made about who would replace whom (especially since the same citizen issue may apply to other candidates on the ticket). For a Member of the House of Representatives, a by-election would be held - because the Liberal/National government has a majority of 1 and 3 of their members are in the gun the results will be ... interesting. 1 Referenda in Australia are not simple. The Australian Constitution is specifically designed to be difficult to change while at the same time granting broad powers to parliament. It takes a nationwide vote and must be carried by a majority of voters nationwide and a majority in a majority of the six states (i.e. 4 or more). Since federation in 1901 there have been 44 referenda of which only 8 have been carried. In is generally accepted that a referendum is impossible to pass unless it has bi-partisan support: and sometimes not even then. 2 And by "unlikely" I mean "impossible" - a conclusion that the constitution must be read in such a way that parliamentary democracy becomes impossible would be contrary to law. Update in light of the High Court’s ruling: No Providing a potential parliamentarian has taken “all reasonable steps” to renounce foreign allegiance they are permitted to serve even if the foreign power refuses to allow them to renounce citizenship. In practice, this means writing to the foreign embassy and renouncing citizenship.

You'd have to look careful for example at the Taiwanese law. Does it disallow companies in Taiwan to hire minors, or does it disallow minors to take jobs in Taiwan? In 99.99% of all cases the effect would be the same, but in this case the minor is in Taiwan, and the company in the USA. If their law disallows minors to take jobs, then the matter is clear. If it disallows companies to hire minors, then there is the question if the US company hiring a remote employee is covered by this or not. On the other hand, if employment is against Taiwanese law, how can they enforce it? Normally enforcement is against the company, not the minor.

Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law.

What happens if a law contains an error of fact? If a law is passed that contains a demonstrably false statement or assumption about the world, how is it generally interpreted? For example, laws will often list a category of things, and then give examples of specific things in the category. It is easy for some of the examples not to be true members of the category. You might have a law that says "Only fish, such as pike, capybara, and perch, may be eaten on Fridays; animal meat is right out." Does that make the capybara legally a "fish" for the purpose of that particular law? How would that affect courts trying to make determinations about what other things not specifically enumerated are (legal) fish? Would an attorney be able to get any mileage out of the argument that the capybara is not in fact a fish, as noted by leading fish experts? Can a law or part of a law be struck down not for being wrong but just for being false?

Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893) is a famous "error of fact" case in the US. The situation was that there was an import tariff imposed on "vegetables in their natural state" brought in from outside the US, but not on "Fruits, green, ripe, or dried, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act" which were on a "free" list. Since imported tomatoes were taxed, it was said that tomatoes are fruits and not vegetables. The court ruled that for legal purposes the terms "vegetable" and "fruit" have their ordinary meaning, and are not held to a possibly variable scientific definition. Definitions were read from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary and the Imperial Dictionary, and witnesses with decades of experience in the produce trade were called who testified as to whether the words had "any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read". Dictionary entries were read regarding the definition of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, pepper, potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower and so on. The court reasoned as follows based on the evidence. First, The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word ‘fruit’ as the seed of plaints, or that part of plaints which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are ‘fruit,’ as distinguished from ‘vegetables,’ in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act and since the terms do not have a special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Observe that "scientific definition" is not even a contender in this discussion. The court observed that "dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court". The crux of the ruling is the following observation: Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables which are grown in kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and lettuce, usually served at dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert. In other words, specialized scientific definitions are not assumed to underlie the use of words selected by lawmakers. If lawmakers list "fish, such as pike, capybara, and perch", then for purposes of that law and that law alone, capybara is defined to be a fish. Explicit redefinitions are fairly commonplace in writing laws, and lawmakers universally have the power to redefine words so that "and means or and or means and, as necessary". An example of a deliberate statutory redefinition is the fact that a bee is a fish in California, for some purposes, see Almond v. Fish. In the Fish & Game Code, FGC §45, “Fish” means a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate, amphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals which means that worms and jellyfish, and insects, are legal fish. The Endangered Species Act §2062 then says “Endangered species” means a native species or subspecies of a bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant which is in serious danger of becoming extinct throughout all, or a significant portion, of its range due to one or more causes, including loss of habitat, change in habitat, overexploitation, predation, competition, or disease. Notice that under an interpretation of the law that ignores the statutory redefinition in §45, invertebrates and a number of chordates would not be protected by law. The court notes that this was a deliberate action by the legislature in 1969, in that enrolled bill reports in support of this modification included the argument that The expanded definition of fish will permit closer control and monitoring of the harvest of species such as starfish, sea urchins, sponges and worms, and the ... Commission will be authorized to make regulations deemed necessary for proper protection and management of these species

Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.

Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it.

UK and EU There is is no legally binding definition of the terms "vegan" and "vegetarian" at EU or member state level. In 2019, the EU began work on legislation for those definitions. However, under the UK's Food Information to Consumers (FIC) regulations (that implemented certain provisions of the EU directive of the same name), food information must be accurate, clear and easy to understand. This is intended to protect consumers from false or misleading labelling. The UK's Trade Descriptions Act also prohibits false or misleading labelling. The UK's Consumer Rights Act 2015 says "Every contract to supply goods by description is to be treated as including a term that the goods will match the description". And in the UK deliberate mislabelling is criminal fraud. I imagine other jurisdictions have similar laws. In 2006 the UK's Food Standards Agency published vegetarian and vegan guidance for food labelling. Unfortunately I can no longer find it on the FSA's website (food.gov.uk). However, it had the following definitions: Vegetarian The term ‘vegetarian' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of products derived from animals that have died, have been slaughtered, or animals that die as a result of being eaten. 'Animals' means farmed, wild or domestic animals, including for example, livestock poultry, game, fish, shellfish, crustacea, amphibians, tunicates, echinoderms, molluscs and insects. Vegan The term 'vegan' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of animals or animal products (including products from living animals). Now, those definitions weren't/aren't legally enforceable in themselves but an enforcement agency might use them as criteria when investigating a complaint. Related: fish and molluscs are key allergens Also under the FIC: Food businesses include restaurants, cafés and takeaways, and businesses that produce, manufacture or pre-pack food. Food businesses must tell you if they use any of the 14 key allergens as ingredients in the food and drink they provide. They must supply allergen information for every item that contains any of the 14 allergens. The 14 allergens include fish and molluscs (e.g. mussels and oysters). The consequences You are free to ask the food business to list the ingredients (indeed this is the advice to people with allergies) You are free to report your concerns to the food business (they really must list their uses of those key allergens) You are free to not give your custom to the business In the UK you can report businesses that you don't believe meet the legal requirements to the National Food Crime Unit. But if there is no direct intention to deceive or deliberate dishonesty it is not a 'food crime' and should not be reported to the NFCU. These non-crime concerns should be reported to the relevant local authority if you get no satisfaction from the business.

Some simplified points of basic defamation law as background: A critical element of defamation law is that the defendant said something false. You therefore can't win a defamation case if it's based on a statement that can't be proven false: "You are annoying." "You are ugly." "You are a bad lawyer." If a statement can't be proven false, it is considered opinion. Statments of opinion are virtually always protected by the First Amendment. Powell's brief relies on this framework to argue that because her statements were statements of opinion, no defamation could have occurred. It's like defending against a murder charge by saying that no one died. Although it isn't generally referred to as the "reasonable person standard," reasonableness comes into this question because part of the calculus in assessing whether a statement is fact or opinion is to ask whether a reasonable person would understand the statement to be making an assertion of fact. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). By leaning into that language, Powell is not saying that reasonable people would not have any reaction or would not have any specific reaction to her statements; instead, she is saying that reasonable people would not have understood her statements to be assertions of fact. Her argument seems to turn on the fact that she was speaking as an attorney representing a political candidate in a lawsuit, and that reasonable people understand statements made in that context to be "inherently prone to exaggeration and hyperbole” and "view them only as claims that await testing by the courts through the adversary process." For what it's worth, that seems to me like a pretty weak argument. While people expect a certain amount of puffery from their candidates, they also expect that lawyers representing the President of the United States aren't going into court with frivolous allegations. More importantly, though, I think she's running the analysis incorrectly. Rather than asking whether a reasonable person would understand her statements to assertions of fact, she's asking whether a reasonable person would think that she was prone to exaggerate in the setting in which she made those statements. As I understand it, a speaker cannot cloak statements of fact from liability by merely refraining from uttering them until she finds herself in a context where people expect some amount of loose speech. Even if you're a partisan hack with no credibility appearing on a TV show hosted by another partisan hack with no credibility, you generally can't accuse your opponent of being a murderer or child molester or something like that. Those are still assertions of fact, even if they're bookended with statements that "Donald Trump is the greatest president this country will ever have." The brief does not rely at all on Hustler or the First Amendment protections for parody that were discussed in the previous answer. These tests are closely related, however, as both defenses claim that the speech was not "false" in the relevant sense.

The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.

Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.

Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.

Can an opposite-sex couple in a civil partnership get married? In the UK, civil partnerships and marriages are both options open to same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike. Where there seems to be a disparity between the two however is that same-sex couples have the option to 'convert' their civil partnership into a marriage whilst it is explicitly stated that opposite-sex couples cannot do this. I suppose I can see the logic- for those in same-sex couples who formed their legal relationship before they were able to get married, they might have wished to make this correction when same-sex marriage was formalised and there's no point in taking it off the books now it is there. But why opposite-sex couples are not permitted to do this too is an unusual oversight. So, the question; an opposite-sex couple in a civil partnership decide they now want to be married. What can they do? A conversion is explicitly not allowed. Can they get married whilst still in the civil partnership? Do they first need to dissolve their relationship and then get married again? What?

The legislation simply provides a novel conversion process for same-sex couples to convert their civil partnership to a marriage, with a date retroactive to the commencement of their civil partnership. See the regulations and the provision of the legislation allowing for this process to be created. There are no restrictions on access to marriage based on the sex of the couple. Any couple can still get married outside of the conversion process, even while in a civil partnership.

A and B have been in a common law marriage for many years. A and C then apply for and receive a marriage license. When A and C marry, what is the legal status of each marriage? I assume in answering all of these questions that C did not know that A was in a valid common law marriage to B at the time of C's marriage to A, although the answers below may implicitly shed some light on how the questions would be resolved if C was aware of this fact. The Marriage Of A and C Is Invalid, The Marriage Of A and B Is In Force The only way to end a common law marriage that is valid in the recognizing state (i.e. either the same one where it is entered into or another way as the case may be; see below for when a common law marriage or foreign marriage must be recognized as valid) apart from a Utah common law marriage, is by the same death or divorce that would terminate a valid marriage entered into with a marriage license. A valid marriage is not established between A and C. No marriage is established between A and C, even if A and C are married in a state that does not recognize common law marriage, and even if both A and C were not aware that a common law marriage was formed between A and B because A and C did not know that the state where A and B were living at the time that the common law marriage was formed recognized common law marriage. This rule is subject to an important burden of proof rule. If there is a facially valid marriage certificate in evidence, the burden of proof is on the person seeking to show that this marriage is void to show that any prior marriage did not terminate by death or divorce prior to the new marriage certificate being issued. This rule flows from the fact that there is no comprehensive index of divorces entered in the United States and the fact that a valid divorce can be entered by consent of the parties in a jurisdiction other than the place where the parties were domiciled at the time of the purported divorce. In practice, this can be used to circumvent the general rule even when the general rule actually applies, especially when a putative marriage existed for many years and the common law marriage was long ago and the couple was separated shortly after it formed (often with the former common law spouse or both spouses being dead at the time of the litigation). But, this is only a burden of proof rule and can be overcome with affirmative proof of a lack of divorce (e.g. by the testimony of A and/or B in this question). The question of when a foreign divorce is recognized by a U.S. state as valid is a complicated one and beyond the scope of this question. It is particularly complicated in countries with non-Western legal systems such as Islamic law, in which some divorces are effected non-judicially. Where Are Common Law Marriages Valid Most states recognized common law marriage at some point in their history, or prior to becoming states when they were territories or parts of other countries. The states that currently recognize common law marriage or recently did so, if the marriage was formed in the first place in that state are as follows: Alabama (if created before January 1, 2017) Colorado (subject to restrictions for minors but allowing same sex marriages even if common law marriage between them was not legally recognized at the time of the common law marriage) District of Columbia Georgia (if created before January 1, 1997) Idaho (if created before January 1, 1996) Iowa Kansas Montana New Hampshire recognizes domestic common law marriage for purposes of probate only (there is a three year cohabitation requirement) although it recognizes valid common law marriages entered into outside the state. Ohio (if created before October 10, 1991) Oklahoma Pennsylvania (if created before January 1, 2005) Rhode Island South Carolina Texas Utah recognizes only common law marriages that have been validated in a judicial proceeding. A common law marriage may be validated by a court of law up to one year after the alleged marriage has been terminated (effectively allowing for "common law divorce" in Utah only). Prior to statehood, Utah allowed polygamous marriage (at least de facto) and this issue greatly delayed its admission as a U.S. state, but it does not now recognize such marriages as valid and all people who entered into those marriages are now dead. The exact test for a common law marriage formation varies by state. The most common test for formation of a common law marriage is an understanding of the couple between each other that they are married, the couple holding themselves out to the public that they are married (especially in joint tax returns and in health insurance applications), and in some states, either cohabitation or consummation of the marriage. There is a body of law governing what connect a couple must have to a state in order for their relationship to be subject to that state's common law marriage rules. If the couple has a shared domicile in the state that is generally sufficient, but this is not always the bare minimum level of connection necessary to establish that a state's common law marriage laws will apply to a couple that is physically present in that state. For example, it is customary in many U.S. subcultures, for example, to hold a wedding in the state of the bride's parents' domicile even if neither the bride nor the groom are domiciled in that state. But, a ceremonial wedding held in a state that recognizes common law marriage without the benefit of a marriage license would almost always be valid in all U.S. states (if otherwise valid), even if neither member of the couple resided there. I am not aware of any U.S. state except New Hampshire where mere cohabitation and/or coparenting for a certain number of years establishes a common law marriage, even though law enforcement and journalists often describe couples in those circumstances as being common law married couples. Functionally, common law marriage usually comes up in one of two fact patterns. First, it validates ceremonial marriages conducted with most formalities of a fully valid legal marriage license marriage with a formal wedding that have some technical defect in formalities; these are easy cases. Second, it establishes marital rights between cohabiting couples (often with shared children) who live together and act more or less like marriage couples who never have a decisive moment that is a wedding or marriage ceremony but end up considering themselves to be a married couple and deal with the administrative state and in their social lives accordingly. In both cases, common law marriage is usually a doctrine invoked generally avoid harsh consequences for wives who have sacrificed economically in reliance on a domestic couple relationship who lack meaningful legal rights do to a lack of marriage formalities. N.B. Australia has a concept called de facto relationships that provide certain legal rights after more than two years of cohabitation for a limited period of time after the relationship ceases to exist in fact. These are not common law marriages in the senes of American law. When Must A State Recognize A Marriage Valid Where Entered Into At The Time Entered Into There is really only one exception to the rule that a common law marriage (or any other form of marriage) which was valid where entered into (even outside the United States) at the time it was entered into (even if that state no longer recognizes common law marriage) is valid in every state. The exception is that a state does not have to recognize marriages which are barred by public policy in the state where the second marriage takes place (for reasons other than a lack of a marriage license), but not in the original state. Basically, the marriages which a state does not have to recognize are: (1) marriages valid where entered into that were polygamous when entered into (generally outside the U.S.), (2) marriages where a spouse was a minor too young to marry at the time of the marriage by the recognizing state's standards if the common law marriage was not reaffirmed by conduct after both spouses were of age (Colorado recognizes common law marriages only when both spouses were at least eighteen years old at the time of the marriage or at some time afterwards in the continued common law marriage, and the validity of this unique limitation has not been legally tested), (3) a marriage entered into without the voluntary consent of both spouses that was valid where entered into (generally outside the U.S.), or (4) a marriage where the spouses were too closely related (although many states will recognize first cousin marriage that was valid where entered into even when first cousin marriage is not recognized in that state). This public policy exception also previously applied to (5) same sex marriages valid where entered into but not in the recognizing state, and (6) to interracial marriages valid where entered into but void in the recognizing state. But, these two public policy reasons to deny recognition of a marriage entered into elsewhere have now been held to be unconstitutional in the United States. Paternity Implications The father of a child born while A and B were married, prior to the purported marriage of A and C would be presumed to be the father among A and B, even if this paternity was not noted on the birth certificate of the child because vital statistics bureau officials were not alerted to the existence of the common law marriage. But, the rule in a majority of jurisdictions is that contrary to the general rule, the presumption that the father of a child born while A and C were purportedly married and at least one of them believed themselves to be married, was the person among A and C who did not give birth to the child, without other proof of paternity, would remain effective even after C learns that A and C are not married. Thus, a child of A and C would be legitimate, even though the marriage between A and C was void. Tenancy By Entirety Implications States with tenancy by the entirety are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. In those states, title to a residency owned by a husband and wife that would otherwise be a joint tenancy with right of survivorship would instead be a tenancy by entirety. A tenancy by entirety property is only subject to being used to satisfy judgments against both a husband and wife, rather than only against one of them individually and functions a bit like an unlimited homestead exemption as to money judgments against one spouse only. Any property purported held in tenancy by entirety between A and C would actually be held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship by operation of law and the claims of a creditor against A or C but not both of them could be enforced against that residence in the one half interest of the person against whom the creditor had a claim. Criminal Law Implications A would guilty of the crimes of bigamy in most states (or under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if A is in the U.S. armed services which might also prosecute A for adultery), although a minority of them might recognize an intent requirement that would absolve A of criminal liability if A didn't realize that A and B were living in a common law marriage state. A may or may not be guilty of the crime of perjury in connection with the marriage application depending upon whether A was aware that A and B were in a common law marriage. Restitution might be awarded in a criminal proceeding resulting in A's conviction, in favor of B or C but probably limited to the legal fees incurred to establish the invalidity of the marriage to C. The odds of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal case under these facts if B complained are probably about 50-50, given that the facts are quite blatant. Often both B and C would ask the prosecutor not to bring charges because both of them have an economic interest in A being able to make money while not in prison so their economic rights can be respected, and often, but not always, a prosecutor would respect those requests. Of course, depending upon the state where the marriage license was issued and the time that the common law marriage of A and B was discovered by a complaining witness to the police or prosecutor's office, the statute of limitations for one or more of these criminal offenses may have run by the time the prosecutor is considering bringing criminal charges. Statutes of limitation for state criminal charges vary greatly from state to state. Rights Of B Against A As A Spouse B has the full rights of a spouse to support during the marriage, and, if either A or B seeks a divorce, to a property division and alimony and if there are joint children to child support and parental rights, with respect to A. While every state has no fault divorce, in some states, fault is considered in property division and alimony and spousal support other than support for children during marriage, and this would work to the disadvantage of A. Rights Of C In States Without A Putative Spouse Doctrine Against A In states without a putative spouse doctrine, C has only the rights of an unmarried person with respect to A (e.g. rights arising from co-ownership and rights to child support and parental rights with respect to their joint children). This said, it is conceivable in these circumstances that C might have a right to recover prejudice in C's economic position as a result of a purported marriage to A under a restitution doctrine, or under a common law fraud theory. Rights Of B In States With An Alienation Of Affections Tort Against C In a few states (including South Dakota, Mississippi, and North Carolina) B would have a right to sue C if C continued to carry on the purported marriage after C learned of the common law marriage of A to B, in an alienation of affections tort. The alienation of affections tort also exists in Hawaii, Illinois and Utah, but subject to greater limitations: Illinois only permits actual economic damages to be recovered in alienation of affection actions. Thus, it prohibits non-economic damages like pain and suffering, and punitive damages, in these suits. Hawaii would only allow B to sue C if C persistently overcame A's free will to establish the relationship with A (e.g. in a relationship that would constitute illegal sexual harassment in employment or an abuse of a fiduciary relationship by C) and B was without marital fault at the time. In Utah, B could sue C only if "full responsibility for the breakdown of a marriage can be attributed solely to the conduct" of C (with the typical case being one where C was a priest or psychotherapist for A). No states have both an alienation of affections tort and a formally recognized putative spouse doctrine. Rights Of C Against A In States With A Putative Spouse Doctrine And For Social Security Benefit Purposes In Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Texas, and Washington state and for purposes of Social Security benefits, C has the legal rights of a putative spouse from A for the period from the date of the putative marriage to C until C learns that A was in a common law marriage to B. The rights of a putative spouse are essentially the rights that a legal spouse would have had for a marriage of that duration reduced, to the extent necessary to respect the rights of B as a true spouse. The relative rights of B and C would be balanced by the Court in an equitable manner in the Court's discretion, likely, in part, by imposing greater burdens on A than a single spouse alone would be entitled to in a divorce. Note also that Colorado, Montana and Texas are the only U.S. states to have both common law marriage and to formally recognize putative spouse status. Bankruptcy Priority Consideration If the claims from B and C against A render A insolvent, and A files for bankruptcy, the marital claims of B will generally have priority as bankruptcy claims over the tort and putative spouse and contractual claims (if any) of C. But, child support claims of both B and C will have equal priority to the marital claims for alimony of B and will be superior to the property division claims of B. Probate Considerations If the common law marriage of A to B is discovered by C only after the death of A, then B has all of the rights of a surviving spouse (some of which are higher priority than creditors claims and some of which are lower priority than creditors claims) while C will have no spousal rights in the probate estate. Any putative spouse rights or tort or contract claim or property ownership claim that C has against A at that time can be asserted in the probate case as a creditor or co-owner of probate property. If A left a Will leaving A's estate in whole or in part to C, C will have rights an unrelated will devisee in the estate to the extent that there is anything left over after B's minimum marital rights and the claims of all creditors have been paid. The rights of a surviving spouse at death differ considerable from state to state. If A left assets by virtue of non-probate transfers to C (e.g. joint tenancy and/or beneficiary designations attached to particular assets), generally C will be entitled to those assets, but the assets that C receives at A's death from A may be invaded by B to the extent that the probate estate assets of A's estate are insufficient to meet A's obligations to B at death as A's surviving spouse. Joint Tax Return Considerations If A and C filed as married filing jointly on their taxes, their tax returns would have to be amended for all such tax years for which the statute of limitations had not yet run (usually three year from the due date of that return) as single or head of household taxpayers with separate returns for each of them. Usually, this would result in additional income tax being due from A and C combined. The application of prior tax payments made and prior tax refunds received would be allocated equitably by an appropriate court if necessary because the parties could not agree. Gift and Estate Tax Considerations For estate tax purposes, B will receive any unused gift and estate exemption of A at A's death. B will receive any assets received from A free of gift, estate and income taxes. Transfers at death to C from A will potentially be subject to estate taxation, and gifts made during life to C from A will potentially be subject to gift taxation. But, unless the sum of A's gifts and inheritances given to all people other than B during A's lifetime exceeded about $11.5 million, no gift or estate tax will actually be due at A's death. Retirement Account Taxation If A died with C as a beneficiary of a retirement account of A, or if C died with A as a beneficiary of a retirement account of C, the surviving person of A and C would not be able to roll over the proceeds tax free into a retirement account of the survivor. Instead, the survivor of A or C who was the beneficiary of the retirement account of the decedent among A or C would have to take taxable distributions either over the life expectancy of the surviving person, or over five years, as the survivor elected. Note On Authority I am writing from memory and my summary notes from when I was a professor of estate planning and later a continuing education teacher for lawyers. I could find all of the statutory or case law authority to back it up, but it would take another two or three hours that I don't have to devote to this answer.

This is a well established model in the UK. One route is the umbrella company. Y here would be the umbrella company. A would then either be providing services to Y or be employed by Y. You may be wondering what use it is if A is employed by Y. The answer here is that whilst A may not benefit from the tax treatment, X does not bear the burden of running PAYE etc. Further, because of regulations such as IR35, it may be that there is a doubt as to whether employment tax apply even if there is a contract for service. Essentially disguised employment means taxes are levied on the employer as if an employment existed; however, in this situation X has the comfort that if this arises they will (normally) fall on Y rather than X. Another route is the service company, where normally A himself will own it (or it is owned between A and A's spouse), take a combination of salary and dividends out (using two allowances if owned between spouses), and he will bill X or Y; companies exist which will perform all the necessary paperwork to do this (in which case Y is called a managed service company), as opposed to a personal service company (if A sets it up himself). It's not clear where you are based, but if you are based outside the UK (and possibly if you are inside the UK) there are accountancy companies that specialise in setting all this up.

Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child.

The UDHR does not create enforceable rights. It is aspirational and not self-executing. This said, calling a legally recognized relationship a "civil union" rather than a "marriage" does not inherently violate the UDHR any more than using the Mandarin or Swahili word for marriage instead of the English one would. A marriage is just a bundle of rights and responsibilities, the UDHR does not tightly constrain what must be included in that bundle, and it is surely the substance rather than the mere terminology that matters for determining if rights have been violated. Something fairly described as marriage must be available to all, but a rose by any other name would be just as sweet. Civil law countries already distinguish between legal marriage, which basically is a "civil union" and religious marriage, which is deinstitutionalized.

The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right).

The specific venue requirement is ORC 3101.05 which says that Each of the persons seeking a marriage license shall personally appear in the probate court within the county where either resides, or, if neither is a resident of this state, where the marriage is expected to be solemnized. If neither party is a resident of this state, the marriage may be solemnized only in the county where the license is obtained. To possibly make things worse, An applicant for a marriage license who knowingly makes a false statement in an application or affidavit prescribed by this section is guilty of falsification under section 2921.13 of the Revised Code. If they lied on the application regarding the venue, that's a large problem. Otherwise, violating 3101.05 is a minor misdemeanor, which could be a fine up to $150. There is no provision that would invalidate the marriage, other than specified prohibited marriages (not nearer of kin than second cousin, already married).

The legal solution is very simple. Under Philippine law (Title 1, Marriage, Article 2) No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. If you do not consent to the marriage during the ceremony, that is the end of the matter, you are not married. You can also refuse to apply for a license under article 11 (which requires your sworn application – refuse to swear). If your are threatened with violence, you can report this threat to the police, since not even your father is allowed to threaten to assault or kill you.

Why was the Dominion v. Fox case tried in Delaware? As reported, Fox News is sued in the Delaware courts by Dominion. What determines which state(s) the Dominion v. Fox case is tried?

The defendant Fox corporation (there are a variety of affiliated or formerly affiliated companies with very similar names) is organized under the laws of Delaware so lawsuits related to its activities anywhere in the world may be brought in that forum. This choice of venue denied Fox any means of contesting jurisdiction or venue. Also, the Delaware courts have a great level of expertise in handling litigation involving publicly held corporations. While this may not have been very important for a jury trial on the merits itself, this expertise was quite relevant in the pre-trial discovery phase of the trial which alleged widespread misconduct by the inner circle of a publicly held company's employees and officers.

Meta Considerations I'm not aware of any such cases and I don't think that there are any, because if there was, the case would have generated more publicity around a "glamorous" issue in the law. Despite the fact that constitutional law makes it much easier to bring defamation cases when one is a private individual suing a non-media defendant in a matter of private concern, any search of the case law reveals that the defamation cases that actually get brought are those against media defendants and those involving matters of public concern. Private individuals rarely suffer enough harm to make it economical to bring a defamation suit, and people whose lives are not a matter of public concern rarely have deep pockets to hire attorneys to bring defamation lawsuits. Only Nominal Damages And No Attorneys' Fees Could Be Recovered First of all, even in a negligence per se case, where an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1 and court costs excluding attorneys' fees) is allowed as matter of law to the prevailing party, I don't think that an award of more than nominal damages would be upheld in the face of affirmative evidence that there was no actual harm to the reputation of the person defamed as a result of the publication of the defamatory statement. In defamation per se cases, nominal damages are awarded when "there is no proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant's attack upon the plaintiff's character and reputation" or "when they are the only damages claimed, and the action is brought for the purpose of vindicating the plaintiff's character by a verdict of a jury that establishes the falsity of the defamatory matter." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620 cmt. a (1977). This would apply in a case of complete disbelief. Since the American rule applies to attorneys' fees in defamation cases, this would make every such suit an economic loser – which doesn't mean that someone might not act in an economically irrational way to defend their honor or something like that. Suing Increases The Harm Rather Than Mitigating It The publicity of a public trial undermines that approach in the kind of case in the hypothetical as well. Absent a lawsuit, there are one or two people who don't even believe it who heard the defamatory statement. But, if you bring a lawsuit, given the likelihood that the media will cover such a case, millions of people will hear the defamatory statement and they may very well believe those statements because they don't know any better. Even if you are ultimately vindicated at the conclusion of a trial, many people will have heard the defamatory statements after the suit is filed, but will never find out that you were vindicated many months later following a trial. Massively spreading defamatory statements about yourself that nobody would otherwise have heard about is just stupid as a matter of litigation tactics. The Presumption Of Harm To Reputation May Be Rebuttable Secondly, it isn't obvious to me that the presumption of harm to reputation in a negligence per se case is a conclusive presumption as opposed to a rebuttable presumption. For example, one can generally argue in a defamation case that someone's reputation before the defamatory statement was made is so irretrievably bad in the area related to the defamatory statement that it is impossible to damage someone's reputation any further, and so far as I know, that argument is not prohibited in negligence per se cases. For example, an intentionally false defamatory statement (which he can prove is false with an iron clad alibi and which the maker of the statement admits was made up at trial) that Ted Bundy once punched a prostitute in the nose giving her a black eye at the Moonbeam Bar at a particular date in the midst of Ted Bundy's serial killing spree, while constituting negligence per se might not state a claim for relief given that Ted Bundy's reputation for not being a violent criminal is already hopelessly tarnished by his multiple murder convictions for similar conduct. Milkovic Can Be Evaluated In Context Third, I am inclined to think that Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, one of the holdings is that "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected," together with cases such as the New York Times case reflect an evolving understanding in the law (quite distinct from the British concept of defamation which has a bit of an "if you don't have something nice to say don't say anything at all" to it), that defamation is simply a special kind of fraud claim in U.S. law, and that the tort of defamation is only constitutional in the United States because it is a form of fraud claim. If defamation is and must be merely a special kind of fraud, then the reliance element of a fraud claim is probably constitutionally required in a case where the existence or absence of reliance can be discerned as a matter of fact, without resorting to generalities as the court in Milkovich had to since the statement was published to a large number of people. It would not be unreasonable (and arguably constitutionally mandatory) to read a gloss on the "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected" standard of Milkovich, to include an implied "by the people to whom the statement was published" clause, which would have one meaning when a large number of people in the general public heard it, and another in a context when only one or two people actually heard the statement, or when it was only heard by a group of people who would interpret it differently than the general public would. And, if so, that would be a complete defense and would not just reduce the claim to one limited to nominal damages. This is not a great stretch. For example, in California the words of an alleged libel must be considered "according to the sense and meaning under all the circumstances attending the publication which such language may fairly be presumed to have conveyed to those to whom it was published." Macleod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.2d 536, 546-547; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1132. Libel Per Se No Longer Exists For Media Defendants Absent Actual Malice At one point it looked like the case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) might constitutionally eliminate libel per se, but this was premature. Gertz does not apply in cases involving matters of private concern to private individuals where the defendants are not media defendants. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (where a defendant's speech concerned a private individual and a matter of private concern, states could allow plaintiffs to recover presumed and punitive damages even absent a showing of actual malice). But, Dun & Bradstreet didn't address the question of whether the presumption of damages in a libel per se case was a conclusive presumption or a rebuttable one, because if it is a rebuttable presumption, then it could be overcome in the hypothetical of the question. And, it also doesn't address the question of whether the Milkovich analysis in a libel per se case must be context specific. In a case involving a media defendant and a private individual plaintiff the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) that: States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion, rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact. More to the point, the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury. We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury. See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976). In the cases where it applies, Gertz requires proof of actual damages and bars the award of punitive damages, as a First Amendment requirement, and since actual damages are entirely absent in the case of the defendants in the question's hypothetical, if Gertz applied to them, they would not prevail. Now, Gertz in 1974 when it was decided, had limitations – it involved media defendants for whom actual malice could not be shown, but it did eliminate the public figure/public concern requirement. But, it isn't obvious to me that the Gertz limitations have not been expanded since then. Libel per se no longer exists in cases governed by Gertz (i.e. media defendants for whom there is no showing of actual malice). From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. 1981). Texas has expanded Gertz somewhat and held that even in cases where it does not apply, actual proof of actual damages is required to recover exemplary damages, even in libel per se cases where damages are presumed. Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1984).

As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.

In the USA, Goliaths are sued all the time. Lawyers would go hungry trying to sue Davids, it's the Goliaths who have money.

There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.

Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence.

I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.

The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.

if a non profit uses the .com domain or a for profit uses the .org domain , would that be false advertising and suable? Do organizations have to use domains according to their financial status and would they be liable for civil or criminal liability if they didn't use domains appropriate to their status (non profit/.org or for profit/.com). Also would using a website that has ad revenue or cookies on it automatically make one a customer or trader legally (the item traded being personal data)?

There is no law pertaining to top level domains, defining "appropriateness". Instead, some organization is an administrator, and there is an understanding as to what the purpose of the domain is, but this is not legally enforceable. The TLDs com, org, net are open to anyone, whereas edu is limited in the US to accredited post-secondary institutions, however some non-educational commercial enterprises were grandfathered in. Insofar as registering a com-domain website does not entail "an intent to make profit" and registering an org-domain website does not entail "an intent to not make a profit", there is no deception w.r.t. internet users. One would of course have to be truthful in registering the domain. Public Interest Registry, the administrator for org, does not even purport that businesses registered under org should be "nonprofit".

Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.

The Quora statement that the word "facebook" cannot be used in a domain name without permission is incorrect, or at least too broad. If a site or app is intended to work with Facebook, it may say so. However it may not use the word "Facebook" whch is trademark, in such a way as to suggest that it is an official Facebook product, or that it is endorsed, authorized, or sponsored by the makers of Facebook, or to cause confusion with the original Facebook. Whether a domain name containing "facebook" does that depends on the details. There are multiple precedents for criticism sites. A domain such as "facebooksucks.com" would not be trademark infringement, and there is caselaw to support this. But that is not what might be wanted here. Perhaps "unofficialfacebookhelper.com" would suffice. But to return to the question asked, use of a word in the hypertext metadata in the "Head" element is a reasonable way of indicating that the site is to be used in connection with Facebook, but there would need to be some additional notice or disclaimer making it very clear to any user that the site is in no way affiliated, endorsed, authorized, or sponsored by the makers of Facebook. The use of a trademark to identify another product with which a given product works is known as nominative use. The law specifically allows it, providing it is not done in such a way as to cause confusion, or to falsely suggest sponsorship, approval, or some relationship that does not exist. However, large corporate trademark owners are known to claim more rights than the law allows them. Such owners may try to suppress nominative use that they hae not approved, although they could not win a trademark lawsuit over such use. US Law 15 U.S. Code § 1125 (c)(3) provides the relevant part: The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services

Can you unambiguously, legally, and conclusively determine what is and is not a "porn site"? I'm sure many are easy... but what about that "Swimsuit modeling" site, or the "Artistic Nudes" site featuring classic French Renaissance paintings? There will always be a grey area. What makes a "site" in a legal sense? Consider all the blog sites filled with user generated content: If just a few pages out of tens-of-thousands are hardcore, indisputable porn, would you require the entire domain to be classified XXX, even if 99% of its content is completely innocent? Who would enforce this? Are you proposing an "Internet Police" force to review all new domain names and their content before they get approved? That is called "Prior Restraint on Free Speech", and is established law. Suppose a site does get approved, then immediately changes the content of their pages from Cooking Recipes to hard-core porn. Who is going to review and approve every update to every website, when sites are updated constantly?! Maybe you're proposing that any individual who finds porn on a .ORG site has the right to sue for damages? This would likely clog the courts with endless vigilante lawsuits about what content belongs on which domain. This is a flat out horrible, poorly thought out idea.

It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable.

This is relatively uncharted legal territory, so until multiple cases establish some sort of precedent, we can only guess. I know of no legal requirement that a Browser or User has to submit cookies or referrer data or other meta-information accurately. In that regard, a user is unlikely to be prosecuted just for submitting HTTP headers. It is likely closely related to Free Speech issues. The DMCA spells out that it is illegal to circumvent copyright protection measures. While this law is typically used to make it illegal to copy DVDs, video-games or streaming movies, it is possible that the "3-free articles" policy could be interpreted as a copyright protection mechanism, and defeating it by changing HTTP headers is a circumvention. A good summary is here. A specific site's TOS (Terms of Service) probably contains language that spells out it is a violation to use the site in a manner other than as it is intended. This is a typical anti-hacking, anti-screen-scraping provision. Altering a browser session to circumvent their services is probably a violation of the license to access the site, and may open a user to a civil lawsuit for damages or even criminal hacking charges (the details of which are different state-to-state)

Short preface: You might want to consult with a lawyer if what that website does really constitutes trademark infringement. But the question did not ask for that. It asked what to do if you want to send a C&D to a website without contact information. That's the question I will answer here. Whether or not the C&D letter itself has merit in this particular situation is another question, and probably one which would violate our "specific legal advise" rule. You can use a whois-database to find the public information on who operates a domain. Doing so for the domain in question yields that the contact information of the actual domain owner was "Withheld for Privacy Purposes". That means the domain was registered through a domain-by-proxy service. The postal address in Iceland you see in the record is the address of that service, not of the domain owner. But you can see the registrar which hosts the domain: "Name Cheap Inc.". So that's somewhere you can address complaints to. If you cause them enough problems, then you might be able to get them to take the website down. Those discount webhosters don't make nearly enough money per customer to fight their legal battles for them. Just reading a C&D letter already costs them more than hosting a website for a year. So they might just fire the customer to avoid the trouble of dealing with you. But then the website might just reappear hosted by some other company a day later and you are back at square one. The registrar should also be able to tell you the real identity of the person who operates the website. However, they will likely not tell you without putting up a fight, as revealing private information without being legally obligated to might make them liable for violating a bunch of privacy laws. Ask your lawyer if there is any hope to get a subpoena forcing them to give you the identity.

For land ownership records and other similar scenarios such as business directors, the requirement for these to be public will be in legislation rather than a contract - this provides the legal basis, see GDPR Article 6(1c). Additionally when government departments are doing it they also have 6(1e) as lawful basis: "1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: ... (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; ... (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" -- GDPR, Article 6(1c,e). I'm not familiar enough with the specific legislation that will apply here but pretty sure this will be the case, and having said this you may well find public registries also become less public going forward. The reason ICANN has come under fire, is partly because under GDPR privacy is a protected fundamental right and therefore to comply personal data should be kept private by default and privacy never something you would be required to pay extra for. Any contract ICANN have in place with their registrars will not override legislation, it is in fact the other way around. "2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons." -- GDPR, Article 25(2). This doesn't stop ICANN from maintaining a register of domain name owners (registrants), but it does mean they can't just publish all records upon request to anyone anymore - whether people will be granted access to personal data will now depend on if they have a lawful basis for this, and in these cases their processing of the personal data will be limited to those purposes. Being nosey doesn't count! "When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract." -- GDPR, Article 7 (4) - Conditions for consent. What this means essentially, is that if the consent is conditional for the contract it will not be treated as freely given, and therefore not valid - it will no longer be acceptable to contractually bind the provision of a product or service with consent to publish personal data or any other form of processing such as marketing mailing lists. Looking now at the specific points you have raised: "GDPR article 6 allows for processing of personal data on a contractual basis (section 1b)" Whilst this is true, this is only part of it - it doesn't allow for unlimited processing for any purpose and sharing it with any people, if you look at Article 5(b) it states that the information is collected for specific explicit legitimate purposes. Each purpose requires its own legal basis and needs to be compatible with the principles of GDPR. Without consent, ICANN currently does not have a legal basis to make the WHOIS records public for EU citizens and should have adopted some technical controls to require them to opt-in if they wish to be included in the public register. They're coming under fire for non-compliance having been given 2 years to prepare and change their systems/processes. "processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;" Again whilst this is true, not all processing is necessary for the performance of a contract. In the same way people must give consent to receive marketing communications, they must freely give consent for their information to be shared/published (separate to the contract for provision of service) in the absence of other lawful basis for this processing. "Also section 1c, processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;" There is no legislation which requires them to publish the personal data of domain name registrants. In this paragraph 'legal obligations' refers to those required by legislation (i.e. statutory obligations), not contracts (or non-statutory obligations) which are covered under Article 6(1b). "And finally section 1e, processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" ICANN has no official government-assigned authority, and publishing the personal data globally is not in the interests of the data subject's or others' welfare or well-being - this is what is meant by 'public interest'. As far as I can see what ICANN are actually doing to comply seems to be accepted by the European Data Protection Board, they are only 'under fire' as you say because they are late in doing so. The deadline was 25th May 2018 and they had 2 years to prepare like all other organisations.

Legality of IRS requiring taxpayers to swear to statements The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under "penalties of perjury" to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination, it would appear to violate the 7th Article of the Bill of Rights which provides that noone "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". Since perjury is a criminal offense and tax fraud is also a criminal offense, it would seem the IRS is requiring taxpayers to act as witnesses against themselves. Has this been tested in court?

The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under "penalties of perjury" to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination The privilege against self-incrimination applies to giving testimony that reveals that you have committed a crime, not to doing something prospectively in a way that does not violate criminal laws. The solution is that you may truthfully report the amount of income that you have on your tax return. Ordinarily, the information that you had a certain amount of income, without a specific description of its source, would not in and of itself be incriminating. So, it is not "obvious that this constitutes potential incrimination[.]", at least in the general case. There might be some circumstance in which merely filling out the information on a tax return required by law and signing it under penalty of perjury would be incriminating, although this is far more narrow that your question suggests. In those circumstances, the solution would be to file an unsigned tax return accompanied by a disclaimer stating that you are not signing it under penalty of perjury as it would be potentially incriminating for you to do so would on a signed and attached explanation that explicitly claims the 5th Amendment privilege. There is actually an IRS form for doing that or similar things on: IRS Form 8275. This would result in serious civil tax penalties, but would probably protect you from a criminal tax law violation (at least for the failure to file offense, not necessarily from the failure to pay offense).

If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't "tipped off" by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for "good cause." Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers.

Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.

I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.

In a landmark document-production case, Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, it was held that The Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence, but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating ... A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an accountant's workpapers in his possession without doubt involves substantial compulsion. But it does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers, on their face, might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications...The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else. By way of background (and as cited by the Fisher court), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 where the accused was intoxicated and blood was drawn involuntarily, the court held that The privilege against self-incrimination is not available to an accused in a case such as this, where there is not even a shadow of compulsion to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. In other words, the self-incrimination clause is about actual testimony, and not other physical acts (such as fingerprints, DNA, records) which are used as evidence of guilt.

Don't even think of going there. If you refuse to pay taxes with this argument, the IRS will take this as a "frivolous tax return", and give you a fine of up to $5,000. If you are trying to argue that this is illegal, you only make things worse. The IRS gets about 20,000 to 30,000 frivolous tax returns every year, so every argument you could come up with they have heard a dozen times.

Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.

First, no, given the wording of the question: "by demanding identity first". US courts have never held that citizens must immediately comply with non-emergency orders free of back-talk. Let's assume that the refusal is conditional: "I won't comply until you show me your ID". In most (?) jurisdictions, there is no obligation imposed on police to show ID, though I am excluding home searches. There is a policy requirement in Seattle (§7) that Employees may use a Department-issued business card that contains their name and serial number to satisfy the request for the information. Employees will also show their department identification card and badge (sworn) when specifically requested to do so. Exception: Employees are not required to immediately identify themselves if: An investigation is jeopardized A police function is hindered There is a safety consideration Massachusetts has a law saying that "Such identification card shall be carried on the officer's person and shall be exhibited upon lawful request for purposes of identification". In the domain of search and seizure law, the court reasoned in Doornbos v. Chicago, regarding a seizure by plainclothes police that Absent reasonable grounds to think that identification would present an unusual danger, it is generally not a reasonable tactic for plainclothes officers to fail to identify themselves when conducting a stop. The tactic provokes panic and hostility from confused civilians who have no way of knowing that the stranger who seeks to detain them is an officer... it is usually unreasonable for a plainclothes officer to fail to identify himself when conducting a stop or frisk As you can see, this identification requirement is tied to constitutional search and seizure limits for which there is voluminous case law regarding what is "reasonable". The scenario that you propose is fairly far from the kind of case identified in Doornbos: is the order from a uniformed officer in a police vehicle? That seems to be what you're describing. Now we must inquire as to the legality of the order. Picking on Washington state law, RCW 46.61.015 requires that No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any duly authorized flagger or any police officer or firefighter invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. RCW 46.61.021 requires a person driving to stop for a LEO, and to identify himself: failure to comply is a misdemeanor. There is no statutory provision that a person can refuse to obey these (or similar sections in the motor vehicle title) until the officer provides ID. A police officer (in Washington: and I suspect any other state) does not have unrestricted authority to give people orders, there are specific statutory circumstances giving police the power to order people to do things. Obstructing a police officer is a crime, but obstructing an officer is where one "willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties", and not "doesn't cooperate". There is a provision, RCW 9a.76.030 where A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer and the "knows to be a peace officer" clause implies either that the officer is uniformed, or has provided identification. Finally, we have "failure to disperse" when a person congregates with a group of three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or substantial harm to property; and (b) He or she refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law. These laws are attuned to emergency needs, thus outside the penumbra of your scenario. In short, the primary question must be, when can police lawfully give you an order that you must obey, which narrows the matter down to traffic-related matters. The seizure must be reasonable: it is reasonable to require a person to stop for a uniformed officer. Reasonability does not entail that all officers must produce ID when effecting a seizure, but this may be the case with plain-clothes officers. Even when in Seattle with a departmental policy requiring officers to identify themselves, an officer's failure to identify does not render the seizure illegal.

What are some new examples of judge made law? What are some recent examples of judge made law? (On both the criminal and civil side.) I am not looking for interpretations in long standing common law. I am looking for development of a new principle, prohibition, theory of liability, ect. invented by a judge on the basis of reason, equity, analogy ect (perhaps to meet a new circumstance or development). Am am also not looking for new interpretaions of statutes, but purely for judge made law.

I am using 1960s and later as a cutoff for "new" in the absence of other clear guidance in the question (keep in mind that the common law goes back to before the 1600s in many cases). I'm also treating a judge made law innovation as "new" even if it was present in a handful of outlier cases in a handful of jurisdictions but was not widely used and widely adopted until much later. A few that come to mind are: The direct strict liability for defective products in torts originated in California in the 1960s. The market share method of allocating damages for product liability in class action lawsuits when the exact manufacturer could not easily be determined because multiple manufacturers made the same defective product is a fairly recent innovation. The widespread adoption of the common law implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in cases not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code is more recent than that. The common law practice of treating installment land contracts upon which many payments have been made as mortgages under a lien theory is relatively recent. The generalized and widespread adoption of unjust enrichment as a cause of action is a late 20th century judicial innovation. The concept of a trust protector for express trusts is relatively recent (maybe seeing widespread adoption in the 1980s). The outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress tort is relatively recent (probably seeing wide use around the 1970s or 1980s). The negligent misrepresentation tort is relatively recent. the injurious falsehood tort (imposing fraud liability when fraud directed at a third-party harms the person seeking relief) The intentional interference with contractual rights/business opportunity tort is relatively recent, at least in wide application. Palimony causes of action. Enforcement of domestic partnership agreements (previously disallowed as a matter of public policy). The use of the contempt of court power to enforce unpaid child support and alimony judgments. The erosion (but not complete abolition) of common law authority for someone to make decision for spouses and children as a "natural guardian" in the absence of a court order or written instrument. The demise of college and university in loco parentis authority over college students. The demise of the common law defense to assault for a husband's "reasonable" discipline of his wife. The demise of marital tort immunities in many states (in other states this was statutory). The demise of the heart balm torts in states where they were not abolished by statute. The common law choice of law rules were revolutionized between roughly the 1960s and 1980s with the "most significant relationship" test largely replacing rigid black and white rules. The tender year's doctrine was a common law innovation that came and went (in the face of constitutional gender equality norms that overruled it). It has been somewhat superseded by a weak primary caretaker presumption and by the concept that the best interests of the child are served by reproducing the pre-divorce/separation status quo to the extent possible. Validating shrink wrap licensing and the theories of contract formation that go with website terms of service are fairly recent common law innovations. Various common law legal theories of relief for revenge porn are quite recent. This is a currently developing area of the common law. Some innovations that started with common law decisions were later widely codified: Putative marriage was a common law innovation before it was codified. Time shares were a common law innovation before they were regulated on a statutory basis. The concept of quasi-community property was a fairly recent innovation that was a common law concept before it was statutory. The concept of derivatives is largely a common law innovation. The common law reporter's privilege, in places where it does not arise from a shield law, dates mostly from the 1970s. Implied warranties of habitability for residential real estate were originally a common law innovation although they have been codified in many jurisdictions now. Limitations on the duration, allowability, and scope of non-competition agreements (some of which remains common law and some of which is now statutory). It is somewhat hard to stick to the question's limitation on "not looking for new interpretations of statutes, but purely for judge made law" because lots of constitutional law and civil procedure, for example, have a very thin statute-like touchstone but have predominantly been a matter of judicial innovation. These include: The demise of notice pleading in the federal courts after decades without significant case law change and no new statutory language. The dramatic narrowing of "general jurisdiction" after decades without significant case law change and no new statutory language. The creation of the "qualified immunity" doctrine in civil rights cases. The creation and then limitations of the Bivens remedy for civil rights violations by federal officials no spurred by new statutory language. The "fraud on the market" theory of securities fraud liability. The concept of insider trading. The definition of "security" in the case of investment contracts. The narrowing of defamation law in multiple respects. The Miranda rule. Case law regarding reasonable expectations of privacy under the 4th Amendment in light of new technologies (infrared, drones, DNA testing, etc.) The "major questions doctrine" for judicial review of administrative action on constitutional grounds. The development of sexual harassment claims from statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. The application of existing statutes and constitutional provisions to LGBT rights with no new statutory language. The determination that juvenile life without parole violates the 8th Amendment. The determination that the Second Amendment creates an individual right and that this right is applicable against state and local governments and not just the federal government. The determination that the 6th Amendment allows for non-unanimous criminal case juries followed by a determination decades later that it does not allow for non-unanimous criminal case juries based upon the experience of Louisiana and Oregon that used those options. The jurisdictional issues of when a state can impose sales taxes on mail order purchases (which involved a double flip of authority at the U.S. Supreme Court level).

Yes, such a scenario is plausible, and there are some cases where it has probably happened. But since juries do not normally give reasons for their votes, it is hard to establish when it has and when it has not happened, and I have seen no statistics on such occurrences. By the way, "Jury Nullification" is simply when one or more jury members vote in a particular way because of something other than the law and evidence as presented in the trial. Most often the term is used when a jury votes to acquit because they dislike or disapprove of the law involved. For example, in the 1850s a number of people accused of violating the US Fugitive Slave Law by harboring runaway slaves were acquitted, reputedly because juries who disliked the law (quite unpopular in many northern states) no matter what the evidence. Later, during Prohibition, some people charged with possessing or selling alcohol were acquitted, reputedly by juries who disapproved of Prohibition. In both cases, it is hard to get authoritative sources that specific cases were actual instances of jury nullification. Anyway, a juror need not "ask" for jury nullification, that juror just votes to acquit. A jury that votes to acquit (or convict) because of political or personal views about the accused might be said to be "biased" but I am not sure if that would be described as "jury nullification".

Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare

Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court.

Negligent patent infringement is — obviously — not a criminal matter, and will only become one of civil nature if a proper patent infringement notice, pursuant to 35 U.S. Code § 287(b)(2), et seq., is duly served on the infringer, and the infringement continues thereafter. (Although even in the absence of it is not legal, but no action is enforceable without) Therefore, as a practical matter, they couldn't — unless one continues with infringing conduct duly served proper notice on unless the infringement is done knowingly and willfully. Additionally, "non-obvious" is a term of art; its case-law description gives broad discretion to patent examiners, supervisory patent examiners, the PTAB as well as the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court — as the case stands — to decide what is "obvious" and what isn't. For example, there is no case law defined upper limit of how many piece of prior art may be considered together when arguing they, combined, would make a system, method or computer program product obvious. The limitations on this generally require, for e.g, that the combination have an objective; in the absence thereof, an applicant may argue that it would not have been obvious. Lastly, it is not everywhere where there is no exception for private use; the U.S. has no such exception though.

The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact.

There is no one answer, but here are some examples. India is famous for deriving general principles of more important constitutional law concepts that can be used to find constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional. The U.S. has not gone to that extreme but does derive constitutional protections for the overall scheme of the constitution and from the legal context of the nation when constitutional provisions were enacted that don't obvious flow from the text of the legislation (e.g. the 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) has been interpreted to establish state sovereign immunity that the text of that amendment does not expressly provide for). Another somewhat weird source of law in the U.S. (constitutional at the federal level and usually common law at the state level) is that the 21st century right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the claim would have been litigated in England in 1789 in the courts of law or the courts of chancery in England. Customary international law is a thing. It also often arises from international practices or diplomatic norms, rather than tribunal adjudications. In the jurisprudence of the legislative process and some aspects of federalism, historical practices that have not been litigated are frequently resorted to as a source of law. For example, the question of whether a legislature is in recess has been resolved based upon historical practice. Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law. In many British colonies and former British colonies (e.g. South Africa and Kenya and Sudan), lower tribal or village courts were often expressly permitted to apply local custom in their decision making. In the U.S., a collection of secondary authority texts compiled by the American Law Institute, an affiliate of the American Bar Association, called the Restatements, which summarize in codified form, various subjects in common law, are often used by courts as a source of law where there is no case law on point in a jurisdiction. In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law. Most Islamic countries provide in their constitutions that Islamic law is the highest authority and supersedes any secular law including other provisions of the constitution to the contrary. In many parts of the United States, mostly in the west, but also in Florida and Louisiana, property rights arising under Spanish/Mexican law, or under Native American law continue in force even though they derived from legal systems other than U.S. statutes and common law. See, for example: Tribe: We have "aboriginal title" to these lands in New Mexico because we had exclusive occupation of them from around 1300 to 1650, and then still used them a lot since then. Further, the "sovereign" (the U.S.) has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District court: No. Tribe on motion to reconsider: How about just these bits of the lands? District court: Still no. Tenth Circuit: There's still a claim for one of the bits. Concurrence 1: No bits for you. Concurrence 2: Two bits. (Source)

First, civil law has, confusingly, two meanings. It can denote the legal systems used in most of Europe, as opposed to the common-law systems arising in England and spreading to most of the former British empire. In the US, and in other common-law jurisdictions, civil law is pretty much everything other than criminal law. Given the tagging of the question, this seems to be the sense that you have in mind. What is tort law and how does it differ from civil law? Is there any difference or overlap between the two? Does one more broadly encompass the other? Tort law is a subset of civil law. Are torts defined in statute? Some are; some aren't. There is a common-law doctrine of torts. These torts have been defined by the courts through judicial precedent rather than by the legislature through statute law. They are therefore known as "common law torts." Some jurisdictions have abolished these torts and replaced them with torts defined by statute. or do they exist alongside statute in some way more fundamentally and less ephemerally than statutes exist? Statutorily defined torts are rather less ephemeral than common-law torts, not more. What is a “common law tort “? See above.

Is a copyright claim diminished by an owner's refusal to publish? Alan is aware of an obscure old book that is out of print, and republishes it. Brenda Books, Inc. objects and sues Alan since they own the copyright. This is not disputed. Brenda Books' claim is a tremendous amount of money. The book is indeed out of print, and Brenda Books claims the reason it's out of print is the low probable sales don't justify the cost of reprinting it. "We don't cede our interest in the work; it's just not profitable to reprint it." Thus it is a "dog in the manger" scenario (in which the dog beds down in the cows' food trough, neither partaking of the cows' food not allowing the cows to do so either; thus maliciously wasting the valuable resource to no profit for anyone.) Note that this is a not a "Disney Vault" scenario where the definitely-profitable resource is made artificially scarce to increase its value further: this is a book that the conventional publisher doesn't really have a pathway to make money on. But setting aside the social or moral issues... How does the fact of Brenda's unwillingness to print the book, affect the damages? Can Alan diminish damages by showing Brenda Books wasn't doing anything with the work anyway, and thus, doesn't really have any lost profits to claim against Alan?

When you own something, you get to decide what you do with it There is no obligation to make a copyrighted work available and the fact that it isn’t is not a defence to a copyright infringement. Brenda Books is entitled to either damages or an account of profits. Arguably, they have suffered no damage, so Alan’s profits are the better target. In some jurisdictions, such as the United States, statutory damages (a set dollar amount for each infringement) is available even if there are no damages or profits.

Yes it does. You can do anything at all with a public domain work, and it is not an infringement of copyright. For the matter of that, one could write a forwards attributes to Justinian or Genghis Khan, who newer wrote any such forward at all, and it would not infringe any copyright, nor any right of publicity. It is possible that such claims would constitute False advertising. But if the claim is "obviously absurd" then such laws usually do not apply. What is "obviously absurd" is a judgement call. I recall seeing books in which a "foreword" is attributed to a fictional character. If such a foreword is attributed to a person who is living, that person might have a right to sue under a publicity right theory. In those jurisdictions where such rights last beyond the author's life, such a suit might be filed by an heir within the time such rights are valid, which varies widely.

In the US, the original author still owns the copyright, unless the original work was out of copyright (in which case no one owns the copyright): copyright is not granted for just pressing a "scan" button, and mechanical reproductions are not eligible for copyright (copyright protects creativity, and a scan involves zero creativity). To quote 313.4(A) ("Mere Copies") of the Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition: A work that is a mere copy of another work of authorship is not copyrightable. The Office cannot register a work that has been merely copied from another work of authorship without any additional authorship. [...] Examples: [...] Photocopying, scanning, or digitizing a literary work. That doesn't necessarily mean the repository can't put any restriction on your use of the copy; the repository may have a terms of service. Terms of service are rooted in contract law, not copyright; just because the work is in the public domain, doesn't force the repository to show it to anyone who asks, and they can force you to agree to a contract first. The enforceability of that contract is fact-dependent.

Copyright still exists even if you don't know who owns it In this particular case, however, the copyright has expired - UK copyright lasts for 70 years after the last author passes away. For a death in 1918, copyright expired on 31 December 1998. For other cases where the author was still alive in 1940 (for this year - 2020) but has since passed, the copyright belongs to their heirs and assignees. It's possible that you don't know who that is. It's even possible that they don't know that they own it. Doesn't matter, it's still copyright protected and those people (whoever they are) can enforce their rights if they want to. When you think that everything everyone ever writes, records, photographs, paints, draws etc. will have copyright for 70 years after their death and that most of that stuff has little to no value, is usually not explicitly dealt with in a will, and their heirs will generally not think to deal with it or pass it on in their will it's no wonder the world is full of orphan works. Some copyright legislation deals with this; the UK's does. You can pay the government for a 7-year licence for orphan works. If the right's holder ever comes forward, they get the fees collected.

The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation.

Almost none. It is a legacy of the era when copyright protection was a function of year of publication. Including it is appropriate, however, to meet the formal requirements for a legal notice of claim of copyright which has some procedural implications if it is omitted.

This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable.

If the suit is to be filed in the US, the first step is to officially register the copyright. No US copyright infringement suit can be brought until the copyright has been registered. The registration process includes a formal declaration as to who the author is (or authors are). (I believe this statement is made under penalty of perjury.) Once the registration issues, the certificate of registration is admissible evidence of the facts stated in it in a us court. Indeed 17 USC 410 (c) provides that: (c) In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court. In other countries, the testimony of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit is itself evidence that the work was created as stated. In either case, it is possible for the defendant to challenge the assertion and claim that s/he is the actual author. Showing when and where the work was first published can usefully corroborate the plaintiff's testimony. Having included a copyright notice in the initial publication may be of value, but if the notice only lists the pen name, it is not of much value. Records of the platform on which a work has been published may help in verifying the identity of the author. So may the testimony of others who saw or read the work, or who were told about it by the author. An author's own copies may be of value, if they carry a timestamp, as computer files generally do. But computer timestamps are not usually secure. Timestamps on email generally are reasonably secure, and could establish that the content existed and had been transmitted on a specified date by a specified person. But none of this will matter unless the defendant claims that the plaintiff is lying in claiming authorship. Unless that happens, the plaintiff's testimony will usually settle the matter. A person whose work seems to have been infringed would usually be wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright suits. Such a lawyer could advise if it is wise to bring suit at all, and if it is, what evidence will probably be needed.

Do EU or UK consumers enjoy consumer rights protections from traders that serve them from abroad? Bob lives in Manchester, or alternatively in Lyon. He purchases a product or service from a vendor in the USA, or perhaps Timbuktu. Do European or British consumer rights legislations bind the American/Malian trader to protect Bob, as the GDPR would?

In theory, what Dale says. However, in practice: Nope, and that's why the trader is in Timbuktu. And I apologize profusely to the Malian people, I have every reason to think it is a fine country in which citizens obey international laws and honor claims, unlike certain other countries. In anglo/Five Eyes nations, Timbuktu tends to simply be used as a metaphor for "a country far, far away and different in its ways than us". If Bob is regularly buying things in the USA or Timbuktu, then either Bob works for Aperture Science and is using portals, or more likely Bob is using mail order. And now, we get to the nut of it. Most mail order sales are done by mail-order sellers who deal in volume. Those people choose their jurisdictions and venues carefully. And they have help. Do European or British consumer rights legislations bind the American/Malian trader to protect Bob, as the GDPR would? No! That's WHY they're in Timbuktu! (or, wherever they actually are; generally behind what I'll call the Red Curtain.) The point of being there is to be untouchable by civil action or government penalty due to that government's non-enrollment in international agreements, and outright obstruction of such actions. Yes, they and their legal team have crunched the question of "what happens when a European or Briton sues us? What happens when an Anglo or EU government tries to action us?" Their companies are structured so they slough those off at minimal real loss. Ever notice how many sellers have a company name that looks like they rolled their face across a keyboard? That's a sockpuppet shell company, and they have thousands of them. If their other layers of defense fail, they simply fold that company and create another. Their government lets them do this, because they chose jurisdictions wisely. A huge fraction of mail order sales are done on this basis, typically through web sites which purport to be "only a marketplace connecting buyers to sellers"... even though some of those marketplaces also provide warehousing and shipping services to the third party ("only a warehouse" and "only a drop-ship firm")... and even though they are known for selling their own products, and use the smallest text on the page to mention that this particular item is from a third party. Not mentioning any names. This type of "be fully complicit in selling junk, while the seller of record hides behind the Red Curtain and uses arrays of shell companies to limit exposure" has become systemized in much of the mail order world. Another scheme I've seen is to trick American consumers into being the seller of record; these people end up "holding the liability bag", and are typically not insured and not collectible in any practical way. Of course you have lovely companies like Eaton, Midnight Solar, Harsco Rail, Roshel, ILSCO, etc. who will meet GDPR simply because it's the right thing to do, even if they don't have feet on the ground inside the EU or UK against which those governments might action. But nobody asks if they're subject to GDPR, do they?

Foreign citizens are just as entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as American citizens are. The case you cited was, in fact, a South Korean citizen who successfully had evidence suppressed from an unjustified border search.

Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".

Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.

There is nothing extraterritorial about these laws. If a company sells a good or provides a service to individuals based in the EU, then this good or service has to comply with EU laws. This concept is self-evident for physical goods that are produced anywhere in the world and then sold in the EU and the GDPR just applies this concept to services provided over the internet. The same legal concept also holds in all other major jurisdictions. The only thing that makes this more complicated for the GDPR is the actual enforcability of these laws but that is a technical issue not a legal one.

A slogan such as "The Stripe of Bitcoin" might well be taken to indicate that the seller of a product or service is trading on the good reputation associates with the mark "stripe". If so, that would probably be a form of trademark infringement, assuming thst "Stripe" is protected as a trademark, unless the permission of the holder of the trademark "Stripe" was obtained. Payment processing and cryptocurrency handling are sufficiently closely related that customer confusion is possible. Note that competitive use is generally permitted. One can, for example market a soft drink with the tag "The cola that's better than Coke" without permission from Coca-cola (which i doubt anyone would ever get). This is because when a marketer says "X is better than Y" no one reasonably thinks X is sponsored or approved by Y, nor will anyone be lead by this tag into thinking that X and Y are the same. Other forms of nominative use are also allowed without permission from the trademark holder. For example, a computer component might have been advertised as: "compatible with Intel Pentium", as this is just using a trademark to name a related product, and does not imply affiliation or sponsorship. But a tag such as "The Rolls-Royce of pencils" might be ruled to be infringing, even though Rolls does not, as far as I know, make pencils. Note that the details of trademark law vary significantly from one country to another. Note further that trademarks protected in one country may not be protected in another. The question does not specify any jurisdiction, so no answer can refer to the particular country that the asker may have in mind.

If GDPR applies, then no one can opt out. If it doesn't apply, then an IP block is superfluous. Whether GDPR applies is determined by Art 3 GDPR. For this, we must distinguish where the data controller is operating from. It is irrelevant where the site is hosted, but primarily relevant where the data controller (your colleague) has an “establishment”, e.g. where he resides or typically works from. Per Art 3(1), GDPR applies to all processing activities in the context of an European establishment, regardless of where the users are. So if your colleague were running this site from Europe, they wouldn't be able to circumvent GDPR by blocking European users. However, if your colleague is running this site from outside of Europe, then Art 3(1) doesn't trigger. Per Art 3(2), GDPR can apply to processing activities where there is no European establishment. There is the Art 3(2)(a) “targeting criterion”: if your colleague “offers” goods or services to people who are in Europe, regardless whether paid or gratis, then GDPR applies to all processing activities related to this offer. I'll discuss this more below. There is also the Art 3(2)(b) criterion: if your colleague monitors the behaviour of people that occurs in Europe, then GDPR applies. For example, an app collecting geolocation information or a website creating interest profiles for ad targeting might trigger this criterion. An IP block can help to establish that no offering/monitoring related to people who are in Europe is happening, but it might not be necessary. It may be worth talking a bit more about the targeting criterion. The GDPR explicitly says that mere availability of a website in Europe doesn't imply that GDPR would apply. Instead, it is necessary to establish the data controller's intention – are they soliciting users from Europe, or otherwise expecting that people from Europe might use those services? Recital 23 gives a couple of non-exhaustive factors that can be considered here, for example: the site uses a language or currency used in the EU but not used in the controller's own country the site mentions users or customers from Europe, e.g. in testimonials This means that a lot of US websites, written in English or Spanish, only mentioning payment in USD (if any), not mentioning any European countries, will not be subject to GDPR. Then, occasional European visitors are irrelevant. It wouldn't be necessary to IP-block potential European users. However, such an IP-based block would help establish that the data controller really doesn't intend for those services to be offered to people who are in Europe. My personal opinion is that it's wasted effort to block users from foreign countries in case their foreign laws claim to apply, but if such a block brings peace of mind that might be worth it. While geoblocking might not be necessary, is it sufficient? There is no clear guidance on this subject, but it seems to be generally accepted that IP-based geoblocking is fine, even though it is trivially circumvented using VPN services. Of course, if a website were to block European IP addresses but were to also advertise that people in Europe can use their services via VPNs, that would probably still be an “offer” and might defeat the point of doing any geoblocking. The Art 3(1)(a) targeting criterion is most easily applied to things like ecommerce where physical goods are shipped to the customer in return for payment – so essentially whenever the data controller participates in the EU Single Market. This is roughly similar to the concept of a Nexus in US tax law. But in principle the targeting criterion can also apply to other kinds of websites or apps such as blogs, even if they are gratis. GDPR does not just apply to for-profit commercial activity, and doesn't distinguish between controllers that are entities/LLCs and controllers who are natural persons. Things are slightly more complicated due to the Art 3(2)(b) monitoring criterion and the pervasive use of online trackers on websites, but this aspect of the GDPR is difficult to enforce and frequently ignored. In this answer, “Europe” means the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the United Kingdom (UK). Note that countries like Norway are covered by GDPR, whereas Switzerland is not. Of course, the GDPR is not the only privacy law relevant internationally.

That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.

What is the "public interest"? Prosecution as in England must only be undertaken if they are required by the public interest. What is this public interest and how is it understood? Can these decisions not become quite politically loaded? For example, suppose an anti monarchist protestor breaches the public order act. A monarchist sympathetic prosecutor may more likely deem prosecution in the public interest. Suppose a monarchist then assaults him. A republican may deem the protectors prosecution ass contrary to the public interest and the assailant's as required by it. But that is not really the public interest but rather the interest of a given specific political cause. What is the public interest when it comes to political masters?

The "public interest" from a charging perspective is not the same as public popularity. From the charging guide, prosecutors: should consider each of the questions set out in paragraphs 4.14 (a) to (g) of the Code to determine the relevant public interest factors for and against prosecution. These factors, together with any public interest factors set out in any further relevant guidance or policy issued by the DPP, should enable prosecutors and police decision makers to form an overall assessment of the public interest. Those public-interest factors are listed here (and each is further elaborated): How serious is the offence committed? What is the level of culpability of the suspect? What are the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim? What was the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence? What is the impact on the community? Is prosecution a proportionate response? Do sources of information require protecting?

One does not lose legal rights by becoming a government official, so POTUS retains the right to sue for defamation, hold copyright, sue for trespass or breach of contract, and so on. The standards for defamation change when one becomes a "public figure" (you have to show "actual malice"), but this is much broader than being a government official. Anything that is a "work of the US government" is not protected by copyright, so presidential decrees, as government works, are not protected by copyright. I do not know of any state where one legally loses publicity rights as a function of being famous, or being an elected official. California Civil Code §3344 spells out the right of publicity in that state, which says that anyone who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent can get sued. However, there is a "fair use" escape clause: For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a). The law doesn't say exactly what constitutes a "political campaign" or "public affairs broadcast or account", but since politicians get caricatured in the papers all the time, with no requirement for consent, it is highly likely that the use you point to would be found to be part of a "political campaign" or "public affairs account". Additionally, under the First Amendment, you can criticize a government official, and that right is not limited to just critical words. It is obvious that the things on sale are basically criticism of POTUS, and you can't use the law to suppress such criticism. Accordingly, one could also criticize Tom Cruise (not a government official) using his likeness on such an object. However, one cannot exploit his image to sell perfume.

For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?

Only Parliament has the power to define crimes in law (well, also in the UK there are common law crimes, where ages ago the courts defined punishable wrongs). The police have the power to enforce existing law, but not the power to create new crimes. Part of police power is the power to use force to enforce laws. If a person is trying to kill another (which is a crime), the police can use force to stop the person from committing this crime. Police power can be statutorily encoded (Parliament passes a law saying what police can and cannot do), or it could be part of common law. As for laws regulating a suspect, there may be a specific statutory prohibition – "you may not reach into your pocket" – or there is a common law inference to be made, that if the police have the power to order you to not reach into your pocket you may be forced to comply. The subtle distinction here is that if it is a crime to reach into your pocket when told not to, you can be prosecuted and imprisoned. If there is no such crime, you just have the consequence that you can be roughed up to some extent for disobeying the police order. One act of Parliament is the Offences against the Person Act 1861 §38 which says Whosoever . . . shall assault any person with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of himself or of any other person for any offence, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, NB "assault" does not require physical contact: creating apprehension suffices. Another law is the Police Act 1996 §89 which says Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both These laws do not exhaustively list all of the things that are forbidden (e.g. they do not say "may not bite. nor scratch, nor kick..."), instead, the prohibitions fall under the general rubric of assault and resisting. Under the circumstances, it is possible that the person could be criminally prosecuted, but even in lieu of a prosecution, it is strongly probable that the police use of force in this instance was lawful. One would have to await the outcome of investigations and litigation to know for sure.

united-states In the United States, information released through the federal Freedom of Information (FoI) process, or any of the various state-level versions of FoI, is considered public information. The person who receives it may share it at will, or publish it. Indeed many such inquiries are made by news reporters who intend to publish the information, and many others are routinely posted to various web sites. I suspect that the law on this point in the UK is similar, but I have not checked it.

No More generally, government agencies have no duty to protect. In the cases DeShaney vs. Winnebago and Town of Castle Rock vs. Gonzales, the supreme court has ruled that police agencies are not obligated to provide protection of citizens. In other words, police are well within their rights to pick and choose when to intervene to protect the lives and property of others — even when a threat is apparent. In the united-kingdom , the situation is the same with the relevant case being Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, a precedent followed in australia. However, the police, fire fighters, ambulance officers etc. do owe the same common law duty of care as everyone else where such a duty exists if and when they do choose to act, unless specifically exempted by law. For example, they owe a duty to people in custody or innocent bystanders.

Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.

Prosecutors have discretion to not bring charges. Wayte v. United States 470 U.S. 598 (1985), Bordenkircher v. Hayes 434 U.S. 357 (1978) The Department of Justice says: The reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion is essential to the fair, effective, and even-handed administration of the federal criminal laws. Decisions about whether to initiate charges, what charges and enhancements to pursue, when to accept a negotiated plea, and how to advocate at sentencing, are among the most fundamental duties of federal prosecutors. The US Attorney's Manual says: The prosecutor's broad discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas has been recognized on numerous occasions by the courts. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966). This discretion exists by virtue of his/her status as a member of the Executive Branch, which is charged under the Constitution with ensuring that the laws of the United States be "faithfully executed." As of April 28, 2016, 35 bankers had been sent to prison for fraud and other financial crimes relating to the 2008-and-onward financial crisis.

Whence arises the idea that how to rent in England ought to be served *at the start of the tenancy*? Gov.uk's preface to the web version of the guide states that the LL or LA should give the current copy of this guide to the tenant "when a new AST starts." Yet the enabling provisions seem to be to be found in statutory instrument 2015 No. 1646 The Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) regulations 2015, particularly regulation 3, Requirement for landlord to provide prescribed information. 3(1) says that LL "must give the tenant under that tenancy the information mentioned in" (2). 3(2) specifies that the information is how to rent in England. 3(3) specifies when it may be in what format. 3(4) clarifies the lack of requirement to re-serve updated versions published subsequent to original service during a tenancy. 3(5) makes 2 exemptions for certain LLs and where the presently current version upon the first day of a tenancy has already previously been served in respect of a previous tenancy where the LL, tenant and premises let are all the same. 3(6) references the appropriate statutory definition of a replacement tenancy. Apart from 3(5) which alludes to a definition of this idea (IE, of "the start of a tenancy") albeit for another purpose-context (that is, defining a relevant point in time as a threshold for the earliest time there could have been updated versions of HTRIE published for certain other aspects of the requirement to take effect), nowhere else does this idea that the requirement is to be fulfilled "at the start of the tenancy" seem to appear, much less does it seem to anywhere be more clearly defined. (ie upon the signing or agreement of a written or verbal lease? On the first / "move in" day of the lease itself? Upon handing over the keys to the tenant? Etc). Of course, s21B(3) of HA1988 provides the restriction on usage by LL of s21(1) or s21(4) until they are no longer in breach of regulations referred to by 21B(1). While 21B(2)(b) refers vaguely and non-specifically to "the time the requirement applies," this is again in the context of defining criteria for ascertaining what version of a document must be served and not per se in that of setting out when to serve it. And this is the closest that anywhere else in s21B comes to touching on the matter. So, while we have a statutory provision laying out the consequence for not serving the document in a timely way (no allowance to use s21), we are left with no statutory source for the oft-repeated, yet apparently ill-defined idea that this booklet is to be served "at the start of a tenancy". What is this idea's basis or origin?

The beginning of the tenancy is defined in section 45(2) of the Housing Act 1988 as: the day on which the tenancy is entered into or, if it is later, the day on which, under the terms of any lease, agreement or other document, the tenant is entitled to possession under the tenancy. (This applies to the statutory instrument because it is made under section 21B of the 1988 Act, and definitions carry over from primary to secondary legislation in this way.) The definition probably matches what people would expect. Section 21B, and the 2015 Regulations, just say that the landlord has to give this information to their tenant. But it follows that if the tenancy has begun, then the landlord's obligation also begins. It binds from day 1. Therefore, the government is justified in saying in the booklet: The landlord, or the letting agent, should give the current version of this guide to the tenant when a new assured shorthold tenancy starts. Because of all the other paperwork involved, it's most common for the booklet to be given as part of the bundle of documents when the tenancy agreement is signed - so, along with the inventory and so on. This is typically not too distant in time from when the tenant is entitled to actually move in, and landlords will often only sign on the day itself even if the tenant has completed their part of the formalities earlier. Perhaps your doubt is about whether it is "OK" for the landlord to provide the booklet before the actual start date of the tenancy, as opposed to waiting until the tenancy is in effect. In the same way, we could imagine a prospective tenant wanting to see the energy performance certificate well before agreeing to sign anything. Does the landlord have to give them another copy on day 1 of the tenancy, even though it's the same as the copy they already have? In fact, there are specific different rules for those other items of information. The most recent gas safety certificate must normally be given "to any new tenant of premises ... before that tenant occupies those premises" (SI 1998/2451 reg.36(6)(b)) The EPC must be given to any prospective tenant at the earliest opportunity, and in any event must have been given to "the person who ultimately becomes the buyer or tenant" (SI 2012/3118 reg.6, and compare the definition of "prospective tenant" in regulation 3). The EICR must similarly be given to new and prospective tenants before they occupy the premises (SI 2022/312 reg.3(e)). So these are meant to be given before the tenancy begins. They are part of what the prospective tenant should know before deciding whether to sign the agreement. The government's model tenancy agreement has checklists for landlord and tenant in relation to these documents, plus the "How to rent" booklet. That is consistent with the idea that the tenant is meant to have this information on the day that the tenancy is to begin, whether that's because they're just being given it now, or because they've already seen it. Armed with all the knowledge, they can now proceed to signing the agreement. Indeed, the content of the "How to rent" booklet makes it less useful if it's provided after the agreement has started. A lot of the material is about searching for a property, making sure that you are prepared to sign, and avoiding bad behaviour by potential landlords. Even though it would meet the letter of the law to only get this information after signing (but still on the day), it also meets letter and spirit to get it on the day, before signing. Or if you had it even earlier, it would be a bold argument to say that the landlord hadn't given you the information just because they emailed it to you a week before the tenancy actually began - especially if you have checked the appropriate little box on the tenancy agreement to say you received it. Nonetheless, because the only practical consequence for landlords is their ability to serve a s.21 notice, it's also common for them to play it safe and send another copy of the booklet before sending the notice itself. They will also often send updated copies as they arise, even though the regulation doesn't require it; some insurers ask for this just to really cement the chance of making a proper s.21 notice. I'm not aware of judicial precedent on early delivery of the booklet, but we can get some guidance from a recent Court of Appeal decision on s.21A, Trecarrell House v Rouncefield [2020] EWCA Civ 760. This case examined the nature of breaches and remedies that prevent serving an eviction notice. The conclusion was that if the tenant received a gas safety certificate "before or with" the s.21 notice, then the landlord has fulfilled their obligation - they are not irreparably in breach just becuse they did not give that information at the beginning. What matters for the Housing Act is that the tenant received it by the time that it was needed for the s.21 process. Likewise, it would seem that if the tenant had the "How to rent" booklet from the landlord before the beginning of their tenancy, then the landlord is not in breach - because the tenant has the information the whole time even though the act of giving the booklet predated the tenancy itself.

The onus lies on the landlord The landlord is the one asserting a right (to evict), therefore, they bear the onus of proving that they have that right. The court will look at the evidence both parties have that the notice was served. For the tenant this is likely to be brief testimony that they never received it. For the landlord, they will testify as to how it was served (personal service, mail etc.) and provide evidence that supports that testimony (photos of them handing it to the tenant, receipts for mail etc.). Please note that only some types of service are valid and laws around service are highly technical. The court will give weight to the evidence (decide what they believe and what they don’t, who they find reliable and who they don’t). The onus in a civil case is “the balance of probabilities” which means if they find the landlord’s version more likely then the notice was served. If they find the tenant’s more likely or both equally likely, it wasn’t.

All that matters is whether the tenancy falls within the statutory definition contained in the Housing Act 1988. Assured shorthold tenancies are subsets of assured tenancies, so first we need to look at the latter. 1. Is the tenancy an assured tenancy? Section 1(1)(a): tenant(s) must be individual(s). Section 1(1)(b): at least one of the tenants must occupy the dwelling-house as their only or principal home. Section 1(1)(c): the tenancy must not be excluded by in Section 1(2) or 1(6). Section 1(2) in turn refers to Part 1 of Schedule 1 which contains a list of exceptions. They are quite detailed but, briefly, the following are excluded: tenancies with high rateable values, tenancies at very low rents, business tenancies, licenced premises, agricultural tenancies, student accommodation provided by universities etc., holiday lets, tenancies with resident landlords, crown tenancies, some local authority lets. 2. Is the assured tenancy an assured shorthold tenancy? Section 19A: the tenancy must either have come into existence after Section 96 of the Housing Act 1996 came into force (the vast majority of cases) or it falls under Section 20. Section 19A: the tenancy does not fall within one of the exceptions in Schedule 2A. Turning to your scenarios: Tim rents an entire flat or alternatively a single bedroom through Airbnb for a week. (The landlord doesn't live in the same house.) Is he an AST? Not an AST; excluded by Schedule 1 as a holiday let. Suppose he rents it for a month, or two months. At what point does he become an AST with corresponding PFE? As long as it is a holiday let, it will not be an AST. It would only be an AST if it were Tim's only or principal home (and all the other criteria apply). There is no magical "point" at which it changes from one to the other; it's down to the reality of the facts. Larry goes to Berlin for a week-long holiday and sublets his HMO room on spare room.com to Theodore for the week. Upon returning Theodore declines to leave. This depends on the specifics of how it was let to Theodore. It sounds like a holiday let on the face of it though. Now what if Larry instead goes away for one month or three months and sublets his room (or flat if it makes a difference) for those periods. Again at what stage does it become AST? As above, it becomes an AST when all the criteria for an AST are met per the statutory definition. Further, let us suppose that for Larry's fortnight holiday he collects a £300 deposit. Must this be accordingly protected given how casual the tenancy is? Section 213(1) of the Housing Act 2004 only requires a deposit to be protected if the tenancy is a shorthold.

According to Consumer Rights 2015, is there a deadline from when the issue is raised to the trader to then taking action to fix it, or is it based on what deadline I set on my letter? The "deadline" is one that is reasonable in the circumstances. See s.23 of the Act: [...] (2) If the consumer requires the trader to repair or replace the goods, the trader must— (a) do so within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience to the consumer, and (b) bear any necessary costs incurred in doing so (including in particular the cost of any labour, materials or postage). [...] (5) Any question as to what is a reasonable time or significant inconvenience is to be determined taking account of— (a) the nature of the goods, and (b) the purpose for which the goods were acquired. [...] If I do send a letter, for instance, notifies him for court, to which address should I send it to? His official one in gov.uk, where he claims he didn't notice or his yard? The Civil Procedure Rules Pre-Action Protocols do not dictate where such a letter (referred to a letter before claim and described here and here) must be served but the usual requirement is to an address at which the potential defendant resides or carries on business within the UK. See Rule 6.8(a) for example.

I don't wish to gainsay or contradict a "professional adviser", especially as I have no idea on what information they based their suggestion. All I can do is direct the OP to the relevant extracts from the section headed "II ACCELERATED POSSESSION CLAIMS OF PROPERTY LET ON AN ASSURED SHORTHOLD TENANCY" in the Civil Procedure Rules, especially my emboldened text at the end of Rule 55.15. Rule 55.14 (1) A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Rule 55.15 (1) On receipt of the defence the court will – (a) send a copy to the claimant; and (b) refer the claim and defence to a judge. (2) Where the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence – (a) the claimant may file a written request for an order for possession; and (b) the court will refer that request to a judge. (3) Where the defence is received after the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired but before a request is filed in accordance with paragraph (2), paragraph (1) will still apply. (4) Where – (a) the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence; and (b) the claimant has not made a request for an order for possession under paragraph (2) within 3 months after the expiry of the period set out in rule 55.14, the claim will be stayed.

That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.

england-and-wales northern-ireland General rule It doesn't make any difference. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides: Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. Provided you meet the following elements: Properly addressing Properly pre-paying Properly posting, then you can take advantage of the above deemed delivery rule. It also makes no difference whether or not the recipient "might or might not bother to open" it. What matters is when it was delivered. The rebuttable presumption is that the notice is effective when it would have been "delivered in the ordinary course of post" (e.g. next day for first class, etc.). To rebut that, the burden of proof shifts to the recipient, who must prove (on balance of probabilities in a civil case) that it was delivered late or not at all. In practice that will be extremely difficult in the majority of cases. You might try to make an argument that "letter containing the document" implies an envelope. However, in my view, the ordinary meaning of the word letter means a piece of paper with some written words on it. A letter is still a letter even when it isn't inserted in an envelope. "Contains the document" suggests to me that the document is found within the words written on the piece of paper. Exceptions The phrase "unless the contrary intention appears" means that if a particular Act contains its own rules of service which contradict Section 7, then Section 7 will be overridden.

In general, the words "due on" take on their ordinary meaning - that is, that the performance of a contract is required on or before the date specified. If it is not specified in the contract, a court will look to what is reasonable in the circumstances. For instance, if payment is due to a company that trades 24 hours a day including the day payment was due, then payment up until midnight may be found acceptable. However, if it is not known to the person making the payment that the business has such extended hours, and especially if it is known that the business has normal hours, then payment after close of business would likely not be reasonable. To your question, and having reviewed some Canadian residential rent legislation, although none define due on specifically - and I would not expect them to do so - most have clauses which provide for termination, and they only refer to serving notice either a certain number of days after rent falls due, or the day after rent falls due. This would tend to support my assertion that rent is payable on or before the specified date, unless the contract says otherwise, in line with the above considerations. NB: While rent is usually payable in advance, this simply means that you are paying for the occupancy during that follows, or substantially follows, rather than the period that has elapsed.

Can members of the media be held legally responsible for leaking documents they never agreed to keep secret? Larry the Leaker is high up in the US government, and has access to highly classified information/documents. He goes to John the Journalist, and tells him to publish all of it. Obviously, Larry has agreed to a bunch of stuff telling him not to leak or talk about any of that stuff, so Larry has no hope. But John never signed anything. So does John face any solid legal repercussions for wholesale publishing everything he got from Larry? In the case of Edward Snowden, I'm pretty sure The Guardian (and its journalists) didn't face any repercussions. But Snowden was ultimately a whistleblower reporting on unethical conduct in that case. I want you to make no such assumptions about what Larry and John are doing. For example, perhaps Larry literally told John the identities of undercover agents in Russia, and John posted it just for the clout. Will John face any legal repercussions, even though he literally never signed anything? Edit: To be clear, I'm not asking about Larry the Leaker (the government employee) whatsoever. I'm asking solely about John the Journalist, who publishes the information, and what legal ramifications he might face. Also if I'm allowed a follow-up: if Nathan the Netizen retweets/reposts John's article and evidence, is Nathan also subject to legal ramifications?

It depends on the nature of the documents. This law specifies that it is illegal to disclose or publish etc. classified information concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government and there are 4 such subcategories. Violation results in imprisonment up to 10 years. This is an ordinary prohibition. Government employees may also be given access to classified information whose disclosure is not criminal in the general case, but would be illegal for the government employee to disclose owing to his position, under this law.

I'm not familiar with this law, but if it works like other tax confidentiality laws I'm familiar with, it would be interpreted so broadly that there would effectively be no difference between "facts," "particulars" or "information." People receiving tax returns under this law would be prohibited from disclosing any of them. Anything that is in the return would be considered secret.

This is a super complex question and no one really knows the answer yet. Orin Kerr is probably the leading scholar on this question, and he generally argues that forced decryption of one's own device is not a Fifth Amendment violation. As I understand it (and oversimplifying by a lot), one key piece of his position is that requiring you to put in your password is a statement about your knowledge of the password itself, not about the contents of the machine into which you are entering it. And because your knowledge of the password for your own devices is presumed, an exception for "foregone conclusions" would leave this compulsion unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. You can read one of his explanations here. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that approach, but a California judge recently reached a conclusion similar to Kerr's. This will probably by a question for SCOTUS before too long.

I do not have the phone number, email, or anything else associated with the account. Well, neither do I - so it must be my account. Unfortunately, the fact that you appear in most or all of the pictures on that account does not prove that you own it. It could be the photographer's account. Do I have ANY options here Can you reactivate the email account associated with the Twitter account? Or the phone number? Either would allow you to reset the password and access the account. You can go to court (in California) and seek an injunction ordering Twitter to delete the photos or give you access. Of course, you have the same issues proving ownership here as you did with Twitter but the court may have different priorities (justice) than Twitter does (corporate protection). I had an idea. If you (or your husband) own the copyright in the photos (i.e. one of you was the photographer) you could issue a DCMA take-down notice because the poster (who, according to Twitter, isn’t you) does not have permission (even if they did at the time: permission can be revoked). Twitter would be unable to contact the account holder and would be required to remove the images when they got no response.of course, if the photographer was someone else, they could do it. Or you could break the law and say it was you, although I would never recommend this even with a near zero chance of being caught.

If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is "new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]" If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice.

I think that the question you are really asking is whether a contract not to disclose certain information (e.g. to authorities) might be void as contrary to public policy, or illegal. Sometimes it is illegal to do so. For example, often concealing personal information in connection to the transfer of funds constitutes money laundering, which is a crime, or securities fraud. The key question is whether there is a legal duty to disclose in a particular context and whether the concealment facilitates some sort of fraud.

One big hole in any scheme that relies on copyright is that it could not preclude people talking about the previous content or talking about you. This is well established First Amendment law. For example, see Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which holds that except in rare judicially established exceptions (relating to military information, obscenity, and inciting acts of violence), government censorship is unconstitutional. Thus, no statutory scheme could be used to prevent third parties who happened to have seen the material while it was freely available from re-iterating what they had seen, or talking about it, or talking about the author (you). People could even reproduce portions of the published content. Some types of reproduction would be protected as fair use in the US, especially if the reproduction is for the purpose of criticism. (17 USC 107, and this previous Law.SE answer) The closest approach would be to protect your work as trade secret, making sure that anyone that you share it with agrees to non-disclosure. But, if you "publish unique content under this pseudonym" there is no way to "arbitrarily or wholly revoke discussion about that content". If the cat gets out of the bag, while you may have remedies against the person who violated the non-disclosure agreement, you would not be able to prevent third-party discussion or reproduction.

According to Blackmail Overview :: Justia (emphasis mine): A blackmailer typically has information that is damaging to the victim, and uses threats to reveal that information in order to coerce the victim. Blackmail is considered a crime regardless of whether the information is true or false. The central element of the crime is the blackmailer’s intent to obtain money, property, or services from the victim with threats of revealing the information. So it's still a crime, at least in the US. But the enforcement problems are tracing the original emailer, which, due to (I assume) multiple email relay IPs, address spoofing, etc, and the big issue of identifying the actual individual who pressed the metaphorical "send" key on the bulk email script, the jurisdiction of that person, etc. As Ron pointed out, BitcoinWhosWho shows no one has fallen for it, even though millions of these emails get sent every day, gauging from the number that I get myself.

Can the Indian Government make laws contrary to the Directive principles of state policy? The directive principles of state policies are embodied in part 4 of the Indian constitution. in article 37 it is stated The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. but can a government pass a law contrary to those ?

Yes, it can. This analysis is IMO very informative of the role of Part IV in Indian law, especially considering a comparison to the related concept of constitutional (fundamental) rights. Fundamental rights are justiceable, directive policies are not. Contraventions of rights can be rescinded by courts, but the courts cannot declare any law to be void because it violates these directives. The directives neither give nor take away legislative power: they are suggestions.

Is it a correct inference that the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" extends to even a private corporation? No. It's not even a correct inference that it extends by its own terms to state and local governments. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights was enacted as part of the federal constitution and only restricts the exercise of the federal government's authority. State and local governments are instead bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Over the years, the courts have held that state action that deprives someone of fundamental rights deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental right, so state action violating it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of the Bill of Rights has been held to be "fundamental," and people routinely say "the state violated the Fourth Amendment" instead of "the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the sort that would violate the Fourth Amendment if conducted by the federal government." Courts will say "the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth." But the point is that the Fourth Amendment itself is not applicable to anyone except the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, only restricts the states. The Fourth Amendment only restricts the federal government. With rare exceptions, neither applies to private entities.

None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story.

I fear that it may mostly be defined by common sense and context, rather than any particular statute. I've certainly not been able to find anything quite as explicit as, for example: An Act of Parliament is an Act passed by the Parliament of Canada and definitely not in any way an Act of a provincial legislature. Nevertheless, if you'll bear with me while I slog through a sea of clauses that all imply the above, then the best places to look for usage and definition are the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982, as they form (the basis/bulk of) the Canadian Constitution. I've also (credit to Zizou212) included some definitions from the Canadian Criminal Code. Looking at the Constitution Act 1982 (as amended, via the Canadian justice department's website) and taking the crudest possible approach (i.e. looking for instances of "Act of") there is, in the main body of the text, only one reference to Acts of Parliament, or to Acts of the provincial legislatures, namely in the notwithstanding clause (section 33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms): Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. Not, I fear, not a full answer to your question, but it's worth noting that a distinction is drawn between "Parliament" and "the legislature of a province". For context, section 32, directly above, reads, This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament [...]; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. We're getting closer. I would argue (though IANAL) that from these two sections alone it's pretty clear that Acts of Parliament are Acts passed by the Parliament of Canada ("This Charter applies [...] to the Parliament and government of Canada") while Acts of "the legislature" of each province are Acts passed by the legislature of that province ("This Charter applies [...] to the legislature and government of each province"). Going back to the original question, I think it's pretty clear that "Parliament" – with a capital P – is (fairly) explicitly the Parliament of Canada. Note that it's the only body of the 4 mentioned there that gets a capital letter, and I imagine that it's because it's the only one referred to by its proper name. Whereas "the legislature and government of each province" is, presumably, just a common sense descriptor and a stand-in for the proper names of those governments and legislatures – it would be tedious to say "the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, and the National Assembly of Quebec, and [...]" – while "the government of Canada" is, I assume, not capitalised because it's also just a descriptor (the 'proper' name being Her Majesty's Government) but I'm descending now entirely into the realms of wildest speculation, as the Constitution Act 1867 is perfectly happy to use the phrase "Government of Canada" (though those were, seemingly, more capital-heavy times). Furthermore, as Zizouz212 pointed out, the Criminal Code of Canada contains an interpretation section: In this Act, Act includes (a) an Act of Parliament, (b) an Act of the legislature of the former Province of Canada, (c) an Act of the legislature of a province, and (d) an Act or ordinance of the legislature of a province, territory or place in force at the time that province, territory or place became a province of Canada; Again, the mention of "Parliament" alongside – and distinct from – provincial legislatures, makes fairly clear that it's the Parliament of Canada. Going back to the typesetter's nightmare that is the 1867 Act, we can eke out a few more puzzle pieces in the definitions: In the Constitution Act, 1867, Part IV: There shall be One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons [...] The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada Part V: There shall be a Legislature for Ontario [...] There shall be a Legislature for Quebec [...] the Legislature of each of the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall [...] continue as it exists at the Union Part VI: It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces [...] In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated Between those three Acts, I'm hoping there are enough bits of context to make clear that Parliament only ever refers to the Parliament of Canada, and not to the provincial legislatures. If, however, you want one more bit of evidence, I can offer the pre-amble to the Canada Act, 1982 the Constitution Act's slightly older, British twin. This was the law that finally patriated the Canadian Constitution, passing (at the British Parliament in Westminster) an Act that defined how Canada could amend its own Constitution, and renouncing any power for the British Parliament to do the same. In that text, (emphasis mine) there are, by necessity, two Parliaments discussed and accordingly it's always made very clear which one is being talked about: An Act to give effect to a request by the Senate and House of Commons of Canada Whereas Canada has requested and consented to the enactment of an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to give effect to the provisions hereinafter set forth and the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada in Parliament assembled have submitted an address to Her Majesty requesting that Her Majesty may graciously be pleased to cause a Bill to be laid before the Parliament of the United Kingdom for that Purpose. Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: The Constitution Act, 1982 set out in schedule B to this Act is hereby enacted for and shall have the force of law in Canada and shall come unto force as provided in that Act. No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend to Canada as part of its law. ...ergo, in the main body Constitution Acts etc., "Parliament" was presumably felt to be clear enough.

Are laws written logically and rigorously? No. Laws are not consistently written to any consistent stylistic standards. Whatever legislators approve becomes the law even if the law is poorly drafted. While some legislative bodies, such as the Joint Tax Committee of the U.S. Congress and the legislative services department of many state legislatures encourage good, or at least consistent, drafting practices, these standards are routinely ignored in the course of the legislative process. This is particularly true in the United States, since it does not have a "House of Revision" akin to the House of Lords or the Canadian Senate, that is concerned primarily with the quality of legislative drafting, and also does not have law that are drafted by the secure majority of a Prime Minster in most parliamentary systems. Instead, in the U.S. there is constant haggling and negotiation on a bill by bill basis at every step of the legislative process right up through a conference committee reconciling different versions of a bill that arise between two houses of a bicameral legislature. As a result, the key drafting priority is to secure support of a majority of legislators in two houses of the bicameral legislature and then avoiding a veto of the final product, and that objective is pre-eminent over the objective of good drafting. Frequently, in the U.S., legislation is intentionally drafted ambiguously in order to secure its passage with different legislators essentially making "bets" on the courts interpreting the language which is known to be ambiguous in the manner that they prefer. Sometimes legal language that is very precise and logical is interpreted to mean something completely different than what it literally says. For example, consider the 11th Amendment to the United States which says: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. This is an amendment to Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 1 of the United States Constitution, which says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. But, what the 11th Amendment actually means is that states retain sovereign immunity in most cases. The governing principle in interpreting legislation is not logic but legislative intent. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. summed up the situation famously when he said: The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.

The United States enforces laws on its citizens. This is not true and never has been in the United States or pretty much any other country. Countries exercise authority over anyone in their territory, and over their citizens even if outside their territory. Sometimes countries agree to waive their authority over a tiny number of diplomats voluntarily while retaining the right to expel them from their country, but that is the rare exception and not the rule. So, which country comes closest to actually preserving people’s right to opt out of the state and have a natural right to at least some land? There really aren't any, and the claim that this is a "natural right" is, at a minimum controversial and not widely held. Many countries have areas that they control which are subject to different regulations than most of the country. For example, until recently, Hong Kong was subject to different laws by different authorities than the rest of China, and there continue to be some laws generally applicable in the rest of China which are not applicable in Hong Kong. Until recently, the Panama Canal Zone was a similar example of control of territory within one country being temporarily ceded to another sovereign authority. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is a third example. Similarly, and with some of the same conceptual framework behind it, the laws that apply in places such as the Channel Islands or the Cayman Islands or Scotland, which are subordinate in legal and political theory to the same King as England is, are permitted by the King and treaties and organic statutes established with the King's symbolic approval, to have laws that are different from those that apply in England. Ultimately, this is simply a form of federalism, although when the extent that the central government's otherwise generally applicable laws can be disregarded quite completely is high, it feels like something more than mere federalism, and is often called a dependency or colonial relationship. Similarly, many countries have "free ports" or "duty free zones" in which their usual taxes don't apply. For example, the U.S. taxation regime that applies in Puerto Rico is different from the U.S. taxation regime that applies within U.S. states. But, even in these cases, there is not an individual right to opt out of laws, there is permission granted by a higher level government for a subordinate level government to adopt laws different from the generally applicable laws of the higher level government. Sometimes the alternative government is democratic, sometimes it is not. Hong Kong, for example, was not self-governing in a meaningful sense until not long before China regained control of the territory at the end of a 99 year concession to the United Kingdom. Some jurisdictions give people subject to their jurisdiction more ability to reach their own legal arrangements contrary to the default rules of law than others. For example, Delaware affords people who create limited liability companies there more authority to deviate from Delaware's default rules of law for limited liability companies than any other U.S. jurisdiction. But this is a far cry from granting people subject to Delaware's jurisdiction generally, freedom to displace mandatory rules of Delaware law in other legal domains such as criminal law. Similarly, sometimes the government will tolerate deviation from binding national laws even when they technical still apply. This has been the story of marijuana legalization in the U.S. and of prostitution legalization in Perth, Australia. But, again, this is an isolated act of tacit toleration in a single subject area, and not a general disavowal of legislative authority.

The question largely does not come up in the US, but it does in some officially bilingual jurisdictions such as Canada. If someone ventures to paraphrase law of the US into Farsi or Spanish, that could be a kind act on their part, but it has no official status: only the law as enacted has legal weight. Though India is officially multilingual in many ways, acts of parliament must be in English – the English version is authoritative, even though translations may be made. In Canada, both English and French versions are official; so in the case of R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265, a conflict is detected: The French version of the text, which translates could bring the administration of justice into disrepute, is less onerous than the more stringent English version, "would bring the administration of justice into disrepute", and consequently is preferable in that it better protects the right to a fair trial (invoking a separate principle of interpretation, lenity, in case of ambiguity). There is some indication that EU directives can be translated after the fact, so that the 1979 Wild Birds Directive was translated from English into Slovak some years later. In the case of the EU, the Directorate-General for Translation shoulders that responsibility.

As of present moment, under no circumstances. That said, the law may and probably will change around that. But the time has not come just yet. Trying to predict what the law will be is out of scope of this site.

Are there or can there be human rights to have access to AI? While I am doing math, computer science or programming, I am greatly benefiting from the use of GPT4 (ChatGPT4) and I don't want that some governmental agency removes access to GPT. I have not had the privilege to access top schools, top teachers, top professors, but GPT4 gives me excellent answers to my questions - both very specific and very general. I consider the access to GPT4 (or any other LLM if there will be one) as necessary condition for my professional and personal growth, for access to good job, education and material conditions. Hence - I consider access to AI, GPT or Large Language Models (LLMs) to be the matter of human rights. And AI could automate physical jobs and hence reduce the exploitation. Governments usually state that they should press people to have physical work because some should do it. Governments usually state that there are no sufficient funds for education, health etc. But AI can boost those incomes too. So - having access to AI (both individually and collectively) should not only foster the growth of individual, but also preserve and guarantee his or her dignity as a person and provide for the practical resources for the implementation of other human rights, including social human rights. I acknowledge that there can be concerns about privacy and other threats that AI can cause, but we should acknowledge that there should be human rights to access AI and that we should concert those private and threat factors not as the issues of isolated matter, but in the balance with the human rights to access AI. What is the literature on this. Or maybe this question is the first suggestion about human rights to have access to AI? Information added. Some commentators have stated that my question involves expression of policy preferences. With all due respect, I should acknowledge that the stated expressions about exploitation, work and accumulation or resources are not my policy preferences but the aspects of the future of the work that are considered in the NBER working paper https://www.nber.org/papers/w30172 titles "Preparing for the (Non-Existent?) Future of Work". Information added. Some simple experiments with ChatGPT+/4 shows that this kind of AI could be sine qua non resource for jobs and education, something like social human rights, not just access to telephone or libraries. Infromation added. Actually there is concept about digital divide and there are programs that tries to close the digital divide/gap and such program involve social program for providing access to computers, high-broadband internet network and also the relevant computer literacy programs. And there have already been calls to extend human rights so that they can reduce the digital divide, e.g. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/digital-divide-and-human-rights So, actually access to AI can be part of this movement. Of course, AI can be and will be costlier and also AI-enchanced society could multiply the harmful consequences of digital divide, hence bringing respective rights to the list of the most important rights.

There's no such right, but a government could create such a right just as it's possible to guarantee a right to telephone service or to public libraries. Some governments do this, some don't. Rights of this nature are not so fundamental as to be found in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK.

I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.

This is a large question, so I'll only put a spotlight on some misconceptions. Why can't Google use legitimate interest instead of consent to serve ads? A data controller such as Google must choose an appropriate legal basis per Art 6(1). But if the legal basis is consent, and the data subject declines or retracts consent, you can't do the processing anyway under legitimate interest instead. It seems that the issue is not that consent was an inappropriate legal basis, but that they decided to use consent and did not collect it properly (see below). However, Google's analysis that they need consent is likely correct. There is an good argument that a website can show first-party ads under a legitimate interest. Google does so as well. But the consent in question is for ad personalization, i.e. on creating detailed profiles on users in order to show more “relevant” ads. For that purpose, Google's legitimate interest would likely not outweigh the data subject's rights and freedoms (compare Art 6(1)(f)). Why might consent be invalid? The GDPR defines consent in Art 4(11) and specifies further requirements in Art 7. The EDPB has issued guidelines 05/2020 and previously WP259 on consent. A core requirement, in addition to the general Art 5(1)(a) transparency principle, is that consent is specific and informed. The user must be informed about the specific purpose for which consent is being asked, and must be able to control consent individually for each purpose. Additionally, consent requires an affirmative action, consent is never the default. The EDPB recommends a layered information approach: in the first information layer, at the point where consent is being asked, the proposed processing activities are summarized. Full details (including all information per Art 13) are provided in a second layer that can be reached via a link. Consent will not be informed if the data subject is required to read the entire privacy policy first. How does the CNIL see Google's approach to consent and transparency? The CNIL asserts that Google failed at every step of a layered information design and failed to obtain valid consent: consent controls were hidden by default, i.e. there was no first information layer consent controls were pre-checked, thus requiring opt-out. That's not how you ask for consent (but might have been alright if Google had used legitimate interest instead). consent is all-or-nothing and not sufficiently granular Google's main information layer is its privacy policy, but it is very general and does not provide sufficiently specific information Google only provides specific information spread across further documents, often 5 or 6 levels deep Could Google rely on Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract? If a data subject enters a contract about Google using their data for ads, yes. Otherwise, no. But in practice, necessity for a contract is very similar to consent because the data subject can freely decide whether or not to enter a contract. Even when the legal basis is a contract, the data controller still has an obligation to provide transparent information. Depending on the structure of the contract, a layered approach could be used as well. However, the purposes of processing are ultimately given by the contents of the contract. What about the Ads Data Processing Terms? These terms are not part of the terms of service or the privacy policy that end users agree to. The ads terms are instead part of their B2B offerings.

The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it.

I want to use a couple of lines from "What is life?" by Erwin Schrödinger as quote on the front of my thesis. Would i need permission for that form publisher or would that be convered in fair use? There are close cases of fair use, but this is not one of them. This is unequivocally and clearly fair use. It is a brief excerpt of a much larger body of work, it is for non-commercial use by a student, and it is for educational and academic purposes (presumably to advance science). Also do i need to attribute the quote properly Yes. This is necessary both because of the moral rights of the author under E.U. copyright law (assuming that works by Erwin Schrödinger are still in copyright), and for reasons of academic ethical considerations. It is still in copyright, because he died on January 4, 1961, which is 58 years ago. So, in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 50 years (the minimum required by the Berne Convention) this is out of copyright, but in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 70 years (e.g. Germany), the copyright is still in force until January 4, 2031. Also, even if the work were out of copyright, as a matter of academic integrity, you would be required to attribute the quote in an academic thesis in any case. Quoting someone without attribution in academic work is considered plagiarism, and could result in your thesis being stricken and also in your degree being revoked in a serious case. Government ministers in the E.U. have been forced to resign over plagiarism in their academic work as students in recent years. This is taken much more seriously in Europe than it is in the U.S.

Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please.

The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins.

Does the law make exceptions for Good Samaritans? I know very little about the law. When I watch court television shows, it seems like if a Good Samaritan breaks the law to stop a bad guy, the law/court turns a blind eye. Are there cases where the law recognizes wrongdoing for the well-intentioned but minimizes or ignores the issue?

Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated.

It is legal to be wrong, it is legal to say false things in public (leaving out defamation), and it is legal to buy and manufacture signs that say false things. Moreover, the sign does not make a false statement, in that legal liability is distinct from moral responsibility. In fact, the sign helps to decrease their legal liability. Via this sign, you have been put on notice that the truck may spray a bit of gravel, so by following too closely, you are negligently contributing to the damage. This is what also underlies those disclaimer signs with "not responsible for theft from your auto". There is nothing "official in appearance" about this sign (a legal citation of a statute might have such an appearance).

None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story.

States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).

The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.

I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B.

This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.

I can't speak directly to South African law. I am an American (but not a lawyer). Much of the relevant American law is derived from English common law, and I will assume for the purposes of this answer that this is true for South African law as well. In this example, you lent a car to a friend, and from the sound of it, primarily for the friend's benefit. (If it had been an "exchange of favors," and s/he let you use a beach house in return, a different "standard of care" would apply.) Because of this fact, your friend owes you a high standard of care for your car. Even "ordinary" wear and tear would be too much. Basically, your friend was responsible for the car's "upkeep," and was supposed to return it to you in as nearly the "original" condition as possible. Not having done so, s/he could be liable to you for getting you a "new" car of the same make, or at least a car that was no older, and had no more miles that yours had, when you lent it.

Are products made from illegal software also illegal? Say a piece of software was aquired, and used, completely illegally, like a license key was hacked online or something, and many other products (say, for example, videos) were made with this illegal product. Are all of those products now also illegal? For example, if they are videos, would they legally have to be removed from YouTube, since they were made in an illegal way? Why or why not?

Presumably by "is illegal" you mean "violates copyright law". Copyright infringement is simply "copying / distributing without authorization", which refers to the original work and not some other work. The act of originally writing a book is not "copying" (likewise "taking a picture", etc), so the act of writing a book using pirated software is also not copying and not infringement. Nevertheless, the scope of remedies for the original infringement is not limited to just the cost of the infringed work. Under 17 USC 504(b), The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. This is sufficiently open-ended that profits from the sale of an original work created using infringed software could be attributable to the infringement.

In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine.

First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not.

They certainly can make that a license term and revoke the license if you do not comply. However, revoking the license is all they can do to "forbid". Or they could sue you for damages without revoking the license. That said, you are free to consult how to use their software so long as you do not hold a license so that you are not bound by the terms AND you do not break the law e.g. copyright. How to do it is up to you to figure. Maybe you could simply consult users that do have a license — on their premises and devices.

First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.

The players behind KAT don't make themselves known. The owners of Pirate Bay were known and were personally legally pursued. That's the place to start. Law enforcement can't criminally charge anyone if they don't know who is responsible. Second is that KAT complies with DCMA takedown rules. They publicly claim to at least. PB was known to have a more f-off attitude. The US Justice Dept does pursue KAT which is why KAT changes domains so often. They do get shut down. Law enforcement has better things to do. The record and movie studios and industry-groups have money and technology to pursue infringers. It's my impression that law enforcement is happy to let the copyright holders do the heavy lifting and the government can come in with criminal charges.

Need clarification for legal relationship containment for multiple spouses According to US law, can a person have a husband and a wife at the same time? If so, how is their property distributed after death?

Currently there is nowhere in the USA where polygamy is legal. So regardless of their sexual or gender expression or orientation, being married to MORE THAN ONE person at the same time is illegal. If, however, it turned out that someone had more than one spouse at their death, I'm sure that property distribution would be a matter for the probate court to sort out. As far as legally-married "trans spouses", for lack of a better term, I don't see why that would that impact inheritance in any way?

As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.

That is, if my mom is sued by somebody for some reason, does that mean I am being sued, and my personal assets are at risk, rather than just hers'? Having power of attorney doesn't mean that you become "one and the same" person, it just means that you can stand in their place legally. If somebody sues your mother, you are authorized to act on your mother's behalf, but that doesn't mean that you are liable for any judgement. Of course there is a fiduciary responsibility to act in your mothers best interest, and violating that can open you up to suits that you are responsible for (because the suit would be against you, not your mother). And, what if she runs out of money, would I be personally financially liable for covering her expenses? No, you wouldn't be. Debts would be settled the same way as if she didn't have anybody acting as PoA. She (you) could declare bankruptcy on her behalf and have the debts discharged. This doesn't obligate you to pay them. And then, what if I simply don't have time to deal with her affairs, that is where I am being put in a position where I have to choose between keeping my job and my personal relationships at home versus going to deal with things over there, would having POA force me to do the latter? This is a personal decision for you. You could alternatively pursue having her declared as an "adult ward of the State". You need to consult a lawyer if you take on full power of attorney, to both protect you, your assets, and your responsibilities. This is something that you really need a lawyer to draft so that the lines are clear, and the expectations are as well. You may need to get a court involved if she is not of clear mind to sign these papers.

Each party had a 33.3% interest in the real estate. When A dies, B gets A's share so has a 66.6% interest. Per Ohio intestate succession law and given that C is the child of A and B, B gets 100% of everything that is A's, see ORC 2105.06(B).

If it is joint title then all parties must agree. If one disagrees no one can enter. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mortgages-real-estate/08/title-ownership-property.asp#:~:text=Joint%20tenancy%20occurs%20when%20two,tenancy%20at%20the%20same%20time. Joint Tenancy Joint tenancy occurs when two or more people hold title to real estate jointly, with equal rights to enjoy the property during their lives. If one of the partners dies, their rights of ownership pass to the surviving tenant(s). Tenants can enter into a joint tenancy at the same time. This usually occurs through a deed

Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.

In California, all parties to a conversation (people being recorded) have to agree to a recording. There are no special rules pertaining to husbands and wives. It is sufficient that the parties are aware that the recording is being made and they continue to talk, knowing that fact. There are exceptions, under Cal. Penal 633.5, in that surreptitious recordings are allowed in order to gather evidence of "extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the person, or a violation of Section 653m". To be used as evidence, there are also "predicate rules" to the effect that you have to prove who the voices are from, that the recording hasn't been altered, and that the recording is reliable (e.g., there isn't a mysterious 18 minute gap).

Short Answer Is there a comprehensive list of rights that partners with children gain when they get married (or lose when they get divorced)? No. There are lots, and lot, and lots of things in the law that depend upon marital status or involve rights gained in connection with marriage. These are scattered across the law and no one primary source or official government source compiles them all in one place. It isn't possible to comprehensively list them all in one answer in this forum, due to restrictions of answer writer time and length. You could easily write an 80 page law review article on the subject if you wanted to be really thorough and you also wanted to cover all U.K. jurisdictions. Many, but not all, of the rights and legal consequences associated with marriage can be created with agreements and legal instruments outside of marriage. But for an unmarried couple, this has to be done piecemeal in order to deviate from the default rules in the absence of marriage one by one. In contrast, marriage has many legal consequences for spouses that arise by default without additional documentation, and there are a few rights and legal consequences of marriage that can not be conferred upon someone in any other way than marriage. Nonetheless, this answer highlights the more notable and important distinctions below. Caveats Regarding The Scope Of the Answer Rights v. Consequences It is more helpful to think in terms of "legal consequences incident to marriage" rather than "marital rights" as some of the legal consequences of marriage are less natural to explain in terms of rights. U.K. Law Is Mostly Not Uniform On This Subject Unless otherwise clearly indicated, I am referring solely to the law of England and Wales. Most laws related to rights incident to marriage are not uniform in the U.K. Instead, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and England and Wales, each have their own separate laws on these subjects, although the differences between them are more differences of detail than of broad conceptual structure at a "forest" level. All references to England below are to England and Wales whether this is expressly stated or not. Who Is Compared? The comparison I am making is generally between married people and unmarried cohabitants, as the law that applies between total strangers isn't really analogous in most cases. (Even though it is theoretically possible to have a married couple that never significantly cohabitates.) While the question is specific to a couple with children, formal rights in relation to the children of a couple are only slightly different in theory. But, as discussed below, the limited size of child support payments make the differences between married couples with and without children in divorce cases, significant anyway because there is a right to property division and spousal maintenance in addition to child support for married couples but not for unmarried couples. Marriage v. Civil Partnerships In England In most, if not all, circumstances, couples in a "civil partnership" receive the same legal treatment as married couples in English law, and you may assume that they are mostly equivalent for the purposes described below. England also has same sex marriage, but a significant number of civil partnerships, most entered into between 2004 when they become available and 2013 when same sex marriage was allowed, remain in existence and have not been converted into marriages. Getting Married And Ending A Marriage Common Law Marriage v. Formal Marriage Despite being the source of the doctrine historically, England no longer has "common law marriage". Common law marriage was abolished in England in the Marriage Act (1753), although it wasn't as clearly established as it is now in common law marriage jurisdictions even before then. An unmarried couple can now become a legally married couple in England and Wales only by filling out the proper government forms and presenting them to the proper government officials. According to the same source, Scotland began formal marriage registration in 1855 (which was previously documents only by the church) and once had four forms of "irregular marriage", three of which were abolished prospectively (i.e. new marriages could not be formed in this way) in 1940, and the last of which was abolished prospectively in 2006. Common law marriage outside of England and Wales, when it did exist elsewhere in the British Commonwealth, was or became closer to the Scots law practice than the historical English practice. Other parts of the British Commonwealth and United Kingdom mostly also abolished common law marriage, but did so later than England did. India, however, has a legal doctrine quite similar to common law marriage today as a legacy of British law, for members of some religions, and Australia, Canada, and Ireland have recognized somewhat similar concepts by statute or local case law innovations. Notably, common law marriage had not been abolished in the American colonies at the time that the United States gained independence in 1776 (although it took a while for the British to diplomatically recognize this political reality). In the time period from 1753 to 2006, the formalities required to get married were more lax in Scotland than in England, so it was common in that time period for couples for whom the formalities of the English marriage system were inconvenient to travel to Scotland to marry. In addition to the reality of this situation, this is a prominent feature in many fictional novels set in this time period. As a result, there is an ample case law in English and Scottish courts over choice of law issues related to this reality. This case law was referred to regularly in the late 19th century and early 20th century by U.S. courts addressing choice of law issues related to marriage and divorce, particularly in cases involving marriages and divorces entered into in Mexico and the Caribbean in an effort to evade legal restrictions present in the home states of the couples involved. In most circumstances, however, the law of England and Wales will recognize the validity of a marriage which was legally entered into under the law of the place where the marriage where it was entered into, even if that marriage didn't comply with English law regarding what is necessary to get married. Terminating A Marriage In England Then And Now Also, like all other common law jurisdictions (and so far as I know, all other civil law jurisdictions), but unlike the situations in Islamic law, it is impossible in England and Wales to end a validly existing marriage by any means other than the death of a spouse or a court order decreeing that the marriage has been dissolved. Also, if a couple was not validly married, even though there could reasons someone might think that they were validly married, a court can clarify the situation by annulling a putative marriage. Historically, since England Christianized for the last time (after becoming almost entirely pagan after Anglo-Saxon invasions by the end of the 6th century that had been preceded by partial Christianization). The restoration of Christianity in England began about 600 CE, and had run its course well before the Norman invasion of 1066 CE, which is at the root of the modern English legal system. Divorce was then prohibited in England until the Anglican Church broke away from the Roman Catholic Church in 1532 in the English Reformation. The first Christian era marriage in England terminated by divorce since long before the Norman invasion in England was in the case of King Henry VIII's marriage to Anne which was terminated in 1552. The next divorce in England took place no earlier than 1670 (although there were a handful of aristocratic annulments in that time period), and divorce was only available by parliamentary decree until 1857 when the Matrimonial Causes Act (1857) was enacted, with just 324 divorces granted by parliament from 1670 to 1857. The same source notes that: Only four of the 324 cases were brought by women. A husband needed to prove adultery to obtain a divorce. By contrast, a wife was required to prove adultery and some other especially aggravating circumstance to have the same grounds. Over the years, women learned that brutality, rape, desertion and financial chicanery did not count. Under the 1857 Act divorce could be granted on the grounds of marital fault, for which adultery by itself sufficed for a man seeking a divorce and adultery by a husband together with cruelty, or rape and/or incest of someone else was required for a wife seeking a judicial divorce. Then according to the same source: A private members’ bill in 1923 made it easier for women to petition for divorce for adultery – but it still had to be proved. In 1937, the law was changed and divorce was allowed on other grounds, including drunkenness, insanity and desertion, although there was a bar on petitions for the first three years of the marriage. Divorce remained particularly rare even after judicial divorce was authorized, especially prior to the 1923 reforms in English divorce law. In the first decade of the 20th century, there was just one divorce for every 450 marriages. . . . it was not until the Divorce Reform Act 1969 that they reached the level we are familiar with today. This legislation marked an important shift not merely because it added further grounds for divorce, on the basis of two years' separation with the other party's consent, or five years' without, but because it removed the concept of ‘matrimonial offences' and hence the idea of divorce as a remedy for the innocent against the guilty. Today, there are just two marriages for every divorce each year. Finally, starting in April 2022 the divorce regime there became an almost fully no-fault divorce regime. So, basically, either member of a married couple can unilaterally divorce at will, without that five year waiting period required from 1969 to 2021, but with still having the economic consequences discussed below. Ummarried Couples Compared Unmarried couples can break up at will, and court intervention is only available to resolve specific disputes over title to specific property, child custody type issues, and child support type issues, which married couples if they broke up would address in a divorce case. If unmarried couples resolve all issues of property division, child custody, and child support by mutual agreement without ever having resorted to court intervention, court involvement in their break up is not required at all. As noted here: In response to the increase in cohabitation, several legal changes were made in the UK in recent years. In Scotland, the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 provides cohabitants with some limited rights. [ed. England does not currently have similar legislation in force.] In addition, since 2003 in England and Wales, 2002 in Northern Ireland, and 2006 in Scotland, an unmarried father has parental responsibility if he is listed on the birth certificate. . . . While 49% of cohabiting couples that aren't married or in a civil partnership believe they have rights under a 'common law marriage', common law marriage has no legal standing in England and Wales. Cohabiting couples aren't automatic beneficiaries or have protections regarding non-joint bank accounts, mortgages, tenancies or pensions, unless the other person is explicitly mentioned as a joint account holder or in the terms as a beneficiary, for example in the event of death. Notable Legal Implications Of Marriage In England and Wales I'll list only a sampling of the legal incidents of marriage which are now, or have historically been, among the most important (some of which have been repealed but are mentioned because many people are not aware that the historic legal situation is no longer the case): Paternity Marriage creates a strong legal presumption (which is in some cases rebuttable) that children born to a married woman are children of her husband. Until officially declared otherwise, a man is deemed to be a child’s legal father if he is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth[.] Rape England no longer recognizes an immunity between spouses for rape. Spousal rape is a crime in England just as it would be for non-married cohabitants. Duty of Support A spouse has a duty to economically support a current spouse (beyond child support), while unmarried cohabitants do not have a duty of support to each other. If your partner won't support you, you can ask a court to order them to support you. When it was nearly impossible or at least very difficult to get legally divorced, this right was used in about a dozen cases a year almost always by women, often in the form of a lawsuit seeking divortium a mensa et thoro ("separation from bed and board") in the canon law courts of the Anglican Church, usually on the basis of adultery or life threatening cruelty and usually with the woman receiving regular spousal maintenance but losing all custody of her children as a result unless there were extenuating circumstances. These days, most spouses who are not being supported simply get divorced and receive spousal maintenance and a share of marital property (and possibly child support as well), instead, so the right to bring a lawsuit to enforce this right has largely fallen into dessitude and is rarely utilized in practice. The doctrine is mostly used to justify policies in other areas of the law that assume spouses provide economic support for each other (which they usually do even though this right is rarely enforced with lawsuits). Property Rights During Marriage During a marriage, the property rights of spouses are essentially identical to those of non-spouse cohabitants. This is as a result of the Married Women's Property Act (1870) which abolished the doctrine of coverture (which treated a husband and wife as a single economic unit managed by the husband) in England and Wales. During the marriage title to property controls who owns and controls property in England and Wales for the vast majority of purposes for members of the married couple, just as it does for unmarried cohabiting couples, even though title may be disregarded for married couples in a divorce, and in some cases in connection with inheritance rights. As discussed in Part 9 below, England and Wales does not have a "community property" regime that is effective during the course of a marriage (although it might recognize the "community property" character of property acquired during a marriage while the couple lived in a community property jurisdiction for some purposes. Income Taxation Marriage has income tax implications in he U.K. If you’re married or in a civil partnership You may be able to claim Marriage Allowance to reduce your partner’s tax if your income is less than the standard Personal Allowance. Government Benefits, Pensions, And Employee Benefits Marriage is relevant to rights under some government benefit including "welfare", programs, but the details are too numerous to set forth here. Likewise, marital status is frequently relevant to the rules for public and private pension plans, and sometimes for other public and private sector employee benefit plans as well. One isolated area where cohabitation can confer rights similar to marriage, however, is in English Social Security laws: Social security law Living together has been part of the law since the beginning of the modern welfare state in 1948. The term "Living together as husband and wife" was introduced from 4 April 1977 to mean the same as "cohabiting with a man as his wife" which was used before that date. The term is now "living together as a married couple". To be regarded as "living together as a married couple" or cohabitating, there are various questions to consider. The question of cohabitation should take into consideration all the six questions, and looking at the relationship as a whole. Additional details on the six factor test for recognition of an unmarried couple for English Social Security benefits purposes can be found here. Court Testimony Historically, England had a privilege that excluded from evidence in court cases certain testimony from spouses against each other and certain testimony about confidential communications between spouses. This has now been abolished. The form of privilege, restricting the admissibility into evidence of communications between spouses during a marriage, existed in English law from 1853 until it was abolished in 1968 (for civil cases) and in 1984 (for criminal cases). The testimonial part of the spousal privilege was mostly abolished in the late 1800s with further clarification through 1984 in certain domestic violence settings. Immigration Spousal status is relevant to an immigration application when one spouse is a British subject and the other is not. Also known as a UK marriage visa, a spouse visa allows married partners of UK citizens to immigrate to the UK because they are married to someone who is 'settled in the UK' - i.e. a person who is ordinarily resident in the UK and has no immigration restrictions on how long they can stay in the UK. Rights Upon A Divorce Or Breakup As a practical matter, differing rights if the couple breaks up are the single most important difference between being a cohabiting unmarried couple with kids and a married couple with kids. The difference matters because the less affluent member of the couple gets a much better deal upon a break up if the couple is married than if they couple is not married. The strong rights of a less affluent member of a couple primarily matter because this makes it economically safer for a woman in married couple who has kids to sacrifice her own economic prospects to focus on those kids than for a woman who is an unmarried cohabitant. This also matters because the economic incentive for a husband not to divorce a wife who is economically dependent upon him is much stronger than the economic incentive for an unmarried cohabitant boyfriend/father to not break up with an unmarried cohabitant girlfriend/mother. Upon divorce, a divorced spouse is entitled to share of the couple's property and/or spousal maintenance (a.k.a. alimony) in excess of child support, which are far in excess of the rights of a non-spouse cohabitant, especially in the case of a long marriage in which the couple's wealth has grown during the marriage. Non-spousal cohabitants who split up divide their property based upon title to property and have no spousal maintenance obligations to each other so only child support (if applicable) is at issue. Child support and custody are still present between unmarried cohabitants or co-parents who have children together. In the arena of property division, England does not have what in the U.S. is called "community property". There is, instead, a distinction between marital property acquired during the marriage and separate property, and England and Wales has an "equitable division" regime rather than one in which there is a fixed percentage right of each spouse, and marital property rights remain inchoate (rather than vested and presenting existing) until death or divorce. If a property settlement is not reached by mutual agreement a court considers factors including: Each partner’s individual assets Contributions to the marriage or civil partnership, both financially and emotionally Time out of the workplace Earning capacity Standard of living before the break-up Requirements such as catering for disabilities Length of marriage How old you both are In practice, the fact that a couple has children together also tends to influence what is equitable in a property division. The presence or absence of spousal maintenance greatly impacts the practical effect of a split up for a couple with children who are married v. a couple with children who are not married. A marital property settlement and spousal maintenance in addition to child support makes life a lot easier for a less affluent ex-spouse than child support alone. Inheritance Upon death, a surviving spouse has inheritance rights different from and greater than a non-spouse cohabitant, in the estate of the deceased spouse. Generally speaking, if there is no will, a spouse has significant inheritance rights, while a non-spouse cohabitant does not. There are also legal limitations on the extent to which a spouse can be denied an inheritance even if there is a will. While in general, a spouse has testamentary freedom to disinherit a spouse in English law (unlike the vqst majority of U.S. and civil law jurisdictions), in England, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act (1975) "sets out categories of people that have the legal standing to challenge another person's Will on the basis that they have not been left reasonable financial provision." Spouses also have greater rights at death than unmarried cohabitants with regard to management of a probate estate of a decedent partner and disposition of a partner's body, at least in the absence of estate planning documents to the contrary. Transfers to a spouse at death are also exempt from inheritance taxation. Marital status is also highly relevant in England to the rules for succession to aristocratic titles and for the titles of someone who is married to someone with an aristocratic title. While English law normally makes little or no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children (which is a function of whether their parents were married), in the area of succession to aristocratic titles and eligibility for titles that imply marriage to someone with an aristocratic title (like the former Queen's Consort), the distinction between married couples and their children, and unmarried couples and their children is very important. Incapacity Unlike most U.S. jurisdictions, marriage does not, in and of itself, grant strong rights relative to a cohabitating partner, to a role in medical decision making or guardianship proceedings in England. An adult's "next of kin" is generally their spouse or civil partnership partner, which is not automatic in the case of a cohabitating partner. But, the rights associated with next of kin status are generally limited to notice or information until another basis to be involved in decision-making is established: As far as the law is concerned next of kin means nothing with the exception of children aged under 18. The next of kin of a child under 18 may be legally entitled to make decisions for or on behalf of the child. The term usually means your nearest blood relative. In the case of a married couple or a civil partnership it usually means their husband or wife. Next of kin is a title that can be given, by you, to anyone from your partner to blood relatives and even friends. It is also possible to name more than one person as your next of kin. This is a title that is primarily used in order for emergency services to know who to keep informed about an individual’s condition and treatment. This means that you have no legal rights as a result of this title. This can create difficulties if you haven’t put additional measures in place to manage your relative or loved one’s affairs. If you do not have any legal rights, you cannot make decisions on their behalf. Similarly, pretty much anyone can be appointed to be an adult's guardian in England, with no absolute priority for a spouse or a blood family member over a cohabitating partner or any other person expressing interest in the care of an incapacitated person. Marriage is just one factor among many considered in a fairly wholistic manner when deciding between competing applications to serve as someone's guardian. Cohabitation Post-Divorce By A Formerly Married Couple A married couple with children that gets divorced and then cohabits post-divorce are not on quite the same footing as a cohabiting couple with children who have never married. The starting point in such a couple for the rights of the former spouses vis-a-vis each other begins with the divorce decree and any incorporated settlement between the spouses in connection with the divorce. Provisions related to child custody and child support may be modified over time as the children grow and circumstances change. In some unusual but not unheard of circumstances, spousal support duties arising from the prior marriage can be imposed long after the divorce even if spousal support was not immediately imposed at the time of the divorce or was only nominal at that time. Provisions related to court ordered child custody arrangements, child support, and spousal support normally continue in force until they are spent by the their own terms (e.g. when the children become adults or spousal support established for a fixed time period ends), are modified by a later court order, or the couple remarries. It is uncommon, but not completely unheard of, for the children of a couple for whom child custody arrangements have been imposed between unmarried coparents or in a divorce at one point, to ever cease to be subject to some sort of court order related to child custody. Court orders related to children or spousal maintenance cannot normally be adjusted by mutual agreement after a divorce without court intervention. Remarriage will generally abrogate and cause to become void all provisions in a divorce decree, settlement, or post-divorce court order related to the children, and all provisions with spousal maintenance, while the property ownership and debt obligations of the parties to the remarriage restart from scratch at whatever state they were in immediately prior to the remarriage. Sometimes a remarriage after a divorce legitimatizes the paternity of children born between the marriages. First Marriages Of A Cohabiting Couple With Children When a cohabiting couple with children marry, they have all of the incidents of a married couple. Sometimes, but not always, this will help establish the father's paternity of their children. Court orders related to the custody and child support of their shared children will usually be dissolved (I don't know if any formal legal action is required to do this or not). Property acquired by the couple prior to marrying while cohabiting will generally be separate property owned by the spouse who was in title to that property prior to getting married. In a subsequent divorce of that couple, the length of the marriage will not include the full time of their cohabitation, but their cohabitation prior to marriage is a factor which a divorce judge is not prohibited from considering entirely in making an equitable division of marital property and in awarding spousal maintenance.

If one leaves the US to commit an act illegal in the US but legal in the country they travel to are they guilty of a crime? Before anyone asks this is part legal curiosity, part proving for 'loopholes' that I could have villains in a story exploit, I don't need 100% accuracy so much as general guidelines, and any unique situation or known 'loophole' is also interesting. I'm curious about how the US handles travel to other countries to activities crimes that are illegal within the US but legal in the country they travel to. At first I thought that this would be legal, but I know sex tourism at the least is restricted, They actually make us take a training at work about how sex trafficking is bad in case we couldn't figure that one out on our own. A quick scan online tells me that the sex tourism thing is specific federal law. Outside of sex tourism of individuals under the age of 18 are there other situations where one can be punished for traveling to another country to commit a crime? If so are these specific laws that address only a few unique situations, or is there some general law that addresses many crimes committed by traveling to another country? I can think of a number of theoretical odd situations as fodder for story telling, I'll likely ask a few of them in more detail in later questions depending on the answer in this one. If someone wants to touch briefly on a few odd situations below in their answer I would be interested, but if any of these situations is too complex I'll ask them as a later follow up question. how does dual citizenship work in situations where it would be illegal for a US citizen to travel to country X to do activity Y, but the individual in question is not only a US citizen but also a citizen of X? How much does 'premeditation' apply to these rules? For instance my quick scanning of sex tourism law refers to an individual traveling to a country "with the intent to ...", does that mean if someone travels to a country and only then decides to do an activity it would be legal (ignoring the difficulty of proving it wasn't premeditated)? Is a non-US citizen within the US (for instance with a visa, or even an illegal alien who lives in the US) still subject to these sort of laws if they leave the US with the intent of doing something illegal within the US and then return? Edit: ...also Id love at least one other instance of an activity that would be a crime if someone travels elsewhere to do it. I'm thinking of potential loophole abuse questions I could ask, but I really don't want to ask them in context of the sex tourism law. Rather or not it's just a theoretical question to explore legal oddities I really don't like even hypothesizing the sort of situation that leads to someone trying to violate that particular law.

Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).

As in most cases it depends on the details. The length of a blade (> 44mm and width > 10) is important and the circumstances. Assume a fine to something up to € 10000, but a sentence up to 3 years is also possible. In Germany it is not crime (anything that can be fined or minimal sentence is less than 1 year is not a crime). I assume that they took your home address and let you leave the country, which alone is a sign that it not a crime. Since you were so smart to place this in your luggage, where it garantied to be found by airport security, you will probably get something in the range of the minimal fine. You also cooperated by giving a statement, which will assist to lessen the fine (you were after all caught red handed). Having it on your person in a public space, the fine would have be higher. Swinging it around among peaple in a threatening manner, will lead you into the range of a sentence. When the fine arrives, there will be bank transaction form. Go to the next post office or bank and pay it, retaining the receipt. Border control will not be interested in you (they only get alerts for proper criminals). Customs (Zoll) could be interested to enforce the fine, show them the receipt. Pay the fine and get on with your life. As to the U.S. Consulate (forget Embassy, State Department: they deal only in diplomatic affairs) all they will tell you is you must obey the laws of the country you are in assisted in getting an English speaking lawyer when requested send you bill for their efforts A Consulate deals with citizen affairs (administration, assistance). Most Embassies have a Cousulate department inside, but not all. In Berlin it does not. The Cousulate is about 20 Kilometres away from the Embassy. The right to call them is based on the Vienna Conventions 1815 and 1961. All countries that reconised these conventions are required to allow a foreigner to contact their Cousulate. A dual citizen, when inside the country where they are a citizen, do not have this right.

Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law.

No, it is not. Just as it is illegal to steal from a thief, it is illegal to hack a hacker. Criminals are often considered a good target for crimes from a practical standpoint, but crimes against criminals are still prosecuted. As criminals are unlikely to report crimes against them to the authorities (particularly when doing so runs the risk of them being arrested for their crimes), targeting them does tend to result in a lower risk of being caught by the authorities, but if the crime is discovered, it will generally be prosecuted all the same. To that point, two Florida men have recently been arrested and are being prosecuted for stealing millions of dollars in Bitcoins from an illegal, darkweb drug marketplace in 2013, and there is always the more famous case of the two government agents who are in jail for stealing from the Silk Road. In your specific example, if all you did was hand over the information to the FBI, it's less likely that you'd be prosecuted than if you did so for personal gain, but you would be at risk of prosecution for engaging in vigilante computer hacking, yes. Also consider that if your actions happened to interfere with an ongoing investigation or result in the inability to prosecute (say, for the evidence you gathered being tainted and inadmissible by your involvement), you could be charged with crimes such as obstruction of justice or interfering with a police investigation as well.

Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).

The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with.

I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.

How I understand your question You have asked about mechanisms to "ensure the return" or something that will "trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule." So I take it as premises of your question that there is a parenting agreement regarding schedule and return, and this trip will happen. Dale M's answer provides advice about what he recommends to a person in such a situation. However, I recognize that many parenting orders include a term that allows international travel that can't be unreasonably refused by the other parent,1 or that allow international travel with no consent necessary.2 There is no mechanism There is no mechanism to pre-register a potential violation of a parenting agreement with a foreign state. I cannot cite to a source to prove a negative, but I am familiar with the operation of the Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention regimes and none that I have encountered have such a mechanism. I have also spent some time looking to see if I have missed something, and am still convinced there is no such mechanism. 1. 2020 BCPC 16: "He shall not unreasonably withhold his written consent to such a trip. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, Y.N. has liberty to apply for a court order. If the court, on such application, finds that W.G. has unreasonably withheld his consent to such a trip, he is hereby put on notice that he may be ordered to pay Y.N.’s expenses incurred in bringing the application." 2. 2018 ABQB 1031 ("Each party shall be entitled to travel internationally with the children without the consent of the other party upon providing 30 days notice of such travel along with a full itinerary including flight information, destination, where the parties are staying and contact information."); 2010 ABPC 410 ("I will allow T.C. to travel outside the country without the written consent of the father."); 2021 ONCJ 440 ("Either party may travel with the Child outside of Canada during his or her parenting time. The Father requires the consent of the Mother, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The Mother may travel internationally with the Child without the consent of the Father, but she must advise him accordingly."); 2020 ABQB 434 ("either party may travel during their respective vacation or ordinary parenting time in Canada or internationally to any Hague Convention Country, without the consent of the other party"); 2017 BCSC 1463 ("The claimant is at liberty to travel with the Children both in Canada and internationally without the consent of the respondent.")

USA school law. Is a charter school a public school? I am trying to understand the main, basic tenets of USA public vs. private school law. (See my previous question of a series). Is a charter school a public school? I see that there is debate on whether charter schools should be described as private schools or state (hence, public) schools. So my question is, by which general criteria could I decide whether a charter school has to be considered public? Also, in the case that they are not to be considered public, is the relationship student/school a contractual one?

Each state has its own system of designating different kinds of schools, but the term "charter school" generally refers to a public school that is subject to less central administrative supervision than an ordinary public school. But the relationship between a student and a school in a charter school, unlike a private school, is not primarily contractual in nature. The charter school has a contractual relationship with the school district (of which the students may sometimes be third-party beneficiaries), but the student does not have a contractual relationship with the school.

Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - Camp David is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So: if you are in a place where you have permission of the lawful authority to be (public spaces give you this implicitly, private spaces require explicit permission), and the lawful authority has not placed restrictions on photography, and the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (like they would in a public toilet), and the subject matter is legal (e.g. considering restrictions on sexual or commercial activities), then you can take photographs.

What is the meaning of notwithstanding in this context? The clause that starts with "notwithstanding" narrows down the levels of studies that are eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). In other words, for purposes of payment of benefits, "education" can be interpreted only as "undergraduate and graduate study", and thus it overrides --only pursuant to that clause-- the wide encompassing notion of "education" as defined in paragraph 5(b). The clause implies that any other levels of studies, such as "elementary or high schools", are not eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). The inclusion of "notwithstanding" seems intended to reflect the awareness of apparent discrepancy of the definitions of "education", and to consequently clarify the intent that paragraph 5(b) be regarded as the appropriate definition of "education" for everything except the matter of payments.

The second paragraph actually says that your e-mail address will become public record if you send an e-mail message to them. That's because there's a Florida law that requires this. If you want to communicate with the school without your e-mail address appearing in the public record, you can call on the telephone, send postal mail, or visit in person. The notice is precisely there to inform you of the fact that sending e-mail to the school will have this effect, and it helpfully mentions one of the ways you can avoid that outcome: If you do not want your e-mail address released in response to a public records request, do not send electronic mail to this entity. Instead, contact this office by phone. If you think about the nature and purpose of public records laws, you will perhaps understand why the Florida law does not speak of consent or allow those corresponding with affected entities to opt out. If that were possible, then people who were conducting improper business with the public entities would withhold consent or otherwise opt out, making the public records law useless in the service of its goal of increasing transparency in government.

Your school can compel you to pray, if it is a private school. I assume you are asking about a government school. As a limited public forum, the school can limit content (can forbid discussion of a topic), but cannot limit viewpoint (cannot allow only pro-abortion speech while prohibiting anti-abortion speech). If they allow the Godly pledge, they must allow the Satanic pledge (as well as allowing silence). See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98. "The power to so restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech based on viewpoint, and must be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose". While it is true that schools are allowed to limit disruptive behavior, declaring "disruption!" does not automatically suspend the First Amendment. A reasonable person would not find find replacing a few word to be a disruption. If you scream "Satan!", that is disruptive, if you just say "Satan" instead of "God", that is not a disruption.

A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.

As was mentioned in a comment, in the United States, businesses are generally registered at the state level. The information collected, and the extent to which or manner in which the public has access to it, varies from state to state. There may still be states where that's a paper-only process, but I'd guess in most of them it's accessible online, at least for basic information. For example, in Michigan the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs has a Business Entity Search tool. If a business deals directly with consumers, it may be a member of the Better Business Bureau. Even if it isn't, but consumers have complained about it, the BBB will make public the information it has about the purported business. If a company is publicly traded (that is, it's corporation that issues stock, and the stock is traded on a stock exchange), it is required by law to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC's EDGAR tool will display the company's filings, which should include annual and quarterly reports. If the company is or wants to be a government contractor, it generally needs to register with the General Services Administration, and certain information about successfully registered entities is publicly viewable in that system. (Conversely, the same system also lists "Excluded Parties" who are prohibited or partially restricted from doing business with the government.) Depending on what the business does, it may also be subject to registration with and regulation by additional state or federal agencies. For a full picture, however, unless you're dealing with the obvious agent of a Fortune 500 company, you'll probably want to get information from a private credit-check service as well; for example, as also mentioned in a comment, Dun & Bradstreet for the business itself, or for a really small business a personal credit report on each of the owners and officers.

Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred.

If someone committed copyright infringement and was able and willing to endure all maximum fines and prison time, could they still practically do it? Let's say an already obscenely rich individual in the US (whose wealth is unrelated to any crime) decides to reproduce unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work for a profit and gets caught. This person has illegally distributed enough of the work to incur the maximum amount of fines and prison time and just... agrees to all of it without a fight. And as soon as the fine is paid and the time is done, the individual repeats distribution of the same copyrighted work again, and repeats this process multiple times. It'd be clear that because this person can continue doing this practically indefinitely due to their obscene wealth and willingness to endure punishment, it'd on the surface seem infeasible to prevent this person from continuing distribution due to copyright infringement having a codified punishment ceiling (to my knowledge a maximum of both 10 years in prison and $250,000 per offense, source). In such a hypothetical case, do the law and/or the copyright owner actually have any teeth to stop this person from continuing to distribute, or can they just ride out the punishments and continue in perpetuity?

If you have sufficient grounds to fear that someone is about to infringe on one of your rights, you can go to court to obtain an injunction against that person. This is a court order to refrain from some particular action. In many cases, the point of this is just to have the legal debate on whether the anticipated action is actually legal or not before it happens rather than after. However, the punishment for violating the injunction is set by the relevant judge based on how important it is to dissuade the target from actually doing the thing, and how extensive the punishment needs to be in order to achieve this. After a few rounds of your guy doing the copyright infringement, getting an injunction against him doing it again should be quite straight-forward. And if he violates that, it would be reasonable to ask for a significantly higher fine next time, and then more, and more. Injunctions could also involve preparatory actions, eg prohibit the guy to even approach a computer, if this is deemed necessary to prevent reoffending.

Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video.

In the United States, making a copy without permission is generally going to be a copyright violation, unless the copying is a fair use. Fair-use defenses look at four questions, and the answers to the questions can tip the scales in favor of or against a finding of fair use: Does your kind of copying affect the market for the original? To what extent can your copy fulfill the demand for the original? What if there were widespread copying of the kind you're considering? The more potential there is for the copies to replace the original, the less likely it is to be fair use. (This is the most important factor in the analysis.) Why did you make the copy? If you made the copy for purposes of news reporting, criticism, or commentary, it's more likely to be fair use. If you made a copy just so you could emjoy the work again whenever you felt like it, that may still be fair use, but it is somewhat less likely. If you made a copy just so you could sell it for profit, that's almost certainly not fair use. How much did you copy? Did you copy the whole thing, or did you copy only as much as you needed to achieve your purpose under Question 2? If you copy "too much" – either in the raw amount or as a fraction of the whole work – it's less likely to be fair use. What did you copy? Highly creative works, such as poems, music, and movies, are at the "core" of copyright principles. A fair use analysis will be more stringent in these cases than when dealing with a copy of a purely factual work, such as a phone book, biography, or list of statistics. Such works are still protected by copyright, but that protection is not as strong. So take all of those and imagine the answer to each on a spectrum. If you see things generally tipping in the direction of fair use, that's a good indication that you're going to be safe. If you see things tipping in the other direction, you may want to reconsider. These questions can be trickier than you might think. If you're dealing with a real situation, you should consult an attorney to get an answer specific to your situation. But what if I don't make any money? This fact tips the scales in your favor, but only on Question 2; you still need to consider the other factors. Whether you make money is less important than whether your copying deprives the copyright owner of the opportunity to make money, but then you have to balance that consideration against the First Amendment principles embedded in fair-use analysis. So if you're ripping Star Wars DVDs to hand them out as Christmas presents, your lack of a profit motive will not save you. But a freelance broadcast journalist who includes short snippets of "Kick Out The Jams" and "Whip It" in a piece on this year's Rock & Roll Hall of Fame nominations would probably be fine, even though she's planning to make some money off her piece.

Copyright requires originality Your infinity hard drive appears to be a machine designed to violate copyright by immediately copying anything presented to it. Damien Riehl and Noah Rubin were creating original melodies. These do not have copyright until they are fixed in a tangible medium. That's what the hard drive is for. This is insurance against them being sued if they release a song and someone claims it violates that person's copyright - they can produce in court the melody with a date stamp of 2015 (or whatever). GitHub or similar would be even better evidence. In this context there is a specific allegation that melody X infringes copyright. Riehl & Rubin can then go to their records (including metadata) and say no, here is melody X version 1 through n and they all predate your release so we didn’t violate your copyright.

No. The Creative Commons license seeks to promote recognition of the original author's work through attribution, but does not provide the same framework for enforcement that the DMCA would. The proper approach in cases such as the deleted Wikipedia article and subsequent reuse would be to provide a courteous notice to Wikipedia of your original publication and ask to be listed as the original author or be provided attribution. In the absence of relief there, then what rights you have would be determined by the Wikipedia Terms of Service. Since, and I am assuming here, that you are not generating billions of dollars on the original publication in royalties, seeking to bring a DMCA type enforcement on a Wikipedia article dispute would be like trying to swat a fly with a sledgehammer. (or more commonly in divorce, two people having hearing and spending thousands of dollars on attorney's fees fighting over a blender -- they are free to do it, but they would have been much better off buying 500 new blenders...) Keeping perspective and providing a courteous letter is probably your most cost efficient first step in situations like this. And in all areas of law, just remember, you catch more flies with honey than you do with salt. (meaning taking the courteous approach usually affords better results than a scalding letter breathing hell-fire and brimstone) In followup to earlier comment: Presuming you would be covered by the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Copyright of 1996 (as a U.S. Citizen you would be), and your copyright is on file with the United States Copyright Offices (same presumption) as prerequisite to suit, then there is nothing that prevents you from invoking the protections under general copyright law and under the DMCA (inlcuding the Takedown provisions). Note: these are not the only prerequisites to taking action, but instead the minimum critera to qualify, and note this does not pass on the wisdom of doing so (there are often significant consequences to improperly invoking previsions of certain acts).

A person's property cannot be seized in the US except by due process of law. There is no law that declares the property of a convicted person to be forfeit to the state. A person who is convicted might be subject to a fine, in which case a court could order seizure of property to pay the fine. Your property might also be seized as a result of a civil forfeiture proceeding (where the government sues your property for being the fruit of an illegal enterprise), but that only applies to property believed to be connected to a crime (e.g. purchased with the proceeds of a crime). Civil forfeiture doesn't even require that you be arrested. Barring that circumstance, the person retains their rights to their property. It is then up to them to make suitable arrangements for the protection or disposition of their property.

First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not.

A website itself cannot be copyrighted, but the content on it is. Copyright protection is automatic: when you write something, it is protected by copyright law, and that protection persists when you put it on a website. If you intend to sue someone for infringement of copyright, you may have to register the copyright (details depend on national law). Creative Commons is not a way of protecting your intellectual property, it is a way of selectively removing copyright protection (by granting permission to copy, under certain circumstances). In some countries, such as Cyprus, registration is not required; also, infringement is a criminal offense subject to a prison term up to 2 years and a fine up to 1500 pounds for a first offense. There are various differences between Cypriot and US law in terms of the registration, but basically the protection in the US is more limited for unregistered works. Under Article 4, as long as you are a citizen or resident of Cyprus, you are entitled to protection in Cypriot court.

Does Justice Roberts Obamacare opinion contradict itself? Chief Justice Roberts' opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius upheld the ACA individual mandate as a tax. Disagreeing with the joint dissenters (Alito, Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia), Roberts, in part III-C of his opinion, demonstrates that the labels used by Congress can not be controlling. (Penalty versus tax.) The "question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise." (Roberts quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.) Since this levy is within the Taxing Power, the characterization (label) Congress gives the exaction does not effect to its constitutional status as a tax. Yet in Part III-D JUSTICE GINSBURG questions the necessity of rejecting the Government’s commerce power argument, given that §5000A can be upheld under the taxing power. Post, at 37. But the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that §5000A can be interpreted as a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt such a saving construction. the Chief Justice seems to say that only a strained reading of Congress's "label" and the doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance allow the mandate to be upheld as a tax. Isn't there tension between these two parts of the opinion?

Isn't there tension between these two parts of the opinion? There is perhaps some tension, but the resolution of that tension is clear. There is certainly no self contradiction. The most obvious tension is between the chief justice's line of reasoning and Justice Ginsburg's. It may be described thus: Justice Ginsburg would uphold the statute by interpreting it as a tax, avoiding the need to consider whether it is authorized as a command under the commerce clause. Chief Justice Roberts notes that the statute reads on its face as a command and says that this requires the court to find that this "more natural" reading is "not authorized" before it can consider other interpretations under the "duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible." Only by following this line of reasoning may the court consider whether the provision may be upheld under the power of taxation. The reasoning paraphrased in the first paragraph of this question explains that the court may go beyond congress's labels -- the claimed basis of its authority -- when it interprets a statute. The quotation from the opinion explains that it is however necessary to consider congress's claimed source of authority first, before moving on to other possible sources. There is a bit of a chicken-and-egg nature to this: if we don't consider (and reject) the commerce clause argument, we can't justify the statute as a tax, but if we can't justify it as a tax, we have to consider the commerce clause argument. Ginsburg's reasoning would avoid this paradox. Therefore, to the extent that a chicken-and-egg paradox is "tension," yes, there's internal tension in Roberts' reasoning, but not outright contradiction. The more significant tension is between Ginsberg's desire to avoid considering the commerce clause justification and Roberts' reasoning that requires it.

There is no parallelism between the Texas decision and the proposed lawsuit. In the anti-mifepristone lawsuit, there exists a statute granting the FDA authority to regulate and review new drugs, and a petition procedure whereby citizens can state ground for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to consider a regulatory action. There is no statutory basis on which a ban of meat-eating could be created by executive action. Congress cannot be sued for not passing a law (failure or refusal of Congress to pass a particular law is not justiciable). If, for example someone were to submit a petition to the FDA urging such a regulation, the petition would have to be denied because the FDA does not have statutory authority to issue such a regulation. As argued here, the anti-mifepristone plaintiffs lack standing in that case, so one can expect that to be a substantial issue in the subsequent appeal.

The Validity of State Wealth Taxes Yes. States can impose wealth taxes, although this doesn't clarify the validity of a federal wealth tax. States have broader taxing power than the federal government in terms of kinds of taxes that they may constitutionally impose. A state may impose any tax (1) that does not unduly discriminate against a federally protected constitutional civil liberty (like freedom of the press), (2) that does not purport to tax the federal government (arguably any other sovereign) without its consent, (3) that does not unduly discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) that has some rational basis. Apart from these specific limitations and (5) any found in state law or the state's constitution, (6) a state's taxing power is plenary as to conduct or activity or property that has a sufficient connection to the state to provide it with jurisdiction. A recent U.S. Supreme Court case repealed some clear rules of the road regarding what states do not have the jurisdiction to tax, effectively increasing state tax jurisdiction considerably, for example, to impose sales taxes on Internet retailers. the biggest problem for a state like California trying to extract revenue from its uber-wealthy populace would be that they would simply move their residence and use any other possible legal loophole to avoid having to pay. This is true. The primary question regarding the validity of a state wealth tax would not be whether a state could impose a wealth tax, but what assets could a state make subject to its state wealth tax. This might be easy to answer in the case of real property, but hard in the case of intangible property or property held via entities. Federal statutes may, however, establish which states have jurisdiction to tax which assets with a state wealth tax as part of the power to regulate interstate commerce, or by ratifying a compact reached between multiple states which have state wealth taxes. Still the facts that many countries in the European Union impose or have historically imposed wealth taxes that generate significant tax revenue, despite the easy ability to the affluent to relocated to other countries in the E.U. that is closely analogous to that of U.S. states seeking to do the same thing, suggest that this is not an insurmountable task, even if there might be some leakage of untaxed wealth at the margins. The Validity of Federal Wealth Taxes In contrast, Congress may only impose taxes expressly authorized by some provision of the U.S. Constitution as amended. The applicable case law on the issue of the constitutionality of a federal wealth tax is not entirely settled. The gift, estate and generation skipping transfer tax system has been held to be constitutional, but since this is a tax imposed on transfers of wealth, it is arguably a tax in lieu of an income tax treated separately for ease of administration (since gifts and inheritances are within the core definition of income in the Internal Revenue Code at Section 63, but then specifically exempted from income taxation in lieu of donative transfer taxes like the gift and estate tax, in a separate statutory Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code.). Federal property taxes in areas not in exclusively federal jurisdiction (e.g. Virginia rather than the U.S. Virgin Islands) were briefly in force in the 1700s, but were repealed before they could be subject to a constitutional challenge. Income taxes, even at 90% marginal tax rates, have been upheld as valid. The analysis and doctrines involved are rather involved for a short answer in this forum, and I am fairly certain that there is published legal scholarship arguing both sides of this question of first impression. In a nutshell, a federal tax must either be an income tax; tax imposed on states rather than individuals on a per capita basis; or an excise tax or duty or tariff. The first two types of taxes are comparatively well defined. The third is the subject of thin, mushy and somewhat inconsistent or indeterminate case law. One could argue, for example, that a wealth tax is really a form of income tax on imputed income from assets that could generate additional value to the owner even if the value that arises from this ownership is not monetized or realized. This argument would be particularly strong if wealth taxes paid with respect to an asset were allowed as a tax credit against taxes imposed on income generated by that same asset, in a manner similar to the foreign tax credit today. A wealth tax clearly isn't a per capita tax on a state government. No such tax has ever been imposed for any meaningful amount of time and has never been a more than nominal source of federal revenues if it has ever generated any federal revenues. There is also a credible argument that a wealth tax is a constitutionally valid excise tax or duty or tariff, focusing on the excise tax component, which is quite ill defined, because the courts have tended to side with the government on issues of the scope of the federal power to tax except in the clearest and most blatant cases of violations of the federal power to tax.

There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.

Distinguishing a case which was decided by a higher court does not violate the doctrine of stare decisis. If the case can be distinguished, then it is not a controlling precedent. The term "controlling" indicates not only that the decision is binding on lower courts, but also that it applies to (or cannot be distinguished from) the facts of the specific case in question. Whether a precedent is "controlling" or not, in a particular case, could itself be a question for an appellate court. So if a lower court distinguishes a previous decision and therefore declines to follow it, the appellate court could say that was an error, and set aside the lower court's decision for not following a controlling precedent.

So it's not that SCOTUS is declining to review the matter on Constitutional Grounds but that it's declining to rule because 1.) It's a military matter 2.) It's under review by congress. SCOTUS is basically saying that, of the three branches, they are the least equipped to deal with military policy and when a better equipped branch is reviewing the matter. SCOTUS doesn't want to dictate to Congress how to change the rules when Congress is in the process of changing the rules itself... but they can say "Hey, we got our eyes on this as a constitutional matter so keep that in mind when you decide on what you're gonna do about this. When Congress makes a decision on this particular law (either change it or keep it), SCOTUS may take a look, but that doesn't mean they'll rule against it, as Congress and the Military can present an argument that it might be necessary for military defense reasons.

I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.

"Could Maine pass a law making New Mexico corporations and LLCs legally nonexistent in Maine (and removing the corporate veil in cases where Maine courts have jurisdiction)?" No. The full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the dormant commerce clause doctrine of U.S. Constitutional law would both invalidate a Maine law to that effect. One might think that the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (as opposed to the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment) might also invalidate this law (e.g., it also prohibits residents of another state from obtaining occupational licenses in a state). But, this is not the case, because the U.S. Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), that corporations are not protected by the privileges and immunities clause. See generally, here. This doesn't mean that Maine couldn't regulate foreign corporations in some manner that doesn't unduly discriminate against out of state corporations. For example, most states require out of state corporations that do business in that state to pay a small fee and make a simple filing with the Secretary of State of that state authorizing them to do business in that state as a precondition to filing lawsuits or counterclaims seeking relief in their state's courts. But, this is far from a denial of the very existence of the out of state corporation and doesn't, for example, prohibit the out of state corporation from defending itself against suits brought against it in that state's courts. Likewise, it does not prohibit an out of state corporation from owning property or from affording limited liability protections to its owners.

What is the difference between the respective doctrines of de minimis and frivolous claims Some claims are dismissed as de minimis while others are said to be frivolous. Are these two notions completely synonymous? If not then what’s the difference between them?

Some claims are dismissed as de minimis while others are said to be frivolous. Are these two notions completely synonymous? No. they aren't even that similar in meaning. If not then what’s the difference between them? Frivolous means not having a basis in the law or a sincere and reasonable effort to extend the law. Sometimes the term frivolous is also used in a broader sense to include not having a factual basis, even though it would be a valid lawsuit if the facts alleged were true. But a narrower definition calls something without a factual basis groundless and calls something without a legal basis frivolous. For example, a lawsuit for breach of contract in circumstances where you are suing over a contract you wanted to enter into with someone even though you acknowledge that they didn't agree to that contract would be frivolous. You can only sue for breaches of contracts that are actually entered into and it is frivolous to bring a lawsuit when you don't argue that a contract was formed. A lawsuit alleging that a contract was entered into with someone and breached when, in fact, the other party to the alleged contract never interacted with the person bringing the lawsuit would be groundless, and within a broader sense of the term, frivolous as well. De minimis means that the magnitude of the harm is so small that the courts won't entertain a lawsuit to address the wrong even though the harm would otherwise be something that someone could bring a lawsuit over. For example, if you sued someone for negligence for slightly bumping into when you were walking down a crowded sidewalk, even though you suffered no physical injury, and you weren't even made to fall or drop something as a result, that might be a lawsuit that is dismissed because the harm was de minimis. Whether a claim can be dismissed for alleging only de minimis harm varies by the nature of the cause of action. Some legal theories will award nominal damages (e.g. $1), if you prevail on the other elements of the claim but show only nothing more than de minimis harm. For example, in Colorado, proof of damages are not necessary to prevail on a claim for breach of contract or negligence per se, and nominal damages will be awarded even if you fail to show damages. Other legal theories make a showing of more than de minimis harm one of the elements that must be proved as part of the cause of action for there to be any legal liability at all. For example, in Colorado, a showing of more than de minimis damages is necessary in a negligence claim. This is a distinction which matters a lot in cases where an award of costs and/or attorney fees depends upon which party prevails on particular causes of action. In the federal courts, there is an additional subject-matter jurisdictional threshold of "standing", as a matter of constitutional law, which requires a showing that the person bringing a claim suffered "actual injury" which arguably involved more than a de minimis harm. But federal courts have recognized that at least for some kinds of lawsuits, standing is present even when the claim is only for nominal damages. A lawsuit seeking a remedy for a de minimis harm would rarely be considered to be frivolous.

I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario.

Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong.

In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important.

Is there such a phrase in jurisprudential or legal thought? In those instances it is common to say that the evidence is inconclusive. Accordingly, it is unavailing because that evidence does not prove the party's allegation.

Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.

Because disputes are expensive, time-consuming and generally not fun An ambiguous term is a dispute waiting to happen. Far better to resolve the ambiguity and correctly allocate (and price) the risk at the start of a contract when nothing is at stake then have that term be at the centre of a dispute with $10 million on the table that both parties think is theirs. At best, a dispute strains the relationship, at worst, it involves time and costs putting the matter before an arbitrator or a judge and hope the resolve the ambiguity your way. I prefer to play roulette at a casino not a courtroom. Contra preferentum is unlikely to be a successful argument in any form of non-determinative dispute resolution - essentially the proffering party is never going to agree that it applies. Further, contra preferentum is a last-resort resolution mechanism. Maybe what you read as ambiguous is actually clear. Or clear in context, or clear when industry norms are considered or when past dealing or current dealings between the parties are considered. Relying on it is a real long shot. Also, almost all B2B contracts explicitly exclude contra preferentum as a method of resolving ambiguous terms.

A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law.

Do any other consumer rights laws have extraterritorial applicability to international organisations that cater to British or European customers? The GDPR purports to bind any organisation, wheresoever it may be based, that serves individuals based in the EU, or (as the case may be) the UK. The GDPR governs the obligations of organisations and businesses to the individuals they serve, much as consumer rights legislation governs (likewise asymmetrically) the relationship, rights and obligations between traders and consumers. Meanwhile, anti discrimination laws similarly govern those between individuals and service providers. But do any of these other types of legislation, in either the UK or the EU, have such extraterritorial jurisdiction/reach?

There is nothing extraterritorial about these laws. If a company sells a good or provides a service to individuals based in the EU, then this good or service has to comply with EU laws. This concept is self-evident for physical goods that are produced anywhere in the world and then sold in the EU and the GDPR just applies this concept to services provided over the internet. The same legal concept also holds in all other major jurisdictions. The only thing that makes this more complicated for the GDPR is the actual enforcability of these laws but that is a technical issue not a legal one.

Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area.

No, they are not exempt Consumer protection laws (in general) apply to anyone doing business with consumers in that jurisdiction. You need to follow that law and apply to the company for a refund in compliance with the law. If they refuse, you can report them to the German regulator who may, or may not, take action against them. If you paid with a credit card, PayPal etc., once the company has broken the law, you can apply to them for a reversal of the charge. Similarly, most online platforms like eBay or Amazon will reverse the charge if you used them.

The goal of the GDPR is to ensure a single market for personal data processing throughout the EU. Since all EU/EEA member states now have equivalent levels of data protection, it doesn't matter in which member state data is stored or processed. Member states cannot generally limit this single market via national laws. Furthermore, secure processing may be possible outside of the EU/EEA as discussed in Chapter 5 of the GDPR. Some countries such as Japan have been asserted an adequate level of data protection so that no special safety measures are necessary. For other countries, a transfer of personal data may be possible under so-called Standard Contractual Clauses which detail the responsibilities of the data exporter/importer. However, the recent Schrems II ruling has invalidated the (partial) adequacy decision for the United States, and has strongly hinted that SCCs only work if the parties are actually able to honor their responsibilities under the SCC (which is not the case with some surveillance laws). Data protection is likely not ensured for processing in the US or by US-controlled companies (even if the processing usually takes place within the EU). Given the sensitivity of health data, this means you should likely avoid using the typical public cloud providers (regardless of availability region). Depending on where your company is based, you might also be disqualified as a data processor by EU data controllers. So the GDPR has no data residency requirements that limit the processing/storage to Germany, but some data residency requirements to keep the data in the EU. However, there may be non-GDPR obligations that mandate how the data can be processed, but I'm not familiar with those (the German regulatory landscape for tele-health is very uneven, differs between German states, but is also improving a lot recently). Since you're processing health data, you should pay special attention to Art 9(3) GDPR which is expanded in German law by §22 BDSG to list a catalogue of possible safety measures you should consider, but none of them are related to data residency. §78 BDSG has further details on transfers into non-EU countries, such as emphasizing that human rights must be guaranteed in the target country.

You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you.

The key issue here is the unauthorized collection of video thumbnails, not the use of cloud services. Under GDPR, every personal data processing activity has one or more controllers who are responsible for the activity, and every such activity needs a “legal basis”. With such cameras, the operator will typically be a controller, since they determine the purposes for which this camera is used. In this scenario, the operators – as part of their responsibility to conduct the data processing activity in a GDPR-compliant manner – had disabled any cloud features provided by the camera manufacturer. Despite this configuration, the camera manufacturer collected thumbnails and uploaded them to servers under their control. So, we likely have two distinct issues at hand: the camera manufacturer misled its customers about the privacy settings of the cameras. This is not necessarily a GDPR issue by itself. the manufacturer performed data processing activities in contravention of various aspects of the GDPR. Relevant aspects of the GDPR that might have been violated: the manufacturer did not have an Art 6 GDPR legal basis for this processing activity, such as a “legitimate interest” the manufacturer did not provide information per Art 13 GDPR to the people being monitored this way even if the cloud-based thumbnail processing were intended, this could be a violation against the Art 25 obligation to ensure “data protection by design and by default” depending on how the cloud storage services were configured, there might be violations against the Art 28 responsibility to contractually bind such vendors as data processors, or against the Chapter V rules on international data transfers Different actors might have different remedies against this violations: buyers of the camera might have remedies under consumer protection and product liability laws against the manufacturer data subjects of the illegal processing activity have remedies under the GDPR they can exercise their data subject rights against the data controllers, such as erasure of the thumbnails. However, this will be difficult to exercise in practice since the manufacturer will not have identifying information, and would then be free from having to fulfil certain data subject requests per Art 11 GDPR. they can lodge a complaint with a responsible supervisory authority, which would be the data protection agency in their EU/EEA member state (or the ICO in the UK). The EDPS is irrelevant here, since it is only the internal supervision authority for EU institutions. The competent supervisory authorities can levy fines. they can sue the data controllers, both for compliance (e.g. deleting unauthorized thumbnails) and for damages, if any were suffered. However, immaterial damages awarded for GDPR violations are typically fairly low, if they are recognized by the court at all. the right to judicial remedy (sue the controllers in court) and to lodge a complaint are independent. They largely pursue different remedies. Both can be used to seek compliance, but only supervisory authorities can impose fines, and only direct lawsuits by the data subjects can seek damages.

The existence of a law/legal system is the province of sovereign states. We do not have a world government so there is no world legal system. There is such a thing as international law, however, that is based on what the sovereign nations of the world agree is international law (usually in a treaty) and the degree to which they have implemented them in domestic law. For example, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over US nationals because the United States of America has refused to ratify the treaty that created it. There are also supra-national entities like the EU whose directives are binding on their member states and such states are required, as a condition of their membership, to enforce such directives domestically. A sovereign state's courts will decide when a person and their activities falls within their jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an Australian citizen can be prosecuted in Australia for paying a bribe to a foreign official in a foreign country even while working on behalf of a foreign company even if such activity is locally lawful. Why? Because Australia is a sovereign nation and it says it can. Sometimes it is impossible for a person to comply with the laws of multiple nations. For example, if the EU requires that certain data about their citizens is to be made confidential but the laws of the USA require a US corporation to disclose this information then it is impossible to comply with both. A person in such a position must decide which laws they will break. It is partly for that reason that multi-national corporations are usually multiple corporations i.e. they have a different corporate subsidiary in each jurisdiction (tax is another reason). For example, if all EU citizens do business with Google (Europe) then Google (USA) can rightfully claim that it has no data about European citizens to disclose.

It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc.

Is unwanted touching ever legal? As a general matter, unwanted touching of one person by another is not lawful. But is there ever an exception? For example, when limited available space requires it. Like, for example: In a crowded elevator? In the bleachers at a crowded football game? On the sidelines of a crowded parade? Other crowded or enclosed spaces? To the letter-of-the-law, is that still illegal? Or is there an exception made in the law? For clarity, I am not referring to inappropriate touching. I'm just talking about the normal kind (brushing and bumping elbows, shoulders, hips, etc.).

To use Texas as an example: Sec. 22.01. ASSAULT. (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse; (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury, including the person's spouse; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. If no reasonable person would think the contact is offensive, and no injury is involved, no assault was committed. This is a fairly common definition of "assault."

Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.

So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.

Can a state declare: "any violence against insert a group here shall not be prosecuted," which is pretty much what Nazis and Communists did, and then claim non-involvement in the violence that would ensue? This would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. https://www.justice.gov/crt/guidance-regarding-use-race-federal-law-enforcement-agencies goes into exhaustive detail on the topic of what may constitute an illegal abuse of selective enforcement. A key quote is highly relevant to your question: [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. There is a lot of case law on this topic. This is frequently discussed in the context of race (especially profiling).

You don't have to interact with people if you don't want to If you don't want to talk or otherwise interact with somebody in a personal capacity, you don't have to. Your reasons for doing so are your reasons. Some of the congregation may have roles that require them to interact with Jane in what I will loosely call an "official" capacity. For example, if one of the congregants is a government employee and government business requires the interaction, they would have to do so. It gets a little tricky when there is not a clear legal duty to interact. For example, if a congregant is an employee of a company with which Jane has business and who would normally be the person to interact with Jane, they might reasonably claim that they have a religious belief that prevents them from doing so. Anti-discrimination law may require the employer to make reasonable accommodations for that belief, for example, by getting a different employee to interact with Jane.

You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't.

Anti-discrimination laws apply to certain protected classes only. Homelessness (real or assumed) is not one of them, so it is perfectly legal to bar such people from your premises. It is also perfectly legal to bar people with red hair (assuming this is not indirect discrimination against certain racial groups). Nobody is required to serve everybody who comes in; what you are not allowed to do is ban women, homosexuals or other groups set out in the applicable statutes.

This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word "POSTED", along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word "Posted" is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs "posted property".

Copyright claim / fair usage We are a sports website covering news and have found a user on YouTube copying our written content and images and pasting it in whole in their videos. We have put in a copyright claim and got some videos taken down but they have put in a counter claim saying it is fair use and they will sue is if we don’t remove the initial claim. Where do we stand on this? They are using 100% of our article content including images, and not even putting in any original content of their own.

First, I don't know what "Sir is" means - I assume it is a typo of "sue us" and answer on that basis. Also, you don't tell us where you are and local law differs - I will assume US law. They can't sue you successfully - that's not how the "Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act" works. The way it works is: You give the "online service provider" (YouTube) a notice of the claimed infringement that complies with section 512. YouTube must expeditiously remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing material and take reasonable steps to promptly notify the alleged infringer of the action. The alleged infringer then has the right to object to the takedown. If they do, you have 14 days to bring a lawsuit in the district court alleging breach of copyright: If you don't then YouTube will restore the material - essentially you have given up your claim that the material infringes your copyright, If you do then the court will decide if the material does or does not breach copyright. The alleged infringer can raise a fair use defense if they like and they may or may not be right. If you win, you get damages, if you lose, you pay damages. In practice, you and the alleged infringer may opt for an out of court settlement instead.

Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).

It depends where you and your friend are and where the copyright was created. Ripping music for personal use is considered fair use/fair dealing in most jurisdictions. Having multiple copies/devices for personal use is OK too - practically, you can't watch more than one at a time unless you have a very unusual brain. If the intention is that both you and he would have and use copies then that is a violation.

The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it.

You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.

The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.

Stack Exchange have already covered this in a couple of places, from MSE's A site (or scraper) is copying content from Stack Exchange. What should I do?: When should I not report these sites? They follow all the attribution requirements. As mentioned before, there is nothing wrong with copying our content elsewhere on the web, so long as they are following all the attribution requirements given. There is no action we can take against a scraper who follows all the rules. And the old Attribution Required blog post mentions that the actual requirements are: Visually indicate that the content is from Stack Overflow or the Stack Exchange network in some way. It doesn’t have to be obnoxious; a discreet text blurb is fine. Hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) Show the author names for every question and answer Hyperlink each author name directly back to their user profile page on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/users/1234567890/username) By “directly”, I mean each hyperlink must point directly to our domain in standard HTML visible even with JavaScript disabled, and not use a tinyurl or any other form of obfuscation or redirection. Furthermore, the links must not be nofollowed

There doesn't need to be any copyright claim for there to be copyright protection. The protection is given automatically whenever someone authors a work. If you make money off of your improved version, the owner of the page may sue you for royalties. The only way to avoid this is to ask him for permission, or to create your page without using any of the source code of the original page.

Are laws requiring fees and classes to practice 2nd Amendment constitutional? Would laws requiring citizens to pay for training courses and permits costs be ruled as unconstitutional if they were challenged? I only ask because, in Minnesota where I live I need to pay for a $60 - $100 dollar 5-hour course, then pay a $100 dollar fee to the sheriff's office every 5 years in order to carry. MN Carry Laws Source

It is unlikely that those requirements would be held to be unconstitutional. A fundamental right such as the right to bear arms can only be restricted in specific ways ("strict scrutiny") – compelling government interest (keeping people from getting shot accidentally), being narrowly tailored and the least restrictive. If, for example, the law also required passing an exam on the history of firearms, that would be overly broad. If the registration fee were $2,000, that would be too restrictive. But the law says that The sheriff may charge a new application processing fee in an amount not to exceed the actual and reasonable direct cost of processing the application or $100, whichever is less. Of this amount, $10 must be submitted to the commissioner and deposited into the general fund. The application fee is not just for the actual cost of applying for the permit, it also includes what looks like a $10 revenue source, and that sort of looks like an unnecessary restriction. I expect, though, that the state would argue that this $10 is necessary to defray actual long-haul expenses that could not be recovered given the $100 limit imposed by the law. The law does not actually require a person to pay for a training course, it just requires a person to take a course (or hold employment as a peace officer in the sate within the year).

So each government has jurisdiction of the crime if and only if it occurs within their borders. In addition, the Federal Government can take a crack at any crime any where in the United States, though typically they only do so if the crime involves crossing state lines (kidnapping over state lines, ect). At the maximum, suppose for arguments sake Alice fatally shoots Bob while Bob is standing at dead center of the Four Corners Monument (the only place in the United States where four states meet). This means that one act of Murder has been committed in four seperate states, so Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona can all claim jurisdiction over the case and each prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder. Additionally, the Federal Government may step in and also prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder (though they are more likely not too. The Feds rarely prosecute crimes after the State UNLESS the State did something horribly wrong... I.E. Utah let her go because Utah is crazy). Additionally, the monument marks the dividing line between the Navajo Nation and the Ute Tribe, both semi-autonomous Native American Tribes that have their own recognized court systems, so they could conceivably charge Alice with First Degree Murder. So in total, the most amount of times someone can be charged for the same crime due to cross-jurisdiction is 7 times (Four States, 2 Tribal Governments, and one Federal Government). In likely hood, a few of these guys will pass because it's a waste of effort. If Alice gets the death penalty in Arizona, Colorado can't kill her a second time. It's important to note that each government gets exactly one trial so Alice can't be convicted twice in Arizona. A more realistic example occurred in the D.C. Beltway Sniper Case, where the perpetrators were tried in both Virginia and Maryland but only for the crimes committed within those states. VA got first crack because they had (and eventually carried out) the Death Penalty. Maryland tried both for insurance in case the VA cases got thrown out for reasons. The Feds found this satisfying and decided not to press their charges.

In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.

You cannot be compelled to sign a form indicating that you agree to something. However, your lack of agreement does not override a policy that they have authority to set. There is a contractual way that this could work out for them, depending on what exactly the document is. To be a contract, the parties must agree to the terms voluntarily, and if you do not agree to the terms, there is no contract. A 10 year old child cannot be bound to a contract, anyhow, so the child's consent is legally irrelevant, though strategically a good idea in the sense of alerting the child to their obligation. To be a contract, both sides must offer something that they are not already obligated to provide. What is the school offering? On the school's side, they might claim "We offer an education", but as a public school, they already have that obligation. Schools have broad authority to impose rules in order to operate, so in lieu of a successful lawsuit that the district overstepped their authority and violated someone's constitutional rights, the school could have a policy prohibiting use of a cell phone in school. Paired with such a policy, they can grant conditional permission, subject to the parent (and symbolically, the child) agreeing to certain terms. Since they are not obligated to allow cell phones at all, they are offering something of value to you, and you have a contract. The cell phone owner could try suing the school for keeping the phone, but the suit would fail because there was a breach of the contract. A strategy probably not worth pursuing is arguing that the confiscation clause is unconscionable (which would void the contract, which entitles the child to have a cell phone at school). Confiscating the phone is not theft, since the intent is not to permanently deprive the owner of their property (just as it is not theft when you have to leave guns or recording devices at the security desk). If a student were to take a forbidden thing without the owner's authorization (such as a gun, or a phone) and it was then confiscated, the rightful owner might be able to sue the school – as long as their hands are clear (if they had no knowledge that the thing was taken and used in an unauthorized manner). In this case, the parent clearly knows and authorizes.

To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').

Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.

The problem with the proposal is that the Second Amendment doesn't specifically protect the right to bear guns – the word it uses is "arms". Restricting sale of bullets or gunpowder is just as much a restriction on the right to bear arms as restricting sale of guns. Likewise, freedom of the press doesn't refer to just the freedom to use a wine press for printing purposes, it also encompasses the purchase of ink, paper, type and drying racks.

If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.

Post Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine standing PETA spends significant amounts of money trying to get people to voluntarily not eat meat. If the government had outlawed eating meat, people would be forced to not eat meat, and so it would not have been necessary to spend money to convince them not to. Given that the government's inaction has caused PETA considerable expense, and taking Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v FDA as precedent, does PETA have standing to sue the government for failing to outlaw the consumption of meat? EDIT: AHM v FDA holds that if a group advocates a position, and incurs expenses doing so, and there is some government action that would have decreased or eliminated those expenses, then that group has standing. One way an organization can establish standing is by identifying specific projects that [it] had to put on hold or otherwise curtail in order to respond to the [challenged action Tex. State LULAC v. Elfant, 52 F.4th 248 , 253 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal marks omitted). This is not a heightening of the Lujan standard, but an example of how to satisfy it by pointing to a non litigation-related expense. OCA,867 F.3d at 612. Plaintiffs need not identify specific projects that they haveplaced on hold or otherwise curtailed. La Unión del Pueblo Entero v.Abbott,No. 5:21-CV-0844-XR,2022 WL 3052489 , at *31 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2,2022). Rather,this is simply the most secure foundation to establish organizational standing. 13A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.9.5 (3d ed. 2022). Furthermore, [a]t the pleading stage , we liberally construe allegations ofinjury. Bezet v.United States,714 Fed. Appx . 336,339 (5th Cir.2017)(quoting Little v. KPMG LLP, 575 F.3d 533,540 (5th Cir.2009)). Here, Plaintiff medical associations have standing via diversionary injury . Because of failure to require reporting of all adverse events , Plaintiffs allege FDA's actions have frustrated their ability to educate and inform their member physicians ,their patients ,and the public on the dangers of chemical abortion drugs .ECF No. 7 at 12. As a result,Plaintiffs attest they have See Lujanv . Defs. ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555 ( 1992) . Atthehearing, Danco arguedElfant held there was no standing where organizations failed to identify specific projectsputon hold. ECF No. 136 at 125. This is incorrect. The FifthCircuit inElfantassumed withoutdeciding the plaintiffspled an injury-in- fact but heldthey did not have standingbecausethe causation and redressability elements were notmet. See 52 F.4th at 255. 12 Case 2 :22- cv- 00223- Z Document137 Filed 04/07/23 Page 13of 67 4435 diverted valuable resources away from advocacy and educational efforts to compensate for the lack of information.See ECF No. 1at 91. Such diversions expend considerable time,energy,and resources,to the detriment of other priorities and functions and impair Plaintiffs ability to carry out their educational purpose.Id at 92; N.A.A.C.P. v. City ofKyle, Tex.,626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.2010) Similarly, Plaintiffs allege their efforts to respond to actions have tak[en] them away from other priorities such as fundraising and membership recruitment and retention. ECF Nos.1-4 at 6, 1-5 at 11. Consequently, Plaintiffs have re-calibrated their outreach effortsto spend extra time and money educating their members about the dangers of chemical abortion drugs.Combined,these facts are sufficient to confer organizational standing.See OCA,867 F.3d at 612 (finding organizational standing even where the injury was not large ); Fowler, 178 F.3d at 356 (injuries in fact need not measure more than an identifiable trifle ) (internal marks omitted). It is to this that I am referring: given the legal argument here, does it give PETA standing? I am not asking about cause of action or anything else, nor am I advocating that PETA should have standing. I am simply asking, if PETA does not have standing, why logic would distinguish it from this case.

There is no parallelism between the Texas decision and the proposed lawsuit. In the anti-mifepristone lawsuit, there exists a statute granting the FDA authority to regulate and review new drugs, and a petition procedure whereby citizens can state ground for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to consider a regulatory action. There is no statutory basis on which a ban of meat-eating could be created by executive action. Congress cannot be sued for not passing a law (failure or refusal of Congress to pass a particular law is not justiciable). If, for example someone were to submit a petition to the FDA urging such a regulation, the petition would have to be denied because the FDA does not have statutory authority to issue such a regulation. As argued here, the anti-mifepristone plaintiffs lack standing in that case, so one can expect that to be a substantial issue in the subsequent appeal.

The situations cannot reasonably be compared legally. In Wynn v. Vilsack, a motion for preliminary injunction was granted (and the program was not ruled unconstitutional). In the ruling, the court found that the evidence "does not support a finding that USDA continues to be a participant, passive or active, in discrimination", and does find that there were past successful remediation efforts, thus "the Court expresses serious concerns over whether the Government will be able to establish a strong basis in evidence warranting the implementation of Section 1005's race-based remedial action", moreover "Plaintiff has convincingly shown that the relief provided by Section 1005 is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest". The court finds that there is a good-enough case that the law fails strict scrutiny. Incidentally, Congress repealed that law. On the other hand, in Evanston, we have no facts or concrete legal allegations (e.g. drafts of a legal complaint). The cited memorandum is a recommendation, not a law. There does exist at least one available council action from 2019 which says that The Chief Financial Officer is hereby authorized to divert all adult use cannabis funds received by the Illinois Department of Revenue for sales of adult use cannabis to a separate fund in a City account for local reparations. SECTION 3: The City may receive donations to this fund from separate organizations, corporations, and individuals established herein by the City Council. The city also has a page referring to Ordinance 102-O-20 (not available) indicating that "The Committee will work with residents, City staff and experts to explore and identify programs and opportunities to be supported by the Reparations Fund". The Program Guidelines §3 indicates that a person may be eligible for money if they are an ancestor, direct descendant, or "other" who has suffered from a "City ordinance, policy, or procedure that served to discriminate against the Applicant in the area of housing". It thus does not exclude Asian and Hispanic homeowners, LGBTQIA2S+, Catholic, Muslims or anyone else, except insofar as a Catholic was not demonstrably the victim of such discrimination. The city also provides an extensive historical study of past government discrimination in housing. You may be able to eke out more concrete information on what they have done here, at the reparations committee website. In terms of potential differentia between the USDA program and the Evanston program, the most obvious difference would be in terms of prior remediation efforts. If you sue Evanston for their program, they could defend the program as providing the remediation that justifies the program – which had already been provided in the USDA program.

If such a bill passes as written, it removes any federal criminal prohibitions against marijuana (assuming their research was sufficiently thorough), and raises marijuana to the same legal status as celery salt, which simply is not mentioned by federal criminal law. There would be no federal declaration that marijuana is now legal, and therefore, when federal law is silent, state law can say something. If silence at the federal level precluded state law on the topic, there could be not any state law – the Supremacy Clause only addresses conflicts. The bill could also be written to include a positive declaration that there shall be no laws against marijuana, and that would create a conflict with state law. Often, conflicts are avoided by crafting a jurisdictional difference, such as having laws that only apply while on federal property, or w.r.t. federal employees. The Constitution is structured to separate what the federal government can do versus what state governments can do, so that conflicts don't arise – however, the Commerce Clause ends up being used to expand federal power (e.g. the Controlled Substances Act). As Nate Eldredge comments, there is a huge difference between what is allowed under federal vs. (certain) state laws w.r.t. fireworks, and even town-to-town variations in fireworks laws. Numerous "professional" acts are completely legal w.r.t. federal law but are illegal at the state level. No federal law prohibits me from practicing as an attorney: it's state law that does that (likewise, being a cosmetologist or selling beer).

Well, moral obligations are not laws, nor sometimes even moral obligations. Some laws are based on what some courts and legislatures think are moral obligations. We think cannibals have a moral obligation not to eat people; cannibals think non-cannibals are fools for passing up a good BBQ. As for a leader's moral responsibility for millions of lives, we can take as extreme examples Mao, Hilter, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc., that there are no obligations. The law that could apply in the case of a POTUS who does not "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States..." (oath of office for POTUS) is that of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors", the grounds for most impeachments. But "faithfully executing the Office of President" has no moral obligation; it has legal implications, that's all. High crimes or misdemeanor are legal definitions, not moral, and depend on previous cases of what a crime or misdemeanor is. Insobriety can be illegal; there are laws on the books concerning public drunkenness. But in the contest of POTUS (one who is hopefully not passed out on the sidewalk in front of the WH), it remains to be seen if insobriety is a high crime or misdemeanor. That would be up to the House Judiciary Committee and US House of Representatives, which by Constitutional powers handles impeachment proceedings. The Twenty-fifth Amendment outlines who succeeds the president due to "Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office," but it does not state who has the power to declare a President incapacitated. It's possible that a POTUS who incapacitates himself with alcohol is guilty of a "high crime or misdemeanor." But how drunk do you have to be to be incapacitated? Drunk enough to think a Game Boy is the nuclear football? Again, that's up to the House. Some past presidents have arguably been functional alcoholics (or functional recovered alcoholics.) But incapacitated? That can be subjective when it comes to the application of the law. And morals have little to do with it, unless those morals have a basis in that same law. Update 12/04/16: Some federal judges have been impeached due to drunkenness: http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html and http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html

Actually, there is not a government kill list, that is just a meme. The First Amendment says (starts) "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...". That means a number of different concrete things: there shall be no laws prohibiting any religion, or preferring a religion, not may there be laws impeding or promoting the practice of a religion. The government therefore cannot reward or punish a person for believing in skin walkers, nor for turning themselves into a coyote (if they can do it). The old practice of burning witches at the stake is illegal, similarly at least under current understandings of the law it would be illegal to punish those without a religion with a fine or death. The aforementioned person can thus practice witchcraft – up to a point. One cannot get away with murder by claiming that they are just practicing the Ásatru ritual of blót. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah is an example of how the government can not restrict a religious practice (banning animal sacrifices of a particular religion), Employment Division v. Smith is an example of a neutral prohibition which happens to impinge on a religion (outlawing certain drugs limits a religious practice).

There is no prospect for equitable relief in such an outcome. The Texas state government enjoys sovereign immunity, except as specified under the Tort Claims Act. Under that law, immunity is waived only in the case of damage caused by negligence of a state employee, and is limited primarily to vehicle accidents and physical injuries. So the state cannot be sued for passing a law found to be unconstitutional. An individual would not enjoy such immunity, but given the law, there is no identifiable defendant to seek relief from (everybody is a potential defendant). An former abortion provider who now declines to perform an abortion can't be sued, because doctors in general have no obligation to perform particular medical procedures (most doctors in Texas won't perform an abortion, even before SB8), and the course will not render a judgment against a doctor on the grounds that they obeyed an existing law but should have known that it would be found unconstitutional.

Not at all. A US business always had the authority to require employees to be vaccinated before entering the workplace, except if a valid state law prohibits this. The EEOC has confirmed that none of the Federal laws which it enforces prevent such a requirement. The proposed mandate under the OSHA Act would merely have required a business subject to the mandate to do what it had the right to do anyway. Even if it is held that the US Federal Government does not have constitutional authority to impose such a mandate, that would not in any way impair any business which chooses to do so from imposing such a requirement on its employees, subject to the requirements under the ADA and the Civil Rights act to offer reasonable accommodations for sincere religious objections, and for disabilities that would interfere with accepting vaccination. Businesses generally are not "covered entities" under HIPPA, and so can ask employees for health information such as a vaccination record, if they choose to. Or they can choose to trust an employee's word on the matter.

I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities.

Do homophobic governments successfully subpoena LGBT dating sites? I live in a very homophobic country and I'm afraid my state's police will eventually get unleashed and start prosecuting LGBT people for engaging in "criminal offenses" only because they identify as LGBT and want to hook up. They don't do it currently, or rather I haven't known of any case when people got punished with real prison terms. Unfortunately, being an LGBT person, I have to use dating platforms showing no sign of care about their users's privacy. They require full-fledged set of information about the registrant including government-issued ID, commonly known as mobile phone number. As you can see, I don't trust those people who care only about profits from data mining. I must use their services because there are no alternatives Has it already happened that an LGBT dating site released information upon request about one of its users to a government of homophobic country so it can prosecute or harass their citizens? Note that I talk about data requests to service providers through subpoenas. I am not interested in cases in which dating sites users voluntarily shared their data to everyone who has access to the dating platform as registered user. Consider that dating platform's owner and servers located outside those homophobic countries.

The basic legal principles are as follows. First, a government may pass a law criminalizing an act, for example this Ugandan law which penalizes homosexual acts, their attempt, and aiding and abetting same. Second, a government has the subpoena power to compel a party to provide evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, unless there is some specific restriction enacted in the country – I find no applicable restrictions in Uganda. In principle, the government could subpoena records of an internet service, in order to find violations of the law. Enforcement of the subpoena is relatively simple within the country, but enforcement against a website in Norway, for example, would be virtually impossible, in that Ugandan courts do not have authority in Norway and Norwegian courts will not recognize such an order. Uganda is not a party to the Hague Service Convention, so the Norwegian courts will simply not consider the subpoena.

There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.

Here's what I had to do : After going through this harrowing phase, I thought I will post an update in case some one is in such a situation. The Northern Territory's Personal Violence Restraining Order act has a clause (section 21) which basically says if the applicant believes a third party knows the defendant's name then the applicant can request the court to order the third party(power, water, electoral roll, etc) to provide the name if the applicant has already made reasonable efforts in finding out the persons name and hasn't been able to. The third parties will only oblige to a court order. I am almost certain every state/territories' act (in Australia) will have such a clause. It was a challenge to get the court registry to accept the application as the front counter staff/supervisor/supervisor's supervisor were all unaware of this provision (to make an application for a PVRO but get the judge to first order the third party). I had to carry with me the act with the highlighted portion for them to read, analyse and consult with other court staff to even take my application in. At least in the NT there are community legal help services available for no fee and I highly recommend them.

Yes and No Selling your own body for sex is legal. Buying sex is illegal. Therefore the transaction as a whole is legal on the part of the seller and illegal on the part of the buyer. See Prostitution in Canada and Prostitution law in Canada. If you think this is odd, you are not alone '... one judge referring to the laws as "Alice-in-Wonderland" and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred to the situation as "bizarre"'. In the circumstances, although I know of no case law on this, it would appear that any contract for prostitution would be void for illegality. Presumably, to enforce payment for services rendered the service provider would need to pursue a quantum meruit claim in equity.

Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

"Checking someone's digital footprint" could be stalking, depending on the circumstances. The better question to ask is about the legality of a certain action, and not the specific name used in a jurisdiction (although indeed in Washington there is a defined crime of "stalking"). I don't know what you mean by "checking someone's digital footprint", and it is not defined by law. Looking at RCW 9a.46.110, we can first discern that it does not matter for the definition of the crime where these people live or where the robbery took place. If two people from Alberta travel to Alaska and harass or murder a person from Texas, Washington law does not enter into the equation. The crime that you're asking about is the snooping, so for Washington to have jurisdiction, the snooping has to be "in" Washington. That does not mean that both parties have to be in Washington – there can be complex jurisdictional laws if the accused is in another state or country. The accused can easily be prosecuted in his own state, he can also be prosecuted in a foreign country, if he is caught there or if he is extradited to that country. For the act to be stalking, the first element is that "He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and...". Harassment is defined in that section as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child. Since there was no communication between the parties, there is no harassment in the legal sense. There is no "following" either, therefore the act fails to constitute stalking w.r.t the first elements. Since the crime is defined by a conjunction of elements and your scenario fails on the first conjunct, it is not "stalking" (it is also not "harassment" as defined in RCW 9A.46.020, 9A.46.060.

Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy).

What is the color of caution or warning of hazard sign? Is the following caution or warning of hazard sign orange or yellow? My impression is that it's color yellow, but the link says it's color orange. And even though the aforementioned link says caution or warning of hazard sign only has one color, in this other link there is more than one color (yellow, green). In addition, there is more than just one shape (diamond shape, rectangular). Thank you!

The picture you posted is of a yellow sign mislabeled as orange. While some tints can be distorted depending on computer screens and color settings and individual perceptions may vary, verification of this specific example can be made by the context provided in your link. Below you can see the published example of a construction area sign: Several places below that is the one you posted in your question: As you can clearly see the colors are distinctly different, yet the color description is the same. It's apparent that the graphic artist who created this copied their work and changed the color, but forgot to change the text. Trust your eyes!

Overview This is a somewhat complex issue. The presence of "No Trespassing" signs would make anyone who enters the property without a specific invitation a trespasser. So would the presence of a fence, even if there was a closed but unlocked gate. An "Enter at your own risk" sign probably would not make such people legally trespassers. In West Virginia, a landowner or lessee or other lawful occupant owes a duty of "reasonable care" to invitees and other non-trespassers. No such duty is owed to trespassers. However, the owner or lawful occupant is expected to avoid dangerous conditions and reckless hazards, as well as intentional causes of harm (such as booby-traps). If through recklessness or serious negligance a dangerous condition exists and a person, even a trespasser, is injured or killed because of such a condition, the owner or lawful occupant is likely to be liable. However, if the danger is "open and obvious" or is as well known to the injured person as to the owner or occupant, there is no liability. A warning sign might make a danger "open and obvious". I do not see that video cameras will be relevant to the matter at all. Cameras do not warn a pedestrian not to enter, nor do they warn of any danger, nor do they prevent a pedestrian from being injured. They may help in detecting or even preventing crime, but will not affect liability for injury to a pedestrian. Sources West Virginia Code Code Sections §61-3B-3. (Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.) of the West Virginia Code provides that: (a) It is an unlawful trespass for any person to knowingly, and without being authorized, licensed or invited, to enter or remain on any property, other than a structure or conveyance, as to which notice against entering or remaining is either given by actual communication to such person or by posting, fencing or cultivation. §55-7-27. (Liability of possessor of real property for harm to a trespasser.) (a) A possessor of real property, including an owner, lessee or other lawful occupant, owes no duty of care to a trespasser except in those circumstances where a common-law right-of-action existed as of the effective date of this section, including the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly causing the trespasser injury. (b) A possessor of real property may use justifiable force to repel a criminal trespasser as provided by section twenty-two of this article. (c) This section does not increase the liability of any possessor of real property and does not affect any immunities from or defenses to liability established by another section of this code or available at common law to which a possessor of real property may be entitled. (d) The Legislature intends to codify and preserve the common law in West Virginia on the duties owed to trespassers by possessors of real property as of the effective date of this section. Articles from Law Firms The article "West Virginia Legislature reinstitutes “open and obvious” doctrine" from the law firm Farmer, Cline, & Campbell discusses how the case of Hersch v. E-T Enterprises, Ltd. P’ship. in which a WVa court abolished the "open and obvious" except to liability, imposing dameages for an "open and obvious" hazard, specifically an open stair without guardrails. The legislature then amended §55-7-27. (a) to restore the exception. The article also reads: West Virginia state law requires property owners remove hazards from their property to reduce the risk of these injuries. The expectation is dependent on the type of person that is on the property. Previously, visitors were broken into one of four categories: invitee, licensee, social guest or trespasser. The duty of care owed to the visitor depended on the category under which the visitor qualified. Today, there are only two categories: trespasser and non-trespasser. The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Mallet v. Pickens, abolished the four categories mentioned above, and held that “landowners or possessors now owe any non-trespassing entrant a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.” The article "Property owners may be liable for injuries to trespassers" from the law firm Farmer, Cline, & Campbell reads: West Virginia homeowners are not obligated to protect those who trespass upon their property. However, they should be aware that they cannot willfully cause injury to any who do trespass. This law can become an issue for homeowners with frequent trespassers as they may find themselves liable for injuries any people, even the uninvited ones, sustain if their properties are left in an unsafe condition. For example, homeowners and landowners could potentially face lawsuits if they purposefully made their properties unsafe. They may also be held liable if the condition of their properties could cause serious bodily harm or death. Further, landowners can also potentially face legal consequences if they fail to warn potential trespassers that there are hazards on their properties. The article "Determining Duty in West Virginia Premises Liability Cases" from Colombo Law reads: Most states use three categories to determine whether a duty is owed to individuals who enter the property of another. These three categories are business invitee, licensee, and trespasser. In the past, West Virginia was one of the many states that followed this standard. However, in 1999 West Virginia abolished and replaced the three specific classifications with a new, more general standard of determining whether the individual is a trespasser or a nnon-trespasser Trespasser. A trespasser is an individual who enters the property of another without the permission of a landowner. An individual will be deemed a trespasser if they do not have either express or implied permission from the owner. In West Virginia, the courts offer little protection to those who are trespassers. As a trespasser, a landowner must only refrain from intentional or reckless conduct. Non-Trespassers. Contrary to trespassers, landowners owe a duty to anyone that is permitted to be on the property. If an individual enters private property with the express or implied permission of a landowner, the landowner must ensure that the premises are reasonably safe for those on the premises. To ensure you are meeting the standard of care, the landowner must inspect the premises to determine whether there are any dangerous conditions present on the property and repair and/or warn individuals of the danger. Premises liability is the legal premise for which landowners are responsible for harm caused by unsafe conditions existing on the landowner’s premises. Premises liability is a broad concept that may be raised for a variety of harms present. One main reason for personal injury actions stemming from premises liability include slip and fall accidents as a result of: Slippery floors Uneven sidewalks or pavement Objects protruding from carpeting , floorboards, or store shelves

Is there any official law that prohibits the use of tritium in France? Yes: it's the French decree 2002/460 of 4 April 2002. It does not mention tritium by name, but this article explains why it is now prohibited: The French authorities have just published decree 2002/460 of 4 April 2002 concerning general personal protection against the dangers of ionizing radiation. Having as its aim the transposition into French law of European directive 96/29 Euratom of 13 May 1996, which lays down basic standards concerning the health protection of the population and workers against the dangers resulting from ionizing radiation, the decree prohibits any intentional addition of artificial and natural radionuclides in consumer goods, as well as the import and export of such goods. Exceptions may be granted to ensure the safety of consumers (for example for diver's watches). No exceptions are made however for decorative pieces (jewellery and watches in general). It follows from these provisions that the use of tritium and other radioluminescent products of the same type for the hands and pointers of watch dials is now prohibited in France. It is now necessary by law to use other luminescent solutions. Source Dated 23 May 2002

It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.

"Posted" is a Term of Art "Posted" is a term of art in trespass law, specifically meaning that signs forbidding entry have been placed at the borders of a parcel. The page "Properly posted definition" from Law Insider reads: Properly posted means that signs prohibiting trespass—or bright yellow, bright orange or fluorescent paint—are clearly displayed at all corners, on fishing streams crossing property lines, and on roads, gates and rights-of-way entering the land. Or, they are displayed in a manner that is visible to a person in the area. The entry "Posting" in the "Legal" section of The Free Dictionary reads: Posting In connection with Trespass statutes, the act of placing or affixing signs on private property in a manner to give notice of the trespass. The page "The Importance of Posting Property Signs" reads in relevant part: Why should you use posted signs on property? Posting property is a great way to let someone know they have entered private land and they might not be welcome. Using posted signs not only indicates trespassing but also can specify restricted activities. Signs are good for both rural and urban settings as a way to protect owners and their property. ... Most states have specific rules for property signs that must be followed. Some rules may include: Words used: POSTED or NOTICE Sign size: 11" x 11" or 144 square inches Lettering size: minimum of 2" Sign color: purple, bright orange, yellow Sign distance: every 100 feet Some states allow the use of spray paint to mark trees and fences in lieu of a sign. Purple paint is frequently used because it stands out against common natural colors. However, if a trespasser is unaware of this marking method, it would be more effective to use a sign. Check local and state laws to confirm what is needed to properly post legally in your area. Several US states use the term "Posted" in their laws on trespass, and provide that the presence of the word "posted" on a sign has special significance. Maryland maryland Maryland Criminal Law Code § 6-402 (2017) provides that: (a) Prohibited. -- A person may not enter or trespass on property that is posted conspicuously against trespass by: (a) (1) signs placed where they reasonably may be seen; or (a) (2) paint marks that: (a) (2) (i) conform with regulations that the Department of Natural Resources adopts under § 5-209 of the Natural Resources Article; and (a) (2) (ii) are made on trees or posts that are located: (a) (2) (ii) 1. at each road entrance to the property; and (a) (2) (ii) 2. adjacent to public roadways, public waterways, and other land adjoining the property. The law firm page "Trespassing Laws in Maryland" reads in relevant part: Posted Property Trespass A person is not allowed to enter onto property that is posted conspicuously against trespassing. That posting can come in the form of signs that are placed where they can be reasonably seen or by paint marks on trees or posts at the entrances and land adjacent to the property. New York new-york-state The page "Posting Your Land" from the NY Dept of Environmental Conservation reads in relevant part: Trespassing Trespassing is illegal even on unposted property. Instead of posting, a landowner or other authorized person may issue written notice to another individual informing them that they are prohibited from entering the property. The notice must contain a description of the property, what restrictions apply (hunting, fishing, trapping) and the person or persons prohibited from entry. It should be delivered by certified mail or other processes (ex: legal notice in newspaper) to prove that the person was served. At any time, anyone by the landowner, occupant, or other authorized person to leave the premises (posted or not), must do so immediately. Trespassing on areas posted against trespass pursuant to the Environmental Conservation Law is punishable by a fine up to $250 and/or up to 15 days in jail. It is a defense to this type of trespass that there are not signs posted instructing people to stay off the property. It may also be a defense that any signs posted in the area are not in the proper place to be easily seen by visitors to the property. Signage Details Hardware and farm supply stores frequently carry signs for posting. Customized signs may also be obtained from local printers. DEC doesn't provide signs to private landowners unless the landowner is a cooperator under the Fish and Wildlife Management Act. In this case, they will be provided with "Safety Zone" signs. Cooperators provide free public access to most of their property in a large cooperative hunting/fishing area. Signs must be a minimum of 11 inches by 11 inches. They also must bear the name and address of the owner, lawful occupant or other person or organization authorized to post the area. The sign must bear a conspicuous statement which shall either consist of the word "POSTED" or warn against entry for specified purposes or all purposes without the consent of the person whose name appears on the sign. These words must cover a minimum space of 80 square inches (about 9 by 9 inches) of the sign. Image from the NYS DEC page linked above (There is a very similar image included in the Wikipedia article "Trespass".) California california In California "Posted property" is the legal term for property where suitable signs have been placed along the boundary or near it, to informa people tht trespassing is forbidden. But it appears that in CA the word "Posted" need not appear on such signs, the words "No Trespassing" being sufficient. California also makes it a misdemeanor (Under section 602) to enter into or remain on property of another, without any legal right to be there, if one is instructed not to enter, or to leave, but such proeprty is not considered "posted". California Penal Code section 553 provides that: he following definitions apply to this article only: (a) “Sign” means a sign not less than one (1) square foot in area and upon which in letters not less than two inches in height appear the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” (b) “Posted property” means any property specified in Section 554 which is posted in a manner provided in Section 554.1 . (c) “Posted boundary” means a line running from sign to sign and such line need not conform to the legal boundary or legal description of any lot, parcel, or acreage of land, but only the area within the posted boundary shall constitute posted property, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (e) of Section 554.1 . California Penal Code section 554 provides in relevant part that: Any property, except that portion of such property to which the general public is accorded access, may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the manner provided in Section 554.1 , and thereby become posted property subject to the provisions of this article applicable to posted property, if such property consists of, or is used, or is designed to be used, for any one or more of the following: ... California Penal Code section 554.1 provides that: Any property described in Section 554 may be posted against trespassing and loitering in the following manner: (a) If it is not enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of the area and at each entrance. (b) If it is not enclosed within a fence, and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or contains any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs along or near the exterior boundaries of the area at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner, and, if such property has a definite entrance or entrances, at each such entrance. (c) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area not exceeding one (1) acre, and has no lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs at each corner of such fence and at each entrance. (d) If it is enclosed within a fence and if it is of an area exceeding one (1) acre, or has any lineal dimension exceeding one (1) mile, by posting signs on, or along the line of, such fence at intervals of not more than 600 feet, and also at each corner and at each entrance. (e) If it consists of poles or towers or appurtenant structures for the suspension of wires or other conductors for conveying electricity or telegraphic or telephonic messages or of towers or derricks for the production of oil or gas, by affixing a sign upon one or more sides of such poles, towers, or derricks, but such posting shall render only the pole, tower, derrick, or appurtenant structure posted property. California Penal Code section 555 provides that: It is unlawful to enter or remain upon any posted property without the written permission of the owner, tenant, or occupant in legal possession or control thereof. Every person who enters or remains upon posted property without such written permission is guilty of a separate offense for each day during any portion of which he enters or remains upon such posted property.

According to New York state law VAT § 1111(d)(4): Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal as provided in section eleven hundred twelve, pedestrians facing any steady red signal shall not enter the roadway. VAT § 1112 says they can't enter the intersection when a DON'T WALK (flashing or not) is showing, but can continue if they're already in the intersection. And just to be clear about the illegality, VAT § 1001 says: It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this title with respect to particular offenses, it is a traffic infraction for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this title. So the answer is, it's a traffic infraction, and illegal.

Is it illegal to display a flag in front of a store? Maybe - not because it's a flag but because it could be an unlawful obstruction of the highway (which includes the pavement) contrary to section 137(1) of the Highways Act 1980: If a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. (i.e. £1,000) Many shops fall foul of this if they don't have a licence, especially with 'A' boards and goods displayed for sale.

Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.

Why 12 Jurors, why not 11, 10, 9, 1? The question might seem basic, but why do juries in the United States consist of 12 members? Was there an experimental determination of this number? Would the addition or removal of a juror operate more effectively?

The origin of the jury is a complex mix of Saxon, Danish and Norman custom which morphed and melded along with English Common Law, which is the basis of the law in all ex-British colonies including the USA. Danish towns in the north and east of England had hereditary “law men”, often 12 in number who decided legal disputes. In parallel the West Saxons (Wessex) in the south and west charged 12 theigns in each area with keeping the peace. When the Normans conquered (who were also of Viking origin) they adopted and adapted the existing legal structures. In the 12th century, Henry II established that a jury of 12 should decide land disputes. Meanwhile other juries of various sizes were formed to investigate crimes and bring charges - this is the origin of the Grand Juries that still live on in some jurisdictions in the USA although they have been replaced by a judge in other common law jurisdictions (and some states in the USA). Ultimately the jury that brought charges and the jury that decided guilt were split and the size was standardised. However, it is incorrect to say that it is always 12: some jurisdictions have different numbers for different purposes. For example, rule 48 of the US Federal rules for civil procedure sets the number at not less than 6 and not more than 12. The jury system continues to evolve with various jurisdictions adopting different numbers, majority verdicts and judge only trials. There is nothing special or “scientific” about 12: it is what it is because it is what it is.

How would jury selection work for a trial of Donald Trump? Just like it does for everybody else - using the rules for criminal procedure in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, in New York, each juror must be fair and unbiased: A juror who cannot provide unequivocal assurance or whose credibility about the assurance is in doubt would properly be excused for cause. Jurors (like judges) are not blank slates; they have opinions about all sorts of things. That doesn't matter. What matters is if they can set those opinions aside and make a decision based only on the evidence. It is not necessary for juror's minds to be empty, just that they be open.

Short Answer Statements of jurors about their deliberations are not allowed to be considered for any purpose, subject to very narrow limitations which do not apply in the fact pattern you are asking about in this question. The General Rule And Its Exceptions Consideration of juror statements, subject to narrow exceptions, is barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which has a state or territorial equivalent that is substantially similar in every U.S. jurisdiction that has true jury trials (as opposed, for example, to courts-martial which look like jury trials but are not jury trials from a legal doctrine perspective). Federal Rule of Evidence 606, which is the model for the lion's share of these rules reads as follows: Rule 606. Juror (a) At the Trial. A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury’s presence. (b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. (1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. This is subject to exceptions only in a few extremely limited circumstances: To document interference or influence on the jury from outside the jury during the trial or deliberations (e.g. bribery of a juror, a juror's consultation of outside facts, blackmail of a juror, counsel for a party providing information not authorized by the judge to the juror). This is covered by Rule 606(b)(2)(A) and 606(b)(2)(B). To establish that a mistake was made filling out the verdict form (e.g. testimony immediately following a jury trial that the jurors confused the names of two co-defendants and incorrectly filled out the jury form convicting each one of the crimes where the jury found the other co-defendant guilty). This is covered by Rule 606(b)(2)(C). Under an exception created just this year for the first time (the source opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court by a 5-3 vote in this case, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado (March 6, 2017), is here), to document that one or more jurors essential to the verdict reached the result as a result of a racially/ethnically discriminatory reasons (e.g., one or more of the jurors who voted to convict in a case resulting in a conviction said "let's convict him because he's Hispanic" and then did so). This is not expressly covered by Rule 606(b), but the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally necessary to allow it. The situation you pose does not involve any of these exceptions. Instead, it concerns the internal deliberations of a jury not subject to outside influence, and it does not involve racial or ethnic bias in deliberations. So, this information is legally irrelevant and may not be considered by any court at the trial or appellate level. Procedural Aspects Of This Question Of course, in all of these scenarios including the exceptions, the mere fact that a juror says something publicly is meaningless legally. But, there is no means by which a lawyer in a case (or anyone else) can obtain information about juror deliberations through a subpoena or other compulsory court process. The only way anyone could find out about improper jury deliberations is if a juror voluntarily discloses these facts. Any effort to introduce consideration to this statement would have to be submitted to the trial court (generally, the trial court that handled the original case, but sometimes a habeas corpus action trial court) in either the form of a sworn affidavit of the juror, or live witness testimony of the juror under oath in the trial court in a post-trial hearing of some sort. This would have to be submitted by a lawyer for the defendant (or less often by the prosecutor in the case, seeking to right a wrong discovered by the prosecutor, for example, in the context of a separate bribery investigation conducted by the prosecutor's office). The juror or a third-party would not have standing to challenge the verdict or to bring juror statements to the court's attention in a legally effective manner. A statement of a juror about the verdict or how it came to be at a trial can only be considered at the trial court level and only: (i) in a post-trial motion for a new trial, which can be considered on direct appeal, (ii) in a collateral attack on the original verdict in a different kind of post-trial motion (state practice differs regarding what these motions are called), or (iii) in a collateral attack through a separate civil action (called a habeas corpus action) to set aside a jury verdict. Generally speaking, appellate courts never consider new evidence in any kind of case and can only consider evidence that is part of the official trial court record. The only true exception to this rule is that it may consider a post-trial fact that would terminate the case for procedural reasons (e.g. the existence of a settlement by the parties, or the death of a defendant during the pendency of the appeal or earlier which would render the appeal moot). Appellate courts can take "judicial notice" of certain matters that constitute general knowledge not specific to the case before them (e.g. the existence and duration of the U.S. Civil War, or the distance between New York City and Chicago, or the name of elected officials at the time the facts of the case took place). But, evidence concerning juror statements is not something about which judicial notice may be taken. Policy Considerations Why do we have such a rule when allowing this testimony could prevent serious miscarriages of justice? In rough order of importance, the reasons include the following: To protect the ability of a jury to engage in "jury nullification", which is an issue also informed by the double jeopardy protections of the 5th Amendment to United States Constitution (applied to state and local proceedings by virtue of incorporation through the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and parallel state constitutional protections) against revisiting a jury acquittal in a criminal case for any reason. To minimize the burden jury service places on jurors who would otherwise routinely be interrogated by lawyers unhappy with their verdict after the trial even if they didn't want to speak with those lawyers. To protect the finality of verdicts on appeal and in post-trial proceedings as this would add another set of grounds to disturb a court decision in addition to those which can be observed in the court record. Non-Obvious Consequences Of This Rule One important consequence of this rule is that "harmless error" analysis by an appellate court, which is conducted when there is a legal error made in a jury trial to determine if the error, if it had been corrected, was material enough to change the outcome of the case, is always conducted on a hypothetical and theoretical basis rather than based upon actual factual knowledge of what would have or would not have influenced the jury's decision. Another important consequence of this rule for appellate practice is that jury verdicts will be upheld in any case where it would be possible for the trial court record to allow a jury to come to the conclusion that it did, whether or not the jury actually considered the arguments and facts it would have had to have considered to correctly reach its verdict. Thus, it is frequently the case that a jury misunderstands the jury instructions or the facts of the case and makes an incorrect decision as a result, but that verdict is upheld on appeal because it would have been possible for a jury which, for example, found witnesses that the actual did not actually believe were telling the truth to have been truthful to rule in the manner that it did. Another practical effect of this rule is that it is easier to overturn a judge's decision on appeal because the judge must articulate his or her factual and legal basis for each ruling, than it is to overturn a jury verdict, since a jury need not articulate the reasoning behind its verdict except to the extent that it is given and completes special verdict forms when it deliberates.

Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called "jury nullification." And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you "roll the dice" there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move.

The exact procedure varies from one district to the next, but generally speaking, it is essentially by lottery. The procedure is typically spelled out in the court's local rules. Jump to page 105 of SDNY's local rules for an example. The lottery system is not entirely random, though. Frequently it is weighted to make it more likely that a case is assigned to a judge from the district's courthouse nearest to the parties, or to make it less likely to be assigned to the chief judge or a judge on senior status. There are then various other rules governing assignments of cases to new judges or visiting judges, but those typically don't happen when a case is originally filed.

Overview The rule on whether jurors may discuss a case before closing arguments is almost always a matter of statewide law and not a decision left to a particular judge in a particular case. There is good reason to believe that prohibiting pre-closing deliberation by jurors tends to make ultimate jury verdicts more accurate for reasons discussed below. The question about juror questions seems to be based upon the inaccurate assumption that jury questions are only allowed if collectively approved by the jury. Details The Rationale For Preventing Pre-Deliberation Discussions Among Jurors The Traditional Rule Described Is Not Universal First of all, prohibiting jurors from deliberating or discussing a case prior to the close of evidence and closing arguments is not universal practice. Colorado, for example, is one of the minority of reformist states that allow jurors to deliberate at any time that they are all present together in a case, after the panel is chosen. Arizona was one of the first states to experiment with this innovation. But, there is a rational reason for the older majority rule. Discouraging Pre-Judgment Of The Case This is first, to discourage jurors from reaching conclusions before all of the evidence is in, because people have a natural tendency to place more emphasis on the evidence that they hear first and to jump to conclusions before hearing all of the evidence, such as the defendant's evidence that comes last. Talking to other jurors consolidates and solidifies opinions and that makes it harder to change opinions when new evidence confronts an original opinion. Groups cling more tightly to an initial consensus than individuals. In contrast, individual jurors often change their minds during the course of a trial. Preventing Groupthink Secondly, it is to maximize the independence with which jurors reach their conclusions at the close of evidence. This matters because, empirically, the ultimate decision of a jury panel is overwhelmingly consistent with the initial pre-deliberation inclination of the median juror on the issue of guilt or innocence. The ultimate verdict of a jury is almost completely foreordained by the initial impressions of the jurors when they start their deliberations, even though it doesn't feel like that because jury deliberations cause people who are in the minority in an initial straw poll on the verdict to change their minds based upon what the other jurors have to say about 90% of the time. Twelve Angry Men (a drama and movie in which a holdout juror convinces all of the other jurors to change their mind on their verdict from their first straw poll) is an extremely outlier case that almost never happens in real life, especially in non-death penalty cases. So getting the first straw poll right is much more important than getting deliberations right since those have very predictable results. Deliberations almost never matter unless the jury has a 50-50 split in their initial straw poll and a lot of cases where there is a 50-50 split in the initial straw poll will produce a hung jury. Statistics on jury decisions To put some flesh on the numbers, the best empirical estimates of the overall accuracy of jury panels in making guilt-innocence determinations is about 90%. (Estimates on false convictions range from about 2.3% to 7% for all serious felonies including convictions arising from plea bargains in a 2007 study, a 14% acquittal rate was found in stranger rape cases where DNA evidence can lead to acquittals following jury trials, and roughly 40-47% of death sentences are overturned in the appellate and post-conviction review process.) Note that about 90% of criminal cases, overwhelmingly those with more clear cut guilt, result in plea bargains, so only about 1% of criminal defendants who are convicted are wrongfully convicted as a result of an inaccurate jury verdict. This accuracy rate somewhat underestimates how hard it is to be that accurate. It has been shown statistically (in the same article supporting the majority rule of jury verdict outcomes linked above), that about 68% of cases are pretty much guaranteed to produce convictions regardless of the makeup of the jury or the process used, while about 14% of cases that produce acquittals are sufficiently clear that the makeup of the jury or the process used doesn't matter (in a large, representative Sarasota, Florida sample). Thus, only about 18% of cases presented to juries are actually close cases and on those cases juries get the right result only a little better than 50% of the time. It is reassuring that about 95%+ of cases that are prosecuted have predictable outcomes in the system either through plea bargaining or correct jury verdicts, but not very comforting that about 2%+ of criminal prosecutions, and about one in five criminal jury trials, involve such unclear facts that their outcome at trial is basically a coin flip. In general, as a matter of mathematics, it is universally true (subject to assumptions that are present in this situation) that when something is more than 50% likely to happen in each trial as you would like it to happen, you are more likely to get a good result if you maximize the number of independent determinations that are made. In contrast, if something is less than 50% likely to happen as you would like, you maximize your odds of a desired result with as few independent trials as possible. The leading article explaining this idea is called "How To Gamble If You Must." In a jury context, in real life, any given independent juror who ends up on a jury poll is more than 50% likely to get the right answer in an initial straw poll the vast majority of the time. So, the more independent jurors you have, the more likely it is that a majority of them will get the right answer. And, the fewer independent jurors you have, the more likely it is that a majority of them will make a mistake. So, by preventing pre-judgment deliberation, you increase the number of independent evaluations of the evidence that are made by the jurors and increase the probability of a correct result on the merits. The Case For The Modern Rule Allowing Pre-Closing Deliberation The counterargument for the modern rule is that an overall mistake on guilt or innocence flows from multiple earlier mistakes in interpreting particular items of evidence, and that the ultimate conclusion flows from a lot of mini-determinations. And, if someone makes a wrong mini-determination early on and can't be swayed from it once deliberations come along, this can lead to the jury being wrongfully hung. In contrast, if jurors deliberate on each item of evidence as it comes along as a complete group, the likelihood of getting any particular sub-issue wrong is minimized, and getting sub-issues right consistently may be more important to reaching a correct decision than maintaining independent points of view throughout the trial. Jury Questions Should Juror Questions Be Allowed? The traditional position is that jurors can't ask questions at all. To the best of my knowledge, juror question asking is a very recent phenomenon (probably late 1980s or later). The modern position, followed in a minority of states, allows jurors to ask questions if they are not objectionable under the rules of evidence that apply to lawyers. Some jurisdictions allow this in both civil and criminal cases, while others allow it only in civil cases. I honestly don't know what the rule in Colorado is on juror questions in criminal cases, because my practice is exclusively non-criminal. The state of the law on jury questioning in criminal cases in the federal courts is summarized in a recent 6th Circuit opinion: Juror questioning, we have explained, “should be a rare practice,” but “the balance of risks to benefits is more likely to weigh in favor of juror questions in complex cases.” The concern about allowing juror questions in criminal cases is that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution and it can lose simply by failing to meet that burden of proof. An answer to a juror question could provide additional evidence that turns a case where it seems likely that a defendant committed a crime but there has not been proof beyond a reasonable doubt, into one where there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, unfairly and unconstitutionally disfavoring the criminal defendant. In a civil case where the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof makes the balance equal between the parties, and where the focus is more on getting a right result between two people who are equal before the state as opposed to protecting people from state overreach, the same considerations about aiding one side in meeting a burden of proof with jury questions don't apply to the same extent. The argument for the modern position is that psychology research shows that people make more accurate decisions when they can ask questions on points about which they are unclear. The lawyers and judge in the room may think that a point made by a witness was perfectly clear, but some of the jurors may not understand the word that someone used and come to the wrong conclusion. But, lawyers can't clarify the facts so as to assist the jurors in making the right decision if the jurors can't ask questions that illustrate what the jurors aren't understanding of the presentation before them. Deliberation As Related To Juror Questions A related issue is asking questions. Obviously if the jury wants to ask witnesses questions, they may need to talk among themselves to decide what question to put to the witness, so the instruction would seem to directly conflict with basic juror rights, such as the right to question witnesses. In my experience when juror questions are allowed, any juror who wants to ask a question may do so unilaterally without reaching the agreement of the other jurors, on the theory that even one juror who doesn't understand something about the testimony or has unanswered questions when facts are available to them, is one too many. Usually, a few jurors ask lots of questions, and many jurors ask few or no questions. So, it isn't clear how a prohibition on jurors deliberating prior to the close of evidence would change the practice of jurors asking questions. Perhaps there are places where jurors are allowed to ask questions only if they agree on those questions, but I am not aware of any such jurisdiction. In every jurisdiction that I am aware of that allows questions, individual jurors can ask them, and questions are not asked by jurors only if no juror has any questions for a witness. Also, even if jury questions did require the approval of the entire jury, my experience with how juries interact is that most juries would routinely approve almost every question of almost every individual juror anyway, so I don't know that it would make much of a difference.

There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case.

An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction.

Can someone summarize the ruling in Texas Mifepristone ruling? I started reading the ruling in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA, but it's 60 pages long and full of the expected legalese. Can someone summarize the argument of the plaintiffs and the legal basis of the judge's ruling in plain language? How can a judge with no medical background invalidate the FDA's approval of a drug?

Some interesting reasoning about standing aside (which antivaxxers etc. will love though, because it stipulates that the FDA refusing to collect all side effects statistics [even starting 16 years later] gives standing to sue on the original approval), the Texas' judge estimation of success on the merits is essentially relying on the finding that "Pregnancy is not an illness" (p. 40) and essentially repeated on p. 44 as "Chemical Abortion Drugs do not provide a Meaningful Therapeutic Benefit", so that in the Judge's estimation drugs for terminating pregnancy can be held to a [much] higher safety standard than the FDA decided by itself. This ultimately phrased as (p. 57): The Court does not second-guess FDA's decision-making lightly. But here, FDA acquiesced on its legitimate safety concerns in violation of its statutory duty based on plainly unsound reasoning and studies that did not support its conclusions. It's followed by another finding that there was likely political interference by the Clinton administration with the FDA's decision. This a rather partial summary since the order involves several FDA decisions, the details of which which I'm glossing over here (like the fact that the decision to not collect all side effects stats for mifepristone is rather more recent, being taken in 2016--but nonetheless the judge found that consequently the original 2000 decision was reopened as well, and can the object of the suit too.)

I think that is not a "reasonable" interpretation of the order, but that's separate from the question of what will be enforced. Focusing on the word of the order, No entity in Texas can compel receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine by any individual, including an employee or a consumer What does it mean to "compel" a person to do something? A court can compel a person to stay in jail for some period of time, and can order the police to use force to enforce that requirement – that's the classical example of compulsion. Nobody except the police can compel a consumer to do anything. All of the words of the order have to be given meaning, and it is not reasonable to say that "compel" is limited to "actions backed up by police action". The government does not separately compel "consumers" and "employees" to do things. In order to sensibly interpret "compel" and "consumer", this has to interpreted as including things other than "pointing a gun at a person". The only sensible interpretation is one that includes denying service to those who do not comply. In addition, the series of "Whereas's" clearly indicate a ban on "no shots, no service" conditions. It remains to be seen in court whether this is found to be enforceable (via the "failure to comply" clause, exactly analogous to other emergency powers allowing restrictions on gatherings etc. previously).

The law is known to everyone in theory. But as various people are said to have said, In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not. Starting from zero and actually finding out what law is applicable to your circumstances is not a trivial matter. To have an answer you can rely on you need to do the following: Find out what law calls it. Sometimes this is obvious, but not always. Go and find the law in question. Over the last 10 years this has got much easier. It used to mean going to your city library and looking up the relevant law. These days we have Google (other search engines are available). Find any other laws which might have bearing on the matter. This can be a long way from obvious (see below). Find any relevant appeal court cases in which something like your circumstances have arisen, and figure out how they relate to your actual situation. You may find that some of the laws which you read in Stage 3 have been ruled unconstitutional, or that the standard of evidence required to prove or disprove something about it has been set impossibly high, or that the penalties or damages have been set absurdly high or absurdly low. If you are in the US then maybe some of those precedents were set in other circuits, in which case you need to figure out what your local circuit is likely to do about it should the occasion arise. Make a calm, dispassionate decision about what to do about your situation. Many people find this extremely difficult. The answer might be life-changing. Under these circumstances making a good decision is very hard. Just to give you an idea about (3), suppose you are planning on importing something for your business. Here is a list of areas of the law you might fall foul of, off the top of my head and I've probably missed some: Tax. Trade in endangered species. Drug prohibition. Environmental protection. Biosecurity. Health and safety. Consumer protection. And that is just the criminal laws. Theories of civil liability can get really complicated. But OK, lets suppose you figure out the law, but despite your best efforts you find yourself in court (criminal or civil). Now in addition to all the law you find yourself enmeshed in a complicated bureaucratic set of rules, depending on the type of court and where you are (e.g. US rules of civil procedure). At this point you need to learn not just the rules but how to play the game they describe. Think of it like playing chess; learning how the pieces move is only the first step on the long road to becoming a competent chess player. And the legal system is like chess in another way; there are no do-overs if you make the wrong move. (Incidentally, anyone who says "Well lets just get rid of all the complicated rules and laws" is committing the fallacy of Chesterton's Fence. Just because you can't see why the rules are there doesn't mean there isn't a good reason). Or you could just hire a lawyer.

Let's look at what they say: Pennsylvania does not have any statutory laws governing assisted reproductive technology. True Pennsylvania’s laws regarding sperm donors come only from case law that are specific to the facts of the case being considered by the court. True and trivial given the previous sentence. Pennsylvania courts have found sperm donor contracts to be legally enforceable. True, that's what Ferguson v McKiernan says in the first paragraph of the decision. Your statement that "PA case law falls strongly on the side of not respecting donor contracts" is, at least as far as the case you cite, flatly wrong. In other cases, the contract may or may not be enforcable indeed the court agrees with this specifically: Although locating future cases on this spectrum may call upon courts to draw very fine lines, courts are no strangers to such tasks, and the instant case, which we must resolve, is not nearly so difficult. This also directly supports the previous sentence. Therefore, even if you go through a fertility clinic, a contract between the donor and the intended parents would need to be in place before the conception. True, this is exactly what Ferguson v McKiernan says. You assert that Ferguson v McKiernan says "donation through a clinic does not make a sperm donor the legal father", however, it doesn't say that at all. The status of the doner as the father was never an issue - both parties agreed that he was the biological father and the court accepted that. What was at issue is if he had the rights and obligations of a father that had been removed by the contract. The lower courts held that the contract was unenforcable as being contrary to public policy because it removed rights from the children who were not parties to the contract. However, the State Supreme Court held that the contract was enforcable. TL;DR What they say on their website is not misleading.

The simplest method is to demonstrate the falsity of the claims: this is simpler than pursuing punitive action against the opposition because in addition to demonstrate the falsity of the claims, you have to demonstrate willfulness and deceitfulness of the oppositions actions. In reading appellate decisions, you will often encounter statement by the higher court that the losing part urges so-and-so, or that the lower court applied a law or doctrine incorrectly, and they explain why that is in error. Such snippets are an excellent model for rebutting incorrect legal claims, although they are usually just the "executive summary" of the refutation. If one side cites Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 as case-law support for the proposition that courts should defer to the interpretation of government agencies whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute, so long as Congress has not spoken directly to the precise issue at question, a refutation would draw on those decisions to show that the three citations do not support the proposition (in my example, it would be unnecessary to do this because it is patently obvious that this is a wildly irrational argument, but many cases depend on a deeper reading of the case law). Rather than focusing on accusations of gibberish, you could focus on establishing the lack of legal merits behind the opposing side's claim.

Breathalyzer tests are distinct from blood tests because the former does not "implicat[e] significant privacy concerns" (see Birchfeld v. ND). A cell phone is like a blood test, because it implicates significant privacy concerns, especially the level of electro-snooping that would be required to determine if someone had recently committed a phone-use offense. As the court held, Because the impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. A breath test might (but also might not) also satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception (waiting some number of hours for a warrant can easily result in the destruction of evidence), but a cell phone case could not give rise to such an exception. It should perhaps be noted that the "implied consent" laws are misnamed, because consent is not the issue. The 4th Amendment ban is on unreasonable searches, not unconsented searches. If you actually consent, it is reasonable for the police to search. I am not aware of any ruling to the effect that "because the defendant consented, the search is valid". In the context of breathalyzer law and case-law, an essential component of what makes the search reasonable is that it is incident to an arrest. With or without consent, or an implied consent law, Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Extending "implied consent" to cause-unrelated searches of cars, homes, or body cavities might not pass strict scrutiny. The state has a legitimate interest in public safety which justifies some minimal intrusion, but adding a provision that "when you drive, you give implied consent to searches of everything" is not narrowly tailored. But since driving is a privilege and not a right, the state has much more leeway to give you an ultimatum: if you don't cooperate with the search, you can lose your license. On the other hand, SCOTUS has not actually approved of this slogan about driving being a privilege. Something noteworthy from Birchfield is that the court also disapproves of blood tests because a less invasive method of achieving the result is available, and they grant that "Imposition of a warrant requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, given the enormous number of drunk-driving arrests, with little corresponding benefit". There being no less-invasive alternative means of realizing the legitimate state interest in stopping distracted driving, I actually expect that when this comes to pass and the matter ends up at SCOTUS, there will be another important change in search law (but "implied consent" will still be irrelevant).

Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.

It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.

Is a sent email in someone else’s inbox subject to data subject rights of the sender? Suppose Bob emails Alice, and both use Hotmail for their e-mail provider. Bob then deletes the message from his sent mail folder. Could Bob issue a subject access request (SAR) to Hotmail for the message (provided it is in fact still) held by Hotmail in Alice's inbox? Or suppose Charlotte emails Dave, who uses a different email provider from him. Could she submit an SAR to Dave’s email provider for the message she sent to him, provided it is held by them?

An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party.

No. You have to ask for specific permission to send marketing emails, and can't make it a condition of making a purchase since marketing emails are clearly not necessary for that. When accepting the terms you need a separate tick box for marketing emails, and it must be unticked by default (opt-in).

Treat all email addresses as if they are personal data. All email addresses that belong to a specific person are personal data of that person, regardless of the specific form of the address. If your list contains the email addresses of data protection officers then all of them are personal data. The only exception I could see would be email addresses that clearly belong to a corporation that is they are addresses of a legal person which is not a natural person.

Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing.

Is X considered personal data? Can you use X to directly or indirectly identify a natural person? In the data to which you have access can X be related to an identifiable natural person? If you answer yes to either of those questions then X is personal data. Article 4(1): ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Scenario 1: you want to count each user agent that comes to your site, that's the only data you have, then the user agent is not personal data (it cannot be used to identify someone - unless it has a name and address etc, which seems highly unlikely - and you cannot relate it to anyone). Scenario 2: you have customer records with names, addresses etc (clearly personal data) and want to record each customer's user agent then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Scenario 3: in one dataset you record that a user agent was associated with order ID 123456 and in another dataset you record that order ID 123456 was for John Smith (plus address etc), then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Is this considered storing personal data? If X is personal data. Do I need user's consent to record X? If you want to record X and X is personal data, then you must have an Article 6 lawful basis for recording X. Consent is one of the six lawful bases. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.

Yes, since you default to no consent, ergo consent would have to be positive. It's rather unsatisfactory though as a sort of double-negative, and needs careful wording to make sure consent is informed. However, this may be a technical problem as it seems odd that you can't have an unchecked checkbox. Does the word 'checked' perhaps appear in the HTML? https://ux.mailchimp.com/patterns/forms#radio

No. This is governed by the HIPAA Security Rule which was a regulation that the HIPAA statute required the Department of Health and Human Services to adopt. The Rule does require someone covered by HIPAA to have a "Business Associate Agreement" (BAA) and a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with any cloud storage provider (which would be the usual way that a U.S. health care provider subject to HIPAA would have a foreign server), but the Rule does not require that a server be physically located in the United States. The lack of this requirement is a good one, because when you are transmitting data (which the Security Rule requires be done in a secure fashion), you can't know which servers the information will end up on in a trip from source to destination. Email and all other Internet content travels through what amounts to a pony express. It goes through a variety in intermediate server nodes which can change during the course of a session, and generally speaking, you never know which intermediate nodes are used. You could be seeing this answer via a server in China, for example, and you would never know it.

Yes, encrypted personal data potentially still is personal data, so some prior thought is necessary. But are you a controller who is processing this personal data? Possibly not. This hinges on what kind of metadata you process, and whether the encryption happens under your authority, e.g. by a software that you provision. If all you can ever get is the encrypted data but not the plaintext, then you can probably treat this similar to pseudonymous or anonymous data. A related example is a postal service. Letters might contain sensitive personal data. But the postal service is not processing the letter contents, and cannot be treated as a controller of this data. (The postal service is prevented by law from processing this data, you are prevented by the encryption). However, a postal service processes personal data like addresses on the envelope. You might want to create a Records of Processing document, which will help you understand what (potentially) personal data you will process. If you are processing patient data on behalf of a healthcare provider, you might want to look into whether you are a controller or a processor. Processor status is not automatic but requires a suitable contract with the controller. As a processor you still have to take appropriate security measures, but you are not responsible for determining the purposes of processing or for responding to data subject requests.

Home Appraisal Appeal We recently applied to have our PMI dropped, and the bank hired an appraiser to do an appraisal on our home. The comparisons they used were nothing like our home and were not in our subdivision, and the homes he did use to make their assessment were near a trailer park. We had our realtor do a market analysis for us and by his estimation, the home is worth $120,000 over what they quoted. We filed an appeal but were wondering what to do if they deny our request. Can I hire a real-estate lawyer and fight their appraised amount?

It is possible. Your basis for legal action would be the Homeowner's Protection Act, 12 USC Ch. 49, which requires removing the PMI requirement in circumstances that relate to the 80% interest threshold. The specific requirements are in §4902. One of the triggers is the "cancellation date", which relates to the initial amortization schedule, basically the day when by making regular payments the loan is reduced to 80% of the initial value (not the loan amount). This completely ignores later appraisals, though the bank can require proof that the value of the property has not declined (and that evidence is "of a type established in advance and made known to the mortgagor by the servicer promptly upon receipt of a request under paragraph (1))"). The law excludes inflationary changes in equity, where e.g. one has an initial 5% interest that swells to a 20% interest over a few years because of inflation. Refinancing is always a legal option, but maybe not the ideal financial choice depending on interest rate differences and refinancing costs. If this is about Canada, there may be different laws.

When the matter is final (no more appeals), the winner in the suit will request a writ of execution to collect whatever is owed. This may involve seizing a person's cash, car and so on. There are limits to what can be seized (some things are exempt by law), for example they can't outright seize a person's home. However, they can put a lien on it, meaning that when the house is sold, the proceeds go to the winner. There are various limits on what can be taken, for example Social Security benefits, welfare, child support – the details are largely determined by state law. There is also a process where the loser's wages can be garnished (there are federal and state limits on how much can be taken). Ultimately, it may not be possible to collect everything. However, today's lack of funds does not necessarily mean permanent lack of funds. A judgment will be valid for a long time and may be renewed. The reason for liability for damages comes down to basic justice. If you harm a person to some extent, you should compensate them accordingly for the wrong that you have done to them. The job of the jury is to determine two factual questions: (1) did the defendant wrongfully harm the plaintiff, and (2) what is the extent of harm. The ability of a defendant to pay such an amount does not affect the answer to those two questions, so inability to pay is legally irrelevant. how much harm was done

The mortgage is not relevant in the way you think it is What matters is who owns the property. The owner(s) of the property must agree with the tenant (or, more likely here, boarder) on the terms. The owner(s) need to agree between themselves how to split the income although for tax purposes it would generally be assessed in proportion to the owner’s shares. Note that the mortgage may not allow tenants or boarders or may require the permission of the mortgage.

A lien is used to prevent sale of a property until a debt is paid. This has nothing to do with priority over a mortgage. The HOA agreed to release the lien for some payment. The negotiation of that payment doesn't matter to the new buyer. Once the lien is released, then it is no longer listed with the county on the property, so the property can now be sold. The former lienholder cannot now apply a new lien to the property because the new owner is not a debtor to the former lienholder. This would be a terrible way to manage property sales, and no mortgage company would allow a mortgage for a property that could not be sold in case of foreclosure, which is likely why the mortgage holder was a private individual. It is possible for a new owner to take on existing liens, but this would be clearly spelled out in purchase documents. There should be a statement on the title search results that no liens exist.

I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith.

To put it as nicely as possible, you're not being very smart by threatening to make the house guest's predicament the worst mistake they ever made. Drawing up a notarized contract with a financial penalty is ludicrous and likely simply illegal in terms of contracting for something that is against the law. Beyond that, any threats you make to against house guest could be grounds for them to file a civil suit against you, either for eviction or physical harm, and you'll end up in court rather than simply getting the house guest to leave. An Unlawful Detainer applies if there is verbal or written lease, and as such you would have to go through the formal eviction process. But if this is a simple house guest issue, with no lease or rental agreement in the past, and they are not a family member with some legal right to be in the house, law enforcement is the way to deal with it. It's very simple: set a move out date and say you will call the police or county sheriff if they don't move out on that date. If they don't leave and you do call the police or sheriff, simply say you have a house guest who won't leave, i.e. a trespasser. Law enforcement will come out and you will explain the story; they will likely make the determination that you are the property owner and the guest is indeed not welcome. Law enforcement will tell the guest to leave or be arrested, as per Florida Law - Chapter 810. You can call the police or county sheriff ahead of the move out date and determine the appropriate laws; and get advice on what you might need to do on the actual move out day. If the house guest has property, law enforcement will stand by at that time while they retrieve their property, or make arrangements for them get it at a later date, with or without law enforcement.

I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.

Yes, you can appeal Deciding that an issue is moot is a matter of law. Issues of law are apealable. So, from your example, if the evidence showed that the tenant was still at the premises and, for whatever reason, the court misinterpreted or misunderstood that evidence, then there would clearly have been an appealable error of law in deciding that the issue was moot. However, if the evidence showed the tenant had left the premises and the court decided on that basis the case was moot they would have clearly been right and an appeal would fail.

Is it possible for a court to adjust damages awards upward beyond what is asked for? When a plaintiff (or counter-claimant) has only sought $1 in relief, do courts ever adjust that upward to reflect the true value of damages?

I don't know of any cases where a court has done this, but the law would permit it in an appropriate circumstance. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) federal courts in the united-states may grant relief beyond what the complaint demands: Final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings. The same is true in new-york under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Law § 3017: The court may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not demanded.

You are correct that you are inviting a lawsuit if you file a counter-notice. You are also correct that it might be a clerical error. Your attorney is the guy who recommends a best course of action for you. Part of the ensuing trouble would be the bill from your attorney. If the copyright holder wins in court, they could recover from you based on actual damages, statutory damages, and profits under 17 U.S.C. §504. The first is how much they lost (e.g. via sales or licensing fees) from your infringement. The second is a fixed amount ranging from $200 to $150,000, depending, provided that the work is registered. It is more likely that your case would fall in the $200 category, given a mistaken belief that you had permission as innocent infringement. The last is about whatever profits you made from the infringement that exceeds the copyright holder's losses. Incidentally, under the relevant provision, 17 USC 512(g)(2)(C), they will restore your material shortly after receiving the counter notification, unless its designated agent first receives notice from the person who submitted the notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) that such person has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider’s system or network. Notice that all that YT has to have done is received notification that a lawsuit was filed. The other party does not have to prove to the provider that they filed a lawsuit.

As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years.

As soon as possible. Liability There is no contract here so you would be relying on the tort of negligence and/or trespass. If you have suffered damage from somebody else's negligence then they are liable for your loss. Part of the problem that you face is you need to determine exactly who was potentially negligent. It probably isn't your neighbour! It is quite likely that your neighbour was using a contractor; a contractor is not an agent and so your neighbour has not been negligent, the contractor has. If you were to sue your neighbour in those circumstances you would lose. You need to take steps now to find out exactly who the person was who caused the damage - that's the person you would need to sue. To win a negligence claim, you need to prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. If the facts are as you say: They probably have a duty, They probably failed in that duty, See below, You have clearly suffered harm or damage. Types of loss or damage The treatment of loss or damage under the law depends on what type of loss it is: Direct loss includes the repair and rehabilitation of the property - this would generally be recoverable, i.e. legally it is a cause of harm. Consequential loss includes the loss of rental income during the period that the property is unavailable. Alternatively, a court may consider that the loss is the cost of you providing alternative accommodation to the tenant if this was an obligation on you; this could be more or less than the rent. It would also include relocation costs etc. This is also generally recoverable. Pure economic loss would include loss of earnings if the tenant terminated the lease and you were unable to find a replacement or were forced to lower the rent as well as any advertising or agent's costs. While it is possible to recover this, it is quite likely that this would be considered unforeseeable and therefore not a legal cause of harm. The legal reasoning is that the loss (tenant terminating the lease) is too far removed from the proximate cause (damage to the unit) to hold the defendant responsible for it. You have already indicated that the tenant is trying to use the circumstances to their advantage; this is not something that could have been foreseen. Duty to mitigate loss You have a duty to mitigate the loss caused by the negligence. This would normally include ensuring that repairs were carried out in the most time and cost-efficient way possible. The defendant is only liable for reasonable costs; not actual costs. Insurance If a third party is liable for the loss, then they are liable for the loss irrespective of if it is covered by your insurance. Your insurance company can sue in your name to recover whatever they have lost; while they can, they will only if they believe it is commercially worthwhile. You need to talk to your insurer to determine what they will cover and what they won't and if they are going to seek to recover and what they will do if you seek to recover - they may choose to take the lead and tack your stuff on the back.

You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally. In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust. The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented.

Does Bob have a case/standing? Yes, this is a reasonably straightforward contract dispute. Once you contract to do something and you then don't do it, you are liable for damages. Contractual damages are assessed on an expectation basis - the innocent party is entitled to be placed financially in the same position as though the contract had been completed without the breach. Bob is entitled to have the item and not to be out-of-pocket more than he agreed to pay. But ... There may not be a contract - see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? A contract is formed when the parties reach an agreement and most website terms and conditions are clear that this is NOT when the customer pays for it. For example, Amazon says: The Order Confirmation E-mail is acknowledgement that we have received your order, and does not confirm acceptance of your offer to buy the product(s) ordered. We only accept your offer, and conclude the contract of sale for a product ordered by you, when we dispatch the product to you and send e-mail confirmation to you that we've dispatched the product to you (the "Dispatch Confirmation E-mail"). So, here, two things have to happen before Amazon and you have a contract: they have to physically dispatch the goods and they have to send you an email saying they have. If they do one without the other, there is no contract. If your vendor has similar terms, you don't have a contract with them and are not entitled to contractual damages. You would not have a case in equity because they were clear that there was no contract until these things happened. You might be able to argue negligence if they sent the email without dispatching the goods but your damage basis would be different. Tort damage is calculated on a restoration basis, not an expectation basis, so you can recoup your losses but not claim any lost profits. It makes no difference here but if you had had a buyer who was going to pay you twice the price you paid, in contract you are entitled to the lost profit, in tort, you aren't. However, if the contract has a dispute resolution clause, that would normally have to be complied with before you can go to court. In some cases, this may prevent going to court at all, for example, if the dispute resolution clause included binding arbitration or expert determination. If there is a choice of law clause then this will usually be binding, however, if this is a consumer contract in New Zealand then NZ consumer law will apply in addition. Similarly, courts will usually observe a choice of venue clause. With what reasonable time lapse between (false) shipment notification of the original order and placing the eBay order? A reasonable time. Depends on what the product is and what normal delivery times are. For a 5mm screw, a reasonable time is probably measured in months. For an aircraft carrier it's probably measured in decades. Does this sort of a claim fall under the jurisdiction of small claims court (given that the amount is less than the threshold)? Neither New Zealand nor England & Wales (bearing in mind Scotland and Northern Ireland are different jurisdictions) have small claims courts. The correct venue in New Zealand is the Disputes Tribunal which is not a court, and in England and Wales it is the County Court. Procedurally, would it be more advantageous for Bob to file the claim in the UK or in New Zealand? Ask a lawyer in each jurisdiction. Now Bob wants to claim damages from the store in the amount "Total for the eBay order less total for the original store order" — on top of full refund of the original order. Bob is not entitled to a refund. He is entitled to damages. A more accurate way to state the damages is the total for the eBay order and to not make any mention of a refund.

No An LLC that didn’t exist at the time of the act or omission that caused the loss being sued over is not a valid defendant. They would sue you personally and all of your assets, including the LLC, would be available to the creditor.

If a person is wrongfully deprived of money (or something else of value) for a period, that is damage, even if the money is later repaid. The victim might have used the money in some profitable or advantageous way during the period when it was taken. But the victim need not prove exactly how s/he might have profited, it is enough to show that the victim was wrongfully deprived of something of value. Of course, there are other elements to fraud. There must have been a lie or deception, on which the victim reasonably relied. There must have been intent that the victim so relay. The deception must have been material and must have directly caused or led to the damage. (Or have gotten the Fraudster a benefit that would not have been provided had the victim known the truth.) But assuming that all the elements of fraud are proved, restitution, even full restitution with interest, does not excuse the fraud. However, as a practical matter, if offered full restitution on condition of a release or an agreement not to prosecute, many victims will choose to take it, preferring their money back, perhaps with interest, to a legal case, even a winning one.

USA Private School Law. Could disrespect of State regulation be constructed as a breach of an enrollment contract? I am trying to understand the main, basic tenets of USA public vs. private school law. (See my previous question of a series). In the case of a private school, I understand that the relationship between a student (/family) and a private school is framed by an enrollment contract. I have been explained that quite often private schools are regulated (and regulations vary extremely widely in the USA). I did check the Pennsylvania case, and I see a number of regulations about teacher certification, curriculum, length of school year and days, and so on. My question is, could those regulations be somehow constructed as clauses of the contract between the family and the school? To say in a different way, if a school does not respect a regulation toward a student, could that be constructed as a breach of the contract?

If it is not actually in the contract, it cannot be considered to be a breach of contract. There are two kind of private schools: approved, and non-approved. An approved private school is subject, in Washington State, to Chapter RCW 28a.195. The state board of education can take action against an approved private school which does not conform to the applicable regulations. This does not create a private cause of action, so you cannot sue the school for violating the regulation, instead you complain to the BoE, who may take action, and if the issue is not corrected, the approval may be withdrawn. The advantage of being an approved school is that this satisfies the compulsory education statute, unlike your local Sunday school, nursery school, or any other kind of things calling itself a school. This does not preclude the possibility that a contract with a private school will include some clause to the effect that the school promises to comply with BoE regulations. This page provides a collection of possibly real enrollment contracts – my cursory reading did not locate any promise to adhere to state regulations There is a separate question herein, that it may be deceptive advertising to imply that you are an approved school when you are not approved.

The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.

You cannot be compelled to sign a form indicating that you agree to something. However, your lack of agreement does not override a policy that they have authority to set. There is a contractual way that this could work out for them, depending on what exactly the document is. To be a contract, the parties must agree to the terms voluntarily, and if you do not agree to the terms, there is no contract. A 10 year old child cannot be bound to a contract, anyhow, so the child's consent is legally irrelevant, though strategically a good idea in the sense of alerting the child to their obligation. To be a contract, both sides must offer something that they are not already obligated to provide. What is the school offering? On the school's side, they might claim "We offer an education", but as a public school, they already have that obligation. Schools have broad authority to impose rules in order to operate, so in lieu of a successful lawsuit that the district overstepped their authority and violated someone's constitutional rights, the school could have a policy prohibiting use of a cell phone in school. Paired with such a policy, they can grant conditional permission, subject to the parent (and symbolically, the child) agreeing to certain terms. Since they are not obligated to allow cell phones at all, they are offering something of value to you, and you have a contract. The cell phone owner could try suing the school for keeping the phone, but the suit would fail because there was a breach of the contract. A strategy probably not worth pursuing is arguing that the confiscation clause is unconscionable (which would void the contract, which entitles the child to have a cell phone at school). Confiscating the phone is not theft, since the intent is not to permanently deprive the owner of their property (just as it is not theft when you have to leave guns or recording devices at the security desk). If a student were to take a forbidden thing without the owner's authorization (such as a gun, or a phone) and it was then confiscated, the rightful owner might be able to sue the school – as long as their hands are clear (if they had no knowledge that the thing was taken and used in an unauthorized manner). In this case, the parent clearly knows and authorizes.

One of the relevant cases is Tinker vs. Des Moines. In it, students wore black armbands in protest, and were suspended from school unless they agreed to remove the armbands. Because their protest was non-disruptive, the school's position was found to be a violation of their civil rights. Generally, the school cannot interfere with students' rights to free speech and civil liberties. That does not mean that students are free from discipline however. If students walk out, whether in protest of a great injustice, or just to get lunch, or go to a concert, the school can discipline the student for walking out. What the school cannot do, however, is treat the reason for the walkout differently. They cannot give minor detention for one reason (say, a rock concert), and a full suspension for politically motivated walk-out. If they are dispensing harsher punishments based on the reason for the walkout, that is crossing a big line. More detailed discussion can be found at http://time.com/5171160/gun-control-student-protest-history/

Parents Can't Legally do That To count as "homeschooling in the state of washington it must consist of a parent (or parents) instructing his or her own children. If another parent, much less a hired teacher, is doing the teaching this is a private school and must be licensed and approved. Thew Washington laws are summarized in the page "Home Based Instruction" from the Washington State office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. This Says: RCW 28A.200.011 states that each person whose child is receiving home-based instruction under RCW 28A.225.010 (4) must file annually a signed declaration of intent that he or she is planning to cause his or her child to receive home-based instruction. current school year. This data is used to maintain student enrollment statistics and project enrollment statistics and trends. This page also links to The Pink Book: Washington State Laws Regulating Home-Based Instruction (PDF) This provides some greater explanation and frequently asked questions around home-based instruction. The Pink Book says: compliance with the law? RCW 28A.225.010 requires all parents of any child 8 years of age and under 18 years of age in this state to cause such children to attend the public school of the district in which the child resides for the full time when the school is in session, unless: The child is attending an approved private school or is enrolled in an extension program of an approved private school. The child is receiving home-based instruction. The child is attending an education center. The school district superintendent has excused the child from attendance ... RCW 28A.225.010(4) defines instruction as home-based if it consists of planned and supervised instructional and related educational activities, including curriculum and instruction in the basic skills of occupational education, science, mathematics, language, social studies, history, health, reading, writing, spelling, and the development of an appreciation of art and music provided for a number of hours per grade level established for approved private schools (see question 3 below) and if such activities are provided by a qualified parent. RCW 28A.225.010(4) requires that the instructional and educational activities be: a. Provided by a parent who is instructing his or her child only and is supervised by a person certificated under Chapter 28A.410 RCW. The supervision consists of and includes planning of objectives by the certificated person and the parent, a minimum each month of an average of one contact hour per week with the child being supervised by the certificated person, and evaluation of such child’s progress by the certificated person. The number of children supervised by the certificated person shall not exceed 30. b. Provided by a parent who is instructing his or her child only and who has either earned 45 college-level credit hours or the equivalent in semester hours or has completed a course in home-based instruction at postsecondary institution or a vocational-technical institute. c. Provided by a parent who is deemed sufficiently qualified to provide home-based instruction by the superintendent of the local school district in which the child resides. The actual laws, linked above, confirm that home-based instruction can only be provided by an actual parent to his or her own child. Instructing a child of some other parent, much less hiring a teacher, moves this out of the category of home-based instruction, and into that of a private school. And to be valid for school attendance, a private school must be approved and licensed, and offer a minimum of 180 days per school year, or 1000 hours of instruction, with an approved curriculum, and certified teachers, and various other requirements.

I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.

Such "warranties" are generally subject to separate laws, and they are not treated as a subcase of "car insurance". Whereas homeowners insurance, vehicle liability insurance and so on are regulated in all states, extended warranties are regulated in over half of the states. There is a model law which tends to inspire state legislators in writing their own laws, and here is an instantiation in Washington state. At the outset, the law says that certain things are not covered, including warranties, maintenance agreements and service contracts (what then is covered??). There may be "required content", for example Service contracts shall state the procedure to obtain service or to file a claim, including but not limited to the procedures for obtaining prior approval for repair work, the toll-free telephone number if prior approval is necessary for service, and the procedure for obtaining emergency repairs performed outside of normal business hours or provide for twenty-four-hour telephone assistance. There are sections specific to motor vehicles, which could be relevant, for example "A service contract provider shall not deny a claim for coverage based upon the service contract holder's failure to properly maintain the vehicle, unless the failure to maintain the vehicle involved the failed part or parts". At the bottom of the Model Act document is a list of statuses in the various states: it's status in Connecticut is nonexistence, as of July 2014 (and no signs of such a law having been subsequently passed). There is a general law about express warranties, which doesn't impose any content restrictions on such contracts. So in CT, it depends on what the contract says.

The main source of liability would be "for injuries caused by the act 'of things that he has under his guard'" (this article). As stated in Art. 1383. of the 1804 Civil Code, "Everyone is liable for the injury he has caused not only by his act, but also by his negligence or imprudence". Then the question is whether the teacher was negligent in allowing a poisoning to happen. It is much more difficult to judge French standards, since court rulings do not generally create legal principles. To take two extremes, suppose on the one hand that a teacher were to store a bottle of sulfuric acid on the table where anyone could take it. Knowing that some rapscallion might take the bottle and prank someone with it, the teacher might have neglected her duty as a teacher to safeguard students. However, if it is safely locked up and yet someone manages to get into the locker (e.g. they have a safe-cracking device that nobody expects a student to have access to), then she probably would not be liable. The difference comes from whether there is fault in the teacher's choices of action, that is, is that choice something that a reasonable person would know is wrong. It's not clear from the description how Bob got the substance: finding a means of preventing students from accessing dangerous materials should be the main goal, and probably does not require stopping experimentation. But facts about the school might imply that the risk is not practically controllable (e.g. no locks on the chemical cabinet).

What is it called when a suspect is questioned without their lawyer? To elaborate, I know it is illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present. Is this a crime or just illegal? If it is a crime, what is it called?

united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly.

It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.

D should be subpoenaing anything and everything they need from anyone and everyone, including E. No matter how good terms you are on, if you are involved in a lawsuit you should not be relying on anyone's good faith to supply you what you need. Suppose you ask nicely and they say yes but, for whatever reason, they don't supply them by your court date. Without a subpoena, if you ask for a continuance the judge will say "tough t*^%^$s"; with a subpoena they will say " Yes certainly, oh, and Mr Sheriff, here is a warrant for the documents, go and get them for me please. Oh and a warrant for the arrest of the person who ignored my subpoena." Where do you want to be?

We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.

You don't really need any reasonable doubts about the currently available evidence to get it started. If an investigating authority thinks a crime has been committed and not yet been adjudicated, it is free to investigate, even if others disagree. There are plenty of avenues for starting an investigation: Congress can exercise its oversight power to initiate an investigation. State legislatures can do the same, so you could petition the New York Legislature, the Virginia General Assembly, or the Pennsylvania General Assembly. At both the state and federal level, attorneys general have the authority to initiate an investigation of crimes committed within their jurisdictions. At both the state and federal level, a judge's authority to appoint a special prosecutor is a power considered to be inherent in the courts, so nearly any court could appoint someone to pursue the investigation. Of course, the prosecutor's authority could be jurisdictionally limited -- if a New York state judge appointed a prosecutor, he wouldn't really have much authority to investigate federal crimes, and if a small-claims court judge in Idaho appointed a prosecutor, he'd be limited by both his lack of authority to investigate events outside his jurisdiction and the practical difficulties of enforcing a subpoena from out of state. Even at the local level, law enforcement and legislative bodies have the authority to launch investigations. If NYPD or the Somerset County Sheriff or the Arlington County Board want to investigate, they could do so. I don't know what the relevant rules are in each jurisdiction, but some states allow lawsuits for civil damages based on criminal activity. So if the gist of the sponsor's complaint is that someone used "explosives and/or incendiaries" to kill his son, it may be that he could bring a lawsuit over that, which would in turn open up the the tools of civil discovery. Of course, that's only if the claim isn't time-barred; now that we're nearly 17 years out, I'd guess that it would be too late. And there's always the possibility of continuing an independent investigation. Using the same tools that the press uses -- interviews, freedom-of-information laws, etc. -- any member of the public is free to make an inquiry into any matter of public concern. Obviously, I'd expect any of these authorities to be reluctant to take up the cause due to the investigatory consensus against the inside-job/cover-up theory, and I'd also expect -- for the same reason -- that any authority that tried to take it up would run into serious roadblocks from all the other authorities that have declined.

"I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true.

This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.

It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.

How far does the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extend? Suppose that an individual has been arrested, multiple times, for possession of controlled substances (i.e. illegal drugs), but has managed to get the charges dropped or dismissed by a court after a hearing each time because the searches leading to the arrest were blatantly unlawful under the 4th Amendment prohibition against unlawful search and seizure. These bad searches are the only evidence available that the person is a drug user/dealer. There is no informant evidence available. Generally, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine forbids using evidence only obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure to convict someone. But, where does the chain of causation end? Can the past arrests serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop a person? As probable cause for a future search warrant or arrest warrant or wiretap? As basis for active surveillance without a stop or arrest or search warrant? As a basis for inclusion of the person on an informal watch list? What if law enforcement set up a string operation targeted at this individual? Could the suppressed evidence be used to counter an entrapment defense (which requires a showing that the defendant didn't have a propensity to commit the crime)? Could the suppressed evidence be used to impeach testimony in a criminal case that the defendant had never used drugs before? Are there any cases that serve as good examples of these limits? (FWIW, this question was inspired by an incident in the TV show "The Santa Clarita Diet", in which a cop enters a house without a warrant or permission to enter and discovers a protagonist smoking pot in California without a medical marijuana exception, but is not limited to those circumstances.)

You have raised two broad questions. The question about reasonable suspicion asks: when is evidence illegally obtained? That's difficult to answer, because it depends on the nature of the evidence and any statute which controlled the way in which it should have been collected. However, the focus of your question seems to be the second issue: what use can the government make of illegally obtained evidence? This is the subject of the exclusionary rule. The short answer is this: The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy created for the purpose of deterring future unlawful conduct. The rule prohibits both direct and indirect use of illegally obtained evidence ("fruit of the poisonous tree") in a criminal prosecution, but will only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. To give more insight into how the courts have applied this balancing test, I will summarise its history and rationale. I will then set out the modern formulation of the rule, and try to answer some of your specific hypothetical questions. History and rationale of the exclusionary rule The exclusionary rule originated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The government searched Weeks' house without a warrant, seized letters and other property, and charged him with operating an illegal lottery. Weeks applied for the return of the property, but the district court held that "the letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but if competent would keep them and permit their use in evidence." Weeks was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution ... The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the doctrine was extended to prevent indirect use of information derived from illegally obtained evidence, unless the information comes from an independent source. The government illegally searched Silverthorne's offices, and copied the records seized before the district court ordered their return. The district court also impounded the copies, so the government issued a regular subpoena to produce the original documents. The district court held Silverthorne in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. The Court acknowledged the 'complexities' of this distinction in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This case introduced the term 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' and an exception to the doctrine where the connection between the illegality and the evidence presented is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' Nardone had been convicted of defrauding the revenue twice. The first conviction was based on evidence obtained from an illegal wiretap, and was reversed by the Supreme Court. Nardone was convicted again after a retrial, and argued that the conviction should be set aside because he was not permitted to "examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the [illegally obtained] information." Frankfurter J, delivering the opinion of the Court, quoted the above passage from Silverthorne and said: In practice this generalized statement may conceal concrete complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint ... The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established—as was plainly done here—the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin. Development of modern limits to the exclusionary rule The Court clarified the purpose of the doctrine in United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), declining to extend it to grand jury proceedings. The Court held that Calandra was required to answer questions put to him by a grand jury, even though the questions had been informed by the fruits of an illegal search. The Court said: The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim ... Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures ... In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons ... the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The Supreme Court endorsed a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Drugs were found in a search of Leon's house and car pursuant to a facially valid search warrant, but on review the district court found that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. Therefore, the search was illegal although the officers executing it had acted in good faith. After reviewing the cases in which the Court had declined to apply the rule, the Court held that the evidence against Leon should not have been excluded: The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern ... We have now reexamined the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances. In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. In Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998), the Court cited Leon and explicitly endorsed the use of a balancing test in declining to extend the rule to State parole proceedings: [B]ecause the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs" ... A federal requirement that parole boards apply the exclusionary rule ... would severely disrupt the traditionally informal, administrative process of parole revocation. The marginal deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is insufficient to justify such an intrusion. We therefore hold that parole boards are not required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court endorsed an even more circumspect approach to the rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The police executed a valid search warrant and found guns and drugs in Hudson's house, but the search was unlawful because the police did not knock and announce before entering. The Court declined to exclude the evidence obtained in the search, holding that: Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs", which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been "cautio[us] against expanding" it, and "have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application." We have rejected "[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,"—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'" (citations omitted) Current state of the law As of June 2017, the last word on the rule is the Supreme Court's decision in Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016). Again, the Court reversed a State court's decision to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal trial. The Court identified three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: First, the independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source. Second, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source. Third, and at issue here, is the attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that "the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained." (citations omitted) Strieff was illegally stopped and asked for ID after leaving a house under surveillance by narcotics police. After discovering an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation, the police lawfully arrested and searched Strieff and found him in possession of methamphetamine. The Court found that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the attenuation doctrine: The three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), guide our analysis. First, we look to the "temporal proximity" between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider "the presence of intervening circumstances." Third, and "particularly" significant, we examine "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." (citations omitted) [W]e hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff's person was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was close in time to Strieff's arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors supporting the State. The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff's arrest is a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected flagrantly unlawful police misconduct. Specific scenarios Can the past arrests serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop a person? As a basis for inclusion of the person on an informal watch list? As mentioned in the introduction, this question is not really about "fruit of the poisonous tree." It is an anterior question about whether or not a police stop was unlawful. The court asks: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Officers are permitted to consider criminal history, as the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (1997): A prior criminal record "is not, alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion." Nevertheless, an officer can couple knowledge of prior criminal involvement with more concrete factors in reaching a reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. (citations omitted) As probable cause for a future search warrant or arrest warrant or wiretap? As basis for active surveillance without a stop or arrest or search warrant? What if law enforcement set up a sting operation targeted at this individual? As with reasonable suspicion, evidence of the suspect's reputation and criminal history can be taken into account in establishing probable cause for an arrest or search warrant. However, a history of past arrests would probably not suffice in itself to "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed": Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Could the suppressed evidence be used to counter an entrapment defense (which requires a showing that the defendant didn't have a propensity to commit the crime)? Could the suppressed evidence be used to impeach testimony in a criminal case that the defendant had never used drugs before? If the evidence is suppressed then by definition it cannot be used adversely to the defendant. However, if the evidence is shown to have been obtained illegally, it will only be excluded where the deterrence benefits of exclusion outweigh its substantial social costs: Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott. The evidence is more likely to be admitted if it falls into one of the three exceptions set out in Utah v. Strieff: independent source, inevitable discovery or attenuation. In considering attenuation, the court will pay particular attention to 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' Clearly, it is impossible to say, in general, whether unlawfully obtained evidence could be admitted to counter an entrapment defence or attack the defendant's character and credibility. Not only will the application of the exclusionary rule depend on a wide range of considerations, other rules of evidence may need to be applied (such as the rules against character evidence and extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter). Nevertheless, the cases cited above should give some insight into how the court will approach the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

Prior to Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), common law allowed police to use deadly force to effect the arrest of a person suspected of a felony. Even though SCOTUS there held that such a practice violates Fourth Amendment civil rights, I was surprised to find that in some states it is still lawful for police to use deadly force to effect an arrest! Let us examine the most extreme case, which is that the police can legally shoot at you to effect your arrest. As explained here, you are always allowed to resist "excessive force." If you make it to court, these qualifications (e.g., "necessary" and "excessive") are ultimately decided based on what a "reasonable person" would have believed in the situation. So if a cop shoots at you, and you "dodge" the bullet, it is possible for you both to be found not guilty of any crime. I.e., the cop can be found to have acted "reasonably" because he believed you were a violent felon and shooting you was the only way to stop you. And you can be found to have acted "reasonably" because you believed you were being subject to excessive force. While this is an interesting hypothetical, in practice of course by the time a cop is shooting at you you are almost certainly going to be charged with resisting arrest. Or, if the cop fired in self-defense (rather than to effect an arrest) you will be charged with a number of far more serious crimes (starting with felony assault, reckless endangerment, and going on from there...).

We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.

The central legal question would be whether the minor has the capacity and authority to consent to a search: in the context of search law, the police would have to have a reasonable belief that both are the case. It is not reasonable to believe that an 8 year old can consent to a police search, that is, a child will most likely acquiesce to a request from the authorities to conduct a search. It is as reasonable to believe that a 16 year old can give actual consent as it is to believe that an 18 year old can consent. The law leaves the matter open for those under 18, to be determined by circumstances. The other consideration, applicable to younger children, is whether the child is authorized to open the house to outsiders. So in People v. Hoxter, 75 Cal. App. 4th 406, a 16 year old child invited police in, whereupon polices obtained plain sight evidence of drug offenses by the child's father. The court found that "sufficient discretion certainly exists" by that age. There are similar results in Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952 involving a 15 year old. In contrast, in Davis v. State, 422 S.E.2d 546, a 10 year old child who was home alone called the police to report drugs in the house. The search was invalidated because although the child's mother had given him permission to call for emergency assistance if he needed help, the child had no right, absent an emergency, to invite anyone into the house while he was alone there, much less into his parents' bedroom See also People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757 involving an 11 year old, for extensive discussion of the question of "joint control" and authority to permit a search, citing US v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 there must be some objective evidence of joint control or access to the places or items to be searched which would indicate that the person authorizing the search has the authority to do so. The mutual use of the property must be such "that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched This article has a number of citations of relevant cases, which suggests a line for police searches somewhere around 13-14 years old. But also see Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 for a permitted case of consent given by a 9 year old to a guardian ad litem: the court found a 4th Amendment issue and and concluded that the search was reasonable, holding that minors can give third party consent. Fourth Amendment rights, unlike rights attendant to due process, do not guarantee a fair and impartial determination of truth; rather, they protect the interest of the citizen "to be let alone". Thus, the subject of a Fourth Amendment-violative search need not be aware of her right to refuse to give knowing and voluntary consent. However, the circumstances surrounding the consent must demonstrate that it was voluntarily given, free of duress or coercion.

A sufficient explanation would be that the ticketed driver was caught and the unticketed driver was not because the officer was already responding to a situation. Had the officer caught the unticketed driver, he would have ticketed him for the same offense. Courts would accept that it would be impossible for the officer to deal with both offenses at the same time. Selective enforcement is done properly when the prosecutor evaluates the risk verses reward of perusing a criminal prosecution against an individual based on the evidence, the nature of the crime, and the likely-hood of a conviction if it goes to trial. For example, while using illict substances is a crime, the government will usually only prosecute on that charge if they find your use while in possession with intent to sell (or in connection to another crime). In this instant, the high school stoner is not going to be as instrumental in the case as the dealer, who can lead to suppliers if he cooperates OR is removed from distributing in his territory if he does not. If the stoner is picked up on a minor offense and carrying a small amount on his person, the police might arrest him for the crime but agree to not press charges if he gives them information to who the dealer who sold him the substance is. Again, the risk here is putting a small time criminal into jail at cost of society, when society would benefit more if that cell was housing the bigger fish (a criminal record can prevent getting certain jobs, which will more likely turn stoner high schooler into jobless loser, which would be a drain on public welfare in and of itself, and that's not including the possibility that joining in drug trafficking as a seller would fix his lack of income). Conversely, in cases such as espionage, the death penalty is on the books but is rarely pursued in favor of lesser sentences. Here, the pay off is that they dangle the death penalty over the spies head unless he tells them about all his spying activities, which benefits the spy agency in filling in security gaps and potentially finding more spies. The use of lighter charges in exchange for a guilty plea is also favored as trials are costly. If a criminal pleads guilty to a crime that the government has them dead to rights for, the prosecution will reward them with lighter offenses for saving their office the price tag of a full blown trial. All this is on condition that selective enforcement is not used as a basis of discrimination, which is illegal for the prosecutors to do.

There isn't a general answer to this question. It needs to be evaluated incident and sub-incident act by sub-incident act. The use of force is legally permitted to prevent harm to others and to the property of others under some circumstances. Citizens arrests are permitted under some circumstances, but generally, the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the crime while it is in the process of being committed. Some laws prohibit wearing masks under some circumstances, but usually not in all circumstances. Your client's "business model" is not consistent with being able to testify in court, so the criminal justice system will only be able to convict someone whom your client delivers to police if they can do so without your testimony. As a general rule, the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence collected by private parties or to statements obtained by private parties that are not made under duress that are not Mirandized. But, if your client is effectively "deputized" or becomes a "de facto" agent of the state who is called up to be a member of a posse for the police, for example, by using an agreed symbol such as shining a light with a symbol on it on some clouds, at that point, with respect to that matter, the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda probably do apply to evidence that your client obtains, and exclusion of that kind of evidence could make prosecution much more difficult, unless the prosecution can successfully make an argument that the other evidence that the illegally obtained evidence leads them to is not "fruit of the poisonous tree" because it would have inevitably been discovered in due course using only the legally obtained evidence. Even if your client does violate the law, law enforcement is not obligated to investigate his alleged crimes even if the victims complain, and prosecutors are not obligated to prosecute those crimes, even if they have overwhelming evidence of guilt which they could use to secure a conviction. Prosecutorial discretion is basically absolute. Your client might be sued civilly for operating a corrupt enterprise under RICO, for various intentional torts, and for negligence, by people who think that they have been harmed by his conduct, but someone can only sue your client if they can figure out who he is and serve him with civil process. If you are helping your client conduct on ongoing criminal enterprise, whether or not the crimes are prosecuted by the criminal justice system, the attorney-client privilege you have with your client is probably forfeit should you be placed under a subpoena and your may be violating other ethical rules. But, of course, somebody has to figure out that you are part of this criminal enterprise before you suffer any consequences for being involved.

In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984).

We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law.

What remedies can a witness use to satisfy the "all the truth" portion of their oath? Hypothetical: A witness took an oath to tell the whole truth. The adversarial cross-examiner abruptly cuts off the witness's testimony in the middle of a statement, leaving the train of thought incomplete and possibly leading to a misunderstanding by the jury. The witness wishes to finish that statement and more. Their objective is to fulfill the "whole truth" portion of their oath. What can the witness do during trial to fix this situation? Can they appeal to the jury? Raise an objection? Or is the witness at the mercy of the (either side's) lawyers' whims? Does the witness have a right to finish their statement even though the cross-examiner has cut them off?

"The whole truth" is part of a formulaic phrase which has been operationalized to mean merely "don't commit perjury." A witness simply answers the questions asked and is not permitted to go further. The witness is at the mercy of the lawyer's whims. The witness does not have a right to testify beyond the scope of the question asked. It is improper for a lawyer to cut off a witness when in the middle of providing an answer to the question asked, but those points are for the other side's lawyer and the judge to raise, not the witness. If the answer of a witness to the question asked on cross-examination leaves a false impression, it is up to the other side's lawyer to correct that by asking additional redirect examination questions of the witness in our adversary system. Asking questions that when answered truthfully leave a false impression because the answer presents an incomplete version of the whole story is standard practice in lawyering. This tactic is less effective, however, in jurisdictions like Colorado where judges and juries can also ask their own questions of witnesses once the lawyers are finished asking their questions.

This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling.

Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected.

Section 9 CJA statements are for criminal proceedings, and there is no cross-pollination. For family law, see Rule 22.4, Family Procedure Rules 2010: 22.4.—(1) A witness statement is a written statement signed by a person which contains the evidence which that person would be allowed to give orally. (2) A witness statement must comply with the requirements set out in the Practice Direction 22A. (Part 17 requires a witness statement to be verified by a statement of truth.) Practice Direction 22A is quite long and difficult for me to reproduce in full here, but of particular note is Paragraph 4.1: Subject to paragraph 4.2 and rules 14.2 and 29.1, the affidavit/statement must, if practicable, be in the maker's own words, it should be expressed in the first person, and the maker should – (a) commence – (i) in an affidavit, ‘I (full name) of (residential address) state on oath .. ’; (ii) in a statement, by giving his or her full name and residential address; (b) if giving evidence in a professional, business or other occupational capacity, give the address at which he or she works in (a) above, the position held and the name of the firm or employer; (c) give his or her occupation or (if none) description; and (d) if it be the case that the maker is a party to the proceedings or is employed by a party to the proceedings, state that fact.

NY Est Pow & Trusts L § 3-2.1(a)(1)(C)(4) requires that There shall be at least two attesting witnesses, who shall, within one thirty day period, both attest the testator's signature, as affixed or acknowledged in their presence, and at the request of the testator, sign their names and affix their residence addresses at the end of the will. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the thirty day requirement of the preceding sentence has been fulfilled. The failure of a witness to affix his address shall not affect the validity of the will. That means that the witnesses attest to having seen you sign the will, and you must know that it is a will being signed. There is no requirement that they see the will itself, and they do not "attest" anything regarding sound mind, memory or testamentary capacity. It is not required that witnesses receive a copy of the will (for any reason), and it is probably extremely rare for them to do so. However, a witness could be called, during a subsequent court procedure, to testify as to relevant facts such as that a beneficiary held a gun to the testator's head.

Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.

As the answer by Iñaki Viggers says, you should submit an affidavit, not simply a letter to the court. An unsworn letter will probably not be admissible at all. It is common for a witness to tell his or her story to the lawyer for the side that wishes to use the affidavit, and for the lawyer to then draft the actual affidavit in such a way that it will be acceptable to the court where it will be used. Then the lawyer sends it to the affiant (the person who would be a witness if s/he came to court, who is making the affidavit) with instructions. Generally an affidavit must be notarized or otherwise sworn to in front of an appropriate official. However, a person can draft his or her own affidavit. It is usual for it to be headed with the name and case number of the case where it will be used. It should include a statement that everything in it is true, and that the affiant swears (or affirms) this under penalty of perjury. It should include only relevant facts that the affiant has personally witnessed, not anything heard from anyone else, or guessed at or deduced. The facts should be stated clearly and simply. The affidavit should be signed in the presence of a notary, who will witness the signature and the oath that the contents are true. This WikiHow page describes the process in detail, with a template form.

It is not as simple as the witness just making the assertion that they are the killer. They will be subject to grueling cross examination to break their story. If the victim was killed at a specific time, perhaps the prosecution can prove the witness was somewhere else at that time, and therefore lying. (No Opportunity) If the victim was killed with a specific weapon, perhaps the prosecution can prove that only the accused had the weapon, and the witness had no access to it, and therefore lying. (No Means) If the victim was killed in a specific way, perhaps the witness doesn't know any of the details of how the crime happened, and therefore is not credible. (No Knowledge) If the accused's DNA is found at the scene, and their shirt is covered in blood, and the witness has no corroborating evidence against them, then the witness is likely lying. (No Evidence) If the witness claims he is the murderer, the prosecution can inquire as to why he killed the victim. The real murderer had a reason: Perhaps money, power, hatred, passion, etc, that the witness may not be able to provide. (No Motive) Planting doubt in the mind of a jury is an effective defense. But lying about who did what, when, how, and why it is not as easy as you suggest.

How "risky" it is if I lose my passport? Will police investigate how I lost it? I have some stamps on my passport that are not really good, and I don't want any of my family members to see it. Now, if I lose my passport somehow, and apply for a new passport, would I get a clean passport, without any travel history on it? Would police investigate if passport is actually lost, or is it carelessness or other reason for its loss? Any other thing I should worry about if I take this route?

Losing your passport is fine, happens all the time But that’s not what you are talking about, is it? You’re intending to deliberately destroy it. While destroying a passport is not a specific offence under the Act or the Rules, your proposed course of action is still illegal. The passport doesn’t belong to you. It belongs to India and deliberately destroying other people’s stuff is illegal. To get a new passport you would necessarily be lying and giving false information on a passport application is an offence. Of course, one wonders why your family are looking at your passport; just don’t show it to them.

The precise details (and citations) will vary with jurisdiction, so this answer deals only with principles. If you pick up and "take possession of" property belonging to somebody else, you are a thief. [Note that 'taking possession' rather than picking up to restore to the owner/correct place is what makes the difference, which is why in real life nobody who cannot prove your intention will take action; but your question explicitly concedes the point.] If the property does not belong to the supermarket, you are not stealing from them, but from the currently unidentified owner: this makes no legal difference. You might conceivably have a defence if you can prove that the owner has abandoned the property, whatever the definition of "abandoned" is in your jurisdiction (note that it is up to you to show this, and possibly that you knew it before you picked up the property). If it belongs to the supermarket, this cannot be true; if a box of matches has fallen out of someone's pocket, it might possibly be (whatever the laws are, it is very unlikely that they have ever been applied in such a trivial case, so there may be some uncertainty). in any case, the shop is undoubtedly allowed to throw you out, ban you from returning to their premises, and inform other shops and the police that they believe you to be a petty thief, based on their experience.

You don’t have to give your name or DOB unless and until the officer has described the offence they suspect you may have committed However, once this has been done, you must provide your name, your DOB, your address, and what you are up to if asked. See this handy summary from the Mayor of London. If you are arrested, you will be advised that you do not have to talk to the police but that failure to do so will count against you in court.

Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."

What are the reasons/ legal requirements that the police might need my personal information, given that I had not been able to provide any further information/ witness testimony to the incident that they were investigating? The police in england-and-wales have a duty to undertake reasonable lines of enquiry and to carry out a proportionate investigation in to allegations of crime. No-one is legally obliged to answer house to house questions but, notwithstanding the honesty and integrity of the majority of members of the public, any information held by the police may need to be corroborated to identify or eliminate suspects, witnesses, evidential opportunities or other lines of enquiry. Also, if it is established that someone has no information that may assist the investigation this is recorded to prevent duplication of effort thus enabling the police to focus their resources accordingly. All the while complying with the relevant privacy and data retention legislation.

This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."

A charge of Theft by Finding is unlikely to succeed, as by posting details of found property on the website Heathrow Airport have made a good faith attempt to find the owner. There might be some comedy value in suggesting Blackmail, but not much more than that. (You knew that one was tenuous.) There appear to be some grounds for arguing the "control" aspect of Criminal Conversion, and if you were to do that they may release your lost baggage to you in person or to your appointed agent. The problem is what would happen next. Heathrow Airport would have grounds for arguing that they had made a good faith attempt to return your baggage, that you had used their system to determine they had your baggage, but that you had chosen to avoid a nominal charge (less than £20, according to the website) to use that system. This would give them grounds to seek to recover the actual cost of storing, locating the owner, and handing the baggage over to them (likely to be more than £20), plus legal fees for recovery of cost (likely to be a lot more than £20). Their argument would be that they had incurred costs in attempting to return your baggage to you, and that it was your responsibility that you had refused an amount that is likely to be considered a reasonable fee for this activity. Short answer : It looks like there's nothing preventing you from pointing out a potential conflict, and it's a nice question for academic debate. But I wouldn't do it. Edit : If you've used the link to missingx.com from the heathrow.com website, you could also have been deemed to have accepted the charge ("if you want to reclaim your item") at point 4.

To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.

Is there a minimum speed limit on US hwy 60 in OK? Are bicycles legal on US hwy 60 in OK? I had this experience about 4 years ago (which actually culminated a series of many similar experiences) where I was cycling my way back home (Missouri) from a bicycle trip to Cancun MX. In Washington county of Oklahoma, just east of Bartlesville on US hwy 60, while observing (and respecting) all applicable laws, hwy patrol officer stops me because I am "obstructing the traffic". He then asks for my ID. I respectfully asked "did I break any law?" Officer: "in Oklahoma bicycles have the same rights as the cars and also same responsabilities. That means you need to have the same speed as the cars" Thinking that he was just mocking the law, I refused to hand him the ID. He could not articulate any reasonable suspicion. He then took me to jail for obstructing an investigation (where the cops stole/took some of my most treasued memories from my bag because they found some Tylenol and Ibuprofen in the same jar) and the next day I posted bail (about $300 in full, cash) I was notified that I had to come back to Oklahoma for a court appearance. Seing that things get more complicated I decided to just pay them to get them off my back, go home and never return to that state. They would not accept my payment as it had been decided I had to come back. I came back, full of hope that the judge would listen and dismiss the case as it was based on a lie. Instead, he said that if I wanted to plead not guilty, I'd have to come back for a new court date to argue my case. At this point I found myself back at square one, so I decided I'd pay them and get it over with (with a "no contest plea") as the trips back and forth to OK would have cost me more that the ticket. Later in the hallway I told the judge the cop's reasoning and his reply was: "He may have been wrong on the bicycle law, but you still should have handed him your ID" Needless to say, I have not taken my bike on any trips ever since. Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. My questions are: 1 - Is making up a law on the spot an acceptable alternative to the requirement that the cops have to have a reasonable suspicion in order to detain a civilian? Remember, "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere" 2 - Was the cop right? Does anyone know of a "minimum speed limit" on US hwy 60 ? (there were no signs about minimum speed limit or any signs regulating bicycle trafic on that road) 3 - Was the judge right to make me come back to OK (under threat of arrest warrant) just to tell me that he can not dismiss the case (in case I was to plead not guilty) ? This is a screenshot of US hwy 60 (Limestone). It is clearly not a "controlled access highway"

Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law.

I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.

You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.

Until it runs out of gas. With the caveat that I can't prove a negative: No, there is no such statute or case law restricting how long a police or law enforcement vehicle can follow someone on a road. However, law enforcement officers can be subject to investigation and sanction under "stalking" or "harassment" laws, which typically require a pattern of documented misbehavior in the absence of good cause for said behavior.

California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.

Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No

I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.

The standard for stopping someone and requesting their ID under the limitations in the U.S. Constitution is "reasonable suspicion." For example, if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that you are taking pictures for the purpose of a secure location for purposes of espionage, or to case the location for a future crime, reasonable suspicion is probably present and you can probably legitimately be asked for you ID. A creative and intelligent officer can almost always conjure up some reasonable suspicion in the situation that you identify to question you and demand ID. For example, she could state that no one else has taken a picture of that location in weeks and that is is very unusual behavior, that your demeanor or the time of day you were present doesn't seem to be that of someone taking a picture for artistic or journalistic purposes, that you seemed nervous, that a previous criminal engaged in similar behavior before committing a crime fourteen years ago, that a confidential informant (e.g. a nosy neighbor) advised him that there was someone engaged in suspicious behavior at that location, that she read in a police anti-terrorism bulletin that terrorist favor that model of camera, etc. The nature of the suspicion doesn't have to be shared with you until you challenge it in court. A dumb cop won't come up with any colorable reason, demands ID for a stated reason ("before you have to do whatever I say") that is inaccurate, admits he has no reason to stop you in a conversation captured by a body camera, and doesn't come up with pretext after the fact before going to the court. In that case, the stop is a de minimis violation of your civil rights justifying a nominal damages award of $1 to you and your attorneys' fees and costs and maybe a consent decree ordering the agency not to do that in the future.

Are authorities allowed to use technology to read your mind? If a technology that reads minds existed, would it be legal for authorities in the United States to use that technology to extract incriminating information from a defendant's mind against their will? Although mind reading technology is currently limited, it is improving rapidly. See, for example, the following article in MIT technology review: https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/03/17/1069897/tech-read-your-mind-probe-your-memories/ and the following wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain-reading I was inspired to ask this question after reading the related question: Why is knowledge inside one's head considered privileged information but knowledge written on a piece of paper is not?

In the US at least, there is no mention of "mind reading" in the Constitution. But should such a technology be developed and actually used to read someone's mind and then that information was used against them in court, I can certainly see an appeal on at least 5th Amendment grounds. It's also possible that should such a technology become viable, that state legislatures and even the US Congress passing prohibitions on using it under certain circumstances.

More generally, the university gets to set whatever rules it wants, unless there is a law limiting what it can do. For example, in the US a government university (qua arm of government) cannot require you to have a particular religion or profess a particular creed, but a private one can. An employer could require you to be in your office from 9 to 5, even though it is legal to not be in an office from 9 to 5. The general principle is that the institution can set its own rules for operation, unless those rules violate the law. Generally, the owner of property has the right to say how it can be used. It is quite common for universities to have variable policies regarding access to their books (e.g. "anybody can walk in and do things with the volumes, which are out in the open, except they have to have borrower's permission to take it out of the building" to "you cannot enter at all, and must have special permission to inspect the book -- nobody can take the books out of the building"). My experience is that UK libraries have a tighter rein on their holdings than do US universities (the sampling problem here is non-trivial). In some cases, the absolute control of the property owner is somewhat overridden by law, especially if the institution is a state-run university (not in the UK). Another possibility is that access to books is a contractual right (some kind of "terms of service" that you and they are bound to). Even in the case of US state universities, I cannot imagine a government having a law declaring the right to copy books to be such a fundamental right that a university cannot deny you that right. The most likely scenario for enforcement is as a contractual matter. A complete analysis of the relationship between the individual and the institution would be way too broad for here, but here is a sample of the questions that could arise. What is the source of your right to access books? Perhaps you are employed as a faculty person: do you have a contract? Can you be fired for breaking rules: are there any limits on what acts can lead to firing? What procedures if any are specified for termination, and what avenue of internal appeal exist? The government would not overrule the institution's decision unless they didn't follow the contractually-governed procedures for termination. Apart from the legal question, a perfectly coherent reason to prohibit scanning books whose copyright has expired is that the act of scanning them may damage the book.

As far as I know, the leading case on the matter is Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43. There, the court explains While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, a corporation is a creature of the State, and there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State; and an officer of a corporation which is charged with criminal violation of a statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a refusal to produce its books. The court specifically denies that corporations have 5th Amendment rights: The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of which he is an officer or employe. This contrast with protection against unreasonable searched of corporations, per the 4th Amendment: A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and, in organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and, although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers, it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Congress, a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, the constitutional privilege against testifying against himself cannot be raised for his personal benefit by an officer of the corporation having the documents in his possession. ... An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Likewise, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals") and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85: Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." So only natural persons can plead the fifth.

In the United States . . . Scope of Search Warrant: To what extent can they search you and your belongings? The scope of a search is limited by what is stated in the warrant. Not only must a warrant be supported by probably cause, it must also describe with particularity, "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See U.S. Const. Amend. 4. For example, they cannot search a house if the warrant specifies the backyard, nor can they search for weapons if the warrant specifies marijuana plants. However, that doesn't mean that officers can seize only those items listed in the warrant. If, in the course of their search, police officers come across contraband or evidence of a crime that is not listed in the warrant, they can often seize it. When it comes to containers, the police are allowed to search anything that items could be inside. So, if they're looking for stolen TV's, they can't search a jewelry box or under the floor boards. However if they looking for something small, like bomb parts, just about everything is fair game. To search you, the warrant would need to authorize the search of your person, or the police would need an independent justification to search you. For example, if they found explosives that were illegal to posses, they could conduct a search incident to arrest. Can they search your entire computer? Yes, assuming computers are within the scope of the warrant. Compelling people to produce passwords of encryption keys: If they find encrypted files can they detain you until you decrypt them? This depends on your jurisdiction as it is a developing area of law and deal with 5th amendment. This is something that would not be done through a search warrant and would involve a separate proceeding. In this situation, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, may be implicated. Case where Court held producing passwords violated the 5th Amendment: The government's postindictment grand jury subpoena ordering the defendant to provide all passwords associated with his computer in order to secure evidence of child pornography allegedly contained in the computer, which spawned the three counts contained in the indictment, required the defendant to make a "testimonial communication," and thus the subpoena violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, where the government was not seeking documents or objects but instead was requiring the defendant to divulge through his mental processes his password that would be used to incriminate him, the district court in U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010), held. The court explained, an act is "testimonial," and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the accused is forced to reveal his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the government. It is the extortion of information from the accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind, that implicates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the court said. Case where Court held producing passwords did not violate the 5th Amendment: The district court in U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012), recognizing that production of a document may fall within the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination since it acknowledges that the document exists, that it is in the possession or control of the producer, and that it is authentic, held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not implicated by requiring her to produce the unencrypted contents of a computer where the government knew of the existence and location of the computer's files; a preponderance of the evidence established either that the computer belonged to the defendant or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she had the ability to access its encrypted contents; and the government had offered her immunity, precluding it from using her act of producing those unencrypted contents against her. The court determined, also, that a preponderance of the evidence, in a motion to compel production of the unencrypted contents of the computer, found during a search of the defendant's residence, showed that either the computer belonged to her or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she could access its encrypted contents, supporting the decision to compel her to produce those unencrypted contents, where the defendant acknowledged, during a telephone conversation with her ex-husband, that she owned or had such a computer, the contents of which were accessible only by entry of a password, and the computer, which was found in her bedroom, was identified with her name. This issues probably will not be decided one way or the other until the supreme court rules on it. If they find a password safe can they force you to give them a password and >then can they log into all accounts you have stored in it? When you say password safe, I am assuming you mean password management software. If so, see above. If you don't give them the password but they find it written down somewhere, can they still use it? Yes, assuming their warrant allows them to search papers or it is in plain view. Out of curiosity, do police ever actually do this? Find a password protected file on a computer and go through all the papers in the desk and try all possible passwords until they find one? I'm not sure, but it wouldn't surprise me. Even if they don't have a warrant that covers papers, police have been known to bend the rules. I think someone with police experience could have a better answer for this.

Affirmative authority that this particular use (incorporation of the format of another program's textual data files into your own program) is protected is somewhat elusive in the US system; however there's a lot of observable evidence that reverse engineering data file formats without a license is widespread. My sense is that this would be analyzed under the same rubric as other kinds of reverse engineering and/or fair use. I'm sure there are others here who are better able to clearly and concisely explain that law than I am. However there may be limits — it seems Microsoft was able to prevent VirtualDub's use of the ASF format by patenting it. That said, it's hard to see how an unencrypted, unencoded ASCII data file file could be patentable (i.e. where the ASCII strings are the data, generated in response to user input, and the format is just their order and separators, etc). For the European arena, there is recent authority in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Limited that the format of a program's data files are not protected by copyright when reverse engineered without the source code. The following is from the digest and application of the CJEUs decision by the English court that referred it, in its subsequent judgment: The judgment of the CJEU On 29 November 2011 Advocate General Bot delivered his Opinion on the questions referred... Questions 1-5 The Court dealt with these questions together. It interpreted this court as asking "in essence, whether Article 1(2) of [the Software Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive": see [29]. Having referred to recital (14), Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of TRIPS, the Court went on: ... 39. [...] it must be stated that, with regard to the elements of a computer program which are the subject of Questions 1–5, neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. 40. As the Advocate General states in point 57 of his Opinion, to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development. 41. Moreover, point 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for Directive 91/250 [COM(88) 816] states that the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright is that such protection covers only the individual expression of the work and thus leaves other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs provided that they refrain from copying. 42. With respect to the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program to interpret and execute application programs written by users and to read and write data in a specific format of data files, these are elements of that program by means of which users exploit certain functions of that program. 43. In that context, it should be made clear that, if a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction within the meaning of Article 4(a) of Directive 91/250. 44. As is, however, apparent from the order for reference, WPL did not have access to the source code of SAS Institute's program and did not carry out any decompilation of the object code of that program. By means of observing, studying and testing the behaviour of SAS Institute's program, WPL reproduced the functionality of that program by using the same programming language and the same format of data files. 45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation (see Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, paragraphs 44 to 46). 46. Consequently, the answer to Questions 1–5 is that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive." Regarding the idea that the user has rights to access their output of a program held in a proprietary data file format there is some additional discussion in the that might be helpful in paragraphs 48 - 62 (of the CJEU opinion), discussing the right of a licensee to 'study and observe' the 'underlying' 'ideas and principles' of a program to accomplish 'acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program.'

Yes In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (aka the Pentagon Papers case) The court specifically permitted public disclosure in national newspapers of information that had been officially classified. This was, of course a request for an injunction, not a criminal proceeding, but it is hard rto imagine that a criminal proceeding could have succeeded after the decision, and in fact no prosecution was attempted. At the start of the unsigned opinion, the court wrote: We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." (emphasis added) This makes it clear that the content of the "papers" wa officially classified. In concurrence, Justice Black (joined by Douglas) wrote: I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed, and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. The question asks: I am wondering if everyone who leaks classified military documents are going to be charged criminally by the U.S. government Even when such charges are constitutionally permitted, the government has the authority not to proceed with them, if it so chooses, for whatever reason it sees fit. Specific laws 18 USC § 793 prohibits conveying various information about the national defense, military equipment, or preparations for war: with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation § 793 does not refer to classification status at all, and it has no explicit excptions, but it would not apply where ther is no "intent or reason to believe" the information will harm the US or help another country. 18 USC § 794 has an intent requirement simialr to that of 793, but covers different kinds of information. Some of its provisions apply only in wartime, and then the required intent is that the information "will be communicated to the enemy". Again classification is not mentioned. 18 USC § 795 Covers making images of "vital military and naval installations or equipment" protected by order of the President. Permission of the relevant military commander is required. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 796 is similar to § 795 but limited to images obtained by use of aircraft. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 797 prohibits publication of images taken in violation of § 795, unless approved by a censor. It is in form a prior restraint. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 798 Prohibits disclosure of information about cryptographic systems. No exceptions are listed, but I think there is caselaw limiting the coverage of this section. 18 USC § 799 prohibits violation of NASA security regulations.

Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..

It is legal for a manufacturer to sell a device which is capable of being misused. For example, a wifi-capable router can be sold even if it is "open" by default. A Bluetooth device has a shorter range than wifi, but in principle can connect to any other device. An owner's legal liability is not different given wifi vs. Bluetooth. Whether or not there is criminal liability for a third person who connects to the device also does not specifically depend on whether the device uses Bluetooth technology, as opposed to some other technology. 18 USC 1030 is the general federal law prohibiting "unauthorized access". In the case of a bed, two legal question arise: is it a "computer", and is it "protected"? It is an electronic high speed data processing device which performs logical, arithmetic, storage and communications facilities, i.e. it is a computer (in the legal sense). It probably is not protected, because it is not "used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication", that is, it is not connected to the internet (unless it is). State laws tend to be broader, not having the "interstate commerce" limitation, so accessing the bed would violate Washington's analog of the federal law. However, under Washington law, the access is probably not "without authorization". That term is defined as knowingly circumvent technological access barriers to a data system in order to obtain information without the express or implied permission of the owner, where such technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include white hat security research or circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer. The term "without the express or implied permission" does not include access in violation of a duty, agreement, or contractual obligation, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an internet service provider, internet website, or employer. The term "circumvent technological access barriers" may include unauthorized elevation of privileges, such as allowing a normal user to execute code as administrator, or allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code. One question is whether there is any technological access barrier that the user circumvents (I don't know if it is possible to circumvent "hidden mode"). Since the term "may include ... allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code", and since playing music on speakers involves running code, then the remote user may be criminally liable. On the third hand, the language of that paragraph ("technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include ... circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer") clearly indicates a legislative intent to address deliberately overcoming active access barriers and not accidentally connecting to an unprotected, open system. Plus, the law also says that you are accessing the computer "in order to obtain information", but that is not the purpose of transmitting sound to speakers.

How long can you be detained before the police are legally required to feed you? Just like the title says, I'm wondering how long somebody can be held in custody before the police are legally required to feed them. Is there any legal limit, or is it at the discretion of the officers? As a bonus/optional question: are there any legal precedents of people starving to death (from not being fed, not by them deciding not to eat) while being held by the police? Update Specifically in regards to the USA (although info about more places is always welcome).

There appears to be no specific number of hours. This article touches on the matter, presenting a slew of cases where e.g. the prisoner was on a hunger strike (self-imposed starvation is not cruel and unusual punishment). Gardener v. Beale upheld a 2-meal plan with 18 hours between dinner and brunch to be allowed. This was, however a temporary exception rather than a long term policy which was to provide 3 meals not spaced further apart than 12 hours. There does not seem to be any period deemed to be legally too long, however a prison system may have (probably does) have a policy, which cannot simply be ignored.

Police make arrests when they (or a judge) decides to Police have the legal power to make an arrest if: they witness a crime being committed. Indeed, anyone can make an arrest in this circumstance. they have reason to believe that a crime has been committed. they have a warrant from a judge. Some reasons why police can, but choose not to make an arrest are: they don’t believe a crime has taken place. Accusations are easy; convictions are hard. they are exercising the discretion they have under the law to not prosecute a crime where it would not be in the public interest. Factors at play include the seriousness of the crime, the availability and strength of the evidence, the police and court resources available, other matters they have before them etc. they do not have sufficient evidence now but will pursue investigations to get more. Arresting someone starts all sorts of legal clocks ticking and if they can’t bring their case in time the defendant will walk.

US law generally doesn't permit trials in absentia (see Can a country put a foreign criminal on trial, without catching them?), so Sheppard would have to be physically brought to the US before a trial could begin, let alone any sort of testimony or sentencing. This could happen if he voluntarily travels to the US, or if he is extradited from the UK via their legal processes for doing so. He could be represented by a lawyer at trial if he chooses, just like any other criminal defendant. If convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, he would presumably serve the sentence in a US prison just like anyone else, unless the US government decides on some other arrangement.

Here's what I had to do : After going through this harrowing phase, I thought I will post an update in case some one is in such a situation. The Northern Territory's Personal Violence Restraining Order act has a clause (section 21) which basically says if the applicant believes a third party knows the defendant's name then the applicant can request the court to order the third party(power, water, electoral roll, etc) to provide the name if the applicant has already made reasonable efforts in finding out the persons name and hasn't been able to. The third parties will only oblige to a court order. I am almost certain every state/territories' act (in Australia) will have such a clause. It was a challenge to get the court registry to accept the application as the front counter staff/supervisor/supervisor's supervisor were all unaware of this provision (to make an application for a PVRO but get the judge to first order the third party). I had to carry with me the act with the highlighted portion for them to read, analyse and consult with other court staff to even take my application in. At least in the NT there are community legal help services available for no fee and I highly recommend them.

Jurisdiction? washington. RCW 9A.16.020 says when force is lawful. (1) Whenever necessarily used by ...a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction Not apparently applicable in this case. (2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody Looks promising, except RCW 9A.52.070 says "(2) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a gross misdemeanor". For the record, (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary but you didn't describe malicious trespass (which incidentally is not statutorily defined in Washington). Our last hope is: (4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public For example, you can detain a person for a few seconds to ask what he's doing there and to get whatever answer you are going to get. It does not extend to "detain the trespasser until you are satisfied that he has truthfully identified himself", or "until the police show up".

Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while.

From a US perspective, in a word, "no". Firstly, "presumption of innocence" is in a trial, not in police interactions. Being arrested does not violate the presumption of innocence. Police do not need any reason to interact with you or ask you questions. Police can arrest you if they have probable cause to suspect you have committed a crime, but this is not always necessary. More on this later(in the fourth section). Secondly, I wouldn't describe requesting to see your ticket, or any document as a "violent communication", in general. It may be rude or insulting, but not violent. (Also "violent communication" is not a legal term. The closest legal terms, verbal assault and threatening communication, are also not this.) More over, there is no indication of am implication of lying in this request. Thirdly, there are many situations in which possessing a document or credential is not sufficient; one must legally display or present them upon request. For example, multiple occupational licenses such as liquor licenses and barber/cosmetology licenses require that the licenses be prominently displayed; whereas, in California at least, a vehicle driver on a public road must not only possess their driver's license and proof of insurance, they must produce them upon the request of any law enforcement officer (Source: https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffvr18). Fourthly, there are situations in which you can be legally searched and questioned without reasonable suspicion. Examples of this include boarder searches and sobriety checkpoints. Sources: (US Supreme Court rulings): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Martinez-Fuerte; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_Department_of_State_Police_v._Sitz A note on sources: bdb484 and I have opposing court case sources. My sources have binding precedent over all courts in the US, save the US Supreme Court, whereas theirs don't have any binding precedent, but are more directly on-topic.

No An arrest is the act of detaining a person or property by legal authority or warrant and has been made when a police officer or another individual makes it clear to the person that they are no longer a free person. A person does not need to be physically touched to be placed under arrest as words alone are capable of bringing about an arrest if they establish that the person is no longer a free person. Now, if a LEO asks you to accompany them, then, so long as you have the choice not to, you are not under arrest.

Can Tucker Carlson be penalized or punished by the US government? Tucker Carlson has often shown much bias in his reporting and opinions. It has now been reported that a Russian internal memo shows that they too consider him a good 'asset' because he is the western voice who echoes the Russian sentiments. It is interesting to note that he is the only westerner mentioned in this memo in this context. now that RT America has ceased operations of all live programming, what are the chances of the US government sanctioning Tucker Carlson and can it actually be done? Kindly asking the senior users to advise here. With the recent developments of the dominion case against FOX, in which some of the statements from Tucker Carlson are directly related to the question asked, I am wondering how to draw attention to the earlier question. More information is now available, and more thought has been put into the issues recently by many more people than previously. Maybe someone who posted previously would like to revise a post or other people may want to respond too. Is just editing (me asking a question) the way to add the post back to draw attention to it? Or is there a for me unknown approach which SE prefers?

The first amendment to the US constitution says: Congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; [...] This constitutional hurdle is a very high obstacle to preventing the media from publicly saying something that is detrimental to the interests of the US government. Giving people the freedom to say "our government is wrong" without being afraid of repercussions is the reason why this amendment exists. And yes, freedom of speech includes the freedom to be wrong. When someone makes false claims in public to sway public opinion, then it's the responsibility of their peers to point out those falsehoods and let people decide by themselves who to believe. The government can of course also engage in counter-speech, for example by holding a press conference where they address claims made about them and present their side of the debate. But it is not the job of the government to use force to suppress falsehoods, because the government can not be expected to be impartial in this matter. The government not suppressing public discourse is one thing which separates libertarian states like the United States from authoritarian states where uncomfortable speech is suppressed. There are a couple exceptions. But as long as Carlson doesn't make any statements which are defamatory, obscene, fraudulent, violate copyrights or explicitly incite physical violence, the government's hands are tied.

To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source.

The Star Vancouver has a good article outlining the actual charges. Meng is not charged with "violating an embargo" but with defrauding U.S. financial institutions. It may be easier to report that the "crime" is violating sanctions but it's a little more nuanced. Meng is charged with defrauding U.S. financial institutions in order to avoid sanctions. From the article: The U.S. authorities allege Meng committed fraud by telling an HSBC executive her company was in compliance with U.S. sanctions against Iran limiting communication technology. The meeting took place in 2013, but the location was not revealed. HSBC is based in London with operations in the United States. Joanna Chiu, the Star reporter who followed the bail hearing, tweeted: US banks became concerned about the relationship between Huawei and subsidiary SkyCom. Meng told banks the two were separate when in fact "Huawei is SkyCom. This is the alleged fraud". Supposedly, the claims were in a PowerPoint presentation made to a financial institution in 2013. As a result of those claims, banks in the U.S. cleared financial transactions for Huawei. The nexus between Meng, Huawei, SkyCom and U.S. law is Meng making claims to HSBC that Huawei is not related to SkyCom inducing U.S. based financial institutions to unknowingly engage in transactions that violated sanctions with Iran. Thus, the fraud charge against Meng.

Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do.

What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination.

There is no internationally-enforceable mechanism regarding how other people call something, or what alphabet can be uses to write a word. I can legally call that country between Bangladesh and Thailand "Burma" or "Myanmar", I can call Україна Ukraine, The Ukraine, or Ukrainia (the latter seems to be old-fashioned, but it's still legal). As a diplomatic matter, the US government seems to have settled on certain designations so that it uses the version "Myanmar" for official purposes although it includes "(Burma)" in popular communications (State Department travel advisories). If it wanted to, the US could call The Republic of North Macedonia by the name "Macedonia", though there would be political protests. The EU, NATO, UN etc. can likewise set its own rules regarding names of countries. There are many additional complications in the case of countries that are not universally / widely recognized, such as Trasnistria and the Republic of Somaliland. If the president of the Republic of Somaliland sought to address the UN, his problem would not be what people would call his country, it is that the Republic of Somaliland is not "recognized" by the UN (it has no official status), or anyone else. The question of "sameness" of language is a prominent feature of nationalist movements. Claims are made that Flemish and Dutch are "the same" or "different", likewise Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin; Dari, Farsi and Tajik. Thus there is no real chance of litigating the matter of whether Moldovan and Romanian are the "same language" and which name should be used. But if the EU parliament wants to, it could rule that the language of Moldova is to be called "Romanian", or "Moldovan".

As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent.

Yes The Browne-Fitzpatrick Privilege Case in 1955 resulted in the two being gaoled for 90 days for breaching the privilege of the Australian Parliament. They were, respectively, the owner and editor of the Bankstown Observer and the breach was an article in that paper that alleged that a then sitting MP, Charles Morgan, had been involved in immigration malfeasance as a lawyer prior to being elected. The men were grilled by the Privileges Committee of Parliament during which they were denied legal representation. The Committee determined that they had infringed privilege and the House, on the motion of the Prime Minister Robert Menzies, voted to gaol them. The High Court of Australia refused to hear an appeal as did the UK Privy Council (which was the highest court with Australian jurisdiction at the time). So, for things printed 300km from Parliament, Parliament decided that these men had broken Parliamentary rules and should be imprisoned. There is doubt, both then and now, that this was a political hatchet job. There is also no doubt that what was done was legal then, however, given that the High Court has since discovered an implied right to political communication in the Constitution, it may not be possible today.